A

Philoſophical Enquiry

INTO THE

LAWS of NATURE:

WHEREIN

The *Eſſence*, the *Principal Heads*, the *Order*, the *Publication*, and the *Obligation* of theſe LAWS are deduced from

The NATURE of THINGS.

WHEREIN ALSO,

The Principles of Mr. HOBBES's PHILOSOPHY, both in a *State of Nature*, and of *Civil Society*, are examined into, and confuted.

Written Originally in *Latin*

By the Right Reverend Father in GOD, RICHARD CUMBERLAND, D. D.
Late Lord Biſhop of *Peterborough*.

And Tranſlated into *Engliſh*,

With large EXPLANATORY NOTES, and an APPENDIX,

By the Reverend JOHN TOWERS, D. D. Prebendary of St. *Patrick*'s Cathedral Church, *Dublin*, and Vicar of *Caſtleknock*, &c.

For when the Gentiles, which have not the Law, do by Nature the Things contained in the Law, theſe having not the Law, are a Law unto themſelves: Which ſhew the Work of the Law written in their Hearts, their Conſcience alſo bearing Witneſs, and their Thoughts the mean while accuſing or elſe excuſing one another.
St. *Paul* to the *Romans*, ii. 14, 15.

Non fingendum, aut excogitandum, ſed inveniendum, quid Natura faciat aut ferat. Bacon.

Quis veſtrum ignorat, ita Naturam rerum tuliſſe, ut quodam tempore, homines, nondum, neque Naturali, neque Civili, jure deſcripto, fuſi per Agros, ac diſperſi vagarentur; tantumque haberent, quantum Manu, ac Viribus per Cædem, ac Vulnera, aut eripere, aut retinere potuiſſent? Cicero pro Sextio.

D U B L I N:
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BRITISH MUSEUM

TO THE

Moſt Reverend Father in GOD,

His GRACE *CHARLES*,

By DIVINE PROVIDENCE,

Lord Archbiſhop of *Dublin*, Primate and Metropolitan of *Ireland*.

MY LORD,

MORALITY and Religion, both Natural and Revealed, carry ſo cloſe, ſo eſſential a Connexion, that they flouriſh and decline together: They ſubſiſt at one and the ſame Time; and they mutually prove, preſerve and ſupport each other. As Virtue is the very Soul of Chriſtianity, ſo Chriſtianity is the very Soul of Virtue. Atheiſm and Infidelity ſap the Foundations of Moral Philoſophy. Immorality and Vice always bear an obſtinate, inveterate Hatred againſt true Religion, againſt all the ſocial Virtues.

THE *External Evidences* of the Chriſtian Religion are *Prophecies* and *Miracles:* The *Internal Evidences* are the Purity, the Perfection of the *Chriſtian Doctrines* themſelves; and their direct Tendency to promote, not only their great End, *the eternal Salvation of all Mankind*, but alſo the ſocial Happineſs of Man in this preſent Life. The *External Evidences* were calculated for particular Times and Seaſons only: The *Internal Evidences* are, from daily Experience, eternally the ſame; they never diminiſh in their Proof. For, the Morals of the Goſpel muſt, at all Times, carry the ſame Conviction, the ſame Power of Perſuaſion, that they did in the Age of CHRIST and his Apoſtles.

THE Practice of Virtue, in all the ſeveral Relations of Duty, is the grand Deſign of this PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY; and That Virtue is not that fickle, changeable Thing which ſome certain Enemies to Mankind and to human Society, would fain with ſuch induſtrious Art and Cunning inſinuate, our AUTHOR proves, upon a Strength of Demonſtration almoſt equal to that of Mathematics.

HE calls his Treatiſe AN ENQUIRY INTO THE LAWS OF NATURE; and yet He, by Arguments the

the moſt inconteſtable, proves, That theſe Laws, altho' never ſo natural, altho' never ſo rational, wanted their innate Force, their binding Sanction, their full Authority, unleſs ſtrengthened by the Power of CHRIST, and the Light of his Goſpel,---notwithſtanding all the mighty Boaſts of ancient Wiſdom to the contrary.

A BOOK ſo wiſely calculated, to declare the Glory of GOD, to advance the Cauſe of true Religion, and to ſecure the Happineſs of Mankind, both in this World and the next, claims a Right to Your GRACE's Patronage.

To be eſteemed a Patron worthy of ſo excellent a Book, is as exalted an Honour as the beſt Merit can deſerve.-----And----That the great momentous Truths delivered in this Book, are the fundamental Rules which ſway Your GRACE's Life and Actions, I appeal to Mankind,---and---to a much better Teſtimony---your GRACE's own Conſcience.

As to my Pains and Labour, in endeavouring to render this very difficult and abſtruſe Author intelligible, and more generally uſeful, I ſhall not here ſay any Thing; for Silence becomes me beſt.

LET

LET the Event of theſe my Endeavours be what it will, I have, however, the Pleaſure of acknowledging in this public Manner, that

I am, my LORD,

With Gratitude, Truth and Reſpect,

Your GRACE's

Moſt Dutiful, and

Moſt Faithful Humble Servant,

Tueſday, May the 1ſt. 1750.

JOHN TOWERS.

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THE

THE TRANSLATOR's PREFACE.

IT is a prevailing Cuſtom with all Writers, to ſay ſomething by Way of Preface: In mere Compliance, therefore, with over-ruling Example, I premiſe a Word or two; not that I imagine a Preface neceſſary; for the AUTHOR's Prolegomena, *or* Introductory Diſcourſe, *lays open the full Deſign of his Performance; and the* Notes *added in this Tranſlation render any Preface ſtill leſs neceſſary.*

Whether Moral Philoſophy *be capable of Mathematical Demonſtration, ſtrictly ſo called, is a Point in which the Learned are not entirely agreed. If any one Book upon this Subject ever could lay Claim to Mathematical Certainty, the following* PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY *is, beyond all Queſtion,* THE BOOK.—*And yet I ſhall not venture to call it a* Mathematical Demonſtration, *in the near Acceptation of the Phraſe.*

However, I dare with Certainty affirm, That whoever peruſes this elaborate Performance, with thoſe ſeveral Degrees of Attention which the various Branches of it exact and demand, will find ſuch a ſteady, firm Acquieſcence of Mind, as can ſcarcely be exceeded by the pure Mathematical Science itſelf. In all Caſes where Quantities cannot with Accuracy be fixed and determined, Moral Philoſophy *is equal in its Evidence to* Natural Philoſophy. *Our* AUTHOR *purſues Nature cloſe; and this is all that* Natural Philoſophy *can do: Nay—he ſtill advances higher; for he improves Nature with Grace, and adds a full Weight to* Moral Obligations, *by the irreſiſtable Sanctions of* Chriſtianity.

His

His Moral Concluſions, drawn from Probability, hold equally rational with any Concluſions of Huygens, De Moivre, Halley, *and* Newton, *in their Doctrine of either* Chances *or* Annuities.

I earneſtly intreat every Reader, who begins this truly learned and judicious Book, to perſevere and read to the End; becauſe he will find the Demonſtration continually to riſe upon him from the firſt to the laſt Page. It is like a regular, well-compacted Building, whoſe Strength, Symmetry and Proportion ſhine in the Unity, Texture and Articulations of all its Parts, raiſed upon a Baſis as ſolid and unſhaken as a Rock. He who will not be at the Pains of taking the Whole, can never perceive the full Perfection of a Part.

I endeavoured, with my beſt Diligence, to throw this Tranſlation into a Method different from the Original. It would, indeed, have given me no ſmall Satisfaction, could I have perfected ſuch a Scheme. My Deſign was to diſtinguiſh all his Principles under diſtinct, ſeparate Propoſitions, and to demonſtrate each of them ſingly, in the Mathematical Way.—And then I intended, in the ſecond Place, to ſtate the Argumentative Part, that is, the Controverſy with Mr. Hobbes, *in a clear View, by way of* Corollaries, *as ſo many neceſſary Conſequences following from the Propoſitions laid down and demonſtrated in the Firſt Part.—But I ſoon found ſuch an Attempt impracticable: For, as the whole Book is nothing but Controverſy, that Reaſoning which, in the Original Structure of it, is argumentative, muſt fail in its Life and Spirit, when turned into another Kind of Reaſoning. Some Attempts have, it is true, been made upon our* Author, *in this Way, many Years ago, and by Perſons of ſome Eminence in the Republic of Letters;—but, with ſuch a Succeſs as ſtill farther diverted my Thoughts from any ſuch Deſign.*

I have added to this Book an Appendix, *to eaſe the tedious Burthen of long* Notes. *If my Labours prove of any Uſe, and tend to render an intricate, obſcure Book more intelligible, I ſhall think my Time well ſpent. I cannot find any Thing to add here which has not been already ſaid, either in the* Book *itſelf, in the* Notes, *or in the* Appendix. *In a Word, That Mankind in general may reap all the good Fruits intended by the* Author *and* Translator, *is my ſincere Wiſh.*

JOHN TOWERS.

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PROLEGOMENA:

OR, THE

Author's Introduction.

SECT. I.

IT is the candid Reader's Advantage, as well as mine, that he be briefly led into the full Intent, Design and Method pursued in the following Work. For, from thence he will immediately understand what my Performance, or, at least, what my Attempt has been; and, as to such Defects as he will find, he may supply them, either from his own extensive Capacity, or from those additional Assistances with which he may be furnished from other Writers.

The Method of Reasoning pursued in this Philosophical Enquiry ought to be well understood by the Reader.

The Laws of Nature are the only solid Foundations of all Morality and Civil Polity; which we fully demonstrate in the following Pages.

The Laws of Nature are the only solid Foundation of all Morality and Civil Polity.

These Laws (like most other Conclusions discoverable by the Light of Nature) are investigated, traced out and demonstrated, by the one or the other of these two Ways, either,

First, By such manifest Effects as follow from these Laws themselves, which, in other Words, is the Demonstration of *Causes by their Effects* (1). Or, *Secondly*, By those evident Causes from whence these Laws themselves originally take their Source and Rise: And this is no other than demonstrating Effects from their Causes.

Causes proved by their Effects.

2. Effects proved by their Causes.

(1) *Causes by their Effects*, &c.] The Effects both of Good and Evil, which follow from the Moral Laws of Nature, do in as natural a Way arise from these Laws, as natural Effects in general do flow and follow from their Causes: Upon which Account these Laws may truly be called Causes, whose real Existence and Energy do prove and demonstrate the Effects necessarily produced by them.

According

According to the first Method, the *Laws of Nature* are considered as Causes necessarily producing Effects. According to the second Method, the *Laws of Nature* are looked upon as necessary Effects resulting from such and such natural Causes (1).

Our Author pursues the second Method of Reasoning.

The Foundation of our Enquiry is laid in the second Method of Reasoning.

The Reality and Force of these Laws themselves; the Demonstration of them, according to the first Method of Reasoning; their actual Existence, and the binding Obligation of them, are Points well pursued and handled by *Hugh Grotius*, and by his Brother *William Grotius*, in that posthumous Treatise of his, intitled, *De Principiis Juris Naturalis Enchiridion*, as also by our Countryman Doctor *Robert Sharrock*, in his Υποθεσις Ηθικη, in his *Book of Offices* (2), who all prove these Laws from the confirmed and well-established Opinions of several Authors in different Ages and Countries: As also by the corresponding Testimony and concurring Agreement of all Nations, especially of those the more polished and civilized in their Customs and Laws. The same Method is likewise pursued by *John Selden*, Esq; in that learned Work of his *De Jure Naturali Gentium juxta Disciplinam Ebræorum.*

(1) There are two general Methods of Reasoning, 1. the Synthetic, and 2. the Analytic. The Synthetic Method, is called the *Argumentum a priori*. The Analytic Method is called the *Argumentum a posteriori*.

The Synthetic Method, or the *Argumentum a priori*, lays down some evident Principles, and then deduces the several Consequences necessarily resulting from them.

2. The Analytic Method, or the *Argumentum a posteriori*, begins with the Phænomena themselves, and traces them up to their Original; and, from the known Properties of these Phænomena, arrives at the Nature of their Cause. Now, the former of these two Methods is evidently preferable, where it can be had (and I think it may be had almost every where, but in the first Cause) since the latter must depend upon a large Induction of Particulars, any of which, when failing, invalidates the whole Argument, and quite spoils a Demonstration.

"It is very true (says Doctor *John Clarke*, "on natural Evil) that this is not a strict "Demonstration of the general Conclusion; "because, that can be had no other Way "than by trying all the Experiments that "can possibly be made every where, which "is infinite and endless; but it is the best "that the Nature of the Thing is capable "of." Law's *Preface to Archbishop* King's *Essay on the Origin of Evil*, Page 5.

The Proofs drawn from Analogy cannot be called either the Synthetic or the Analytic Method of Reasoning; it is rather arguing by Illustration, from Similitude or Comparison, than from the direct Principles of Reason strictly so called, it neither proves the Cause from the Effect, nor the Effect from the Cause.

It is comparing together Things which we are certainly sure have already a determined Existence, and carry certain Habitudes to each other, either of Fitness or Unfitness, but it never proves, neither is it brought to prove, the Existences of the Things themselves which are compared.

(2) *In his Book of Offices.*] This Treatise is entitled, Υποθεσις Ηθικη, Sive de finibus & officiis secundùm naturæ jus, unde casus conscientiæ, quatenus notiones a natura suppetunt, dijudicari poterunt. Jureconsultorum, item veterum aliorumque doctorum, tam ex paganorum quam ex christianorum scholis consensus ostenditur. Principia item & rationes novatorum omnium in philosophiâ ad ethicam & politicam spectantes, quatenus huic hypothesi contradicere, videantur in examen veniunt. In usum Theologiæ & L. L. & vitæ honestati studentium. Oxon. 1682. 8vo.

And,

And, indeed, in my Opinion, all these Authors have deserved very well from Mankind—but in an especial Degree that Work of *Hugh Grotius*, intitled, *De Jure Belli & Pacis, Libri tres, in quibus jus Naturæ & Gentium, item Juris Publici præcipua explicantur:* A Work the first in its Kind: A Work truly worthy of its Author, and as truly worthy of Immortality. Some few Errors (but such they are, wherein the Customs of his native Country have headlong carried away this great Man) will easily obtain Pardon from a good-natured Reader.

SECT. II.

THERE is not, indeed, so much Weight in those Objections which are generally produced against this Method of demonstrating the Laws of Nature, as to prove it either sophistical or trifling; and yet, I must frankly own, that these Objections have carried so much Force over some ingenious Minds, as to represent them very useful, and to be the surest Way of searching after a more pregnant Proof from an Investigation of these Causes, by whose Operation a Knowledge of the Laws of Nature might spring up in the human Mind: But this will appear more evident, if we briefly state those Objections, and produce likewise the Sum and Substance briefly of Arguments in answer to them.

First Objection is drawn from the Difficulty in collecting those several Points wherein all are agreed.

It is objected, First, *That such Reasoning is weak, whose Conclusions are drawn from the Sentiments and Customs of either a few Men, or of small Numbers of Civil Societies concerning the universal Opinion and Judgment of all Mankind, since there is not any one Man who perfectly understands the Laws and Customs even of that Civil Government under which he lives, to say nothing of all Societies and Governments; much less can he understand the inward Sentiments of all Individuals, so as that he can form fair Comparisons and Judgments, and to collect all those Points wherein all agree.*

Answer.

To which I answer, That the Judgments, Opinions, Sentiments, and of different Nations, concerning any one Point which is obvious from daily Experience (such as Religion or the Worship of a Deity, in some Mode or other, as generally understood; an Humanity of some Sort or other, sufficient to prohibit Murder, Theft and Adultery) may be easily formed by every Man, every where, without such a Knowledge of Law as is acquired by long Study and Application; because such Sentiments sufficiently declare their universal Agreement in these Points, even from the very Laws of Nature themselves: Which Consent, we find, is acknowledged by many Nations as a natural Good; from whence we may presume that the same Consent is also acknowledged by all other Nations, from that Similitude and Likeness, and which universally holds in all human Nature, especially since our Adversaries cannot produce any Instance confirmed by full Experience, which evinces, that any Nation entertains a contrary Sentiment. Those Relations seem to me very doubtful, nay very little to be credited, which are told of some bar-

barous *Americans* and *Hottentots*, as paying no manner of Worſhip to a Deity, for ſuch negative Aſſertions can ſcarcely admit of any Proof. For this Reaſon *Accoſta*, and ſome other Authors, ſeem to paſs a very raſh Judgment on thoſe People whoſe Language, Cuſtom and Sentiments they could not poſſibly underſtand, to any Degree of Perfection, in ſo ſhort a Time, ſince their Stay amongſt thoſe Nations was ſo very tranſitory.

Nay—we read, indeed, that even the *Jews* and *Chriſtians*, whoſe religious Diſcipline was much more holy than the Religion of any other Nations, were (notwithſtanding the Divinity of their Worſhip and Diſcipline, at ſome certain times) falſely accuſed of the higheſt Impieties.

Let this Matter ſtand as it will, manifeſt it is, that theſe Truths are clearly enough diſcovered to all Mankind, which have been without Difficulty acknowledged by all, altho' that theſe very ſame Truths have been either overlooked by ſome, or oppoſed by others. For it will appear, in the Conſequence, a Matter moſt ſignificant, and of the higheſt moment, (ſince this Argument is evident from other Proofs, as well as from ſuch Teſtimony and Cuſtoms) that thoſe Propoſitions (in which the Laws of Nature are contained) lay down the true Means for attaining the beſt End, and that all Mankind are indiſpenſably obliged, by the Help of theſe very Means, to purſue that very End, *i. e.* the *beſt End*.

SECT. III.

2d. Objection. This ſecond Objection is drawn from the Difficulty of enforcing the Dictates of Reaſon without the Civil Authority.

SECONDLY, it is objected, *That although, as well by the Force of our own Underſtandings, as from the Behaviour of many other Perſons quite ſeparate and diſtinct from us, ſome certain Dictates of Reaſon may be allowed; yet that the Authority of ſome public Lawgiver, eſtabliſhed by Civil Authority, is wanting, to enforce the univerſal Obligation of theſe Laws: For otherwiſe (ſay theſe Objectors) it is lawful for any one Man that pleaſes to diſobey them*; i. e. *he may, by the ſame Parity of Reaſon, reject the Judgment of all others, by which all others may, both in Word and Deed, reject the Judgment of any one Man.* Not only the Ancients, but alſo our own Countrymen, at this very Day, Mr. *Hobbes* and *John Selden*, Eſq; put their Objection in this Light, but yet with a quite different View.

For, Mr. *Hobbes*'s Objection is framed with this ſiniſter View, That no one ſhould think himſelf obliged, as to any Acts of outward Behaviour, by the Dictates of Reaſon, antecedent to the inſtituted Authority of a Civil Magiſtrate; becauſe, that all the Inſinuations of ſuch a Magiſtrate muſt be conſtrued ſo many Dictates of right Reaſon, indiſpenſably binding and obligatory, as we ſet forth in the following Diſcourſe.

And to this Propoſition of his muſt be referred what he ſays in his Book *De Cive*, Chap. 14. Sect. 15. "That Natural Laws, altho' ſet forth in "the Writings of Philoſophers, cannot, for that Reaſon, be deemed "Written

" Written Laws, the ſupreme Authority of the Civil Magiſtrate being " wanting."

It was not, to be ſure, in Mr. *Hobbes*'s Intention to take away from the Laws of Nature the Title of *Laws*; becauſe he has vouchſafed to honour theſe Laws with that Title (altho' in a very improper Acceptation of the Word *Laws*, as he elſewhere acknowledges;) but he gives us to underſtand, that theſe Laws are not publiſhed by a ſufficient Authority; notwithſtanding that the Philoſophers have learned them from the *Nature of Things*, and which, from the *Nature of Things*, they have tranſcribed into their own Writings. Manifeſt, however, it is, that theſe *Laws of Nature*, if they once become genuine, true Laws, as eſtabliſhed upon the Authority of Nature, don't require any new Authority, when they are copied and tranſcribed into Books, and become written Laws.

Mr. Selden ſuppoſes the whole Authority and Sanction of the Laws of Nature immediately and only to ariſe from the Legiſlative Power of Almighty God.

Selden then, for the ſame Reaſon, ſuppoſes ſo mighty a Defect of Authority in the Laws of human Reaſon, in themſelves conſidered, abſtracted from all other Conſiderations of Authority, as to judge it neceſſary for us to have immediate Recourſe to the Legiſlative Power of Almighty God, and to tell us, that their Dictates from thence only take their eſſential Virtue, as the whole Knowledge of them is communicated by Almighty God to Mankind, who, at the ſame Time that he communicates theſe Laws, in Reality promulges them to us: And this truly (if I be not out in my Judgment) *Selden* with a very prudent Caution hinted to the Moral Philoſophers, who, generally ſpeaking, conſider the Dictates of Reaſon itſelf as ſo many Laws, paſſing over, at the ſame Time, every Argument which proves the eſſential Reality of ſuch Laws, without conſidering that theſe Laws are eſtabliſhed by Almighty God himſelf.

The Laws of Nature, as to the eſſential Virtue of them, don't ariſe from an expreſs'd Divine Revelation.

But here our Author, ſince he finds the Diſpenſation muſt be ſhewn by the which God reveals theſe moral Dictates to be his Laws, he propoſes two Methods of Divine Diſpenſation.

Mr. Selden propoſes two Methods of Divine Diſpenſation.

1. That God revealed them to *Adam* and *Noah* (1) by his own moſt holy Voice; whence, by Tradition only, the Precepts of the *Noachidæ*, (i. e. *Noah*'s Poſterity) were delivered down to future Generations.

2. That God endowed human Nature with ſuch a clear Faculty, which Faculty (by the Help of that Agent's Underſtanding who explains thoſe Precepts or Laws) might open and reveal theſe Precepts or Laws to us, ſo as to diſtinguiſh them, when opened and explained, from every poſitive Law whatſoever.

(1) *By his own moſt holy Voice.*] Gradus revelationis divinæ quatuor.

1. Neſuah, Prophetia per viſionem & ſpectra.

2. Ruah Haccodeſh, afflatus ſpiritus ſancti, qui erant ſine iſtis, ut in David, &c.

3. Urim & Thummim ſeu Hoſchem, in pectorali judicio (ſplendeſcentia pectoralis ſeu Hoſchem, prænuntians Judæis victoriam, quod ceſſavit ſplendeſcere anno 200. Antequam ego ſcriberem, inquit Joſephus, cum Deus iraſceretur ob tranſgreſſiones legum. Vid. Suid. in voce Ephod.)

4. Bathcol, *i. e.* vox cælitùs audita; & hæc ultima erat, ſub templo ſecundo. *See Dr.* Hammond's *Reaſonableneſs of the Chriſtian Religion*, Page 136. 2d. Edit. Lond. 1684. *Works in four Volumes in Folio, Volume the Firſt.*

This

This ſecond Method he delivers under ſuch looſe and general Terms only, that, in my Opinion, it ſtands in need of much Explication and Proof.

The whole Strength of Mr. *Selden*'s Reaſoning depends upon the firſt Method; and (according to the Tradition of ſome *Jewiſh* Doctors) he labours to prove, that God gave ſeven Precepts to the Sons of *Noah*, under which Precepts, if obeyed, the whole Law of Juſtice is comprehended.

Beyond all Diſpute, what Mr. *Selden* has ſaid, in that Treatiſe of his, intitled, *De Jure Gentium*, &c. fully proves, that the *Jews* imagined all Nations over the whole Face of the Earth, altho' they ſhould not receive the Laws of *Moſes*, tied down to the Obſervance of ſome certain Laws of God; the principal Heads of which Divine Laws they imagined to be contained in the (1) *Laws of the Noachidæ*. What he has now ſaid, at leaſt ſerves to prove thus much, and upon the Teſtimony of a Nation neither inſignificant nor unlearned, that the whole Race of Mankind are obliged by Laws which are not inſtituted by Civil Authority.

It muſt, moreover, be confeſſed, that this truly learned Man had one chief Deſign in view, which he executed to very good Purpoſe, and the Knowledge of this Matter has ſeveral excellent Uſes in the Chriſtian Theology. At the ſame Time, however, *Selden* has not been ſo fortunate as to ſolve that Objection, which we have now raiſed againſt his Opinion; for, notwithſtanding that he himſelf was perfectly well acquainted with theſe *Jewiſh* Traditions, and perhaps heartily believed them all, yet they are not equally clear and evident to all Mankind.

Nay,—that even ſeveral of theſe very Traditions, which contain the higheſt and moſt ſolemn Myſteries of their Religion, are held by many in Contempt and Ridicule; nay, it appears to me a Point even ſelf-evident, that an oral Tradition of the Learned Men in one Nation, is not ſo ſufficient a Publication of a natural Law, as to oblige and bind all Mankind.

SECT. IV.

THAT therefore ſome Authority, and that a Divine one too, may more evidently appear (and by which Authority theſe moral Dictates become Laws) we reſolve to make a *Philoſophical Enquiry* into their

(1) *Laws of the Noachidæ.*] The ſeven Precepts given to the Sons of *Noah*, were as follow, *viz.*

1. To abſtain from Idolatry.
2. To bleſs the Name of God; or, (as others expreſs it) to abſtain from Malediction of the Divine Name.
3. To abſtain from Murther.
4. To abſtain from Adultery, or from the Pollution of impure Mixtures.
5. To abſtain from Theft.
6. To appoint Judges to be Guardians of theſe Precepts; or, in general, to preſerve public Juſtice.
7. To abſtain from the Limb of a living Creature.

Cauſes,

Cauſes, both internal and external, near and remote: For, by ſuch a Series of Reaſoning, we ſhall at length be led to the firſt Author, or efficient Cauſe, of them, from whoſe inherent Perfections, and their inſeparable Sanctions of Rewards and Puniſhments, we demonſtrate the Authority of theſe Laws to ariſe.

Almoſt all other Writers content themſelves with general Terms, That theſe Dictates, or the Actions conformable to them, are taught by Nature. But, to me, it ſeems neceſſary (eſpecially conſidering the Age in which we live) more diſtinctly and minutely to inveſtigate after what Manner the Energy and Power of ſuch Things, as both are and are not within our own Influence, may contribute to impreſs and enforce the Sanctions of theſe Laws.

Something of this Kind my (1) Lord *Verulam*, our Countryman, told us was wanting, *De Augm. Scientiarum*, Lib. 8. Cap. 3.

If ſo ſolid a Foundation as this were laid, it would, upon this very Account, be the moſt uſeful; becauſe, from hence we might trace, both in what Manner the human Underſtanding might be inſtructed naturally in the Knowledge of the Divine Will, or Laws; and alſo, according to what Rule the inſtituted Laws of every Civil Society are to be tried and proved, whether they be juſt and right, or even whether they are capable of Correction and Amendment, by the Supreme, Civil Authority; ſuppoſing that they have at any Time deviated from the beſt and nobleſt End.

Upon this Foundation can alſo be demonſtrated, That there is ſomething in the Nature of God, and of Mankind, diſtinct from ourſelves; as alſo, that there is ſomething within our own Power which, upon an upright Behaviour, adminiſters immediate Comfort and Joy, as alſo ſubſtantial Preſages of future Rewards: And, on the other Hand, that there are natural Cauſes of the bittereſt Anguiſh and Apprehenſion, upon groſs Miſbehaviour, from whence the Deciſions of Conſcience, which is armed (if we may ſo expreſs it) with Whips and Scorpions againſt Iniquity, may appear: And from hence clearly conclude, That Mankind, in the Duties of Morality, are not impoſed upon by cunning Eccleſiaſtics or deſigning Politicians.

(1) *Lord* Verulam, *our Countryman, told us was wanting.*] His Lordſhip, at his 97th Aphoriſm, where he comes to cloſe his 8th Book, ſays, "But this Title, touching the "Certainty of Laws, ſhall ſuffice for a Pre-"cedent to the reſt of a Digeſt which we "with Care and Diligence endeavour to con-"trive, *Digeſtum juris Anglicani: Sacrum "juſtitiæ templum: Opus ſane regium, ſed "nondùm conditum: Quod tuo ſeculo, excellen-"tiſſime princeps*, (Jacob. 1.) *inſtaurandum: "Tui nominis æternitati conſecrandum reſer-"vatur.*"

SECT.

SECT. V.

PLATO (1) and his Followers ſolve the whole Difficulty at once, and ſave the Trouble of ſo nice an Inveſtigation, by a much eaſier Method, which is, by ſuppoſing that there are innate Ideas of Things, and of Laws natural. But I, to confeſs the Truth, have not arrived at ſo high an Exceſs of Happineſs, as to come at the Knowledge of natural Laws in ſo conciſe and compendious a Way: Neither did we think it adviſeable to ſettle all the Doctrines of natural Religion and Morality, upon that Hypotheſis which has been rejected by the Generality of all Moral and Chriſtian Philoſophers; and which Hypotheſis could never be made out even by *Epicurus* and his Followers, againſt whom our preſent Diſquiſition and Arguments are at preſent aimed. I reſolved, however, not to be too ſevere againſt this Opinion; becauſe, I heartily wiſh that every Thing which can, in the leaſt, contribute to true Piety and ſound Morality, may carry its full Weight (and the *Platonic* Philoſophy, in my Opinion, pays great Regard to theſe two worthy Ends) as alſo becauſe it is not impoſſible but that the firſt Impreſſions (of true Piety and ſound Morality) may be both born with us, and become deeper engraved upon our Hearts and Minds from outward Cauſes.

SECT. VI.

BESIDES,—the ſame Arguments which would not ſuffer us to ſuppoſe that the *Laws of Nature* are innate Principles of the Mind, prevented us alſo from ſuppoſing, without good Proof, that theſe Laws had an eternal Exiſtence in the Divine Mind. But, I judged it neceſſary to begin with thoſe Principles which are diſcovered and underſtood upon the Evidences of Senſe and daily Experience; and from theſe Principles to de-

(1) Plato *and his Followers ſolve the whole Difficulty at once.*] *Plato* calls the third Part of his Philoſophy, conſiſting in Reaſon and Diſſertation, *Dialectic*. Although Judgment ariſe from *the Senſe*, yet the Judgment of Truth, he ſays, is not in the Senſes. He affirmed the Mind to be the Judge of Things, and alone is to be credited and depended upon, becauſe ſhe alone ſeeth that which is ſimple, and uniform, and certain: This they called *Idea*. All Senſe they conceived to be obtuſe and ſlow, and no way able to perceive thoſe Things which ſeem ſubject to Senſe, which are ſo little, as that they cannot fall under Senſe, ſo moveable and various, that nothing is *one*, *conſtant*, *nor the ſame*, becauſe all Things are in continual Alteration and Fluxion. All this Part of Things they called *Opinative*: Science they are affirmed to be no where, but in the Reaſons and Notions of Mind; whence they approved Definitions of Things, and applied them to all whereon they diſcourſed. They approved likewiſe Explications of Words by Etymologies: They uſed Arguments and Marks for Things, to prove and conclude what they meant to explain: In this conſiſted all the Diſcipline of Dialectic, that is, of Speech concluded by Reaſon. *See* Cicero's *Academic Queſtions*, Diogenes Laertius, *and* Stanley's *Lives of the Philoſophers*.

duce

duce and infer, That certain Practical Propoſitions of unchangeable Truth (diligently exerciſed, employed in promoting, protecting and preſerving the Happineſs or Good of all rational Beings collectively taken) are neceſſarily impreſſed upon our Minds from the Nature of Things; and which Nature of Things the firſt Cauſe conſtantly and invariably conſents to and determines ſhall produce the ſame Effect, and that, in the very Connexion of the Terms in this Propoſition, are eſſentially included a Declaration of Rewards conſequent upon a due Obedience paid to them, and of the heavieſt Puniſhments annexed to the Violation of them, in the very Frame and Make of Things, as originally and unalterably deſigned and ordered by the Firſt Cauſe himſelf.

From whence it clearly follows, that theſe very Laws are really no other than theſe and ſuch like *Practical Propoſitions*, with proper Rewards and Puniſhments annexed, and which are likewiſe publiſhed and divulged by a fit Author worthy of them.

A Perfection analogous.

The Way being thus far cleared, and it being made evident, That the Knowledge of theſe Laws, and a Practice conformable to them, is the natural Perfection, or the happieſt State of our rational Nature; it follows, that a Perfection analogous to our Knowledge of theſe Laws, and a conformable Practice (but yet a Perfection infinitely ſuperior) neceſſarily inheres in the firſt Cauſe: From whence flows, not only whatever Perfection is in ourſelves, but alſo all that moſt perfectly-wiſe Diſpoſition of Effects tending towards the common Preſervation and Perfection of the univerſal Syſtem, ſo obvious to the Evidences of Senſe and daily Obſervations.

In theſe Kinds of Inveſtigation the Synthetic and Analytic Methods of Reaſoning are uſed.

For, in my Opinion, that may be eſteemed amongſt thoſe Diſcoveries, eſtabliſhed upon the ſureſt Demonſtration, which is, That we ought neceſſarily firſt to know what is *Juſtice*, and, of Conſequence, what all thoſe Laws are in which *Juſtice* is wholly employed, before we can diſtinctly underſtand Juſtice as the Attribute of God: And, that, this the Divine Juſtice of the Supreme Being, muſt be always looked upon as the perfect Pattern and Example which we are to imitate. For, our Knowledge of God is (1) not from an immediate *intuitive Knowledge* of his Perfections,

Intuitive Knowledge.

(1) *Not from an immediate, intuitive Knowledge.*] When the Mind perceives the Agreement or Diſagreement of two Ideas immediately by themſelves, without the Intervention of any other, it is called *Intuitive Knowledge*. For in this, the Mind is at no Pains of proving or examining, but perceives the Truth, as the Eye doth Light, only by being directed towards it. Thus the Mind perceives, that White is not Black, that a Circle is not a Triangle, that Three are more than Two, and equal to One and Two. Such Kind of Truths the Mind perceives at the firſt ſight of the Ideas together, by bare Intuition, without the Intervention of any other Idea: And this Kind of Knowledge is the cleareſt, and moſt certain, that human Frailty is capable of: This Part of Knowledge is irreſiſtible, and, like bright Sun-ſhine, forces itſelf immediately to be perceived, as ſoon as ever the Mind turns its View that way; and leaves no room for Heſitation, Doubt or Examination, but the Mind is preſently filled with the clear Light of it. 'Tis on this Intuition that depends all the Certainty and Evidence of all our Knowledge, which Certainty every one

Demonſtrative Knowledge.

Perfections, (1) but from Effects of which God is the Cauſe, firſt conveyed into the Mind by Senſe and Experience. Neither can we with Safety aſſign to God theſe Attributes with which, from any other Source, we are not ſufficiently acquainted.

SECT.

finds to be ſo great, that he cannot imagine, and therefore not require a greater: For a Man cannot conceive himſelf capable of a greater certainty, than to know that any Idea in his Mind is ſuch as he perceives it to be; and that two Ideas, wherein he perceives a Difference, are different, and not preciſely the ſame. He that demands a greater Certainty than this, demands he knows not what, and ſhews only, that he has a Mind to be a Sceptic, without being able to be ſo. Certainty depends ſo wholly on this Intuition, that in the next Degree of Knowledge, which I call *Demonſtrative*, this Intuition is neceſſary in all the Connexions of the intermediate Ideas, without which we cannot attain Knowledge and Certainty. *Mr.* Locke's *Eſſay concerning human Underſtanding*, Book 4. Chap. 2.

(1) *But from Effects of which God is the Cauſe, firſt conveyed into the Mind by Senſe and Experience*, &c.] The next Degree of Knowledge is, where the Mind perceives the Agreement or Diſagreement of any Idea, but not immediately; though wherever the Mind perceives the Agreement or Diſagreement of any of its Ideas, there be certain Knowledge; yet it does not always happen that the Mind ſees that Agreement or Diſagreement which there is between them, even where it is diſcoverable; and, in that Caſe, remains in Ignorance, and, at moſt, goes no farther than a probable Conjecture. The Reaſon why the Mind cannot always perceive preſently the Agreement or Diſagreement of two Ideas, is, becauſe thoſe Ideas, concerning whoſe Agreement or Diſagreement the Enquiry is made, cannot, by the Mind, be ſo put together as to ſhew it. In this Caſe, then, when the Mind cannot ſo bring its Ideas together, as by their immediate Compariſon, and as it were Juxtapoſition, or Application, one to another, to perceive their Agreement or Diſagreement, it is fain, by the Intervention of other Ideas (one or more as it happens) to diſcover the Agreement or Diſagreement, which it ſearches; and this is that which we call *Reaſoning*. Thus the Mind being willing to know the Agreement or Diſagreement in Bigneſs, between the three Angles of a Triangle and two right ones, cannot, by an immediate View and comparing them, do it; becauſe the three Angles of a Triangle cannot be brought at once, and be compared with any one or two Angles; and ſo of this the Mind has no immediate, no intuitive Knowledge. In this Caſe the Mind is fain to find out ſome other Angles, to which the three Angles of a Triangle have an Equality; and finding thoſe equal to two right ones, comes to know their Equality to two right ones.

Theſe intervening Ideas, which ſerve to ſhew the Agreement of any two others, are called *Proofs*; and where the Agreement or Diſagreement is by this Means plainly and clearly perceived, it is called *Demonſtration*, it being ſhewn to the Underſtanding, and the Mind made ſee that it is ſo. A Quickneſs in the Mind, to find out theſe intermediate Ideas, (that ſhall diſcover the Agreement or Diſagreement of any other) and to apply them right, is, I ſuppoſe, that which is called *Sagacity*.

This Knowledge by intervening Proofs, tho' it be certain, yet the Evidence of it is not altogether ſo clear and bright, nor the Aſſent ſo ready, as in intuitive Knowledge: For tho', in Demonſtration, the Mind does at laſt perceive the Agreement or Diſagreement of the Ideas it conſiders, yet it is not without Pains and Attention; there muſt be more than one tranſient View to find it. A ſteady Application and Purſuit is required to this Diſcovery: And there muſt be a Progreſſion by Steps and Degrees, before the Mind can, in this Way, arrive at Certainty, and come to perceive the Agreement or Repugnancy between two Ideas that need Proofs, and the Uſe of Reaſon to ſhew it.

Another Difference between Intuitive and Demonſtrative Knowledge, is, that tho' in the latter all Doubt be removed, when, by the Intervention of the intermediate Ideas, the Agreement or Diſagreement is perceived; yet, before the Demonſtration, there was a Doubt, which, in Intuitive Knowledge, cannot happen to the Mind that has its Faculty of Perception left to a Degree capable of diſtinct Ideas, no more than it can be a Doubt to the Eye (that can diſtinctly ſee White and Black) whether this Ink and this Paper be all

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SECT. VII.

HAVING hitherto, in the general, demonſtrated the Difference between the Method we have followed, and the ſeveral Methods purſued by others, we think it proper now to lay down the principal Heads, which thro' this whole Eſſay are more diffuſively, and at large delivered. Such Reaſonings as are uſually inculcated by the Natural Philoſophers, but more particularly ſuch of them as are eſtabliſhed upon mathematical Principles, we take for granted, as ſo many Truths ſufficiently known and proved: Becauſe our only Deſign here is, to lay down the Principles, Precepts, Rules, Laws of Moral Philoſophy, and to deduce them from ſuch a Knowledge of Nature as is already ſuppoſed and taken for granted. But more eſpecially I have ſuppoſed, That all thoſe Effects of corporeal Motions, which are, in their own Nature, neceſſary Effects, and which are produced independent of any human Power (as a voluntary, free Agent) to ariſe from the Deſign, Will and Pleaſure of the firſt Cauſe; and which, in other Terms, is only this, That all Bodily Motions are originally cauſed by the impreſſed Force of the firſt Mover, *i. e.* God; and that by the permanent Continuance of the ſame impreſſed Force, ſuch Determinations of Motion are always carried on, according to the Laws of Motion.

It is, to be ſure, quite needleſs and unneceſſary to prove here, a Point which has been ſo often well demonſtrated by many Natural Philoſophers. Nay,—and is a Point which, without Reſerve, is allowed by the Man whom we ſo ſtrictly call to an Account,—by Mr. *Hobbes* himſelf, *Leviath.* Chap. 12. In which Paſſage, after having inferred the Cauſe of Religion in Mankind, to proceed from Anxieties about ſomething that is future, he ſubjoins theſe Words, (whether he ſpeaks with any ſubtle Deſign or no, I leave to the Judgment of others) "But the acknowledging of one God "eternal, infinite, and omnipotent, may more eaſily be derived from the "Deſire Men have to know the Cauſes of natural Bodies, and their ſeve-"ral Vertues and Operations, than from the Fear of what was to befal "them in Time to come. For he, that from any Effect he ſeeth come "to paſs, ſhould reaſon to the next and immediate Cauſe thereof, "and from thence to the Cauſe of that Cauſe, and plunge himſelf pro-"foundly in the Purſuit of Cauſes, ſhall at laſt come to this, That there "muſt be (as even the Heathen Philoſophers confeſſed) one Firſt Mover;

of a Colour. If there be a Sight in the Eyes, it will at firſt Glimpſe, without Heſitation, perceive the Words printed on this Paper, different from the Colour of the Paper: And ſo, if the Mind have the Faculty of diſtinct Perception, it will perceive the Agreement or Diſagreement of thoſe Ideas that produce Intuitive Knowledge. If the Eyes have loſt the Faculty of ſeeing, or the Mind of perceiving, we in vain enquire after the Quickneſs of Sight in one, or Clearneſs of Perception in the other. *Mr.* Locke's *Eſſay concerning human Underſtanding*, Book 4. Chap. 2.

" that is, a First and an Eternal Cauſe of all Things; which is that which " Men mean by the Name of God."

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Whoever conſiders the Frame of the World, and of human Nature in particular, and obſerves the Effects of Wiſdom, Power and Goodneſs; and yet, denies a free, active, wiſe and good Providence making and governing the World, to be the firſt Cauſe of all theſe Effects, muſt, in the Concluſion, be reduced to aſſert ſomething which implies a plain and manifeſt Abſurdity. For the Reſult of all the Reaſonings of ſuch Men upon this Subject, muſt, in the End, amount to one of theſe Aſſertions; either,

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Tully very often, in his Writings, charges the Hypotheſis of *Epicurus* with this Abſurdity, of aſſigning a particular Motion of *Declination* to Atoms, (which *Lucretius* calls *Clinamen Principiorum*) in order to produce Free-will, or a Power of acting voluntarily, and yet not pretending to aſſign any Cauſe of ſuch Declination; which, he ſays, is the moſt abſurd Blunder that any Philoſopher can fall into.

Abſurdity can be ſuppoſed as to ſay, That God is the Cauſe of ſuch Effects, and yet, at the ſame Time, to deny, that he can act by a voluntary, free Choice.

into. And he makes this a fundamental Fault in the Philoſophy both of *Epicurus* and *Democritus*, that they conſidered only Matter, and not the efficient Cauſe or Power by which Things are produced. And indeed whoever does this, will, in the End, be forced upon the ſame Abſurdity that *Epicurus* was, or ſomething very like it. And the removing it a Degree further off, will not alter the Caſe, unleſs it be to make the Thing more abſurd when we come at it. Juſt as *Epicurus*, to avoid one Difficulty, which *Democritus*, it ſeems, did not care to fence againſt, run upon this Solution, which, as *Tully* ſays, was much worſe than owning the Thing to be indefenſible. And this has, in the Event, been the Caſe of all thoſe Schemes of Philoſophy, which have pretended to make the World without an infinite, intelligent Mind being concerned in it.

3. To ſuppoſe, that all Things were from Eternity, ſucceeding one another neceſſarily, in the Way they now are, without any ſupreme, intelligent Power to diſpoſe them, or give them Motion, will alſo be equally abſurd. That ſomething muſt have exiſted from all Eternity, cannot be denied by any one; for elſe nothing could have exiſted. This muſt therefore either be ſome one ſelf-exiſtent, unchangeable, independent Being, from whom all other Things originally receive their Being; or elſe there muſt be an eternal Succeſſion of dependent, changeable Beings, as this viſible World comprehends, one producing another, without any original Cauſe at all; that is, there muſt be an infinite Series of Effects following one another, without any efficient Cauſe, which is abſurd.

Ariſtotle, indeed, is alledged as an Aſſerter of the Eternity of the World; and, being a Man of a very piercing Judgment, Atheiſts ſometimes think themſelves ſufficiently defended under the Patronage of his Name. But, if they would really conſult his Writings, they would find that his Arguments afford their Cauſe but very little Defence. For, whatever Eternity he may aſcribe to the material World, he is very far from doing it in their Senſe. He never thought that Matter could move itſelf, or could be the original Cauſe of all Things; but he makes an eternal, intelligent, independent Mind, to be the firſt Cauſe or Principle of all Things, and that which gives Motion to all Things, being itſelf unmoveable and unchangeable, as may be ſeen at large both in his Phyſics and Metaphyſics. And he every where makes Beauty and Order to be the Effects of Mind and Underſtanding. And he commends *Anaxagoras* in many Places, for this Principle, That an intending Mind was the Cauſe of what is good and right, and the Mover of Matter, for ſome End and Deſign. And he is ſo far from thinking final or intending Cauſes unphiloſophical, that he expoſes that Philoſophy, as very ridiculous, which pretends to give an Account of the Formation of Animals without them; and he ſays, that an ordinary Carpenter would give a much better Account of a Piece of Work, of which he was the Maker, than ſuch kind of Philoſophers did, who went no farther than the mere mechanical Motion of one Part of Matter upon another.

And he elſewhere juſtly blames thoſe Philoſophers, who allowed nothing but Matter, in the Univerſe, for introducing Motion without any active Cauſe or Principle to produce it; and likewiſe, becauſe they were not able to give any Account of what was good and fit (τῦ εὖ καὶ καλῶς) in the Being or Formation of Things, from Matter alone, or from Chance and Fortune. And thoſe who make Body or Matter the only Subſtance or univerſal Nature, he condemns of great Miſtake, inaſmuch as they conſider only the firſt Principles of Body, but not of Things incorporeal, tho' there be Things incorporeal; and likewiſe, becauſe, pretending to philoſophize about the Nature of all Things, they take away (or leave out) the Cauſe of Motion. So that *Ariſtotle* was far from thinking an immaterial Subſtance a Contradiction, or that Matter could move itſelf, or think and act. *See Biſhop* Leng's *Sermons, preached at* Boyle's *Lecture in the Years* 1717, 1718. *Sermon the ninth.*

SECT.

SECT. VIII.

HERE we may alſo farther add, That there are ſome certain Qualities, or Properties, in natural Bodies (1) which the *Peripatetics* term *Senſibiles Species Qualitatis.* All Motion impreſſed upon our Senſes by theſe

The ſenſible Species of Quality obſerved by the Peripatetics.

(1) *Which the* Peripatetics *term* Senſibiles Species Qualitatis, *&c.*] *Ariſtotle* reckons four Kinds of Quality.

The firſt comprehends the *Habits*, that is to ſay, the Diſpoſitions of Mind or of Body, acquired by reiterated Acts, as the Sciences, the Virtues, the Vices, Skill in Painting, Writing, Dancing.

The ſecond, the *Natural Powers*, ſuch as are the Faculties of the Soul, or of the Body, the Underſtanding, the Will, the Memory, the five Senſes, the Power of Walking.

The third, the *Senſible Qualities*, as Hardneſs, Softneſs, Heavineſs, Cold, Heat, Colours, Sounds, Smells, the various Taſtes.

The fourth, *Form and Figure*, which is the exterior Determination of Quantity, as to be round, ſquare, ſpherical, cubical. *Art of Thinking*, Part 1. Chap. 3.

Tertiam ſpeciem qualitatis ponit Ariſtoteles paſſionem & paſſibilem qualitatem quæ vel paſſionem infert ſenſui, ut ſunt objecta ſenſuum. Vel ex paſſione & alteratione corporis oriuntur, ut rubedo in verecundia, vel pallor in timore. Et, licèt, odores oriantur etiam in rebus non ſentientibus & ſine ulla paſſione quæ ſentiatur; tamen illa alteratio & permixtio qualitatum ex quâ oriuntur colores, eſt apta paſſionem ſenſitivam inferre ſubjecto, ſi ſubjectum ejus ſit capax. Ex quo patet paſſionem, à quâ denominatur paſſibilis qualitas, eſſe paſſionem, quæ infertur ſenſibus per alterationem materialem in organis, qualis alteratio ſit in ſenſu *Tactûs*, *Guſtûs*, & *Odoratûs*: Horum enim ſenſuum objecta non ſolum injiciunt ſpeciem intentionalem in ſenſus, ſed etiam alterant & immutant materialitèr organa horum ſenſuum, mutando illorum temperiem & complexionem.

Ariſtoteles, poſt quam objecta horum trium, dixit eſſe paſſibiles qualitates, eò quod paſſionem inferant ſenſibus, ut *Calor*, *Sapor*, *Odor*, negavit hoc de coloribus: Non, enim, paſſionem inferunt *Viſui*; cum eum non alterent materialiter, niſi aliquando per accidens, ſi ſint conjuncti cum aliâ qualitate alterante, ſic lumen in igne conjunctum calori, alterat viſum. Quare negat colores eo ſenſu dici qualitates paſſibiles, ſed alio, quia nimirum ex materiali paſſione oriuntur.

Diſtinguit autem Ariſtoteles qualitates paſſibiles. Nam, ſi, 1. Levitèr inhæreant, & facile tranſeant, dicuntur paſſiones: Si, vero, 2. Sint permanentes & diuturnæ, dicuntur paſſibiles qualitates; ſi quis enim erubeſcat ex verecundiâ, non dicitur rubens abſolutè, ſed paſſus ruborem; ſi quis verò permanentem habet ruborem, abſolutè, dicitur rubens.

Non ſolum autem ſunt in corpore paſſibiles qualitates, ſed etiàm in animâ.

Nam etiam in animâ oriuntur effectus ex paſſione & alteratione corporeâ, ut, *Ira*, *Gaudium*, *Timor*, *Triſtitia*, *Amor*: Hi enim affectus ſenſitivi nunquam excitantur in animo, niſi excitata aliqua alteratione in corpore, cùm ſint actus animæ a corpore & organo dependentes, tales etiam ſunt affectiones mentis; ut, *Amentia*, *Oblivio*, *Mentis Alienatio*, quæ ex organi alteratione aliquâ proveniunt. Et, quidèm, ſi leviter inhæreant, dici vult Ariſtoteles paſſiones, ſi verò ſint diuturnæ, paſſibiles qualitates. P. Martin Smiglecii Logic. Diſputation. 11. Quæſt. 3. Pag. 416. 417. Edit. 1634. 8vo.

In theſe ſenſible Species of Quality, 1. *Senſation*, 2. *Imagination*, and 3. *the Intellect*, or rather Perception of the Intellect, are nearly affected, and acted upon in Conjunction. For there are (in the Words of a very ingenious Author and Poet) certain Powers in human Nature, which ſeem to hold a middle Place between the Organs of bodily Senſe, and the Faculties of moral Perception: They have been called by a very general Name, the *Powers of Imagination*. Like the external Senſes, they relate to Matter and Motion; and, at the ſame Time, give the Mind Ideas analogous to thoſe of moral Approbation and Diſlike. As they are the Inlets of ſome of the moſt exquiſite Pleaſures we are acquainted with, Men of warm and ſenſible Tempers have ſought Means to recal the delightful Perceptions they afford, independent

theſe Qualities and Properties, ſo as to ſtrike the Apprehenſion and work upon the Judgment, is a natural Effect; and therefore, as ſuch, in Fact, proves, That God, as he is the Author of Nature, is the Cauſe of ſuch an Effect; not, ſo much ſo, immediately, as by the Intervention or Inter-

independent of the Objects which originally produced them. This gave Riſe to the imitative or deſigning Arts; ſome of which, like Painting and Sculpture, directly copy the external Appearances which were admired in Nature; others, like Muſic and Poetry, bring them back to Remembrance, by Signs univerſally eſtabliſhed and underſtood.

From Heav'n my Strains begin; from Heaven deſcends
The Flame of Genius to the human Breaſt,
And Love and Beauty, and poetic Joy
And Inſpiration. Ere the radiant Sun
Sprung from the Eaſt, or 'mid the Vault of Night
The Moon ſuſpended her ſerener Lamp;
Ere Mountains, Woods, or Streams adorn'd the Globe;
Or Wiſdom taught the Sons of Men her Lore;
Then liv'd th' Eternal One: Then deep-retir'd
In his unfathom'd Eſſence, view'd at large
The uncreated Images of Things;
The radiant Sun, the Moon's nocturnal Lamp,
The Mountains, Woods and Streams, the rolling Globe,
And Wiſdom's Form celeſtial. From the firſt
Of Days, on them his Love divine he fix'd,
His Admiration: till in Time compleat,
What he admir'd and lov'd, his vital Smile
Unfolded into Being. Hence the Breath
Of Life informing each organic Frame,
Hence the green Earth, and wild reſounding Waves;
Hence Light and Shade alternate; Warmth and Cold;
And clear autumnal Skies and vernal Show'rs,
And all the fair Variety of Things.
But not alike to every mortal Eye
Is this great Scene unveil'd. For ſince the Claims
Of ſocial Life, to diff'rent Labours urge
The active Pow'rs of Man; with wiſe Intent
The Hand of Nature on peculiar Minds
Imprints a diff'rent Byaſs, and to each
Decrees its Province in the common Toil.
To ſome ſhe taught the Fabric of the Sphere,
The changeful Moon, the Circuit of the Stars,
The Golden Zones of Heav'n; to ſome ſhe gave
To weigh the Moment of eternal Things,
Of Time, and Space, and Fate's unbroken Chain,
And Will's quick Impulſe: Others by the Hand
She led o'er Vales and Mountains, to explore
What healing Virtue ſwells the tender Veins
Of Herbs and Flow'rs; or what the Beams of Morn
Draw forth, diſtilling from the clifted Rind
In balmy Tears. But ſome, to higher Hopes
Were deſtin'd; ſome within a finer Mould
She wrought, and temper'd with a purer Flame.
To theſe the Sire Omnipotent unfolds
The World's harmonious Volume, there to read
The Tranſcript of himſelf. On ev'ry Part
They trace the bright Impreſſions of his Hand:
In Earth or Air, the Meadow's purple Stores,
The Moon's mild Radiance, or the Virgin's Form
Blooming with roſy Smiles, they ſee portray'd
That uncreated Beauty, which delights
The Mind ſupreme. *They* alſo feel her Charms;
Enamour'd, *they* partake th' eternal Joy.
As *Memnon*'s Marble Harp, renown'd of old
By fabling *Nilus*, to the quivering Touch
Of *Titan*'s Ray, with each repulſive String
Conſenting, ſounded thro' the warbling Air
Unbidden Strains; ev'n ſo did Nature's Hand,
To certain Species of external Things,
Attune the finer Organs of the Mind:
So the glad Impulſe of congenial Pow'rs,
Or of ſweet Sound, or fair-proportion'd Form,
The Grace of Motion, or the Bloom of Light,
Thrills thro' Imagination's tender Frame,
From Nerve to Nerve: All naked and alive
They catch the ſpreading Rays; till now the Soul
At length diſcloſes every tuneful Spring,
To that harmonious Movement from without,
Reſponſive.———

The Pleaſures of Imagination, *by* Anonymous, *in Three Books. A Poem.* Book 1. Ver. 56.—124.

poſition

position of inferior, ſecondary Cauſes. And therefore, from hence it follows, That God (by Means of theſe Motions, as it were, laying ſome faint Repreſentations of all Kinds of natural Objects, but more eſpecially of natural Cauſes and the Effects flowing from them) delineates and paints theſe Notices or Images upon our Minds: And then, in the next Place, the ſame great Author of Nature, when once theſe Notions and Objects are, in various Ways, rudely ſketched out, faintly repreſented to, and imperfectly imaged out upon the Mind, excites and urges us on, from the whole viſible Creation, to compare and join theſe Notions or Repreſentations together; and, by Conſequence, the Will of God, as declared in the Works of Creation, is, That the human Mind ſhould frame and put together true Propoſitions, from thoſe Apprehenſions or Notions which ſuch Objects have raiſed in us.

From whence it comes to paſs, that an Object at ſome times, in the Whole of it, is (1) expoſed to our View; whereas, at other Times, the very ſame Object is viewed more accurately and diſtinctly, according to the various ſubordinate Relations and Circumſtances to which, from Time to Time, every ſuch Object reſpectively, is capable of being applied.

From whence the Mind underſtands, That the Notion of the Whole exactly repreſents the very ſame Thing that the Notion of all the Parts taken together; [and of which Parts ſuch a Whole is conſtituted] from hence the human Mind is neceſſarily obliged to form this one ſelf-evident Propoſition, That the Whole is exactly the ſame with all its Parts taken together; or, to affirm and conclude, That all ſuch Cauſes as preſerve the Whole, preſerve alſo all the eſſential, conſtituent Parts of every ſuch Whole.

SECT. IX.

THE next Step, then, in the Order of our *Enquiry*, which naturally follows from a careful, diligent, intellectual View of all thoſe Propoſitions within our Notice, which deſervedly lay claim to the Pre-eminence of univerſal Natural Laws, as I have obſerved, is, That all theſe Laws may be comprehended under one ſingle univerſal Law; which [Law] if fairly, and to Advantage, be defined and explained, will account for all thoſe Limitations, Objections and Exceptions, which each Law

All the Laws of Nature reducible to one ſingle Propoſition.

(1) *Expoſed to our View*, &c.] As for Inſtance, the Law of Nature appears to us under two different Views; either, *Firſt*, as it is a general Law, comprehending the whole Syſtem of rational Agents, as one inſeparable Whole, and with which this Law at all times invariably agrees: Or, *Secondly*, where the View of this Law is more diſtinct, ſeparates and varies according to the ſeveral ſubordinate Relations and Circumſtances to which it is at different times capable of being reſpectively applied. And herein lies the material Difference between Primary and Secondary Laws of Nature. *See* Chap. 5. Sect. 1.

ſingly may ſeem to labour under: And from the clear Evidence of which univerſal Law, that all the reſt may borrow a clearer, a fuller Light. And this univerſal Law may be expreſſed in this, or ſome ſuch Form, *viz.*

The one univerſal Propoſition, or Law of Nature.

That the fulleſt, moſt vigorous Endeavour, of each and all rational Agents, in promoting the Common Good of the whole rational Syſtem, contributes effectually to the Good of each ſingle Part in ſuch a Syſtem: Under which Whole, or Syſtem, the ſingle, individual Happineſs of each, and all of us, is eſſentially contained: And, on the contrary, that Acts, oppoſite to ſuch a Propenſity, muſt produce Effects oppoſite, and by Conſequence, amongſt many other Evils, involve us, and each of us, in Miſery.

For which Reaſon, therefore, it is, that the whole Sum and Subſtance of this Philoſophical Diſquiſition turns upon theſe three Points, either,

The Subject Matter of this Propoſition.

Firſt, Upon ſuch Points as immediately concern the *Subject Matter* of the Propoſition, namely, a clear and diſtinct Apprehenſion or Knowledge of the Terms contained in the Propoſition itſelf: Which Apprehenſion or Knowledge muſt be laid in and drawn from the Nature of Things. Or,

The Form of this Propoſition.

Secondly, Upon ſuch Points as immediately concern the eſſential Conſtruction, *Form* and Make of the Propoſition itſelf, namely, the Connexion of the Terms in this practical Propoſition; but more eſpecially of that Propoſition which, upon account of the Rewards and Puniſhments annexed to it by the Author of Nature, juſtly deſerves the Title of *a Law*. Or,

The Concluſions and Corollaries deducible from it.

Thirdly, and Laſtly, Upon ſuch Points as immediately concern the neceſſary, concluſive Inferences of all other natural Laws, with their ſeveral Limitations and Reſtrictions; a ſtrict Regard, however, being always firſt had to the common Good, or happieſt State of the aggregate, collective Whole, or univerſal ALL.

SECT. X.

What are contained under the Terms of this Propoſition.

AS to a clear and full Apprehenſion or Knowledge of the Terms contained in the Propoſition, all thoſe Topics concern, as we have in general laid down, either, *Firſt*, The Nature of Things. Or, *Secondly*, Human Nature. Or, *Thirdly*, and more eſpecially, The univerſal, common Good.

Thro' the Courſe of this ENQUIRY, we muſt beg the Reader not to take it ill, that we aſcribe Reaſon to God, and rank him amongſt rational Beings: And that, at ſometimes we may be ſaid to exert Benevolence towards God, or to carry ſuch a Propenſity towards him as is ſuited to his Divine Nature, *i. e.* ſuch a Propenſity as is in itſelf good.

At the ſame time acknowledging, that we do not affix the ſame Meaning to theſe Terms (*i. e.* we do not take them in their proper, natural Senſe) as we do, when they are applied to human Nature: But we always underſtand *Omniſcience* and *Wiſdom* in God to be *abſolute* and *perfect*; neither

ther could *Cicero* himſelf, that great Maſter of Language, deſcribe Wiſdom better than by calling it *Adult Reaſon*, i. e. *Reaſon in its fulleſt Perfection.*

We are not to imagine that all the Love and Affection which we are capable of ſhewing in our Worſhip and Service of him, can be either demonſtrated or increaſed by adding any Thing to his Perfections, which are compleat and infinite in themſelves, from and to all Eternity.

However, this is a Point clear and beyond all Doubt, That it is more acceptable and agreeable to the Divine Nature, that Obedience to him in all our Behaviour, and our Imitation of him, in our Care and Concern for the public Good of the whole human Species, which is conſtantly preſerved in Being, by his own Divine Providence, and alſo, that in all our Words, Thoughts and Affections, the Worſhip and Love of him are manifeſtly better ſuited to his beneficent Nature, than, on the contrary, the *Neglect*, or *Contempt*, or *Hatred of him*, or the *Reſiſtance of his Authority and rebelling againſt him.*

Becauſe, if we *abſtractedly* compare two rational Natures together, we ſhall acknowledge a more perfect Harmony and Correſpondence between them (*i. e.* they bear a nearer Reſemblance to each other) when one Nature acts conſiſtently and in Co-operation with the other, than if we ſuppoſe them at Variance, and that the one contradicts and counter-acts the Deſign intended by the other.

Neither do I ſee that any Objection can poſſibly ariſe from ſuppoſing the one of theſe rational Natures to be *God*, and the other *Man*.

And, upon this Foundation, as, by the Help of our five Senſes, it is well known, that it is more pleaſing and agreeable to any Man, to be beloved, eſteemed, reſpected, than to be hated, abominated, deſpiſed. So, according to the cleareſt Analogy in the World, this Truth is found correſpondent to Reaſon, That it is more agreeable to the ſupreme, rational Being, Almighty God, to be beloved and honoured by the Obedience of Mankind, than to be hated and deſpiſed by them. For, ſince a Propenſity towards being beloved, implies no Sort of Imperfection even in human Nature; therefore in Almighty God, ſuch a Propenſity is ſo far from carrying in it the leaſt Suſpicion of an Imperfection, that, on the contrary, it ſtrongly argues an affectionate, benign Nature. Becauſe, by loving Almighty God, we diſcover the Perfection of our Nature, and (1) *that we are made in the Image, after the Likeneſs of God himſelf.*

Now,

(1) *That we are made in the Image, after the Likeneſs of God himſelf.*] *Geneſis* i. 26. Wherein this Image of God, this Similitude, this Likeneſs between God and Man conſiſts, has admitted of ſome Argument amongſt the Learned. Great Miſtakes have been owing to the mixing and confounding Metaphor and Analogy together. I ſhall here add ſuch Quotations, Notes, and Obſervations, as may help to illuſtrate, clear up and explain this important Doctrine.

Animal hoc, ſays *Cicero*, providum, ſagax, multiplex, acutum, memor, plenum rationis & conſilii quem vocamus Hominem, præclarâ

Now, if what has been ſaid be true, upon the Principles both of Reaſon and Experience, from hence it demonſtrably follows, that God has inſeparably

quâdam conditione generatum eſſe a Supremo Deo. Solum eſt enim ex tot animantium generibus atque naturis particeps rationis & cogitationis, cum cætera ſint omnia expertia. Quid eſt autem non dicam in homine, ſed in omni cœlo atque terrâ Ratione Divinius? Quæ cum adolevit atque perfecta eſt nominatur rite Sapientia. Eſt igitur (quoniam nihil eſt ratione melius, eaque & in homine & in Deo) prima homini cum Deo rationis ſocietas. Inter quos autem ratio, inter eoſdem etiam recta ratio communis eſt. Quæ cùm ſit lex lege quoque conſociati homines cum diis putandi ſumus. Inter quos porro eſt communio legis, inter eos communio juris eſt. Quibus autem hæc ſunt inter eos communia, & civitatis ejuſdem habendi ſunt. Si vero iiſdem imperiis & poteſtatibus parent, multo etiam magis parent huic cæleſti deſcriptioni mentique divinæ & præpotenti Deo, ut jam univerſus hic mundus, una civitas communis deoru n atque hominum exiſtimanda: Et quod in civitatibus ratione quâdam (de quâ dicetur Idoneo loco) agnationibus familiarum diſtinguuntur ſtatus, id in rerum naturâ tanto eſt magnificentius, tantoque præclarius, ut homines deorum agnatione & gente teneantur. Nam cum de natura omni quæritur, diſputari ſolet; & nimirum ita ſunt ut diſputantur perpetuis curſibus, converſionibus cœleſtibus extitiſſe quandam maturitatem ſerendi humani generis, quod ſparſum in terra atque ſatum, divino auctum ſit animorum munere. Cumque, alia, quibus cohærent homines, e mortali genere ſumpſerunt, quæ fragilia eſſent & caduca *animum tamen eſſe ingeneratum a Deo*; ex quo, vero vel agnatio nobis cum cœleſtibus, vel genus, vel ſtirps appellari poteſt. Itaque ex tot generibus nullum eſt animal, præter hominem, quod habeat notitiam aliquam Dei: Ipſiſque in hominibus *nulla gens eſt* neque tam immanſuета, neque tam fera, quæ non, etiamſi ignoret qualem habere Deum deceat: tamen habendum ſciat. Ex quo efficitur illud, ut is agnoſcat Deum, qui, unde ortus ſit, quaſi recordetur & noſcat. Jam vero virtus eadem in homine, & Deo eſt, neque ullo alio ingenio eſt præterea. Eſt autem virtus nihil aliud quam in perfecta, & ad ſummum perducta natura. Eſt igitur homini cum Deo ſimilitudo. Quod cum ita ſit, quæ tandem poteſt eſſe proprior certiorve cognatio? Itaque ad hominum commoditates: & uſus tantam rerum ubertatem natura largita eſt, ut ea, quæ gignuntur, donata conſultò nobis, non fortuitò nata videantur: Nec ſolum ea, quæ frugibus atque baccis terræ fætu profunduntur, ſed etiam pecudes: Quod perſpicuum ſit, partim eſſe ad uſum hominum, partim ad fructum, partim ad veſcendum procreatas. Artes vero innumerabiles repertæ ſunt, *docente naturâ*, quam imitata ratio, res ad vitam neceſſarias ſolertèr conſecuta eſt.

The Ground and Reaſon of the Diſtinction between Divine Metaphor, and Divine Analogy, will appear very obvious, if we conſider that there can be no real Reſemblance, or true Correſpondency, between mere Objects of Senſe, or their Ideas, and immaterial Heavenly Beings. But there may be a real Reſemblance, or at leaſt a true Correſpondency and Proportion, between the Operations of our Mind (as well as our complex Notions formed partly out of them) on one Side of the Compariſon, and the immaterial Things they are ſubſtituted to repreſent on the other; for, as we are made in ſome meaſure after the Image of God, eſpecially in our ſpiritual Part, this ſerves to render all the Analogy, rationally built on ſuch Conceptions and Notions, real and juſt with reſpect to him, and his Attributes, as well as to other purely ſpiritual Beings, who are created in a yet nearer Likeneſs; and therefore his natural, or rather ſupernatural Attributes, we conceive by Analogy with the Operations and Properties of our own Minds; and what we call his Moral Attributes, we conceive by Analogy with our complex Notions of human Virtues and moral Excellencies.

Now, therefore, to prevent any Miſtake hereafter, in relation to thoſe Inſtances which may be given of Analogy, I muſt obſerve, That tho' Light, in its greateſt Reſplendency, is material, and an Object of Senſation, and therefore cannot be transferred to God, otherwiſe than metaphorically; there being nothing in his purely ſpiritual Nature correſpondent or anſwerable to Matter: Yet as intellectual Light is uſed for Knowledge, and becomes expreſſive of the moſt noble Faculty or Perfection of the human Mind, it carries in it ſo much of the Nature of the true Analogy; and therefore, whenever I uſe it as an Inſtance of ſuch,

inſeparably annexed the ampleſt Reward to our Love of himſelf, which he never would have done, had it not been his Will and Pleaſure to be beloved

ſuch, I take it in that Senſe, and as it excludes all Materiality.

Again, the Idea of Subſtance is an Idea altogether of Senſation, as it includes Length, Breadth and Thickneſs; and therefore cannot be transferred to God in this Senſe, otherwiſe than by pure Metaphor; and this precariouſly too, ſince it is no Scripture Metaphor. And therefore, whenever I mention our conceiving the Subſtance of God by Analogy with material Subſtance, I ever mean, as it imports the Notion of Being in general only.

So again, Wind, or Breath, are Ideas of Senſation, and cannot be transferred to the Holy Ghoſt, otherwiſe than metaphorically: But as Wind, or Breath, from its firſt Propriety, comes to ſignify animal Life both in Man and Beaſt, and from thence is uſed to expreſs the immaterial Spirit of a Man, which is a Notion complex enough to take in all the Operations of an human Mind, then 'tis pure Analogy, uſed to conceive the incomprehenſible and Holy Spirit.

To ſum up the Difference then between Divine Metaphor, and Divine Analogy in full. Metaphor expreſſes only an imaginary Reſemblance, or Correſpondency; Analogy conveys the Conception of a correſpondent Reality, or Reſemblance. Metaphor is rather an Alluſion, than a real Subſtitution of Ideas; Analogy a proper Subſtitution of Notions and Conceptions. Metaphor, at beſt, is but the uſing a very remote and foreign Idea, to expreſs ſomething already ſuppoſed to be more exactly known; Analogy conveys ſomething correſpondent and anſwerable, which could be now no otherwiſe uſefully and really known without it. Metaphor is moſtly in Words, and is a Figure of Speech; Analogy a *Similis ratio*, or Proportion of Things, and an excellent and neceſſary Method or Means of Reaſon and Knowledge. Metaphor uſes Ideas of Senſation to expreſs immaterial and heavenly Objects, to which they can bear no real Reſemblance or Proportion; Analogy ſubſtitutes the Operations of our Soul, and Notions moſtly formed out of them, to repreſent Divine Things, to which they bear a real tho' unknown Correſpondency and Proportion. In ſhort, Metaphor has no real Foundation in the Nature of the Things compared; Analogy is founded on the very Nature of the Things, on both Sides of the Compariſon; and the Correſpondency or Reſemblance is certainly real, though we don't know the exact Nature, or Manner, or Degree of it; at leaſt we may ſafely preſume this from the Truth and Veracity of God, who has thus made his Revelations to Mankind, under the analogical Conceptions and Language of the World.

Though nothing is more plain and evident than this Analogy, which runs thro' all our Conceptions and Reaſonings upon the Things of another World, when we come to reflect and conſider the Matter cloſely; yet we fall into it ſo naturally, and are ſo uſed to it, from the firſt, that we are generally inſenſible of it; and apt to take it for granted, that thoſe Conceptions are as direct and immediate, and our Language for them as ſtrictly proper, as when they are applied to the Things of this World. And, indeed, there would be no Harm in leaving the World, to continue in that Opinion; there would be no Occaſion for undeceiving Men, nor for putting them upon diſtinguiſhing ſo nicely the Nature of Metaphor and Analogy, if there had been any other effectual Way of clearly and ſatisfactorily obviating the many dangerous Miſtakes, and even fatal Errors, prevailing in this Age, which ſtrike at the very Root of Chriſtianity. It is now become abſolutely neceſſary to put this Matter into a glaring Light, ſince the whole *Socinian* Syſtem, and all that Infidelity which is the Effect and Conſequence of it, as well as ſome more modern Syſtems, which are in no ſmall Degree built upon its general Principles, turn upon reſolving all Revelation, and the Myſteries of Chriſtianity, into mere Metaphor and Alluſion only: And upon their ever confounding this with the true Analogy, which is of a quite different Kind; which is founded in the very Nature of Things, and is abſolutely neceſſary even to our thinking of heavenly Objects, tho' we ſhould never expreſs our Thoughts by Words.

Of Metaphor and Analogy.

Metaphor, in general, is a Subſtitution of the Idea or Conception of one Thing, with the Term belonging to it, to ſtand for another Thing, on account of an appearing Similitude only, without any real Reſemblance, and true Cor-

loved by his Creatures.——But——if the Reader will be pleaſed to peruſe and read over the three firſt Chapters of this Treatiſe (the Heads of which I have juſt now recited) he will find, that we explain the Terms (in the School-Mens Phraſe) of the Propoſition propoſed and laid

Correſpondency between the Things compared: As when the Pſalmiſt deſcribes the Verdure and Fruitfulneſs of Vallies by Laughing and Singing. Analogy, in general, is the ſubſtituting the Idea or Conception of one Thing to ſtand for and repreſent another, on account of a true Reſemblance, and correſpondent Reality in the very Nature of the Things compared.

It is defined by *Ariſtotle*, Ἰσότης τοῦ λόγου, *An Equality or Parity of Reaſon*; though, in Strictneſs and Truth, the Parity of Reaſoning is rather built on the Similitude and Analogy, and Conſequent to them, than the ſame Thing with them.

We have three Ways of thinking and ſpeaking, concerning God and His Attributes, as well as all other Beings purely ſpiritual and immaterial, by the Parts and Members of an human Body; of other Things merely material, by the Paſſions and Affections of an human Soul, and by the Operations and Perfections of the Mind or Intellect.

As to the firſt of theſe, it is certain there can neither be any bodily Parts, or Members, or Appetites, in Beings immaterial; much leſs in the Divine Being, who is of a Nature infinitely above that of any created Spirit: Nor can there be any ſuch real Similitude and Reſemblance between mere Nature and pure Spirit, as that the Nature and Properties of one ſhould of themſelves furniſh our Underſtanding with any juſt and uſeful Conceptions of thoſe belonging to the other. So that neither the Words or Ideas of that Sort, can with any ſuch Aptneſs and Correſpondency be transferred to the Divine Being, as the Operations and Perfections of our Minds are. Therefore, when we attribute to him any bodily Members, ſuch as Eyes and Ears, and Hands and Feet; or bodily Actions, ſuch as Searching, or Seeing, or Walking; the Words are purely figurative and metaphorical. Theſe and ſuch like Terms are uſed to expreſs the Wiſdom, or Knowledge, or Mercy, or Power of God; or ſome other Attributes and Perfections, for which we are not without Words more proper, juſt, ſignificant and expreſſive.

Beſides, the transferring our bodily Members, or other Things merely material, to God, or the Divine Nature of Chriſt, is purely voluntary, and not of abſolute Neceſſity; as it is in thoſe other Words, Power and Knowledge, and Wiſdom and Holineſs; which are, by a true Analogy, transferred to the Divine Being; and without which we could neither think, nor ſpeak, either of him or his Attributes. To which I may add, That if the Reader will look inward, and think with ſome Intenſeneſs, he will find, that in attributing to God our bodily Members or Movements, or any other Thing merely material, he transfers the bare Words only, and abhors the transferring of the Idea; which ſhews, that all ſuch Expreſſions are purely figurative and metaphorical: But in attributing the Operations and Perfections of the Mind or Intellect, he jointly transfers both the Word and the Conception without Scruple, which is a Confirmation of their being truly analogical.

Now, tho' this firſt Kind of Words and Expreſſions are purely figurative and metaphorical, yet they are not mere empty Sounds, or ſo many Letters put together, without any real Import or Signification even in common Metaphor, where a borrowed Word is uſed to expreſs ſomething leſs properly, but to more Advantage, the Thing thereby expreſſed is nevertheleſs real, becauſe the Word is figurative; as when it is ſaid, An Orator thunders and lightens in his Diſcourſe, it means ſome real Action or Performance in him, and ſome real Effect, ſome Warmth, or Commotion, or Paſſion raiſed in the Minds of his Auditors: So when we ſpeak of God, as having bodily Members, and performing bodily Actions, we always intend to expreſs ſomething (tho' not correſpondent and ſimilar) yet true and real, of which we had before obtained the moſt exact Knowledge we are capable of, by the Help of Analogy.

The ſecond Way we have of expreſſing God's Attributes, is, by the Affections and Paſſions of an human Soul. Men have run into two Extremes concerning this Way of ſpeaking of God; ſome contend earneſtly for real Paſſions in God, and of the ſame Kind they are in us, but more excellent in Degree; as the *Socinians*: Others, in the contrary Extreme;

laid down; and that theſe Terms are not employed in the mere Definition of Words only, but that they ſtate the true Conceptions, the juſt Ideas and the real Nature of thoſe Things from whence the Terms ariſe; at leaſt, ſo far as they concern the preſent Enquiry. And in this very ſame Work the

treme, allow neither any Paſſions in God, nor any divine Perfections ſimilar and anſwerable to them, to be a Foundation for Truth and Reality in all our Diſcourſes concerning God, where we uſe the Language of human Paſſions.

That there are, literally ſpeaking, no Paſſions in God, nor indeed any Perfections of the ſame Kind with what theſe are in Man, even when regulated duly, is moſt true; for all our Paſſions and Affections, as well as our Thinking, and Knowledge, and Will, are the joint Operations or Properties of Matter and pure Spirit in eſſential Union; and therefore, when they are under even the ſtricteſt Government, and moſt exact Regulation, cannot be of the ſame Kind with the Excellencies or Perfections of pure Spirits, who have not only a quite different Way of knowing from us, entirely ſeparate from all Matter, and independent of it, but alſo of Loving and Hating, of Inclination and Averſion; and certainly this muſt be more eminently true, with reſpect to the infinite Perfections of the Divine Nature, which differ vaſtly more in Kind from thoſe of all finite created Spirits, than theirs do from the moſt exalted human Perfections.

As the Paſſions and Affections, therefore, are attended with natural Commotion and Diſturbances in us, and are more apt to be ſeduced by material Impreſſions than the pure Intellect and Will, conſequently they cannot be attributed to God, ſo fully and exactly as the Operations of theſe laſt, but are however transferred with a lower and leſs perfect Degree of Analogy, after we have removed all the natural and moral Irregularities of them as carefully as we can. And accordingly we may obſerve, that whenever we attribute even our commendable Paſſions and Affections to God, we do it with ſome Degree of Scruple and Reluctance, at the beſt; whereas, when we transfer Knowledge, Wiſdom, Power, and Will to him, we do it familiarly and without Scruple.

From hence we may obſerve, that tho' our Paſſions are not transferred to the Divine Nature, as fully as the Operations of the Intellect and Will; yet God is not ſo groſsly repreſented by them, as by our bodily Parts; nor is the Language of our Paſſions then purely figurative and metaphorical, but carries in it a good Degree of Analogy: For tho' there are, literally ſpeaking, no ſuch Paſſions in God as Love or Hatred, Joy or Anger, or Pity, yet there may be inconceivable Perfections in him, ſome way anſwerable to what theſe Paſſions are in us, under a due Regulation and Subjection to Reaſon.

It is ſure, that in God thoſe Perfections are not attended with any Degree of natural Diſturbance, or moral Irregularity, as the Paſſions are in us. Nay,—Fear and Hope, which imply ſomething future for their Objects, may have nothing anſwerable to them in the Divine Nature, to which every thing is preſent. But ſince our reaſonable Affections are real Diſpoſitions of the Soul, which is compoſed of Spirit as well as Matter, we muſt conclude ſomething in God analogous to them, as well as to our Knowledge or Power. For it cannot be a Thought unworthy of being transferred to him, that he really loves a virtuous, and hates a vicious Agent; that he is angry at Sinners; pities their moral Infirmities, is pleaſed with their Innocence or Repentance, and diſpleaſed with their Tranſgreſſions. Though all theſe Perfections are in him accompanied with the utmoſt Serenity, and never-failing Tranquillity.

Thus much is certain, That they all exhibit and repreſent to us ſomething as real on the Part of the Divine Nature, as in common Uſe they expreſs in the human; ſomething ſo ſolid and anſwerable, as renders all our Reaſonings, and Diſcourſes concerning God, in the Language of our commendable Paſſions, as juſt and true, as when we ſpeak them of one another: Some ineffable Perfections which move and incline him to act, in all his Diſpenſations, towards Mankind and other intelligent Beings, as our Paſſions, properly regulated, diſpoſe us to demean ourſelves to other Men; and which are, nevertheleſs, real, becauſe they are infinite, and conſequently of another Kind than they are in us.

The laſt Way we have of conceiving and expreſſing the Divine Nature and Attributes, is by the Operations and Perfection of our Intellect and Will; which being more refined, and

the Reader will likewiſe obſerve, that I explain in direct Terms, and at once, the Efficacy and indiſpenſable Obligation of ſuch human Acts, as, from their own inherent Nature, are either abſolutely neceſſary to the common Happineſs of all Mankind, or to the private Happineſs of Individuals.—And yet, at the ſame Time, it ſeems to be, and is, highly proper to uſe

and fartheſt removed from Matter, and but accidentally liable to moral Corruption (that is, by voluntarily yielding to the vicious Appetites of the Body, and the irregular Paſſions of the interior Soul) are the beſt and moſt lively Repreſentations we have of the Divinity; ſuch as Wiſdom and Knowledge, and Thinking and Reaſon, and Will, with all the various Modifications of them: And accordingly, in theſe we familiarly transfer both the Word and the Conception annexed to it, to expreſs the Divine Perfections; but becauſe even thoſe in us, as well as our Paſſions, are the joint Operations of finite Matter and Spirit in eſſential Union, and are neceſſarily tranſacted by the Concurrence of Body, therefore they are likewiſe but Analogy when applied to the Divinity. Now, tho' they are ſo, and, as I have obſerved, tho' we are utterly ignorant of Part of the real Ground of that Analogy which runs thro' theſe, as well as thro' all thoſe moral Virtues and evangelical Graces proceeding from the due Direction and Regulation of our Paſſions: Yet that there is a ſure and ſolid Foundation for this Analogy in the Nature both of God and Man, is evident, if we conſider,

That we were originally, and in our Kind, formed to ſome Reſemblance and Similitude of the Divine Nature. The Words of God himſelf are thus, *Let us make Man in our Image, after our Likeneſs*; and the Relation of *Moſes*, by Inſpiration, is thus, *So God created Man in his own Image, in the Image of God, created He him.* How far the Expreſſion may have a Reſpect even to that bodily Likeneſs of *Chriſt*, who, in the eternal Purpoſe of God, was, at the Fulneſs of Time, to take our human Nature into the Divinity; and to that Reſemblance of him in the Body of a Saint, when, at his appearing, it ſhall be faſhioned like unto his glorious Body, we know not: Tho' the Expreſſion being in the plural Number, and ſpoken to his Council, as ſome learned *Jews* expound it (which Council could be no other than that Divine Perſon who was to take that Nature upon him, and the holy Spirit of God) would incline one to think that a Likeneſs, even in this Inſtance, was not totally excluded. Nor can we ſay how far any Reſemblance or Correſpondency may be intended between that living Soul in Man, which reſulted from the Union of the pure Spirit with the Body, when God breathed into his Noſtrils the Breath of Life; and the ineffable Proceſſion of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son. But, without all Doubt, the ſolemn Manner of expreſſing this Likeneſs, by ſuch an immediate Repetition of the ſame Thing over again, and the reduplication of the Words *Image* and *Likeneſs*, do plainly ſhew, that ſomething is intended very remarkable; ſomething ſo real and ſolid, in the very Nature of Things, that it is not to be evaded by any Suppoſition, of its being only a figurative and imaginary Likeneſs: Nay—ſomething of no leſs Conſequence muſt be intended at the Bottom, than by thoſe Sayings to lay a firm and immoveable Foundation for Truth, in all thoſe Sentiments, and Words, and Expreſſions, which, thro' all Generations, were neceſſarily to be transferred from the Human Nature to the Divine. Thus far Biſhop *Peter Brown*, of *Corke* in *Ireland*.

The proper Notion of a Moral Agent, is, That he acts, or ought to act, in Conformity to ſome Law; as the Obſervance whereof would be attended with a certain Dignity and eaſy State of Mind; ſo Shame and Diſorder would be the natural Conſequences of violating it.

Now, tho' God is the ſupreme Lord and Creator of all Things, cannot be preſcribed to, or directed by any Thing without himſelf, yet his own Nature, in the eſſential Perfection of it, is an eternal and inviolable Law to himſelf. And in this reſpect, indeed, there is a conſiderable Difference between the moral Obligations of Men, and thoſe Actions of a moral Nature which we attribute to God: Man may have ſeveral Commands impoſed upon him, under the Character of a Moral Agent, concerning Things, which are not antecedently founded in any moral Reaſon, but depends wholly on the poſitive and arbitrary Will of God. The Right of Creation and Government, gives the ſupreme Being a Power

uſe Words, in ſo comprehenſive a Meaning, as may (according to a ſound, rational Conſtruction) in ſome meaſure, convey to our Minds the Majeſty and

Power of enjoyning ſuch indifferent Things, tho' he ſhould not aſſign, or we be able to diſcover any explicit Reaſons for them. But there are other Things depending on the eternal Rules of Reaſon, the univerſal and ſovereign Law, whereby all intelligent Beings are, or ſhould be, governed, that have the Force of a moral Obligation in them, I would be underſtood in a becoming Senſe, both to God and Man. For Reaſon is the Law of Order, which determines what is right or wrong, good or evil, decent or diſagreeable; the Law which God himſelf invincibly loves and follows, and without which we could have no Notion worthy of him as God.

And whereas God poſſeſſes Reaſon in the higheſt and moſt perfect Degree, and there can be no Cauſe within or without him to obſtruct its Operations, he muſt in all his moral Actions, purſuant to the Light of it, be proportionably, and in the moſt perfect Degree, a moral Agent. Except it ſhould be ſaid, which indeed ſome Men have been ſo unreaſonable as to ſay, that the Diſtinction of Right and Wrong, Good and Evil, Decent and Unbecoming, does not ariſe from any antecedent Principles of Reaſon, but merely from poſitive, ſubſequent Inſtitution, which would be in Effect to affirm, that there is really no ſuch Thing as Reaſon. For, not to anticipate, what I am to ſhew at large under one of my general Heads, if we do not clearly ſee the natural Reaſon of diſtinguiſhing between theſe Things, there appears to be nothing which we can certainly conclude from any Method of Reaſoning.

But how tranſcendent ſoever the moral Perfections of the Divine Nature may be, when compared with thoſe of Men or any other intelligent Beings, there appears no evident Reaſon, why we ſhould conclude, as a great Prelate has done, that the moral Attributes of God are of a different Nature from thoſe we obſerve in Men. For we conſider Things as of a different Nature, not which are different in Degree, but which differ in Kind. Now if the Reaſons of Juſt, Good, and Fit, have the ſame Foundation in the Divine, that they have in a human Mind; or, in other Words, if it be reaſonable that God, when he determines himſelf to act, ſhould do what is agreeable to the general Rules of Juſtice, Goodneſs and Prudence, then thoſe Reaſons or Rules, with the proper Acts ariſing from them, are the ſame in reſpect both to God and Man in the Relations, how much ſoever they may differ in the Degrees of Perfection.

Again, if the moral Attributes of God be not founded in the ſame general Reaſons with thoſe of Men (and if they be ſo founded, the Nature of them is ſtill the ſame) then it would be impoſſible for us to form any diſtinct Notions of the Divine Attributes, or rather any Notions at all, but what would be very irregular and confuſed; for they being no farther of a moral Conſideration, than as we apprehend them reaſonable in themſelves, if we do not know what common Reaſons to reſolve them into, we at once deſtroy the Morality of them, and all poſſible Methods of Reaſoning upon them.

What Grounds, I ſay, can we have upon any Principles of Natural Religion, to attribute certain Perfections to God, whereof we are not able to diſcover any natural Reaſon; which yet it is impoſſible for us to do, without knowing what they are, in ſome imperfect Manner at leaſt, in their own Nature.

I ſhall only add, ſince I am arguing on Occaſion of what has been advanced by a learned Perſon in one of the firſt Stations of the Church, that when God refers it, ourſelves being Judges whether his Ways are not equal, if we are not to judge concerning the Equality of them, according to our common Notions of what is juſt and right, the Deſign of ſuch an Appeal would be altogether impracticable. Neither could we be capable, as both Reaſon and his poſitive Commands require we ſhould, of imitating his Perfections, did we not know wherein his Perfections conſiſt; an unknown Object of Imitation evidently implying as great an Inconſiſtency, as an unknown Object of Deſire.

Theſe Reflections, I hope, will not render me obnoxious to any Charge of being wanting in a juſt Deference to the Archiepiſcopal Character; my Deſign in them is only to prevent ſuch ill Effects as a great Name, recommended with much Erudition, may have, towards miſleading us in our Reaſonings upon the moral Perfections of God, in the clear and diſtinct Conceptions whereof, the only ſolid Foundation is laid, both of Faith in him, and

and Dignity of Almighty God: And this is a Point I had chiefly in View; That, by the Help of an *Analogy* (with Prudence and Caution applied), we

Obedience to his Laws; for want of which, therefore, very great Errors in Doctrine, and Corruptions in Practice, have been too frequently occaſioned.

We grant, indeed, there are certain moral Virtues in Men; for Inſtance, Sobriety, Temperance, and Chaſtity, which, as they imply ſome Defect in the Reaſons of them, are by no Means to be attributed to the moſt perfect Being. But yet even ſuch Qualities are founded in this general Reaſon of a moral Action, that they are agreeable to the preſent State of Man, and neceſſary to his Perfection. As the moral Attributes of God are conformable to the eternal Reaſon and Perfection of his own Nature, ſo theſe Virtues, tho' only of a more accidental Conſideration, are termed moral in Men, as they are reaſonable in regard to the preſent Condition of human Nature, and, in their direct Tendency, perfective of it. *Dr.* Richard Fiddes's *Theologia Speculativa*, Page 124. Vol. 1. Book 1. Part 2. Chap. 13. *Of the moral Attributes of God in general.*

Analogia vel eſt ſimilitudinis vel proportionis, *i. e. Metaphoricè & Propriè.*

Analogia ſimilitudinis vel metaphoricè quando illud nomen commune propriè tantum ſignificat unam rationem quæ tantum in uno analogorum verè ineſt, in altero verò non ineſt verè & propriè ſed Metaphoricè, *e. g. Ridere* propriè tantum ſignificat riſum hominis, qui riſus formaliter & propriè ineſt ſoli homini: Prato verò ineſt tantum per ſimilitudinem, atque adeo metaphoricè; hæc ergo vox *ridere*, etſi propriè, tantùm, unam rationem ſignificat, ſcilicet, *riſum hominis*, quatenus tamen eſt vox analoga, ſecundùm hanc analogiam ſignificat & *riſum hominis* & *floriditatem prati*, quæ ſunt rationes ſimpliciter diverſæ, ſed ſecundùm quid, unæ, ſcilicet, ſecundum ſimilitudinem proportionalem.

Quia, ſicut ſe habet *riſus hominis ad hominem*, ita ſe habet *floriditas prati ad pratum*. R. H :: F. P. Propriè ſit hæc analogia quando illud nomen æquè propriè ſignificat plures rationes, quæ tamèn, ſecundùm ſimilitudinem proportionalem ſunt una ratio. Exempli gratia, hæc vox *principium* æquæ propriè dicitur *de corde animalis* & *de fundamento domûs*.

Immediatè enim ſignificat principium animalis, *i. e.* primam partem animalis, quæ eſt fons vitæ: Et principium domûs, *i. e.* primam partem domûs: Atque hæ rationes ſunt una ratio, ſecundum ſimilitudinem proportionalem. Ita etiam ſe habet hæc vox gubernator, ad rectorem navis & rectorem reipublicæ, æquè enim & propriè ſignificant hæc ſignificata, quæ in proportionali ſimilitudine conveniunt. Robert. Baron. Metaphyſic. Special. Pag. 422. Sect. 1. Part 1. Paragr. 5.

But to prevent any Man's being miſled, by miſtaking the ſcholaſtic Uſe of the Terms *Analogy* and *Analogical*, into an Opinion that we cannot frame, in any Degree, a true and proper Notion of Attributes applied by Analogy, or, in the School-phraſe, predicated analogically, it may not be amiſs to enquire into the true Senſe and Meaning of thoſe Words.

Every one knows, that Analogy is a *Greek* Word, uſed by Mathematicians to ſignify a Similitude of Proportions. For Inſtance, when we obſerve that two is to ſix, as three is to nine, this Similitude, or Equality of Proportions, is termed *Analogy*.

And, altho' Proportion ſtrictly ſignifies the Habitude or Relation of one Quantity to another, yet, in a looſer and tranſlated Senſe, it hath been applied to ſignify every other Habitude; and conſequently the Term Analogy comes to ſignify all Similitude of Relations or Habitudes whatſoever.

Hence the Schoolmen tell us there is Analogy between Intellect and Sight; for as much as Intellect is to the Mind, what Sight is to the Body, and that, he who governs the State is analogous to him who ſteers a Ship. Hence a Prince is analogically ſtiled a Pilot, being to the State as a Pilot is to his Veſſel.

For the farther clearing of this Point, it is to be obſerved, that a twofold Analogy is diſtinguiſhed by the Schoolmen, *metaphorical* and *proper*.

1. Of the *metaphorical Kind* there are frequent Inſtances in Holy Scripture, attributing human Parts and Paſſions to God. When he is repreſented as having a Finger, an Eye, or an Ear; when he is ſaid to repent, to be angry, or grieved: Every one ſees the Analogy is merely metaphorical; becauſe thoſe Parts and Paſſions, taken in the proper Signification, muſt, in every Degree, neceſſarily, and

we may evince, not only our Obligation to all Acts of Religion and Piety, but alſo the true Nature of Univerſal Juſtice, and (by Conſequence) of that ſupreme Dominion, Power and Empire, which, by an inherent, juſt Right, belong to Almighty God only.

SECT. XI.

The Form of this univerſal Law or Propoſition.

IF we cloſely examine into the eſſential Form, Conſtitution and Structure of this Propoſition, we ſhall evidently find it to be a practical Propoſition: Becauſe it fairly declares what are the natural Effects and Conſequences of any human Act.

We are here, however, to take Notice, That, altho' we uſe the Verb CONDUCIT, *Conduces*, in the *preſent Tenſe* or Time which NOW exiſts (becauſe *drawn* or *derived* from Things actually preſent); yet this Verb CONDUCIT, *Conduces*, is ſo far from being limited, and tied down to the preſent NOW, that it is quite ſeparate and diſtinct from it. For, ſince the Truth of the Propoſition eſſentially depends upon that *Identity* or *Sameneſs* which always ſubſiſts between *the Whole and all its Parts taken together*, the Propoſition is, with the ſame Truth and Certainty, equally clear when applied to *Futurity*, as we ſhall ſhew at large in another Part of this Diſcourſe. And therefore, whenever we uſe the Verb CONDUCIT, *Conduces*, we always apply it to a *future Tenſe*. And this Application of the Term is alſo, for a farther Reaſon, better ſuited to my preſent Deſign, becauſe this PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY is not ſlaviſhly and implicitly confined to any one particular Hypotheſis whatſoever. For, the preſent Enquiry does not ſuppoſe Mankind born, either in a State of Civil Society

and from the formal Nature of the Thing, include Imperfection. When therefore it is ſaid, the Finger of God appears in this or that Event, Men of common Senſe mean no more, but that it is as truly aſcribed to God as the Works wrought by human Fingers are to Man; and ſo of the reſt. But the Caſe is different when Wiſdom and Knowledge are attributed to God. Paſſions and Senſes, as ſuch, imply Defect; but in Knowledge ſimply, or as ſuch, there is no Defect. Knowledge, therefore, in the proper, formal Meaning of the Word, may be attributed to God proportionably, that is, preſerving a Proportion to the infinite Nature of God. We may ſay, therefore, that as God is infinitely above Man, ſo is the Knowledge of God infinitely above the Knowledge of Man; and this is what *Cajetan* calls *Analogia propriè facta*. And after this ſame Analogy we muſt underſtand all thoſe Attributes to belong to the Deity, which in themſelves ſimply, and as ſuch, denote Perfection.

We may therefore, conſiſtently with what hath been premiſed, affirm, that all Sorts of Perfection, which we can conceive in a finite Spirit, are in God, but without any of that Allay which is found in the Creatures.

This Doctrine, therefore, of analogical Perfection in God, or our knowing God by Analogy, ſeems very much miſunderſtood and miſapplied by thoſe who would infer from thence, that we cannot frame any direct or proper Notion, tho' never ſo inadequate, of Knowledge or Wiſdom, as they are in the Deity, or underſtand any more of them, than one born blind can of Light and Colours. *Biſhop* Berkley's *Minute Philoſopher*, Dialogue 4. Section 21. Vol. 1. Page 161, *&c.* Dub. Edit. 1732.

only; or, out of such a State only; but equally indifferent to both. This Enquiry does not suppose a Consanguinity between the whole human Race, derived from the same, one, common, original Parents, as we learn from the History of the Bible. Because, our present Design is to demonstrate, the Sanctions and Obligations of the Laws of Nature, to those who deny the Truth and Divine Authority of the Holy Scriptures. Neither, on the contrary, does this System of Morality suppose (with Mr. *Hobbes*, Cap. 8. Sect. 1. *De Cive*) that the Generality of Mankind spring up at once, and arrive instantly at adult Age, like so many Mushrooms.—But—our moral Proposition, and all the Conclusions deducible from it, suppose, That the first created Pair (*Adam* and *Eve*) might understand and assent to this Proposition, and to these Conclusions; and, with the strictest Conformity imaginable, at the same time, to those Relations in which they stood to God as their Creator, and to a Race of Posterity which probably were, for many future Generations, to arise and spring from them.——Nay—— THIS OUR GRAND MORAL PROPOSITION may be understood, and with as little Difficulty, by *Gentiles* and *Heathens* of all Sorts, who have not ever even heard one Tittle of such original Parents.

SECT. XII.

I SHALL not, indeed, think my Time and Pains ill bestowed, to make one Remark, concerning the Sense and Meaning of the Moral Proposition at first laid down, which is, That under these Terms, in which is explained, what Cause that is, which is capable of producing the most excellent and the very best Effect, are also delivered, and in a concise Manner explained, what Means they are which contribute most to, and are best fitted for, the Attainment of this ultimate End.

For, *First*, the Effect which a rational Agent proposes to himself, (when once he has well considered and determined to employ his Time and Pains in producing such an Effect) is called the *End*.

And, *Secondly*, All Moral Acts, which in this PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY are understood as so many Causes, by whose active Force and operative Energy the Agent endeavours to effect his End, are called the *Means*.

Effects, or Ends and Causes, or Means in Morality, compared with the Rules in Practical Geometry.

The same manner of Thinking holds good in the Rules of Practical Geometry: The Causes of such Geometrical *Operations* are laid down, namely, the regular Drawings, according to stated Rules, of certain Lines. Whether then such an Operation as this be considered, either as a Problem whose Solution is required; or as an End which we propose to ourselves: Yet Geometricians, upon the Whole, understand by such a Praxis, the intermediate Steps proper for the Attainment of the End they chiefly are to consider.

By

By ſuch a Proceſs as this, the Method is diſcovered, how to reduce all that the Moraliſts have ſaid, concerning the Application of Means to the beſt End, into certain Theorems, which contain the Energy and Operation of human Acts in producing their Effects.

For, under this View all the Rules of Morality may, with more Eaſe, be diſcovered; and can (provided they are true) with a more clear Certainty be demonſtrated.

By the like Manner of Reaſoning, we may alſo from hence learn, with what Eaſe all uſeful, true Knowledge, about the Operation of Cauſes (which we can as we pleaſe apply to our own Uſe) ſuggeſts to us the Means proper towards the Execution of a known, intended End; and which Means, of Conſequence, render ſuch a Knowledge capable of being reduced to Practice upon every Occaſion.

In a Word, from hence alſo it evidently appears, That the Propoſition which we have hitherto been ſpeaking of, ſo far, at leaſt, carries in it the Nature and Force of a Law, as it regards the End which is very worthy of a Law's Sanction, *viz.* the common Good of all rational Beings; or, in other Words, the Glory of God, in neceſſary Conjunction with the univerſal, public Felicity of the whole human Race.

SECT. XIII.

BUT here, perhaps, it may be objected, That the two neceſſary Conditions, requiſite to the lively, effective Energy of a Law, cannot, at firſt ſight, in this moral Propoſition, with ſo clear an Evidence appear; namely, 1. A Lawgiver of ſufficient Weight or Authority. And, 2. A Sanction properly enforced by Puniſhments and Rewards. Objection.

In Anſwer, therefore, to any ſuch Surmiſes, we ſay, That if theſe Points be with a cloſer Attention examined into, we ſhall find, that the Law itſelf, the very Inſtant it is conveyed to, and impreſſed upon, the Mind, from the *Nature of Things*, manifeſtly declares, that the Author of it is the Lawgiver; or, in other Words, that this Author and Lawgiver is the firſt Cauſe of all Things; and, by Conſequence, that he is the Cauſe and Author of all ſuch Truths as are neceſſarily laid in Nature, and ariſe from the *Nature of Things*.—Now—amongſt ſuch natural Truths, the Truth of that Propoſition (in which, as we maintain, the *fundamental Law of Nature* is comprehended) muſt be reckoned and eſteemed the principal and chief. Anſwer.

Neither can any Man, with the leaſt Appearance of Reaſon, require a more evident Proof, that God is the Author of this Propoſition, than the very ſame Proof which demonſtrates God to be the Author of the *Nature of Things*; from whence (*i. e.* from which Nature and Conſtitution of Things) the Truth of the Propoſition neceſſarily ariſes.

Upon

Upon this very ſolid Foundation, therefore, the Author of this Moral, Practical Propoſition being once diſcovered, the only Point which remains to be proved, is, That the Author himſelf has framed and annexed a ſufficient Sanction; which Sanction is ſufficiently promulged and publiſhed in the very Propoſition itſelf.

SECT. XIV.

I AM, however, at the ſame Time, fully apprized, That a *Sanction*, taken in the ſtricteſt Meaning of the Term, is defined by *Cicero* and (1) *Papinian*, *That Branch or Part of a Law, which inflicts a Puniſhment upon thoſe who neglect to obey its Injunctions.*

But, we judge it proper to underſtand the Term *Sanction* in ſomewhat a more enlarged and extended Meaning: For we apprehend, that the Term *Sanction*, muſt take in the Rewards which the ſame Law promiſes to the Obedient. Becauſe even theſe Rewards, as they are ſuppoſed Encouragements, prove the Barriers and Bulwarks of the Laws themſelves; and from hence it is that Laws are deemed ſacred, according to the enlarged Signification of *Sacred*, as delivered to us by the Civilians; ſays *Marcian*, *Digeſt*, Firſt Book, eighth Title, eighth Law, That the Term *Sanctum*, or *Sacred*, is that which is defended and guarded from the Injury of Men. And *Ulpian*, in the very next Law (*i. e. D.* 1. 8, 9.) affirms, That Laws are ſacred, upon account of the Sanction by which they are eſtabliſhed. However, if there be any who are unwilling to recede from this more rigorous Interpretation of the Term, (by ſuppoſing that all Sanctions imply Puniſhment only) there is no Reaſon why we ſhould quarrel about the Name, provided we are conſiſtent and agree in the Definition of the Thing. For the Sake, then, of thoſe who are of this Opinion, we have added that Part of our Propoſition concerning all ſuch voluntary Acts, as contradict and oppoſe the Care and Concern of the common Good (by either a careleſs Neglect or a wilful Violation) from whence neceſſarily, and by direct Conſequence, are inferred Evils which muſt fall to the Lot of the very Individuals themſelves, in the Syſtem of rational Agents, but moſt remarkably the greateſt Evils muſt befal ſuch Tranſgreſſors themſelves.

Thus far then we ſee, that there is a Declaration full and expreſs enough as to the Puniſhment, without the leaſt Notice of a Reward.

We indeed, however, have employed the very beſt Share of our Pains in Proof of the firſt Branch of our Propoſition, which treats about the Re-

(1) *Papinian.*] *Papinian*, a famous Civilian in the Time of the Emperor *Caracalla*. He was beheaded, becauſe he would not write a Vindication of *Caracalla's* Murther of his Brother *Geta*. *Caracalla* and *Geta* were Sons to the Emperor *Septimius Severus*, and were elected Emperors upon his Death. *See Archdeacon* Echard's *Roman Hiſtory*, Vol. 2. Pag. 396. *See Appendix*, Pag. 58.

wards

wards neceſſarily included in human Happineſs: Becauſe, upon this Foundation of Rewards, the latter Branch of the Propoſition is moſt evidently demonſtrated: As alſo, becauſe the very Nature of Puniſhment includes in it *Evil, i. e.* in other Words, the Privation or Want of thoſe Bleſſings, which from the Nature and Eſſence of our very Being we earneſtly crave, and importunately ſollicit, as being neceſſary to our Welfare and Happineſs.

Now, it is evident, that we cannot frame the leaſt Notion of what any Privation is, unleſs we firſt underſtand thoſe ſeveral Sorts of Good of which we are deprived; and to which every ſuch Privation is contradictory and oppoſite.

In a Word, the *Nature of Things* (whoſe Footſteps we in this Treatiſe have traced, whoſe Tracks we have purſued with the cloſeſt Diligence and moſt accurate Sagacity) is almoſt totally employed in conveying to the human Mind direct and poſitive Notions of Cauſes and Effects; which Notions are at firſt impreſſed upon us by the Help and Mediation of our outward Senſes; which outward Senſes are, in themſelves, abſolute Strangers to what we term *Negations* and *Privations*. And for this further Reaſon, becauſe the *Nature of Things* principally and chiefly works upon our Paſſions and Affections, by our natural Love, rather of ſome preſent Good, or by the Hope of ſome Good in Futurity, than from our *Hatred* or *Dread* of ſome Evil either *preſent* or to *come*.——Becauſe, no one, for Inſtance, deſires Life, Health, a right Tone of Nerves, or an agreeable Flow of animal Spirits (all which truly are called *Corporeal Pleaſures*): Neither does any Man deſire to ſecure the Cauſes of them, with this only View, that, he would, willingly, avoid Death, Diſeaſes, and a languiſhing State (which are directly oppoſite to natural Bleſſings): This is not, I ſay, the true Source of every ſuch Deſire. But the Truth is, every one deſires theſe Bleſſings upon account of that natural, inherent, intrinſic Goodneſs which ſuch Bleſſings carry in their own Nature; or (in the Language of the Schoolmen) upon account of ſome *poſitive Agreement* and *correſpondent Fitneſs* which they bear to the natural Conſtitution, Frame and Make of every human Body. And, In the ſame Method of Reaſoning,—No Man covets excellent Endowments of Underſtanding, a more extended, a more clearly diſtinct Knowledge, for Inſtance, of the ſubliméſt, nobleſt Objects; a Knowledge always accompanied with the ſweeteſt, complacent Compoſure and Harmony; a Knowledge for ever conſiſtent with itſelf: Neither does any Man covet that moſt delicious inward Senſe, either of Benevolence, or of a ſure and certain Hope, and of an uninterrupted Joy in the proſperous, happy Condition of the whole, univerſal, rational Syſtem. Such natural and moral Senſations as theſe, I ſay, no Man covets to feel purely, and for no other Reaſon, but becauſe he would willingly avoid the Anxieties which attend Ignorance, Malevolence, Envy, and Compaſſion; but, on the contrary, every ſuch Deſire ariſes from that exquiſite, actual, poſitive Delight,

light, which we experimentally feel from the Exercise of such Acts and Habits. And from hence, therefore, the true Reason appears, why the Privation, Negation, Absence, or Want of such Blessings is so absolutely disagreeable to, and abhorrent from, our Nature: As also, why the Causes from whence every such Privation or Want arises, appear so very afflicting and uneasy.

From hence, therefore, it follows, as a most evident Conclusion; Since the very Laws, even of Civil Society, are defended and guarded by the strongest Sanctions of Punishments, *i. e.* Death, and the Forfeiture of all Worldly Goods; if we examine the Point truly as it is, we shall find, that the very Sanctions of such Laws as compel Mankind to Obedience, arise from the Love of Life, of Self-preservation, and of such Worldly Wealth, as, by the Declaration of these Laws, contribute to a longer Continuance of Life, and the better preservation of it; which, in plain Terms, amounts only to thus much, (1) The *Abhorrence from Death and Poverty*, is only the

(1) *The Abhorrence from Death and Poverty*, &c.] Truth being the Rule of Action, the Wisdom of God has so ordered Matters, that we never deviate from Truth, the Truth of the Case, but we find an Inconvenience proportionable to the Deviation from it. This has led some to imagine, that all *Obligation* arises solely from the *Good* or *Evil* which is annexed to, or consequent upon, the Performance or Nonperformance of an Action: And, that no one is *obliged* to follow Truth, because it is reasonable, but because of the *Convenience* or *Inconvenience* attending his Obedience.

It is true, that God has so contrived and made Things, that Happiness or Misery shall follow the Performance or Non-performance of certain Actions: But Happiness or Misery do not *make* the Rule of Action, but *suppose* it: They are the *Motives* or *Reasons* why we should carefully attend to *Truth*: And because *we* might be negligent, or might even wilfully transgress our Duties, therefore God has annexed these as Sanctions to what is the Rule of Action. The Law of any Superior is the Rule which the Subject is to follow: And the *Penalty* is not the Law itself, but the *Sanction* of the Law. And as the Sanctions of a Law are not the Law, so are they not designed to *create*, but to *enforce* the Obligation. Pleasure or Pain annexed to a Law, do suppose, that a Person will observe his Duty, rather than forfeit, or not enjoy the one, or bear the other; but if he be so resolute and determined as to submit to the Pain, or to despise the Pleasure, —is his Duty altered, or is he less a Criminal? No, the Reason of the Thing; its being agreeable to *Truth*, makes it constantly fit to be done, and induces that moral Quality called *Obligation*; and the Happiness annexed to the Law, *i. e.* the good or evil Consequences attending it, are *Enforcements*, or Motives, constantly to adhere to what is *true*.

However difficult it may be, in certain Cases, to discover *Truth*, or to comprehend the true Circumstances and Relations of Things, yet it must be observed that *moral Truths* are generally intelligible: The People of ordinary Capacities can converse together, they can make use of affirmative and negative Propositions; they can do this long together, and upon various Subjects; and if they fall into any Mistake, they are capable of being easily set right in all such Cases, and they presently see and own their Error. All this cannot be done without perceiving very much Truth. And indeed the Minds of Men are so framed, that Truth is as obvious to them, when the Terms made use of to express it are clear, as Colours are to their Eyes, or Sounds to their Ears. But then, as Art may mix many Ingredients of divers Sorts, and compound a Colour that cannot be expressed by Words, or perhaps distinguished by the Eye from another that very nearly approaches it; so a Case may be so perplexed, by interweaving of many Circumstances, that no one can be able to understand or determine what is the Truth. Whenever this happens, a Man must be liable to Blame for acting at all; because the Truth

of

the *Love of Life and Wealth:* As he, for Inſtance, who, by joining together two Negatives, ſays, that he is *not willing to want Life* (*i. e.* not willing not to have it) ſays only juſt the ſame, as if he affirmed that he is deſirous to enjoy Life.

To

of the Caſe is ſo involved, and ſo many Circumſtances are not ſeen, that he ought not to act, as having no Rule to direct him.

The great Objection againſt making Truth the Rule or Law of Action, may now receive an eaſy Solution. 'Tis urged, That if Truth be the Rule of Action, and every Action be good that agrees to *Truth*, then every Action will be good. "For there being as many "Truths concerning Vice as Virtue, this will "make the Obligation to purſue the one, as "great as the Obligation to purſue the other; "*e. g. Robbery diſturbs Society, diſcourages Induſtry.* Theſe are Truths concerning Vice: "Ought we to act according to them?" If the following of Truth be the Thing that makes an Action virtuous or good, our Obligations will be as many and as ſtrong for following Vice; ſince, in this Caſe, Actions will agree to Truth in one Caſe, as much as in the other.

The Anſwer is, *Firſt*, Suppoſe that oppoſite or contrary Truths may be formed about any Thing, *e. g. Injuſtice deſtroys Society—Juſtice preſerves Society:* This is nothing but the ſame Truth maintained under different Expreſſions. *e. g.* Injuſtice is the ſame with *Not Juſtice* or *minus Juſtice*; and to *deſtroy* is equal to *not preſerve.* Now, two Negatives being equal to an Affirmative, or deſtroying each other, 'tis plain that *minus Injuſtice deſtroys*, is equal to *Juſtice preſerves* Society; ſo that oppoſite Truths may be in Reality nothing elſe but the ſame Truth differently expreſſed. Biſhop *Cumberland* has very juſtly obſerved, *Scilicet, fuga mortis & egeſtatis eſt amor vitæ ac divitiarum; uti, qui, per duo negativa dicit ſe nolle vitâ carere (id eſt eam habere) tantundem dicit, ac ſi affirmaret velle ſe vitâ frui.* De Leg. Nat. Prolegom. Sect. XIV. *The flying from Death and Poverty, is the Love of Life and Riches: As he that, by two Negatives, ſays, he will not want Life, ſays the ſame as if he had affirmed, that he would have Life.*

Should it be inſiſted on, that oppoſite Truths are quite different in themſelves, and are not a Difference in Expreſſion only; that Injuſtice is not the ſame with Not Juſtice, but ſomething poſitive in itſelf,—then I ſay, *Secondly*, That the Truth of a ſingle Propoſition is not, or may not be, THE Truth, the whole Truth, the Truth of the Caſe, but only a Part of the Truth. Suppoſe a Felon were to be tried for any Act of Felony of which he is really guilty, he may, in his own Defence, own many Truths, or true Propoſitions, but yet not own THE Truth; which, unleſs it can be come at by Witneſſes, or Circumſtances, may continue unknown. So in the preſent Caſe, it is a true Propoſition, that Injuſtice is deſtructive of Society; but then, to act upon ſuch a Propoſition, does not make the Action good, becauſe many other Truths muſt be violated by him that will deſtroy Society; and, conſequently, he does not act upon the Truth of the Caſe.

Here, therefore, is a ſtrange Paralogiſm offered by Means of the Word *Truth.* This Term ſignifies a true Propoſition; and it likewiſe ſignifies (as it always does in the preſent Subject) the Truth of the Caſe; all the Circumſtances of the Thing; all the Relations that are concerned. A true Propoſition ſometimes ſignifies the whole Truth, or the Truth of the Caſe; and then to act upon ſuch a true Propoſition, is following THE Truth. But when a true Propoſition does not contain or expreſs the whole Truth of a Caſe, he that acts upon ſuch a Truth may be guilty of enormous Wickedneſs: Whereas he that acts upon THE Truth of the Caſe, never can be guilty of any Evil. Indeed, no Inſtance can be put, where a Man ſhall act upon THE Truth, and be guilty of any Vice; becauſe THE Truth cannot lie on both Sides of any Practice whatever. There may, indeed, be ſome true Propoſitions made on both Sides of a Caſe; but ſome Truth is not the whole Truth: And, conſequently, it is nothing to the Purpoſe to make Objections which are founded only upon an Equivoque in the Word *Truth.*

It may be ſaid, perhaps, That he that acts an unjuſt, wicked, or villainous Part, acts truly ſuch a Part; and the Truth of the Caſe is, that it is a villainous Part. But then, this villainous Part cannot be acted, without breaking thro' the real Relations of Things, or that Truth of Circumſtances, or Habitudes, which ought to have been obſerved; and conſequently the Offender muſt be guilty of Sin, becauſe he does not follow THE Truth: For THE Truth can never be on the Side of Wickedneſs

To all that has here been ſaid, we alſo further add, That the very Laws of Civil Society are, if I determine the Matter right, much more firmly eſtabliſhed upon that *End*, which not only the Lawgivers had in view when they enacted theſe Laws, but upon that *End* alſo, which the beſt and moſt civilized

in any poſſible Caſe, unleſs both Sides of a Contradiction may be true.

The different Manners of expreſſing themſelves, has led ſome to imagine a Difference between Writers, who have treated on the Foundations of Morality, who yet really mean one and the ſame Thing. Some call it *Truth*; others, the *Nature of Things*; others uſe the Terms *Fitneſs*, *Agreement*, or *Relation* of Things to one another. Theſe Terms, when explained, all ſtand for very nearly the ſame Ideas; and if People were not diſputatious, any one of them might be uſed to expreſs the Rule of Action. *Truth* is a general Word, that comprehends all the Relations of Things to one another. The *Nature of Things* is their Eſſence, or what makes them what they are; and in courſe it comprehends their Properties and Qualities, and Reſpects to one another. When the Term *Relations* of Things is uſed, their Eſſences are not conſidered, but merely their Habitudes to one another. By *Fitneſs* and *Unfitneſs*, *Agreement* or *Diſagreement*, is ſuppoſed ſuch an actual Application of Things to one another; from whence we are enabled to perceive their Tendency, or not Tendency, to that for which we ſay they are fit, or their Agreeableneſs or Diſagreeableneſs to ſuch or ſuch Purpoſes. By *Reaſon of Things*, we mean their Properties, or Ratio's. And if we underſtand theſe Terms when we treat of Quantity, as in *Figures*, *Lines*, &c. what ſhould hinder us from underſtanding Reaſon, Fitneſs, Agreement in moral Science, which we underſtand ſo clearly in Mathematics.

Moral Rectitude, or moral Pravity, do not ariſe from any natural Good or Evil annexed to the Rule, but from the Agreement to, or Diſagreement from, the Rule itſelf to which the Action is referred: And this the Term *Rectitude* implies.

It matters little to enquire in this Place, how far a ſuperior, intelligent Being may conſider the Diſpoſitions in free, imperfect Creatures, to follow or to ſwerve from Right, and, conſequently, how fit it is to annex Pleaſure or Pain, *i. e.* Rewards or Puniſhments, to the Diſpoſitions in Men, who pay Obedience or Diſobedience to his Laws. The Point here is, what is THE *Law?* And this is, as I have obſerved, not the *Sanction* of the Law; for if it were, then the Terms would be identical, and you might uſe indifferently *Law*, and *Sanction of a Law*, *i. e.* the Whole or Part indiſcriminately. But take the *Truth* of Things, or the Reaſon of Things, to be the Law; and ſuppoſe the Action referred to it to agree or diſagree with it; and then the *Rectitude* or *Obliquity* of the Action will inſtantly be ſeen.

It is true, in Fact, that God has annexed *Pleaſure* or *Pain* to moral Actions, by poſitive Law, as he has natural Conveniencies or Inconveniencies to *natural* Actions; if this be what makes Obligation, it would be abſurd to ſay that God is under *Obligation*, ſince he cannot have any Happineſs added to what he enjoys, or any Miſery inflicted on him. But let it be conſidered, that God has a Rule or Law of Action, as certain as Man or any other intelligent Being has; that he conforms his Actions to that Rule or Law; that his Perception of Truth, or the true Relations of Things to one another, does in Strictneſs *oblige* him to act agreeably to them; that he would not be *good* or *juſt*, if he treated Goodneſs and Wickedneſs, Virtue and Vice, as the ſame Thing, or if he did not conform his Actions to the Reaſon of Things.—Let this, I ſay, be conſidered, and it will again be evident, that Happineſs, or Miſery, Pleaſure or Pain, is not the Rule or Law of his Actions, but *Truth*; and that which *obliges* Him, *obliges* us, and all intelligent Beings; and this ſhews us in what the *Rectitude* of Actions conſiſts.

This cannot be expreſſed in too many different Manners, becauſe it is a Matter of the greateſt Importance. Men may frame to themſelves a different Rule or Law of Action, and it may poſſibly lead them right, as it coincides with this which is the Way of God himſelf. They may inſiſt upon the *Moral Senſe*, or upon the *Divine Will*, or they may join to theſe the *Reaſon of Things*, and found Morality on them *all* conjoined. But the *Moral Senſe* is either the ſame with the Perception and Judgment paſſed on moral Ideas, and then it is only a different Expreſſion for the Power by which we perceive and judge of *all* Ideas, as well moral as others; or elſe it is a Word without any Meaning. The *Divine*

Will

civilized Members of Society had agreed upon, conſented to, and eſtabliſhed as the beſt.—And this End, moſt certainly, is the public, common Good of the Whole; which Good implies in it ſome certain Happineſs, the ſeveral Parts and Portions of which are diſpenſed to the good Members of the Community; and, by Conſequence, are the natural Rewards of Obedience: Not to mention thoſe Puniſhments which theſe ſame Laws denounce and threaten; which Denunciations and Threats may, perhaps, influence ſome few only;—and thoſe even the very baſeſt and worſt of Mankind.

SECT. XV.

WE here, then, briefly demonſtrate, in our moral Propoſition, the conciſe Rule, not only of all the Precepts of the Law of Nature, but alſo of ſuch Sanctions as are inſeparably annexed to them; as alſo the Corollary which follows from this Propoſition, concerning oppoſite Acts of Behaviour.

The Subject of this Propoſition is the ſtudious Concern, according to the beſt of our Abilities, about the common Good of the whole Syſtem of rational Agents: In which Concern, according to the beſt of our Abilities, is expreſſed our Love towards God and Man, who are conſtituent Agents of this univerſal Syſtem. God, to be ſure, is the principal Agent; Mankind the ſubordinate Parts, ſubject to his all-wiſe Direction: Benevolence, then, as reſpectively conſidered, in relation to both, comprehends Piety and Humanity, or the Love of God and of all Mankind; that is, in other Words, the Laws of the two Tables of the Ten Commandments, as deducible from Nature. The Predicate, *Secondly*, of this Propoſition, effectually ſecures the Good and Happineſs of all ſingle, individual Parts; in the collective Sum of which ſingle Individuals, is eſſentially blended our own private Happineſs, as we are inſeparable Parts of ſuch Individuals collectively taken.

In the Predicate, therefore, of this Propoſition, as all the poſſible Kinds of Good, which we are capable of performing towards ALL, are ſaid to be the Effects of this ſtudious, active, benevolent Propenſity, ſo in the midſt of all our other Regards, we muſt not neglect the collective Sum of all thoſe ſeveral Kinds of Good, in the which our own reſpective, private Happineſs eſſentially conſiſts and is interwoven: Which private Happineſs of each is the principal, chief Reward of our Obedience, as ariſing from

Will, if by that be meant Revelation, it is nothing to the preſent Purpoſe: If by it be meant what is diſcoverable by our Reaſon rightly applied, it is the ſame as *Truth*: If by it be meant, that God *made* all Things as they are; and that therefore their particular Relations did not, or could not have ſubſiſted, unleſs he had made Things as he *has*.—This is true, but nothing to the Purpoſe.

the Reaſons and Natures of Things: Whereas, on the contrary, from a different Behaviour, Miſery is the Conſequence, is the unavoidable Puniſhment of ſuch malignant Iniquity. The Connexion, therefore, between the Subject and Predicate of this Propoſition is very natural; it is the ſolid Foundation of all that Truth contained in the Propoſition itſelf; and it is a ſure Criterion, or a Characteriſtic Mark, of that Coherence or Agreement which naturally unites Obedience and Rewards, as alſo, Tranſgreſſion and Puniſhments.

From all which Reaſonings the Reader may, indeed, eaſily obſerve the true Reaſon why this practical Propoſition, and all the Concluſions deducible from it, ought to oblige and bind all rational Agents, who are capable of knowing what the Propoſition means: When, at the ſame Time, other Propoſitions, as for Inſtance, the Propoſitions in Geometry, are as deeply impreſſed by Nature, and conſequently by Almighty God (the Author of Nature) upon the human Mind: And yet that thoſe other Propoſitions do not oblige Mankind to regulate their Practice by them:—Nay,—ſo far from it, that ſuch Propoſitions may, without the leaſt Danger of Puniſhment or Penalty, be neglected by the Generality of Mankind, who have not the leaſt Occaſion for ſuch practical, geometrical Operations.

The whole Strength of Argument, in theſe different Caſes, muſt be drawn from the quite different Effects evidently appearing in the one and the other Kinds of Operations. For, the Effects of Practical Geometry are ſuch, as the Generality of Mankind may ſafely want, and without the leaſt Damage: Whereas,—the Effects of a ſtudious, diligent Propenſity towards the *Common Good*, are Effects which intimately concern the *Sum Total*, the *Aggregate Whole*, and of which we ourſelves are ſo many inſeparable Parts.

Now, upon the united Inclinations and Endeavours of the Whole, ſo neceſſarily depends the Happineſs of each Individual; inſomuch that (without the utmoſt Hazard and Danger of loſing either the Happineſs itſelf, or at leaſt the Proſpect of it) ſuch a benevolent Propenſity in each cannot be laid aſide. And this is the very Point of Inſtruction which Almighty God has revealed to us in the very Nature of Things themſelves.

From whence it demonſtrably follows, That Almighty God has clearly diſcovered to us, that he himſelf is the Author of that Connexion which evidently exiſts between theſe Rewards or theſe Puniſhments, and human Actions.

Upon the ſame ſolid Foundation of Reaſoning it is, that not only this Propoſition itſelf, but alſo all the Propoſitions contained in it, are, from the Power and Authority of Almighty God, well known to receive and carry in them the full Obligation and Sanction of Laws.

SECT.

SECT. XVI.

BUT it is farther evident, from the very Terms of our grand Moral Propoſition, that the full, adequate, and immediate *Effect* of that Practice and Behaviour, upon which the Sanction of this Law is eſtabliſhed, muſt be pleaſing in the Sight of God, and prove moſt wholeſome and beneficial to all Mankind; becauſe, in Reality, it *is* the natural Good of all thoſe ſeveral Parts, which conſtitute and make up the whole Syſtem of rational Agents: Nay,—and what is even ſtill more, that this Effect is the greateſt, moſt ſubſtantial Good, of all thoſe various and different Kinds of Good, which, either, the whole is capable of receiving, or which can be conferred upon it; becauſe, ſuch a Good as this is a much larger, a much more extenſive Good, than any Good of the like Kind which concerns a ſingle Part, or ſome ſingle Parts only, in the general Syſtem.

The Law of Nature carries in it the higheſt natural Good, and as ſuch muſt be moſt pleaſing both to God and Man.

What the beſt Effect is.

But, beſides all this, it is ſufficiently intimated in this Propoſition, that the private Happineſs of each, and all Individuals reſpectively, is and muſt be derived from the moſt perfect State and Condition of the whole Syſtem. But more eſpecially ſince the very Sanction itſelf of this Law eſſentially depends, upon either the Attainment or Privation of ſuch private Happineſs.

Such an eſſential Connexion, therefore, between the Happineſs of the Whole, and of all its Parts, operates and influences ALL, juſt as the Nouriſhment of each ſingle Member in the animal Oeconomy, is derived from the Nouriſhment of the whole Maſs of Blood, as ſecerned and diffuſed thro' all the diſtinct, ſeveral Parts. *See* Chap. 7. Sect. 1.

From hence, therefore it appears, that this very beſt Effect, which we are now ſpeaking of, cannot be, to be ſure, any minute Particle of it, the private Happineſs, for Inſtance, of any one ſingle Man: But, on the contrary, the Effect here meant is, the prineipal End which the Lawgiver, who framed it, had in view, as well as the principal End of all inferior Agents, who act in true Obedience to the Divine Will.

This very beſt Effect is not the private Happineſs of any one Individual only.

By the like Chain of Reaſoning it is alſo, from hence, evident, that all ſuch human Acts as are, from their own natural, innate Force and Efficacy, fitted to ſubſerve and miniſter to the common Good, may very juſtly be termed *Acts naturally good*; and are, in Reality, Acts of a more perfect, of a more excellent Nature, than ſuch as are only fitted and miniſter to the private Good of any one ſingle Man. And the Difference between theſe two Sorts of Acts is juſt in the ſame exact Proportion, as the common Good is preferrable and more excellent than any private Good whatſoever.

What Acts are naturally good.

And, according to juſt the ſame Analogy of Reaſoning, ſuch Acts which, in the ſhorteſt Method, produce the principal Effect as their chief End, are, in their own Nature, Acts ſtrait and right, upon account of

Acts, which in the ſhorteſt Way produce the beſt End, are right, taken from a right Line.

of that natural Similitude which they bear to a right Line; which Line, between any two given Points, is always the ſhorteſt.

Human Acts are called morally good, when they are found to agree with the Rule, &c.

Theſe very ſame Acts, however, when they come afterwards to be compared with any Law (whether natural or inſtituted) as the Rule of Action; and, when ſuch Acts are found to agree, and are conformable to ſuch a *Law* or *Rule*, they then are called *morally good*, or exactly ſtrait and right, *i. e.* they are well and exactly fitted to ſuch a Rule. For, the Rule itſelf is called ſtrait and right, becauſe it directs and ſhews the ſhorteſt Way to the End propoſed.

The Doctrine applied to Mankind.

In like Manner, alſo; ſince the State or Condition of the whole, univerſal, human Species, is moſt amply furniſhed by Nature with excellent Endowments, both of Mind and Body; with an exact Fitneſs, Symmetry and Proportion of Parts; and all naturally adapted to produce the very beſt End: Such a State or Condition of Being as this, is, in its own genuine Nature, the moſt beautiful; becauſe, ſuch a State or Condition exactly correſponds to the Definition of Beauty, which [Definition] is drawn from the Figure, the Comelineſs, and Symmetry or Proportion of Parts. —And, from hence it is manifeſt, that all thoſe Acts which are ſo conſtituted and produced as to be, from their own inherent, natural Energy, fitted either to conſtitute, model, erect, eſtabliſh, or preſerve ſo bleſſed a State as this, are termed, and very deſervedly, *beautiful* or *decent*, *handſome*, *comely*, *becoming*. And, from hence we may arrive at ſome diſtinct Notion of the (Τὸ καλὸν & Τὸ πρέπον *ſive*) Decorum which, in the Practice of Virtue, is ſo often celebrated by the Philoſophers.

Beauty defined.

The Decorum of the Ancients.

Laſtly, Since in our third Chapter *(De Bono Naturali*, concerning *Good)* we have very largely explained, That Good may, and can, very well be explained, underſtood, and appear amiable and lovely, and without any Regard to *Self-love:* No one can be at a Loſs in acknowledging, that ſuch a Good as this is in itſelf deſirable; which Good comprehends, in the very Nature and Conſtitution of it, all Kinds of Good univerſally and reſpectively relative to all: And, for which Reaſon, ſuch a Kind of Good is not at all ſuited to ſtoop and bend to the Happineſs of any one ſingle Man only, whoſe Happineſs is ſo very minute a Particle of ſo extended and general a Good.

Honeſtum & Decorum.

In exactly the ſame Manner of Reaſoning it is evident, that Acts ſuited to anſwer this End, as being the beſt and moſt beautiful, are, in their own Nature, amiable, lovely, and highly worthy of the Praiſe and Commendation of all rational Agents; and conſequently (upon account of that exalted Honour, of which, from their univerſally beneficent Nature, they are worthy) may deſervedly and juſtly be termed *Acts in themſelves honeſt*, or *commendable and decent.*

We judge it convenient to preſs home upon our Readers, in a more earneſt Manner than uſual, theſe Points, leſt any one ſhould vainly imagine that we have not, as amply as we ought, acknowledged the ſeveral Perfections of Religion, Piety, or univerſal Love and Charity, ſince we

have

have traced to their Source the Sanction of thoſe Laws by which ſuch Acts [*i. e.* of Piety or Charity] are principally governed, from that ſure Felicity which is annexed to the Obſervance of each of them, as well as that ſure Miſery which unavoidably follows the Breach and Violation of all or any one of them. For, even in the inſtituted Laws of Civil Society themſelves, the Sanctions of them are clearly diſtinguiſhed from the principal End and adequate Effect of them, namely, the public Good: A material Part, however, of that Effect which ariſes from the Civil Law, is either an Infliction of Puniſhment, or an Encouragement by Reward, as the Sanction upon which the Law itſelf is confirmed, ratified and eſtabliſhed.

Rewards and Puniſhments are the Sanctions of a Law.

SECT. XVII.

BUT—ſince the cloſe and neceſſary Conſequence of Rewards and Puniſhments, from ſuch Acts as are agreeable or contrary to the public Good, ſeems ſomewhat obſtructed, and not ſo immediate, upon account of that old Objection, *That Evil happens to the Good, and Good to the Evil*, we judge it neceſſary to enquire ſomewhat more critically into this Objection, and to ſhew (notwithſtanding all which poſſibly may, and can, be ſaid againſt it) that this cloſe, neceſſary Conſequence, or Connexion, is ſo uniform and evident, in the very *Nature of Things, and of Man*, as from thence certainly to conclude, with Certainty, what that Sanction is which enforces ſome Sorts of Acts, and prohibits others. However, we only, at the preſent, ſuppoſe and take for granted, what, hereafter, ſhall appear upon demonſtrative Proof,—namely,—That ſuch a Reward, or ſuch a Puniſhment, is ſo effectual and binding, as to conſtitute the Sanction of a Law, whoſe true Value (all Circumſtances conſidered) vaſtly exceeds the whole Weight of Advantage reſulting from any Act which violates this Law.

It is neceſſary to premiſe here two Cautions: The firſt is, That upon an exact Compariſon, and a fair Counterpoſition of ſuch Effects as immediately ariſe from different Actions, whether good or evil, we are not to admit the Calculation or Value of ſuch Good or Evil, as is not within the Sphere either of our own Skill, or of our own Prudence, to procure or avoid. Such, for Inſtance, is all that Good or Evil, which is laid in what we call a *Natural Neceſſity*. Neither are we, in the next Place (by way of ſecond Caution) to allow in the Account, any Event which caſually, and by Accident, happens. And the Reaſon is, becauſe theſe two Kinds of Good and Evil generally do and muſt happen, promiſcuouſly and indifferently, both to *Good* and *Bad*. Whereas the only Good and Evil, from whence we here make the Eſtimates of our moral Calculation, are ſuch as lye within the Power of human Reaſon, and as they depend (ſo far as, and no farther than they do depend) upon the Freedom of human Action.

Here,

Here, then, having premiſed, as proved and taken for granted, this one general Argument, drawn and deduced from this one known Maxim, —namely,—THAT each and all of the conſtituent Parts, or Individuals, in any Whole, who either act for or againſt the common, the public Good, are Members or Parts of every ſuch Whole.—And from hence our Argument ariſes, which is, THAT every ſuch Whole is either preſerved or deſtroyed, by the Power and Operation of all its Individuals, or Parts, reſpectively.

From hence, on the contrary, by a neceſſary Conſequence, it follows, That every and all ſuch ſingular Parts, or Individuals, receive either Advantage or Loſs, juſt in the ſame Proportion as ſuch an univerſal Whole is differently affected by Good and Evil.

Thus far, I ſay, being premiſed, we ſhall now proceed more diſtinctly to ſuch direct and ſpecial Proofs as are drawn either, partly, *Firſt*, from the Cauſes which conſtitute ſuch Acts; and this is the Subject Matter of our Second Chapter, *Concerning Human Nature and Right Reaſon.* Or, partly, in the *ſecond* Place, ſuch Proofs are drawn from the genuine Effects and natural Conſequences of ſuch Acts, concerning which we treat more at large in our Fifth Chapter, wherein we diſcourſe upon the *Law of Nature and its Obligation.*

This Fifth Chapter is, indeed, by far the longeſt, and the leaſt clear of any in our Book: And the Reaſon is, becauſe in this Chapter I am under the unavoidable Neceſſity, often, of purſuing my Adverſary, Mr. *Hobbes*, thro' that wildeſt State of Confuſion upon which he builds his whole Scheme and Hypotheſis; that, hence, I may, from his own Conceſſions, be able to anſwer and confute him.

There is alſo another Reaſon why this Fifth Chapter is longer and more intricate; Becauſe I was under as ſtrong a Neceſſity alſo of anſwering ſeveral Objections ſtarted, not only by Mr. *Hobbes*, but by much ſounder Philoſophers likewiſe.

For theſe Reaſons I judged it proper to lay before my Readers, in this preliminary Diſcourſe, but as conciſely as poſſible, not only the Plan and Deſign which I have there purſued, but alſo by what a Chain of Reaſoning all that is there ſaid tends to prove my main Point. For, had I not uſed ſo clear and ſuccinct an Account, my Readers might imagine, that in ſo complicated a Multiplicity of Matter, I had taken them from the ſtrait Path of Truth into the Wanderings and Mazes of Error.

SECT. XVIII.

THE efficient Cauſes of human or moral Acts, are the Powers and Capacities of Soul and Body.

Now, ſince, upon this Suppoſition, it is an evident Point, as I have before obſerved, That Happineſs (*i. e.* the higheſt Reward we are capable of)

of) is eſſentially and inſeparably connected with the fulleſt, moſt aſſiduous Exerciſe of all our Capacities and Powers, as applicable to thoſe ſeveral Objects, and to the nobleſt and beſt Effects which are adequate, correſpondent, and fully proportionate to them. We from hence collect, that Men endowed with theſe Capacities and Powers, are naturally obliged, under the Penalty of forfeiting their whole Happineſs, to employ them about ſuch Objects as are, in the Nature of Things, the moſt noble, the moſt excellent. Theſe Objects are, namely, 1. God. 2. The human Kind, made (and with ſo cloſe a Reſemblance) in God's Image, and after his Likeneſs.

Neither can it be long a Matter of any Doubt, whether our Faculties are more happily employed in cultivating with both God and Man, a right Underſtanding and Friendſhip; rather than in drawing upon ourſelves their Enmity and Hatred; or in eſtabliſhing Peace, than in waging War with them.

For it is evident, that there cannot be ſo even a State of Neutrality, wherein our Love to God and Man are equally indifferent; or, wherein the Ballance of Agreeable and Diſagreeable is exactly equal: But, more particularly, when our Affections and Paſſions cannot but diſcover themſelves by ſome outward, viſible Signs, ſuch as Words and Geſtures. Becauſe, take the Suppoſition either Way, we are under a Neceſſity, either, *Firſt*,—To exert ſome Care, leſt any one Individual be deprived of ſuch Means as are neceſſary to his well-being and Happineſs; which Care or Concern cannot be ſhewn without ſome Benevolence. Or—*Secondly*,—That we, by a deliberate Choice, deprive him actually of any one or more of theſe Means and Bleſſings: And ſuch a wilful Violation of Truth and Juſtice as this, is certainly an infallible Mark of a malevolent Mind.

If then, upon the Suppoſition that we have a natural Deſire of Happineſs implanted in us, we are under the unavoidable Neceſſity of gaining and procuring to ourſelves the Good-will and Favour both of God and Man; the Sanction, then, of that univerſal, natural Law (which is the only one Point I am now ſo ſtudious to defend) becomes, at once, clear and undeniable. For, the Sanction of this one, ſingle Law, eſtabliſhes the Whole of Natural Religion, as well as all ſuch Means as are neceſſary to the true Happineſs of all Mankind.

And under theſe two principal Articles are comprehended (beſides thoſe Duties which we owe to God, and to the reſt of our Superiors)

Firſt, All thoſe Treaties and pacific Agreements about Trade and Commerce, which ſubſiſt between different Nations; and, in the Preſervation of which, the Laws of Nations, in general, are principally employed and concerned.

Secondly, The eſſential Conſtitution, *i. e.* the Preſervation of every Civil Society, as cemented and united by human, inſtituted Laws.

Thirdly, The whole Security of Family-kindred, Conſanguinity, Natural Alliance, Friendſhip, Dependance, and all ſuch ſeveral Relations of Duty.—And—upon this third Kind of Duties and Obligations, not only thoſe general Laws which ſettle the public Tranquillity of Nations, but alſo the ſpecial Laws of Oeconomy and Family-affairs are employed. In a Word, there are (in this Fifth Chapter, concerning the *Law of Nature and its Obligation)* a large Collection of ſuch Materials and Topics, each of which, in ſome Degree or other, is capable of ſome Application and Practice, in ſo large and extended a Society; or, at leaſt, they all carry in them ſome Tendency, either near or remote, towards a right Diſcipline.

There is, however, here, one Requeſt which I make to the Reader, and that is, not to conſider the Topics and Materials of this Fifth Chapter, or the Reaſonings upon them, in a divided, ſeparate View; but, on the contrary, as linked and connected together. From whence by the united, collected Strength of them all into one ſingle Point, the one chief Demonſtration in our View may ariſe, which proves the full Sanction of this ſo univerſal a Law:—And,—the Sanction is this, *viz.*—That Mankind neceſſarily muſt fail of their principal, ultimate Happineſs, (which, *i. e.* principal, ultimate Happineſs, is laid in the Exerciſe, or the genuine, adequate, compleat, full Uſe of their Faculties and Powers) unleſs they habitually exert all their Faculties and Powers, in procuring the Love and Favour both of God and Man: And that this is the End, above all others, in the effectual Attainment of which all our Capacities and Powers are naturally framed, and moſt fitly adapted. And this is the very Point which proves, that all the Tranſgreſſors of this natural Law are without the leaſt Excuſe.

SECT. XIX.

NOW, it is by this Method and Chain of Reaſoning we demonſtrate, from the natural Effects of the free Powers in rational Agents, That the Sanction of this Law is eſſentially laid in Rewards and Puniſhments.——From whence it clearly follows,

Firſt, That, by Vertue of theſe our ſtudious and diligent Endeavours, we are obliged to love and honour God as the only, one, infinitely wiſe Being, and the principal Benefactor of all other rational Agents.

2*dly*, From hence it follows, in the ſecond Place, that we are to protect, as much as in us lies, the Lives, and all the Bleſſings thereunto belonging, of all Mankind, let their Kindred, Country, Nation or People be what they will.

3*dly*, With a View to this principal End, *i. e.* the common Good, it likewiſe follows (as a neceſſary Concluſion, which could be eaſily demonſtrated, if Occaſion required it) That all Civil Government is, at firſt, moſt

moſt firmly eſtabliſhed upon the Principles of Liberty and Property; and that, in every Civil Eſtabliſhment thus conſtituted, the Security and Continuance of it are preſerved with the moſt perfect and rational Liberty.

4thly, and Laſtly, from hence it follows, upon the ſame Principle, That all ſuch Bleſſings and Advantages, as are diſtributed and portioned out to Individuals (in which Number we muſt always neceſſarily include each of ourſelves) conſiſtent with the Truth and Reaſon of the Whole, can avail nothing without the Protection and Defence of the whole ſocial Syſtem, derived upon every ſuch Individual.

The Sagacity of Man cannot diſcover, in human Nature, any one Principle, except ſuch a Propenſity as this, which ſo actively inclines towards the common Good of all; but more eſpecially if this Propenſity be directed by the Dictates of a prudent, wiſe Underſtanding. A Propenſity productive of the moſt and the higheſt Degrees of Good. And upon the Suppoſition that this ſtrong Propenſity be lodged in us, no one Act can be wiſhed for, deſired, or expected from us, which we will not, with all our Heart, and with all our Strength, execute and effect.

Wherefore, ſince ſuch Effects as theſe are certainly fore-known to follow, as neceſſary Conſequences, from this ſo noble a Propenſity, no one can be ignorant, that in theſe Effects are contained the preſent, ſolid Comforts and Joys of Religion, in Conjunction with that ſure and certain Hope of a bleſſed Immortality, inſeparably joined to ſuch preſent Happineſs. We may add alſo, as farther Conſequences, That the ſeveral Advantages of a quiet, peaceable Commerce with foreign Nations;——That all the Benefits of Civil Government, of our Family-affairs, and of private Friendſhips, are ſo inſeparably annexed to ſo generous, benevolent a Propenſity, as the Recompence and Rewards of it: And, moreover, that all theſe ſeveral Joys and Comforts, Advantages and Profits, cannot be ſecured by any Method different from this; neither is it within the Sphere of human Wiſdom and Sagacity, to deviſe or find out any other.—And therefore, it neceſſarily follows, That whoever (let him be who he will) throws off all Regard for the public Good, at the ſame Time rejects and lets go the only true efficient Cauſes and Means of his own private Happineſs; and in the Place ſubſtitutes and wilfully embraces the true efficient Cauſes and Means of his own Miſery and Ruin, as his impending, neceſſary Puniſhment. In a Word—Since from the Reaſon and Nature of Things, it is, to a Demonſtration evident, that the Sum Total of all that Happineſs (which, by Vertue of any Means in our own Power, we can procure to ourſelves) muſt ariſe from our ſincere Regards for true Piety and Peace, for mutual Traffic and Commerce between different Nations; from our real Concern for Civil Government and private Oeconomy; as well as for firm and laſting Friendſhips: And that all theſe Concerns and Regards, rationally and conſiſtently ſubſiſt in the Mind of, and only in the Mind of him, who is ſtudious and diligent about the common Good of

all rational Agents.——From hence, I ſay, it neceſſarily follows, that the moſt ſubſtantial Reward which any one can poſſibly acquire, is naturally and inſeparably joined to this ſo ſtudious an Inclination; and, that the abſolute Privation, or Want of ſuch a Reward, is as naturally and inſeparably annexed to an oppoſite Conduct and Behaviour.

The firſt of theſe, namely, that which aſſigns the Cauſes of ſuch an Happineſs, as Individuals uſually can and do procure to themſelves, we have proved, from ſuch Effects as are well tried by Experience, in Chapters the Sixth, Seventh and Eighth of this ENQUIRY.

The ſecond of theſe, namely, That the ſeveral Branches of Piety, and an univerſal Benevolence exerted reſpectively and in particular towards each, as well as in the general towards all, are comprehended under the ſtudious and diligent Concern for the public Good, we have demonſtated in the Definition and ſeveral Branches of what we underſtand by public Good, in the Corollaries or Conſectaries of Chapter the Ninth. And therefore, from theſe Premiſſes, the Concluſion is drawn as clearly diſcoverable, and known by the Light of Nature.

SECT. XX.

IT muſt, however, notwithſtanding the whole Force and Strength of my preſent Argument, at the ſame Time be acknowledged, That all theſe Effects are not within the limited Sphere of Power in each to compaſs;——but that many of them——very many of them——depend upon the Benevolence of other rational Agents, independent of us: Yet, ſince theſe rational Agents are endowed with a Nature *analagous, ſimilar, and very like to our own, we may fairly conclude, That Good, the public Good,* is the beſt, the moſt excellent *End* which they can propoſe to themſelves; and that their natural Perfection obliges them to act, as well for this very End, as upon account and for the ſake of any other End leſs beneficial and excellent: And beſides this, it is fully confirmed, by Experience, that ſuch Ends or Effects of univerſal Benevolence, which are not in our own Power, can generally be compaſſed by ſuch Acts of Behaviour as are within our own Power. Upon which Account, it is very juſt and reaſonable, that all ſuch Acts of our own ſhould be computed and valued amongſt thoſe Effects which ſuch Acts are capable of producing; or, at leaſt, as the Conſequences, generally ſpeaking, which happen and follow from them.—And, upon this one plain Maxim, *viz.*—"That every Act may "be eſteemed a Man's own, which he is able to operate and produce by "the Help and Aſſiſtance of his Friends."

The whole Return (which, according to the natural Conſtitution of the univerſal Frame, is the Recompence annexed to good Actions) very nearly, in ſome Points, reſembles the Emoluments and Profits of a public Revenue, in which the public Patrimony or Eſtate conſiſts: Which Patrimony,

mony, or Eſtate, is not made up of certain fixed Payments, equal Rents, and determinate Salaries, Allowances, Taxes, Contributions only; but, on the contrary, of numberleſs Taxes and Revenues, generally ſpeaking, contingent; and whoſe Value, altho' it be very ample and large, is not always of the ſame, one, clear, neat Profit; and yet ſuch Revenues are generally computed at one, certain, fixed Rate. Such, for Inſtance, are the Taxes which ariſe from Ports, *i. e.* Duties outward and inward, Turnpikes, public Roads, Bridges, *&c.*—And for which Reaſon (to bring this Compariſon cloſer to our Purpoſe)—In computing the Reward we are here ſpeaking of, not only thoſe particular, individual Parts of the Reward, which always, inſeparably belong to good Actions. Such, for Example, are,

1. That formal Beatitude, as it is phraſed (or that eſſential, inherent, intrinſic Happineſs) grounded upon the Knowledge and Love of God, and of Mankind, acting as in Conjunction with him [*i. e.* God] and perfectly conſiſtent with ſuch a Knowledge and Love.

2. The abſolute Dominion over all our Appetites and Paſſions.

3. The moſt harmonious Agreement between all the Principles of Action, and the whole Tenor of our Lives.

4. The Divine Favour.

And, 5. The ſure and certain Hope of a bleſſed Immortality ſo natural to Reaſon.——Such ſure and certain Portions and Parts of our Reward or Happineſs are, I ſay, not only to be taken into the Account—but—we alſo ought to bring into the Computation, ſuch Bleſſings or good Things as accidentally, as well as neceſſarily, belong to them. Such, for Inſtance, are the Advantages which accrue to us, from the Piety and Religion of others: Such Advantages as are derived upon us, either from Civil Society, or from Compacts and Agreements between different Nations, rather than ſuch Bleſſings, ſuch good Things, ſuch Parts or Portions of Happineſs as we can procure by Acts, ariſing from our own beſt Abilities merely.

By an equal Parity of Reaſoning, we diſcover, what are the conſtituent Parts of that whole Puniſhment which is inſeparably annexed to ſuch Acts as are detrimental to the public Welfare: Or, to expreſs my Meaning in fuller Terms, the Law prohibiting and forbidding ſuch Acts as theſe, truly and properly receive its Sanctions by Vertue of all theſe immediate Conſequences which follow from a Behaviour oppoſite to the Duties and Obligations I have but juſt now deſcribed.

SECT. XXI.

EVERY one of us, to be ſure, knows and underſtands, from the neceſſary Wants of that State and Condition wherein we are born and live, what *good Things of Life* theſe are, which we call *Contingent*; or, in other Words, we know how to calculate and make an Eſtimate of ſuch

Cauſes

Cauſes to come, which either may, or may not, produce ſuch or ſuch Effects. And upon the Strength of ſuch probable Chances, thus calculated, we are puſhed on to Action. Now, for Example, the very Air which we breath, with ſo vehement a natural Propenſity pant after, and earneſtly deſire to ſuck in, is not at all times ſalutary and healthful to our Blood, and animal Spirits; but, on the contrary, at ſome particular times, is impregnated with a deadly Contagion.

The other *Non Naturals* likewiſe, Meat, Drink, and the ſeveral Degrees of Exerciſe, for Inſtance, do not always preſerve Life; nay, ſo far from it, that they very often even create Diſeaſes: Nay, often Agriculture, and good Husbandry of Land, are at ſometimes ſo far from rewarding human Induſtry, that even Loſs enſues.—Mankind—however—nevertheleſs, are not leſs naturally inclined to purſue ſuch laudable Induſtry, in Hopes of the Advantages which, from ſuch Induſtry, may and will probably follow. Upon the like Proſpects and Expectations, we are induced and prompted to a ſtudious Concern for the common Good; which Proſpect or Expectation is not merely of itſelf the only, no, not even a principal Motive with us; any farther than as ſuch an Hope or Expectation conſpires and joins with thoſe Rewards, as before mentioned, which are, in their own Nature, inſeparably joined to ſuch an Hope or Expectation. Now, with how high a Degree of Probability we may hope that our Labours, employed for the Public, may and will be requited, by thoſe of Mankind in eſſential Conjunction, we ſhall be beſt enabled to calculate, if we conſider what we find true in Fact, upon our own Knowledge and Experience, as well as from the Hiſtories and Records of Ages paſt, concerning a Behaviour ſuitable to this End; and thoſe moral Inſtructions or Rules for Practice, which both theſe Evidences have diſcovered to us, opened and laid before us.

For, 1. In the Cuſtoms and Inſtitutions of all Nations whatſoever, a Regard is always had to the public *Worſhip of a Deity, of one Deity at leaſt*, if not more: By Vertue of which public, religious Sanction, all, upon faithful, ſolemn Engagements, are reſtrained and deterred from Perjury.

2. The moſt beneficial Trade and Commerce every where flouriſh, between Nations of any Note and Diſtinction, unleſs obſtructed by too frequent Wars.

3. Every where ſome Sort of Civil Government is preſerved, under whoſe Influence the ſeveral Diſtinctions of Power and Property are conſidered.

4. Every where, generally ſpeaking, the Ties and Obligations of Families and Friends are obſerved.

Now, ſince the whole Concern about the common Good, carries no other Meaning than the public Worſhip of a Deity, the Security of public Trade, a right Diſcipline both in Civil and Family Concerns, and the Obligations or Ties of Friendſhip, as the ſeveral conſtituent Parts of one univerſal WHOLE in eſſential Conjunction: It manifeſtly follows, that the Con-

cern

cern about ſo univerſal a Good as this, is, and may every where, more or leſs be, diſcovered amongſt Mankind; from whence, neceſſarily and of Courſe it muſt happen, that ſeveral Advantages, of mutual Peace and ſocial Aſſiſtance, may be, and are, conferred and beſtowed upon Individuals. Nay,——indeed it appears to me equal to any Demonſtration, that every one who has arrived at a State of Manhood, for every Year he has lived in ſuch a State, is much more indebted to that Care of others, which is employed for the public Good, than he is to his own Care; and which Care of his own, in all the tender Periods of his Life, was, indeed, next to nothing.

In the mature Period of Life, *i. e.* of Manhood, the whole of our preſent Being and Happineſs depends upon that Submiſſion and Obedience which thoſe around us pay to the Rules of Family-œconomy, to the Laws of Civil Government, and to the Precepts of Religion;—all which ſeveral Degrees of Obedience entirely flow and ariſe from a Concern for the public Good.

From whence it follows, That if, in any future Exigency of Time, we expoſe our Lives to Danger, nay,—even if we ſuffer Death itſelf, for the public Good, we are leſs Loſers upon this Account, than we were Gainers from it: For, upon the Suppoſition of a longer Life, we only loſe the uncertain Expectation of future Enjoyments: Nay, the Probability is by far ſtronger, that Individuals ſcarcely can entertain any Hope poſſible, where the Good of the Whole is quite deſtroyed; and the Reaſon of this Poſition plainly appears, becauſe, from the common Good, we derive the actual Poſſeſſion of Life, and of all thoſe Perfections with which we are bleſſed.

And—I am as equally ſure, that the moſt ſubſtantial Bleſſings which we reap in Civil Society from mutual Aſſiſtance, might have been diſcovered and fore-known by our Firſt Parents, from the very Nature of Man.——Provided always, that they had maturely weighed and determined this one Point within themſelves—namely—Whether their Poſterity would be more benefitted upon a Perſuaſion, that Piety towards God and our Parents, and mutual Good-will towards Men (under which two Heads is comprehended the Whole of Religion, of Civil Government, which firſt ſubſiſted in a private Family, and of National Right, or the Law of Nations) than by training them up in the abſtruſe, dark Contradictions of Atheiſm, or by exhorting them, that each might claim a Right and Property in and over all; and, by Conſequence, immediately hurry them into mutual Rapine, Violence and Blood.

But the natural good and evil Conſequences of ſuch human Acts as theſe are well known before-hand, ſince Almighty God has plainly declared to Mankind before-hand, whenever they deliberate upon any Act, whether it muſt or muſt not be done, and in ſuch a Manner of Declaration as to encourage them to, or to deter them from, acting under any given Circumſtances. So that theſe natural Conſequences carry in themſelves

ſelves the true Nature, the true Reaſon, of Rewards and Puniſhments, and upon which the Sanction, the Authority of a Law is grounded.

SECT. XXII.

THESE Points, therefore, appear to me of the moſt demonſtrable Certainty, ſince they carry ſo exact an Analogy to that Order and Method in which all brute Creatures are, by Inſtinct taught, That the healthful, vigorous State of all the individual Members in each animal Body, is and muſt be continued by proper Portions of Food for Suſtenance, and by regular Quantities of Air for breathing: Upon both which the juſt Conſiſtence of that vital Blood which animates and enlivens the whole animal Body, generally ſpeaking, immediately, entirely depends.—Altho' at the ſame time, it muſt be allowed, that either ſome inward, bodily Diſorders, or ſeveral caſual Accidents from without, as for Inſtance, Bruiſes, Contuſions, Wounds, Fractures, *&c.* may, at ſome particular times, prevent all that wholſome Strength and Nouriſhment generally acquired by Food and Air. We are, by an exact Similitude of Reaſoning, from ſuch Acts as (according to a regular Order of Things) prove miniſterial to the public Good, made acquainted with thoſe various Perfections and Abilities diſcoverable in human Agents, who are no other than Members and Parts of the rational Syſtem: Becauſe ſuch Perfections and Abilities do not leſs naturally flow from the common Good, than a Strength of Limbs, of our Hands, for Inſtance, flows from a proper Craſis and Conſiſtence in the whole Maſs of Blood.

It muſt, however, be confeſſed, that many accidental Cauſes happen, from whence this general Concern for the whole does not always produce that uninterrupted, pure Happineſs, which each of us, ſeparately and ſingly, ſo earneſtly deſires to enjoy. Thus, for Inſtance, our utmoſt Care and Caution in the Choice of Air and Aliments (how neceſſary ſoever they be to the Animal Oeconomy) don't guard us againſt Diſeaſes and Caſualties; for, it may happen, as well in the one Caſe, thro' the enormous, notorious Acts of ſome Individuals in a particular Society, juſt as it happens in the Body natural by Means of a diſtempered, unnatural Diſpoſition [διαθεσις] in ſome one Bowel; ſo the Caſe, I ſay, may be juſt the ſame from the Invaſions of foreign Enemies, that good Men happen to be deprived of the Rewards due to their worthy Deeds, and happen alſo to ſuffer Evils, which they have no way merited.

Since Evils, however, of this Sort are, indeed, often overcome and repulſed by the wholſome Operation of regular Diſcipline and Civil Government (which Kinds of Severity and Diſcipline always reſult neceſſarily from a ſtudious Care and Concern for the common Good): As alſo, ſince ſuch Evils are, after ſome tranſitory Suffering, by Means of our own Strength, in Conjunction with the Sanctions of Civil Authority, ſhaken off and removed:

moved: Juſt as Diſeaſes are diſperſed by Means of ſome happy Criſis or Turn for the better: As alſo ſince ſuch Evils are often largely recompenſed from ſome, much ſuperior Advantages, partly derived upon us by the good Offices of thoſe around us; but more eſpecially by the Vigour and Sanctions of Civil Power, as well as of thoſe Alliances which are entered into and guarantied with foreign States: From theſe ſeveral Cauſes it happens, that Mankind cannot probably, at any one particular Time, be totally deſtroyed: And—*Secondly*, For the very ſame Reaſons alſo it happens, that States and Empires muſt remain and endure much longer than any one Generation of Men, or of other Animals, altho' the longeſt lived whatſoever.

From all theſe Premiſſes, well weighed and duly conſidered, it is a clear Point, that the depraved Appetites and vicious Inclinations of ſome particular Men;—nay, even thoſe ſudden Hurries and Tranſports of Paſſion ſo common to all (and alſo ſo deſtructive of the common Good) cannot prove an Objection of any mighty Weight againſt acknowledging, that the ſtrongeſt, the moſt powerful Propenſities of all Mankind taken together, are carried, and bear a full Tendency, to that one Point or End which we daily ſee is purſued, intended, effected, and compleatly brought to paſs in general by them all. And this ultimate End, in the general aimed at by all, is the Preſervation, by a conſtant Progreſs in Perfection of the Whole: Any ſuch Objection, therefore, is only, in other Words, ſaying, that Diſeaſes, at any time generated in the Parts of animal Bodies, are Foundation ſufficient for denying that the whole Structure of an human Body, and the natural Offices of all its Parts, are contrived and fitted for the Preſervation of the Individual, for the Propagation of the Species, and for the Support of natural Energy and Power in all the Members, Limbs and Parts; and that for as long a Continuance as to a full End and Extent of that Period which God and Nature, in the ordinary Courſe of Things, have ordained and fixed for a Continuance here.

Now, upon this Foundation likewiſe it is, that not only the firſt Inſtitutions of all Civil Government, all original Commiſſions, Truſts, Deputations and Embaſſies, all ſolemn Leagues and Covenants between different and diſtinct Nations, were at firſt eſtabliſhed; but alſo the whole Execution, Diſcharge, Payment, Performance and Deſign of all ſuch Contracts, Engagements, Ratifications, public Faith and Agreements, are ſettled exactly upon the ſame Foundation.

For, upon the Violation of public Faith between Nations, the Tranſgreſſor (who in this Caſe ſtands as the acting Party) is obliged to fly for Protection to ſome other Nation in Alliance:—A ſure Proof that every ſuch Tranſgreſſor, in his own Judgment appears convicted, and ſtands ſelf-condemned.

Upon the ſame Foundation of Reaſoning, it is a Caſe equally clear, *viz.* That if at any time, one Religion be totally baniſhed and extirpated out of any Nation or People, and another Religion be immediately eſta-

bliſhed in its ſtead, it is, by this ſecond Eſtabliſhment of Religion, that every ſuch Nation or People endeavour to reconcile themſelves to the Favour and Acceptance of Almighty God.

Whenever any State or Kingdom is laid in Ruin, by either Civil Commotions or public War, another State or Kingdom immediately either ſtarts up, or is aggrandized out of its Ruins.

Now, all theſe Arguments only prove, that the whole Syſtem of rational Agents may, at leaſt upon an equal, if not a ſtronger Parity of Reaſon, be compared (as to the Preſervation of the Whole, and a ſubordinate Preſervation of all its Individuals) to the univerſal Syſtem of Nature. For the Laws in both appear to be theſe, *viz.* That from the Corruption of one Thing, ſprings up the Generation of another. And, *Secondly*,—That—in the Generation of Individuals in the animal Syſtem, all are naturally endowed with ſuch Powers, Capacities and Organs, as by the Exerciſe and Operation of which they may, for ſome certain Time, both preſerve themſelves and propagate their Species.

SECT. XXIII.

WE have hitherto, in this compendious Introductory Diſcourſe, delivered the Sum and Subſtance of that Method, whereby we have inveſtigated and traced out the Sanction of the Laws of Nature: Under this *Sanction* we have conſidered Happineſs, the natural Conſequence of good Acts, as the Reward annexed by the Author of Nature to ſuch Acts themſelves: And, on the contrary, that the Abſence, the Want of Happineſs, is by an equal Conjunction annexed as the Puniſhment to bad, unworthy Acts.

For, let the Degree of Good or Evil be what it will, which is connected to human Acts, the ſame Degree of each is, by the ſame neceſſary Connexion, contained and underſtood in thoſe practical Precepts which truly declare, what are the real Conſequences of ſuch Acts in themſelves. Becauſe God, according to our beſt Apprehenſions, declares thoſe particular Precepts to us: Which Precepts are neceſſarily ſuggeſted to our Minds, either from our own free Acts, or from thoſe of other rational Agents; as alſo, becauſe that theſe practical Precepts plainly lay before us what thoſe Effects are which naturally follow from them. For in theſe practical Precepts, declared to us by Almighty God from the Nature of Things, the Good and Evil annexed to human Acts, not only admoniſh us to perform ſome and to avoid others, but comprehend alſo, in the very Nature of them, the full Notion, the compleat Definition of Rewards and Puniſhments.

Here, then, I agree as well with one Sort of Moraliſts, who affirm Virtue to carry its own Reward; as well as I do with other Moraliſts, who extend their Views farther than the Enjoyment of Virtue, and expect from

from Almighty God and their own good Conſciences, from their Family and Friends, from their own Fellow-countrymen, and from Strangers, ſome certain Bleſſings, whether of Mind or Body, either temporal or eternal, as the Rewards of Virtue; and which, as they ſay, are natural Conſequences diſcoverable by the mere Dictates of Reaſon.

Now, our Method of Enquiry ſeems to acquire great Strength of Argument from this one Conſideration,—namely,—That all the Moral Writers, how widely ſoever they differ amongſt themſelves in other Points, are yet thus far agreed, which is; "That good and worthy Acts muſt, of "Neceſſity, be honoured and rewarded with ſuitable Returns; as alſo "that, in Fact, they really are honoured and rewarded."—And—on the contrary,—"That baſe, unworthy Acts muſt as neceſſarily be coerced "and reſtrained by ſuitable Puniſhments; and that they, in Fact, are ſo." In theſe Points Philoſophers are entirely agreed, how warmly ſoever they may differ and diſagree about other Matters.

In the ſame Points are alſo agreed the firſt Founders and Authors of all Religion. The Lawgivers alſo, in all civil States, Empires and Kingdoms, are of the ſame Opinion. Nay,—and what is more than all—thoſe very Perſons themſelves, who ſeem willing to overlook the Sanction of Rewards, and who are ſo wholly inclined to deduce all the moral Virtues from Gratitude only, find it, however, yet neceſſary to acknowledge, that Gratitude flows from the Remembrance of Benefits received.

Now it muſt be allowed, that the Motive to act well, upon account of Benefits received, ſavours much more of a ſelfiſh Principle, than when the Motive ariſes from an Expectation or Hope of Benefits to come: Nay—indeed, much more ſo. For, that Man ſeems to act upon ſomewhat a more generous Principle, who is influenced by a Benefit in Expectance (ſince ſomething of Doubt generally attends Hope) than he who acts the ſame way, *cæteris paribus*, upon account of Benefits exactly equal; and of which Benefits he has had the actual Enjoyment.——But—beſides all this,—the Memory of paſt Benefits diffuſes thro' the whole Soul that kind of Delight and Joy which is a Part, and no ſmall Part, of that Happineſs, and conſequently of that Reward, which we freely acknowledge to be a worthy Motive, a fit Argument to act well.

Neither, indeed, does it ſeem any otherwiſe poſſible that ſo univerſal a Conſent ſhould thus prevail with all, were it not that the common Nature of ALL, or univerſal Reaſon, did dictate the ſame Truth to ALL.——And—which Truth is, *That the ultimate End, namely, the common Good of ALL, no otherwiſe can be preſerved, and kept ſecure from Violence, than by Means of thoſe Sanctions which ariſe from Rewards and Puniſhments; and conſequently, that the common Good is at all times preſerved and ſecured, by the Sanctions ariſing from them.*

SECT. XXIV.

THE Method we have purſued in reducing all the *Laws of Nature* to one ſingle Precept, ſeems of Advantage for theſe farther Reaſons, *viz.*

Firſt, That the Demonſtration of one ſingle Propoſition is much ſhorter than the ſeveral Proofs of thoſe many Propoſitions generally laid down by Philoſophers.

Secondly, Such a Method alſo is much eaſier retained in the Memory; becauſe it is impoſſible that the Memory can labour under any great Burthen from the Remembrance of one ſingle Propoſition only.

And, *Laſtly*, the principal, the higheſt Advantage of one ſingle Propoſition is, That from the very Nature of the common Good itſelf (which Good, in this Propoſition, we are inſtructed ſtudiouſly to promote) there is a certain Rule or Meaſure laid before the Judgment of every wiſe and prudent Man, by the Aſſiſtance of which [Meaſure or Rule] he may fix a certain, uniform, regular Moderation to his moral Acts, to his Appetites and Paſſions; in which Moderation, Virtue does eſſentially conſiſt.

Ariſtotle, it is true, in his Definition of Virtue, has recommended the Inveſtigation of this very Rule to the Judgment and Determination of every wiſe, prudent Man: But he has not, at the ſame time, diſcovered any Criterion, or Mark, whereby (1) to form a ſure Judgment concerning it. The moral Propoſition which we have eſtabliſhed, demonſtrates, that this Rule is to be diſcovered and drawn from the Nature of that End, which really and truly is, in itſelf, the beſt and moſt excellent: Regard, however, always being had to all the Individuals of the whole, univerſal, rational Syſtem; or of that rational Eſtabliſhment over which Almighty God preſides as ſupreme Head; and of which rational Syſtem and Eſtabliſhment, the Members and conſtituent Parts are all Beings, acting in full Obedience and due Subjection to Almighty God, as their ſupreme Lord, Governor and Head.

For, from hence we ſhall learn and practice all ſuch Acts of Religion and Piety towards God, as are perfectly conſiſtent with the Security and Preſervation of Unity and Peace, of Intercourſe and Commerce between all Nations; perfectly conſiſtent with the ſeveral Eſtabliſhments of Civil Government, together with the ſeveral Degrees of Submiſſion due to it; perfectly conſiſtent alſo with a proper Concern for the private Happineſs of Individuals. And we ſhall moreover be led and directed to practice all thoſe Acts of the moſt diffuſive Good-nature and Humanity which are truly miniſterial, and exactly ſubſervient to true Religion and Piety.

(1) *To form a ſure Judgment concerning it.*] See his Chapter upon Virtue, intitled, Περὶ Ἀρετῆς, τί ἐστι. Καὶ ὅτι, ὅτι Πάθος ἐστὶν ὅτε Δύναμις, ἀλλ' Ἕξις. Ariſtotelis Opera omnia, Gr. & Lat. Tom. 3. Ethic. Nichom. ſive de moribus, Lib. 2. Cap. 4. Pag. 26. Edit. Paris 1654. Fol.

And

And in the general: (1) "All and every one of our Appetites and "Paſſions; all and every one of our Acts and free Motions; is to the "Sum Total of all our Powers and Abilities, and to each other, as the "Degree First Form.

(1) From this one ſingle Analogy, ſtated in either Form, and which is the Golden Rule of all Morals, we deduce two univerſal Canons.

Canon 1.

The Ability of an Agent, in each Caſe of Duty reſpectively, bears the ſame Proportion to the Total of ſuch an Agent's whole Abilities collectively, as the Good enjoined by every ſuch Duty reſpectively, bears to all the Good which an Agent's whole Life is capable of producing.

Firſt, Let (*a*) expreſs the Ability in any one Caſe of Duty.

Let (A) expreſs the whole Abilities collectively, *&c.*

Let (*g*) expreſs the Good enjoined by any one Duty reſpectively, *&c.*

Let (G) expreſs the whole Good collectively, *&c.*

The Analogy then will ſtand thus,

a. A : : *g*. G.

Canon 2.

The Affection or Inclination of an Agent in each Caſe of Duty reſpectively, muſt bear the ſame Proportion to all the ſeveral Degrees of his Affections or Inclinations, as the Degree of Good to be produced by every ſuch Duty reſpectively, bears to all the Good which the Agent's whole Life is capable of producing.

Secondly, Let (*i*) expreſs the Affection or Inclination in any one Caſe of Duty.

Let (I) expreſs the whole Affections or Inclinations collectively, *&c.*

Let (*g*) expreſs as in the firſt Canon.

Let (G) expreſs as in the firſt Canon.

The Analogy then will ſtand thus,

i. I : : *g*. G.

Thirdly, Let (*m*) expreſs the whole Momentum or Power of the Agent in any one Caſe; therefore $m = axi$.

Fourthly, Let (M) expreſs the whole Momentum or Power of the Agent in all Caſes collectively; therefore $M = A \times I$, and conſequently, *m*. *g* : : M. G.

From theſe two Canons thus expreſſed, the following Corollaries ariſe.

Cor. 1. That the Momentum of human Power, both as to Ability and Inclination, in any particular Caſe of Duty or Virtue, is to the Sum Total of all ſuch Momenta, as the Good flowing from the particular Duty or Virtue, to all the Good which the Agent can produce during his whole Life.

Cor. 2. As the Operations of our Abilities are not to counteract and oppoſe each other, ſo neither muſt any particular Parts of our Duty or Virtue contradict and deſtroy any of the reſt.

Cor. 3. As the Whole is nothing elſe than all the Parts collectively taken, ſo no one Part is to contradict or leſſen the Whole.

Cor. 4. From hence we may eaſily learn to eſtimate the Value of Good or Virtue in any particular Caſe.

Cor. 5. From hence we may with Eaſe diſtinguiſh the ſeveral Subordinations and Degrees of Good in the whole Catalogue of Virtues and Duties, how they conſiſt together, and hang or depend upon each other.

Cor. 6. That the Momentum of Power in exerciſing any Virtue, ought to be to the Good which ſuch a Virtue produces, as the whole Momentum of human Power during Life, bears to the whole univerſally beneficent Good which the whole human Life can produce.

Cor. 7. That the conſtituent Branches or particular Parts of Virtue, muſt never contradict the Scheme of Virtue in general.

Cor. 8. That the Duties due to God, to our Neighbour (*i. e.* to all Mankind) and to ourſelves, muſt always carry a perfect Harmony, an exact Correſpondence with, and a regular Subordination to each other.

From whence we may obſerve, that the Momentum of Good in any one ſingle Caſe of Duty, is as the Affection or Inclination multiplied into the Ability, which we expreſs by Letter *m*; and therefore $m = ixa$.

The Momentum of Good, in all the Caſes of Duty collectively, is as the whole Affection or Inclination multiplied into the whole Ability, which we expreſs by the Letter $M = I \times A$; and therefore *m*. ixa :: M. $I \times A$.

Now if the Momentum of Good produced be always as the Inclination multiplied into the Ability of the Agent, therefore every Degree of Good has its own proper Momentum,

i. e. its

" Degree of Good which any of these our Faculties or Powers is fitted to " procure at any and all times, bears to the whole universal Good, which " the full Period of human Life is capable of effecting."

Second Form. Or rather thus. The Product of Inclination and Ability, in each single Case respectively, bears the same Proportion to the Product of all our Inclinations and Abilities, in all Cases collectively, as the Quantity of Good in any one Case [and to the Production of which, in all Cases, these Inclinations and Abilities are naturally made ministerial] bears to the greatest universal Good which the whole Course of the human Life is capable of effecting.

Upon this one solid Foundation only it is, that we shall be effectually secured,

First, Against too anxious a Solicitude about Affairs of little or no Consequence.

Secondly, We shall be effectually secured against too careless a Concern in Matters of Weight and Moment.

Thirdly, We shall be effectually secured against too indolent and passive a Volition about the public Good.

Fourthly, We shall be effectually secured against an over-officious Care and Thought in private Concerns.

Upon this solid Foundation, I say, the Case will be so far otherwise, that the whole Measure of all our Endeavours will be adjusted and proportioned, according to the Dignity and Importance of the Business at any time,—nay,—at all times, to be transacted.

In short, upon the same Foundation we must build and settle that whole Series, or natural Order which prevails, and is to take place in special or particular Laws; according to which [natural Order] may fairly be demonstrated, how far a Law of prior Obligation limits and ties down a Law of an inferior, subordinate Degree; which Kind of Order the Reverend and most learned *Robert Sharook*, J. U. D. in his ΥΠΟΘΕΣΙΣ ΗΘΙΚΗ *sive de Finibus & Officiis*, &c. (but particularly in his tenth Chapter) has with masterly Skill and Judgment laid before us, *viz.* " That a total Absti-

i. e. its own proper Degree of Inclination multiplied into its own proper Degree of Ability; and consequently, all the Good in the human Life is governed by the same Proportion; and therefore let the Momentum of Good, or M, be what it will in the Whole either more or less, it is always governed by I×A in the Production of such a Good.

From hence we deduce the regular Subordinations and just Degrees of the several Virtues, according to the Degrees of Good to be produced. Thus, for Instance, if one Duty or Virtue produces three Degrees of Good, and another Virtue produces four, why then the Proportion will be as three to four; and consequently the Momentum differs in the same Proportion, and I×A must differ accordingly.

By this Method of adjusting and settling the several Duties of Morality, we may form a Judgment how to prefer some Duties before others, and fix their Subordinations and Subserviencies, and regulate them according to the several Relations of Beings, Times, Things and Circumstances: We shall by so regular an Order seldom misplace our Pains and Concern in the Performance of Duties, or be at a Loss which Duty to prefer, or which to postpone.

" nence

" nence from Violence, and Invaſion upon the Property of others, is pre-
" ferable to the Diſcharge and Performance of Contracts and Promiſes:
" That greater Regard is to be paid to a Contract or Promiſe, legally
" and ſolemnly made and entered into, rather than to Obligations of Gra-
" titude, *&c.*" Now, the Reaſoning upon prior Obligations muſt be drawn from the Principle we have eſtabliſhed: Since ſuch Reaſoning contributes more to the common Good, that the principal, ſpecial Law of Nature ſhould be eſtabliſhed and preſerved, concerning the ſeparate Dominion and Right over Property (which is, that no one ſhould be diſturbed in his Poſſeſſions by the Invaſions of another) than that any one ſhould ſtand by thoſe Agreements, which cannot be performed without ſuch an Invaſion.—And—in the comparing other ſpecial Laws together, the ſame Reaſoning holds equally ſtrong; which Laws, according to the Order of their Dignity and Conſequence, I have enumerated in the following Sheets.

N. B. Whoſoever is willing to receive fuller Satisfaction in this Point, may look into the Author juſt now quoted, or in the *Appendix* to this Tranſlation at Number III. p. 63, 64.

It ſufficiently anſwers my preſent Purpoſe, to have inveſtigated (and upon my Principles) the Order to be obſerved in the ſpecial Laws of Nature; unleſs, perhaps, it may to ſome ſeem neceſſary here to add, That it cannot appear a Matter of the leaſt Aſtoniſhment to any, that no one Right of any Kind, no one poſſible Virtue, can be clearly explained, unleſs a due Regard be firſt had to the State and Condition of all rational Agents of the whole intellectual Syſtem.

We obſerve, for Inſtance, in Philoſophy, or Natural Philoſophy (1), that thoſe Accidents or Qualities of natural Bodies which are daily obvious to

(1) *That thoſe Accidents or Qualities of natural Bodies which are daily obvious to our Senſes, cannot clearly be explained,* &c.] The Properties of Body cannot be known *a priori*; we muſt therefore examine Body itſelf, and nicely conſider all its Properties; that we may be able to determine what natural Effects do flow from thoſe Properties.

Upon a farther Examination of Body, we find there are ſome general Laws according to which Bodies are moved. It is paſt Doubt, for Inſtance, that a Body once moved continues in Motion; that Reaction is always equal and contrary to Action. And ſeveral other ſuch Laws concerning Body have been diſcovered, which can no way be deduced from thoſe Properties that are ſaid to conſtitute Body; and ſince thoſe Laws always hold good, and upon all Occaſions, they are to be looked upon as general Laws of Nature.

But then we are at a Loſs to know, whether they flow from the Eſſence of Matter, or whether they are deducible from Properties, given by God to the Bodies, the World conſiſts of; but no way eſſential to Body; or whether, finally, thoſe Effects which paſs for Laws of Nature, depend upon external Cauſes, which even our Ideas cannot attain to.

Who dares affirm any thing upon this Point concerning all or any Laws of Nature, without incurring the Guilt of Raſhneſs? Beſides, whoever examines the Phænomena of Nature will be fully perſuaded, that many of its Laws are not yet diſcovered, and that many Particulars are wanting towards the compleat Knowledge of others.

The Study of Natural Philoſophy is not, however, to be contemned, as built upon an unknown Foundation.

The Sphere of human Knowledge is bounded

to our Senſes (*e. g.* 1. The Communication of Motion. 2. Gravitation or Attraction. 3. The Action of Light and Heat. 4. Solidity. 5. Hardneſs. 6. Fluidity. 7. Rarefaction. And 8. Condenſation) cannot clearly be explained without regarding the whole Syſtem of the material World, and the ſeveral Motions neceſſary to be preſerved and kept up in the Laws of this Syſtem.

The

ded within a narrow Compaſs; and he that denies his Aſſent to every Thing but Evidence, wavers in Doubt every Minute, and looks upon many Things as unknown, which the Generality of People never ſo much as call in queſtion.

But rightly to diſtinguiſh Things known from Things unknown, is a Perfection above the Level of human Mind. Though many Things in Nature are hidden from us; yet what is ſet down in Phyſics as a Science is undoubted; from a few general Principles numberleſs particular Phænomena or Effects are explained, and deduced by mathematical Demonſtration. For the comparing of Motions, or, in other Words, of Quantities, is the continual Theme; and whoever will go about that Work any other Way than by mathematical Demonſtrations, will be ſure to fall into Uncertainties at leaſt, if not into Errors.

How much ſoever then may be unknown in natural Philoſophy, it ſtill remains a vaſt, certain, and very uſeful Science. It corrects an infinite Number of Prejudices, concerning natural Things and Divine Wiſdom; and as we examine the Works of God continually, ſets that Wiſdom before our Eyes: And there is a wide Difference betwixt knowing the Divine Power and Wiſdom by a metaphyſical Argument, and beholding them with our Eyes every Minute in their Effects.

It appears then ſufficiently what is the End of Phyſics, from what Laws of Nature the Phænomena are to be deduced, and wherefore, when we are once come to the general Laws, we cannot penetrate any further into the Knowledge of Cauſes.

There remains only to diſcourſe of the Method of ſearching after thoſe Laws, and to prove, that the three *Newtonian* Laws, delivered in the firſt Chapter of this Work, ought to be followed.

The firſt is, that we ought not to admit any more Cauſes of natural Things than what are true, and ſufficient to explain their Phænomena. The firſt Part of this Rule plainly follows from what has been ſaid above. The other cannot be called in queſtion, by any that owns the Wiſdom of the Creator.

If one Cauſe ſuffices, it is needleſs to ſuperadd another; eſpecially if it be conſidered, that an Effect from a double Cauſe is never exactly the ſame with an Effect from a ſingle one; therefore we are not to multiply Cauſes, till it appears one ſingle Cauſe will not do the Buſineſs.

In order to prove the two following Rules, we muſt premiſe ſome general Reflections.

We have already ſaid, that mathematical Demonſtrations have no Standard to be judged by, but their Conformity with our Ideas; and when the Queſtion is about natural Things, the firſt Requiſite is, that our Ideas agree with thoſe Things which cannot be proved by any mathematical Demonſtration: And yet as we have Occaſion to reaſon of Things themſelves every Moment, and of thoſe Things nothing can be preſent to our Minds beſides our Ideas, upon which our Reaſonings immediately turn; it follows, that God has eſtabliſhed ſome Rules, by which we may judge of the Agreement of our Ideas with the Things themſelves.

All mathematical Reaſonings turn upon the Compariſon of Quantities, and their Truth is evidenced by implying a Contradiction in a contrary Propoſition.

A Rectilineal Triangle, for Inſtance, whoſe three Angles are not equal to two right ones, is a Thing impoſſible. When the Queſtion is not about the Compariſon of Quantities, a contrary Propoſition is not always impoſſible. It is certain, for Inſtance, that *Peter* is living, though it is as certain that he might have died Yeſterday. Now, there being numberleſs Caſes of that Kind, where one may affirm or deny with equal Certainty; there follows, that there are many Reaſonings very certain, altho' altogether different from the mathematical ones. And they evidently follow from the Eſtabliſhment of Things, and therefore from the predetermined Will of God.

For by forcing Men upon the Neceſſity of pronouncing concerning the Truth or Falſhood of a Propoſition, he plainly ſhews, they muſt aſſent to

Arguments

The ſame is likewiſe evident in Geometry: For there is not any one poſſible Effect ariſing from Compound Motion, and wherein there is a continued Subordination of one Motion upon another, which can be clearly inveſtigated and traced up to its original natural Cauſe; unleſs all theſe ſeveral Motions be, in their Order of Subordination and Dependance, exactly calculated and compared together.

Arguments which their Judgments neceſſarily acquieſce in; and whoever reaſons otherwiſe, does not think worthily of God.

To return to Phyſics: We are in this Science to judge by our Senſes of the Agreement that there is betwixt Things and our Ideas.

The Extenſion and Solidity of Matter, for Inſtance, aſſerted upon that Ground, are paſt all Doubt. Here we examine the Thing in general, without taking Notice of the Fallacy of our Senſes upon ſome Occaſions, and which way Error is then to be avoided.

We cannot immediately judge of all phyſical Matters by our Senſes; we have then Recourſe to another juſt Way of Reaſoning, tho' not mathematical: It depends upon this Axiom, *(viz.)* We muſt look upon as true, whatever being denied would deſtroy Civil Society, and deprive us of the Means of living.

From which Propoſition the ſecond and third Rules of the *Newtonian* Method moſt evidently follow. For who could live a Minute's Time in Tranquillity, if a Man was to doubt the Truth of what paſſes for certain, wherever Experiments have been made about it; and if he did not depend upon ſeeing the like Effects produced by the ſame Cauſe?

The following Reaſonings, for Example, are daily taken for granted, as undoubtedly true, without any previous Examination; becauſe every body ſees that they cannot be called in queſtion, without deſtroying the preſent Oeconomy of Nature.

A Building this Day firm in all its Parts, will not of itſelf run to Ruin To-morrow.

Thus, by a Parity of Reaſon, the Coheſion and Gravity of the Parts of Bodies, which I never ſaw altered, nor heard of having been altered without ſome intervening, external Cauſe, will not be altered To-night; becauſe the Cauſe of Coheſion and Gravity will be the ſame To-morrow, as it is To-day. Who does not ſee, that the Certainty of this Reaſoning depends only upon the Truth of the forementioned Principle? The Timber and Stones of any Country which are fit for a Building, if brought over here, will ſerve in this Place, except what Changes may ariſe from an external Cauſe; and I ſhall no more fear the Fall of my Building, than the Inhabitants of the Country, from whence thoſe Materials were brought, would do, if they had built a Houſe with them.

Thus the Power which cauſes the Coheſion of Parts, and that which gives Weight to Bodies, are the ſame in all Countries.

I have uſed ſuch Kind of Food for ſo many Years, therefore I will uſe it again To-day without Fear.

When I ſee Hemlock I conclude it to be poiſonous, tho' I never made any Experiment of that very Hemlock I ſee before my Eyes.

All theſe Reaſonings are grounded upon Analogy; and there is no Doubt but our Creator has, in many Caſes, left us no other Way of Reaſoning, and therefore it is a right Way.

Which being once proved, we may afterwards make Uſe of the ſame Method in other Matters, where no abſolute Neceſſity forces us to reaſon at all. When an Argument is good in one Caſe, there is no Reaſon why we ſhould refuſe our Aſſent to it in another. For who can conceive that Things proved the ſame Way, are not equally certain? Beſides, tho' we conclude in general, that this Method of Reaſoning is right, from the Neceſſity of uſing it; yet it does not follow, that particular Reaſonings depend upon that Neceſſity. I conclude from Analogy, that Food is not poiſonous; but is that Argument only good when I am hungry?

In Phyſics, then, we are to diſcover the Laws of Nature by the Phænomena; then by Induction prove them to be general Laws: All the reſt is to be handled mathematically. Whoever will ſeriouſly examine what Foundation this Method of Phyſics is built upon, will eaſily diſcover this to be the only true one, and that all Hypotheſes are to be laid aſide. *See Dr.* Graveſande's *Mathematical Elements of Natural Philoſophy confirmed by Experiments*; *or, An Introduction to Sir* Iſaac Newton's *Philoſophy*, 1ſt Vol. 8vo. Lond. Edit. 1720. Preface, Pages 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17.

In a Word, from this regular Subordination and Order in the *Laws of Nature*, wherein not only all the ſpecial Laws are ſubordinate to the one general Law; but alſo, wherein all the inferior ſpecial Laws are ſubordinate to the ſuperior ſpecial Laws; we may, in the moſt ſatisfactory Manner demonſtrate, That not one of theſe Laws is ever at any Time diſpenſed with by Almighty God, except in Caſes where the Obligation of the inferior Law becomes relaxed, merely becauſe the Subject Matter of it is ſo altered and changed, that the ſuperior ſpecial Law cannot be obſerved, if the inferior Law continues ſtill in full Force. Hence it appears, that the Law eſtabliſhing the diſtinct Dominion over Property, and prohibiting any Invaſion upon the Right of others, cannot be diſpenſed with, even upon the Suppoſition, that God has made it lawful for the *Iſraelites* to invade the Land of *Canaan*, when the *Canaanites* had revolted againſt God, and turned Idolaters.

And—the Reaſoning upon which this Aſſertion is grounded, appears demonſtrable; becauſe the very ſame Law proves it neceſſary to the common Good, that the ſupreme Dominion over all Perſons and Things be, in the firſt Place, aſcribed to God; ſince God can, by his own immediate Right of Sovereignty, (as often as it may ſerve the one principal End deſigned) take away that very Right or Power which any one Creature has over his own Right and Property; and, by Conſequence, transfer the ſame Right and Power to any one or more of his other Creatures. Such the Divine Will being clearly manifeſted, by evident Signs and Tokens to this Purpoſe; which, we read, was evidently the Caſe between the *Iſraelites* and the *Canaanites*.

From whence it is manifeſt, that the *Iſraelites* only took their own Right into Poſſeſſion, and did not aſſume any Power to invade the Right of another. In like Manner alſo, the Law is no way diſpenſed with, which, for the public Good, forbids that any Injury ſhould be offered to the Innocent; notwithſtanding that it may, at ſome particular Times, be commanded (whenever it appears abſolutely neceſſary, to anſwer the ſame End) that the Innocent ſhould run the Hazard of Loſs, nay,——even of Life itſelf: But more eſpecially in all ſuch Caſes wherein Almighty God has given Indications ſignificant enough of the Divine Will and Pleaſure. For upon this very Foundation it is, that the Honour due to Almighty God, as univerſal, ſupreme King, is aſcribed to him, and with the fulleſt Propriety imaginable; becauſe, according to his own Almighty Scheme of Power and Goodneſs it is, that the very beſt *End* is chiefly and primarily ſecured.—And, conſequently—the Security or Happineſs of an Individual is not, in this Caſe, either an eſſential Part or the efficient Cauſe of the common Good: Nay—ſo far from it, that the Damage, the Loſs of an Individual, is often eſtabliſhed as the neceſſary Means of ſecuring the chief and ultimate End.

Now, the Reaſoning hitherto urged will ſtill receive a clearer Light, if we conſider what the whole, compleat Truth is, which this general Propoſition

poſition carries in it, *viz.* "The Cauſe which preſerves, as far as in its "Power lies, the Whole, preſerves alſo, as far as in its Power lies, all "the Parts of every ſuch Whole."

The Truth, I ſay, of this general Propoſition, is not at all changed in every particular Caſe; altho' at ſometimes it ſo happens, that an healthy, ſound Hand, expoſed to Danger, may, in Defence of the Head, be cut off by ſome outward Violence, or external Force. For, as a Preliminary Article ſettled, we demonſtrate, That the eternal Obligation of all theſe Laws, is eſſentially eſtabliſhed upon the Truth of the one practical Propoſition, which firmly ſtands upon the very ſame Principle. And therefore this Obligation is, by the ſame Parity of Reaſoning, equally immutable.

SECT. XXV.

AS to thoſe Corollaries which we, from our Foundation of Principles in the following Treatiſe, have inferred, I ſhall not take upon me here to ſay any Thing; becauſe I cannot, upon ſecond Thoughts, recollect that it was in my Power to expreſs them ſhorter, or more conſpicuous.

I ſhall here, however, venture to affirm thus much, That I have not, in expreſs Terms, deduced all thoſe practical, uſeful Concluſions, which very readily follow from our Principles: Neither, indeed, could I enumerate them, becauſe in theſe Principles are contained all the moſt univerſal Rules of Equity, which are applicable to all thoſe new Circumſtances of Duty that daily ariſe in Matters both of civil and of private Life.

For, from theſe Principles, the Judge or Magiſtrate may readily underſtand what Laws of Civil Inſtitution are in their own Nature *equitable*; and, by Conſequence, worthy of a ſtrict Obſervance: What Laws of Civil Inſtitution are capable of an equitable Conſtruction and Amendment, ſo as to take off and abate the Severity and Rigour of them.

The Judge and Civil Magiſtrate may alſo, upon theſe Principles, as readily know (or we may, upon the ſame Principles, with the ſame Eaſe, know) what are the honeſt, fair Conditions and Covenants of all Contracts and Agreements; what are the true, conſcientious Motives of all public Wars between different Nations; as alſo what Covenants, Conditions and Motives are not ſo.

Perſons in all private Concerns likewiſe may, from the ſame Principles, learn, not only that unchangeable Obligation of Obedience due to the Divine Laws, and to ſuch human Laws as immediately build their Authority upon them; but they may alſo learn their Duty in all Caſes which derive a Liberty, a Sanction, under theſe two Authorities; ſuch Caſes happen every Day without Number. By all theſe Caſes, Perſons in private Life, at all Times, may be directed and led to conſult the very beſt

End; and by these Cases they may as effectually be restrained and diverted from all illegal, unjust Means of pursuing Happiness.

Now, these two different Capacities of both civil and private Life, will discover the indispensable Obligations all Mankind are under, of advancing and making a daily Proficiency in Virtue.

And—if upon no other Account,—yet upon this one single Account only, That such a Proficiency, such a Perfection, arising from constant Practice, daily encreases those Abilities, and their full Energy in promoting the public Good: By which Means the common, universal Happiness grows still more and more capable of some farther Addition and Increase in *Good*, or *fuller Happiness*.

SECT. XXVI.

WE have deduced the original Constitution of all Civil Society from two Laws of Nature, which (in order to answer the true Ends and Purposes of every such Society) must be considered in a close, essential Conjunction—As for Example—*In the first of these two Laws there is strictly enjoined the Settlement of a separate, distinct Right and Dominion over Property, Possessions, and the Effects produced by personal Industry, Employment and Labour. These Rights are supposed even before the Civil Establishment of Society; and therefore, the very Moment every such Society begins to exist, these Rights and Properties must be preserved distinct and inviolable, as Means essentially necessary to the common Good of the Whole.*

A distinct Property.

In the second Law of Nature there is strictly enjoined the Exercise of that inbred, inherent, radical Affection [Στοργη] *so deeply impressed upon the Hearts and Minds of Parents towards their Young.*

The Love and Care of Parents for their Young.

Now—this so strong a Propensity of Love could not possibly exert itself, except our First Parents, the First Parents of Mankind [*Adam* and *Eve*, for Instance] had granted to their Children, when arrived at adult Age, not only a distinct Family-property of their own respectively, but also a parental Right and Authority over their own Children, whether actually descended already, or in Times future to descend from them, and with all that Plenitude of Power which they themselves originally, and in the Beginning, possessed over all, by Vertue of the first Law or Grant from Almighty God.

Upon such a distinct, delegated Right from them [from *Adam* and *Eve* suppose] as this, it might reasonably be expected to happen, and in Fact it did happen, that as soon as Families increased and multiplied, some Fathers of Families, either during their own Lives, or by Will at their Deaths, lawfully could divide their own Right and Property amongst their several Children, by either transferring to each Child an absolute Dominion and Right over, each, his own particular Family respectively; or by transferring

The Original of Monarchy.

transferring a Right and Dominion over many Families collectively; and from whence ſeveral States of Monarchical Government might naturally, and did originally ariſe.

Other Fathers of Families might alſo, upon the Diviſions of Dominion and Property after another Form, amongſt their Children, lay the Foundation of an Ariſtocratical Government in other Places. The Original of Ariſtocracy.

Other Fathers of Families might, upon the Diſtribution of Dominion and Property amongſt their Children, after a ſtill different Form, eſtabliſh Democratical Government in other States. The Original of Democracy. And yet in all theſe principal, diſtinct Forms of Civil Government, that the whole Obligation ſhould ſtill remain and continue in full Force, not only of ſtudying and promoting the common Good of ALL, but alſo a total Obedience to all thoſe Precepts neceſſarily from thence reſulting, which conſtitute diſtinct, ſeparate Dominion and Property; which prohibit any Invaſion upon the Rights of others; which enforce the faithful Performance of all Engagements, Contracts and Obligations of Gratitude; which limit and adjuſt the proper Concern about SELF and *Self-preſervation*; which point out the due Care and tender Protection of our Young; and, in a Word, all thoſe Precepts which enjoin and cultivate that univerſal, humane Love and Goodwill to be exerciſed towards ALL: For, upon all theſe ſeveral Relations and Obligations of Duty, the whole Sum and Subſtance of the Law of Nations is entirely laid and founded.

This truly lawful Original of all Civil Government, however, we ſuppoſe merely poſſible; and yet it is ſuch a Suppoſition, as ſhews what all the univerſal Qualities, Properties and eſſential Requiſites of Civil Societies in general are;—and—indeed, the Principles of true Philoſophy do not require from us any other Scheme, Hypotheſis or Suppoſition than this. We do not, notwithſtanding all this, deny, that the whole Queſtion concerning the actual Origin of all Civil Society, as under the Influence and Direction of free Agents, turns upon Matter of Fact. And, for this very Reaſon, an Enquiry into the actual Origin of Civil Society, is not capable of ſtrict Demonſtration upon Principles of Reaſoning. All that is capable therefore of being ſaid upon this Subject, muſt be drawn entirely from moral Evidence.

Matters of Fact, indeed, within our own Memory, ought to be proved *vivâ voce*, *i. e.* upon the Teſtimony of living Witneſſes: Whereas Facts of an earlier Date human Reaſon cannot, in a natural Way, prove by any other Method than either, *Firſt*, by an *Oral Tradition*, in which Kind of Evidence there is little or no Certainty; or, *Secondly*, from ſome authentic Records, written and collected purely to keep up the Remembrance of memorable Tranſactions: Such are the Records and hiſtorical Collections preſerved in the Archives and Regiſtries of all Empires, Kingdoms, States, Commonwealths, Republics, great Cities, *&c.* Since then it may be eaſily proved, that the Origin of every Civil Society, as far as our Knowledge reaches, is of a much earlier Date than can poſſibly come within the

the Memory of living Witneſſes, we muſt conſequently determine their original Conſtitution and Frame from the ancient Laws, Cuſtoms, Privileges, Uſages, Rules, Rights, and other public Records of each Civil State, as are publicly preſerved, atteſted and proved by full Authority and Conſent. But—ſuppoſing our Curioſity to lead us into earlier Searches, we muſt have Recourſe to ancient Hiſtories of the moſt authentic Credit.

Now, amongſt theſe earlieſt Hiſtories, we do not find any of the ſame Antiquity and Certainty with the Hiſtory of *Moſes*. *Moſes*, in his Hiſtory, does not allow, next to God, a more ancient Right over Perſons and Things, than the Right of Fathers of Families over their Wives and Children; and then the Right of the Firſt-born after them: For, in the *Moſaic* Account, we no where read that any ſuch univerſal Right over ALL was committed to *Adam* and *Eve*, as to render it lawful for them, in their State of Innocence, to rebel againſt God; neither was it, conſequently, lawful for them, by reciprocal Force, to deprive each other of Food and Life; nay, even ſuppoſing them to have falſly imagined, that ſuch a Behaviour could contribute to their own Preſervation.——The Caſe is repreſented, in *Moſes*'s Account of the Creation, far otherwiſe; for, on the contrary, there we find, that all the Qualifications and Requiſites neceſſary towards eſtabliſhing the common Good of a riſing Empire (deſigned as a Theocraſis immediately to ſubſiſt under the Dominion and Power of Almighty God himſelf) are confeſſedly allowed and acknowledged. For, that a diſtinct Dominion and Right over Perſons and Things (ſuch as we have deſcribed to be neceſſary) appears beyond all poſſible Contradiction: Becauſe, at the very firſt Eſtabliſhment of theſe Laws themſelves, the Divine Authority plainly operates; and alſo at the very ſame Time it is equally evident, that all human Dominion, Power, Authority, is originally and totally derived from the free Grace, Gift and Delegation of Almighty God himſelf.

Nay—and beſides all this—ſuppoſing that this original Divine Power, thus delegated by Almighty God to Mankind, had been preſerved pure and inviolable, neither the one or the other of our Firſt Parents could take away from either, that Food which was neceſſary to ſuſtain Life; much leſs could either of them deprive the other of Life. Nay,——they were ſo very far from exerting the leaſt Enmity towards each other, that upon their firſt Interview, we read, there commenced an intimate Friendſhip between them; which Friendſhip could not poſſibly ſubſiſt without ſuch a mutual Fidelity and Gratitude, as always limit and regulate *Self-love*.

The Concern next, in a natural Order to follow, was the Propagation of their Species, and, by Conſequence, the Preſervation and tender Care of them.

This ſo cloſe and ſingular an Union of Love, by all poſſible Ties between Man and Wife; and that ΣΤΟΡΓΗ or ſtrong Propenſity of tender Affection

Affection towards their Children, being eſtabliſhed as the fundamental Principles, it manifeſtly appears, That all the Degrees of Love, Humanity and Benevolence, as reſpectively and variouſly to be exerciſed towards ALL, were originally laid in theſe two firſt natural Relations and Alliances, and are, by an equal Neceſſity, all comprehended under them, juſt in the ſame Way that the leſſer is comprehended under the greater: And the Truth of this is very evident, becauſe, according to this authentic Hiſtory of *Moſes*, no other Degrees of Relation and Kindred amongſt Mankind, could be conſidered by our Firſt Parents as Objects of their Concern, except thoſe of Husband and Wife, Parent and Child.

It is therefore evident (even to a Demonſtration) that our Syſtem of Philoſophy exactly agrees to, and correſponds with, the ſacred Hiſtory of the Bible.

SECT. XXVII.

IN the following Treatiſe, however, we thought it moſt adviſable to obſerve ſtrictly the Bounds and Limits of Philoſophy; and, conſequently, to keep quite clear of all ſuch Theological Queſtions as are employed and concerned about the Rights and Privileges of Divine Dominion; either, *Firſt*, in the Article of Predeſtination; or, *Secondly*, in the Satisfaction purchaſed for us in the Perſon and Merits of our Saviour Chriſt.

Neither have we taken the leaſt Notice how total an Alteration for the worſe, the Powers and Faculties of human Nature ſuffered after the Fall, from the original Sin of our *Firſt Parents*. Queſtions of this Kind, I ſay, did not come within our ENQUIRY; for, as we build our Scheme of Morality entirely upon Philoſophical Principles, ſuch Queſtions as theſe muſt and only can be determined upon the Authority of Scripture. Our ſole Deſign and Aim here is to eſtabliſh the Law of Nature, juſt ſo far as, and no farther than, we are conſcious of ſuch a Law, from our own natural Reaſon, Obſervation and Experience. And yet in the mean while, notwithſtanding all that can be urged to the contrary, we are, upon the moſt ſatisfied Conviction perſuaded, that nothing ever truly can become the Subject Matter of Divine Revelation, in evident Contradiction to the true Principles of human Reaſon.

The Caſe, indeed, is ſo far otherwiſe, that we, by Vertue of this very Argument, believe the holy Scriptures to derive their Original from God, as the Author of Nature and Creator of ALL: Becauſe all the ſeveral Parts of the Bible clear up, defend, guard and exalt the Laws of Nature. With this principal View it was, that I never touch upon any one Point of *Controverſial Divinity*, becauſe I was unwilling to enter the Liſts with Mr. *Hobbes* about the Senſe of Scripture.

With

With this further View alſo, I judged any ſuch Controverſy, in a more particular Manner, needleſs, becauſe it cannot be imagined that even Mr. *Hobbes* is heartily, and in earneſt, an Enemy to Scripture Authority, ſince *He himſelf* ſettles the whole Authority of Scripture upon the Will and Pleaſure of each and every Civil Eſtabliſhment; and conſequently, that the ſame Scripture Authority varies and becomes changeable at the ſame Will and Pleaſure. And upon this unſettled Foundation Mr. *Hobbes*'s Doctrine is, That in one Civil Society Scripture Authority may carry full Force and Efficacy; whereas in another Civil Society it may carry no Force or Efficacy at all.

SECT. XXVIII.

I HAVE ſaid little or nothing concerning that Immutability which the *Laws of Nature* carry in them; and yet I have all along, with my beſt Diligence, kept in cloſe View their eternal Obligation; but more particularly, whenever we attempt to demonſtrate the unchangeable Truth of theſe moral Propoſitions, or natural Laws, from that neceſſary Connexion or Agreement which always exiſts between the Terms in each of theſe Propoſitions or Laws themſelves: That is, in other Words, the eternal Sanction and Obligation of theſe Laws, can only be made to appear clear and evident from the neceſſary, unchangeable Truth of theſe moral Propoſitions themſelves.

For no one can doubt that Propoſitions of neceſſary Truth, whenever they are diſcovered, muſt be true: Neither is it a Point of leſs Certainty, that the Truth of every ſuch Propoſition was well known to Almighty God, to the Divine Mind, from all Eternity.

No one of Mankind, as far as I can learn, ever denied the ſame Eternity of Exiſtence to mathematical Propoſitions, altho' but lately diſcovered and known. This very Point, therefore, we judge neceſſary to urge, and in the ſtrongeſt Terms, home upon our Readers; and with this one only Deſign, that the Connexion between human Acts (altho' never ſo free and arbitrary, when once they are produced or begin to exiſt) and their Effects, is not leſs neceſſary than that Connexion is, which always happens between the Operations or Motions of Bodies merely natural, and ſuch Effects as are demonſtrated to ariſe from them.

Three Lines, for Inſtance, drawn at Pleaſure by any Man, according to the Principles laid down in the Firſt Book of *Euclid*'s Elements, do not, by a leſs invincible Neceſſity, form a Triangle, than if theſe very ſame three Lines had flowed from Cauſes plainly neceſſary.——And upon exactly the ſame Strength of Reaſoning we have, in this our Philoſophical Diſquiſition, at large demonſtrated, That our Love to God and Man (altho' the mere Reſult of our own freeſt Choice, yet when once fully exerted) neceſſarily renders every one of us the happieſt which is in the Power

of

of each to be. Neither is it a Point leſs evident, that the Conſent, when once agreed upon, concerning the ſeveral Diviſions of Property, and of ſuch Poſſeſſions as are acquired by human Labour and Induſtry; or, that ſuch a Conſent, when once the Diviſion is actually made, ſhould be preſerved inviolable upon the Principles of Innocence, Virtue, Fidelity, Gratitude, a juſt, limited Regard for ourſelves and our Young, and, laſtly, of that univerſal Love and Humanity extended to all.

Such ſeveral Compacts as theſe, and the faithful Obſervance of them, are, I ſay, eſſential Parts and conſtituent Branches of univerſal Love or Benevolence; and, by Conſequence, bear the ſame Proportion to the Happineſs of all in general, and of each in particular (but more eſpecially of the Perſon who profeſſes and exerciſes theſe Virtues) that Quadrants and the other, all the other leſſer Arcs or Sectors bear to, and are inſeparable Parts of a Circle; and, by Conſequence, that the one as well as the other have an equal, coeval Eternity.

SECT. XXIX.

WE have thought proper to premiſe thus much concerning the Subject of our Book. I ſhall now briefly ſay ſomething as to the Method of our handling this Subject.

There are many Things in our Expreſſion and Style which require, nay, importunately ſollicit, the ingenuous Candour of every good-natured Reader. We have been ſo wholly employed upon our Subject that we have, to confeſs the Truth, been, I am afraid, too negligent about a correct Manner of Expreſſion. What is here delivered was written, as it were, by ſtealth, now and then, in the midſt of numberleſs Interruptions, and at ſuch times only as a very uncertain, broken State of Health, and the very heavy Duty of my Profeſſion, as a * Clergyman, would allow me. We have placed our Argument in as clear a View as we poſſibly could, by frequent Compariſons drawn from the mathematical Science; becauſe the Perſons, but particularly Mr. *Hobbes*, againſt whom we at preſent argue, reject utterly, almoſt every Proof built upon all other Sciences and Arts.

But—beſides this—we thought it worth our while to demonſtrate the fundamental Principles of true Religion and Morality, upon mathematical and philoſophical Reaſonings; becauſe there are ſome who, in a mean, diſcontented Way (not daring to ſpeak out) have hinted, how totally Religion and Morality are ſhaken and overturned when thus treated. Whereas the Truth honeſtly is, that theſe Principles are firmly laid in thoſe very Proofs and Demonſtrations.—Nay, ſo much ſo, that the very Philoſophers themſelves, who attack the Rules and Precepts of Morality with mechanical Weapons, can be, and in Fact are, ſtrenuouſly oppoſed and utterly defeated by thoſe very Weapons which they ſo fondly chooſe and admire.

* See his Life in the Appendix.

Our Author keeps himself clear of every Hypothesis.

Of each particular Hypothesis—relating to the Frame and Structure of the Universe, I have designedly, and on Purpose, kept myself quite clear: The Reasons why we did so are many; but the chief Reason is this, That our principal Conclusions, our main Scope and Design are all fully preserved, notwithstanding that our Readers are left at free Liberty to choose any one Hypothesis, provided it be such an Hypothesis as, by a regular Subordination of Causes (answering and accounting for the Phænomena of Nature) directly leads us up to the first Cause and principal, original Mover of all, namely, Almighty God.

Now, notwithstanding that our Principles stand secure and firm upon any such Hypothesis, yet I have in many Passages, to confess the Truth, paid a more particular Regard than ordinary to that mechanical Hypothesis which, with so much Wit and Ingenuity, is schemed out for us by *Cartesius*: Because his Hypothesis, as far as I can understand, leads us in a most concise Way to the first Cause and Mover of all; and is an Hypothesis also allowed and approved of by our Adversaries in general. And yet we must, at the same Time, acknowledge that other Hypotheses, fixed upon mechanical Principles, possibly may be invented, and ought to be admitted, in case the Phænomena, the Appearances of Nature, require and stand in need of any such Hypotheses.

I have still one Request more to make, which is, That the Reader will not pass too severe a Sentence upon this Performance, before he reads over the whole Book, and compares the close Connexion of all its Parts with each other. For of this one Truth I am fully satisfied, that if there be either Strength or Beauty in this imperfect Offspring of my Brain, it entirely arises from a solid Union of all its Parts with one another, and from the fit Regularity, the exact Proportion of each single Part, both as to the individual Part itself in particular, as well as to the one, common, general Good, designed and intended in the whole.

The Reader will never find, in the Complexion of this my Offspring, the gawdy Colourings of rhetorical Ornaments; neither will he observe that sparkling, wanton Leer of Countenance which always betrays an airy, volatile Genius. But the whole Model, Frame, Make of this Composition, is collected from studious Observations upon Natural Philosophy; from the solid, decent Deportment and Behaviour of sound Morality, and from Studies of the graver, more contemplative Kind. And if so, this Product of mine, like the Wise and Aged, at once becomes the Object of Respect and Veneration.

SECT. XXX.

AND now, by way of Conclusion: My principal Design in writing this Treatise, is to promote and serve the public Good, by fairly declaring what that *Law of Nature and Society* is, which we, from the

Nature

Nature of Things, find exhibited to, and impreſſed upon, the human Mind.

I did not, to ſay the Truth, think it worth while to employ my whole Book, or even the larger Part of it, in confuting the erroneous Opinions of Mr. *Hobbes*; and yet, at the ſame Time, I thought it a Duty incumbent upon me, diligently to examine into and confute thoſe Errors, which have made ſuch foul Work with the Principles and Practices of too, too many amongſt us. I therefore, the moſt effectually to anſwer this one End, judged it proper to pluck up, by the very Roots, the fundamental Points of Doctrine contained in his Book *De Cive*, and in his *Leviathan*; and fairly to demonſtrate, that the Doctrines laid down in his Writings, but more eſpecially in theſe two Treatiſes, are directly oppoſite, not only to all Religion, but alſo to all the true Principles of Civil Society, and to all right Diſcipline of rational, wiſe, Civil Government. Theſe, his fundamental Doctrines, being once quite overthrown and demoliſhed, thoſe ſeveral wicked, deſtructive Opinions, ſo unfriendly to Society, muſt of courſe fall to the Ground.

What, in Fact, this my Performance is, muſt, after all, be ſubmitted to the Judgment and Candour of my Reader. As to my Confutation of Mr. *Hobbes*, or as to the controverſial Part of my Book, I am quite careleſs about it; neither will I ſo much as ſue for my Reader's Favour, ſuppoſing him even to act the Critic with ſtrict Severity. But—as to the ſolid Proof, the full Eſtabliſhment of my Doctrine, ſince I am too, too conſcious, indeed, of my weak Abilities, and how utterly inſufficient my beſt Sagacity is to ſearch into the whole Compaſs of Knowledge, which the *Nature of Things* is capable of ſuggeſting to the Mind of Man, in all the ſeveral conſtituent Branches of Virtue: And I being as fully conſcious alſo, that it was not in my Power to recollect at one critical Moment (when, perhaps, moſt neceſſary) all Articles which, in ſome Part of my Life before, I had diſtinctly conſidered, notwithſtanding my beſt Inclination to expreſs every one of them in this Book. I muſt therefore beſeech my Reader, not only ſtrictly to examine into what here is offered, but to enquire with all his Diligence alſo into the Nature of *God* and *Man*, and with an impartial Sincerity to try and examine his own Heart. For, from theſe diligent Reſearches, he will daily diſcover ſuch Means as neceſſarily tend to the ſame Deſign and End in the whole Progreſs of Virtue.

But—beſides all this, ſince I very well know how different my Sentiments are from thoſe of ſome very learned Men, concerning thoſe Cauſes which impreſs the Laws of Nature upon our Minds; one Caution is, in my Opinion, very proper to add, namely, how fair and equitable it is to mutually love one another, and, of Conſequence, to fulfil that Law which we both, on each Side of the Queſtion, acknowledge to be a Law impreſſed, written and engraved upon our Hearts by Almighty God himſelf.

These Thoughts of mine never had been committed to Writing (much less to the Press) were they not extorted from me by the importunate Sollicitations of some Friends in the University of *Cambridge*,—Friends who favoured me with their Thoughts, and without the least Reserve. In this Number Dr. *Hezekiah Burton* and Dr. *John Hollings*, the two best and most learned of Men, held the very first Place in my Love and Esteem: They, indeed, carried the most prevailing Ascendant over me: These two excellent Men were in the closest Intimacy, and with whom I most chearfully cultivated a disinterested Friendship for twenty Years and upwards:—A Friendship, to say the Truth, of Improvement and Delight. I pay such a Deference to the Judgment of such Counsellors, and I am so greatly indebted to their Friendship, that I thought it a Crime, almost equal to Impiety, to withstand and resist their persuasive Importunities too long.

And, Lastly, as to you, candid Reader, peruse these my Labours for the Improvement and Advantage of others; enjoy the full Benefit of them yourself, and I wish you well.

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A PHI-

A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY INTO THE LAWS of NATURE; With a CONFUTATION of Mr. *HOBBS*'s Philoſophical Principles, &c.

PART I.

CHAP. I.

Concerning the Nature *of* Things.

SECT. I.

ALTHO' the ancient (1) *Sceptics* and (2) *Epicureans* utterly denied the real Exiſtence of all Laws merely natural; and, altho' there are

(1) There were two principal Diviſions of ancient Philoſophy in Succeſſion: 1. The *Ionic*. 2. The *Italic*.

1. The *Ionic* Philoſophy took its Riſe from *Anaximander* the *Mileſian* of *Ionia*.

2. The *Italic* Philoſophy began with *Pythagoras*.

Anaximander was the Diſciple of *Thales* a *Mileſian* likewiſe of *Ionia*.

Anaximander therefore, in Honour to himſelf, as well as to his Maſter *Thales*, called his Branch of Philoſophy, *Ionic*.

The *Italic* Philoſophy was diſtinct from the *Ionic*, in Reſpect of the Author, Place, Time, Diſcipline and Doctrine.

This ſecond Diviſion of Philoſophy is called *Italic*, from that Part of *Italy*, which, upon Account of ſeveral Colonies ſettled there, was named *Magna Græcia*.

The *Sceptics* were a Sect of the *Italian* Philoſophy.

Pyrrho the *Elian* was the Author of this Sect.

Pyrrho found out, it ſeems, a new Method of philoſophic Reaſoning.

He introduced into his School *Incomprehenſion and the Way of Suſpenſion*, Ἀκαταληψίαν καὶ Ἐποχὴν, ἣν εἰσαγαγὼν, as *Diogenes Laertius*, in the Life of this Philoſopher, expreſſeth himſelf. *Lib.* 9. *Segm.* 61.

For he aſſerteth, that nothing was either honeſt or diſhoneſt, juſt or unjuſt in itſelf: That all Things are quite indifferent, as to Good and Evil; and, That all Differences, of whatever Nature, Kind and Degree, ariſe from mere Cuſtom and Civil Inſtitution.

(2) *Epicureans.*] The *Epicureans* were alſo of the *Italic* Sect. They took their Name

are (1) ſome Perſons, of a much later Date, who ſtill ſtrenuouſly maintain the ſame Opinion: Yet we all, on both Sides of the Queſtion, ſeem agreed in one and the ſame Definition of the Term.

The Laws of Nature defined.

By *Laws of Nature*, we underſtand *ſome* (2) *Propoſitions of unchangeable Truth and Certainty, which are to direct and govern the* (3) *voluntary Motions of rational free Agents, in the Election of Good, and in the avoiding of Evil: Which Laws lay Obligations upon all outward Acts of Behaviour, even in a State of Nature, prior and antecedent to all Laws of human Impoſition whatſoever:*

from *Epicurus*, a Native of *Samos*, who was born in the 3d Year of the 109th Olympiad.

To diſcuſs all the Principles of this Philoſophy, is not, in this Place, neceſſary; becauſe little to the preſent Purpoſe.

I ſhall only mention ſuch of the *Epicurean* Doctrines as may ſerve to explain our Author.

The *Epicureans* denied Divine Providence; they only looked upon the Gods, as idle, indolent Beings, wrapped up in Self-Enjoyment, totally regardleſs of human Actions, and of human Happineſs or Miſery: And they denied all the Laws of Nature.

Quod ſi jam rerum ignorim primordia quæ ſint,
Hoc tamen, ex ipſis Cæli Rationibus, auſim
Confirmare, aliiſque ex rebus reddere multis,
Nequaquam nobis Divinitùs eſſe paratam
Naturam Rerum; tantâ ſtat prædita Culpâ.
Lucret. lib. V. ver. 196, &c.

Epicurus, in plain Terms, ſays, That Juſtice which always relates to others, belongs to Man in no other Reſpect, than as he is a Member of civil Society: For Juſtice, in itſelf, even amongſt Men, is, ſays he, nothing. And his Reaſon is, becauſe it is to be found only in Societies, according to the Extent of every Country, in which the Inhabitants may conveniently enter into Agreements and Covenants, of neither offering nor receiving any Hurt. Becauſe, ſays he, if a Man be ſingly conſidered, there is no Juſtice at all; and, what is Juſtice in one Society of Men, many Times is, if the Covenants be of a contrary Nature, Injuſtice in another Society.

Cicero, from all theſe Doctrines, by very concluſive Reaſoning, lays ATHEISM to the Charge of the *Epicureans*. *See* Diogenes Laertius, Lucretius, Stanley's *Lives of the Philoſophers*, Cicero *de Natura Deorum*, and Epicurus's *Morals in* Engliſh *with* Digby's *Notes*.

(1) *Some Perſons of a much later Date.*] As *Mr. Hobbs*, Mr. *Selden*, &c.

(2) *Propoſitions of unchangeable Truth and Certainty.*] Every human Compoſition, of what Kind and Degree ſoever, muſt, from the Nature of it, be imperfect, and muſt carry Change and Decay in its very conſtituent Parts. For which Reaſon, the Laws of Nature cannot owe their Origin to human Invention.

(3) *Voluntary Motions of rational free Agents.*] There are ſeveral involuntary Motions in free Agents. As for Inſtance, The Syſtole and Diaſtole of the Heart: The Circulation of the Blood: The Syſtole and Diaſtole of the Arteries: The Periſtaltic Motion of the Inteſtines: And, the Protruſion of the Chyle, thro' the Lacteal Veſſels, to the Subclavian, with ſome other involuntary Motions, obſervable in human Nature, not to mention the neceſſary Coercion and Reſtraint often laid upon the Will from outward Cauſes: And the *Motus Primo-Primi*, ſo often mentioned by Metaphyſical Writers. *See* chap. 4. Sect. 1.

This Diſtinction between voluntary and involuntary Motions in free Agents, is of the higheſt Importance; becauſe, upon the free and voluntary Motions of every rational, accountable Agent, depends the very Soul, the very Eſſence of all Morality. For, according to the Laws of natural and moral Philoſophy, no other Aſſiſtance towards an happy Life is required from us, as we are accountable Agents, than as ſuch natural and moral Laws concern Freedom, and the ſeveral Objects reſpectively belonging to it, *i. e.* as ſuch Objects lye within the Capacity and Sphere of Man's free Agency. *See below*, Sect. 4. *of this Chapter.*

All Motions, both voluntary and involuntary, animal and rational, in human Nature, demonſtrate the real and actual Exiſtence of the Laws of Nature; and this eſſential fundamental Doctrine, our Author firmly eſtabliſhes by viewing an human Body, under three different Capacities.

1. As the human Body is endowed with ſome Properties which inhere in it, as it is a phyſical or natural Body.

2. By

whatſoever: And are clearly diſtinct from every Conſideration of all ſuch Compacts and Agreements (1) *as conſtitute civil Government.*

Some certain Truths of this Kind, ariſing from the Nature of Things, and from the humane Make, are neceſſarily ſuggeſted to the Minds of all Men.

The Mind perceives and is conſcious of theſe Truths: The Memory retains them, (provided all the rational and animal Powers be in a right State and Condition) and, by Conſequence, theſe Truths are deeply laid, and have an actual Exiſtence in the human Mind.

Theſe are Points which we affirm, and theſe are *The Points* which our Adverſaries, juſt now mentioned, with no ſmall Art and Subtlety, evade and deny.

That therefore the true eſſential Nature, the true real Exiſtence of theſe Propoſitions may be the more clearly traced out, and ſeparately diſtinguiſhed, it will be abſolutely neceſſary,

Firſt, To enquire into the (2) Make and Frame of the Univerſe.

Secondly, To ſearch out the natural State of Man. And,

Thirdly, To ſpecifically diſtinguiſh the true, real Nature of Good, ſo as diſtinctly to diſcern the Subſtance from the Shadow, the Reality from every falſe Appearance of it.

Theſe three Articles, which conſtitute the firſt Head of this *Philoſophical Enquiry*, muſt at leaſt ſo far be underſtood as they concern the preſent Argument.

That from hence, in the next Place, we may evidently demonſtrate, what Propoſitions they are, which muſt direct the Conduct, and Behaviour of Mankind: What Propoſitions they are, which carry, in their own inherent Sanctions, the Force and Obligation of Laws; and theſe, in other Words, are ſuch Propoſitions only, as declare what Courſe of Behaviour is neceſſary towards effecting, and bringing to paſs, the End we neceſſarily want, and muſt purſue.

2. By conſidering the human Body, as it is an animated Body endowed with Senſes like other Animals. And,

3. As the human Body is eminently diſtinguiſhed by ſome Qualities which ſpecifically diſtinguiſh it from, and give it a Superiority over all other animal Bodies whatſoever.

And thus, by the deepeſt Enquiries and Reſearches into all Sorts of Powers and Capacities, both voluntary and involuntary, phyſical, (or natural) animal, and rational, in human Nature, he demonſtrates, That univerſal Benevolence is the true Law of Nature, a Law of eternal Truth and Obligation. *See* Chap. 2. Sect. 13, 17, 21.

(1) *As conſtitute civil Government.*] All wiſe Law-givers, all wiſe Founders of States and Empires, have, more or leſs, according to Differences of Time, Place and Circumſtance, built their general Syſtems of Laws and Polities upon Principles of Right Reaſon: A manifeſt Proof That Right Reaſon is natural, and prior to all ſuch Laws and Inſtitutions.

(2) This Treatiſe is divided into three Parts.

The firſt Part comprehends	Chap. 1. Chap. 2. Chap. 3.
Second Part comprehends	Chap. 4, Chap. 5.
Third Part comprehends	Chap. 6. Chap. 7. Chap. 8. Chap. 9,

And then, in the *Third* and laſt Place, that theſe Propoſitions actually exiſt, will be ſufficiently evinced from thoſe real Cauſes, which conſtitute and produce them: From thoſe real Cauſes, by whoſe immediate Sanction, Authority and Power, theſe Propoſitions are every Moment influenced, directed, and governed.

SECT. II.

Why we ought to enquire into the Make and Frame of the Univerſe.

TO examine into the Make, and Frame of the Univerſe, cannot be thought an improper Enquiry.

Becauſe, without ſuch a Search, the moſt exalted human Faculties, and Powers muſt lie undiſcovered; for, as the beſt human Capacities and Intellects are, in themſelves, very indigent, ſo they require large Helps, and many Aſſiſtances from Abroad; and they are, at the ſame Time, capable of Activity, Motion, and Improvements from outward Objects and Motions of all Sorts.

For who can diſcover what Objects are, or are not, beſt ſuited to anſwer all the rational and animal Powers, unleſs he, to the beſt of his Capacity, ſearches into all thoſe Cauſes, as well remote as near, which originally framed human Nature: Into all thoſe Cauſes which, at preſent, actually preſerve it: Into all thoſe Cauſes, reſpectively, which differently tend towards its future Preſervation or Ruin? Neither, indeed, can it be ſufficiently known, what is beſt and fitteſt to be done, under any given Circumſtances, unleſs Effects, both remote and near, according to all the Variety of Circumſtances, be well weighed, and compared together.

Whereas Reflections, not only upon thoſe ſeveral Cauſes, by whoſe immediate Energy human Nature ſubſiſts; but alſo upon all ſuch Effects, altho' never ſo minute, as may ariſe from theſe Cauſes, lead the Mind by a natural Connection into an Idea of all Mankind, and of itſelf, as a very ſmall inſignificant Part of ſo extended and noble a Whole: Into a Survey of the univerſal Frame of Nature, and, by Conſequence, into an Idea of God, the original Maker, Creator and Governor of all.

Theſe neceſſary Foundations of Enquiry being well laid, and thoroughly digeſted, the Mind may form ſome general Rules, whereby to diſcover, what moral Acts, within human Power, principally promote the common Good of all Beings, but more eſpecially that of rational Agents, in which common Good is eſſentially contained the private Happineſs of each Individual.

Now, under ſuch Rules, (provided they are true and well connected) we ſhall, in the Courſe of this Enquiry, find the Laws of Nature to be fairly comprehended.

SECT.

SECT. III.

IT is not, however, the Deſign of this Undertaking to diſplay the diſtinct Natures, ſeverally, of all Beings and Things; this is far from our Intention.

Let us rather congratulate the extraordinary Sagacity of this our very (1) *Happy Century*, wherein the (2) *Intellectual Syſtem* of univerſal Nature, in

(1) *Happy Century.*] Quis enim abunde mirari poteſt (ut cum *Valejo Paterculo*, Lib. 1. Cap. 16. 17. loquar) quod eminentiſſima cujuſque Profeſſionis ingenia, in eandem formam & in idem artata temporis congruere ſpatium: & quemadmodum clauſa capſo, alioque ſepto, diverſi generis Animalia, nihilo minus ſeparata alienis in unumquodque Corpus congregantur; ita cujuſque clari operis capacia ingenia in Similitudinem & temporum & profectuum ſemetipſa ab aliis ſeparaverunt. Alit æmulatio ingenia; & nunc invidia, nunc admiratio incitationem accendit; Naturaque quod ſummo ſtudio petitum eſt, aſcendit in ſummum.

In Anglia clarebant Franciſcus Bacon, Vicecomes Sancti Albani; Gulielmus Camdenus, Clarentius; Edwardus Comes Clarendoniæ; Edwardus Coke; Robertus Cotton; Joannes Davis; Joannes Dodderige; Joannes Finch, Cuſtos Magni Sigilli; Gul. Hakewill; Matthæus Hale; Henricus Hobart; Joannes Holbourn; Edwardus Leigh; Jacobus Ley, Dominus de Mancheſter; Edwardus Littleton, Cuſtos Magni Sigilli; Georgius Mackenzy; Joannes Maynard, Franciſcus Moore; Gulielmus Noy; Gulielmus Prynne; Henricus Rolle; Henricus Spelmannus; Joannes Vaughan; Henricus Yelverton, & alii. In aliis Europæ partibus florebant ſæculo Seldeniano Andreas Alciatus, Italus; Gothofredus, Antonii Anteceſſor & Cancellarius Academiæ Gieſſenſis; Henningus Arniſæus, Polyhiſtor, Profeſſor Viadrinus & Helmſtadienſis; Reinardus Bachovius Echtius, Anteceſſor Heidelbergenſis; Matthias Berneggerus, Polyhiſtor; Chriſtophorus Beſoldus, Anteceſſor Tubingenſis & Ingolſtadienſis; Hieronymus Bignorius, Gallus; Joannes Henricus Boeclerus, Polyhiſtor Argentoratenſis; Barnabas Briſſonius, Gallus; Joannes Brunemannus, Anteceſſor Viadrinus; Auguſtus Dux Brunſwicenſis, notus ex Societate frugiferâ, & Bibliothecâ Wolfenbutelenſi, cujus Scripta extant ſub Nomine Guſtavi Sileni; Gulielmus Budacus, Gallus; Philippus Camerarius, Conſiliarius Noricus, & Procancellarius Altorfinus; Benedictus Carpzovius, Anteceſſor Lipſienſis; Martinus Chemnitius, Anteceſſor Roſtochienſis, Cancellarius Pomeraniæ, & Holſatiæ; Hermannus Conringus, Polyhiſtor; Jacobus Cujatius, Gallus; Petrus Cunæus, Profeſſor Batavus; Nicolaus Faber, Gallus; Marquardus Freherus, Conſiliarius Palatinus; Joannes Freinſhemius, Polyhiſtor; Chriſtianus Friſius, Danus; Chriſtophorus Forſtherus, Germanus; Gilbertus Gaumin, Gallus; Melchior Goldaſtus ab Heimensfelt; Jacobus Gothofredus, Syndicus Genevenſis; Hugo Grotius, Batavus; Joannes Gryphiander, Oldenburgenſis; Achylles Harlayus, Gallus; Georgius Philippus Harſdorferus, Noribergenſis; Ludolphus Hugo, Cancellarius Hannoveranus; Arnoldus Huitfeldius, regni Daniæ Cancellarius; Joannes Leunclavius, Amelburnus; Thomas Lanſius, Juriſconſultus Germanus; Joannes Limneus, Conſiliarius Brandenburgenſis; Fredericus Lindenbrogius, Hamburgenſis; Joannes Loccenius, Literaturæ Septentrionalis Reſtaurator; Antonius Matthæus, Haſſius; David Mevius, Stralſundenſis; Joachimus Minſingerus, à Prundeck, Cancellarius Brunſwicenſis; Joannes Oxenſtierna, Comes Moreæ Auſtralis, Suecus; Nicolaus Claudius, Fabricius Peireſkius, Petrus Pithoeus, Galli; Claudius Raalamb, Juriſconſultus Sueo; Nicolaus Rigaltius, Gallus; Conradus & Nicolaus Ritterſhuſius, ille Anteceſſor Altorfinus, hic Conſiliarius Noribergenſis; Claudius Salmaſius, Gallus; Juſtus Georgius Schottelius, Conſiliarius Brunſwicenſis; Vitus Ludovicus a Seckendorff; Joannes Stiernhoeckius, Juriſconſultus Abuenſis; Gaſpar a Teutleben, notus a Societate Frugifera, Anno 1617, conſtituta, cui is primus nomen dedit; Jacobus Thuanus, Andreas Tiraquellus, Henricus Valeſius, Galli; Marcus Velſerus Auguſtanus; Matthæus & Petrus Weſenbecii; Martinus Zieglerus; & quam plurimi alii, qui, affulgentibus benignis in

in its two moſt eſſential Branches, (namely, 1. the Being and Attributes of God, and 2. the Immortality of the Soul) is clearly laid open, and upon demonſtrative Evidence:——An Evidence which daily receives additional Proofs from clearer, and ſtill clearer Reſearches into Natural Philoſophy, into the Frame and Conſtitution of Things.

Let us then not only congratulate our own Age, but Ages laid in a long Series of Futurity, that the material or corporeal Parts of Nature now begin to open themſelves, and ſhine under a more excellent Philoſophy; a Philoſophy eſtabliſhed upon Mathematical Principles. Such a Philoſophy is, beyond Doubt, a moſt glorious Diſcovery; a Diſcovery which is made up, and conſiſts of ſeveral Parts.

Firſt, It is that Diſcovery which is to ſolve and account for all the Phænomena or Appearances of this viſible World; and upon the moſt ſimple, eaſy, uniform Principles: Upon the Principles of, 1ſt. Matter, and 2d. Motion.

I. Of Matter, or natural Body, under different Figures, Dimenſions and Qualities; under different attracting and repelling Powers. And,

II. Of Motion, ſimple and compounded, under different Directions and Tendencies.

Secondly, It is that Diſcovery which, by repeated Experiments and Obſervations, faithfully tryed and taken from all the Phænomena of this viſible World, is to confirm and prove, what are the eſſential Properties of Matter and Motion.

Thirdly, It is that Diſcovery which is to inveſtigate, point out and demonſtrate, upon Geometrical Principles, that the Experiments tryed prove theſe

in Muſas ſideribus, Halcyonia inter & turbines imperii Britannici, iiſdem cum Seldeno noſtro auſpiciis & Temporibus, patrium, totumque Literatum Orbem Scriptis, Doctrina, & conſiliis illuſtraverunt. *See Doctor* David Wilkins's *Life of* John Selden, *before* Selden's *Works*.

All Arts and Sciences in this Century acquired new Life and Vigour; all Sorts of Knowledge and Learning met with Countenance and Incouragement; all curious Inventions and Experiments were approved of and promoted, and Politeneſs and good Taſte came more and more into Faſhion; and even the *Engliſh* Tongue was daily more improved and refined, both as to Verſe and Proſe, by the ingenious Men of the Age, ſuch as *Waller*, *Cowley*, *Denham*, *Davenant*, *Sprat*, *L'Eſtrange*, *Dryden*, *Etheridge*, and others; beſides thoſe of the Court, as the King himſelf, the Lord Chancellor, the Duke of *Buckingham*, and the Earl of *Rocheſter*; who all together introduced a more juſt and judicious Way of Writing and Speaking than had been known before in *England*.

This Century had the Fame of producing that memorable Eſtabliſhment, ſo much encouraged by the King and the Court, called the *Royal Society*; a celebrated Body of Men, who laid a glorious Foundation for the fineſt Inventions and Experiments in Mathematics, Phyſic, Philoſophy, *&c.* which, ſince then, have met with innumerable Additions and Improvements, to the Glory of Learning, and the Honour of the *Engliſh* Nation. The chief Promoters of this Society in its Infancy were Dr. *Ward*, Mr. *Boyle*, the Lord *Brouncker*, Dr. *Wilkins*, Dr. *Wallis*, Sir *William Petty*, Dr. *Goddard*, Dr. *Willis*, Dr. *Bathurſt*, Dr. *Wren*, and Mr. *Rooke*; which afterwards received a great Addition of the moſt eminent Men in the Nation. *See Archdeacon* Echard's *Hiſtory of* England, Vol. III. Pag. 40, 41. And, laſtly, in this Countury appeared the great Sir *Iſaac Newton*.

(2) *Intellectual Syſtem.*] *See Dr.* Cudworth's *Intellectual Syſtem of the Univerſe.*

theſe to be the eſſential Properties, and ſpecific diſtinguiſhing Qualities, of *Natural Body* thus variouſly figured, and of *Motion* thus variouſly compounded.

Fourthly and laſtly, It is that Diſcovery which is to produce ſuch a natural Hiſtory of this viſible World, as ſhall accurately, and to a minute Exactneſs, agree to, and correſpond with, all the Laws of compound Motion, and with all the Laws of a natural Body, under every poſſible Variety of Figure, Dimenſion, *&c.*

To attempt ſo glorious a Diſcovery as this, is an Undertaking, to be ſure, vaſtly ſuperior, not only to the Capacity of one ſingle Man, but even to the united Capacity of an whole Age.

And yet ſuch an Undertaking is it, as does not ſeem ſuperior to that united Capacity, to that indefatigable Curioſity, of thoſe moſt ſhining and illuſtrious Perſonages, the Members of the ROYAL SOCIETY: An Undertaking truly worthy of our moſt gracious Sovereign King *Charles* II. the Founder, Patron, and brighteſt Ornament of this Society (1).

Inſtead then of my weak Endeavours, or, indeed, of any one mortal Man's Endeavours to carry on ſuch an Undertaking; we may, and with the fulleſt Security, commit the Care and Execution of this Undertaking to the penetrating Sagacity, Wiſdom and Fidelity of ſuch a Society. The *Royal Society* of England.

It will be ſufficient, in the Beginning of this Treatiſe, once for all, to inform the Reader, that the whole Doctrine of moral Philoſophy, and of the Laws of Nature, are drawn ultimately, either from natural (2) Obſervations, confirmed by univerſal Experience; or from Concluſions well known, and eſtabliſhed upon true Philoſophical Principles (3).

I underſtand and take *Phyſiology*, or *Philoſophy*, in this Treatiſe under ſo extenſive a Meaning, as to comprehend not only the Phænomena or Appearance, *i. e.* the ſenſible Effects of natural Bodies, as confirmed by Experiments; but alſo the Nature of our immortal Souls, as known by clear Inveſtigations and evident Traces, drawn from their well-known active Powers; from ſuch Properties and Perfections as peculiarly belong to them; and which ſpecifically diſtinguiſh Beings and Things from each other; and from whence, by (4) *a regular Subordination of Natural Cauſes* (as comprehended The Term *Phyſiology* to be taken in a much more extenſive Meaning than is commonly underſtood by the Term *Philoſophy*.

(1) The *Royal Society* of *England* was erected by Letters Patent from King *Charles* II. *A. D.* 1660. *See Biſhop* Spratt's *Hiſtory of the* Royal Society. *See the* Appendix, No. 1.

In the Reign of *Lewis* XIV. *A. D.* 1666, the *Royal Academy of Sciences* at *Paris* was inſtituted.

The firſt Meeting (entirely Mathematical) was in *June* the ſame Year. *See* Du Hamel's *Hiſtory of the Academy*. *See the* Appendix, No. 2.

(2) *Obſervations confirmed by univerſal Experience*, &c.] If repeated Experiments always hold good, and come out the ſame, the Philoſophical Principles confirmed by theſe Experiments cannot be queſtioned: Becauſe Nature is regular and uniform in all her Operations; and whatever Concluſions follow, by clear Deductions of Reaſon, from theſe Principles carry in them their own Evidences of Truth.

(3) This one Caution effectually ſecures our AUTHOR from any juſt Imputation of ſervilely adhering to any Hypotheſis: Nature is the true ſolid Foundation of all his moral Philoſophy.

(4) *A regular Subordination of natural Cauſes.*] Where there is a Subordination of Cauſes and

hended under the ſame Philoſophy) we infer the Being and Attributes of God; we underſtand him to be the original Author and prime Mover of all: And from hence we acknowledge him the ſole original Cauſe of all *neceſſary Effects*.

For, in Truth of Reaſoning, not only the Nature of all created Beings, but even of the Creator himſelf, plainly ſuggeſts to our Minds theſe Ideas as the Subject Matter, the material Principles, which compoſe and conſtitute theſe Laws of Nature; and which prove them ſo many practical Propoſitions of experimental Truth and Certainty.

And this full Demonſtration of GOD, as Creator and Preſerver of all, proves, moreover, his infinite Power, his unlimited (1) Dominion over the whole Univerſe.

But theſe Principles now come under a fuller, a clearer Enquiry.

Effects, there muſt neceſſarily be a Cauſe in Nature prior to the reſt, uncauſed. Or thus, where there is a Series, in which the Exiſtence of one Thing depends upon another, the Exiſtence of this again upon ſome other, and ſo upwards, as the Caſe ſhall be, there muſt be ſome independent Being upon whom the reſt do originally depend.

Suppoſe a Chain hung down out of the Heavens, from an unknown Height, and tho' every Link of it gravitated towards the Earth, and what it hung upon was not viſible, yet it did not deſcend, but kept its Situation; and upon this a Queſtion ſhould ariſe, What ſupported or kept up this Chain? Would it be a ſufficient Anſwer to ſay, that the firſt (or loweſt) Link hung upon the ſecond (or that next above it) the ſecond, or rather the firſt and ſecond together, upon the third, and ſo on *ad infinitum?* For, what holds up the whole? A Chain of ten Links would fall down, unleſs ſomething, able to bear it, bindered: One of twenty, if not ſtaid by ſomething of a yet greater Strength, in Proportion to the Increaſe of Weight; and therefore one of infinite Links certainly, if not ſuſtained by ſomething infinitely ſtrong, and capable to bear up an infinite Weight. And thus it is in a Chain of Cauſes and Effects, tending, or as it were gravitating, towards ſome End. The laſt (or loweſt) depends, or (as one may ſay) is ſuſpended upon the Cauſe above it: This again, if it be not the firſt Cauſe, is ſuſpended upon the Cauſe above it: This again, if it be not the firſt Cauſe, is ſuſpended as an Effect upon ſomething above it, *&c.* And if they ſhould be infinite, unleſs (agreeably to what has been ſaid) there is ſome Cauſe upon which all hang and depend, they would be but an infinite Effect without an Efficient; and to aſſert there is any ſuch Thing, would be as great an Abſurdity as to ſay, that a finite, or little Weight, wants ſomething to ſuſtain it; but an infinite one, or the greateſt, does not. Wollaſton's *Religion of Nature delineated*, Pages 65, 67, 68.

(1) *Dominion.*] Deus omnia regit non ut Anima Mundi, ſed ut Univerſorum Dominus, & propter Dominium ſuum, Dominus Deus παντοκράτωρ, *i. e.* Imperator Univerſalis dici ſolet.

Nam Deus eſt Vox relativa & ad ſervos refertur: Et Deitas eſt Dominatio Dei, non in Corpus proprium, uti ſentiunt quibus Deus eſt Anima Mundi, ſed in ſervos. Deus ſummus eſt ens æternum, infinitum, abſolute Perfectum: Sed ens utcunque perfectum ſine Dominio non eſt Dominus Deus, dicimus enim Deus Meus, Deus Veſter, Deus Iſraelis, Deus Deorum, & Dominus Dominorum; ſed non dicimus æternus Meus, æternus Veſter, æternus Iſraelis, æternus Deorum: Non dicimus infinitus Meus, vel perfectus Meus, hæ Appellationes Relationem non habent ad ſervos. Vox Deus paſſim ſignificat Dominum: Sed omnis Dominus non eſt Deus.

Pocockus noſter Vocem Dei deducit a voce Arabica Du, (& in Caſu obliquo Di) quæ Dominum ſignificat, & hoc ſenſu Principes vocantur Dii. *Pſalm* lxxxiv. 6. & Joan. x. 45. & Moſes dicitur Deus Fratris Aaron, & Deus Regis Pharaoh (*Exod.* iv. 16. vii. 1.) & eodem ſenſu animæ Principum Mortuorum olim a Gentibus vocabantur Dii, ſed falſo propter defectum Dominii. *Vid.* Iſ. Newton *Phil. Nat. Princip. Math.* Pag. 528. *Quarto Edit.* Lond. 1726.

SECT.

SECT. IV.

Some few general Truths comprehended under one univerſal Propoſition, are beſt to inveſtigate the Laws of Nature.

NOTWITHSTANDING, however, that there are numberleſs Truths deducible from the Knowledge of univerſal Nature; and notwithſtanding that theſe Truths form the Subject Matter of thoſe particular Precepts, which are to regulate and conduct moral Behaviour; yet we judge it beſt to ſelect and make Choice of ſome few Truths only (and thoſe the moſt general) which may, in ſome Sort, form a Definition, or, more properly, a Deſcription of Nature's Laws: Such Truths as may be more clearly and diſtinctly comprized under one ſingle Precept, as the true original Source and genuine Parent of all Laws whatſoever, merely natural.

And this was my principal Deſign in writing this Diſſertation. And This univerſal Precept, or, one grand Propoſition ſtands thus.

PROPOSITION.

The univerſal moral Propoſition. The happieſt State which each, from his own Abilities, is capable of ſecuring to himſelf, is the ultimate End deſigned by theſe Laws. Duties of the higheſt and moſt univerſal Benevolence, the beſt and moſt effectual Means towards the Attainment of this End.

That the greateſt Benevolence, *of each and every one individual Agent in the rational Syſtem, fully exerciſed and exerted towards all, eſſentially forms the happieſt State which each (ſingle Perſon or Individual) from his own free Capacities and Powers merely is capable of; and which* (Benevolence) *is, moreover, the only Method or Means indiſpenſably neceſſary, towards effectually promoting the happieſt State, which each can poſſibly enjoy.* And,

By Conſequence,

The common Good will become the ſupreme Law.

That the true Meaning of this Propoſition may be the better underſtood, it will be neceſſary,

1. To explain the Terms of the Propoſition itſelf.

2. To ſhew how this Propoſition is taught in the Nature of Things.

3. That this univerſal Propoſition carries in it (and which, I hope, will appear evident in the Sequel of this Diſquiſition) the full Sanction of a Law; and that All, I ſay, *even* All, the Precepts or Laws of Nature immediately flow from it.

Firſt, As to the Terms themſelves.

Benevolence defined.

By the Term BENEVOLENCE, as here uſed, I would not have my Readers imagine that, in any Part of this Diſcourſe, I mean that languid, lifeleſs Volition, which never actually performs, or reduces into Practice, its own Intentions: But that Kind of *Benevolence* only, I mean, by whoſe immediate, operative Energy, we really, and in Fact, execute all thoſe Intentions which we heartily will and deſire.

Under this Term BENEVOLENCE, is fairly comprehended, likewiſe, that Affection which influences us to will and to do Acts pleaſing in the Sight of our Superiors: And, what Kind of Benevolence or Affection it is, which eſpe-

cially and ſpecifically is diſtinguiſhed by the Term *Piety* towards *God*, our *Country*, and our *Parents*.

Why the Term Benevolence is preferable to the Term Love.

Now, for the following Reaſon it is, that I prefer the Term *Benevolence*, or the Term Affection, to the Term *Love*: Becauſe, from the very Nature and Conſtitution of the Term *Benevolence* itſelf, there is repreſented to us all the compounded various Operations of the rational Will, as fitly and differently applied to all Objects: Beſides, this Term, *(viz. Benevolence)* is never underſtood or taken in a bad, immoral Acceptation; whereas the Term *Love* frequently is.

Here then, we have choſen the moſt exalted, the higheſt Degrees of *Benevolence* to fix upon, as the adequate, full, compleat Cauſe of *ultimate Happineſs*: That is to ſay, of ſuch an *Happineſs* as is, at all Times, moſt preferable.

We ſhall ſhew, in ſome future Part of this Diſcourſe, how ſuch Difficulties, as ariſe from this Manner of conceiving Things, may be ſolved by the

What is meant by the Word ALL.

Word ALL. I mean ſuch a *Sum Total* or *Whole*, as is conſtituted and eſſentially made up of *all the individual ſingle Parts* taken together and *united*, in order to come at that *ultimate* or *chief End*, which we expreſly call the *Happieſt State*.

What Beings are comprehended under the Title Rational.

I may venture to comprehend, under the Term *Rational Beings*, both *God* and *Man*: And, that, upon the Authority of *Cicero* himſelf, who has done ſo before me; and whom, in the Application of a *Latin* Word or Phraſe, I may ſafely take as my Guide. For *Cicero*, in his firſt Book of Laws, affirms, that Reaſon is common both to *God* and *Man*; and he has defined *Sapientia*, or *Wiſdom* (which is an Attribute univerſally aſcribed and annexed to the Idea of *God)* to be nothing elſe than Reaſon, in its matureſt, beſt Perfection.

Why the Word *conſtituit* is uſed.

In the Deſcription of this one univerſal Propoſition, I have uſed the Word *Conſtituit*, (conſtitutes or eſſentially makes up) to ſhew, that *Benevolence* is both the intrinſic, inherent, inward, innate Cauſe of all *preſent Happineſs*, as well as the efficient Cauſe of all *Happineſs to come*; and that it is the one ſufficient Cauſe, *ſine quâ non*, equally neceſſary, towards the Enjoyment of both Happineſs, *i. e.* both preſent and future.

I have added in this Definition, or Deſcription, *(quantum ab ipſis fieri poteſt) i. e.* (which each, from his own free Capacities and Powers merely, is capable of) to inſinuate, that there are often ſeveral outward foreign Aſſiſtances, not at all in our own Power; and yet, which are very requiſite to an happy animal Life.

No Agent accountable farther than his Freedom reaches.

However, according to the Laws of both Natural and Moral Philoſophy, no other Aſſiſtances towards an happy Life are required from us, as we are accountable Agents, than as ſuch natural and moral Laws concern the Rules of free Actions, and of ſuch Objects to them (*i. e.* to free Actions) reſpectively belonging, as lie within the Capacity or Sphere of human Freedom.

Now,

Now, altho' it may happen, (as to be ſure it does) that different Men, according to their ſeveral reſpective Capacities of Soul and Body, (nay, even the very ſame one individual Man) under different Circumſtances, are, at one Time, more, at another Time, leſs able to contribute towards the common Good; yet the Law of Nature is ſufficiently obſerved, and its End fully anſwered, if each Individual, under any given Circumſtances, actually performs all the Good in his Power.

But——A fuller more enlarged Explanation of this Doctrine will appear in the following Diſcourſe.

And ſo much for the Terms contained in the Definition or Deſcription, *&c.*

SECT. V.

How this univerſal Propoſition is taught in the Nature of Things.

WE come now to the ſecond Branch of our Definition, which is to ſhew, how the Ideas or Notions, which are comprehended under this univerſal Law, neceſſarily become impreſſed upon the Mind of Man: And that theſe Ideas or Notions, as ſoon as they actually exiſt there, (that is, in the human Mind) carry a neceſſary Connection, *i. e.* form a true Propoſition; which Propoſition, ſince it evidently is practical, we will prove muſt, in the very Nature of it, ſupport the Dignity, the Weight, the Sanction of a Law.

It is a Point allowed on all Hands, becauſe confirmed by univerſal Experience, that there are two Inlets, or Ways, thro' which Notions or Thoughts are firſt raiſed and formed in the Mind; and which Notions or Thoughts are, by the Logicians, termed *Simple Apprehenſions*.

1. (1) By the immediate Preſence and actual Operation of the Object itſelf upon the Mind; from whence the Mind perceives and becomes conſcious of its own Operations, and of the Motions cauſed in its (2) own Imagination;

(1) *By the immediate Preſence and actual Operation of the Object*, &c.] The Object preſent raiſes a Thought, a Notion, an Idea in the Mind.

That Soul and Body are cloſely united, we certainly know; but by what inviſible Tye this Union is formed, we cannot comprehend; by what ſecret Energy Matter works upon Spirit, is as dark a Myſtery as the Doctrine of the ever-bleſſed Trinity.

(2) *Its own Imagination*, &c.] The Imagination is that common Repoſitory, or Storehouſe, wherein all Ideas are lodged and laid up, as Materials proper for the Operations of the Mind to work upon: Theſe Operations are, 1. Simple Apprehenſion. 2. Judgment. and 3. Illation, or Inference, or Reaſon ſtrictly ſo called. A very ingenious Writer, well verſed in logical and metaphyſical Subjects, calls theſe Operations, *Operations of the pure Intellect*. The firſt, ſays he, of thoſe Operations of the pure Intellect, is that of *a ſimple View*, or Survey, of thoſe Ideas of Senſation, in the very Order and Condition they lie in the Imagination, without altering the Nature or Situation of any one of them, without paſſing any Judgment, or making any Inferences with Relation to them. This, the Logicians have rightly termed Simple Apprehenſion, but do unhappily always confound it with pure Senſation, and the mere mechanical Perception of external Objects; by which Means, the firſt and fundamental Diſtinction, between Reaſon and the natural Inſtinct of Brutes, is loſt.

Imagination; that is, the Mind perceives and becomes conſcious of ſuch Ideas and Images, as it is converſant and employed about: And then by an (1) Analogy, or Similitude, or Compariſon, from thence naturally ariſing, we form ſome Judgments concerning the Intellects and Capacities of other rational Beings; namely, both of *God* and *Man*.

2. And then, *Secondly*, by the Miniſtration of our external Senſes, of our Nerves, of our Membranes, of our Animal-Spirits, Bodily-Organs, *&c.* (the Miniſtration of all which, is the Manner how we arrive at theſe ſecond Kind of Impreſſions and Perceptions.) The reſt of Mankind, and the other Parts of this viſible World, are conveyed into our Minds; that is, our firſt Notions of them at once become evident (2).

And

There is an eſſential Difference between a ſimple Apprehenſion of the Mind and a ſimple Perception of the Senſe; the Conſequence of this is an Idea in the Imagination; the former frames or occaſions no new ſimple Idea, and only apprehends one that is already made, and preſented to its View: As, when by looking upon a human Body, a Repreſentation or Similitude of it is tranſmitted thro' the Eyes to the Imagination: This is the Cauſe of a new Idea, in which the pure Intellect hath no Part; it contributes nothing to the Production of that Idea, and it is formed without the leaſt Act or Concurrence of the Mind.

In all Senſations, the Imagination is purely paſſive, diſpoſed by Nature to receive only, and retain ſuch Impreſſions as are made upon the Senſes; ſo that there may be an immenſe Number of ſimple Ideas lodged there, before we need neceſſarily ſuppoſe one ſimple Act, or Apprehenſion of the Intellect, with relation to them, which muſt be an Act ſubſequent to all Senſation whatſoever; and never to be conſidered in Conjunction with it, as if it were one and the ſame Thing. The ſimple Apprehenſion, I am now ſpeaking of, is an Act or Operation of the Mind, and not of the Senſes; which laſt is common to us with Brutes; but the firſt a Perfection, an Excellency of an human Soul: Inſomuch, that it is the moſt noble and elevated Manner of Operation in the Intellect, and that by which it comes neareſt to the Manner of Knowledge in Angels. Præcipua, ſays a great Philoſopher, Intellectus humani, ſicut Angelorum Functio videtur eſſe, ut ſit ex ſuâ Naturâ Intelligens; hoc eſt, ſimplici Intuitu, non Ratiocinatione cognoſcens.

Now therefore, antecedently to this ſimple Apprehenſion, or any other Act of the pure Intellect, we are to ſuppoſe the Imagination plentifully ſtored, and furniſhed with Ideas of Senſation, altogether without its Concurrence.

They began to be tranſmitted inwardly, thro' the Senſes, from our Infancy; they daily multiply by Experience, and our Converſation with external ſenſible Objects; and are increaſed to a prodigious Number, before we are conſcious to ourſelves of any Operations of the pure Intellect upon them: In this common Store-houſe, and Receptacle, thoſe Ideas lie in Confuſion together, all disjoined and unranged; and in no other Order than that wherein they happen to be firſt tranſmitted. And were there no immaterial Principle at all within us, they would always remain in the ſame diſorderly Condition, undiſturbed and unobſerved, and without any other Alteration, than what would be made by the Acceſſion of new Ideas, from Objects as yet unperceived; and by the reviving of thoſe that were defaced or obliterated, from the Repetition of ſuch Impreſſions as had been made before. *Biſhop* Brown's *Procedure, Extent and Limits of human Underſtanding*, Pag. 155, 156, 157.

(1) *See the Notes upon Analogy. Prologomena*, Sect. 10.

(2) *Ideas of Senſation and Reflexion.*] Firſt, our Senſes, converſant about particular ſenſible Objects, do convey into the Mind ſeveral diſtinct Perceptions of Things, according to thoſe various Ways wherein thoſe Objects do affect them: And thus we come by thoſe Ideas we have of Yellow, White, Heat, Cold, Soft, Hard, Bitter, Sweet, and all thoſe which we call ſenſible Qualities; which when, I ſay, the Senſes convey into the Mind, I mean, they, from external Objects, convey into the Mind what produces there thoſe Perceptions.

This

And therefore,

That the Terms of that Propoſition, which I juſt now laid down, are made known to us; partly by an *internal Perception*, partly by an *external Senſation*.

What *Benevolence* truly is; of what Degrees it is capable; and, by Conſequence, what is, according to each Capacity, the full Extent of this Virtue: Theſe are Points, which no Man can underſtand, by any other Method than by looking inwardly upon the (1) Reflex Acts of his own Mind; neither is there Need of any other neceſſary Helps: Becauſe, as the human Mind is circumſtanced, it is impoſſible but it muſt perceive ſuch Motions and Affections as are intimately and inſeparably blended in the very Nature of it.

Benevolence better underſtood by Ideas of Reflexion than by any other Method.

At the ſame Time, however, we allow that, to the Mediation and Help of our outward Senſes, we owe the Knowledge of theſe Bleſſings, and

This great Source, of moſt of the Ideas we have, depending wholly upon our Senſes, and derived by them to the Underſtanding, I call *Senſation*.

Secondly, The other Fountain, from which Experience furniſheth the Underſtanding with Ideas, is the Perception of the Operations of our own Mind within us, as it is employed about the Ideas it has got; which Operations, when the Soul comes to reflect on and conſider, do furniſh the Underſtanding with another Set of Ideas, which could not be had from Things without, and ſuch are Perception, Thinking, Doubting, Believing, Reaſoning, Knowing, Willing, and all the different Actings of our own Minds; which we being conſcious of, and obſerving in ourſelves, do from theſe receive into our Underſtandings as diſtinct Ideas, as we do from Bodies affecting our Senſes.

This Source of Ideas every Man has wholly in himſelf; and tho' it be not Senſe, as having nothing to do with external Objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called Internal Senſe: But as I call the other *Senſation*, ſo I call this *Reflexion*; the Ideas it affords being ſuch only, as the Mind gets by reflecting on its own Operations within itſelf.

By *Reflexion*, then, in the following Part of this Diſcourſe, I would be underſtood to mean, that Notice which the Mind takes of its own Operations, and the Manner of them, by Reaſon whereof there come to be Ideas of theſe Operations in the Underſtanding. Theſe two, I ſay, *viz.* external material Things, as the Objects of *Senſation*, and the Operations of our Minds within, as the Objects of *Reflexion*, are, to me, the only Originals from whence all our Ideas take their Beginnings. The Term *Operations* here I uſe in a large Senſe, as comprehending not barely the Actions of the Mind about its Ideas, but ſome Sort of Paſſions ariſing ſometimes from them; ſuch as is the Satisfaction or Uneaſineſs ariſing from any Thought.

The Underſtanding ſeems to me, not to have the leaſt Glimmering of any Ideas which it doth not receive from one of theſe two. External Objects furniſh the Mind with the Ideas of ſenſible Qualities, which are all thoſe different Perceptions they produce in us; and the Mind furniſhes the Underſtanding with Ideas of its own Operations.

Theſe, when we have taken a full Survey of them, and their ſeveral Modes, Combinations and Relations, we ſhall find to contain all our whole Stock of Ideas, and that we have nothing in our Minds which did not come in one of theſe two Ways. Locke's *Eſſay concerning human Underſtanding*, Book 2. Chap. 1. Sect. 3, 4, 5.

(1) *By any other Method, than by looking inwardly upon the reflex Acts of his own Mind.*] In the Order of Nature, Senſation is prior to Reflexion, according to the old logical Maxim, *Nihil eſt in Intellectu, quod non prius fuit in Senſu.* And yet when the Mind is once ſufficiently ſtored with Materials of Knowledge, the Truths of Morality are more immediately perceived by reflex Acts of the Mind than by Senſation; which will appear to a Demonſtration, when we ſearch deeper into this Enquiry.

happy

happy Effects which *Benevolence* univerſally communicates and diſpenſes to *All*.

But of this we ſhall treat hereafter in Chap. III.

In the ſame Manner, indeed, alſo, we underſtand the Nature of Reaſon, from (1) the internal Senſe of it, impreſſed upon the Mind; and, from hence, we diſcover who the rational Agents are whom we have mentioned in the Subject, or firſt Part of our univerſal Propoſition.

Now, that there are other Beings, beſides ourſelves, endowed with Reaſon, we collect and infer by certain Marks and Tokens, conveyed to us from our outward Senſes.

For, we inveſtigate, or trace back to their Original, the conſtituent, operative, efficient Cauſes of all Things: Either,

1. By the reflux Acts of our own Minds; or,

2. (2) By ſome Manner of outward Efficiency, which, in the general, is by the Help of our outward Senſes; and from thence conclude, by rational Inferences, built upon the Phænomena, or real Appearances, of viſible Objects.

For the Mind (3) partly from an inward retired View into itſelf; partly from outward Objects (by the Help of the five external Senſes communicated

(1) *The internal Senſe of Reaſon.*] That the Perceptions of moral Good and Evil are perfectly different from thoſe of natural Good or Advantage, every one muſt convince himſelf, by reflecting upon the different Manner in which he finds himſelf affected, when theſe Objects occur to him. Had we no Senſe of Good, diſtinct from the Advantage or Intereſt ariſing from the external Senſes, and the Perceptions of Beauty and Harmony, our Admiration and Love toward a fruitful Field, or commodious Habitation, would be much the ſame with what we have toward a generous Friend, or any noble Character; for both are, or may be, advantageous to us; and we ſhould no more admire any Action, or love any Perſon in a diſtant Country, or Age, whoſe Influence could not extend to us, than we love the Mountains of *Peru*, while we are unconcerned in the *Spaniſh* Trade, we ſhould have the ſame Sentiments and Affections toward inanimate Beings which we have toward rational Agents, which yet every one knows to be falſe. Upon Compariſon we ſay, "Why "ſhould we admire or love with Eſteem in- "animate Beings? They have no Intention "of Good to us; their Nature makes them "fit for our Uſes, which they neither know, "nor ſtudy to ſerve: But it is not ſo with "rational Agents, they ſtudy our Intereſt, and "delight in our Happineſs, and are benevo- "lent towards us."

We are all then conſcious of the Difference between that Love and Eſteem, or Perception of moral Excellence, which Benevolence excites towards the Perſon in whom we obſerve it, and that Opinion of natural Goodneſs, which only raiſes Deſire of Poſſeſſion toward the good Object. Now, "what ſhould make "this Difference, if all Approbation or Senſe "of Good be from Proſpect of Advantage? "Do not inanimate Objects promote our "Advantage, as well as benevolent Perſons "who do us Offices of Kindneſs and Friend- "ſhip? Should we not then have the ſame "endearing Sentiments of both, or only the "ſame cold Opinion of Advantage in both?" The Reaſon why it is not ſo, muſt be this, "That we have a diſtinct Perception of "Beauty or Excellence, in the kind Affec- "tions of rational Agents, whence we are "determined to admire and love ſuch Charac- "ters and Perſons." *Mr.* Francis Hutcheſon's *Enquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Virtue or moral Good*, Sect. 1. p. 117, 118, 119. *Edit.* Lond. 1726.

(2) *By ſome Manner of outward Efficiency*, &c.] This outward Manner of Efficiency, is the Impreſſion cauſed by external Objects upon one or more of the five Senſes.

(3) *Partly from a retired View into itſelf*, &c.] Some perhaps may be apt to imagine, that our Author, in this Paſſage, contradicts the

nicated to it) the Mind, from both which (*viz.* Reflection and Senſation) obſerves and experiences Effects, as influenced by and under the Direction of the Will.

Hence, from Obſervation and Experience, Effects influenced by the human Will are known.

The Mind from hence perceives,

1. What is the true Nature of itſelf: And,

2. What are the effective Operations, and outward Means, whereby it wills and ſtirs the voluntary Acts and Motions of our Bodies, in the Proſecution of ſome apparent Good.

And laſtly, we underſtand, by the very ſame Method,

1. What the State of Man really is.

2. Wherein conſiſts the true Happineſs of ſuch a State.

From both which, as we have already hinted, Man's true Nature, and the Degrees of *Good* he is capable of, may be collected. For, truly the preſent State and Condition of Mankind, can add nothing to the Natures of Things, unleſs ſome ſmall Idea of a tranſient momentary Continuance here; and, that ſuch a State is determined happy, from the Concurrence and Cooperation of the largeſt Quantity, and beſt Quality of Good.

SECT. VI.

AS to what concerns the Connexion of the Terms contained under this Propoſition, in which [Connexion] the Truth of it neceſſarily conſiſts; the Propoſition itſelf, in my Apprehenſion, appears very clear.

The Connexion of the Terms contained in this one univerſal moral Propoſition, will perhaps appear firmer, by expreſſing the Propoſition under a different Form of Words.

Becauſe, in other Words, it is neither more or leſs than this:

That ſuch a Volition, Propenſity and Proſecution, of all the Good in our Power, which contributes moſt effectually towards the true Enjoyment of our ſelves, and of all other rational Beings, is the higheſt Degree of Good which Mankind can produce, in order moſt happily to enjoy all other rational Beings: And, that all other rational Beings may moſt happily enjoy them: Nay, that very Propenſity of Mankind, whereby they procure to themſelves, and to all around them, the greateſt Quantity of Good cannot be more operative and powerful, than the Will or Deſire implanted in each, of purſuing his own Happineſs, in Conjunction with the united Happineſs of all.

In which Words there is contained,

1. Firſt, this ſelf-evident Truth, That the Propenſity towards effecting any End, cannot be ſtronger and more operative than the determined Purpoſe and Inclination of the Agent, to act, in all Caſes, to the very beſt of his Abilities.

the commonly received Notion, maintained by logical and metaphyſical Writers, That all our Ideas ariſe from *Senſation* and *Reflexion*. But——This by no Means is his Opinion.—

All that he affirms here, is, That the Knowledge of Moral Philoſophy is much more immediately owing to reflex Ideas, than to Ideas of Senſation.

2. And

2. And, the ſecond ſelf-evident Truth is, That the Happineſs of each ſingle Perſon, *e. g.* of *Plato*, of *Socrates*, and of each other Individual, reſpectively, (which is underſtood and expreſſed in the Prædicate of our general Propoſition) cannot particularly, and ſpecifically, be diſtinguiſhed and ſeparated from the Happineſs of the *Whole*, *All*.

For the efficient Cauſe of each ſingle Happineſs (*i. e.* of the Prædicate in this Propoſition) neceſſarily inheres in the *Whole*, as the Subject of the ſaid general Propoſition: And which Truth is eſtabliſhed upon this Maxim, 'That the Whole differs nothing from all its Parts taken together.'

The Queſtion here is not what ſome few Individuals may do towards procuring private particular Happineſs: But the Queſtion is, Whether the common Happineſs of All, be not the greateſt poſſible Happineſs of Each?

This univerſal Propoſition, however, (which expreſſes the Benevolence of all) muſt hitherto be underſtood, as agreeing only with the Laws of Nature themſelves: Becauſe this Propoſition demonſtrates, not what any one Individual, or a few, may do towards procuring a diſtinct private Happineſs, without the leaſt Regard had to others: But this Propoſition demonſtrates what All, *even* All when unitedly conſidered, are capable of performing towards ſuch a diſtinct ſeparate Happineſs: And, what, each and every Individual is capable of performing, towards attaining the common Happineſs of all, without any Oppoſition amongſt Individuals (ſuch an Oppoſition being quite contrary to that Reaſon, of which all are ſuppoſed Partakers.) Under which common Happineſs of *All*, the greateſt poſſible Happineſs of each, and every Individual, is eſſentially contained, and in it, moſt effectually ſecured.

The Knowledge of human Nature in general, eaſier than the Knowledge of any one Individual, under all poſſible given Circumſtances.

For, ſuch a Knowledge in general, is readier come at, and more compleat when known, which ariſes from the common eſſential *Attributes* of human Nature; and which informs us, what, or how much, *All*, either can or cannot contribute towards the general, public, univerſal Good, than ſuch a Knowledge, which tells us only what is poſſible for any one ſingle Perſon, under all given Circumſtances, to perform towards the ſame End.

Becauſe, as Circumſtances are, in their own Nature, infinite; thus *All*, (*i. e.* Circumſtances) cannot poſſibly be known. Several Armies, for Inſtance, being drawn out into the Field of Battle, it is more evident that they all cannot poſſibly conquer, than it is to know which Army of them all will carry the Victory.

Thirdly, and laſtly, the Regard had to ſuch an Happineſs as concerns only one, two, three, or, in ſhort, any ſmall Number, is and muſt be laid aſide for the preſent: Neither can it, by any rational Probability, be reaſſumed as preferable in Time to come; eſpecially if, upon Enquiry, any Doubt remains concerning the Contradiction, Oppoſition or Neglect, which ſuch private Happineſs carries in it, with Reſpect to the Happineſs of all rational Beings.

Becauſe, to a Mind truly affected and touched with the Happineſs of others, under theſe Circumſtances, one eſſential Part of its own Perfection is wanting; namely, that inward Tranquillity which flows from an uniform Wiſdom, *i. e.* from ſteady Reaſon, in its matureſt Perfection, and which always acts with perfect Conſiſtency.

For,

For, that rational Agent moſt certainly contradicts himſelf, who preſcribes one Rule for his own private Conduct, and a quite different Rule for the Conduct of other rational Beings, who partake of the very ſame Nature with himſelf.

In rational Agents, it is a Contradiction to ſuppoſe each to follow a ſeparate Rule of Action.

Beſides all this, there is wanting that ſublime Joy which naturally ariſes in every benevolent Breaſt, from that impreſt Senſe excited by the Happineſs of others. Not to mention Envy, Pride, and all that numberleſs Train of Vices which conſtantly ſurround the malevolent Mind, and which neceſſarily conſtitute its Miſery; becauſe, ſuch a Mind labours under the very worſt Diſeaſes of the human Soul.

But, to proceed one Step further: There is no Reaſon why any one ſhould, upon the leaſt Foundation, hope to be happy, if he pays no Regard to thoſe other rational external Cauſes (namely, God and Man) upon whoſe united Aſſiſtance ſuch an Hope neceſſarily depends; but more eſpecially, ſhould he provoke theſe Cauſes to draw upon him Deſtruction.

For there is no Method which directs any one ſingle Perſon to his own Happineſs, which does not equally direct *all* to the common united Happineſs of *All*.

What I have hitherto, very briefly, premiſed, may ſufficiently ſhew my Deſign; namely, to demonſtrate only, from theſe and ſuch like Obſervations, clearly diſcoverable by common Experience, that the Truth of the foregoing Propoſition appears in a very fair View.

But, ſuch Conſequences as naturally follow from theſe Premiſſes, we ſhall hereafter ſhew more at large.

SECT. VII.

HERE, however, I lay it down as a preliminary Truth, that this univerſal Propoſition cannot operate effectually upon the Manners and Behaviour of any rational Man, unleſs he propoſes to himſelf the Effect, which, as we here affirm, ariſes from this univerſal Propoſition, or Law; *i. e.* unleſs he propoſes to him this Effect, as that *ultimate and chief End*, in which his own private Happineſs is intimately blended and mixed with the united Happineſs of all other rational Beings: And, moreover, unleſs he uſes (as *Means* neceſſary towards the Attainment of this *End*) all that Variety of free Motions and Actions, which Benevolence comprehends in the very Nature and Eſſence of it.

Every rational Agent muſt propoſe to himſelf this univerſal Propoſition as the Rule of Action.

The neceſſary Truth, however, of the one grand Propoſition, is, in the firſt Place, ſufficiently clear; as alſo, the Truths of all theſe Propoſitions which, from thence, by rational, fair Conſequence, are deducible from it. Such, for Inſtance, are thoſe Laws leſs general, which lay the Obligations of Fidelity, Gratitude, ΣΤΟΡΓΗ, or the tender Care of our Young, and of all thoſe other particular Virtues

which neceſſarily conſtitute ſome ſingular Branches of human Happineſs. For, the whole Truth, as well of the one general Propoſition, as well as of all thoſe particular Propoſitions which follow from it, depends upon the natural and neceſſary Energy of thoſe Actions and Virtues, as the effective, operative Cauſes which produce ſuch Effects.

The one general Propoſition is demonſtrated in Chap. 5. the particular Propoſitions which follow from it are demonſtrated in Chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9.

There is here, however, one Caution very proper, which is, that ſuch Actions as are in the Power of, and depend upon, free rational Cauſes, may be ſeparated and diſtinguiſhed from the actual Exiſtence of ſuch Actions as already really exiſt: It being in every Circumſtance ſufficient to make out any general Truth, that (1) whenever ſuch Cauſes exiſt and operate, the ſame and alike Effects ſhall flow from them.

Truths

(1) *Whenever ſuch Cauſes exiſt and operate*, &c.] All Demonſtration conſiſts, not in the Conſideration of Things, as actually exiſting, but in the Perception of their Relations to one another, whether they exiſt or not. And he that can perceive ſuch Relations, can demonſtrate every Propoſition in Mathematics, as well as if Lines, and Squares, and Circles, and Curves, of all Sorts, did exiſt. Suppoſe a Man were to act upon this Knowlege, and conform to what he perceives to be true, his Action would be deemed right: Suppoſe it to be a moral Action, conformed to the Truth of the Relation which he ſtands in to other People, it would be a good Action: Suppoſe again, that the Action was not agreeable to the true Relation he was in; as, *e. g.* if a Man, knowingly, were to violate the Engagements he was under to any Perſon, it would be an evil Action. So that a Conformity to Truth, the Truth of the Caſe, or its Diſagreement with that Rule, is the Thing which conſtitutes an Action or Agent, good or bad. *Doctor* Sykes's *Principles and Connexion of Natural and Revealed Religion diſtinctly conſidered.* Chap. 1. pag. 12, 13.

Titius and *Sempronius*, being both born of one Father and Mother, could not have ſtood in the Relation of Brothers to each other, had they not been actually born of the ſame Parents: But ſuppoſing this World had not been made, yet the Relation of two, that ſhould be born of the ſame Father and Mother, would have been, what we now call, Brothers; juſt as a Square would have been equal to two Triangles on the ſame Baſis, ſuppoſing that no Square or Triangle had ever in Fact been made. The Ideas of Things depend not on the Things themſelves; but the Things are made from the Ideas, as the Archetypes, and their Proportions, Habitudes, Ratio's, are eternal. The Square of the Hypotenuſe in a Rectangle Triangle, is equal to the Squares of the two other Sides, whether there be or be not any Rectangle Triangle made or exiſting. An unoriginated Being muſt have a Property that an originated Being has not, whether there be any originated Beings or not; it depends indeed upon the Will of God, whether particular Relations ſhall in Fact exiſt; but the Relations are the ſame, whether the Things exiſt or not: Theſe do not commence upon a Suppoſition of God's having created Things; nor are they the Conſequences of the Exiſtence of Things. Thus in moral Relations: Before that a Syſtem of rational Creatures was made, or put into a ſocial State, the Ratio or Relation of them to one another, the Fitneſs of Juſtice, Equity, Temperance, Prudence, Fortitude, to their Happineſs, were what they are now. It was true from all Eternity, that whether ſocial Creatures ſhould be ever made, or not, Virtue would promote the Happineſs of ſuch poſſible Beings: Injuſtice, Cruelty, Unmercifulneſs, and every Vice would hurt them. The actual Exerciſe of Juſtice and Goodneſs to one another, would commence indeed, when ſuch Creatures ſhould be made; but the Relation of Juſtice to the Good of Society, its Fitneſs to that End was eternal. So in caſe of certain Duties which ariſe from the particular Frame of a Man's Body, *e. g.* Temperance, Chaſtity,——theſe would have been exactly the ſame; their Proportions, their Fitneſs to the Happineſs of ſuch a poſſible Being, would have been the ſame as now they are in Fact: And you might have reaſoned from ſuch Relation, or Proportion, in the ſame Manner as now we do, when ſuch material Bodies as ours are in Fact made. *Id. Ibid.* Chap. 2. pag. 45, 46, 47.

Truths of this Kind are confeſſedly allowed in all Sorts of Mathematical Problems: For, that, our Knowledge, concerning Truths of this Nature, is demonſtrative and clear, was never yet queſtioned by any thinking Mind.

Every one knows, for Inſtance, that the actual Drawings of Lines, and the actual Compariſons of theſe Lines one with another, by a Geometrical Inveſtigation, are the free and voluntary Productions of the human Underſtanding.

We at Pleaſure, for Inſtance, add, ſubſtract, multiply, divide, *&c.* and yet, at the ſame Time, all theſe voluntary Operations (in which we are at free Liberty whether we will perform or not) are wrought according to neceſſary regular Rules; when, at the very ſame Time, he who works theſe Queſtions, in caſe he works them true, finds out that the Sum total is always equal to all the Parts added and taken together. And the ſame holds good, not only in Addition, but alſo in Subſtraction, Multiplication, Diviſion, the Extraction of the Square and Cube Roots, *&c.* Nay, the ſame Concluſion univerſally holds good, as to all thoſe Queſtions in general, whoſe Solutions may, and can, poſſibly be made out and proved from given Principles.

For, the Queſtion, at any Time, to be proved, is always deduced by the Help of theſe and ſuch like Operations, rightly and truly wrought, purſuant to thoſe Rules of Truth and right Reaſon to which ſuch Operations reſpectively belong.

The Connexion then is neceſſary between any one Effect which is required, and the Cauſe or Cauſes of ſuch an Effect: And yet every ſuch Effect muſt be tried and proved by its own reſpective Science. All the other *Practical Diſciplines* (as well as the practical Branches of the Mathematical Science) may be reduced to the ſame Manner of Reaſoning.

This very Point is the principal Point we propoſed in laying down the fundamental Principles of perfect Morality, according to the ſame Method; *Firſt*, by reducing all thoſe voluntary Motions and Actions (the only true Objects of Moral Philoſophy) to one general Principle, namely, *Benevolence.*

2*dly*, By inveſtigating, tracing and diſcovering all the various Kinds of Benevolence, as differently applicable to different Beings reſpectively.

3*dly*, and laſtly, By demonſtrating how cloſe and neceſſary the Connexion is between the various Operations of this one Principle, and thoſe Effects which follow, as being Effects which we naturally deſire, and, above all others, principally wiſh for and hope to enjoy.

SECT. VIII.

No other Acts than Acts voluntary come within the Direction of human Reason.

NOW, since no other Acts than such as are voluntary, can come under the Direction and Government of human Reason; and, since voluntary Acts, are such Acts as concern intelligent Beings only, these Acts are the only Acts which are comprehended in the Notion of Moral Behaviour.

The Will cannot chuse Evil as Evil.

As also, since the Object of the Will is always a good Object; (1) (for Evil, and the Degrees of it, must be always estimated and rated from the Privation of Good, both as to Quantity and Quality) it evidently appears, that we cannot form any one Conception or Notion of moral Behaviour, more general than that Notion, which is so peculiarly and eminently distinguished by the Term *Benevolence*.

Because, the very Word *Benevolence* implies a strong Inclination, a constant Propensity towards all Sorts of *Good*; and, by Consequence, an Abhorrence (an entire Absence from us) of all Sorts of Evil.

But,—besides all this,—the Efficacy of *Benevolence* extends itself not only to all the several Acts of Apprehending, Judging, Reasoning, and comparing together the many different Sorts of *Good*, not only to all those Ways of finding out and discovering those Means, wherein we exert the Strength, Force and Power of our rational Faculties; but also that Extent of Capacity in our animal Powers, which we freely, at every Motion of the Will, exert and apply in the Prosecution and Attainment of every and all such various Kinds of *Good*.

See Chap. 2. Sect. 6.

For, *this Maxim, in the general, holds true,* That the flowing of a Mathematical Point, does not more infallibly produce a Line; or, the Addition of Units produce a Sum total; than That *Benevolence* sheds a kindly genial Influence upon that Person to whom we, by an united Activity, wish well: (2) *And this Influence is in a compounded Ratio (under any given Circumstances) of every benevolent Agent's Abilities, and his Degrees of Affection multiplied into each other.*

In

(1) *For Evil and the Degrees of it,* &c.] The human Will cannot will Evil, as Evil. Malum ut malum, seu sub Ratione mali, nemo potest appetere. Omnis etenim Appetitio naturaliter fertur in Bonum. Hoc patet ex Definitione Boni. *Bonum est id quod omnia appetunt.* Bonum quà Bonum, ex sui Ratione formali, significare Relationem convenientiæ. *Vid.* Eustachii *Ethic. de Bono.* Quæst. 1, 2, 3, & 4. The Term *Convenientia* rejected by our Author in his Definition of Good, and why. *See* Chap. 3. Sect. 1.

(2) *And this Influence is in a compounded Ratio,* &c.] Mr. *Francis Hutcheson,* in his *Enquiry concerning moral Good and Evil,* Sect. 3. pag. 183. expresses our Author's Sense in the following Manner; 1. The moral Importance of any Agent, or the Quantity of the *Momentum* of public Good (and to which I add, *and private Good too)* produced by him, is in a compound Ratio of his Benevolence and Ability; or, by substituting the initial Letters for the Words: M the *Momentum* or Quantity of Good; B the *Benevolence*; and A the *Ability.* Why then M=A×B.

5. The Virtue then of Agents, or their *Benevolence,* is always directly as the *Moment* of

In like Manner: It is equally, and as undeniably certain, that the punctual and faithful Diſcharge of our Engagements, *Gratitude* to our Benefactors, and the Exerciſe of that Affection which we expreſs by the Term ΣΤΟΡΓΗ, or *Parental Love*, and the like Duties, are, either the moſt *operative effective Branches of* Univerſal Benevolence; or, at leaſt, *prove the beſt Means (as ſuited to certain Caſes of Duty) towards promoting this End.* And, as undeniably evident it is alſo, that theſe ſeveral Branches of moral Behaviour will, beyond all Peradventure, produce their own proper genuine Effects. And theſe Effects are produced by the very ſame Methods of Operations, in the which it is evident that Addition, Subſtraction, Multiplication and Diviſion, are Branches and Rules of Arithmetical Computation; or by the ſame Methods of Operation, in the which it is evident, that a Right Line, a Circle, a Parabola, and the other Curves, expreſs and repreſent various Effects, which Geometry, by the flowing of a Mathematical Point, is capable of producing.

In the very ſame Way, then, by the which general Theorems of Mathematics (commonly uſed and neceſſary in the Conſtruction of Problems) are quite free and diſengaged from all ſuch anxious uncertain Apprehenſions, as ariſe from all thoſe Acts which are contingent and future; which, namely, is by removing, abſtracting and ſeparating, from all ſuch Propoſitions, the future contingent Exiſtence of their Conſtruction: And which alſo is done by demonſtrating thoſe general Properties and Effects, which, at all Times, muſt ariſe whenſoever, in Time to come, the ſeveral Conſtructions of ſuch Propoſitions ſhall happen actually to be made.

In

of Good produced in like Circumſtances, and inverſely as their *Abilities*, or $B=\frac{M}{A}$.

But Mr. *Hutcheſon* and our Author differ at the ſame Time very widely; for in *Axiom* the ſecond he ſays, *viz.*

2. In like Manner, the *Moment* of private Good or Intereſt, produced by any Perſon to himſelf, is in a compound Ratio of his Self-love and Abilities; or ſubſtituting the initial Letters $I=S\times A$.

And Mr. *Hutcheſon* farther proceeds, in *Axiom* the ſixth, and ſays, *viz.*

6. But as the natural Conſequences of our Actions are various, ſome *good* to ourſelves, and *evil* to the Public; and others *evil* to ourſelves, and *good* to the Public; or either *uſeful* both to ourſelves and others, or *pernicious* to both; the entire Motive to good Actions is not always *Benevolence alone*; or Motive to Evil, *Malice alone:* (Nay, this laſt is ſeldom any Motive at all) but in moſt Actions we muſt look upon *Self-love* as another Force, ſometimes conſpiring with *Benevolence*, and aſſiſting it, when we are excited by Views of *private Intereſt*, as well as *public Good*; and ſometimes oppoſing *Benevolence*, when the good Action is any Way *difficult* or *painful* in the Performance, or *detrimental* in its Conſequences to the *Agent*. In the former Caſe $M=\overline{B+S}\times A=BA+SA$; and therefore $BA=M-SA=M-I$, and $B=\frac{M-I}{A}$. In the latter Caſe $M=\overline{B-S}\times A=BA-SA$; therefore $BA=M+SA=M+I$, and $B=\frac{M+I}{A}$.

Let Mr. *Hutcheſon* expreſs theſe ſelfiſh Motives by what Symbols or Marks he pleaſes, yet ſince he, in his latter Caſe, or if in any Caſe, makes Self-intereſt, or private Intereſt to oppoſe the public Good, or *Benevolence*, his Morality flatly contradicts Dr. *Cumberland*, who, in his *Philoſophical Enquiry*, ſuppoſes, and proves to a Demonſtration, that no private ſelfiſh Intereſt can have any real permanent Exiſtence, where the public Good and the true Principles of Benevolence are not intimately involved in all the Calculations of

In Purſuance, therefore, of this very Method, we judge it a Matter of the firſt Importance, to lay down and ſettle ſome certain, clear Principles, as they (*i. e.* theſe Principles) are deduced and drawn from the genuine Effects, from the principal Heads, and from the ſeveral reſpective Relations of Duty which are eſſentially laid in, and immediately take their Riſe from Univerſal Love or Benevolence, as their fundamental Source; paſſing over in Silence, at the ſame Time, every Thing which concerns the real and actual Exiſtence of this one univerſal Propoſition, and yet this Propoſition, or Principle of *Univerſal Benevolence*, is, at the ſame Time, in its own Nature, undoubtedly certain, ſince there is no Contradiction nor Impoſſibility implied, as to the real and actual Exiſtence of it. Becauſe many Concluſions may follow, which may guide and direct us in the Practice of Moral Duties; which, in Fact, is the very End that Theorems anſwer, in every poſſible Conſtruction of Problems.

Now, notwithſtanding that theſe Principles of Reaſoning are fully concluſive, yet we muſt, however, acknowledge, that even at the very Time we uſe our beſt Endeavours to produce ſome Effects, wherein the Concurrence of other Agents, quite independent of us, is neceſſary, it may poſſibly happen, that ſuch Endeavours may not anſwer the Deſign intended: And yet, who will ſay that the Truth of general Rules is violated? For, we find, that in endeavouring to produce the Effect deſired, it was not in our own Power, from the Want of foreign Aſſiſtance, to bring ſuch an Effect to paſs; or, to ſpeak in the mathematical Phraſe, that the Problem laid down could not be ſolved and abſolutely determined from the Data or Principles given: Which Defect being once diſcovered, as Mathematicians entirely acquieſce, and are quite ſatisfied, ſo ſhould every wiſe Man, in all moral Caſes of an exact parallel Nature, enjoy, and upon the beſt Grounds, a perfect Eaſe and Tranquillity of Mind.

The Experience, however, of what is paſt, and thorough Obſervations upon our own full Abilities, will very ſoon, in moſt Caſes, inform us how to judge, whether any Effect, under ſuch or ſuch given Circumſtances, is, or is not, within the Poſſibility of our own mere Powers only to accompliſh:—Nay,—and ſuch a Judgment we can generally form, without the Pains and Trouble of any formal Tryal or Experiment.

Now, as we are rational Creatures, we cannot really and truly avoid an Information, an Inſight into ſuch Principles of Knowledge; becauſe, that Man can ſcarce poſſibly avoid the Imputation of Folly, who with mighty Endeavours purſues an End, when, in the very Proſecution of it, he is ignorant what, according to the full Extent of his own ſingle Abilities, in Conjunction with ſuch external Helps and Aids as he may probably and reaſonably expect, he is able to execute. Or, at leaſt, it is the Duty and Buſineſs of every reaſonable Man to be fully ſatisfied, that the well-grounded Expectation of effecting the End propoſed, and wherein outward Helps are neceſſary, carries more important Weight, and is of greater Conſequence

ſequence than any other, which he himſelf, at the ſame Time, by his own Endeavours merely, can certainly produce.

Now, to prove what we have here advanced, we ſhall ſhew, in the Courſe of this Enquiry, that ſome Propoſitions of unchangeable Truth and Certainty, can and may poſſibly ariſe out of the Energy and Operation of ſeveral Kinds of Good, which Kinds of Good are in themſelves, only, contingent.

SECT. IX.

BUT, to proceed one Step farther. The Nature of Things does, *Firſt*, in Order to a clear Apprehenſion and a diſtinct Knowledge, inſtruct us to enquire, What *Effect* that is, which is the *beſt*, and in our Power to produce? And,

Secondly, What that *ultimate End* is, which we ought chiefly and above all others to regard?

Our Author means here the Terms of the one grand univerſal Propoſition (or Law of Nature) as laid down Chap. 5. Sect. 1. See 4th Section of this Chapter.

A true Anſwer to the firſt of theſe Queſtions, is comprehended in the *very Terms themſelves*, which are very incomplex, very ſimple; and, for this Reaſon, they carry an eaſier a more certain Signification.

And, in Anſwer to the ſecond Queſtion: As this Queſtion takes in every Thing which is contained under the firſt; ſo it alſo implies, that a rational Agent reſolves within himſelf always to produce the *very beſt Effect*, by a right Application of the *proper Means*.

For, ſince it ſo is, that, Effects, be they what they will, which contribute to the public Good, are in our Power to produce; and ſince, that, *theſe very ſame Effects*, by the Will of *the Firſt Cauſe*, are conſtituted and made *the neceſſary Means* towards effecting our own Happineſs. The Obligation, therefore from hence ariſes, not only as to the real Intention in producing ſuch Effects; but alſo, that this very Intention itſelf is, at one Time or other, diſcoverable in all Men. And from hence the Neceſſity appears, why we ſhould eſtabliſh the Foundations of the Laws of Nature upon the cleareſt, fulleſt Obſervations of the Powers and Abilities in human Nature; and alſo upon certain Criteria and Marks, whereby to diſtinguiſh, and to conclude for certain, that the conſtant determined Exerciſe, Operations and Practice of theſe Powers and Abilities, can contribute to, and actually will produce, mutual, human Happineſs. In ſhort, the Sum and Subſtance of all which Laws of Nature, as hitherto deſcribed, is (to uſe one Term) called *Benevolence*, or *Univerſal Love*.

For Reaſons, therefore, already mentioned, I have taken Notice, that Mathematicians, in laying down the Rudiments of their Science, ſay nothing of the End, which the Doctrine they deliver regards, when, at the ſame Time, the beſt Writers amongſt them, with all their Endeavours, proſecute, by far, the beſt and nobleſt of all Ends.

The

The principal and chief End which they propoſe to themſelves, is to inveſtigate and trace out thoſe Reaſons which prevail, and take Place in all Kinds of natural Bodies, and their various Motions, as well ſimple as compounded.

From which Inveſtigations and Deductions of mathematical Reaſonings, are diſcoverable not only *all*, even *all*, the Phænomena or Appearances of Nature (which we, with ſo much Wonder and Surprize, uſually admire) but alſo, thoſe Effects ſo highly uſeful and neceſſary to the Well-being and Happineſs of Mankind in general.

Theſe are the noble and laudable Ends which the beſt mathematical Writers carry chiefly in their View; and yet, the whole mathematical Science, *in laying down the firſt Principles*, (at leaſt, ſo much of this Science as is delivered by *Des Cartes* in his *Geometry*, and the Commentators upon him) think it ſufficient to hint only, and that very briefly too, at ſo much as may barely ſerve to eſtabliſh, and fix the Truth of the Theorems propoſed;

Namely,

(1) That all the poſſible Properties, Relations, Analogies and Proportions, of which, Right Lines are capable, be fairly drawn, conſtructed, delineated

(1) *That all the poſſible Properties*, &c.] There is one very fundamental Error, amongſt ſeveral others, in the *Carteſian* Philoſophy: *Des Cartes* conſiders Matter much more as a Mathematical, than as a Phyſical or Natural Body. He makes its ſole Eſſence to conſiſt in Extenſion, or a Trine Dimenſion of Length, Breadth and Depth. He and his Followers will not allow any other Explication of natural Appearances, than from the Figure and Motion of the Parts of Matter.

Such of them as pretend to define Body by its Nature, which they make to conſiſt in Extenſion alone, allow of no Space or Extenſion that is not corporeal; but ſince we have, or at leaſt imagine to have, ſays Dr. *John Keil*, an Idea of Space diſtinct from the Idea of Body, they certainly offend againſt the Laws of good Method, who place the Nature or intimate Eſſence of Body, in any of its Attributes, which, we are not ſure, do only belong to it.

But the *Carteſians* ſay, That the Nature of Body cannot conſiſt in any other of its Attributes, ſince neither Hardneſs, or Colour, or Weight, or Figure, or Taſte, or any of its ſenſible Qualities, can conſtitute its Eſſence. For, all theſe Attributes may be taken from Body, and yet the Nature of Body will remain; but take away Extenſion, and the corporeal Being is immediately deſtroyed; therefore it is neceſſary that the Nature of Body ſhould be placed in Extenſion only.

This is the Argument of *Des Cartes* himſelf, altho' it is unworthy of a Philoſopher: For nothing can from thence be deduced, unleſs this, that thoſe ſenſible Qualities, which he mentions, are not of the Eſſence of Body; and that Extenſion is an Attribute neceſſary and eſſential to it. But,—what then? Cannot the ſame univerſal Attribute agree to two different Species of Things? Is it neceſſary that all Things which have the ſame Attribute, muſt have the ſame Nature and Eſſence? If this be ſo, there will be no Diſtinction or Diverſity in Things. Now, although Space and Body have one and the ſame eſſential Attribute common to them both, yet they are very different Things: And there are other eſſential Attributes, peculiar to each, whereby they are ſufficiently diſtinguiſhed.

In the firſt Place, Solidity is proper to Bodies only, and ſo eſſential to all of them, that you cannot ſo much as ſeparate it from them in your Imagination, but at the very ſame Time you deſtroy that very Idea which you had formed of Body. Wherefore, if the Eſſence and intimate Nature of Body is to be placed in ſome one Attribute, Solidity certainly has a much better Pretence to be that Attribute than Extenſion; eſpecially when there ſeems to be a Being different from Body, which

delineated and repreſented, he means, I ſuppoſe, according to the mechanical Rules of Practical Geometry.

And then (as *Carteſius* ſays) from ſuch a Praxis and Conſtruction of Lines, it follows, that the unknown Relations, Analogies, Proportions and Properties of ſuch Lines, may, without much Difficulty, upon Geometrical Principles of Reaſoning, ſoon be deduced, diſcovered and ſolved, by the Help of ſuch Properties, *&c.* as are more evident and eaſier known.

Des Cartes lays down only one ſpecial Rule concerning the Knowledge of ſuch Lines as are neceſſarily preparative.

which we call Space, to which likewiſe Extenſion appertains; at leaſt, the contrary does not yet appear.

Beſides this, we have the Idea of Space, altogether diſtinct from the Idea of Body, each of them ſeems to be endued with Attributes, not only diſtinct and proper to themſelves, but ſo contrary, that it is impoſſible to imagine they could be inherent in the ſame Subject. For, we conceive Body as ſolid and impenetrable, diviſible and capable of Motion, whoſe Parts may eaſily be diſunited, ſeparated and removed from one another to any Diſtance whatever: One Body may oppoſe another Body that is moving; it may ſtop, or at leaſt diminiſh its Motion. A Body, likewiſe, may communicate its Motion to another Body that is at reſt, or that moves with a leſs Force towards the ſame or oppoſite Parts, and carry it along with it.

On the contrary, we conceive Space to be that wherein all Bodies are placed; or, to ſpeak with the Schools, have their *Ubi:* That it is altogether penetrable, receiving all Bodies into itſelf, and refuſing an Ingreſs to nothing whatſoever; that it is immoveably fixed, capable of no Action, Form or Quality, whoſe Parts it is impoſſible to ſeparate from each other, by any Force however great: But the Space itſelf remaining immoveable, receives the Succeſſions of Things immoveable, determines the Velocities of their Motions, and meaſures the Diſtances of the Things themſelves. Theſe, therefore, ſo diſagreeing and repugnant Attributes of Space and Body, it is impoſſible ſhould belong to the ſame Subject. *See Dr.* John Keill's *Introduction to Natural Philoſophy, tranſlated into* Engliſh *by* Anonymous, *Lecture 2d.* Lond. 1720, Octavo.

Another remarkable Error, altho' not of quite ſo unphiloſophical a Kind, in *Des Cartes*, is his Solution of Geometrical Queſtions by Algebra. Dr. *Henry Pemberton*, in the Preface to his View of Sir *Iſaac Newton*'s Philoſophy, has the following remarkable Paſſage: "I have often heard him *(i. e.* Sir *Iſaac Newton)* cenſure the handling Geometrical Subjects by Algebraic Calculations." And his Book of Algebra he called by the Name of *Univerſal Arithmetic*, in Oppoſition to the injudicious Title of Geometry which *Des Cartes* had given to the Treatiſe, wherein he ſhews how the Geometer may aſſiſt his Invention by ſuch Kinds of Computations. He frequently praiſed *Sluſius*, *Barrow* and *Huygens*, for not being influenced by the falſe Taſte which then began to prevail. He uſed to commend the laudable Attempt of *Hugo de Omerique*, to reſtore the ancient Analyſis, and very much eſteemed *Apollonius*'s Book *De Sectione Rationis*, for giving a clearer Notion of that Analyſis than we had before. Doctor *Barrow* may be eſteemed, as having ſhewn a Compaſs of Invention equal, if not ſuperior, to any of the Moderns, our Author only excepted. But Sir *Iſaac Newton* has, ſeveral Times, particularly recommended to me *Huygens*'s Stile and Manner: He thought him the moſt elegant of any Mathematical Writer of modern Times, and the moſt juſt Imitator of the Ancients. Of their Taſte and Form of Demonſtration, Sir *Iſaac* always profeſſed himſelf a great Admirer. I have heard him even cenſure himſelf, for not following them yet more cloſely than he did, and ſpeak with Regret of his Miſtake, at the Beginning of his Mathematical Studies, in applying himſelf *to the Works of Des Cartes*, and other Algebraic Writers, before he had conſidered the Elements of *Euclid* with that Attention which ſo excellent a Writer deſerves. Thus far Dr. *Pemberton*.

And the Rule is neither more nor leſs than this, *viz.* that theſe Lines be either added together, ſubſtracted, multiplied or divided; and that the Extractions of the Square and Cube Roots (which he judges chiefly neceſſary) are to be conſidered (1) as a certain Kind of Diviſion.

Des Cartes does not run out and harangue, in declamatory Panegyrics, upon that accurate Knowledge of all theſe Concluſions which may be diſcovered and drawn from Compariſons, and analogical Reaſonings of all ſuch Lines amongſt themſelves: And yet, this is the principal Deſign he has in View.

For, he ſuppoſes that ſuch a Knowledge is (for its own Sake) the moſt deſirable, and carries the moſt powerful Efficacy in anſwering the very beſt Purpoſes of human Life.

Des Cartes imagines, that he fully diſcharges the Office of a Philoſopher, if he, in few Words, ſhews how theſe Kinds of mathematical Operations are applicable to the ſeveral Solutions of all Kinds of Problems: He does not, in ſhort, imagine it in the leaſt to derogate from either his Veracity or Honour, ſhould there be Numbers who, either thro' Ignorance or Sloth, will not apply his Rules: Nay, even ſuppoſing there happen many who cavil and lay Objections againſt his Principles and Manner of Reaſoning.

The Caſe is exactly parallel in the *Inſtitution of Morality*, as comprehended under, and deduced from the Laws of Nature.

For, the whole Inſtitution or Syſtem of moral Behaviour, is employed in computing the ſeveral Quantities, Ratio's and Proportions of human Abilities, which can in any Sort or Degree contribute to the common Good of all rational Beings: Which Computations differ with an infinite Variety, according to all the different Caſes of Duty which can poſſibly happen.

For which Reaſon, the moral Writer may very juſtly ſay, that he has faithfully diſcharged the Office of a Moraliſt, if, in the Beginning of his Book, if, in ſettling his Principles, he briefly tells you, that all the poſſible Caſes which can happen, are comprehended under the moſt general the moſt diffuſive *Benevolence*.

And, then, when this one fundamental Principle is once well eſtabliſhed, he may indeed, without any Imputation of a Fault, in the next Place, minutely, ſeparately and diſtinctly demonſtrate the diſtributive Diviſion, the ſeparate diſtinct Application of this one fundamental, general Principle, to the whole Syſtem of Morality.

(1) *As a certain Kind of Diviſion.*] The Extraction of the Square Root is very like Diviſion, only with this Difference, that, in the Rule of Diviſion, the Diviſor is always fixed; whereas, in the Extraction of the Square Root, you are obliged to find out a new Diviſor for each Operation.

The Extraction of the Cube Root is alſo very like Diviſion, but, by many Degrees, more difficult. This Subject is very well handled by Mr. *Hill*, in his Arithmetic.

Thus,

Thus, for Inſtance, in the firſt Place, he can diſtinctly demonſtrate, that *Fidelity, Gratitude, Self-preſervation, the Preſervation of our Young, &c.* are comprehended under this one general Head, namely, *Univerſal Benevolence:* Under what Circumſtances and Relations of Life theſe Duties and Obligations become binding, and muſt, in Fact, be applied and reduced to Practice. He may then, in the next Place, prove, how and after what Manner, Religion, Virtue, Society, and all thoſe other Means which render the human Life happier, neceſſarily grow and branch out from theſe firſt Duties. And in this Sort of an Inveſtigation eſſentially conſiſts the Solution of that moſt important uſeful Problem, which Moral Philoſophy inſtructs us how to inveſtigate, and trace up to its Original.

Now, notwithſtanding, perhaps, that there may be ſome who will not obey ſuch worthy Inſtructions as theſe; and, others who oppoſe and ſtigmatize them with Marks of Infamy; yet, neither the Veracity nor Authority of them can, indeed, at the ſame Time, be in the leaſt leſſened: No ſuch Concluſion as this can, according to fair Reaſoning, poſſibly follow.

The only one right Concluſion hence ariſing is this; that ſuch obſtinate Oppoſers ſhipwreck their own Happineſs, and very probably, in ſome Meaſure, hurry others along with themſelves into the ſame Deſtruction.

Since then it is a clear Point, that an Effect ſo ſignally advantageous as *Univerſal Benevolence* is, can certainly be produced by voluntary Acts of our own; and, over which Acts we have a full Dominion: Beyond all Peradventure, Mankind, conſidered as rational Agents, muſt and will, very eaſily, be perſuaded to lay down this Effect to themſelves, as the End which they are to purſue, and with as earneſt Endeavours as they poſſibly can: As alſo to exerciſe themſelves in all ſuch Acts and Habits (which are the efficient, inſtrumental, operative Cauſes of this Effect, or End) as the neceſſary Means towards aſcertaining and producing it.

Juſt, in like Manner, as Artiſts are encouraged to try their Hand in making Optic Glaſſes of a Parabolic Curve; and Teleſcopic, Perſpective Glaſſes in the Curve of an Hyperbola, from thoſe excellent Effects which Mathematicians demonſtrably prove to follow, from ſuch Methods and Forms of grinding theſe ſeveral Glaſſes.

SECT. X.

I SHALL only here add a Word or two more to what I have already offered, *viz.*

A Divine Sanction annexed to this general Propoſition.

That the Truth of my general Propoſition, as alſo all other Truths of equal Evidence (but more eſpecially ſuch Truths as from this general Propoſition are neceſſarily inferred) draw their original Foundation and Source from Almighty God himſelf; and, by Conſequence, have, to the due Obſervance of them annexed a Reward; and, on the contrary, have to the wilful Violation of them, a Puniſhment as cloſely annexed: And that theſe Truths, moreover, are ſo conſtituted as to be eſſentially, and in their own inherent Nature, adapted as the fit Rules of our moral Behaviour.

And, if ſo, I cannot ſee what is wanting to enforce this grand moral Propoſition, with the Sanction and Obligation of a Law.

I intend, from this one Principle (but it ſhall be towards the Cloſe of this Work, Chap. 9.) (1) to deduce and prove, by Way of Corollaries, the two grand Branches of moral Duty, *viz.*

1. *Piety to God.*
2. *Love* or *Charity to our Neighbours.*

Under which two Branches of Duty is comprehended the whole Sum or Subſtance of the two Divine Diſpenſations, *viz. Moſaical* and *Evangelical.*

The particular Duties of Morality deduced from this general Propoſition.

In the ſame Ninth Chapter alſo I will ſhew, how, from the ſame Principle, all the Virtues and Duties of Moral Philoſophy may be drawn, and alſo the Laws of Nations, with reſpect both to War and Peace.

Now, that theſe Truths (of ſo evident a Nature, which have been hitherto laid down, are eſtabliſhed and impreſſed by Almighty God, the Author of Nature) are, in the moſt conciſe Method of Reaſoning, (2) proved from thoſe Principles of Philoſophy which demonſtrate in what Manner, and by what Means, all Notices and Impreſſions are made upon our

(1) *To deduce and prove by way of Corollaries, &c.*] Deductis tandèm e Naturâ Præceptis, circa mores generaliſſimis, & virtutibus moralibus inde ſigillatim explicatis, viſum eſt paucis indicare quomodo hæc quæ tradidi Præcepta generalia ad alia Magis limitata & vulgo Magis uſitata nos deducant: Hinc enim probabitur etiam ſpecialia illa à Deo per Signa naturalia mentibus humanis ſimul imprimi, eaque iiſdem Præmiis & Pœnis ſanciri: Hoc autem oſtendemus conſiderando brevitèr Decalogum et Leges Civiles.

Decalogus in duas ſolet dividi Tabulas, quarum prior Præcepta continet de Moribus noſtris erga Deum, poſterior de iiſdem erga Homines Tractat: Utraque impletur amore in Deum Homineſque.

Manifeſtum autem eſt, Præceptum quod e Naturâ hauſimus de Benevolentiâ Univerſali, ſeu de ſtudio Boni Communis quatenus Deum reſpicit ut Syſtematis Intellectualis Caput, & Homines velut ei ſubditos, hæc duo in ſe complecti. *Vid.* Caput 9. *Conſectaria.*

(2) *Proved from thoſe Principles of Philoſophy which demonſtrate, &c.*] The moral Concluſions hold equally the ſame from *Carteſius, Newton*, or any Hypotheſis which is rational and natural, becauſe they are laid in Nature.

Senſes,

Senſes, according to the Natural Laws of Motion, as they are commonly called.

And the Reaſon is, becauſe all Motion was originally impreſſed by Almighty God himſelf upon the whole material Syſtem, and is, with as conſtant a Regularity, continued and preſerved by the ſame Almighty Power.

By ſuch a Method of Inveſtigation as this, which, to my Underſtanding, appears as firm and ſolid as poſſible (becauſe the whole of it is eſtabliſhed upon demonſtrative Proofs) we ſhall be able, at once, to reſolve all neceſſary Effects into an original prime Cauſe, a Firſt Mover. (1) For the Impreſſion made upon us by the (2) Terms of this *Propoſition*, at leaſt ſo far as ſuch an Impreſſion is cauſed by Matter put into Motion, is (3) a natural Effect.

i. e. Of the grand univerſal Propoſition laid down.

The

(1) Impreſſio autem Terminorum hujus Propoſitionis (quatenus ſaltem provenit à Materiâ Motâ) eſt Effectus naturalis; et Perceptio identitatis ſive cohærentiæ Terminorum iſtorum prout in Imaginatione exiſtunt, nihil aliud eſt quàm Perceptio quòd uterque Terminus eſt Impreſſio quædam ab eâdem cauſa in nos facta. Ipſa autem Mentis quâ vel Terminos in Imaginatione poſitos Apprehendit, & quâ eorum nexum Perſpicit, & vires ſuas, Actioneſque perſentiſcit adeò Naturaliter & Neceſſariò ſequitur præſentiam eorum in Imaginatione.

1. This Impreſſion is made upon one or more of the five Senſes.

2. It is a Natural or a Phyſical Effect; becauſe it ſeems to be ſuch an Effect as flows from the Action of Matter upon Matter, or from the Laws of Matter and Motion.

3. Such an Impreſſion, ſo far, is a mere Impreſſion of Senſe only.

4. A Perception in the Imagination, is to the Imagination what an Impreſſion of Senſe is to the Senſes; but they both ariſe from the very ſame Cauſe.

5. A Perception of the Mind or Intellect, is that whereby the Mind apprehends theſe Terms, and diſcovers their Connexion.

6. The Mind, from its own natural Frame and Make, is conſcious of its own Faculties and Powers, with the Exerciſe and ſeveral Operations of theſe Powers upon theſe Terms.

7. There is an innate Propenſity in the Mind to repreſent all Objects, Impreſſions and Propoſitions which come before it fairly.

8. So regular a Progreſs, ſo clear a Connexion, ſo cloſe an Order, cannot be attributed and aſcribed to any other Cauſe, than to the efficient Cauſe of the Mind, *i. e. God.*

9. There is an eſſential Difference between a ſimple Apprehenſion of the Mind, and a ſimple Perception of the Senſe; the Conſequence of this (*i. e.* of a ſimple Perception in the Senſe) is an Idea in the Imagination; the former, (that is to ſay, the ſimple Apprehenſion of the Mind) frames or occaſions no new ſimple Idea, and only apprehends one.

(2) *Terms of this Propoſition.*] The Terms of any Propoſition, taken ſingly and unconnected, raiſe Ideas in us by ſimple Apprehenſion; but when the Terms are connected ſo as to form the Propoſition, either Affirmation or Negation, then the ſecond Operation of the Mind, called Judgment, is cloſely concerned.

(3) *Is a natural Effect*, &c.] That Maxim of the Logicians is to be taken for a ſure and fundamental Truth, *Nihil eſt in Intellectu quod non fuit prius in Senſu.* The true Meaning of which is, that the Ideas of *Senſe* are *the firſt Foundation* on which we raiſe our whole Superſtructure of Knowledge; and that all the Diſcoveries we can make in Things temporal and ſpiritual, together with the moſt refined and abſtracted Notions of them in the Mind of Man, take their Riſe originally from Senſation.

At our Birth, the Imagination is entirely a *Tabula raſa*, or perfect *Blank*, without any Materials either for a ſimple View, or any other

The Perception alſo, *Secondly*, of this very ſame Impreſſion; that is, the Perception of the Connexion and Coherence of theſe Terms, as they lie in the Imagination, is exactly the ſame Perception which is formed in us by either or both theſe Terms; namely, a certain Impreſſion made upon us from the very ſame Cauſe. Becauſe, in the *third* Place, (1) that very ſame Perception, whereby the Intellect apprehends the Terms laid in the Imagination, and diſcerns the Connexion of them; and whereby the Intellect becomes acquainted with the full Strength and Exerciſe of its own Powers and Capacities, are Conſequences which ſo very naturally and neceſſarily follow (not only from the actual Exiſtence of theſe Terms in the Imagination, but alſo from that innate, natural, innocent Propenſity of Mind, ready to obſerve all ſuch Objects and Things as fairly come before it) that all ſuch Effects as theſe, I ſay, cannot poſſibly but be attributed to the efficient Cauſe of the human Mind, *i. e.* to Almighty God, by every ingenuous Enquirer, who acknowledges God the Creator and firſt Mover of all Beings and Things.

This Method then of reſolving all neceſſary Effects into Almighty God, as their firſt original Cauſe, is, beyond all Queſtion, the beſt;—Becauſe all the other Methods of accounting for Nature, and her Phænomena or Appearances, how widely ſoever they may differ from this Method of ours, or amongſt themſelves, agree however in this one ſingle Point, That they acknowledge God to be *the* (2) *firſt Cauſe of all neceſſary Effects:* Notwithſtanding

other Operation of the Intellect. We are not furniſhed with any *innate* Ideas of Things, material or immaterial; nor are we endued with a Faculty or Diſpoſition of forming purely intellectual Ideas or Conceptions, independent of all Senſation: Much leſs has the human Soul a Power of raiſing up to itſelf Ideas out of nothing, which is a Kind of Creation. *See Biſhop* Browne's *Procedure*, &c. pag. 382.

(1) *That very ſame Perception*, &c.] There is a wide Diſtinction between the ſimple Perceptions of Senſe, and the ſimple Apprehenſions of the Intellect; between the primary and ſimple Ideas of Senſation, which are independant of the pure Intellect, and thoſe ſecondary compound Ideas which are its Creatures; between all thoſe, and the complex Notions and Conceptions of the Mind. *See Biſhop* Browne's *Procedure*, &c. pag. 407.

Altho' a Perception of the ſimple Apprehenſion, and a Perception of the Judgment, (if I may venture to call it ſo) differ widely; yet they both may ariſe, originally, from certain Impreſſions made upon us by the very ſame Cauſe.

We may be able to perceive the ſimple Terms themſelves; and yet, at the ſame Time, not be able to perceive their Connexion or Agreement

(2) *The firſt Cauſe of all neceſſary Effects*, &c.] Effects which depend upon the Agency of Man are contingent: Effects which ariſe from the Power and Wiſdom of God are neceſſary. After what Manner human Acts and the Conſequences of them are connected with neceſſary Effects, the Reader may ſee well explained at the fourth Section of the fifth Chapter.

Neceſſitas Exiſtentiæ *abſoluta* uni Soli Deo convenit, qui ſolus ita Exiſtit, ut à nullo *in* exiſtendo dependeat, atque adeò ut nullus poſſit ei Præripere vel Auferre ejus *Eſſe*.

Neceſſitas Exiſtentiæ *ſecundum quid* competit Creaturis incorruptibilibus, ut Cælis, Angelis, et Mentibus hominum: Dico iis competere Exiſtentiæ Neceſſitatem ſecundum quid; quià abſolutè loquendo, poſſent *non Eſſe*: Dependent enim ab Agente libero, quod pro Arbitrio ſuo poteſt iis Eſſe conferre aut Denegare; interim ſi Conſerantur cum aliis Creaturis, earum Reſpectu poſſunt dici Neceſſario exiſtere, idque

withſtanding that many Sects of Philoſophers do not ſeem, with an Attention ſufficiently cloſe, to have obſerved, that both the firſt Apprehenſion of the ſimple Terms, and the Compoſition of them, whenever with a natural and clear Connexion formed into a Propoſition (and, from which Connexion a neceſſary Propoſition ariſes) muſt be concluded and reckoned amongſt neceſſary Effects, *i. e.* ſuch Effects as cannot but exiſt: The natural Impreſſions of Motions being firſt produced, and an intelligent Nature firſt actually exiſting, before whom are clearly and diſtinctly repreſented theſe ſimple Terms, and the Compoſition or Connexion of them.

Now,—Notwithſtanding there be many that pretend to account for Nature and her Operations, who have not duly conſidered this one material Point; yet, however, I ſay, this is a Doctrine of material Conſequence in itſelf, and of conſiderable Importance in our preſent Enquiry: Becauſe, in all neceſſary practical Truths (*i. e.* in all ſuch Truths as direct and point out to us Acts neceſſary to a neceſſary determinate End) this is a Doctrine which aſſerts and maintains the Sanction, the Authority of Laws, upon this one ſolid, confeſſedly-allowed Principle, that Almighty God is the Author of them. (1).

SECT.

idque quia ita Exiſtunt ut nullum ens Creatum poſſit iis eorum Eſſe auferre.

Contra verò alia res (ſcilicet Contingentes) quæ ortui & interitui obnoxiæ ſunt, habent ſuum Eſſe ita inſtabile & mutabile ut ab aliis Creaturis poſſint Deſtrui, & ſic Exiſtentiam amittere.

(1) *Supplemental Notes by way of Recapitulation.*

1. Impreſſions are, in the firſt Place, made upon our Senſes.

2. Theſe Impreſſions are conveyed to, and ſtored up in the Imagination.

3. Theſe Impreſſions, as ſtored up in the Imagination for the Intellect to work upon, are called *Ideas*.

4. All Objects alſo, fairly laid before the Mind, and perceived by it, are called *Ideas*.

5. The Ideas of theſe Objects which we form in our own Minds (ſo far as they are capable of being communicated) are expreſſed under ſignificant Signs and Words.

6. A bare Contemplation, or View of theſe Ideas by the Intellect, is called *Simple Apprehenſion*.

7. When the Intellect, in contemplating or viewing theſe Ideas, proceeds to compare, compound and connect, divide and ſeparate, affirm and deny; *Then*, this Operation of the Intellect is called *Judgment*.

8. When this Affirmation or Negation is expreſſed under ſignificant Words, it is called *a Propoſition*.

9. The Words, under which this Affirmation or Negation is expreſſed, are called *the Terms of a Propoſition*.

10. In every Propoſition whatever, there is either an Affirmation or Negation; and conſequently every Propoſition ariſes from this ſecond Operation of the Mind, *i. e.* Judgment. For, when the Mind pronounces upon any of its Ideas, either ſimple or compounded, or upon any of its complex Notions or Conceptions, by expreſs Affirmation or Negation, then it becomes a Propoſition; the Nature of which is varied, according to the different Quantity or Quality of it, as the Schools term it.

11. All Natural Bodies act upon our Senſes, according to the Laws of Matter and Motion.

12. All Impreſſions made upon our Minds by outward Objects, are natural Effects.

13. No outward Object can affect the Mind, but by the Help and Mediation of the Senſes.

14. Words, or Terms, or Signs (by which natural Objects, and the Ideas of them, ſtrike us) are deſigned to convey and expreſs ſuch Objects and Ideas truly, as they are in themſelves.

15. The

SECT. XI.

The Controverſy with Mr. Hobbes begins here.

NO one, however, can peremptorily ſay, whether (1) our *Malmeſbury*-Friend, Mr. *Hobbes*, is or is not for aſcribing theſe neceſſary Effects to God, as the firſt Cauſe of them; or what he is pleaſed to think concerning the lively, effective Influence of Laws, ratified by ſo ſupreme a Sanction. His Writings, it is true, ſeem, here and there, to allow theſe Principles; and yet, we find many Paſſages, wherein he both contradicts the Being of God, proved from theſe Principles, and alſo, the Divine Authority of natural Laws eſtabliſhed upon the very ſame Foundation.

As to the firſt Charge laid againſt Mr. *Hobbes*, It is beyond all Contradiction true, that this Syllogiſm of his is evidently atheiſtical.

Mr. HOBBES's SYLLOGISM.

†i.e. A phyſical or natural Body, ſubject to all the Laws of Matter and Motion.

"Whatſoever is neither † *Body*, nor any Accident of Body, does not "exiſt.

"But God is neither *Body*, neither is He any Accident of Body.

"And therefore God, *&c.*"

Now, Mr. *Hobbes*, in many Parts of his Writings, very ſtrenuouſly maintains both Premiſſes in this Syllogiſm; but he abſolutely denies any Impiety in the Concluſion.

"For, (2) the Impiety of ſo raſh a Concluſion (he argues) lies at the "Door of him who either infers ſuch a Concluſion; or, who offers any "other Contempt or Affront to Almighty God." *In his Book* De Cive, Chap. 14. Sect. 19.

The

15. The Impreſſions made upon the Mind by theſe Words, Terms or Signs are natural, becauſe they expreſs and declare the Things they are deſigned to repreſent.

16. The Impreſſion, therefore, as Biſhop *Cumberland* ſays, of the Terms contained in a Propoſition (ſo far as ſuch an Impreſſion is cauſed by Matter put into Motion) is a natural Effect.

17. If Impreſſions made upon the Mind by Terms, or Words, or Signs, be natural Effects, ſo muſt the Ideas raiſed by outward Objects be natural Effects alſo.

18. All Effects cauſed by outward Objects, or natural Bodies, are natural Effects.

19. All Perceptions, Apprehenſions, Judgments, and Reaſonings of the Mind, are naturally formed and fitted to receive all that Truth which *Things*, *Words* and *Signs* carry in them.

20. The Terms of every Propoſition are arbitrary Words, agreed upon by common Conſent, Uſage and Cuſtom, to expreſs our Ideas.

(1) *Our* Malmeſbury *Friend.*] Mr. *Thomas Hobbes* was born at *Malmeſbury*, a Town in *Wiltſhire* in *England*, *April* 5. A. D. 1588. *See his Life, written by* Anonymous *in* Latin, *Appendix*, No. 10.

(2) *The Impiety of ſo raſh a Concluſion*, &c.] The Queſtion here truly is, Whether there be a God or no? Mr. *Hobbes* anſwers this Queſtion in the Negative: And, this Negative of his, he endeavours to prove by throwing his Reaſoning into the Syllogiſtic Form. The *Medium* or *Argument* which he produces in this Syllogiſm is *Body, and the Accident of Body.* Now, if this *Medius Terminus*, or *Argument*, carries any Meaning, it is introduced to diſunite, divide and ſeparate the *Prædicate of the major*

The Meaning of his major Propoſition he delivers more openly, and with leſs Diſguiſe, where he maintains, " That incorporeal Subſtance are " two Words which, when joined, are mutually deſtructive of each other, " and imply juſt the ſame as to ſay an incorporeal Body; and that there is " not one really exiſting Part of the Univerſe which is not Body." In his *Leviathan*, Chap. 34. Page 207. And Page 17. Line 5 and 6. *Lib. De Corpore*, Sect. penultima. " To ſay, that any Thing can be moved or pro- " duced by any incorporeal Subſtance, is a vain Aſſertion; is, in ſhort, " ſaying nothing."

But,

major Propoſition, and the *Subject of the minor Propoſition* from each other, *i. e. Exiſt* and *God* from each other. So that, the third Propoſition or Concluſion, is neceſſarily implied in the major and minor Propoſitions, whether this third Propoſition or Concluſion be expreſſed and delivered in Words, or no.

This Kind of *Illation* or *Power of concluding* is the Office properly of the third Operation of the Mind, called *Diſcurſus*. In Illations and Inferences of this Kind, the human Mind, altho' rational and free, is always under a moral Neceſſity of concluding and inferring, according to the Force of the Premiſſes, or of the two firſt Propoſitions premiſed and laid down.

This Kind of concluding, from Premiſſes or Propoſitions placed together, according to Mode and Figure, and the other Laws of Syllogiſm, is called, by the Logicians, the *Neceſſitas Conſequentiæ*; and it is that Kind of Neceſſity in which the very Eſſence of a Syllogiſm conſiſts, and always reſults from the *Premiſſes* thus legitimately conſtituted, whether either or both of the two Premiſſes, when taken as ſingle Propoſitions, be, in themſelves, true or falſe.

Neceſſitas Cohæſionis dividitur à Philoſophis in *Neceſſitatem Conſequentis*, ſeu *Neceſſitatem ſimpliciter dictam*, & *Neceſſitatem Conſequentiæ*, ſeu *Neceſſitatem ſecundùm quid*. *Neceſſitas Conſequentis* eſt earum rerum cohærendi Neceſſitas: Quæ Naturâ ſuâ ità determinatæ ſunt ad Cohærendum, ut non poſſint non Cohærere ſalvâ earum Naturâ: Hoc modo Neceſſe eſt hominem eſſe Animal, Deum eſſe Juſtum; neque enim unquam poterit fieri, ut Homo manens Homo non ſit Animal, aut ut Deus non ſit Juſtus; ita nimirùm hi termini Naturâ ſuâ determinati ſunt ad Cohærendum. *Neceſſitas Conſequentiæ* eſt quâ res illæ quæ Naturâ ſuâ ad Cohærendum non determinatæ ſunt, ità Cohærent, ut non poſſint pro illo tempore non Cohærere, idque vel propter Determinationem factam ab extrinſecâ causâ, vel ratione alicujus Suppoſitionis. Sic, dicere ſolemus eum qui irreſiſtibili vi ab uno loco in alium locum pellitur Neceſſitate quâdam locum mutaſſe, quia ſcilicet etſi hic Homo & loci mutatio ſint res nullo modo determinatæ ad Cohærendum, ita ſcilicet ut non poſſint non Cohærere; Accedente tamen hâc extrinſecâ vi, ità uniuntur illæ res, ut, pro illo tempore & durante illa vi, non poſſint non Cohærere. Prior ergo Neceſſitas poterit optime Appellari *Neceſſitas Naturæ vel Eſſentiæ*; poſterior verò eſt *Accidentalis Neceſſitas*.

Si quis quærat cur prior Neceſſitas dicatur *Neceſſitas Conſequentis*, poſterior verò *Neceſſitas Conſequentiæ*; reſpondetur, hæc nomina à Philoſophis primo Attributa fuiſſe concluſionibus Syllogiſmorum: Cum enim viderent Philoſophi in omni bono Syllogiſmo Concluſionem poſſe eatenùs dici Neceſſariam, quatenùs Neceſſariò infertur ex Præmiſſis; cum itèm viderent, in quibuſdam Syllogiſmis, *Concluſionem* non ſolum eſſe eatenus *Neceſſariam* quatenùs infertur ex *Præmiſſis*, ſed etiam ipſam *Concluſionem*, ſpectatâ Naturâ ſuorum terminorum, eſſe *Neceſſariam*, ut Diſtinguerent, & Secernerent *generalem* hanc *Neceſſitatem* quæ cernitur in Concluſione omnis boni Syllogiſmi, à *Speciali* illâ *Neceſſitate* quæ cernitur in Concluſionibus quorundam Syllogiſmorum, Demonſtrationem ſcilicet; excogitarunt hanc Diſtinctionem in *Neceſſitatem Conſequentiæ* & in *Neceſſitatem Conſequentis*, Aſſerentis in omni bono Syllogiſmo Concluſionem eſſe Neceſſariam Neceſſitate Conſequentiæ, quià poſitis præmiſſis, Neceſſario ſequitur Veritas concluſionis; in Demonſtrationibus vero Concluſionem non tantum eſſe Neceſſariam *Neceſſitate Conſequentiæ*, id eſt, ideò quia Neceſſariò inferatur, poſitis Præmiſſis, ſed etiàm *Neceſſitate Conſequentis*, quia ſcilicet *ipſum conſequens*, id eſt, ipſa *Concluſio*, in ſe ſpectata, id eſt, propter Cohæſionem terminorum ſuorum, *Neceſſaria* eſt; cum tamèn contrâ, in aliis Syllogiſmis

But, as to his minor Propoſition, which ſays, *that God is not a Body*, he delivers himſelf in Terms plain enough, when he will not attribute to God the Properties of Body, "ſuch as Figure, Place, Motion, Reſt, *&c.*" *De Cive*, Chap. 15. Sect. 14.

He has, indeed, openly declared himſelf in the Appendix to his *Leviathan*, lately publiſhed; where, in the Beginning of his third Chapter, he ſays, that God is a Body, not remembering, at the ſame Time, his Promiſe in the firſt Chapter of the very ſame Appendix, that he would not deny the firſt of the thirty-nine Articles of the Church of *England*, where, in plain Words, it is declared, *That God is incorporeal, and without bodily Parts.*

Now if that Authority, for which he ſeems ſo remarkably to contend, is not of ſufficient Weight with him, only hearken to his own Doctrine in his Book *De Cive*, Chap. 15, Sect. 14. where he aſſerts, "That thoſe Phi-"loſophers entertained unworthy Notions of God who *affirmed him to be* "*the World, or the Soul*, (*i. e.* one eſſential, inſeparable Part) *of the* "*World*; for by this Notion, they are ſo far from allowing him any At-"tribute, that they abſolutely deny his Exiſtence."

qui probabiles & Dialectici dicuntur, *Concluſio* vel *Conſequens* in ſe Spectatum non ſit *Neceſſarium* ſed *Contingens*. Hinc cæperunt alii occaſionem, dum loquuntur de *Neceſſitate rerum*, Aſſerendi alias res eſſe Neceſſarias *Neceſſitate Conſequentis*, quiâ ſcilicet, illæ ipſæ res in ſe Neceſſariæ ſunt & Naturâ ſua cohærent: Alias vero res eſſe *Neceſſarias Neceſſitate Conſequentiæ* tantùm, quiâ ſcilicet cum in ſe Neceſſariæ non ſint, *i. e.* Naturâ ſua ad cohærendum non ſint determinatæ, factâ tamèn aliquâ Suppoſitione, aut extrinſecâ aliqua vi irreſiſtibili Accedente, quaſi per conſequentiam quandam Neceſſariò ſequitur earum Cohæſio & Conjunctio ſaltem *pro tunc* ut aiunt. *Rob. Baron.* Metaphyſ. General, Sect. 12. *De Neceſſario & Contingenti*, pag. 295, 296, 297. *Edit.* Cantab. 1685.

Upon the Diſtinction here laid down principally depends the ſpecific Difference between the *Neceſſitas Conſequentis* and the *Neceſſitas Conſequentiæ*: For, the *Neceſſitas Conſequentis* always carries a Truth of Agreement in the very Propoſitions themſelves, and muſt cohere and agree ſo long as the Truth in the Propoſitions laſts; for which Reaſon this Kind of Neceſſity takes Place, in all Demonſtration where Truth is and muſt be the Foundation: Whereas, the *Neceſſitas Conſequentiæ* is that Coheſion or Agreement which is not abſolute but relative, and laſts only ſo long as the Premiſſes, or two firſt Propoſitions, remain in the Form, and according to the legitimate Rules of Syllogiſm. Thus, for Inſtance, in Mr. *Hobbes*'s own Syllogiſm, the major Propoſition (viz. *Whatſoever is neither Body, nor any Accident of Body, does not exiſt*) is a Propoſition in itſelf, falſe.

Whereas, his minor Propoſition (viz. *But, God is neither Body, neither is he any Accident of Body*) is, in itſelf a true Propoſition.

Now, notwithſtanding that *the major Propoſition is falſe*, and that *the minor Propoſition is true*; yet, from theſe two Propoſitions, thus ſyllogiſtically conſtituted, the third Propoſition or Concluſion (viz. *and therefore God does not exiſt*) neceſſarily follows.

At whoſe Door then does the Impiety of ſo raſh a Concluſion lie? Is not this impious, atheiſtical Concluſion blended into, and involved in, the very Eſſence of the Premiſſes? Does not he, who forms the Premiſſes, form the Concluſion? The Premiſſes are certainly raſh; but the Concluſion is neceſſary. A raſh, arbitrary Concluſion, from legally conſtituted Premiſſes, is a logical Abſurdity. A Man may as well deny that three and three make ſix, as to deny that this Concluſion is neceſſary; as to deny that it is Mr. *Hobbes*'s own Concluſion; or, to deny that it is an atheiſtical Concluſion.

Does

Does not Mr. *Hobbes* then, when he argues in this Way, *i. e.* while he aſſerts God to be a Body, declare Him to be a Part of, or even the whole Univerſe?

For in his *Leviathan*, Chap. 34. Page 207. "The Univerſe, ſays he, "being the Aggregate of all Bodies, there is no real Part thereof that is "not alſo Body; nor any Thing properly a Body that is not alſo Part of "that Aggregate of all Bodies, *the Univerſe.*"

Theſe, beyond all Contradiction, are his own Aſſertions, and delivered in his own Words.

Now, according to him, the World and the Univerſe are ſynonymous Terms, which any one will ſee who looks over and reads theſe Words in his Book *De Corpore*, Chap. 26. concerning the Univerſe and the Stars: "Objectum omne Univerſi Mundi vel pars eſt, vel partium Aggrega-"tum, *&c.*" That is, Every one Object of the Univerſe is either a Part of the World or an Aggregate of Parts, *&c.*

I am therefore much afraid, and upon his own Evidence, that his Denial of a God can be fairly proved upon him.

It is not my Deſign to purſue this Matter farther; for the natural Qualities of corporeal Subſtances are, beyond all Doubt, well known, not only to Mr. *Hobbes*, but alſo indeed to almoſt every one elſe, to be utterly repugnant to the Divine Nature; ſuch as, for Inſtance, *firſt*, meaſuring or taking the Dimenſions of Body in Length, Breadth and Depth.

Secondly, The Diviſibility of a natural Body into ſeparate diſtinct Parts, even *ad Infinitum.*

Thirdly, The ſeveral Alterations and Changes which a natural Body undergoes in Generation, Corruption, *&c.*

Fourthly, The paſſive Power with which each natural Body is endowed, of excluding all other natural Bodies out of any Place, at the Time it occupies ſuch a Place.

Theſe, and ſuch like Qualities, are, I ſay, ſo well known to be the eſſential, ſpecific, diſtinguiſhing Qualities of Body, that you might with much greater Eaſe perſuade Mankind that there is no God at all, than bring them to a Belief, that God is a corporeal Subſtance or material Being.

There is, however, one Circumſtance which, in this Place, falls out lucky enough; and it is, that notwithſtanding Mr. *Hobbes*, in his Syllogiſm juſt now ſtated, contradicts his own Premiſſes, yet he fairly and openly enough acknowledges the Being of God: Nay, he even acknowledges and admits the Strength, the Cogency of that Demonſtration which proves his Exiſtence. For,

He grants, that "there is, and muſt neceſſarily be, one prime, origi-"nal, eternal Cauſe of all Things." *Leviathan*, Chap. 12. pag. 53.

Mr. *Hobbes*'s own Words are theſe,

"For, he that from any Effect he ſeeth come to paſs, ſhould reaſon to "the next and immediate Cauſe thereof, and from thence to the Cauſe of

" that Cauſe, and plunge himſelf profoundly in the Profound of Cauſes, " ſhall at laſt come to this, That there muſt be (as even the Heathen " Philoſophers confeſſed) one Firſt Mover; that is, a firſt and eternal " Cauſe of Things; which is that which Men mean by the Name of " God."

Now, concerning the Authority of thoſe religious and moral Dictates which are built upon right Reaſon, and as flowing from this one Principle, *viz.* the Exiſtence of God: Yet, that theſe Laws, notwithſtanding their Dependance upon right Reaſon, are derived from God by a natural Neceſſity, determining and compelling Mankind, by a moral Neceſſity, to obey them.

In which Aſſertion Mr. *Hobbes* is neither conſiſtent with himſelf, nor indeed with Truth.

For in his *Leviathan*, Chap. 26. pag. 138. " The Laws of Nature, " ſays he, which conſiſt in Equity, Juſtice, Gratitude, and other moral " Virtues on theſe depending, in the Condition of mere Nature (as I " have ſaid before in the End of the 15th Chapter) are not properly Laws, " but Qualities that diſpoſe Men to Peace and Obedience."

And he aſſigns his Reaſon for this Poſition in his Book *De Cive*, Chap. 3. Sect. 33. " Becauſe, ſays he, the Law, in ſtrict Propriety of ſpeak- " ing, is the declared Sentence of him who (according to an inſtituted " Law) lays the Injunction either to do, or to forbear ſomething."

And, in the ſame Book *De Cive*, he infers, " That the Laws of Na- " ture (ſo far as they proceed from Nature being merely natural) are not " Laws."

For, altho' Almighty God is not properly to be comprehended under the Term *Nature*; or, altho' that Propoſition whoſe eſſential Conſtitution is laid in declaring and explaining to us what Acts are to be performed, and what omitted, under the Penalty or Reward of either leſſening or increaſing human Happineſs; and altho' this *Enunciation* or *Propoſition*, be ſo formed by the human Mind, as to ariſe from the Neceſſity of that Nature with which we are created by Almighty God; yet, notwithſtanding all this, Mr. *Hobbes* will not allow any Thing of the Kind a ſufficient Token or Revelation of the Divine Will; neither will he allow any ſuch Evidence ſufficiently and expreſly enough to declare the Sentence or Will of him, who by a lawful Authority rules over us.

Now, pray, in what other Form does that Governor command, who plainly and in expreſs Terms rules over us, than to inform us, by the ſtrongeſt, cleareſt Evidences, that he himſelf has conſtituted all Things any Way relating to us; ſo that if we *act Thus, or Thus*, the natural Conſequence is a Puniſhment: Whereas, if we act in a quite contrary Manner, the natural Conſequence is as ſure a Reward; and that all this Power of Sanction is eſtabliſhed upon his own ſupreme Dominion and Sovereignty merely.

And,

And, in the ſame Book, Mr. *Hobbes* alſo argues, " That the Laws of " Nature are not Laws in any other Senſe, than as they are Laws expreſly " enjoined in the Holy Scriptures."

Now, if any one happens to enquire into the Criterion or Mark, whereby to judge whether the Scriptures are of Divine Original; or, whether any Prophet really ever was who received ſuch a Revelation, or any other Revelation, from Almighty God?

Why Mr. *Hobbes*, in a very cunning artful Way, anſwers this his own Queſtion, by affirming, " That it is evidently impoſſible for any Man to " be aſſured of a Revelation made to another, without an immediate Re- " velation particularly made to himſelf." Nay, he carries his Argument even ſo far as to deny any Revelation made to another effectual and binding, altho' atteſted by Miracles, and Signs, and Wonders.

Leviathan, Part 2. pag. 148. his Edition printed in *Engliſh* at *London*, 1651; the Tranſlator here delivers Mr. *Hobbes* in his own Words: " Divine poſitive Laws (for natural Laws, being eternal and univerſal, " are all divine) are thoſe which, being the Commandments of God, not " from all Eternity, nor univerſally addreſſed to all Men, but only to a " certain People, or to certain Perſons, declared for ſuch by thoſe " whom God hath authorized to declare them. But this Authority of " Man to declare what be theſe poſitive Laws of God, how can it be " known? God may command a Man, by a ſupernatural Way, to deli- " ver Laws to other Men: But becauſe it is of the Eſſence of Law, that " he who is to be obliged, be aſſured of the Authority of him that deli- " vereth it, which he cannot naturally take Notice to be from God. How " can a Man, without ſupernatural Revelation, be aſſured of the Reve- " lation received by the Declarer? And how can he be bound to obey " them? For the firſt Queſtion, How a Man can be aſſured of the Reve- " lation of another, without a Revelation particularly to himſelf? It is evi- " dently impoſſible; for tho' a Man may be induced to believe ſuch Re- " velation, from the Miracles they ſee him do, or from ſeeing the extra- " ordinary Sanctity of his Life, or from ſeeing the extraordinary Wiſdom " or extraordinary Felicity of his Actions: All which are Marks of " God's extraordinary Favour; yet they are not aſſured Evidences of ſpe- " cial Revelation.

" *Miracles* are marvellous Works; but, that which is marvellous to one, " may not be ſo to another: Sanctity may be feigned, and the viſible Fe- " licities of this World are moſt often the Work of God, by natural and " ordinary Cauſes; and therefore no Man can infallibly know, by natu- " ral Reaſon, that another has had a ſupernatural Revelation of God's " Will, but only a Belief, every one (as the Signs thereof ſhall appear " greater or leſſer) a firmer or weaker Belief."

In this very Chapter, however, Mr. *Hobbes* affirms it eſſential to a Law, that he who is to be bound by the Obligation, be aſſured of the Authority of him that declareth it; and yet ſuch an Aſſurance, ſuch a Certainty as this,

this, he renders trifling and nothing; and, which he has openly acknowledged, not only in the Paſſage juſt now quoted, but alſo in the latter End of Chap. 15. *Leviathan*, Pages 79. 80.

" The Laws of Nature are immutable and eternal; for Injuſtice, Ingratitude, Arrogance, Pride, Iniquity, Exception of Perſons, and the reſt, can never be made lawful; for it can never be, that War ſhall preſerve Life, and Peace deſtroy it. The ſame Laws, becauſe they oblige only to a Deſire and Endeavour (I mean an unfeigned and conſtant Endeavour) are eaſy to be obſerved; for in that they require nothing but Endeavour, he that endeavoureth their Performance fulfilleth them; and he that fulfilleth the Law is juſt.

" And the Science of them, is the true and only Moral Philoſophy. For Moral Philoſophy is nothing elſe but the Science of what is Good and Evil, in the Converſation and Society of Mankind. *Good* and *Evil*, are Names that ſignify our Appetites and Averſions; which, in different Tempers, Cuſtoms and Doctrines of Men, are different.

" And divers Men, differ not only in their Judgment, on the Senſes of what is pleaſant and unpleaſant to the Taſte, Smell, Hearing, Touch and Sight; but alſo of what is conformable or diſagreeable to Reaſon, in the Actions of common Life. Nay, the ſame Man, in divers Times, differs from himſelf, and one Time praiſeth, that is, calleth Good, what another Time he diſpraiſeth, and calleth Evil; from whence Diſputes, Controverſies, and at laſt War. And therefore, ſo long a Man is in the Condition of mere Nature; (which is a Condition of War) as private Appetite is the Meaſure of Good and Evil: And conſequently all Men agree on this, that Peace is Good; and therefore, alſo, the Ways or Means of Peace, which (as I have ſhewed before) are Juſtice, Gratitude, Modeſty, Equity, Mercy, and the reſt of the Laws of Nature, are good, that is to ſay, moral Virtues; and their contrary Vices, Evil. Now the Science of Virtue and Vice is moral Philoſophy; and therefore the True Doctrine of the Laws of Nature is the true moral Philoſophy. But the Writers of moral Philoſophy, tho' they acknowledge the ſame Virtues and Vices; yet, not ſeeing wherein conſiſts their Goodneſs, nor that they come to be praiſed, as the Means of peaceable, ſociable and comfortable living, place them in a Mediocrity of Paſſions: As if not the Cauſe, but the Degree of Daring, made Fortitude; or not the Cauſe, but the Quantity of a Gift, made Liberality.

" Theſe Dictates of Reaſon, Men uſe to call by the Name of Laws, but improperly; for they are but Concluſions or Theorems, concerning what conduceth to the Conſervation and Defence of themſelves; whereas Law, properly, is the Word of him that by Right hath Command over others. But yet, if we conſider the ſame Theorems as delivered in the Word of God, that by Right commandeth all Things, then are they properly called Laws."

Now

Now if we, in Conſequence of this, are, concerning what he ſays, willing to believe him in each or both of theſe Paſſages; yet we muſt deny ſuch Laws as theſe to be Laws, whether we conſider them to ariſe from Nature, or whether we conſider them as revealed in the Holy Scriptures.

Becauſe, according to him, we cannot poſſibly be aſſured that the Scriptures are the revealed Will of God. But — in a Word — to cut this Argument ſhort—we rather ought not to give the leaſt Credit to that Man who thus evidently contradicts himſelf.

For this very ſame Mr. *Hobbes*, as if with a deliberate, premeditated Deſign, leaves his Readers to conjecture, that the one Side of this Contradiction was penned purely in Honour to the Chriſtian Civil Magiſtrate; and that the other Side of this Contradiction was delivered as his own Opinion.

See that ſame third Book of his *De Cive*, at Paragraph 34; and in the firſt Paragragh of his fourth Book *De Cive* he declares openly, that "the "very ſame Law which is uſually ſtiled Natural and Moral, may alſo, "very deſervedly, be called a Divine Law; as well becauſe, in the firſt "Place, that Reaſon (which is the Law of Nature itſelf, and immediately "derived from Almighty God) is given to every Man as the Rule of his "Actions: As alſo becauſe,

"*Secondly*, That the Precepts of Life, which are from hence derived, "are the ſame with thoſe which, upon a Divine Authority, are delivered "as Laws of the Heavenly Kingdom by our Lord *Jeſus Chriſt*, and by "the holy Prophets and Apoſtles."

Here then, to be ſure (and perhaps with the Intent that his Readers might obſerve how very complaiſant he is to the Laws and Cuſtoms of Countries wherever he happens to reſide) here then to be ſure, I ſay, in this Place, he admits thoſe very Concluſions generally to be (and with the greateſt Juſtice) called Laws: Which Concluſions, a little before, he abſolutely denied ought, in any true Propriety and Accuracy of ſpeaking, to be deemed as Laws at all.

And this is only, in other Terms, ſaying, that the very ſame Governor, veſted with lawful Authority, may at once preſcribe to any Perſon, under his Power and Juriſdiction, a Rule of Action, with the full Sanctions of Rewards and Puniſhments annexed: And yet, at the ſame Time, aſſerting, that this very Governor has not properly any Authority of either commanding or forbidding any Action, *i. e.* of enacting any Law at all.

SECT.

SECT. XII.

NOW, as for thoſe ſeveral Contradictions, to which Mr. *Hobbes*'s Method of Reaſoning is capable of being expoſed, I ſhall not at preſent inſiſt any longer.

I ſhall only now, therefore, lay before my Reader, by Way of friendly Caution, one Specimen of Mr. *Hobbes*; that ſo, upon the Strength of a ſingle Inſtance, the Reader may more readily underſtand his real Sentiments in all his Writings.

* That his whole Reaſoning, whenever he aukwardly ſpeaks in Favour of Revelation, is grounded upon Fear, is plain; becauſe he never attempts to produce one good Argument in Favour of it, at the Time he ſeems to allow the Chriſtian Revelation.

* The Reaſonings juſt now mentioned, which he has advanced in Favour of *Moral Rules*, carry in them this TEKMHPION, or *Characteriſtic Mark*, whereby any one may clearly, and at once diſcover, that his whole Doctrine is grounded upon *Fear*.——And why? Becauſe he produces no honeſt Argument, to prove the Point which he ſeemingly appears to allow.

For, Mr. *Hobbes* proceeds thus in his ſandy Rope of Argument. "God, he ſays, gave Reaſon to Mankind, as the Rule of human Actions." And in another Place of his Writings (to ſhew how conſiſtent he is with himſelf) he ſtrives, as well as he can, by this his favourite Rule, *Reaſon*, to demoliſh and quite overturn the whole Promulgation of Actions and the Rules of Life, which Revelation eſtabliſhes. And that this is his Doctrine we fairly prove upon him; notwithſtanding what he himſelf, in the Paſſages juſt now mentioned, ſays, to vindicate the Evidences of Revelation.

For, to vindicate what he offers in Contradiction to himſelf, he ſubjoins his Reaſon, ſuch as it is; which Reaſon is wholly taken from the Definition of a Law laid down by himſelf. †

Hence any one may learn, from his own private Sentiments, what his Words mean, what he openly declares, *viz.* That the Concluſions of Reaſon which are to direct Equity, Modeſty, and the other Moral Virtues, are not (according to vulgar Apprehenſions) Laws of Nature properly ſo called.

In this Caſe, to be ſure, he has acted juſt the ſame Part which, as he obſerves, cautious prudent Men act in another Affair concerning Religion; where in *Leviathan*, Chap. 12. pag. 53. he ſays, "(1) Men that "by

† Here our Author means Mr. *Hobbes*'s Definition of a Law of Nature;—which Law Mr. *Hobbes* defines thus, "A Law of Nature *(Lex Naturalis)* ſays he, is a Precept "or general Rule found out by Reaſon, by "which a Man is forbidden to do that which "is deſtructive of his Life, or taketh away "the Means of preſerving the ſame; and to "omit that by which he thinketh it may be "beſt preſerved." *Leviathan*, Chap. 14. pag. 64.

(1) *Men act by their own Meditation.*] Men, by their own natural Reaſon, inveſtigate the Being and Attributes of God; from whence they conclude, that God is infinite, omnipotent and eternal: Well then, how do theſe cautious and prudent Men proceed next? Why, they begin to doubt their own natural Reaſon;

" by their own Meditation, (*i. e.* by their own natural Reaſon) arrive to " the Acknowledgment of an Infinite, Omnipotent and Eternal God, " chuſe rather to confeſs he is incomprehenſible, and then confeſs their De- " finition to be unintelligible ; or if they give him ſuch a Title, it is not " dogmatically with Intention to make the Divine Nature underſtood, but " piouſly to honour him with Attributes, of Significations as remote as they " can from the Groſſneſs of Bodies viſible."

The Controverſy with Mr. Hobbes, for the preſent, ends here.

But we have, for this Time, ſaid enough of Mr. *Hobbes* and his Reaſoning.

The only one Point which I laid down to prove is, *That the Authority, or the effectual binding Force of Obligation, which the Laws of Nature derive from their Author, by a proper contemplative View of the Univerſe, can be demonſtrated: And upon exactly the ſame Evidence that we demonſtrate the firſt Cauſe of all, the Being and Attributes of God.*

We acknowledge, however, at the ſame Time, that ſome certain clear Mark of Obligation muſt be drawn from ſuch Rewards, *i. e.* from that Increaſe of Happineſs which always accompanies every benevolent Agent, by Vertue of the natural, benign Influence and operative Felicity of his own Actions: And this is ſuch an Increaſe of Happineſs, as conſtantly purſues and grows upon the Man (let him be whom you will) who ſtudiouſly and in Earneſt obſerves theſe Laws. And, *Secondly*, this clear Mark of Obligation muſt likewiſe, on the contrary, be drawn from theſe Puniſhments, *i. e.* from thoſe ſeveral Degrees of Miſery which, whether they will or no, they draw upon themſelves, who reſiſt and rebel againſt theſe Dictates of right Reaſon.

For, in downright Truth of ſpeaking, the cloſe Connexion of theſe Rewards, with that *Benevolence* which comprehends the whole Laws of Nature, is fairly expreſſed by the happieſt State of *Each* and *All*, in that Propoſition which I have premiſed and ſtated.

And by Conſequence it neceſſarily follows, that the Abſence, the Want of ſuch an Happineſs, *i. e.* in other Words, the Miſery, oppoſite to ſuch Happineſs, is ſufficiently declared to ariſe from, and eſſentially to conſiſt in, the Malevolence or *operative Ill-will of All towards All.*

SECT. XIII.

God, from natural Effects, is proved the Author of Nature and of Nature's Laws.

THOSE Points being premiſed and ſuppoſed, which I have hitherto only briefly touched upon, concerning God the Author of natural Effects; and upon which Hypotheſis or Foundation, as we have hinted,

Reaſon; and then they chuſe rather to confeſs that God is incomprehenſible, and that their Definition of God is unintelligible. Or, ſuppoſing that they do give to God the Title of *Infinite*, *Omnipotent*, *Eternal*, it is not dogmatically with an Intention to make the Divine Nature underſtood but piouſly, *&c.*

A Method of Induction this, which any Man in his Senſes, except Mr. *Hobbes*, might bluſh to own, and be aſhamed of.

theſe Laws are neceſſarily ſuggeſted to the Minds of all Men; or, at leaſt, of all thoſe who are arrived at a mature State of Reaſon, in this Vale of Mortality: Theſe Points, I ſay, being ſuppoſed, we ſhall proceed next to the diſtinct and clear Account of that neceſſary Origin of thoſe more ſimple Notions, from whence the general Propoſition, and the Corollaries deducible from it, are taken; as alſo of that complex Truth, which reſults and concludes from the Compoſition of theſe Terms. Now, the Subject of this Propoſition is the higheſt Degree of *Benevolence* towards all rational Beings; which *(Benevolence)* plainly appears to conſiſt eſſentially, in a conſtant, regular, willing Propenſity towards all the poſſible Good in our Power, exerted to all in general as far as the preſent Condition of our own Nature, in Conjunction with all other Circumſtances, can poſſibly admit.

We judge it proper here to conſider, after what Manner the Impreſſions and Notions of Things, as made upon the Senſes and Intellect of Man, are inſeparably connected with the Appearances and Notices of this viſible World; of which (viſible World) the human Body is ſo formed as always to conſtitute a Part.

Now all the Notices and Impreſſions made upon us, are employed either,

Firſt, (1) Upon the many ſeveral Sorts of Good in general: Or

Secondly, Upon ſuch Sorts of Good as are truly moſt communicative, and beſt fitted to produce the Happineſs of many: Or

Thirdly, Theſe Notices and Impreſſions are to inform us, amongſt ſuch ſeveral Sorts of Good (wherein there often are different Degrees; and wherein, perhaps, there is often little or no Difference at all: Theſe Notices and Impreſſions, I ſay, are to inform us in all Caſes) to eſtimate, value and call *the Greateſt Good*, *the Beſt*.

Fourthly, Theſe Notices and Impreſſions are to inform us, that ſome Sorts of Good are daily in our Power, and conſequently are truly practical. Whereas there are other Sorts of Good, as we may eaſily obſerve in ſome certain Circumſtances, which greatly exceed the narrow Limits of our Capacities. Theſe Notices and Impreſſions are therefore, upon the Principles here eſtabliſhed, diſcoverable to us only two Ways, either

(1) *Upon the many ſeveral Sorts of Good in general*, &c.] *Bonum* in Definitione poſitum, Cap. 3. Illud Intellectum velim, quod à Philoſophis bonum *Naturale* appellari ſolitum eſt, quodque jam antè Definivimus reſpectu Naturæ Creaturarum, quòd eam conſervet aut perficiat, ſeu fæliciorem faciat: Reſpectu autem Naturæ Divinæ utpote ex ſe Beatiſſimæ, id quod ipſi gratum eſt aut placet, ut μακαρισμὸς Analogicè ſcilicet, quoniam quæ nos conſervare, aut perficere ſentimus grata dicimus nobis; *i. e.* Animum tranquillum relinquunt & gaudii plenum: quoniam autem conſervari, & perfici apertè repugnant infinitæ Perfectioni, Tranquillitas autem, & gaudium, ſeu Complacentia ſeparatim ab Imperfectione concipiantur, hæc tutò divinæ Majeſtati tribui poſſunt. Cap. 5. Sect. 9. *See Archbiſhop* King's *excellent Treatiſe concerning the Origin of Evil. See the ingenious Biſhop* Butler's *Analogy of Natural and Revealed Religion.*

Firſt,

Firſt, More immethodically and confuſedly, although with a ſufficient Degree of Evidence from obvious Experience and daily Obſervation: Or,

Secondly, With a more ſeparate, diſtinct Perſpicuity from ſpeculative, intellectual Reaſonings, philoſophical Demonſtrations, and (1) Deductions mathematically demonſtrated, and built upon Experiments cautiouſly tried and faithfully compared together.

And ſince by both theſe Ways, in ſome Degree or other, the Knowledge of the Laws of Nature is more or leſs imprinted upon our Minds. From hence it comes to paſs that, to the Generality of Mankind, the Ideas of theſe ſeveral Objects appear confuſed and imperfect; but yet their Extent of Knowledge is always in Proportion to theſe Obſervations which they have made upon Nature and Nature's Laws.

Whereas to Philoſophers who ſtudy Nature, their Obſervations undergo a more accurate Enquiry: The cloſe Connexion of univerſal Notions (upon which their Obſervations are made) with general Cauſes and firſt Principles; that Series of Conſequences, by Vertue of which particular Precepts are regularly drawn from one comprehenſive univerſal Source, as the firſt Foundation of all; the mutual Chain and Dependance of each upon the reſt; the Order of Dignity and Precedence which every one of theſe Laws and Precepts preſerves, according to the Perfection and Excellency of each. (2) *An Examination into Nature, by ſome ſuch Method as this, ſeems truly the Buſineſs of a Philoſopher:* When, at the ſame Time, a groſs,

(1) *Deductions mathematically demonſtrated, and built upon Experiments cautiouſly tried, and faithfully compared together.*] The Method of inveſtigating Nature, purſued by the *Royal Society* of *England*, is the moſt extenſive, the nobleſt and beſt contrived to anſwer, in all Caſes of Enquiry, the great Ends of Truth. It takes a general Proſpect of all the Objects of Mens Thoughts, which can be nothing elſe but either *God*, or *Men*, or *Nature*. Their Enquiries therefore are truly phyſiological, comprehending all Arts and Sciences. Their Obſervations are accurate; their Experiments often repeated and exact; and their Demonſtrations eſtabliſhed upon both. *See Appendix*, No. 1.

(2) *An Examination into Nature by ſome ſuch Method as this, ſeems truly the Buſineſs of a Philoſopher*, &c.] The Lord *Bacon* judiciouſly obſerves, in his admirable Treatiſe, intitled; *Novum Organum Scientiarum*, that only two Methods can be taken in the Purſuit of natural Knowledge.

1. One, is to make a haſty Tranſition from our firſt and ſlight Obſervations on Things to general Axioms, and then to proceed upon thoſe Axioms, as certain and unconteſtable Principles, without farther Examination.

2. The other Method, (which he obſerves to be the only true one, but to his Time unattempted) is to proceed cautiouſly, to advance Step by Step, reſerving the moſt general Principles for the laſt Reſult of our Enquiries.

Concerning the firſt of theſe two Methods; where Objections which happen to appear againſt any ſuch Axioms, taken up in Haſte, are evaded by ſome frivolous Diſtinction, when the Axiom itſelf ought rather to be corrected; he affirms, that the united Endeavours of all Ages cannot make it ſucceſsful; becauſe this original Error, in the firſt Digeſtion of the Mind (as he expreſſes himſelf) cannot afterwards be remedied: Whereby he would ſignify to us, that if we ſet out in a wrong Way, no Diligence or Art we can uſe, while we follow ſo erroneous a Courſe, will ever bring us to our deſigned End. And doubtleſs it cannot prove otherwiſe; for in this ſpacious Field of Nature, if once we forſake the

groſs, collective View of Nature all together, and as if it were at once taken, which (is the vulgar Method of Obſervation) may appear, and very juſtly, a Thing impoſſible.

The vulgar Method of Obſervation, however, I did not think proper to paſs over quite in Silence.

Becauſe,

true Path, we ſhall immediately loſe ourſelves, and muſt for ever wander with Uncertainty.

The Impoſſibility of ſucceeding in ſo faulty a Method of Philoſophizing, his Lordſhip endeavours to prove from the many falſe Notions and Prejudices to which the Mind of Man is expoſed. And ſince this judicious Writer apprehends, that Men are ſo exceeding liable to fall into theſe wrong Tracts of thinking, as to incur great Danger of being miſled by them, even while they enter on the true Courſe in Purſuit of Nature; I truſt I ſhall be excuſed if, by inſiſting a little particularly upon this Argument, I endeavour to remove whatever Prejudice of this Kind might poſſibly entangle the Mind of any of my Readers.

His Lordſhip has reduced theſe Prejudices, and falſe Modes of Conception, under four diſtinct Heads.

The firſt Head contains ſuch as we are ſubject to from the very Condition of Humanity, through the Weakneſs both of our Senſes, and of the Faculties of the Mind; ſeeing, as this Author well obſerves, the Subtilty of Nature far exceeds the greateſt Subtilty of our Senſes, or acuteſt Reaſonings.

One of the falſe Modes of Conception, which he mentions under this Head, is the forming to ourſelves a fanciful Simplicity and Regularity in natural Things. This he illuſtrates by the following Inſtances; the conceiving the Planets to move in perfect Circles; the adding an Orb of Fire to the other three Elements; and the ſuppoſing each of theſe to exceed the other in Rarity, juſt in a decuple Proportion. And of the ſame Nature is the Aſſertion of *Des Cartes*, without any Proof, that all Things are made up of three Kinds of Matter only. As alſo this Opinion of *Fermat*, another Philoſopher, that Light, in paſſing through different Mediums, was refracted, ſo as to proceed by that Way, through which it would move more ſpeedily, than through any other.

The ſecond erroneous Turn of Mind, taken Notice of by his Lordſhip under this Head, is, that all Men are, in ſome Degree, prone to a Fondneſs for any Notions which they have once imbibed; whereby they often wreſt Things to reconcile them to thoſe Notions, and neglect the Conſideration of whatever will not be brought to an Agreement with them; juſt as thoſe do, who are addicted to judicial Aſtrology, to the Obſervation of Dreams, and to ſuch-like Superſtitions; who carefully preſerve the Memory of every Incident, which ſerves to confirm their Prejudices, and let ſlip out of their Minds all Inſtances that make againſt them. There is alſo a farther Impediment to true Knowledge, mentioned under the ſame Head by this noble Writer; which is, that whereas, through the Weakneſs and Imperfection of our Senſes, many Things are concealed from us, which have the greateſt Effect in producing natural Appearances; our Minds are ordinarily moſt affected by that which makes the ſtrongeſt Impreſſion on our Organs of Senſe, whereby we are apt to judge of the real Importance of Things in Nature by a wrong Meaſure. So, becauſe the Figuration and the Motion of Bodies, ſtrike our Senſes more immediately than moſt of their other Properties, *Des Cartes* and his Followers will not allow any other Explication of natural Appearances, than from the Figure and Motion of the Parts of Matter. By which Example we ſee, how juſtly his Lordſhip obſerves this Cauſe of Error to be the greateſt of any; ſince it has given Riſe to a fundamental Principle in a Syſtem of Philoſophy, that not long ago obtained almoſt an univerſal Reputation.

Theſe are the chief Branches of thoſe Obſtructions to Knowledge, which this Author has reduced under his firſt Head of falſe Conceptions. The ſecond Head contains the Errors to which particular Perſons are more eſpecially obnoxious. One of theſe is the Conſequence of a preceding Obſervation; that, as we are expoſed to be captivated by any Opinions, which have once taken Poſſeſſion of our Minds, ſo, in particular, natural Knowledge has been much corrupted, by the ſtrong Attachment of Men to ſome one Part of Science of which they reputed themſelves the Inventors, or about which they have ſpent much of their Time; and hence have been apt to

conceive

Becauſe, *in the firſt Place*, it is that Method which the Generality of Mankind naturally falls into. As alſo,

Secondly, Becauſe thoſe Principles, upon which the Laws of Nature are philoſophically accounted for, meet with warm Oppoſition and much Contention from many Quarters.

From

conceive it to be of greater Uſe, in the Study of Natural Philoſophy, than it was; like *Ariſtotle*, who reduced his Phyſics to Logical Diſputations; and the Chymiſts, who thought that Nature could be laid open only by the Force of their Fires. Some, again, are wholly carried away by an exceſſive Veneration for Antiquity; others, by too great Fondneſs for the Moderns; few having their Minds ſo well ballanced, as neither to depreciate the Merit of the Ancients, nor yet to deſpiſe the real Improvements of later Times. To this is added by his Lordſhip, a Difference in the Genius of Men, that ſome are moſt fitted to obſerve the Similitude there is in Things, whilſt others are more qualified to diſcern the Particulars wherein they diſagree; both which Diſpoſitions of Mind are uſeful: But, to the Prejudice of Philoſophy, Men are apt to run into Exceſs in each; while one Sort of Genius dwells too much upon the Groſs and Sum of Things, and the other upon trifling Minuteneſſes and ſhadowy Diſtinctions.

Under the third Head of Prejudices and falſe Notions, the Writer conſiders ſuch, as follow from the lax and indefinite Uſe of Words in ordinary Diſcourſe; which occaſions great Ambiguities and Uncertainties in philoſophical Debates (as another eminent Philoſopher has ſince ſhewn more at large;) inſomuch that this our Author thinks, a ſtrict defining of Terms to be ſcarce an infallible Remedy againſt this Inconvenience: And perhaps he has no ſmall Reaſon on his Side; for the common, inaccurate Senſe of Words, notwithſtanding the Limitations given them by Definitions, will offer itſelf ſo conſtantly to the Mind, as to require great Caution and Circumſpection, for us not to be deceived thereby. Of this we have a very eminent Inſtance, in the great Diſputes that have been raiſed about the Uſe of the Word *Attraction* in Philoſophy; of which we ſhall be obliged hereafter to make particular Mention. Words thus to be guarded againſt are of two Kinds: Some are Names of Things, that are only imaginary; ſuch Words are wholly to be rejected. But there are other Terms that allude to what is real, though their Signification is confuſed; and theſe latter muſt of Neceſſity be continued in Uſe, but their Senſe cleared up and freed, as much as poſſible, from Obſcurity.

The laſt general Head of theſe Errors, comprehends ſuch as follow from the various Sects of falſe Philoſophies; which this Author divides into three Sorts, the *Sophiſtical*, *Empirical* and *Superſtitious*. By the firſt of theſe, he means a Philoſophy built upon Speculations only, without Experiments; by the ſecond, where Experiments are blindly adhered to, without proper Reaſoning upon them; and by the third, wrong Opinions of Nature fixed in Mens Minds, either through falſe Religions, or from miſunderſtanding the Declarations of the true.

Theſe are the four principal Canals by which this judicious Author thinks that philoſophical Errors have flowed in upon us. And he rightly obſerves, that the faulty Method of proceeding in Philoſophy, againſt which he writes, is ſo far from aſſiſting us towards overcoming theſe Prejudices, that he apprehends it rather ſuited to rivet them more firmly to the Mind. How great Reaſon, then, has his Lordſhip to call this Way of Philoſophizing, *the Parent of Error, and the Bane of all Knowledge?* For, indeed, what elſe but Miſtakes can ſo bold and preſumptuous a Treatment of Nature produce? Have we the Wiſdom neceſſary to frame a World, that we ſhould think ſo eaſily, and with ſo ſlight a Search, to enter into the moſt ſecret Springs of Nature, and diſcover the original Cauſes of Things? What Chimeras, what Monſters has not this prepoſterous Method brought forth? What Schemes, or what Hypotheſes of the ſubtileſt Wits, has not a ſtricter Enquiry into Nature not only overthrown, but manifeſted to be ridiculous and abſurd? Every new Improvement, which we make in this Science, lets us ſee more and more the Weakneſs of our Gueſſes. Dr. *Harvey*, by that one Diſcovery of the Circulation of the Blood, has diſſipated all the Speculations and Reaſonings of many Ages, upon the Animal Oeconomy. *Aſellius*, by detecting the Lacteal Veins, ſhewed how little

Ground

From whence this manifeſt Danger ariſes;——That, if I ground the whole Strength of my moral Doctrine upon ſuch phyſiological Principles only as ſuit with my own Taſte, and pleaſe myſelf; the Doctrine which I endeavour to eſtabliſh may, upon this very Account, be rejected by many, ſince their Principles of Natural Philoſophy and mine don't perhaps agree.

Let us therefore call to Mind and ſtrictly examine into thoſe Appearances of Nature, obvious to all; and let us demonſtrate the Terms of the Propoſition laid down, and their neceſſary Connexion, ſo that, by this Connexion, the Terms may ſolidly unite into one true Propoſition of ſtrict Demonſtration; and this is the Demonſtration which I am to lay before my Readers, as briefly as poſſible, in this Chapter.

SECT. XIV.

Similitude of Nature in the Individuals of Mankind, evinces the Neceſſity of Benevolence.

ALL Mankind daily obſerve and feel the Uſe and Enjoyment of many Bleſſings, *Natural Products of the Earth*; ſuch as are generally called, Food, Raiment, Houſes: And alſo by the ſame Obſervation and Experience That mutual Aſſiſtance, Labour and Induſtry, are fitly adapted to the Being of each, in the Articles of Life, ſuch as Preſervation in this World for a certain Period, Strength of Body, Eaſe, Tranquillity and Improvement of Mind:—And ſuch Effects, indeed, as theſe we conceive, under one general Notion, to agree with that whole Species of which we ourſelves are Individuals: That is, we judge ſuch ſenſible Effects as theſe to be *Good*; and, by Conſequence, that the *Natural Affection*, from whence theſe outward viſible Actions ſpring; and by Vertue of which ſuch Effects are produced and cauſed, is apprehended, underſtood and expreſſed by the Term *Benevolence*.

But, beſides this, all Mankind very well know, that the ſingle Benevolence of each Individual can prove advantageous, not only to himſelf, not only to a few Individuals, but that each ſuch ſingle *Benevolence* is capable of a general Influence or Application, as well by a rational Uſe of the Underſtanding, as by manual Labour, bodily Strength, and outward Induſtry.

And, ſince every one rational Creature cannot but obſerve, that all other Rationals of the ſame Species carry a Nature exactly ſimilar and like to his own, who are duly qualified to make ſuitable Returns; it muſt be acknowledged that Individuals poſſibly may be, and actually are, benefited

Ground all Phyſicians and Philoſophers had in conjecturing, that the nutritive Part of the Aliment was abſorbed, by the Mouths of the Veins ſpread upon the Bowels. And then *Pecquet*, by finding out the Thoracic Duct, as evidently proved the Vanity of the Opinion, which was perſiſted in, after the Lacteal Veſſels were known, that the Alimental Juice was conveyed immediately to the Liver, and there converted into Blood. *See Dr.* Pemberton's *Introduction to his View of Sir* Iſaac Newton's *Philoſophy*.

by

by numberleſs Bleſſings, the genuine, true Effects of ſuch mutual Aſſiſtance. All which Bleſſings would not only be quite removed from us, but there muſt neceſſarily come in their Place innumerable, hazardous and dangerous Accidents; which, with the extremeſt Poverty, muſt daily await each of us, if every ſingle Perſon, regarding himſelf only, ſhould prove always malevolent, and act with Hatred to all other rational Beings.

Whereas, on the contrary, ſuch an operative Power as proves beneficial to great Numbers of rational Agents, neceſſarily raiſes in our Minds a Notion of the *common general Good*.

Nay,—and what is ſtill more, this Kind of an operative Power may, with the moſt Eaſe imaginable, carry alſo a Regard to all in general, with whom, as Occaſion offers, we may at any and all Times become acquainted and have any Thing to do. We may alſo add, to what we have ſaid, this one moſt evident Truth, obvious to univerſal Experience and daily Obſervation,

That we have it much more in our Power to aid and aſſiſt our fellow Creatures, of the ſame Species, than any other Creatures whatſoever: Not to mention the leaſt Word of Things inanimate; and for this one demonſtrative Reaſon,

Becauſe, the Nature of Man, from our own certain Knowledge, (and ſuch a Knowledge is it as cannot eſcape us) is more obvious to us; and, by Conſequence, the Good and Evil incident to this Nature, eaſier underſtood than our Knowledge of any other Creatures whatſoever.

Nay,—and what is ſtill more,—that the Nature of Man is capable of many more abundant and different Sorts of Good, which lie within the Sphere of our own Powers, Abilities and Capacities to purſue and effect for the Service of human Nature.

And, on the contrary,

That the Nature of Man is liable alſo to more Dangers and greater Calamities, in the removing, remedying and eaſing of which, our Strength and Abilities are moſt fitly and happily employed.

Add to this alſo; that by our own Sagacity, Prudence, Wiſdom, Caution, and by well-timed Advice communicated under fit Signs and proper Tokens, we muſt confer numberleſs Benefits and Advantages to Mankind, of which all the other Animal Creation is utterly incapable.—But, beſides this,—

Upon Account of that real Similitude, which actually exiſts between our own Nature, and the Nature of other rational Beings, *To will and to deſire* the ſame Objects for them, which by an impreſſed Force, Inclination and natural Inſtinct, we wiſh and deſire for ourſelves; *Reaſon* cannot do otherwiſe than determine *ſuch a Will or Deſire* much more agreeable to the internal Principles of all our Actions (let thoſe Principles be what they will) than to wiſh and deſire the ſame, or the like Objects, to Creatures of a quite contrary and different Nature.

And

And moreover, we cannot but be alſo very ſenſible of a ſtrong Propenſity towards benefiting others who are like to ourſelves, ſince we may rationally hope and expect that the Perſon, thus benefited and obliged, will be ſo touched with Tenderneſs and Gratitude, as to return the Obligation either in an equal or greater Degree, juſt as they, in like Manner, have it in their Power to oblige us.

In one Word, it is a Truth confirmed by univerſal Experience, That no one earthly Poſſeſſion is more valuable, no one Glory more ſplendid, no one Protection a firmer Security which can poſſibly happen to Man, than the ſincere, univerſal Benevolence of *all to all*; which Kind of Benevolence is perfectly conſiſtent with that ſolid Tye of particular Friendſhip eſtabliſhed between a few, and ſuch a few as every one ſhall beſt like or think proper to chuſe; ſince all other Bleſſings of Life, nay, even Life itſelf, Mankind may, in caſe they are malevolent and exert Ill-will, take away from us, and with all poſſible Eaſe: For, by no one other Method, better or more ſecure and effectual, can either or both of theſe *(Univerſal Benevolence or Private Friendſhip)* be gained, than that every one, really and in Fact, ſhall ſhew himſelf affected towards *all*, juſt in the ſame Way that he himſelf could wiſh *all* to appear and really to be affected towards himſelf; that is, with an *Univerſal Benevolence* upon all proper Occaſions and Opportunities exerted towards *all*; but with a more intenſe, though not contrary Propenſity, when exerted towards a few ſelect Perſons, choſen as Friends.

Now if, as is very reaſonable to expect, it generally and in Fact happens over the Face of the whole Earth, that all Mankind, *even all*, are earneſt and ſolicitous in imploring the Favour and Aſſiſtance of the Firſt Cauſe, for the firmer Security and ſurer Eſtabliſhment of human Happineſs; we ſhall aſſuredly find, that there is not any one Principle in us more truly divine, and which is more highly pleaſing to Almighty God, than that ſincere and moſt extenſively diffuſive Benevolent Love of which we have been hitherto treating:———A Love which extends itſelf even to Almighty God himſelf, as the Creator, Author, Head, Source and Father of all rational Agents:———A Love which extends itſelf to all other rational Beings, as his Children made moſt eminently above all the other Creation, in God's own Image, and after his own Likeneſs, and conſequently moſt beloved by him.

Τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμεν. *For we are alſo his Offſpring*, was the noted Saying of the Poet * *Aratus* the *Cilician*, a Saying univerſally received by the

* *Aratus* was born at *Soli*, a famous City in *Cilicia* in *Aſia Minor*, founded by the wiſe *Solon*, and afterwards called *Pompeipolis*, in Honour of *Pompey* the Great.

He wrote under the Patronage of *Antigonus*, ſirnamed *Gonatas*, King of *Macedon*, who began his Reign in the 125th Olympiad, as is ſettled by *Euſebius*.

There was an intimate Friendſhip maintained between him and *Theocritus*.

His Work, which in many old Editions paſſes for no more than a ſingle Poem, with the

the *Athenians* in their State of Heatheniſm, long before St. *Paul* ever preached amongſt them. It muſt, indeed, appear forward Preſumption to cite the numberleſs Paſſages to this Purpoſe: For—what need is there to prove a Thing in itſelf as clear as Noon-day.

SECT. XV.

The Poſtulata in Geometry and Moral Philoſophy equally rational.

WHAT I juſt now have ſaid concerning human Happineſs, is ſo obvious both to common Experience and plain Reaſon, that I do not know any one Point relating to the Nature of Man which appears more evident: An Evidence which carries juſt the ſame Force of Demonſtration to direct our Practice, our moral Duties, as the Poſtulata in Geometry have in the Conſtruction of Problems. As for Inſtance, in plain Surfaces we can, from any given Point, to any other given Point, draw a right Line; or, upon a Plane, from any Center, at any Interval, deſcribe a Circle. The ſeveral other Poſtulata likewiſe, of a more intricate Kind, uſed in the Problems of ſolid Bodies, and of the ſeveral different Figures deſcribed by Lines, admit of equal Demonſtration alſo.

Free-will as much concerned in Geometry and Arithmetic as in Moral Philoſophy.

In all theſe ſeveral Caſes, I ſay, the Operation entirely depends upon the free voluntary Powers of human Nature: And here we are to obſerve, by the By, that no Scruple is ever ſtarted in Geometrical Calculations, about the Explication or Definition of Free-will: The like may be alſo ſaid in the ſeveral Operations of Arithmetic.

Now, it is fully ſufficient, in demonſtrating the Truth of theſe Sciences, that there really is an inſeparable Connexion between ſuch Operations (which Operations are always ſuppoſed poſſible) and which Operations, when uſed in Practical Geometry, we evidently find to be in our own Power, as well as the deſired Effects or Concluſions ſought.

Upon exactly the ſame Foundation of Reaſoning alſo is truly eſtabliſhed the whole Truth of Moral Philoſophy; upon a Foundation laid in that

the common Name of ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΑ, has been thought ſince to make two diſtinct Pieces, the firſt only being called ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΑ, and the ſecond intitled ΔΙΟΣΗΜΕΙΑ. The former is properly *Aſtronomical*, giving an Account of the Situation and the Affection of the Heavenly Bodies; the other *Aſtrological*, ſhewing the particular Influences ariſing from their various Diſpoſitions and Relations. Yet whoever conſiders the noble Beginning of the Phænomena, and the plain Entrance on the *Dioſemeia*, without any Formality or Addreſs, will ſtill conclude them to be one Poem divided into two Books.

For this celebrated Poem of his it is, that *Ovid* paſſes this high Compliment upon *Aratus*.

Cum ſole & Lunâ ſemper Aratus *erit.*
Amorum Lib. 1. Eleg. 15. Carm. 16.

But, as the higheſt of all Honours, this Line of *Aratus* is mentioned by St. *Paul*, *Acts* xvii. 28. *For in him we live and move and have our Being; as certain alſo of your own Poets have ſaid, for we are alſo his Offſpring. See Dr.* Kennet's *Life of* Aratus, *in his Lives and Characters of the ancient* Greek *Poets.*

unchangeable Agreement, between the higheſt Happineſs of which the Powers and Happineſs of Man are capable, and thoſe Acts of *Univerſal Benevolence* (*i. e.* of our Good-will or Love both to God and Man) which daily exerts itſelf in the whole Contrivance and Deſign of Moral Virtues.

We muſt ſuppoſe, however, at the ſame Time, that Man deſires and ſeeks after the beſt, moſt ſubſtantial Happineſs his Nature can comprehend and enjoy. And alſo, that Man is able to exerciſe Love, not only towards himſelf, but alſo towards God and towards Mankind, who partake of the ſame common Nature with himſelf.

I ſhall only here add one Word more, which is, *viz.* namely,

Corollary. That the very ſame Experience which proves the Benevolence of *each* towards *all*, to be the moſt operative, active Cauſe of every one ſuch benevolent Agent's own individual private Happineſs, by as equal and neceſſary a Conſequence of Reaſoning proves, that the Love or Benevolence of any given Number towards any other given Number, will produce a proportionable Effect. And,—on the contrary,

That Malevolence, or an operative Ill-will towards all, does (in exactly the ſame Proportion) as ſpeedily draw the ſureſt Deſtruction upon each, notwithſtanding the whole mighty Operation of an over-violent Self-Love. And,—the Reaſon is evident; becauſe ſuch a Malevolence or Hatred baniſhes all the Cauſes of Happineſs which are neceſſarily requiſite to conſtitute ſuch a State; and ſubſtitutes in their Place as neceſſary Cauſes of Calamity, in all Degrees and Shapes. From whence nothing leſs can poſſibly ariſe, than that extremeſt Miſery which is ſurely threatened.

SECT. XVI.

Mr. Hobbes acknowledges in Words, and contradicts in Reaſoning the above Corollary.

NOW, altho' Mr. *Hobbes* every where acknowledges the Force and Import of the Corollary, which I have juſt now drawn from our fundamental Principle, yet he goes upon a quite different footing; for he ſuppoſes every one Individual to conſider only himſelf, his own Life and Happineſs; and that (1) each may lawfully arrogate and aſſume to himſelf a Right to and over all Things and Perſons. And from hence Mr. *Hobbes*, at once, infers an univerſal State of War, *each* againſt *all*.——And then, in the next Place, he loudly aſſerts, that Miſeries of all Sorts, nay, Death itſelf, impend over and are ready to fall upon the Heads of all: And

Upon the univerſal Right of each to all, Mr. Hobbes eſtabliſhes his State of War.

(1) *Each may lawfully arrogate and aſſume to himſelf*, &c.] *See Mr.* Hobbes's *State of Nature conſidered by Dr.* John Echard, *in a Dialogue between* Philautus *and* Timothy, *pag.* 84, &c. Lond. 5*th Edit.* 1705. Octavo.

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what is ſtill more, he ſuppoſes that all Mankind are conſcious, and fully convinced of this his Doctrine, even before they ſhould agree to enter into any ſocial Covenant or Compact whatſoever with each other.

He is, to be ſure, as quick-ſighted as *Lynceus*, in ſpying out Cauſes of Evil and of dreadful Apprehenſion; but as blind as *Tireſias*, in finding out the Cauſes of Good, and of an Happineſs eſtabliſhed upon a ſure and certain Hope.

And ſuch an Ignorance as this Mr. *Hobbes* affects, notwithſtanding that the Cauſes of Good and Happineſs are, beyond all Peradventure, equally obvious with thoſe of Evil and Fear: Nay, in Truth of Thinking, are Cauſes more obvious; for, in the Order and Procedure of diſtinct Knowledge, they are prior Cauſes; becauſe ſuch Cauſes muſt neceſſarily firſt come under our Enquiry and Search, which conſtitute and preſerve the Natures of Things (and as ſuch comprehend all Sorts of Good;) rather than ſuch Cauſes as corrupt and deſtroy the whole Natures of Things; and, for which very Reaſon, are truly called *Evils of every Kind.*

I cannot poſſibly, therefore, entertain the leaſt Doubt, but Mr. *Hobbes* himſelf very well knows, what powerful Efficacy a ſtudious, diligent Concern for the common Good (properly governed by the prudent Counſels of right Reaſon) muſt carry, in ſettling the Security and Happineſs of *all*; and in as full a Degree, as a total Neglect muſt tend to the Deſtruction of *all.* Even upon his own Suppoſition, that each ſingle Perſon ſo overeagerly pants after his own private Happineſs; or, ſuppoſing Mr. *Hobbes*'s own private Opinion to be what it will, it is yet, however, a Point evidently certain, that each Perſon may be fully inſtructed, even from the private Experience of each, that the Truth here laid down is and may, with all the Eaſe imaginable, be underſtood by every Man, provided he has arrived at a mature Age, and is of ſound Mind, no way diſtempered in his Underſtanding.

For, from the Nature of the Thing itſelf (and which all may experience if they pleaſe) every Man is endowed with a Will ſufficiently able to procure ſeveral Bleſſings of Life, and powerful enough, as Opportunity offers, of doing not only Good to himſelf, but to others alſo; and in order to bring about this End, every Man muſt know that ſuch an Exerciſe of the Will as this, is abſolutely neceſſary. Neither can Mankind in general be ignorant, that ſuch a Kind of Will or Propenſity in all other Perſons, muſt be as effectual and neceſſary, towards anſwering the ſame End.

But, I am really tired of inſiſting ſo long upon ſuch an evident Point; and yet I could not quite paſs it over in Silence, ſince from ſuch Poſitions as theſe, in the Way of Poſtulata, all his other Concluſions and Conſequences are inferred.

The ſpecial Laws of Nature are deduced from the general Law.

Now, ſince (1) the Deduction of the ſpecial Laws of Nature from the one general Law, is the true Subject Matter of Philoſophical Speculation, and therefore may, upon this very Account, be properly placed under the ſecond Method of inveſtigating or diſcovering theſe ſpecial or particular Laws; I ſhall premiſe, as a preparative Introduction to this my Enquiry, or one ſingle Point, ſome certain Phyſiological Conſiderations, which may perhaps clearly prove, that a Philoſophical Contemplation upon Nature can greatly aſſiſt the human Underſtanding, in a more clear Diſcovery of this one General Law.

SECT. XVII.

What we are to underſtand by tranſcendental Notions.

IN the firſt Place, therefore, by Way of Preliminary, I think it proper to take Notice, that all thoſe moſt general Notions, which commonly paſs under the Name of *Tranſcendental Notions*; the Uſe and Application of which Notions being moſt frequently met with in all the Laws of Nature (as well Phyſical as moral) are equally uſed and applied to natural Bodies; from whence it follows, that ſuch Notions may be, and actually are, impreſſed upon the Mind from our outward Senſes.

Firſtly, Theſe tranſcendental Notions are our *Univerſal Conceptions* of *Cauſe* and *Effect*, and of that Agreement which inſeparably connects and unites them (i. e. *Cauſe and Effect*) together.

Secondly, Such tranſcendental Notions are likewiſe our univerſal or abſtracted Conceptions of Number, which is a Compound of Unity more or leſs repeated: And from hence, in Arithmetic, ariſes our Notion of Addition, which entirely conſiſts in collecting and joining together ſo as to form a Sum Total; of Subſtraction, which depends entirely upon Difference, *&c.*

Thirdly, The Notions which we have of Order.

Fourthly, Of Duration, and ſo on.

Now, notwithſtanding I might imagine that ſuch Obſervations as theſe may contribute to prove my preſent Enquiry, ſince the Laws of Nature are framed upon ſuch Notions as eſſential, conſtituent Parts: Yet, ſince it is a clear Point, in which our Adverſaries and we are confeſſedly

(1) *The Deduction of the ſpecial Laws*, &c.] Our Author, in his Sixth Chapter, ſhews after what Manner the ſpecial Laws of Nature are comprehended in and deduced from the general Law of Nature. In the Seventh Chapter he compares, by a very juſt and elegant Similitude, the general Law of Nature, and the particular Laws comprehended under it, with the Animal Body in general, and the conſtituent Parts and Members of it. In the Eighth Chapter, he proves that the particular Moral Virtues are eſſential, conſtituent Parts of that Univerſal Benevolence ſo ſtrictly enjoined by the Law of Nature.

And, our Author further, in his Ninth or laſt Chapter, ſhews how the Law of Benevolence, and the general Precepts of Morality, may be reduced into Precepts of private Concern and practical Uſe, by each ſingle Individual reſpectively; and this he demonſtrates by the Decalogue, and from the Laws of Civil Inſtitution.

agreed;

agreed; and is alſo a Point obvious to all, I ſhall not any longer inſiſt upon it.

Phyſiology, *Secondly*, moſt clearly and diſtinctly inſtructs us, what Things they are, and what their ſeveral Capacities, and Powers, and Motions, which can prove either good or evil to others; and by how immutable, how neceſſary an Event every ſuch a Conſequence may happen and muſt come to paſs.

Natural Good deſcribed.

For, ſince Phyſiology is chiefly and principally employed in tracing and finding out the Cauſes of Generation, Duration and Corruption, all which are, as we from daily Obſervation know, incident to natural Bodies in general, but to the human Body more eſpecially: Alſo, ſince Phyſiology is a Science, ſo well fitted to demonſtrate the neceſſary Coherence or Agreement of ſuch Effects as theſe, with the Cauſes which produce them; and ſince, *in the third Place*, it is alſo a clear, certain Point, that the Cauſes which generate, produce and preſerve theſe Effects, *for Inſtance, Man*, are the efficient Cauſes of his Duration and Continuance here, for ſome determined, ſhort Period of Time; and are likewiſe the Cauſes why Man is bleſt with Abilities, both of Mind and Body, daily improveable, and which are ordained and fitted for certain Offices and Duties, that ſuch Cauſes therefore as theſe, with Reſpect to Man, are and ought to be called *Good*.

Natural Evil deſcribed.

Whereas, on the contrary, the Cauſes of Diſſolution, Diſeaſes and Calamities, prove to Mankind natural Evils.

Whence it moſt undeniably follows, that Phyſiology truly explains what, with Regard to human Nature, is *Natural Good* and *Natural Evil*; and demonſtrates, that ſuch Good or Evil is neceſſary and unavoidable: The conſtituent Branches of this Phyſiology or natural Science, I take to be the Knowledge of all thoſe Things which Nature produces as uſeful, for the *Food*, *Raiment*, *Habitation* and *Medicine* of Mankind.

What is natural Science or natural Knowledge.

We may alſo very juſtly reduce under the Head of *Natural Science*, the Knowledge of all the human Operations, and the Effects ariſing from them, as variouſly uſeful to the Life of Man.

For, altho' the voluntary Acts of Man, which are obvious to the outward Senſes, do not begin and flow in the ſame Manner that the mere natural Motions of phyſical Bodies do, that is, by the Pulſion, Percuſſion and Motion of other phyſical or natural Bodies, but receive their Energy and Direction from Reaſon, and from the free, voluntary Powers of our Minds: Yet ſince their true, viſible Motions, take their Degree and Quantity of Velocity from bodily Strength, which bodily Strength is exactly the ſame in its Nature with the Forces and Momenta of other phyſical Bodies. From hence it therefore muſt follow, that theſe natural, viſible, moral Acts, whenſoever they begin to exiſt, by the very ſame Neceſſity, and in the ſame Manner, exactly purſue and produce their own Effects, and, according to the regular Laws of Motion, that any other phyſical or natural Motions do.

Now,

Now, the Truth of this Doctrine is evinced moſt clearly and univerſally in the Operations and Effects produced by ſimple Machines.

Thus, for Inſtance,

1. In the Lever.
2. In the Pully.
3. In an Inclined Plane.

(1) Upon which three Mechanic Powers all the other Doctrines of Mechanics depend.

(2) All the ſeveral Mechanic Powers, I ſay, produce the very ſame Effects, when impelled and put into Action by human Force, that they do, when (in the Place of ſuch Force) Weights of natural, animated Bodies only are applied to ſuch Powers. An Experiment univerſally well known.

SECT. XVIII.

Induſtry and Labour exerciſed according to the Laws of Mechaniſm by human Bodies, equally uſeful to one and all.

IT is a Truth alſo as well known to all, even the meaneſt Capacity, that human Induſtry, by the Aſſiſtance of bodily Motions, and which Motions the Philoſopher without any Scruple accounts for, and ſolves by Mechaniſm: Such human Induſtry, I ſay, thus exerted, can be, and actually is, uſeful, not only to each ſingle Individual himſelf, but to others alſo, in procuring and preſerving Food, Raiment, Medicines, Houſes and Ships.

Upon theſe, and ſuch like Neceſſaries of Life as theſe, is exerciſed all that human Labour converſant about Agriculture, Architecture, Ναυπηγία, or Ship-building, Traffic, and the other Crafts of Smiths and Weavers.

Nay,—the very Propagation of the Species, the nurſing and rearing of our Infant-young, may (upon Mr. *Hobbes*'s own Confeſſion, and which I ſhall not contradict) be accounted for upon the very ſame Principles.

(1) The Mechanical Powers are certain Inſtruments or Machines, contrived for the moving great Weights with ſmall Force; and their Effects are all deducible from Obſervation.

They are uſually reckoned five in Number, *viz.*

1. The Lever.
2. The Wheel and Axis.
3. The Pully.
4. The Wedge.
5. The Screw.

And to which ſome add,

6. The Inclined Plane.

As theſe Inſtruments have been of very ancient Uſe, ſo the celebrated *Archimedes* ſeems to have been the firſt who diſcovered the true Reaſon of their Effects, *&c.* Pemberton's *View of Sir* Iſaac Newton's *Philoſophy*, pag. 69, *Quarto.* Lond. 1728.

(2) *All the ſeveral Mechanic Powers*, &c.] Sir *Iſaac Newton*, in his *Chronology of antient Kingdoms amended*, pag. 19. Quarto Edit. *Lond.* 1728, informs us, that *Dædalus* (in the Year before *Chriſt* 989) and his Nephew *Talus* invented the Saw, the Turning-lath, the Wimble, the Chip ax, and other Inſtruments of Carpenters and Joyners, and thereby gave a Beginning to thoſe Arts in *Europe*. *Dædalus* alſo invented the making of Statues with their Feet aſunder, as if they walked.

The

The Liberal Arts and Sciences alſo are not a little indebted to theſe ſame Laws of Motion; for by their Help and Aſſiſtance, the human Mind is either from the Arts and Sciences opened, improved and enlarged with Knowledge, or directed to Action and Operation by Means of viſible, ſenſible, articulate Sounds, or Words of the Letters, of Numbers, *&c.*

For both in Writing and Speaking, we are much aſſiſted by the phyſical or natural Energy of both Hands and Mouth, they being employed and uſed as Inſtruments or Machines of Action and Operation.

The excellent Uſes of Speech and Writing.

Now, theſe two Articles of Writing and Speaking are materially neceſſary in the Execution and Perfection of Bonds and Contracts, in the ſeveral Diſtributions and Conveyances (nay even in the very Preſervation) of Right and Property.

Under which Heads the whole Doctrine of Juſtice (both diſtributive and commutative) is almoſt entirely comprehended.

Juſtice a fundamental, moral and ſocial Virtue.

And it is well known that Juſtice is the principal, the genuine good Effect of a right Diſcipline, both in Morality and Politics.

The many good Effects of Words and outward Signs, when properly applied.

The Efficacy, the Power of Words is not at all contemptible; to ſay nothing of their Operation, their Energy in improving the Mind and regulating the Paſſions: Which Efficacy, which Power however (that is of Words and Letters) when once produced, is all owing to bodily Organs; when, yet at the ſame Time, as well the original, arbitrary Impoſition of Words, to expreſs Things, as well as the whole Structure and Compoſition of them, are all (notwithſtanding the mighty Power of Mechaniſm, and of bodily Organs) a Work of the human Intellect, directing the Imagination and the Tongue; and notwithſtanding the operative Efficacy of Words and Letters, as expreſſed by bodily Organs, yet the human Liberty, the human Freedom is ſtill equally true and unreſtrained; even after hearing the Eloquence of Orators, or after reading over the written Laws of wiſe Legiſlators in all States and Kingdoms.

How the Laws of Superiors are to operate.

Let us now, by way of Illuſtration, examine upon what Foundation, upon what Motive, Laws either written, or the mere arbitrary Dictates of a Superior operate.

Let the Foundation, the Motive be what it will, we all from Experience certainly know, that the whole Force of all Laws whatſoever works their Influence upon the Mind of the Governed.

Partly, *Firſt*, by the Promulgation; partly, in the *ſecond* Place, by a juſt Execution: Which Execution has beforehand been publickly known to have received the fulleſt Sanction; by which Sanction the Puniſhments and Rewards, from ſuch Threats and Promiſes as the Laws expreſs, are ſeverally portioned out and diſtributed according to Obedience and Diſobedience, Merit and Demerit.

Each and all of which Sanctions are made known to us by our Senſes: Which Senſes are affected from corporeal or bodily Motions, endeavouring, by a natural Neceſſity, to procure an End proper for them to produce.

For

The Knowledge of Laws to be understood in a State of Nature.

For this Reaſon, I judged it proper to make this Remark, That, ſince the Promulgation and Execution of Laws are in themſelves neceſſary, uſeful and good; or, in other Words, ſince by their Mediation and Efficacy they are co-operating efficient Cauſes in the Happineſs of all rational Creatures, that therefore, for this very Reaſon, and upon this very Argument, we can eaſily demonſtrate the Promulgation and Sanction of theſe Laws of Nature, to be naturally and neceſſarily ſuch as they really and truly are; and all this upon ſo ſolid a Foundation, we can fully learn, even before any Laws of human Inſtitution were eſtabliſhed.

For, all theſe natural Criteria, Marks, Signs and Tokens, act after the ſame Way in the Operations of Morality, that the *Cynoſura* or North-Star, the leſſer Bear-Star, Obſervations upon the Planets Motions, the Compaſs, the Sea-Chart, and the ſeveral Mathematical Inſtruments uſeful and neceſſary in Navigation, act and unitedly operate in producing Ends deſigned and intended; and yet all theſe ſalutary Helps may, thro' a careleſs Indolence, be quite neglected.

The Operations alſo of the human Underſtanding, and their Concurrence with corporeal Motions in producing their proper Effects, may be compared to the Buſineſs of a Pilot ſitting at the Ship's-helm, and of a Merchant in the ſame Ship computing the Value and Uſe of his Freight, and yet neither Pilot nor Merchant can work to any Purpoſe without the Intervention of ſome ſignificant Tokens, of ſome viſible Signs, without the Advantage of Ports, Harbours, Bays and Winds; unleſs the Ship be ſtaunch in her Bottom, in her Rigging, and be well furniſhed with good Sails; unleſs, alſo, different Climates and Countries produce right merchantable Goods, proper to relieve the mutual Wants and Neceſſities of Mankind.

And yet all theſe Means, Helps and Aſſiſtances, as every one knows, depend upon neceſſary Cauſes.

SECT. XIX.

Arts and Sciences known in a State of Nature, altho' improved in civil Society.

NOW, although theſe Arts and Sciences cannot be imagined, before civil Societies were entered into, to carry that Perfection in them which we now obſerve; and although the human Mind could not, with any Sort of clear, diſtinct Perception, foreknow at what Degrees of Improvement and Excellency theſe Arts and Sciences might in future Times arrive; yet all could and muſt have foreſeen (and which is a Point Mr. *Hobbes* himſelf might freely give up) that a mutual, ſocial Aſſiſtance muſt prove uſeful, convenient and beneficial; and that the natural Propenſity of the human Mind towards ſuch a ſocial State, was capable of a full Diſcovery by proper Signs, Marks and Tokens: For even Mr. *Hobbes* himſelf lays the Foundation of all Society, as eſtabliſhed for this very End and Purpoſe, *i. e.* as a State of mutual ſocial Aſſiſtance. Upon the

A State of Nature a ſocial State.

Mr. Hobbes allows that the Foundations of Society were eſtabliſhed for mutual Aſſiſtance.

ſame

ſame Reaſoning exactly all Acts, Motions and Behaviour, contrary to theſe natural Propenſities and Tendencies, namely, all ſuch, by Means of which the Frame, Make or Structure of the human Body is weakened or impaired, by with-holding ſuch Supplies as are neceſſary to ſupport Life and Strength, ſuch as Food, Raiment, Houſes; or (1) all ſuch Acts which, in their Place, ſubſtitute whatſoever is hurtful and deſtructive, are neceſſarily, and in their own Nature, Evil: As alſo are all ſuch Acts, Motions and Behaviour, whereby the human Mind is hindered or debarred from Knowledge and Virtue; or whereby, in their Place (*i. e.* of Knowledge and Virtue) are introduced falſe Notions, lawleſs, unbridled Appetites and Paſſions, which always prove deſtructive, quite deſtructive of all Concern for the public Good: Theſe all, I ſay, neceſſarily and in their own Nature are Evil.

We are however, here, at the ſame Time, ſtrictly to obſerve, That whenever we mention *Good and Evil*, as comprehended under the Laws of Nature, we do not conſider either the Body or the Soul, or both, of any one Individual, or of a ſmall Number only; becauſe, at particular Times, it may ſo happen that the capital Puniſhment of ſome few, greatly advances the *public Good*. We therefore, for moſt weighty Reaſons, always would be underſtood to regard the whole aggregate, collective Body of Mankind, under the ſuperior Direction of Almighty God, as their univerſal Lord and Governor; or, in other Words, to ſignify by this collective Body, one univerſal Syſtem of rational Agents, naturally framed and fitted for the Care, Protection and Management of *Divine Providence*.

But,—as to this Doctrine, I ſhall, in the further Proſecution of our Enquiry, at another Time, more clearly and fully explain it.

We muſt, however, notwithſtanding any Thing, hitherto, which has ſeemingly appeared to the contrary, acknowledge that the *Good* of the *whole Aggregate Body* is nothing elſe than, either, the Sum total of that Happineſs which accrues to the *Whole*, or, at leaſt, to the *greateſt Part* of the *Whole*.

Now, whatever we have here offered concerning the Efficacy of numberleſs human Acts which naturally tend to the Preſervation and Aſſiſtance of others (and wherein the Doctrine of mere Self is little or nothing concerned) we have ſaid with this one only View, that we may after, in a more clear and diſtinct Method prove, how Mankind can and may, from right Obſervations upon the Faculties, Powers and moral Acts of others, naturally arrive at a Knowledge of natural Good in the ſeveral Branches of it; which Branches of it, are truly important and neceſſary; and, by Conſequence, that we may diſcover what and how many are the Sorts of

(1) *All ſuch Acts which in their Place ſubſtitute*, &c.] So far as ſuch Acts ariſe from the voluntary Choice of rational Creatures, ſo far are ſuch Acts truly moral Evils: The Effects ariſing from ſuch Acts, as for Inſtance, Death, Sickneſs, Pain, Want, &c. may juſtly be called natural Evils.

natural Good which lie within the Sphere of Capacity and Power in other Agents to perform by the united Co-operation of both Soul and Body.

From hence, in the next Place, it will be no difficult Matter to demonſtrate, that the Powers and Capacities of theſe Faculties and moral Acts, are not ſo narrow and limited as to ſerve and benefit the one ſingle Individual only; but are, on the contrary, capable of diffuſing Joy and Happineſs amongſt Multitudes.

For, juſt in the ſame Manner as the Knowledge, the Experience in Arts and Sciences, as alſo the Diligence, the Induſtry of one ſingle Agent, can diffuſe Inſtruction and Benefit amongſt many; ſo likewiſe may and can the Benevolence, the Fidelity, the Gratitude of one ſingle Agent alſo gratify, delight and do Good to Multitudes. And therefore, ſince there are ſeveral Sorts of Good which are general, and in their own Nature common to many, theſe ſeveral Sorts of Good are naturally, and by a neceſſary Conſequence, fitted to impreſs an Idea of *Common Good* upon the Minds of all who will turn their Attention this Way.

Nay,—we may ſtill carry this Point much higher; for, by Means of that neceſſary ſocial Union which, in this Life, inſeparably ſubſiſts between Soul and Body, the human Capacity can extend its Energy and Operations much wider, and perform much more ſubſtantial good Offices for the Benefit of others, than the mere brutal Force (ſuppoſing it much ſtronger than it is) of any other Animal whatſoever.

For, *Firſt*, upon human Skill and the Power of Sagacity, depends entirely the whole Invention, the whole Art of Navigation.

Secondly, The human Underſtanding knows, likewiſe, how to enter into and obſerve Leagues, Treaties, Compacts and Covenants with Nations, Countries and People, at the remoteſt Diſtances.

Thirdly, The human Underſtanding has likewiſe inſtructed us, by arbitrary, ingenious Signs or Marks, called *Letters* and *Numbers*, to carry on Traffic and Commerce with *Indians*, both in the Eaſt and Weſt.—And,

Fourthly, What is ſtill more, the ſame inventive Capacity of human Nature can, even at ſuch immenſe Diſtances, either, *Firſt*, communicate the Articles, Conditions and Treaties of Peace; or, *Secondly*, ſend the neceſſary Proviſions, Preparations and Inſtructions of War.

Now, from ſuch a Variety of Actions, both intellectual and corporeal, as muſt from hence ariſe, there muſt, of Courſe, happen almoſt infinite Determinations of Action, both as to Body and Mind.

We muſt, however, allow, notwithſtanding all that ſuperior Perfection of human Nature above both the Animal and Phyſical Creation, we muſt, I ſay, allow what commonly happens in other Cauſes which operate entirely by a phyſical, natural Energy; and that is, namely, We cannot but obſerve ſuch plain Efficacies and obvious Effects, as evidently bring along with them and produce a great Variety either of Good or Evil, and that to Multitudes.

Nay,

Nay, even thus much is (allowed by the *Peripatetic* Philoſophers, and is alſo) confirmed by that univerſal Experience which teaches us, that the Rays of the Sun do adminiſter (a genial, vital Moiſture and Juice to an Infinitude of Vegetables over the Face of the whole Earth; as alſo) a reviving, wholſome, ſound, vigorous, healthy Warmth to the Blood and Spirits of all Animals.

But we need not (go ſo far back as to) fix our ſole Dependance upon the *Peripatetic* Philoſophy for theſe Obſervations; becauſe the deeper and more accurate Improvements of Philoſophy demonſtrate, that the whole Motion in each Particle of Matter ſpreads its Influence and Effect even to the remoteſt Diſtances; and, by Conſequence, in ſome Degree or other, altho' never ſo ſmall, but yet neceſſary, co-operates with numberleſs natural Cauſes in producing natural Effects, nay, even numberleſs natural Effects. And,—to demonſtrate the Truth of this Aſſertion is indeed very eaſy; neither is it, in Truth, a Demonſtration any ways foreign to our preſent Purpoſe.

But,——ſince a Demonſtration of this Kind is entirely eſtabliſhed upon Phyſico-Mathematical Principles; that is to ſay, upon the Principles of Arithmetic, Algebra, Fluxions, Geometry and Natural Philoſophy, which Principles will, to the Generality of Mankind, appear at too remote a Diſtance from Morality; as alſo,—becauſe this is a Point which our Adverſaries themſelves will readily grant. I judge it, therefore, beſt not to trouble my Readers with ſuch Materials as I have now by me, for the full, clear Proof of ſuch a Demonſtration.

SECT. XX.

I SHALL only take the Liberty, at preſent, to make one ſingle Remark upon Mr. *Hobbes*, which is, that he enlarges, in my Opinion, more copiouſly than he ought upon this very Point; when, in the laſt Paragraph but one in his Book *De Corpore*, he diſplays himſelf with his uſual Eloquence, and ſays, "In medio pleno motum exiſtere nullum poſſe, quin "cedat pars Medii proxima; proxima et deinceps proxima ſine fine; adeò "ut ad quemcunque Effectum conferant Neceſſariò aliquid etiam ſingula-"rum rerum motus ſinguli."

Hobbes quite miſtaken in his Notions of Good and Evil.

In a Medium which is a Plenum; or, to expreſs it otherwiſe, in a full Medium, no Motion can poſſibly ſubſiſt, unleſs that Part of the Medium which is next, gives way, and then the next Part to that, and then the next Part to that, and ſo on *ad Infinitum*, by an endleſs yielding or ſucceſſive Motion of each, and all the Parts; ſo that, to the Production of any Effect, the ſingle, individual, particular Things muſt neceſſarily contribute ſomething, either more or leſs.

Now, Mr. *Hobbes* does not, to be ſure, all this while, ſee what Conſequence may poſſibly follow; which is, that ſome one Act or other of Man (in the Production of ſuch an Effect, ſuppoſe, for Inſtance, the Effect to be, namely, either the Preſervation or Perfection of many, of very many Perſons, who perhaps, according to Mr. *Hobbes*'s Principles, have no Sort of Taſte, Reliſh, Appetite or Deſire that Way, *i. e.* for ſuch an Effect; yet it is plain that ſome one Act or other of Man) naturally may contribute ſomething towards ſuch an Effect; that is, in other Words, prove a natural Good to Multitudes.

For, had Mr. *Hobbes*'s Sentiments been different from what they are here repreſented, he would not, with ſo ill-a-digeſted Conception have aſſerted, that Good only relates to him who deſires and has an Appetite for it. "Bonum tantum reſpicere Appetentem." And then, upon this Maxim of his own, he would fain ram theſe no-Concluſions down our Throats, *viz.* That the Nature of Good and Evil, in a State of Nature, changes, alters, varies, according to the Will and Pleaſure of each individual Man; and that the Nature of Good and Evil, in all the ſeveral States, Forms and Eſtabliſhments of civil Society, varies according to the arbitrary Will and Pleaſure of the ſeveral civil Governors and Magiſtrates reſpectively.

"Naturam Boni & mali variam eſſe pro Arbitrio ſingulorum hominum in "Statu Naturæ: Et pro Arbitrio principum in omni Civitate."

Now that theſe are the fundamental Δογματα, the favourite Foundation-Maxim of Mr. *Hobbes*'s Ethics, Morality and Politics, I ſhall ſhew more at large when I come to my third Chapter, which treats upon natural Good, *de Bono Naturali*.

What I purpoſe in this Place, now, is only to ſay that ſome certain Powers, ſome certain Motions and Actions of certain Things; and, by Conſequence, the Powers, Motions and Actions of Man, naturally impreſs upon our Minds the Idea of ſuch a Good as is common to *all*. From which Idea we collect That ſomething muſt and ought to be done on our Part, by each of us, for the Preſervation of others, and to advance their Proſperity.

Now ſince we are not left to our own Choice and Determination, whether ſuch and ſuch Actions ſhall, as we pleaſe, effectually anſwer and produce this End (*i. e.* the Good of others) or no,—it therefore, by a neceſſary Conſequence of Reaſoning, follows, that Nature ſufficiently inſtructs us, as to the eſſential Difference between *Good* and *Evil*; as to the ſeveral Degrees of each; and whether ſuch *Good* or *Evil* relates to the General or to the Particular; whether it reſpects the Whole collectively, or the Parts ſingly.—Nay, we may in ſome Caſes carry our Doctrine much farther:—For the Generation, the Preſervation, the full Maturity, the Excellency, as alſo the Decay, the Corruption of natural Bodies (as for Inſtance, of human Bodies) are all nothing elſe than ſeveral variouſly-complicated Motions of conſtituent Particles which compound them: All which

various

various Motions are effected and brought to paſs by Cauſes drawn from Geometrical Theorems fairly demonſtrated.

From whence it manifeſtly appears, That all phyſical or natural Bodies are generally preſerved and riſe to full Perfection, and from their own Cauſes, by the ſame Neceſſity that Demonſtrations in Geometry generally hold true.

The Cauſes which conſtitute, preſerve and bring to due Perfection Things in general, and Mankind in particular, are ſuch as fall under the Notion of, and really are, *Good*; and the Cauſes contrary to theſe are *Evil*, whether ſuch Cauſes concern one, many, or even all. Natural Good. Natural Evil.

Wherefore, upon the Suppoſition that ſuch Motions and Actions of other Agents, employed in the Service of others, do really exiſt; and that theſe are ſuch Motions and Actions as, we cannot but obſerve, do carry ſome Degree of Efficacy, towards the Preſervation of others; and that ſuch Perſons purſue the End intended, by the ſame Neceſſity in which Geometrical Theorems, concerning any ſuch Motions, are proved to be, and really are true; it muſt, by a neceſſary Conſequence, follow, that ſuch Motions are naturally good, even ſuppoſing no Laws commanding them really to exiſt.

For which Reaſon that fickle, changeable Nature of *Good*, which Mr. *Hobbes* has deviſed, moſt wretchedly agrees with thoſe neceſſary and immutable Cauſes which form, conſtitute and preſerve Mankind; and yet theſe, at the ſame Time, are the very Cauſes which this very ſelf-ſame Mr. *Hobbes* moſt ſtrenuouſly maintains and contends for.

Neither can that poor Evaſion of his poſſibly hold good, when he aſſerts, "That there is no ſuch Thing as a Rule (either of *Good* or *Evil*) "before the Impoſition or Inſtitution of civil Laws:" And yet, this Aſſertion of his he over and over again inculcates.

Now, this poor evaſive Aſſertion, which Mr. *Hobbes* is ſo deſperately fond of, cannot hold true, will not bear the Teſt:——Becauſe the Meaſure or Rule of *Good and Evil* is exactly the ſame as the *Rule of True and Falſe*, (1) in ſuch Propoſitions as lay down and declare the operative Efficacy of ſuch Motions as make for and produce the Preſervation and Corruption of other Things; and which, in ſhort, ſtands thus, otherwiſe expreſſed, *viz.* The Nature of Things, and whatſoever Propoſition declares to us the true Cauſe of Preſervation, do both, with the very ſame Force, with the very ſame Energy, with the very ſame Demonſtration, equally diſcover to us, what really, truly and in its Nature is *good*.

(1) *In ſuch Propoſitions as lay down and declare*, &c.] Good is in the Nature of Things: The Declaration of that Good in Nature forms the Propoſition: The Good in the Nature of Things is not true, becauſe it is expreſſed in the Propoſition; but the Propoſition is true, becauſe it is the Declaration of what Nature truly is.

The Truth of the Propoſition, therefore, is as eternally and immutably true as the Nature of Things.

SECT.

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From whence it manifeſtly appears, That all phyſical or natural Bodies are generally preſerved and riſe to full Perfection, and from their own Cauſes, by the ſame Neceſſity that Demonſtrations in Geometry generally hold true.

The Cauſes which conſtitute, preſerve and bring to due Perfection Things in general, and Mankind in particular, are ſuch as fall under the Notion of, and really are, *Good*; and the Cauſes contrary to theſe are *Evil*, whether ſuch Cauſes concern one, many, or even all. Natural Good. Natural Evil.

Wherefore, upon the Suppoſition that ſuch Motions and Actions of other Agents, employed in the Service of others, do really exiſt; and that theſe are ſuch Motions and Actions as, we cannot but obſerve, do carry ſome Degree of Efficacy, towards the Preſervation of others; and that ſuch Perſons purſue the End intended, by the ſame Neceſſity in which Geometrical Theorems, concerning any ſuch Motions, are proved to be, and really are true; it muſt, by a neceſſary Conſequence, follow, that ſuch Motions are naturally good, even ſuppoſing no Laws commanding them really to exiſt.

For which Reaſon that fickle, changeable Nature of *Good*, which Mr. *Hobbes* has deviſed, moſt wretchedly agrees with thoſe neceſſary and immutable Cauſes which form, conſtitute and preſerve Mankind; and yet theſe, at the ſame Time, are the very Cauſes which this very ſelf-ſame Mr. *Hobbes* moſt ſtrenuouſly maintains and contends for.

Neither can that poor Evaſion of his poſſibly hold good, when he aſſerts, "That there is no ſuch Thing as a Rule (either of *Good* or *Evil*) "before the Impoſition or Inſtitution of civil Laws:" And yet, this Aſſertion of his he over and over again inculcates.

Now, this poor evaſive Aſſertion, which Mr. *Hobbes* is ſo deſperately fond of, cannot hold true, will not bear the Teſt:——Becauſe the Meaſure or Rule of *Good and Evil* is exactly the ſame as the *Rule of True and Falſe*, (1) in ſuch Propoſitions as lay down and declare the operative Efficacy of ſuch Motions as make for and produce the Preſervation and Corruption of other Things; and which, in ſhort, ſtands thus, otherwiſe expreſſed, *viz.* The Nature of Things, and whatſoever Propoſition declares to us the true Cauſe of Preſervation, do both, with the very ſame Force, with the very ſame Energy, with the very ſame Demonſtration, equally diſcover to us, what really, truly and in its Nature is *good*.

(1) *In ſuch Propoſitions as lay down and declare*, &c.] Good is in the Nature of Things: The Declaration of that Good in Nature forms the Propoſition: The Good in the Nature of Things is not true, becauſe it is expreſſed in the Propoſition; but the Propoſition is true, becauſe it is the Declaration of what Nature truly is.

The Truth of the Propoſition, therefore, is as eternally and immutably true as the Nature of Things.

SECT.

SECT. XXI.

An Analogy between the Qualities of natural Bodies and the Powers of human Nature.

WE now therefore obſerve, and are, in few Words, made ſenſible, after what Manner the Nature of Things can, and actually does, impreſs upon our Minds the Knowledge of *Good* and *Evil*; and that the Knowledge thus impreſſed by Nature is as extenſive, as the *Good* and *Evil* are general and concern all; and that this Knowledge is as ſure, firm, well eſtabliſhed as, and of equal Certainty with, That which diſcovers and demonſtrates to us the Cauſes of Generation and Corruption.

I ſhall now proceed to the Conſideration of Matter and Motion; of that Matter and Motion in which the phyſical or natural Powers of an human Body, as well as the other Parts of the viſible World, conſiſt; and demonſtrate, that they all have a finite Quantity of Power which they cannot exceed.

For, from hence flow thoſe moſt ſelf-evident Maxims concerning all natural Bodies.

Maxim. 1. That no Body can be in more Places than one at the ſame Inſtant of Time.

Maxim. 2. That the ſame Body cannot, although placed in a different Poſition, receive a different Tendency to ſeveral Places at once, ſo as to ſubſerve and miniſter to the contrary, counter-acting Wills and Inclinations of many human Agents: The Caſe is ſo far otherwiſe, that a phyſical Body is ſo limited in its natural Power, as to receive a Determination or Direction of Motion, from either one ſingle, voluntary Agent only, unleſs with this Proviſo, that two or more voluntary Agents conſpire and unite in producing the ſame Effect and End.

Neither is this Property the ſpecific, diſtinguiſhing Quality of natural Bodies, but is equally common and applicable to human Nature, and to all created Beings, ſo far as their Powers and Capacities are limited.

Now, from hence,

A celebrated Diſtinction of the Stoics.

Two *Maxims* or *Concluſions* clearly follow, and which are of great Moment to our preſent Purpoſe.

Firſt Maxim. We may learn, from the Knowledge of Nature in general, but more particularly of our own Nature, that ſo much celebrated and cry'd-up Diſtinction of the *Stoics*.

Acts within our Power. 1. Τα Εφ' Ημιν *i. e.* What Things they are which come within the Sphere of our own free, voluntary Power: As for Inſtance, the Acts, Motions and Powers of both Soul and Body, which immediately fall under the Direction of the human Will; both which Powers, (*viz.* of Soul and Body) from evident Effects, we daily perceive. And from hence, by a ſtrict Analogy of Reaſoning, we may eaſily infer, what Effects our own free Capacities, upon any future Occaſions, can produce. And, *Secondly*,

Acts not within our Power. 2. The Τα ουκ Εφ' Ημιν or ſuch Powers as are not within our own free, voluntary Sphere of Action.

Now,

Now, theſe ſecond Powers (*i. e.* the τα ουκ εφ' ημιν) are, by far the greateſt, largeſt, moſt extended Motions and Powers of Nature; as alſo, That theſe ſecond Powers (and which we cannot but, daily, every Moment obſerve) chiefly take Place and rule in the univerſal, whole Courſe of Nature; and which Motions or Powers we, as very inſignificant Animals indeed, have not the leaſt Force or Energy to counteract and reſiſt. We cannot likewiſe, in the next Place, but obſerve, that upon the immediate Efficacy of theſe ſecond Powers and Motions, all, even all Things here below, are in a fluctuating, changeable Condition.

And, *Laſtly*, what is ſtill of the neareſt Conſequence to us, That upon theſe (τα ουκ εφ' ημιν) Powers, all the Changes and Chances, Viciſſitudes and Events, of Proſperity and Adverſity, of Life and Strength, of our Decay and old Age, Diſſolution and Death, All depend.

In ſettling, therefore, the true Foundation of Morality and of moral Duties, in the Government of our Paſſions, Appetites, Affections, and in all our Purſuits or Endeavours, this moſt excellent Diſtinction between (τα εφ' ημιν, και τα ουκ εφ' ημιν) *i. e.* ſuch Things as are, and ſuch Things as are not within our own Power, being always kept carefully in Remembrance, and cloſely obſerved, ſerves to the beſt, moſt uſeful, practical Purpoſes.

For, from hence we may learn, *Firſt*, That the whole Happineſs which we ought to ſeek after, as the Reward and Comfort of our Labours, muſt ariſe from the prudent and wiſe Regulation of our own free Faculties and Powers, in Conjunction with ſuch Helps, Aſſiſtances and Supports, as we aſſuredly know divine Providence, in the all-wiſe Government and Adminiſtration of univerſal Nature, will vouchſafe to afford us. The firſt practical Doctrine.

Upon ſo ſolid a Foundation of Reaſoning as this we ſhall be,

Secondly, quite free from thoſe empty Labours and fruitleſs Expectations, with which the airy Vanity of human Hope ſo eagerly ſolicits and perplexes the Generality of Mankind. The ſecond practical Doctrine.

Thirdly, Neither ſhall we, in the third Place, upon this ſo excellent and rational a Foundation, torment ourſelves about ſuch Evils as either have, in Times paſt, or may in Times future, and without the leaſt Fault or Miſconduct of our own, come to paſs. The third practical Doctrine.

And, conſequently, by far the largeſt Share of thoſe Anxieties, uſually cauſed by the Paſſions of Grief, Anger and Fear, will be effectually prevented: And from hence we ſhall not only be directed how to ſhun Evils, but we ſhall be alſo able to find out the readieſt, ſhorteſt Path in which we are, Step by Step, to proceed, towards the Attainment of all thoſe ſeveral moſt ſubſtantial Kinds of *Good* we can poſſibly arrive at; and all which Kinds of *Good* are comprehended under the regular Improvement of our Minds, and a perfect Maſtery over our Paſſions.

It is not, however, my Deſign to expatiate more largely here upon this Point.

I ſhall take Notice only, in this Place, of one Truth, which, in my Opinion, may make moſt for my Purpoſe; namely,

That

That it is a Truth, moſt manifeſtly confirmed by univerſal Experience, that the Powers and Capacities of each ſingle Man, with regard to that Happineſs of which each is capable and actually ſtands in Need, are ſo weak and inſignificant as to want many Helps, many Aſſiſtances of many Agents, neceſſary to the Enjoyment of an happy Life: And yet, at the ſame Time, notwithſtanding all this, it is as true, that each Individual can effect many good Ends advantageous to others, independant of his own Wants or Occaſions; and which Ends, very probably, may not prove of any ſignificant Uſe to himſelf.

Now, ſince we are well aſſured, and by the ſtrongeſt Evidences imaginable, *i. e.* from the well-known Bounds and Limits of our own Capacities, that we have not the leaſt Power to compel and force all ſuch Beings of whoſe Aſſiſtance we ſtand in Need (namely, *God* and *Man)* to cooperate with us in attaining to our own Happineſs; all, conſequently, that is left in our own Power towards effecting this End, is to offer both to *God* and *Man* our beſt Services, and faithfully to perform the ſame, in order to reconcile them to us, and bring them over to our Intereſt.

That ſupreme, perfect, tranſcendental *Benevolence*, therefore, which we have eſtabliſhed in our general Propoſition, conſiſts in an eager, ſtrong, conſtant Propenſity of acting, according to its (i. e. *Benevolence*'s) Dictates, with all our Hearts, with our firmeſt Perſeverance, and with the moſt general Influence.

Nay,—we muſt conſtantly act thus, even in Caſes where frequently there is not the leaſt Proſpect or Hope of any Reward or Return.

And,—what is even ſtill more, we muſt indiſpenſably act thus, notwithſtanding we are, in many Caſes, perſuaded, according to the general Rules of Probability, that any Return of Love, ſuitable to ſuch generous, benevolent Acts, is a quite groundleſs Expectation.

This very ſame true Principle of *Benevolence* does not, however, forbid us to cultivate Friendſhip chiefly with thoſe from whom we may, according to a rational Probability, expect the moſt ample Returns of Gratitude.

Now, theſe are the firſt Dictates, the firſt Maxims which we are able to collect and draw from the finite Nature of all created Things; but more particularly from the finite Nature of ourſelves.

SECT. XXII.

Whatſoever is uſeful to the Whole is uſeful to each Part, another Maxim.

FROM hence it follows, that whatſoever is in human Power, and in the Power of other created Things, naturally and neceſſarily to perform for the Uſe of Mankind, muſt be limited to certain Perſons, within certain Limitations of Place and Time.———And—conſequently—if right Reaſon preſcribes either the Uſes of Things, or the Labours of Man, as uſeful to all Mankind, right Reaſon alſo neceſſarily preſcribes ſuch Uſes of Things, and of human Induſtry, to be (and that ſuch Uſes really are) limited

limited within determined Bounds of Place and Time, to certain Perſons only.

Now this Concluſion is moſt evidently true; becauſe right Reaſon in preſcribing is truly *That, and only That*, which preſcribes, ſo as to be effected, whatſoever can, according to the Reaſons and Natures of Things, be effected.

The natural Conſequence, therefore, of this Concluſion is to prove, that (1) a ſeparate, diſtinct Diviſion of Things and of human Endeavours amongſt All, is neceſſary to the Uſe and Benefit of All, at leaſt for ſo long a Time as ſuch Things and Endeavours can be of any Uſe or Benefit to others, whether the Whole be conſidered or not. A ſeparate Property neceſſary.

And,—in Truth of ſpeaking, this neceſſary Limitation of the Uſe of a ſingle Thing, appropriated and applied to one Perſon, for ſo long a Time as the Thing can be of real Service to ſuch a Perſon, is no other than a natural Diviſion, it being the Separation of ſuch a Thing from the Uſe of any other Perſon for the Time limited.

(1) *A ſeparate, diſtinct Diviſion of Things, and of human Endeavours.*] Mr. *Wollaſton*, in his Treatiſe intitled *The Religion of Nature delineated*, Edit. 2. *Lond.* 1724. Quarto, Sect. 6. pag. 127. ſhews, that there are Truths reſpecting Mankind in general, antecedent to all human Laws. As for Inſtance, *Firſt*, that every Man hath in himſelf a Principle of Individuation, which diſtinguiſhes and ſeparates him from all other Men in ſuch a Manner, as may render him and them capable of diſtinct Properties in Things (or diſtinct Subjects of Property.) That is, B and C are ſo diſtinguiſhed, or exiſt ſo diſtinctly, that if there be any Thing which B can call his, it will be for that Reaſon not C's; and *vice verſâ*, what is C's, will for that Reaſon not be B's: The Proof of this I put upon every Man's own Conſcience. Let us ſee then whether there is any Thing which one Man may truly call his.

Secondly, That there are ſome Things, to which (at leaſt before the Caſe is altered by voluntary Subjection, Compact, or the like) every individual Man has, or may have, ſuch a natural and immediate Relation, that he only, of all Mankind, can call them his.

The Life, Limbs, *&c.* of B, are as much his as B is himſelf: It is impoſſible for C, or any other, to ſee with the Eyes of B; therefore they are Eyes only to B; and when they ceaſe to be his Eyes, they ceaſe to be Eyes at all: He then has the ſole Property in them, it being impoſſible in Nature that the Eyes of B ſhould ever be the Eyes of C.

Further, the Labour of B cannot be the Labour of C; becauſe it is the Application of the Organs and Powers of B, not of C, to the effecting of ſomething; and therefore the Labour is as much B's, as the Limbs and Faculties made uſe of are his.

Again, the Effect or Produce of the Labour of B, is not the Effect of the Labour of C; and therefore this Effect or Produce is B's, not C's; as much B's as the Labour was B's, and not C's; becauſe, what the Labour of B cauſes or produces, B produces by his Labour;

Or, it is the Product of B by his Labour; that is, it is B's Product, not C's, or any other's: And if C ſhould pretend to any Property in that which B only can truly call his, he would act contrary to Truth.

Laſtly, There may be many Things which B may truly call his in ſome ſuch Senſe, or upon ſome ſuch Account as no other can; and to which C has no more Right than D, nor D than F, *&c.*

The Property of which will therefore be in B, becauſe C has no more Title than D, nor D than F, *&c.* And that to which every one beſides B has an equal Title, no one beſides B can have any Title to at all, their Pretences mutually balancing and deſtroying each other, whilſt his only remains.

And in this Caſe, a ſmall Matter being oppoſed to nothing, will be ſtrong enough to maintain the Claim of B.

It is, from hence, evident, that I call all ſuch Things ſingle, individual, or one, the *all-hood* or *all* of which is neceſſarily employed in the one ſingle Uſe of one Individual for the Time being; as for Example, *Food*, *Raiment*, &c.

There are, however, other Things of a more comprehenſive Nature, termed alſo *ſingle* or *one*, although capable of an Application, and actually are applied to the Uſe of many at the ſame Moment of Time; as for Example, *an Iſland*, *a Wood*, *a Field*, &c. wherein no Declaration has been made, no Determination ſettled, as to the diſtinct Diviſion and ſeparate Uſe.

For, from that natural Diviſion of Things, and the Neceſſity there was for ſuch a Diviſion, in order the more ſecurely to preſerve all (upon which Points I have been already ſpeaking) the original Right over Things at firſt began, as ſoon as each had reſpectively claimed and taken Poſſeſſion. Concerning ſuch a ſeparate and diſtinct Right as this, both Philoſophers and Lawyers harangue moſt diffuſively: It is ſuch a Right, ſay they, as takes Place, ſuppoſing all Things in common.

For *Right*, according to them, is the Power of doing ſomething which the Law allows.

But,—in the firſt State which we have ſuppoſed, (that is, in a State of Nature) *a Law* is nothing elſe but *the Dictate of right Reaſon, promulged and publiſhed by Almighty God himſelf, enjoining ſuch Acts as are neceſſary to the public Good:* And conſequently, at the firſt Inſtant that right Reaſon allows and aſſigns over the Uſe of any Thing, or of any human Endeavours to any one, for the Time being, as Means neceſſary to the *common Good*, inaſmuch as ſuch Means are neceſſary to this End, (namely, the *common Good)* at the very ſame Inſtant of Time, I ſay, a Right is granted to every ſuch Perſon of the Uſe in that Thing and Labour for a Time limited and appointed.—Nay,—even the Will, the Inclination, the Benevolence, conformable to ſuch a Dictate of right Reaſon as this, is *Juſtice*, in as much as it *is that Law which grants to every Individul his own private Rights, and after the ſame Manner that ſuch Rights are, in future Times, to ariſe in the State of civil Society.*

This very ſelf-ſame *Good-will* or *Benevolence* likewiſe, ſo far as it only permits or ſuffers ſuch or ſuch Perſons to occupy, poſſeſs and enjoy theſe Rights; and ſo far alſo as it coerces and reſtrains all Tendencies, Motions and Inclinations towards contrary Acts: Such a *Benevolence* as this, I ſay, is a laudable Innocence.

It muſt then, in the next Place, be allowed a Truth of ſtrict, ſelf-evident Certainty, that no one Individual can be in any Way ſerviceable to the *common Good*, unleſs he preſerves his Life, his Limbs, his Health, his Strength, by the proper Application and Uſe of *certain good Things*, of *certain human Endeavours.*

And conſequently it follows, that the Property in, and Dominion over, ſo much of both (i. e. *certain good Things*, and *certain human Endeavours)* are the *Means* evidently neceſſary to the *one grand End* deſigned, namely, *the common Good.*

For,

For, the Preſervation of the total Sum of the Whole, aggregated and compounded of all its ſeveral Parts, diſtinguiſhed, at the ſame Time, by a Diviſion, a Separation from each other, *(and, ſuch a Whole as this is the human Kind)* conſiſts in the Preſervation of all the different Parts reſpectively; not to mention one Conſideration, altho' very worthy of Notice, namely, the regular Order and Subordination which muſt and ought always to be preſerved amongſt the Parts themſelves.

But the Preſervation of all the Parts, in a State of Separation and taken ſingly (*i. e.* in our preſent Caſe, the Preſervation of each individual, ſingle Man) requires a ſeparate, a diſtinct Uſe of Things, and of human Endeavours.

And therefore, ſuch a ſeparate, divided, diſtinct Uſe is neceſſary, abſolutely neceſſary, to the Preſervation of the Whole.

Preſuming it a Matter of Fact generally known and allowed, that the Property in Things was, at ſome certain Period of Time, claimed ſeverally, occupied diſtinctly, and applied ſeparately, to all the various Uſes truly neceſſary of each and every one: This Fact, I ſay, being once confeſſedly allowed, ſuch a Diviſion or ſeparate Uſe as I have hitherto deſcribed, and which bears a very cloſe Reſemblance to Property, is very conſiſtent with Community or civil Society in general.

For, ſuch a Kind of ſeparate Uſe as this, nearly reſembles That obſervable at Club-feaſts, Ordinaries, or public Entertainments and Theatrical Shows; which Kind of Occupancy or Poſſeſſion, altho' allowed by ſeveral of the ancient Philoſophers as not at all repugnant to Reaſon, yet it by no Means appears a Doctrine agreeable to Sacred Hiſtory.

Let, however, the Occupancy, the Poſſeſſion, the Uſe, be grounded either upon the Principles of Nature, or upon the Opinions of Philoſophers, or upon the Authority of Scripture; yet every ſuch Occupancy, every ſuch Poſſeſſion, every ſuch Uſe, abſolutely contradicts the Right of *all to all:* A Morality this of Mr. *Hobbes*'s own Invention: A Morality, calculated to prove a State of Nature to be a State of War; and wherein, before any Inſtitution of civil Society, every one, as Mr. *Hobbes* affirms, may, upon the Principles of Juſtice and Neceſſity, act according to his own Self-will and Pleaſure, in direct Oppoſition to all.

From hence we may eaſily collect, how and in what Manner the Right ariſes to each Individual of preſerving his own Life, Perſon and bodily Members ſound and whole. Such a Right, I ſay, ariſes from hence, that the Preſervation of Individuals, proves the ſecureſt Means of performing our Duty both to God and Man; under which Duty, under which Service, is eſſentially comprehended *all that Good* which I have defined to be *the common univerſal Good.*

The Right, moreover, of each Individual, is evidently circumſcribed within theſe Limits and Bounds; that ſuppoſing, in the *firſt* Place, either Religion or the Security of Mankind to require it, we muſt readily ſacrifice our Lives: And, *Secondly*, this very ſame Right forbids us to injure

the Innocent, upon any Account or Pretence whatſoever; notwithſtanding that the private Benefit iſſuing from thence may appear moſt conſiderable.

Now, the Concluſion I have drawn moſt clearly follows from thoſe Principles of Mr. *Hobbes*, which I juſt now have very briefly ſuggeſted; and it is ſuch a Concluſion, as utterly confounds and overthrows his whole Doctrine concerning the Laws of Nature, and Government in general.

For, that whole Doctrine of his, at moſt, to ſpeak the beſt of it, only ſuppoſes, but does not prove; neither does it limit the Right of preſerving this mortal Life of ours as the one (altho' not the only one) true, ſolid Baſis or Foundation of all natural and ſocial Laws.

This Doctrine of Mr. *Hobbes* is, moreover, totally converſant about ſuch Means as appear applicable to this End (namely, the Preſervation of Life;) and yet, in Reality, often they are Means, according to his Notions, monſtrous, abominable, deſtructive. *See his Book* De Cive, Chap. 1. Sect. 7. *and ſeveral other Parts of his Writings.*

We are alſo to paſs the ſame Judgment upon the Origin of *Meum* and *Tuum*, of *Property* and *Dominion*, when underſtood in an extended Meaning; ſuppoſing that we conſider ſuch an original Right, quite abſtracted from the divine Revelations delivered in the Hiſtory of *Moſes*; and which, indeed, thoſe Philoſophers were neceſſarily obliged to do, who did allow the *Moſaic* Account.

Now the Proof being drawn from the very Nature of Things, why ſuch a Separation or Diviſion of Right was once introduced, it ſeems extremely agreeable to the natural Diſpoſition of the human Mind, as well by an Analogy of Reaſoning, as from ſuch Experience and Obſervations as all have tried upon the Inconveniencies which evidently ariſe from all Things being in common: It is natural, I ſay, upon this Foundation, to ſuppoſe Mankind advancing and proceeding to ſtill farther Diviſions of Property and of perſonal Services; whence, conſequently, muſt ariſe a fuller, more ample Dominion over both; which Dominion being once introduced as of perpetual Continuance, ſhould be ſo conducted and carried on as to conſult and regard the common, univerſal Advantage of All.

SECT. XXIII.

Property in common muſt deſtroy Society.

THE Reader cannot, in my Opinion, expect from me, in this Treatiſe, a full Enumeration of all thoſe moſt deſperate Evils which unavoidably muſt flow either from an even, exact Equality amongſt All, or from the promiſcuous Uſe in common of Wives, Children and Property in general. Several other Authors have very copiouſly enlarged upon theſe Points.

Points. *See* Ariſtotle's Politics, *Book the ſecond, and the Commentators upon him.*

From hence we may obſerve, That all which *Ariſtotle* has advanced concerning any one particular Civil Society, may with equal Eaſe and Truth be applied to Society in general, as conſtituted and made up of Mankind the Subjects, and God the ſovereign Ruler and Head.

What ſufficiently proves our preſent Argument is this, *viz.* Common Experience fully informs us, that in all thoſe Caſes where Property, at any Time, remains common, in order to remedy thoſe infinite Confuſions and Diſputes which always happen in all ſuch Commonage, the Parties, generally ſpeaking, come to a diſtinct, ſeparate Diviſion of every ſuch common Property; and of which Practice there are many Inſtances recorded by the * *Roman* Lawyers: *Julius Paulus*, of *Padua*, in his Pandects, under the Title *De Servitutibus Prædialibus Urbanis*, ſpeaking of the Law concerning Things in common; and the Emperor *Theodoſius*, long before *Paulus*, in the thirty-fourth Title, tenth Book of his *Code*, has obſerved, That it is a Miſtake which Mankind naturally fall into, to neglect That which is a Property in common; and as to himſelf, he ſays, That, in his Opinion, he poſſeſſeth nothing unleſs the whole Property is in himſelf.

Thoſe imminent Dangers, in Truth, which always attend Strife and Contention; the Famine and Scarcity which naturally follow a Neglect of Tillage and Agriculture: All which Evils moſt remarkably encreaſed when Mankind multiplied. Add to this alſo the many Enormities and Vices reſulting from Ignorance, and the Want of right, wholeſome Diſcipline or Government, which overſpread the whole Earth: Theſe ſeveral Cauſes, I ſay, brought Mankind to ſuch a paſs, that they could not but obſerve and determine it to be as equally neceſſary to the univerſal Happineſs of all, that the Diviſion of prædial and perſonal Services (*i. e.* Property and Labour) ſhould be eſtabliſhed and continue for the future; as it is neceſſary that Man ſhould reſpectively, for the Time being, (*i. e.* allotted) uſe and enjoy the Neceſſaries of Life, whenever any ſuch Neceſſaries of Life come thus reſpectively to be poſſeſſed.

Now, from hence it follows, that juſt in the Manner as Nature grants the Right of a Diviſion once ratified and become durable, laſting, firm in Things and human Endeavours (which, in plainer Terms, is no other than Dominion or Property) ſo does Nature in the very ſame Manner, as I have already ſhewn, grant the Privilege of taking and uſing the Neceſſaries of Life for the Time being.

It is, beyond all Contradiction, the cleareſt Point imaginable, that *the future Uſe of Things and human Endeavours* bears the ſame Proportion to the whole Life of any Individual, that the preſent Enjoyment of ſuch Things and Services bears to NOW the Time being, which thrown into an Analogy will ſtand thus:

* *See the* Appendix, No. 3.

Let

Let F expreſs the whole future Uſe of Things and of good Offices.

Let L expreſs the whole future Life of any one Individual.

Let E expreſs the preſent Uſe and Enjoyment of Things and of good Offices.

Let N expreſs NOW, or the Time preſent.

F : L :: E : N

In both Parts of the Analogy the Relation is as near, and equally well connected to a Cauſe equally juſt and neceſſary; that is, F is as nearly related and as cloſely connected to L, as E is related and connected to N.

Wherefore, in our preſent Caſe, the Reaſoning is exactly the ſame as in Geometrical Proportions; where, from three Terms given, a fourth Term is diſcovered: As for Example,

$$3 : 6 :: 4 \left(\frac{6 \times 4}{3} = \right) 8$$

And from hence we may fairly argue that Mankind, in a State of Nature (even in ſuch a State of Nature as Mr. *Hobbes* has ſuppoſed) can reaſon thus: That as a Right to Life NOW for the Time being, proves a Right to ſuch Cauſes as neceſſarily preſerve Life; ſo alſo does the Right to Life future demonſtrate a Right to uſe Things, and perſonal Services, for ſuch a Length of Time future as is preſcribed and limited.

In an Analogy or Proportion ſo obvious, there is no Need (in order for the Diſcovery of the fourth Term) to multiply the ſecond and third Terms into each other and divide by the firſt, according to the regular Rules of Arithmetic; which Method, however, becomes unavoidable, and muſt be practiſed in larger Numbers.

But, in our preſent Caſe, the Reaſoning is plain to every Man of ſound Underſtanding, and is, in the general, reducible and reduced into Practice every Day, by them who uſe little or no Attention, and who are not even at the Trouble of throwing the three Terms into a diſtinct, regular Form of Analogy.

We ſhall, however, in order to be the more clearly intelligible, demonſtrate, that the two firſt Terms of our Analogy (*i. e.* N and E) are pointed out to us by Nature itſelf; and that the third Term is, of Conſequence, univerſally known, and obvious to every one; for, as all Mankind naturally carry their Thoughts and Views into Futurity; and, conſidering it as a Portion of Exiſtence highly probable, ſo they ſuppoſe themſelves and the other Parts of Mankind; nay, even, they ſuppoſe their own Poſterity, and the other Parts of the human Race, to hold (for ſome certain future Time, more or leſs) a Continuance upon Earth; and conſequently, that a Right to Self-preſervation in one and all, muſt carry the ſame Duration and Continuance reſpectively.

Nay, and what is ſtill more, that there is an inbred Principle, natural and peculiar to Mankind, above all the other Animal Creation, of taking Care and providing for Futurity, even at a long Diſtance, to harbour anxious

anxious Thoughts and Solicitudes about ſuch a Futurity; to examine and pry into all the latent Cauſes of Things future, as far as the Depth of human Capacities reſpectively can penetrate into theſe Cauſes.

By theſe Means, conſequently, the human Mind arrives at the fourth proportional Term I have mentioned; which fourth Proportion is conſtituted from certain Cauſes fixed and limited to the future Preſervation of human Life: Which Cauſes are, in Fact, no other than the diſtinct, divided, ſeparate Uſes of Things and of human Endeavours, as ratified by mutual Conſent and Agreement: Rights which ſecure future Happineſs and Proſperity: Rights which totally expel all future Apprehenſions, Dreads, Dangers and Fears of Strife and Contention: Rights which effectually baniſh that Famine or Scarcity, which (Famine or Scarcity, as we have ſuppoſed) Experience ſeems fully to have inſtructed us, took Riſe and Beginning originally from the Neglect of Tillage and Manufactures.

Now this Kind of Reaſoning, upon an exact Similitude of Caſes, is ſo ſolid, that the Demonſtration carried in it, emulates and cloſely reſembles the geometrical Method laid down in the ſixth Book of *Euclid*'s Elements, Propoſition the ſecond, where, by drawing a Line parallel to a Line given, a fourth Proportional is diſcovered. Now, the moral Reaſoning is as demonſtrative as the geometrical, but with this remarkable Superiority of Difference, that the Evidence it carries is clearer and more eaſily underſtood. Every one, however, muſt perceive, that the whole Evidence is entirely drawn from Suggeſtions of natural Reaſon merely.

In a Word, in this Inſtance of a more compleat, diſtinct Diviſion of external Things and of human Endeavours, we ſhall, in the firſt Place, be able to demonſtrate, from a Change of Circumſtances in the human Conſtitution (*i. e.* from ſome certain Conſiderations which, becauſe not originally eſſential to the Nature of Man, cannot be comprehended under the firſt primitive Notion of human Nature.) From hence, I ſay, we ſhall be able to demonſtrate, upon what Motive the Neceſſity of ſome new, ſuperinduced human Actions muſt ariſe, in order the better to promote and ſecure the public Good; and, in the ſecond Place, upon what Account, from the neceſſary Influx or Efficacy of ſuch Actions in producing the Effect (*i. e.* public Good) deſigned, the Right or Authority might ariſe of eliciting and drawing forth all the natural Power or Energy of ſuch Acts into practical Uſe, even in that State wherein we cannot ſuppoſe Civil Government yet eſtabliſhed.

In ſuch a State of Affairs as is here ſuppoſed, there could not be any ſuch Thing as the Right of doing or forbearing any Thing, unleſs it were that Right which right Reaſon might dictate, as neceſſary to the public Good; or, at leaſt, not repugnant to ſuch a Good.

Firſt, Any Right, uſeful and neceſſary to the public Good, is, of Conſequence, enjoined by right Reaſon.

Secondly, Any Right, not repugnant to the public Good, is permitted by right Reaſon.

But

But this we ſhall explain more at large in our fifth Chapter, concerning the Law of Nature and its Obligation.

There is, however, one Point which I judge proper to fix upon a firm Foundation, and to inculcate earneſtly in this Place, *viz.* That all Right which can prove of any Uſe or Service as the neceſſary Means of Preſervation to any one Individual, muſt be eſtabliſhed either upon the poſitive Command, or at leaſt upon the Permiſſion of the Law of Nature, *i. e.* upon the Law of right Reaſon; which Law pronounces and declares what Things and Means are neceſſary to the common Good, according to the Natures of Things.——But—we are always to obſerve this juſt Caution, That every ſuch Right be carefully diſtinguiſhed from an Abuſe of the Term, an *invaſive Violence*, arrogating and aſſuming theſe Means: For in the true Meaning of this Term *Right*, the pure Origin of the Thing itſelf is now ſought. From whence it evidently follows, That it cannot poſſibly be known what Right any Man has to Self-preſervation, unleſs it be firſt diſcovered how ſuch a Preſervation contributes to the common Good; or, at leaſt, how conſiſtent it is with ſuch a Good.

If, therefore, this be the true Origin of our Right, each to his own Preſervation, upon the ſame Foundation, conſequently, our Powers and Capacities will be ſo far limited as to prevent any Invaſion upon the Rights of others, which are fixed in the ſame Law in the ſame Foundation: Neither are we to wage War againſt All, that is, againſt the whole rational Community, which neceſſarily muſt involve Each and All in Ruin. My Aſſertion then, in ſhort, is this, *viz.* That any Right, quite diſtinct and free from mean Force, even in the Caſe of Self-defence, is utterly unintelligible, if a ſtrict Regard be not firſt had to thoſe Rights and Privileges granted and allowed by the Law of Nature; which (Law of Nature) provides for, and ſecures the Happineſs of all; and alſo, that all Arguments truly rational, by Vertue of which any one Man can arrogate and aſſume to himſelf any one Right, prove at the ſame Time, and with as full an Evidence, That there is a Law whereby every one, and all other Perſons, have the very ſame Right to defend themſelves.

But, *Secondly*, ſince the Right of eſtabliſhing this diſtinct Diviſion or Property can eaſily, and only, be deduced from the common Good of the Whole, then it clearly follows, That the ſovereign Dominion, the ſupreme Power of Almighty God over all, muſt be preſerved pure and inviolable; and, conſequently, upon this Principle, That no Right of Dominion over others ever was, is, or can be delegated to any Man, allowing him to deprive Perſons, quite innocent and harmleſs, of ſuch their Poſſeſſions as are neceſſary to preſerve Life.

Nay,—the Caſe is ſo far otherwiſe, that the Right of Government, for theſe Reaſons, and for theſe Reaſons only, was granted to Mankind, That, *Firſt*, the diſtinct, ſeparate Rights, Privileges and Properties of Each and All, ſhould be guarded, defended and ſecured from thoſe Miſchiefs which always attend Strife and Contention. And,

Secondly,

Secondly, That theſe Rights, Privileges and Properties ſhould be enhanced, promoted, extended and enlarged as far as poſſibly the Nature of Things (aſſiſted by the moſt powerful, the ſtrongeſt Energy of human Abilities and Induſtry) may and can allow.

SECT. XXIV.

The natural Order of moral Duties.

HAVING hitherto in a conciſe, but yet in a very demonſtrative Chain of Reaſoning, deduced and proved (upon that Law which lays the Obligation of ſtudying and promoting the *common Good*) the Property which each and all Individuals ſingly claim, at leaſt in the Neceſſaries of Life; and that, therefore, ſome Right is moſt certainly eſtabliſhed, which every one may, with great Juſtice and Propriety, aſſert and aſſume to himſelf as his own: And alſo, by Vertue of the ſame Law, that all the reſt of Mankind will be obliged to give to him ſo much, at leaſt, as is uſually underſtood and meant in the Definition of Juſtice.

But,—beſides all this, it may, however, appear highly proper to demonſtrate particularly what Acts thoſe are which naturally are fitted to promote the public Happineſs of All.

Becauſe, from hence it will appear, how far each may be allowed reſpectively both to PERMIT and to COMMAND. Now it is manifeſt, in the firſt Place, and which is a very principal Conſideration, how neceſſary it is to abſtain from all *Injury* and *Hurt* of the Innocent. Becauſe the injuring and damaging any Part, more or leſs, muſt affect the Whole, except in ſuch Caſes of Default, where Puniſhments muſt be inflicted for the *Good of the Whole*.

From hence it is that all Violence offered to others, is ſtrictly forbidden and prohibited: From hence all Invaſion upon the Rights of another is alſo prohibited and forbidden; becauſe every Injury attempted upon the Mind, the Body, the Fortune or the Reputation of any one, detracts ſomething, either more or leſs, from the Whole.

From hence alſo, upon the ſame natural Law, it is neceſſary for the public Good that Reſtitution and Satisfaction be immediately enjoined and enforced for any Loſs, Injury or Damage ſuſtained; under which Injunction, Sentence is pronounced, That *Juſtice* muſt be done to every one; and that Each muſt have, and be reſtored to, his own.———But,—*Secondly*, It is, in the next Place, manifeſt, that this beſt, nobleſt Effect cannot be produced by a mere Forbearance only from bad, injurious Acts; but it is alſo as abſolutely neceſſary, that each Perſon ſhould contribute *his Share, his Shot, his Proportion*, towards this very beſt Effect or End, out of his Subſtance and Labour, by a faithful, conſtant, regular Diſcharge of certain Taxes, Duties and Abilities.

Becauſe otherwiſe, that is, ſuppoſing ſuch Obligations not diſcharged, the public Proſperity cannot riſe to thoſe higheſt Perfections of which it is

capable. And, beſides this, we ſhall be much wanting to ourſelves, in the very Article of our own private Happineſs.

It is, therefore, upon this very Account commanded, whenever, at any Time, the Nature of the chief, principal, ultimate End requires us to convey, transfer, and make over ſome Part of our *Right*, whether by a preſent Donation and Gift, or by ſome Contract and Promiſe implying ſome future Performance, That we muſt and ought to ratify, confirm and make good every ſuch Grant and Engagement, without any *Fraud, Subtlety, Evaſion* or *Trick*. Now, the transferring or conveying either our Subſtance or our Labour for the Uſe of another, is then, *and only then*, valid and obligatory, where ſuch a Conveyance can contribute any Thing to an Effect determined beforehand, and preſcribed by ourſelves. And upon this Foundation is built the Obligation of entering into and performing Contracts, Promiſes and Engagements. In a Word, our Pains and Diligence, our Labour and Induſtry, will be the moſt wiſely, the moſt happily employed in proſecuting the *common Good* of all rational Agents, if our Motions and Acts be and are diſpoſed, exerted and performed according to the following Order.

Primary Duties. *Firſt*, That all our Motions and Acts be principally, and in the firſt Place, acceptable to the perceptive, ruling Cauſes of the *common Good*; in which *Good*, conſequently, the *Good* of each is eſſentially included: Or, in other Words, every one ſhould endeavour to render himſelf pleaſing and acceptable to Almighty God, to Governors, and to the whole Community, (ſuch Rulers and Government being ſuppoſed actually to be) to Parents, or any other protecting Guardian, Benefactors; and, in a more eſpecial Manner, to the Mediators of Peace, or to the Embaſſadors of it.

Secondary Duties. *Secondly*, That every one muſt, and ought to ſtudy and purſue the Preſervation of himſelf, and the further Perfection of his Nature; the ſtricteſt Obſervance, at the ſame Time, being always paid to the Rights of others, and by ſuch an Innocence of Behaviour as I have already demonſtrated to be neceſſary, and is demanded from All. Under this ſecond Claſs of Duties, we may alſo place that ſtudious, diligent Concern incumbent upon every one, to adorn his Mind with uſeful Knowledge and virtuous Habits; as alſo to protect, guard and defend the Life, Health and Chaſtity of his own Perſon.

Duties of a third Kind. *Thirdly*, That every one muſt and ought to take a true and tender Care of his own Family and Children; becauſe, upon ſuch a Care entirely depend all thoſe Aids and Aſſiſtances, which the declining Years and growing Infirmities of Generations preſent are to expect. Upon ſuch a Care alſo, all the riſing Hopes and Expectations of Generations to come, not to mention, that all Mankind are formed out of the ſame common Maſs of Clay: That, ALL, both Parents and Children, partake of the ſame one common human Nature; and that ALL are made in God's Image, after his Likeneſs.

Upon ſuch a Foundation as this, it is, That ALL, by ſo juſt a Claim, aſſume to themſelves the common Rights and Privileges of human Nature. To this third Claſs of Duties may alſo be referred the Degrees of Affection due to Conſanguinity, *i. e.* to Children born of the ſame Parents with ourſelves, and their Children.

Duties of a fourth Order.

Fourthly, Every one ſhould uſe his beſt Diligence, in all ſuch Acts as are commonly called Acts of Humanity; to uſe his beſt Diligence to oblige all the reſt of Mankind, by mutual good Offices; and to render himſelf uſeful to *all*, without Hurt to *any*.

Acts of Humanity are, *e. g. Firſt*, Pointing out the right Road to thoſe who want and deſire to know it.

Secondly, The helping and raiſing up thoſe who have fallen, *&c.*

As to any farther Proof of theſe Principles and Duties, nothing further need be added here, only thus much, *viz.* That in order to the Preſervation of any whole or aggregate Body, whoſe conſtituent Parts ſuffer a Change, a conſtant Flux, a perpetual Motion; (and under ſuch an Aggregate as this we place Mankind) it is abſolutely neceſſary that ſuch Parts as either actually corrupt, or tend to corrupt the Whole, be cut off: But more eſpecially if ſuch corrupting Parts, ſuch Agents of Corruption be intimately mixed and blended with the Whole.

Now,—the Remedy, in this Caſe, muſt be ſo effectual, as to cauſe a certain regular Circulation of Motion and Activity thro' all the Parts; and alſo, That the Cauſes of Preſervation in ſuch a Whole, and all the eſſential Parts of it, be tenderly cheriſhed and genially nurſed: Nay,—not only thoſe Parts which actually *now* exiſt, but all thoſe Parts alſo which, *in Times to come*, ſhall be generated and produced by every Motion and Degree of Power, natural and intrinſic to the whole aggregate Body.

And, conſequently, all ſuch Parts, all ſuch Powers, all ſuch Motions as move in a ſmaller Sphere, are narrower, more limited, and which bear a leſs Relation to the *Whole*, muſt ſubſide, and give way to the general Parts which carry a more extenſive Influence.

Now, there can ſcarcely, in the Nature of Things, be imagined a more evident and plain Truth, than that general Propoſition which immediately ariſes from the Definitions of *Contraries*, or *Corrumpents* and *Deſtructives* of each other; of *preſerving and corrupting Cauſes*; of *Whole and Part*; of *Cauſe and Effect*: And yet this Propoſition, however even as to the *Minutiæ*, or the minuteſt Circumſtances, anſwer in the Whole, to all theſe Points, which (as in the laſt Section has been obſerved) are abſolutely neceſſary to the Preſervation of all Mankind.

SECT. XXV.

Things deſtructive, as contrary to the Whole, as to any of its Parts.

THAT nothing, however, might be wanting to impreſs and fix ſuch Notions as theſe deep in the Mind of Man, and to evince the neceſſary Connexion they bear to each other, Nature affords us even ocular Demonſtration, by numberleſs Examples taken from the various Kinds and Species of Things.

The Nature of every ſingle Animal may juſtly be conſidered as an *aggregate Whole*, cemented and made up of various Parts, widely differing from each other. The Nature, however, of every ſuch Animal (for the certain Time limited and preſcribed by univerſal Nature) preſerves itſelf by thoſe very Methods I juſt now mentioned:

Firſt, By baniſhing, as far as in its Power lies, all noxious, hurtful, deſtructive Things, which Evils every ſuch Animal, with the niceſt Caution, ſeparates from its vital Nouriſhment.

Secondly, By the conſtant, regular Circulation of Blood, and, perhaps, of many other Juices, ſuch as the Lympha, the Bile, and the Animal Spirits.

Thirdly, From the conſtant Repair and Renewal of Parts effluxed, conſumed and evaporated, by a new Generation, as it were, of Parts alike and juſt the ſame.

Fourthly, By the mutual good Offices of Individuals, produced according to the general Laws of Motion: And yet ſuch mutual good Offices do not, in the leaſt, hinder, obſtruct or prevent each Animal from taking to itſelf the Quantity of Food neceſſary to nouriſh, ſtrengthen and invigorate the Individual.

Now, would we only be at the Trouble of examining into the Tendencies, the Behaviour, the Acts of different Animal Beings towards each other (but here we are to ſuppoſe them of the ſame Species reſpectively) it is manifeſt, we ſhall find, That they *all* preſerve their own Kind by a Sort of Innocence; by ſome Degree of Gratitude for Benefits received; by a limited Φιλαυτία, or Self-love; and by a ſtrong Propenſity of Affection towards their Young.

See Chap. 2. Sect. 20.

———*Parcit*
Cognatis Maculis ſimilis Fera———

Juvenal, Sat. 15. ℣ 160.

The Leopard ſpares thoſe of his own ſpotted Kind.

Should any one, in a Word, take a View of this viſible World, and conſider it with *Carteſius*, and ſome other Philoſophers, as a moſt beautiful Machine, he would obſerve that this Vortex of ours, in which we dwell, is daily preſerved; and upon no other Principles than from the Strugglings and Juſtlings in the contrary Motions of other Vortices in their Approaches to each other; from a reciprocal Revolution of the Parts, in a conſtant

a conſtant Succeſſion into the Places of the immediately foregoing Parts, and ſo on ſucceſſively; from propagating all the various Species of Things in ſuch Motions, whereby Nature produces all the Individuals which actually, from Time to Time, exiſt; and by cauſing all the Parts to recede from, and give way to each other, in ſuch a Ratio or Proportion as the ſeveral Dimenſions and Motions of theſe ſeveral Parts reſpectively bear to each, and to the Whole.

But, I determined within myſelf not to dwell long upon any ſuch Hypotheſes as theſe, notwithſtanding that I very well know, how lawfully I might uſe even an Hypotheſis, a feigned Argument, a Suppoſition, provided always that the natural Laws of Motion were critically and exactly obſerved in every ſuch Hypotheſis or Suppoſition: And that (1) *Carteſius* has, with the ſtricteſt Truth and Care, obſerved theſe natural Laws of Motion

(1) Carteſius *has, with the ſtricteſt Truth and Care*, &c.] The *Carteſians* will have Gravity to ariſe from the Action of a Celeſtial Matter, which being agitated in a Vortex is carried about the Earth, and conſequently recedes, as much as it can, from the Earth, and forces celeſtial Bodies being leſs agitated towards the Earth. Or, as the Moderns have more clearly explained the Opinion of *Cartes*, ſince the etherial Matter makes continual Gyrations about the Earth, it will have, after the Manner of Bodies that move circularly, an Endeavour of receding from the Center of Motion; ſo that it will compel terreſtrial Bodies, having a leſs Force, towards the Center: As Water gravitating towards the Earth drives upwards, or towards the Circumference, Bodies of a leſs Weight, in reſpect to their Bulk, which are immerſed in it.

This, however ſpecious it may ſeem at firſt Appearance, if it be brought to an Examination, will be found contrary to all the Laws of Nature. For, in the firſt Place, the *Carteſians* require their etherial Matter to be carried round the Earth in Circles; but from what Cauſe that Motion ariſes, or by what Means it is continued, is as difficult to explain, as to give a Reaſon for Gravity itſelf. They therefore who contend that Gravity proceeds from thence, undertake to explain what is unknown, by what is ſtill more unknown; eſpecially ſince there may be produced divers Arguments, whereby that Rotation is wholly deſtroyed. But let us grant to the *Carteſians* their Poſtulatum, and then let us ſee whether this Phænomenon does thence follow. Since it is neceſſary that the Velocity of the Vortex revolving about the Earth, is, at the Superficies, equal to the Velocity of the Earth's Rotation (for, if it was greater, ſome Part of the Motion would be communicated to the Earth; whence it would happen, that its Velocity would be always diminiſhed, and that of the Earth increaſed, till they arrived at an Equality) ſo that from the Magnitude of the Earth, and the Time of its Rotation being known, there will be given the Space which a Body, urged by the centrifugal Force of the celeſtial Matter, can run over in a given Time; namely, that which is equal to the Square of the Arch deſcribed, in the mean while applied to the Diameter of the Circle, by Lemma 2. in the Demonſtrations of Monſ. *Huygens*'s Theorems of the centrifugal Force and circular Motion. If a Calculation be made from this Principle, it will be found that the Space which will be run over in a Second of Time, by a Body agitated by a centrifugal Force of the Ether, will not exceed half a Foot: If, therefore, the Effect of Gravity was produced mechanically, heavy Bodies in a Second of Time would not deſcend above half a Foot; but heavy Bodies in their Motion downwards, will paſs over, in the ſame Time, fifteen Feet: So that, if after this Manner the Ether was the Cauſe of Gravity, it would act contrary to the Laws of Mechanics, by making a Body deſcend through fifteen Feet in one Second of Time.

To avoid the Force of this Objection, the *Carteſians* ſuppoſe the Rotation of the etherial Matter to be much ſwifter than the Rotation of the Earth; which, though it is impoſſible, yet if we alſo concede to them this, there will not thence proceed the mechanical Action of Gravity. For, ſince the Matter of the Vortex is always carried in Circles parallel to the Equator, and the Directions of the centrifugal

Motion (in almoſt all the ſeveral Branches of his Hypotheſis) is, what we may lawfully venture to affirm.

Let any Hypotheſis whatſoever, after all we have ſaid in favour of *Carteſius*, be aſſumed; any Hypotheſis, I ſay, accounting for the Phænomena of Nature, and the Laws of Motion, in ſuch an Hypotheſis muſt neceſſarily be acknowledged; which Laws (in the midſt of all thoſe natural

gal Forces are always made in Lines lying in the Planes of theſe Circles; it follows, that all Bodies muſt deſcend in theſe Planes, and tend perpendicularly to the Axis, and not to the Surface of the Earth. If, therefore, the ſubtile Matter acted mechanically, it would force Bodies perpendicularly to the Axis; whence, according to theſe Theoriſts, it compels them to tend to the Center of the Earth, it produces an Effect contrary to the true Laws of Mechanics.

That they may remove this Diffiulty, they farther ſuppoſe the etherial Matter to be carried not in Circles parallel to the Equator, but in great Circles of a Sphere. But how it is poſſible to conceive this, I am at a Loſs to know; for ſince every great Circle twice interſects all the other Circles that are infinite in Number, it is neceſſary that the Motion of any Particle ſhould be hindered by infinite others moving different Ways; and at length its Motion ſhould ceaſe, if at firſt an equal Quantity of Motion was impreſſed on all the Parts: or that, laſtly, it ſhould be all carried in parallel Circles, if at the Beginning the Motion was greater towards one Part than another.

Moreover, it may be aſked, whence it comes to paſs that the ethereal Matter does move in the Superficies of the outermoſt Sphere, ſince it has a centrifugal Force, it ſeems as if it ſhould recede from thence; what then is it that hinders it from doing ſo? They are wont to anſwer, That the ambient Bodies compreſs the Matter in the exterior Sphere, and prevent its eſcaping. But ſince this Matter muſt preſs other Bodies encompaſſing it, it is neceſſary that it communicates a Motion to them, and theſe Bodies, in like Manner, will impreſs a Motion on others encompaſſing them, and ſo the Motion of the ſubtile Matter will he propagated *in infinitum*; whence, of Neceſſity, its Celerity muſt languiſh by Degrees.

There are many other Difficulties which accompany theſe mechanical Explications of Gravity; one whereof we ſhall here propoſe, and which extends to all the Theories of this Sort; and it is this: If a Body is after any Manner driven downwards by a ſubtile Matter, the Force whereby it is driven, will be neceſſarily as the Number of Particles, by the acting of which together the Body is conſtrained to tend towards the Earth: But the Number of Particles is as the Superficies of the Body; wherefore the Force whereby the Body is preſſed downwards, will be as its Superficies, and not as the Quantity of Matter in the Body, which is contrary to Experience. Nor will all the reſt of the Hypotheſes, which they frame to account for the Appearance of other Things, be found leſs repugnant to the Laws of Nature, if they are brought to an Examination.

All theſe Errors ſeem to ſpring from hence; That Men ignorant of Geometry preſume to philoſophize, and to give the Cauſes of natural Things. For what can we expect but Miſtake, from ſuch, as having neglected Geometry, the Foundation of all Philoſophy, and being unacquainted with the Forces of Nature (which can only be eſtimated by the Means of Geometry) do yet attempt to explain its Operations, by a Method not at all agreeing with the Rules of Mechanics.

Amongſt the Philoſophers of this Sort, *Cartes* leads the Van; who, though he was a famous Geometer, yet that he might accommodate himſelf to the idle and common Herd of Philoſophers, made no Uſe of Geometry in his Philoſophy: And although he pretended to explain all Things mechanically by Matter and Motion, yet he introduced a Philoſophy, which was as contrary to the true Laws of Mechanics as poſſible. Thoſe may be reckoned of his Sect who refuſe the Labour of philoſophizing aright, that is, geometrically: And ſuch are by much the greateſt Number, being ſcattered almoſt all over the Earth.

But although ſo great a Part of the Philoſophers have embraced the Shadow of Philoſophy, and not its Subſtance; yet there have not been wanting (nor I hope ever will) ſuch as have employed real Pains in diſcovering the true Laws of Nature, and in inveſtigating from thence the Cauſes of Things by mechanical Principles. *See Dr.* John Keil's *Preface to his Introduction to Natural Philoſophy.*

Changes

Changes and Revolutions I have ſettled) maintain the preſent State and Condition of the whole Frame of this natural Syſtem. And, when this is once done, there is proved, and by the nobleſt of all Inſtances, what thoſe Things are which neceſſarily are required to the Preſervation of *this beſt and moſt compounded Whole.*

And this one Conſideration cannot but lead Mankind into a ſure and certain Knowledge, that human Acts, ſtrictly conformable to theſe Laws, muſt prove Cauſes not leſs efficient and proper to preſerve the whole Syſtem of human Nature, and to render it happy.

For this Reaſon I imagine, That even the ſpecial Theorems about Motion (commonly called *the Laws of Motion*) from the neceſſary Obſervation of which (*i. e.* Theorems and Laws) general Effects, as I can remember them to ariſe, may be conſidered as of great Uſe and Advantage in promoting this End. But as ſuch Contemplations as theſe may take me at too great a Diſtance from my principal Deſign, I muſt beſeech my philoſophical Reader either to draw for himſelf ſuch Obſervations from his own Experience, or to conſult in theſe Points the Writings of *Galilæo, Carteſius, Wallis, Wren, Huygens,* Authors of the firſt Credit, Reputation and Applauſe.

My only Remark here is, That all Obſervations muſt be built upon this one Suppoſition, namely, That *Motion,* the Inſtant it receives its Impulſe from the *Firſt Cauſe* (the Creator of Matter) is not annihilated, does not ſtop; (but that this Motion, purely becauſe it once exiſts) begins in a Plenum in a *Full*; *i. e.* In a Word, where there is no *Vacuum*; is conſtantly propagated, always, and of Courſe revolves into itſelf.

Suppoſing then Mankind to exiſt in any kind of State whatſoever, it ſerves my preſent Purpoſe if we allow to Man (and allow we muſt) the Power of performing ſuch Duties and Acts as I have hitherto deſcribed, in order to preſerve the whole aggregate Body, or the whole human Species: And that the Propenſity, the Will, the Inclination, the Tendency, to effect and compaſs ſuch Acts and Duties as theſe, is to the full, and as equally neceſſary to their Happineſs and well-being: And laſtly, more particularly, That all the Means neceſſary to produce this Effect (*i. e.* human Happineſs) can and muſt be reduced to the Heads already deſcribed.

SECT. XXVI.

How human Acts are to be eſtimated.

THE Whole, then, of what we have already offered, concerning the neceſſary Connexion between the Acts aforeſaid, and the *common Good,* carries in it a conſtant View towards this *one Deſign* or *End*; namely, That from the Connexion and Relation which they bear to this *one End,* the Nature of human Acts ſhould invariably, without the leaſt Change, be fixed and determined.

Under

Under which Acts are comprehended *Piety*, *Probity*, and all the Virtues.

Now, the Connexion or Relation between integral, perfect Causes, and such an Effect as they are to produce, is absolutely unchangeable.

Integral Causes defined. By integral Causes, we understand Causes considered with all their own proper, full Circumstances, requisite and necessary to produce the Effect designed.

The Nature of Virtue stated. In every State, whether of Things in common, or wherein Things are divided into separate, distinct Property; in every such State, each human Act which, in its general Tendency, cautiously avoids to debauch the human Mind either with Falshood or Perfidy: Wherein no Hurt or Violence is offered to the Life, the Reputation, the Chastity, the Innocence of any: Wherein *Benefactors* are treated with *Gratitude*, and where grateful Returns are made for Benefits received: Wherein also each Person, with his Family and Posterity, is taken Care of and provided for, without the least Hurt or Damage to any other. Every such human Act, I say, always was, and always will be, the Cause of *common Good*, and consequently must be specified and distinguished by the Name of *Virtue*.

The one only Point then here to be considered, is, That the Effect designed be large, extended, diffusive enough; which, in other Words, is, That some additional Advantage arise to the Whole; or, at least, that the Whole receives no Damage, sustains no Loss from our studious Care, from any Endeavours of ours to gratify and benefit any one or more of its Parts.

For, otherwise (*i. e.* if we do not act with this one constant, steady Design) our Conduct, our moral Behaviour, becomes corrupt, degenerates and changes into *Vice*.

The Sanctions of Virtue. Because, at the very same Instant of Time that the Natures of Things discover to us by what Acts the *common Good* (which *Good* essentially comprehends the *private Happiness of Each and All)* is to be, and must be, obtained; and which *Good* must be pursued with all the Capacity in the Power of Each respectively: At the very same Instant of Time likewise, I say, we cannot but know and understand, That Acts of a contrary Nature and Tendency, as necessarily introduce Evil and Misery amongst Mankind; as also, That such Evil, such Misery happens as necessarily, by Vertue of that Connexion which, from the Will and Intention of the *First Cause*, unchangeably subsists between such Acts and their own proper Effects.

From which Premisses this Conclusion is evidently gathered, That by Vertue of the same Will and Intention of the *First Cause*, all Mankind are obliged to pursue Virtue and shun Vice, upon Pain of forfeiting their Happiness, as well as upon the sure and certain Prospect of securing to themselves and enjoying such an Happiness.

Now, infinite are the Evils, to the Transgressor, which inseparably, according to Nature, follow from every Act destructive of, and hurtful

to

to, others. Becauſe every ſuch Tranſgreſſor, even himſelf, contradicts and acts againſt thoſe practical Principles of his own Conſcience, which (as he cannot but know) tell him better Things: By which Means, he raiſes to himſelf ſo much Anxiety and Uneaſineſs in his own Mind, that he cannot ſtand acquitted even by the Sentence of his own Conſcience: And therefore,

Whoſoever once ſubmits himſelf, either to the tyrannical Dominion of raſh, haſty Conduct, or to a blind Hurry of Paſſions, rather than to the ſober Advice of his own Reaſon, will, by Degrees, be more eaſily led away by them; and conſequently will, and without much Difficulty, draw upon himſelf Deſtruction.

And,——we may alſo farther add, That the very ſame Example which every ſuch Tranſgreſſor lays before others for their Imitation, may and will, in ſome future Time, be exerciſed againſt himſelf, and to his own utter Confuſion and Ruin.

By ſuch fatal Tranſgreſſions as theſe, Surmiſes, Suſpicions, Miſtruſts, and the Cauſes of Jealouſy are inflamed: The miſerable Effects of all which Evils, he, who tranſgreſſes the Laws of Nature, muſt and will aſſuredly feel and experience to his Coſt.

But, the Evils do not even end here. For——beſides this——whatſoever Puniſhment is comprehended under every ſuch immoral Act, is juſt the ſame as is comprehended under a (1) *Procatarctic meritorious Cauſe.*

In

(1) *Procatarctic meritorious Cauſe.*] As Almighty God is the one only Creator, Author and Preſerver of all the Beings and Powers in Nature, ſo he is, in ſtrict Truth and Propriety of ſpeaking, the one only principal efficient Cauſe. In the Order of Creation, ſome Beings are endowed with Reaſon, others are denied this Privilege. The natural Conſequence of rational Faculties is a Will, a Choice, a free Power of chuſing and refuſing, of preferring and rejecting.——And——in the Operations of theſe two (*viz.* 1. *Reaſon* or *Underſtanding*, and 2. The *Will*) eſſentially conſiſts the formal true Notion of Agency. The only Objects of chuſing and refuſing, of preferring and rejecting, are *Good* and *Evil*. For, about Objects abſolutely in their own Nature indifferent as to both (if any ſuch there be) the Underſtanding and the Will are little or no way concerned. In the very Notion of Agency, every Agent has a full Power over his own Acts, juſt ſo far as, and no farther than, this free Power reaches; juſt ſo far is he a moral accountable Being, and no farther. Juſt ſo far as this free, active Power is reſtrained by any outward Force, or external Cauſe, ſo far does he ceaſe to be an Agent in any true Meaning of the Term, becomes a Being acted upon from without, and is no better than a Stock or a Stone. Upon this Freedom of Action it is that Virtue and Vice, with the natural Conſequences of them, are imputable to the Agents themſelves: Upon this Foundation only is eſtabliſhed the juſt Notion of Moral Good and Moral Evil. Mankind from hence are determined the proper Objects of Reward and Puniſhment: And——upon this Foundation we fairly conclude, that every Agent is the principal efficient Cauſe of his own Acts, and of all the Conſequences ariſing from them.

This Notion, then, of a principal efficient Cauſe in the Agency of Man, cannot tend in the leaſt to derogate from the Being and Attributes of God. This Notion of Agency does not deny that God is the principal, firſt, efficient Cauſe, the *one* Author and Creator of all the Beings and Powers in Nature. This Notion of human Agency only aſſerts, That, as God made Man a rational, free Agent, and conſequently accountable, ſo he made Man the principal efficient Cauſe of his own Agency, he endowed him with the Capacities of chuſing Good and refuſing Evil, and gave

In the Sanction and Execution of these Punishments (that Malefactors and future Offenders may, as effectually as possible, be coerced and restrained) all Mankind are ready and willing to give their Assistance, not only from the natural Principle of Love to the Public Good in general, but from that innate Principle of Love also which each in particular bears implanted in him for Self-preservation.

Now, altho' that Energy, that Operation of an impulsive Cause, which lies concealed in moral free Acts, may actuate and influence rational Beings only; namely, God and Man: Yet, it is such an Energy, such an Operation, such a Power, as always carries in it some Weight, some Moment; and, consequently, ought always to be taken under our Deliberation before we execute the Act itself; lest, by such a Neglect, we, even against our own Intentions, draw Ruin and Destruction upon ourselves.

him the Dominion over his own free Acts, Capacities and Powers. Whenever, therefore our Author seems to insinuate, that God co-operates with natural, inferior Causes, in the Production of either Good or Evil to Individuals, he only means, that God acts as the Author of Nature and of Nature's Laws; that his Laws are immutable, and must take place, let the voluntary Acts of Man be what they will: God has established these Laws, Man executes them and feels the Influences of them, whenever he pleases to draw down upon himself either Good or Evil, Happiness or Misery, Reward or Punishment. The Powers and Dispositions of both the natural and moral World are such, that Good and Evil are blended in the very Essence of them. All created Beings are formed with the Appetite of Good, and with an Aversion from Evil. Upon the Principle either of Self-preservation, or of Instinct, or of an impressed Force, they vigorously oppose and repel any Attempts which tend to destroy the Good they naturally desire. They reflect, I say, by a manifold Increase, and with all their innate Strength, the Evil intended, back upon the Agents themselves. He therefore who commits a moral Evil, commits in some Degree, either more or less, a natural Evil, destructive of himself. ——And to sum up all, in the Laws of Matter and Motion, in all the Laws of Nature, the Author of this *universal All*, has contrived and ordered *the Whole* by such Weight and Measure, with such Instincts and Appetites, with such Tendencies and Propensities, as to concur and co-operate in producing Good or Evil, Happiness or Misery, Reward or Punishment to each moral Agent, just as he is pleased either to use or abuse his Reason and Freedom, by either a right or a wrong Application of them. From hence we may learn, how each moral Agent is the principal efficient Cause of his own Happiness or Misery, and how both God and Nature are co-operating, assisting, helping Causes (or, if I may venture to use the Expression, *Causes less-principal)* in producing the same Effect.

Aristotle, and the Commentators upon him, have distinguished Causes into numberless Divisions and Subdivisions: Such nice Distinctions may amuse the Speculative and the Curious, but they neither can instruct the Ignorant, nor enlarge the Mind by useful Knowledge. A *procatarctic meritorious Cause* is our Enquiry at present. By a procatarctic Cause we are to understand a less-principal Cause, which, by some external, outward Method of Efficiency, acts upon a principal Cause. When the Term *Meritorious* is added to *Procatarctic*, we are to understand such a Motive as influences *a less-principal* Cause, in Cases both of Good and Evil to retaliate such Usage, Behaviour and Treatment as the principal Cause has originally occasioned and given Rise to. In these Retaliations, a moral Agent is always supposed the Author of them; and in these Retaliations, especially in Cases of Evil, the principal Cause has little or no Power to prevent and restrain the Efficacies of them.

And thus much may serve, at present, to explain the Meaning of a procatarctic, meritorious, efficient Cause. *See* Chap. 5. Sect. 36, 37, 38.

For,

For, all our Expectation, all our Hope, depends upon *God* and *Man*, who execute the ſeveral Efficacies, the ſeveral Effects of Merit or Demerit, as each reſpectively ariſes from that Agreement or Diſagreement which our free voluntary Acts bear to the common Good. And herein chiefly conſiſts the true Notion of a *Cauſa Procatarctica meritoria.*

Now, that Almighty God, the omniſcient Searcher of Hearts, infallibly knows all Sin and Wickedneſs, altho' carried on and committed with the cloſeſt Secrecy, and that he aſſuredly will puniſh all ſuch Sin and Wickedneſs, are Truths ſo very evident, that, in all Likelihood, I ſhall be thought very officious in attempting any Proofs upon Points ſo obvious: But more eſpecially ſince there are extant ſo many Writings of both ancient and modern Philoſophers, as well as Fathers of the Chriſtian Church, to this Purpoſe.

But—above all—ſince the Man, whoſe Doctrines and Opinions are, more immediately, now under our Examination, has no where, as far as I can learn, denied theſe Truths.

However,—notwithſtanding all the Cenſure of an officious Writer, which I may chance to incur upon this Account, yet the Manner how we arrive at ſuch natural Knowledge as this ſhall hereafter be demonſtrated, when once I come fully to declare my Sentiments concerning the Obligations of the Laws of Nature. *See* Chap. 5. *concerning* the Law of Nature and its Obligations, *beginning at* Sect. 18. *to the End of* Sect. 28.

And, in the next Place, as to Mankind, it always is for their Intereſt in the general, that *Benevolence* and *Juſtice* ſhould flouriſh and ſpread an univerſal Influence. And ſince they cannot but know, and ſince they certainly will, puniſh flagrant Crimes, altho' committed with the deepeſt Secrecy; that therefore, upon theſe very Accounts, the Author of any flgrant Wickedneſs cannot enjoy any Security.

Secret Crimes are oftentimes found out and diſcovered, by ten thouſands of Ways which no Sinner can evade. Nay—many notorious Offenders, even themſelves, have proved their own Informers, the *Betrayers* of themſelves, without Deſign, Unawares, by Startings, Dreams, Ravings (1) and other diſorderly Affections and Emotions of the Mind.—Diſcoveries made by theſe ſeveral

(1) *And other diſorderly Affections and Emotions of the Mind.*] The laſt Difference that *Laertius* puts between *Epicurus* and *Ariſtippus* is, that as *Ariſtippus* eſteems the Pains of the Body greater and more troubleſome than thoſe of the Mind, he ſuppoſes likewiſe the Pleaſures of the Body much greater and more conſiderable than thoſe of the Mind; whereas *Epicurus* is of a contrary Opinion. "In the "Body, ſaith he, we can feel only Things "preſent, but the Mind can be ſenſible of "Things paſt and to come."

'Tis manifeſt, that a great Degree of Pleaſure, or an extreme Affliction of the Mind, contributes more to an happy or to an unhappy Life, than much Pleaſure or much Pain of Body. If the painful Diſeaſes of the Body imbitter the Sweetneſs of our Lives, thoſe of the Mind ought to render it much more unhappy. Now the principal Diſtempers of the Mind, are the greedy, extravagant Deſires of Riches, of Glory, of Dominion, of ſordid and unlawful Pleaſures: Moreover, the Diſturbances, Gripings and Sorrows that overwhelm the Mind, thoſe anxious Cares that conſume it, *&c.*

This ſeems to be what *Ovid* thought, when he upbraids us, becauſe we can readily under-

ſeveral Ways, *Epicurus* himſelf and his Followers have confeſſed: And who, notwithſtanding all their ſtrongeſt Efforts to ſhake off the Fear, the Dread, the Apprehenſions of a Divine Providence, have yet acknowledged it, in many Paſſages of their Writings, impoſſible for human Nature to ſhake off the Fear, the Dread of Mankind.

The

go the ſcorching Heat of the Fire, the Sharpneſs of Iron and the Trouble of Thirſt, to free ourſelves from ſome Diſtempers of the Body; but to heal the Mind, which is of a far greater Value, we ſcruple to ſuffer any Thing.

Ut corpus redimas, ferrum patieris & ignes,
Arida nec ſitiens ora lavabis aquâ,
Ut valeas animo quicquam tolerare negabis;
At pretium pars hæc corpore majus habet.

And I ſuppoſe *Horace* had the ſame Fancy in the forementioned Paſſage.

——————Nam cur
Quæ ſeriant oculos feſtinas demere ſi quid
Eſt animum differs curandi tempus in annum?

Truly as the Soul is infinitely more noble than the Body, and, according to the Opinion of *Ariſtotle*, it alone makes up almoſt the entire Man; it muſt therefore neceſſarily be much more ſuſceptible as well of the Impreſſions of Good, of Pleaſure and Delight, as of Evil, Trouble and Diſquietneſs. Beſides, the Diſeaſes of the Mind are ſo much the more dangerous than the Diſeaſes of the Body, becauſe theſe have Signs to make us underſtand them, but the other are often concealed from us. For our Reaſon, that ought to ponder them, is diſturbed, and cannot make a right Eſtimation; therefore ſuch as are ſick in Body ſeek a Remedy from Phyſic, but ſuch as are diſtempered in Mind, from Philoſophy, yet will not obey its Directions. Again, amongſt the Diſeaſes of the Body, thoſe are the greateſt and the moſt dangerous of all, which caſt us into a Slumber, and are not felt by the Patient, as, a Lethargy, the Falling Sickneſs, and that burning Fever which cauſeth a Delirium. Now there is ſcarce any Diſtemper of the Mind, but ought to be reckoned of as dangerous a Conſequence; and the rather, becauſe they are not known to be what they are, and oftentimes are covered over with a fair Shew and Pretence of contrary Virtues: For Example, Fury and Wrath are ſtiled Courage; Fear and Cowardice uſurp the Name of Prudence; in ſhort, Diſcontent, which is a Grief of the Mind, and a Diſtemper which generally cauſeth the other Diſeaſes to be more unpleaſant, ſad and troubleſome, affects nothing more than to ſeem to be taken and cauſed not without great Provocation and juſt Reſentments. Neither are we to pretend, with *Ariſtippus*, that Criminals are commonly puniſhed with Pains and bodily Torments, as being more ſevere and uneaſy to be undergone. For as the Legiſlator, or the Judge, hath not the ſame Power over the Mind as over the Body, ſo it is as true, that he cannot appoint, that the Offender ſhould be tortured in his Mind, but in his Body, that ſo a viſible Puniſhment might be inflicted upon the Offender, whereby the People might be kept in ſtricter Awe from offending: But it follows not from thence, that there is no greater Pain than that, or that the Pain of the Mind may not be a more grievous Torment.

Beſides, when a Man is really under the actual Sufferings of the Body, or when he ſuppoſes that he ſhall ſhortly be ſo, he fancies in his Mind that he ſhall be tied to the Rack, or perhaps, that his Head ſhall be cut off; that he ſhall be broken upon the Wheel, or burnt at the Stake; that he ſhall loſe his Life in ſight of the World with public Shame, and be accounted a perpetual Ignominy and Reproach to his Family and deareſt Friends: And who cannot but be troubled at this? And can you imagine any Torture of the Body (ſuppoſing it to be ſeparated from all this) that can ſtand in Competition with this inward Kind of Grief, and cruel Vexation of the Mind? And for this Reaſon it is that I have aſſerted, That the Pains and Torments are not directly appointed by the Judge, but are thereby indirectly deſigned, to the End they might increaſe the former, and render the Puniſhment more grievous. To this Purpoſe, have we not ſeen, that the Threats and terrible Apprehenſions of Death, have changed the Hair of the Head into a hoary Colour in one Night; have dried up the Moiſture of the Body, and have killed ſeveral? This plainly ſhews, that the laſt and greateſt

Torment,

The Reader may, if he pleaſes, examine into the fixed, the ſettled Opinions of *Epicurus*, as they are delivered by his fond Admirer *Gaſſendus*, with Annotations.

What

Torment, is not that of the Body, but that of the Mind, *&c.*

I do not here recount the Grief and Diſturbance of Mind, which Envy, Ambition, and the Remorſe of Conſcience, cauſeth in an evil Man, a Tyrant, or ambitious Wretch; I will at preſent only inſert what *Juvenal*, *Horace* and *Perſius* mention of it, as a greater Torment than ever *Cæditius* or *Rhadamanthus* invented.

JUVENAL, Satyr 13. V. 192.

——————Cur tamen hoſtu
Evaſiſſe putes, quos diri conſcia facti
Mens habet attonitos, & ſurdo verbere cædit,
Occultum quatiente animo tortore flagellum?
Pœna autem vehemens, ac multo ſævior illis,
Quas & Cæditius gravis invenit aut Rhadamanthus,
Nocte dieque ſuum geſtare in pectore teſtem.

But why muſt thoſe be thought to 'ſcape, that feel
Thoſe Rods of Scorpions, and thoſe Whips of Steel
Which Conſcience ſhakes, when ſhe with Rage controuls,
And ſpreads amazing Terrors thro' their Souls?
Not ſharp Revenge, not Hell itſelf can find
A fiercer Torment than a guilty Mind,
Which Day and Night doth dreadfully accuſe,
Condemns the Wretch, and ſtill the Charge renews. CREECH.

HORAT. Epiſt. 2. Lib. 1. v. 58.

Invidia ſiculi non invenere tyranni
Majus tormentum——————

Sicilian Tyrants never yet could find
A greater Rack, than Envy to the Mind.

PERSIUS, Satyr 3. V. 35.

Magne pater divûm, ſævos punire tyrannos
Haud aliâ ratione velis, cum dira libido
Moverit ingenium ferventi tincta veneno;
Virtutem videant, intabeſcantque relictâ.
Anne magis Siculi gemuerunt æra juvenci:
Et magis auratis pendens laquearibus enſis
Purpureas ſubter cervices terruit; imus,
Imus præcipites, quàm ſi ſibi dicat; & intus
Palleat infelix quod proxima neſciat uxor?

Great Father of the Gods, when, for our Crimes,
Thou ſend'ſt ſome heavy Judgment on the Times;
Some Tyrant King, the Terror of his Age,
The Type, and true Vicegerent of thy Rage,
Thus puniſh him: Set Virtue in his Sight,
With all her Charms adorn'd, with all her Graces bright;
But ſet her diſtant, make him pale to ſee
His Gains outweigh'd by loſt Felicity!
Sicilian Tortures, and the Brazen Bull,
Are Emblems, rather than expreſs the full
Of what he feels; yet what he fears is more:
The Wretch, who ſitting at his plenteous Board,
Look'd up, and view'd on high the pointed Sword
Hang o'er his Head, and hanging by a Twine,
Did with leſs Dread, and more ſecurely dine.
Ev'n in his Sleep he ſtarts, and fears the Knife,
And, trembling, in his Arms takes his accomplice Wife:
Down, down he goes, and from his darling Friend
Conceals the Woes his guilty Dreams portend.
DRYDEN.

And, though ſome pretend, that a wicked Varlet, by his repeated Crimes and long-accuſtomed Habit in Villainy, may attain at laſt to ſuch an Inſenſibility, as to have none of thoſe ordinary Remorſes which rack the Minds of the cruelleſt Tyrant, and by that Means may become happy: And, beſides, that the Freedom from Remorſe makes not a Man happy, I will farther add, that in the ordinary Courſe of Life, this Suppoſition is not only ſcarce to be found, as is eaſy to be proved, but altogether impoſſible; and that there is no Man, though never ſo much hardened in Wickedneſs, that can baniſh or expel out of his Mind this inward Executioner. Again, ſuch a Wretch cannot be reckoned in the Number of Men, but of Monſters that are to be ſtrangled; and not only ſo, but in the Number of Fools, becauſe he hath loſt his Senſe and Reaſon, by brutiſhly expoſing himſelf to the Rage, if I may ſo ſay, and to the

Fury

What I have here farther to add is only this,—That, beſides the divine Vengeance of Almighty God, who is the Revenger of the moſt ſecret Crimes, and at whoſe Vengeance the Conſciences of almoſt all Sinners are ſo dreadfully ſcared and terrified; that, beſides the divine Puniſhments, I ſay, Mankind have, even in a State of Nature, abſtracted from all civil Society, proved the immediate Avengers of flagrant, notorious Crimes, almoſt as ſoon as the Crimes have been committed; and this is a Truth ſo manifeſt, that it ſcarcely ſtands in need of any Proof. For, ſince it is the Advantage of Mankind in general, that notorious Crimes ſhould be puniſhed, every Perſon therefore, upon this very Account, who has Power ſufficient, has a Right to inflict thoſe Puniſhments, which, according to the Nature and Reaſon of the public Good, ought to be inflicted by ſome Body.

For, ſhould we ſuppoſe, for Inſtance, all Inequality of Condition amongſt Mankind abſolutely to ceaſe, *i. e.* ſuppoſing all to be in a State of Nature, without Civil Society, Then *Chremes*'s Maxim (in *Terence, Heauton.* Act. 1. Sc. 1. ℣ 25.) holds good, *Homo ſum humani nihil a me alienum puto*, i. e. *As I am a Man, there is nothing concerns human Nature which is not my Concern.*

Neither, indeed, can Mr. *Hobbes* himſelf (who allows to each Individual a Right of waging War againſt All) deny that the Sword of Juſtice is, and ought to be, the Avenger of Crimes.

And, to ſpeak the Truth, I cannot ſee any juſt Reaſon why Mr. *Hobbes* ſhould not (who inculcates, according to the Laws of Civil Society, the Power and Force of Obligation, from the Puniſhments annexed, and the Apprehenſion or Dread which from ſuch Puniſhments ariſes) I cannot, I ſay, ſee why he ſhould not acknowledge alſo ſome Obligation affixed to the Laws of Nature, even as to *external Acts*; either from ſuch Puniſhments as, Conſcience forebodes, will, at ſome future Time, be inflicted by Almighty God; or, from thoſe Puniſhments, even, which each and every one Individual can, in a State of Nature, with Juſtice inflict upon any who tranſgreſſes and violates the Laws of Nature.

The extended Arm of ſo many Avengers muſt, beyond all Queſtion, be terrible: And—it would and muſt be wonderful, indeed, if ſome one, out of ſuch a Multitude, is not fortified with Strength and Courage ſufficient, to be both able and willing to revenge any Inſult offered to the public Utility.

Nay, Mr. *Hobbes* himſelf in ſome Paſſages of his Writings (as, for Inſtance, in his *Leviathan*, towards the latter End of the thirty-firſt Chapter) acknowledges, That ſome natural Puniſhments of this Kind may be traced

Fury of all Men, who abominate him, and look upon him as a Beaſt of Prey, or as a Tyrant, that deſerves to be cut off. Gaſſendus's *Moral Philoſophy of* Epicurus, Book 1. *concerning Happineſs*, Chap. 2. *in the* Section *entitled*, That the Pains and Pleaſures of the Mind are greater than thoſe of the Body, Page 63. *collected by Monſ.* Bernier, *and tranſlated into* Engliſh *by* Anonymous. *Edit.* Lond. 1699. Octavo.

out

out and discovered.—And, what is more, he asserts likewise, That Offences are *not the Result of Civil Compacts*, but of *Nature*.

There scarcely is any one human Act which is not the Origin, which does not begin the Chain of some, nay of many Consequences linked together; and consequently linked together by so hidden, as well as close a Connexion, that no human Foresight can penetrate and see into the End of it.

Circumstances and Accidents, both pleasing and vexatious, are so indissolubly interwoven, mixed and blended together, that he who chuses the pleasing, embraces also the vexatious, that he who tastes the Sweet, tastes also the Bitter, which are inseparable; altho' perhaps not at first, before Trial, perceived.

Mr. *Hobbes*, in the Edition of his *Leviathan* published in *English*, speaks with less Disguise; for here he adds, That such vexatious Events, or natural Vexations, are the Punishments of such Actions as produce and give Rise to more Evil than Good. As for Instance,

1. *Intemperance* is punished with natural Diseases.
2. *A rash Precipitancy of Behaviour* is attended with Misfortunes.
3. *Injustice* is closely pursued with the insulting Force of Enemies.
4. *The Retaliations of Force* punish the Invaders upon the Persons and Properties of others. And from these, and such Instances as these, Mr. *Hobbes* concludes, That such natural Punishments as these closely attend the Violation of the Laws of Nature, as being Effects natural, and not arbitrary.

This very self-same Mr. *Hobbes*, notwithstanding that, he sounds the Charge of War against All; yet he, at the same Time, overlooks this Cause [*i. e. War*] to be the Punishment either of Transgressions against the public Good, or of Invasions upon the public Safety: But he, at once, sends all into Battle, to strip others of their lawful Rights and Possessions, and, then to arrogate such Rights and Possessions to themselves. *See his Book* De Cive, Chap. 1. Sect. 11. *and* 12.

Now, since the immediate Effect of Right, that is, in our present Case, since the immediate Effect of a Right to punish an usurping Invader, is the Obligation of Restraint, or refraining from that very Crime, Mr. *Hobbes* therefore acknowledges the Cause, or the same Foundation of Right, namely, the Right of punishing, to be in All (the Right of War being once allowed:) And yet Mr. *Hobbes*, at the same Time, perceives no Effect; that is, he does not perceive any Obligation from hence arising; or, in plainer Terms, he does not perceive that any Obligation is discovered.

He acknowledges, that almost all Virtues are necessary to Peace and to mutual Defence; that all Mankind are agreed in it, and allow, that such a State of Peace is good; and that War (under which the Right of punishing Offences is comprehended) carries in it a natural Agreement with the Contempt and Disdain of all the moral Virtues: And yet, he does not perceive that all Mankind are, from the Apprehensions of War, as a Punishment, obliged to practice the external Acts of these Virtues.

Now,

Now, moral Virtues, as they are internal Acts merely, will not, cannot, preſerve, ſecure Peace, and mutual Defence; and yet theſe are Effects, as Nature points out, to be purſued and ſecured. *Compare Mr.* Hobbes's *Book* De Cive, Chap. 3. Sect. 27. *and* 34. *together.*

SECT. XXVII.

(1) SINCE then, from general Notions, we have very briefly demonſtrated how conducive and neceſſary to the common Good it is, in all Mankind to will and deſire that, *Firſt*, the Uſes in Things, and mutual reciprocal Endeavours, ſhould be diſtributed, divided and ſeparated, and limited at leaſt for a Time, ſo as to ſerve Individuals by a ſeparate Poſſeſſion; and in ſuch a Manner that each reſpectively may look upon the Things allotted to him as his own private Property. And—ſince, *Secondly*, this Dictate of Reaſon openly declares, and fully decrees, Rewards for the Obedient, and Puniſhments for the Diſobedient: And ſince, *Thirdly*, this ſame Dictate of Reaſon is likewiſe impreſſed upon the human Mind: And, *Fourthly*, that this ſame Dictate of Right Reaſon, likewiſe, moſt juſtly claims Almighty God (he being the Cauſe and Author of all Effects) for its Author and Defender: And here, by the Bye, we are to obſerve, that within theſe four Circumſtances or Conditions, the whole Sanction of a Law is limited):

Controverſy with Mr. Hobbes begins.

Since theſe Points, I ſay, have been clearly proved, it will be very proper now, with the ſame conciſe Perſpicuity, to examine into that *Hobbian* favourite, ruling Maxim, namely, "The Right which every one has and "claims to all Things."

The Right of every one to ALL, the Hobbian Principle, examin'd into.

For, as we conclude, determine and ſettle the whole Grounds and Reaſons of Right, to be eſtabliſhed upon our Opinion of univerſal Juſtice, and conſequently of all Virtue; ſo from that Opinion of his, which we ſtrenuouſly oppoſe, we judge and conclude, that theſe very ſame Foundations of Right, as far as in Mr. *Hobbes* lies, are utterly demoliſhed.

Mr. *Hobbes* with this very View and Deſign, in his Book *De Cive*, Chap. 1. Sect. 10. declares, "That in a State of Nature *(i. e.* in ſuch a State as is quite clear of, and diſtinct from, all Civil Authority) each has a Right "over all." And—which Right he thus explains, "That it is lawful "for every one to do every Thing he pleaſes, and againſt whom he plea-

(1) *Since, then, from general Notions,* &c.] Under four Conditions is comprehended the full, compleat Sanction of a perfect Law.

1. A private, diſtinct, ſeparate Uſe in Things and perſonal Labours is neceſſary, according to the Dictates of Right Reaſon.

2. Rewards and Puniſhments, the natural and neceſſary Conſequences of this rational Dictate.

3. This Dictate of Right Reaſon is naturally impreſſed upon the human Mind.

4. Almighty God, the Author of this rational Dictate. Theſe four Conditions conſtitute the full, entire Sanction of a Law.

"ſes:"

" ſes:" Or, as he expreſſes himſelf in other Words, at the Concluſion of this very Head, " That each has a Right to poſſeſs all Things, and to " do all Things."

That this ſo monſtrouſly-licentious a Liberty, is neceſſarily included in the Law of Nature, he endeavours to prove out of thoſe Paragraphs, which he has delivered under the ninth Article; and out of other Paragraphs from the ſeventh to the End of the Annotations ſubjoined to the tenth.

Since, therefore, I did not think it a material Point to quote, at large, and *verbatim*, all theſe Paſſages, I muſt earneſtly entreat my Readers, with ſome Attention, to conſider, whether the Sum and Subſtance of what he ſays, in the whole, be not faithfully reduced into the following Syllogiſm.

SYLLOGISM.

In a State of Nature, every one has a Right to, or lawfully may poſſeſs, all Things: And act, againſt All, whatſoever he himſelf ſhall judge neceſſary to his own Preſervation. Major Propoſition.

But, to poſſeſs all Things, and to do all Things againſt All, every one will judge neceſſary to his own Preſervation. Minor Propoſition.

Therefore every one has a Right to, and lawfully may poſſeſs, all Things: And act againſt All, whatſoever he himſelf ſhall judge neceſſary for his own Preſervation. Concluſion.

Now, leſt it might ſo happen that Mr. *Hobbes*'s Treatiſe *De Cive*, cannot eaſily be had: And, leſt it ſhould be imagined that I miſrepreſent his Argument, I ſhall here give a ſhort Account of his Reaſoning, and in his own Words, as delivered to us in his Annotations at Article 10.

" Every one has a Right to preſerve himſelf, *per* Art. 7. Every one " therefore, has the Right of uſing all Means neceſſary to this End, " *per* Art. 8.

" But the Means neceſſary are ſuch, as he himſelf ſhall judge and de- " termine to be ſuch Means, *per* Art. 9.

" Every one, therefore, has a Right to do every Thing, and to poſſeſs " all Things, according as he himſelf ſhall judge and determine neceſſary " to his own Preſervation."

And then, as to what is done, whether it be right or wrong in itſelf, it matters not, becauſe, " Every ſuch Act entirely and only depends " upon the Opinion and Determination of the Agent."

The Propoſition therefore laid down concludes true, *viz.*

That, in a State of Nature, every one has a Right to do every Thing againſt all, *&c.*

From his laſt Conſequence it appears, that every one has a Right to do and to poſſeſs all Things, according as he himſelf ſhall judge neceſſary, *&c.*

Therefore, every one has a Right to do and to poſſeſs all Things againſt all.

Here then it is manifeſt that this Minor Propoſition muſt be underſtood in the Senſe and Meaning following, namely, thus: But every one will judge it neceſſary, for his own Preſervation, to poſſeſs all Things, and to act againſt All.

For, to underſtand it in any other Senſe: That is, ſuppoſing the minor Propoſition to be left out; the Concluſion cou'd not follow from the major Propoſition laid down in the Syllogiſm.

Here then, by the Bye, we are to obſerve, that both Premiſſes in the Syllogiſm are falſe.

Becauſe, in the firſt Place, the minor Propoſition is underſtood. And this minor Propoſition he ſeems to ſuppoſe ſo evidently taken for granted, that he wou'd not even produce it: (Not to ſay any thing of proving it:) Unleſs perhaps he may imagine it ſufficiently proved from what he has ſaid at his ſeventh Section, namely, "That every one is led to the De-"ſire of whatſoever he ſhall judge to be for the Good of himſelf, and "that ſuch a Deſire is influenced by as natural, and as equally ſtrong a "Neceſſity, as that Neceſſity whereby a Stone, or any other heavy Body, "is carried downwards."

I don't, however, ſee any Reaſon, even this Suppoſition being taken for granted, why every one ſhould judge every Good neceſſary for himſelf.

Mr. *Hobbes*, truly, in another Place of this Book, Chap. 1. Section 4. *De Cive*, acknowledges fairly and openly, that there are ſome who entertain a different Opinion. His Words are theſe. "For, one allows to "the reſt, according to a natural Equality, all thoſe Advantages which "he allows to himſelf: And this is a Behaviour, he ſays, becoming a "modeſt Man who forms a right Eſtimate of his own Abilities."

Mr. Hobbes's Definition of Right from his own Principles muſt be abſurd.

If any Man whatſoever be really modeſt, who determines according to right Reaſon, and who allows to others the ſame Advantages which he aſſumes to himſelf, he cannot ſurely claim any Right to himſelf upon the groundleſs abſurd extravagant Notion, "That every one may, "and ought to aſſume and arrogate ALL to SELF, as the Means neceſſary "to Self-Preſervation."

Pray obſerve Mr. *Hobbes*'s own Definition of *Jus*, or Right, in his Book *De Cive*, Chap. 1. Section 7. where he calls it, "The Liberty of "uſing natural Powers and Faculties according to right Reaſon."

And, therefore, it cannot come within the Definition of Right for any one (1) to confound and overturn that natural Equality, which, (*i. e.* na-

(1) *To confound and overturn that natural Equality*, &c.] If 20, or 20000, or, &c. have all an equal Right to the ſame Property, then, according to Reaſon, each upon an equal Dividend has a Right to his own Share, *i. e.* to $\frac{1}{20}$, or $\frac{1}{20000}$, or, &c. Part, if 20 Men for Inſtance have a Right to 20 Pounds, each Man in fact has only a Right to one Pound. *See the Rules of* Fellowſhip with and without Time *in* Vulgar Arithmetick. *See* Echard *againſt* Hobbes.

tural

tural Equality) right Reaſon dictates, according to that Confeſſion of his, juſt now mentioned.

But—beſides all this—ſuppoſing each Individual to judge according to right Reaſon :—Yet, what will all this ſignify, if, at the ſame Time, each is at his own arbitrary Will to determine for himſelf, a full Diſpoſal, Uſe and Enjoyment of all Things and Perſons. Notwithſtanding, at the ſame Time, that the arbitrary Will and Pleaſure of each, may differ as widely from the arbitrary Will and Pleaſure of every other Individual, as can poſſibly be imagined. Could we, I ſay, ſuppoſe the Determinations of each Individual in ſuch a Diſpoſal of Things and Perſons as this neceſſary to the Well-being and Preſervation of each and all, we might then fairly from hence conclude the Fact to be ſo. Becauſe, a Thing (which happens naturally) always is as right Reaſon determines it.

Whereas, the Caſe in Fact is really ſo far otherwiſe, that not only the general Laws of Matter and Motion, but alſo common univerſal Experience, with an united Evidence, demonſtrate how abſolutely impoſſible it is for any one phyſical or natural Body (not to mention Animal Bodies, Human Bodies, *&c.*) to receive a Motion an Impulſe, a Tendency from (1) as many various and contrary Influences at one and the ſame Time, as there are oppoſite contrary Wills and Inclinations amongſt Mankind, in the Uſe and Exerciſe of the very one ſelf-ſame Capacity or Power.

And conſequently, upon the whole, Mr. *Hobbes*'s Doctrine is impoſſible, from the Nature of Things, which (*i. e.* the Nature of Things) ſuppoſes it neceſſary, that each and every one Individual muſt and ought to judge and determine according to right Reaſon.

SECT. XXVIII.

MY Readers, I believe, by this Time perceive the Reaſon why I have placed, amongſt ſuch Notices as are principally neceſſary to the Knowledge of Nature's Laws,

Three fundamental Maxims neceſſary to underſtand the Laws of Nature.

Firſt, This one ſelf-evident Obſervation, namely, "*That the Capacities and Uſes, as well of Perſons as Things, are limited.*"

For, from this eaſy, plain Obſervation, Mr. *Hobbes*'s principal Miſtake (and which by the Bye, is the Foundation of all his Morality and Politics) is expoſed and laid open: And, from the ſame Obſervation alſo, *Secondly*, This moſt beneficial Truth is inferr'd: Namely, that, both *the Uſes in Things, and the Capacities, the Powers, the Abilities of Perſons, muſt neceſſarily, from the Nature of Things, be employed diſtinctly and ſeverally:* That is, they muſt be applied, determined, fixed and limited

(1) *As many various and contrary Influences*, &c.] Suppoſe a Body placed in the Center of a Circle, and drawn by equal Forces to all Points of the Circumference, muſt it not continue in an abſolute State of Reſt?

to *One at a Time*, in caſe we are, with Sincerity, inclined and willing that they ſhould produce their whole full Effects; and conſequently, if we have a Mind to anſwer and ſerve the Public.

From the ſame ſelf-evident Obſervation alſo; *Thirdly, Where the Right of many to enjoy Things in common is equal, the prior Right of a firſt Occupancy muſt always carry the Preference.* What we have here offered fully demonſtrates, that the minor Propoſition of Mr. *Hobbes*'s Syllogiſm directly contradicts thoſe general Notions, upon which the Laws of Syllogiſm are grounded.

The major Propoſition of this Syllogiſm is with great Dexterity and artful Caution defended by Mr. *Hobbes*; but as we ſhall, in the future Chapters of our *Enquiry*, have Occaſion to take this Propoſition to Pieces, it may not, perhaps, be ſo proper to enter into any farther Controverſy about it at preſent; and the Reaſon is, becauſe the Nature of ſuch a Right, as is aſſerted in this Propoſition, cannot be diſtinctly apprehended, unleſs ſome Knowledge of the Laws of Nature be firſt laid down and ſtated, determined and ſettled.

A Knowledge of the Laws of Nature neceſſary to determine the true Notion of *Right*.

Mr. *Hobbes* then, in my Opinion, tranſgreſſes, when (altho', in his Definition of *Right*, he fairly and openly confeſſes his Meaning of *Right* to be ſuch a Liberty as the Laws allow, *De Cive*, Chap. 14. Sect. 3.) he ſuppoſes ſuch a Right or Liberty to be originally in Mankind: And then, in the next Place, he commits to them an unlimited, lawleſs Power in the Exerciſe of ſuch a Right or Liberty; even before he has ſettled and defined what the *Laws of Nature* are. Whereas, it is certain, that, if no Regard be firſt had to theſe Laws, as of a prior Exiſtence, there is no Poſſibility of arriving at the Knowledge of any Right at all: And this, in Fact, was the Occaſion of leading Mr. *Hobbes* into all thoſe groſs and notorious Errors of his.

Now, that Mr. *Hobbes* has erred in this grievous Manner, may be eaſily gathered from his own Definition of *Right*. For, he has defined *Right* to be the Liberty of uſing the natural Powers and Faculties according to right Reaſon: Which is directly the ſame with the Law of Nature itſelf; of which Law he has not hitherto taken the leaſt Notice.

However, ſince this Syllogiſm of his is now before us, we ſhall, in few Words, ſhew him how he proves his major Propoſition, that the Falſity of it may appear more clear and unqueſtionable.

His Demonſtration, as I have reduced it into the Syllogiſtic Form, ſtands thus:

Major Propoſition. Every one has a Right to poſſeſs all Things, and to act againſt all, in the Manner he, in his own Judgment, ſhall determine neceſſary to the Preſervation of Life, *&c.*

Minor Propoſition. But, whatſoever he himſelf ſhall determine neceſſary, the ſame, as a Judge, he adjudges neceſſary to the Preſervation of Life, *&c.*

Therefore

Therefore he himſelf is the Judge of Things neceſſary to Self-preſervation, *per* Article the 9th. Concluſion.

The Senſe and Meaning of his major Propoſition is comprehended in his own Words, as they ſtand in Article 10th.

" But we conſtitute the individual Perſon himſelf the Judge, whether " Things really and truly conduce to this End or no. So that ſuch " Things muſt be accounted neceſſary, which he himſelf judges to " be ſo."

" And (*per* Art. 7.) by the Right of Nature ſuch Things become ne- " ceſſary are, and muſt be accounted neceſſary, which neceſſarily conduce " to the Defence of his own Life and Limbs."

Now——I maintain, in Oppoſition to Mr. *Hobbes*, that his major Propoſition is falſe. See Mr. Hobbes's Syllogiſm in this Section.

Firſt, For the Sake of a greater Good, either,

1. The Happineſs of the Soul;

Or, 2. The Glory of God;

Or, 3. The common Good of Mankind.

Upon all and every one of theſe three Accounts, I ſay, we ought to ſacrifice our Lives: Becauſe, theſe are the three principal Concerns of every human Creature; even ſuppoſing that a Neglect of this Kind ſhould prove the neceſſary Means to preſerve Life.

Secondly, Mr. *Hobbes*'s major Propoſition is falſe, becauſe, in a State of Nature, a Judge might falſely pronounce Things neceſſary, which in Truth and Reality are not ſo. Neither, indeed, can any poſſible Reaſon be aſſigned, why the Sentence of a Judge in a State of Nature ſhould bind, and carry a Sanction ſufficient to confer a Right upon any one, in Caſe ſuch a Sentence contradicts and diſagrees with the Rule of judging. There are certain determined Rules of judging Right.

Now, *the Rule of judging* in ſuch a State, is, the Laws of Nature, and the Nature of Things, from whence theſe Laws are drawn and formed: So that, the Point reſts juſt where it did, ſuppoſing either of them (*i. e.* either the Laws of Nature, or the Nature of Things) the Rule of judging.

It is impoſſible to conceive a State wherein there is not ſome Rule for the Conduct and Regulation of the human Judgment; or wherein Things will alter, change and vary in an Inſtant, juſt as a fickle, raſh, precarious Judgment ſhall determine: Notwithſtanding that ſuch Determinations of the Mind ſhall carry in them the fulleſt Contradictions. The human Judgment not precarious and fickle.

The Uſes and Conveniencies of ſuch Things as preſerve the human Life, and, what is ſtill much more, the Neceſſity of Things contrived for this End, all depend upon the natural Powers and Capacities of Things: Neither can any ſuch Neceſſity be arbitrarily changed at Pleaſure, to gratify either the Fancy or Humour of any Man.

(1) Suppoſe

(1) Suppoſe any one, in a State of Nature, ſhould take it in his Head to pronounce Hemlock a ſalutary Plant, and the proper Nouriſhment and Support of himſelf: Suppoſe, conformable to this Opinion, he ſhould ſwallow down large Draughts of Hemlock-juice, would Hemlock, for this Reaſon, become ſalutary and wholeſome?

Groſſly abſurd indeed is ſuch a Thought as this.——Becauſe the very Experiment would, in ſpite of ſuch a Determination, infallibly kill the very Man who pronounced Hemlock wholeſome.

The Nature of Good unchangeable.

Neither are the Efficacies and Powers leſs fixed and ſettled, of ſuch Things as prove either good or evil to the whole human Species, whether they reſult from the voluntary Acts of Mankind (about which Acts the Law of Nature or Moral Philoſophy is concerned:) Or, whether they be the natural, operative Powers of Aliments and Medicines, concerning which the Art of Phyſic inſtitutes Rules.

Neither are Things changed by the Opinions of Mankind, whether they be Judges with or without any ſuch Appellation and Title.

According to the ſame unalterable Laws of Motion do theſe univerſal general Cauſes act, which prove either beneficial or hurtful to Multitudes: And juſt in the ſame Way that any particular Cauſe, as for Inſtance, Hemlock, deprives, which deprives only one ſingle Man of Life.

(1) *Suppoſe any one, in a State of Nature, ſhould take it in his Head to pronounce Hemlock*, &c.] Sed antiquorum curam diligentiamque quis poſſit ſatis venerari, cum conſtet omnium venenorum ocyſſimum eſſe aconitum, & tactis quoque genitalibus fœminini ſexûs animalium eodem die inferre mortem? Hoc fuit venenum, quo interemptas dormientes à Calphurnio Beſtiâ uxores M. Cæcilius accuſator objecit. Hinc illa atrox peroratio, ejus in digito mortuas. Fabulæ Narravere, à ſpumis Cerberi canis, extrahente ab inferis Hercule, ideoque apud Heracleam Ponticam, ubi monſtratur is ad inferos aditus, gigni. Hoc quoque tamen in uſus humanæ ſalutis vertere, ſcorpionum ictibus adverſari, experiendo datum in vino calido. Ea eſt natura ut hominem occidat, niſi invenerit quod in homine perimat. Cum eo ſolo colluctatur, velut pari intùs invento. Sola hæc pugna eſt, cum venenum in viſceribus reperit: Mirumque, exitialia per ſe ambo cum ſint, duo venena in homine commoriuntur, ut homo ſuperſit. Imò verò etiam ferarum remedia antiqui prodiderunt, demonſtrando quomodo venenata quoque ipſa ſanarentur. Torpeſcunt ſcorpiones aconiti tactu, ſtupentque pallentes, & vinci ſe confitentur. Auxiliatur eis elleborum album, tactu reſolvente: Ceditque aconitum duobus malis, ſuo & omnium. Quod ſi quis illa fortè ab homine excogitari potuiſſe credit, ingrate deorum munera intelligit. Tangunt carnes aconito, necantque guſtatu earum pantheras, niſi hoc fieret, repleturas illos ſitus. Ob id quidam pardalianches appellavere. At illas ſtatim liberari morte, excrementorum hominis guſtu, demonſtratum. Quod certè caſu repertum quis dubitet? Et quoties fiat etiam nunc ut novum naſci, quoniam feris ratio & uſus inter ſe tradi non poſſit. *C. Plinii ſecundi Naturalis Hiſtoriæ*, Lib. 27. Cap. 2. Pag. 114. Vol. III. Edit. 1668. *Lugd. Batav. Roterodami apud Hackeos. Octavo.*

SECT.

SECT. XXIX.

MR. *Hobbes*'s Error (concerning the binding Force of that Sentence which falſely pronounces a Dominion, a Right over all Perſons and in all Things, as neceſſary to Self-preſervation.

The Sentence of a Judge, in a particular Caſe, no Vindication of Mr. Hobbes.

His Error in maintaining that Sentence, which decrees to any Perſon or Perſons ſo unbounded a Right) ariſes, as I apprehend, from hence; that he has obſerved in Civil Society the Sentence of a Judge, who ſits ſupreme in a Court, to bind the Subject, notwithſtanding that the Sentence or Decree has been directly againſt the true Nature of the Thing, and the true Merits of the Cauſe. An accidental Caſe, now and then, perhaps, happening thus (as carrying in it a Probability only) might be introduced into Civil Society, by the Conſent of Parties, in order to put an End to Strife and Contention.

See Appendix, p. 64.

The Decrees of Princes no Argument in Favour of Mr. Hobbes.

The Determination, the Sentence even of a Prince, does not, however, ſo far prevail, that Things which either are in their own Natures impoſſible; or, which are not neceſſary to the Preſervation of Life in general, ſhould change and become neceſſary to any ſuch End. A Prince may and can, beyond all Controverſy, decree and make over a Property in Things, which Subjects cannot, without Rebellion, contradict.

For, all the Subjects of Civil Society, whenever there is Occaſion, muſt acknowledge a ſupreme Arbitrator, a ſupreme Judge, equally indifferent to all. From the original, ſocial Contract they are ſuppoſed to acquieſce under, and ſubmit to his Arbitration in all Points of Debate and Litigation, and that with their own voluntary Conſent. Every Perſon who is conſtituted an Arbitrator, or a Judge of righ t orwrong, is ſuppoſed to be a Perſon choſen out of the moſt ſkilful Lawyers; a Perſon able, and by ſolemn Oath obliged, to determine and give Sentence according to well-known eſtabliſhed Laws, according to Allegations and Proofs, and according to a true State of the Caſe.

Small Inconveniencies paſs unnoticed rather than violate public Happineſs.

Now, notwithſtanding all that upright Integrity in decreeing and pronouncing Judgment; yet it is, however, univerſally allowed that the public Happineſs is, at ſome particular Times, more effectually promoted and ſecured by permitting ſome ſmall Inconveniencies, which might poſſibly ariſe from Determinations not ſo critically impartial, than, That Strife and Contention ſhould either laſt for ever, or be decided by Blood-ſhed and Slaughter, Fire and Sword. So that, even in ſuch Caſes, a Concern for the common Good, is always ſuppoſed of much weightier Conſequence, than the Concern for any one Individual. And—this Power of Judging and Determining, may very well be ſuppoſed the Baſis or Foundation of that Prerogative granted to Rulers and Governors in all Civil Societies.

Diſcretionary Powers in Rulers and Judges neceſſary.

Now, in ſuch a State of Nature as Mr. *Hobbes* ſuppoſes, and under which State he defines the Condition of Mankind to appear, out of Civil Society; in ſuch a State as this, it is impoſſible, I ſay, that the Decrees,

crees, Arbitrations, Sentences, Judgments, *&c.* juſt now mentioned, can prevail and take Place.

A ſupreme Arbitration in Civil Society muſt ſomewhere be lodged.

Becauſe, ſuppoſing every one a Judge, which is Mr. *Hobbes*'s Suppoſition, there cannot be imagined either that Skill or that Integrity, in the which every Judge muſt and ought to excel. Where, in ſuch a State, could be the Authority lodged to ſummons and examine Witneſſes? How could all the other Requiſites be performed which are neceſſary towards a diſtinct, a clear Knowledge of the Cauſe at any Time under Conſideration? And yet all theſe are Points of ſuch important Conſequence, that the Neceſſity of them appears every Day in Courts of civil Judicature.

No mix'd Aſſembly in this natural State of All can be ſuppoſed, wherein Each and every one will ſubmit himſelf and his neceſſary Concerns, to the Judgment and Integrity of only nominal, ruling, ſupreme Powers.

Neither, indeed, is there the leaſt Reaſon why Mankind ſhould, in a mere State of Nature, indulge any particular Perſons, however ignorant and corrupt, with ſo full an Execution of ſupreme Authority as this is, *viz.* the Power of judging.

Doubtful Points in a State of Nature can be determined from Things themſelves only.

Whereas the Fact, in Truth and Reality, is ſo far otherwiſe, that a State of Nature cannot poſſibly admit of any other final Determination, in doubtful Matters, than ſuch as ariſes from Things themſelves: Or, where the Evidence, ariſing from moral Teſtimony, is ſo clear and unqueſtionable, that it does not labour under the leaſt Apprehenſion of Doubt or Impoſition. And—what we may alſo farther add—there could not poſſibly be any End put to Strife and Contention, unleſs ſome one or more of the Parties contending, influenced either by Weight of Proof, or by an high Opinion of Skill and Veracity in another, can be ſuppoſed willing to yield to and abide by ſuch a Determination.

For the Nature of Judgment [an Operation of the Mind] with which all Mankind ſeem ſo intimately well acquainted, diſcovers to us, that no Scruple or Doubt can be removed by Compulſion, but by Conviction only; and by ſuch Arguments as are deduced and drawn either from the Nature of Things, or from the Weight and Authority of ſome one or more Inſtructors; and whoſe Authority the Opinion of the Perſon informed embraces. (1) *Nature acknowledges* the Diſtinction *between Judgment* true and falſe, *between right Reaſon* and perverſe Obſtinacy.

The true Notion of human Liberty.

Truth and right Reaſon (ſo very natural to the Mind of Man) confer upon him a Right, a Privilege of acting as right Reaſon directs.

(1) *Nature acknowledges*, &c.] *i. e.* There is a Truth in all Nature which is the Foundation of true Judgment, of right Reaſon: The Truths of Nature differ from Judgment and Reaſon, only as the Object differs from the Faculty, *i. e. between Judgment and no Judgment.*

For, falſe Judgment is no Judgment at all: Judgment is only a mere Affirmation or Negation, juſt as Things are; Judgment not grounded upon Truth is Falſhood. *That Reaſon which is not right*, is no Reaſon at all. *See* Collins's *Book*, Diſcourſe upon Freethinking, *with the Anſwer to it, by* (*Doctor* Bentley) Phileleutheros Lipſienſis.

For,

For, the very Definition of Right, or Privilege, is neither more nor leſs than the *Liberty of applying and uſing our natural Powers and Faculties, according to right Reaſon.*

Whereas Error, or a falſe Judgment of the Mind, whether it be concerning Things neceſſary to the Preſervation of Life; or whether employed upon other Matters of Practice, does not impower any Man to act whatſoever he may falſely imagine, conducive and neceſſary to the Preſervation of his own Life. Becauſe the Reaſon of a Man deluded by Error and Miſtake, is not right Reaſon: Neither can any Man, according to the Rules of right Reaſon, uſe his own Powers and Capacities (*i. e.* act) right, whilſt he is enſlaved by Error, in flat Contradiction to all the Freedom of Reaſon. It is a groſs Miſtake therefore in Mr. *Hobbes* to aſſert, That all Things, in a State of Nature, muſt be conſidered as neceſſary to the Preſervation of SELF, which each Perſon ſhall judge and determine neceſſary for himſelf; or, that a Right, conſequently, is compatible to every one, of acting as he pleaſes, in all Caſes, and againſt All.

Surely then it was, in the higheſt Degree imaginable, unbecoming in Mr. *Hobbes* to miſtake upon ſo obvious a Point, and in the Manner he did.

Firſt, Becauſe it is mean and low to beſtow upon every one the Privileges peculiar to Civil Society in a State of Nature.

Secondly, Becauſe he pretends to diſtinguiſh, even to a minute Exactneſs, the Difference between theſe two States.

And, *Thirdly*, For this more demonſtrative Reaſon, becauſe it is a natural Impoſſibility for one and the ſame Body to move at the ſame Time, according to the contradictory Wills of Mankind, towards two Places diametrically oppoſite to each other.

All Mr. *Hobbes*'s mighty Boaſt, then, amounts only to this, That he has demonſtrated the Suppoſition, that is, the Contradiction here proved upon him, neceſſary. Now this Concluſion of his renders the Truth of his Premiſſes very ſuſpicious.

Firſt, Becauſe all thoſe Properties which Mr. *Hobbes*, in this Doctrine of his, attributes to Civil Society, muſt at once fall to the Ground, this chief Corner-ſtone, this mighty Foundation of his being demoliſhed!

The Right of every one to All, neceſſary to Self-preſervation in a State of Nature, being once well confuted, deſtroys all thoſe Properties, &c.

Secondly, Becauſe that State of War, which from hence he has deduced, as neceſſarily agreeing with the State of Nature, at once ceaſes. Art. 12.

For, from the arbitrary Opinion of each Perſon, every one has a Right to invade and fall upon all the reſt of Mankind: And, by the ſame Parity of Reaſon alſo, each and every Perſon has a Right to reſiſt.

From whence (obſerve Mr. *Hobbes*'s Concluſion) *War muſt neceſſarily enſue.* A very raſh, a very unwarrantable Concluſion indeed!

By the very ſame unhappy Fatality all his other Concluſions upon the ſame Principles, and which he calls Demonſtrations, fall to the Ground alſo.

These ſtrange Poſitions of his will yet admit of a ſtill more ſolid Confutation, when once we have more firmly eſtabliſhed thoſe Principles from whence ariſe both *the Laws of Nature, and that Liberty* granted to each, within thoſe Limits and Bounds, which theſe Laws limit and circumſcribe.

What I ſhall here, by the Bye, offer, is only this; That Mr. *Hobbes*, in his firſt Chapter, which is now under our Examination, has laid down an End too poor, narrow and confined, namely, *the Defence of Life and Limbs merely.* Now, theſe Bleſſings may be ſufficiently ſecured to thoſe who are, in all other Reſpects, very miſerable. The Means alſo, to this End propoſed, are equally poor, narrow and confined (*See* Chap. 1. Sect. 8.) that is, he propoſes Means merely and only neceſſary.

Whereas this univerſal Syſtem which we inhabit, when once it falls under our Notice, ſupplies us with numberleſs Obſervations, exciting the human Mind to acknowledge and adore the Firſt Cauſe of all: And if we turn our Thoughts in upon ourſelves, by reflex Acts of the Mind, this Syſtem will greatly contribute likewiſe to compleat the Mind's Perfections; and not only preſerve Animal Life to the Body, but alſo as effectually promote the Health, Strength, Activity, Beauty and Ornaments of it.

This Syſtem of the Univerſe, when once obſerved and underſtood, will, beſides all this, afford Subject-matter *for Laws of Nature*, and lay the true Foundation of that *Liberty which we are to exert and apply according to right Reaſon.*

Now, ſince theſe, and ſuch Notices from Nature as theſe, are plain and obvious, to Perſons not over inquiſitive and curious, inſomuch that it is impoſſible they could eſcape Mr. *Hobbes*'s Obſervation; it is very eaſy to gueſs why Mr. *Hobbes* did not aſſign a nobler, a more comprehenſive End to *Right or Dominion* and *to the Laws of Nature*, than the poor Preſervation of this mortal Life.

Nay—even ſuppoſing us to allow, that the Soul was breathed into Man's Noſtrils, as into thoſe of a Swine, for no other End and Deſign but to ſupply the Place, as it were, of Salt, to keep the Body from Corruption: Yet Mr. *Hobbes*, at the ſame Time, in order to obtain this ſo mean and low an End, beſtows upon each individual Man, an univerſal Right over all Perſons and Things as *the neceſſary Means.*

Mr. *Hobbes* then, as we cannot but obſerve, has erred as much on the one Extreme as he has on the other.

And—to conclude this *Section*—no one Man alive can be imagined guilty of a fouler Offence againſt *Right Reaſon*, than to overlook and neglect the *beſt End poſſible*, and then to ſuppoſe *Impoſſibilities the neceſſary Means.*

SECT.

SECT. XXX.

MR. *Hobbes* then, to no kind of Purpoſe, we ſee, ſeeks Protection for this his moſt abſurd *Right of all Men to all Things*, from that original Uſe of Things in common, which certain Philſophers and which ſome Hiſtories have taught.

The original Uſe of Things in common, the Ground of Mr. Hobbes's Error.

For, beſides what Mr. *Selden* has proved, *That private Property, even from the Time of* Adam, was univerſally received and eſtabliſhed as a *Right*; and which *Right* he proved the Gift, Appointment and Deſignation of Almighty God himſelf, *Geneſis* i. 28. as you may ſee at large in that Treatiſe of his, intitled, *Mare Clauſum*, Book 1. Chap. 4. Beſides this Proof, it is, moreover, undoubtedly true, I ſay, that both Philoſophers and Hiſtorians have ſuppoſed, that the Uſe of a Right ſo generally received carried in it even then, in the earlieſt Age, the Sanction of *Private Property*; inaſmuch that whatſoever Share or Proportion any one had at firſt taken and aſſumed as his own, no other Perſon could, without a manifeſt Act of Injuſtice, without offering an Injury, take away from him.

Private Property an original Right, proved by John Selden, Eſq;

Cicero, in his third Book *De Finibus*, Chap. 20. ſays, That ſuch a Right as this may very fitly be compared to the uſual Cuſtom in a common Theatre, which, altho' it be common, yet *each Seat or Place* may very juſtly be eſteemed *his* who firſt occupies and takes the Poſſeſſion of it. *See* Grotius De Jure Belli & Pacis, Book 1. Chap. 2.

How a common Right becomes a private Property for the Time being.

Mr. *Hobbes* is, indeed, the firſt of all Mankind who had the Aſſurance to maintain any ſuch "Right of *one* to *all*, and over both Perſons and Things; "which Right (if we can take his Word for it) comprehends and takes "in the Right of Rule, of Dominion over All: A Right coæval with "Nature itſelf." *De Cive*, Chap. 15. Sect. 5. "A Right commencing with the firſt Moment of Infancy;" notwithſtanding what he, at the ſame Time, aſſerts, *viz.* "That this Right is founded in Power: A "Right ſo binding and effectual, that no Part of it, no not even the mi-"nuteſt, is alienable." *De Cive*, Chap. 14. Sect. 9.

With Nature itſelf, i. e. with the Birth of each Perſon.

Here then, in the next Place, his Conſequence follows, "That it was "impoſſible for any one to invade and poſſeſs any Property or Right which "belonged to another:" And yet, at the ſame Inſtant of Time, he maintains, "how lawful it is to claim and arrogate a Right to every Thing." As for Inſtance; "That a promiſcuous, general, common Uſe of Wo-"men is lawful, and that, without any Saving to the ſolemn Ties of either "Marriage or Conſanguinity. That it is lawful, when any Violence "any Invaſion of this Sort is offered, to declare and enter into a War "againſt All. And, conſequently, that it is lawful to kill any one, even "the moſt innocent."

i. e. That it is lawful for the Adulterer and Inceſtuous to wage War.

Upon this glorious *Leviathan*-Foundation, eſtabliſhed by Mr. *Hobbes*, all Things, all Rights, muſt and are to be determined by the private Judgment of each Perſon: And, conſequently, that the Duties and Obligations due to Parents, may at Pleaſure be either exerted or with-held.

It happens very unlucky all this While, that Mr. *Hobbes* forgets what he himſelf has aſſerted in another Part of his Book *De Cive*, Chap. 1. Sect. 10. *in the Annotations.*

That Civil Society can create the Ties, the Rights of Nature, a Poſition only fit for Mr. Hobbes.

" That no ſuch Thing as a Sin can be imagined in a State of Nature; " and, conſequently, that no Right proper for ſuch a State, could take " place in Children." Of the ſame Stamp is alſo what Mr. *Hobbes* has added at the End of his ninth Article, Chap. 14. namely, " That Teſti- " mony is not of the leaſt Uſe, either as to ſpeaking Truth or Falſhood, " in a State of Nature; becauſe (ſays he) there are not any public De- " crees, Judgments, Sentences, *&c.* in ſuch a State." Why then, if a private Judge has no Buſineſs at all with Teſtimony of any Kind, in order to pronounce Sentence, neither has an Arbitrator between contending Parties any Buſineſs to be elected to ſettle Differences, if falſe Teſtimony (as being deſtructive of the common Good) be not criminal, even antecedent and prior and independent of all Laws of Civil Inſtitution. And then immediately, in the ſame Paſſage, he proceeds to tell us, to aſſert, " That " the Commands of the ſecond Table of the Decalogue, are no other than " Laws of Civil Inſtitution only."

We may alſo here farther add that remarkable Paſſage of his which more than once in his Writings he expreſſly mentions.

" Quod in ratiocinatione falſâ, ſive in ſtultitiâ hominum, officia ſua, " erga cæteros homines, ad conſervationem propriam neceſſaria, non vi- " dentium (quidni & non obſervantium ?) omnis conſiſtit legum natura- " lium violatio." *De Cive*, Chap. 2. Sect. 1. *in Annotat.* & *De Cive*, Chap. 3. Sect. 27.

" That the whole Violation of the Laws of Nature eſſentially and " entirely conſiſts in the falſe Reaſoning; that is, in the Stupidity or Ig- " norance of thoſe who do not apprehend (and pray why may not we alſo " add, who do not practice ?) the relative Duties, as the Means neceſſary " to Self-preſervation."

Mr. *Hobbes* acknowledges, That Laws, in a State of Nature, always carry an Obligation over the inward Seat of Judgment, the (1) *Conſcience.* And that theſe Laws therefore at leaſt, to ſay no more, lay upon the human Mind the Obligation of a clear Determination, namely,

That a Right to all Things, and a Dominion over all Perſons, are not, cannot be, neceſſarily required to the Preſervation of each and every one Individual.

(1) *Conſcience.*] Conſcientia eſt habitus intellectus practici, *&c. Vid.* Sanderſon.

Now

Now if every one Perſon is under an Obligation, a moral Neceſſity, to judge and determine thus, why then it follows, that his Judgment (if it can be called Judgment) is nugatory, trifling, vain, who thinks and determines the contrary: Neither from ſo groſs an Error as this can ſo monſtrous and domineering a Right over all as this ariſe.

In a Word, there cannot poſſibly be any Right of acting, contrary either to the *Law of Nature*, or any Dictate of *Right Reaſon*.

Becauſe *Right* is defined, *the Liberty of acting according to Right Reaſon*.

Now, *Right Reaſon*, as we prove demonſtratively, diſcovers the abſolute Neceſſity there is for private Property, or the diſtinct, ſeparate Diviſion of Things: And, which diſtinct, ſeparate Right, even according to Mr. *Hobbes*'s own Confeſſion, forbids the arrogating and aſſuming any Right in, and Dominion over all.

SECT. XXXI.

It is proved againſt Mr. Hobbes, that Injury and Injuſtice can be committed, ſuppoſing no Laws of Civil Inſtitution and Compact.

LET us now proceed to examine into the other Proofs produced by Mr. *Hobbes*, to eſtabliſh this wild Notion of his.

In the Beginning of his *Annotations* to Article 10. Chap. 1. *De Cive*, he ſeems to inſinuate, that "Let any one Man act by another as he will, "in a State of mere Nature, he cannot do the leaſt Injury to any Man liv- "ing:" And his Reaſon is, "becauſe an Injuſtice againſt all, *ſuppoſes* "Laws of human Inſtitution, which Laws carry no Force, no Obligation "in ſuch a State."

He grants, however, "even ſuppoſing a State of Nature only, that a "Crime, an Offence, may be committed, both againſt *God*, and againſt "*the Laws of Nature*." But, if ſo, it is a moſt egregious, abſurd Falſhood, which Mr. *Hobbes* ſuppoſes, and without even the leaſt Shew of Proof, That *an Injury done to Mankind ſuppoſes human Laws*.

For, ſuppoſing the *Laws of Nature* to be Dictates of *Right Reaſon* which relate to Almighty God himſelf only; yet, from theſe Laws or Dictates, a Power agreeable to Reaſon is derived by Almighty God upon Man, over all ſuch Things as right Reaſon proves and demonſtrates, to have been thus granted by Almighty God to him.

As for Example. Every innocent Man has a Right,

1. To his Life.
2. To his Limbs in their beſt State of Perfection. And,
3. To neceſſary Suſtenance.

For without theſe three natural Bleſſings, no one, as is moſt evident, can prove of any Service to the Public.

And

And conſequently, That Man, let him be whom you will, is injured, if any Perſon, agreeable to Mr. *Hobbes*'s Opinion, ſhould either maim or kill him, in order to arrogate and aſſume all to himſelf.

For all Violence, all Reſiſtance offered to the Right of another is an Injury, let the Law be what it will which originally conferred ſuch a Right upon him: And much more ſo, if ſuch a Right be granted by the Divine Law, even in Preference to any Human Law or Civil Compact whatſoever.

Mr. *Hobbes* here ſuppoſes, That no one Perſon can injure another, unleſs (by ſome prior Agreement which ſettles Right) it appears that ſuch a Perſon has transferred and made over to another his own natural Power of doing whatſoever he himſelf pleaſes.

But——this is a begging of the Queſtion, and takes for granted, as a Point proved, namely, "The Right which every Man has of doing whatſoever he himſelf pleaſes."——A Right which we demonſtrate to be impoſſible, and therefore Mr. *Hobbes* poorly, and to no manner of Purpoſe, takes a Prop for his weak, tottering, fundamental Doctrine, from this one Corollary juſt now mentioned; a Corollary which entirely depends upon that ſuppoſed *Right of every one and all to and over all:* A ſuppoſed Right, which I have entirely overthrown and proved groundleſs.

Mr. *Hobbes* not only here (*Annot. to* Art. 10. Chap. 1. *De Cive*) openly and avowedly maintains, That "no Injury can be done to another "with whom we have not actually entered into a formal Compact or "Agreement."

In ſome other Parts of his Writings, however, he, with more ſolid and ſounder Reaſoning (and which really is the Truth) has as publicly maintained, "That whatſoever Act is committed contrary to right Reaſon "is an actual Injury." *See* De Cive, Chap. 2. Sect. 1.

Since, therefore, we all allow that any Thing may lawfully be done which does not contradict right Reaſon, we muſt conclude, upon the ſame Strength of Argument, That every Thing is injurious which contradicts right Reaſon. And, conſequently, Mr. *Hobbes*, at the very ſame Time, acknowledges this Law of *right Reaſon* to be THE LAW.

Mr. *Hobbes*, to be ſure, in this Paſſage, does not require us to transfer our own Right, in order that Injury may follow; for which Reaſon, whenſoever he acknowledges the Dictates of Reaſon to be Divine Laws, we muſt beſeech him to ſhew ſome Cauſe or Impediment why theſe very ſame Laws ſhould not confer upon every Man ſuch a Right to Life, which (*i. e.* Right) without an open Breach upon theſe very Laws cannot be deſtroyed: Or, to ſhew, how it can poſſibly come to paſs, that any one Man ſhould have a Right to act againſt, and break in upon the Rights of another. For that Right, and no other, which every one truly has, is ſuch a Liberty as is granted by right Reaſon, which can never allow to any one

Part

Part of Mankind a Power of thwarting, contradicting, counteracting and reſiſting the reſt.

When all Mankind, at the ſame Time, are under an indiſpenſable, moral Neceſſity, of both ſpeaking and acting according to the poſitive, preſcribed Laws of right Reaſon, it certainly then is vain, empty Talk in Mr. *Hobbes* to aſſert, That the Injury or Affront is only offered to Almighty God, when the divine Laws alone are tranſgreſſed and violated, unleſs he is able, *Firſt*, to prove, That theſe divine Laws cannot confer a Right upon Man to enjoy his Life, his Limbs, and the Neceſſaries of Life; and unleſs he is able to prove alſo, *Secondly*, That theſe Laws cannot, by an equally-binding Obligation, prohibit the Violation of any Right granted to another.

But—here—by the Bye—it may not ſeem improper to add this one ſingle Remark; namely,

That if an Injury or an Affront conſiſts in the Violation of thoſe Agreements only which concern the Transference of Right, then there cannot be, indeed, according to Mr. *Hobbes*'s Principles, any Injury or Affront offered to Almighty God; notwithſtanding that the *Laws of Nature* (including even thoſe Laws eſtabliſhed by Almighty God himſelf) be violated: Whether, *Firſt*, ſuch Laws be conſidered as Laws which ſettle Peace amongſt Mankind; or, *Secondly*, whether they be conſidered as Laws which enforce the Worſhip and Adoration of Almighty God; or, *Thirdly*, whether they be conſidered as Laws which prohibit the blackeſt of all Crimes, even Blaſphemy itſelf.

Man, to be ſure, cannot be ſuppoſed to have ever entered into any formal Compact with Almighty God concerning the Obſervance due and to be paid to his Laws.—Nay,—even Mr. *Hobbes* himſelf allows (*De Cive*, Chap. 2. Sections 11 and 12.) that "No Compact can be entered into "with Almighty God, unleſs he, in his infinite Wiſdom, is pleaſed to "ſubſtitute and appoint certain Perſons (ſuch as are revealed in the holy "Scriptures) commiſſioned to propoſe and accept ſuch Compacts, Condi-"tions and Agreements."

God and Man are, then, according to Mr. *Hobbes*'s Doctrine, in ſuch a State of Hoſtility, that, without any Injury or Affront offered to Almighty God, Mankind may and can be his public, avowed Enemies: They have a Right, upon this atheiſtical Hypotheſis, with gigantic Bravery to rebel, and exerciſe Hatred againſt their Creator.

"God, it is true, indeed, Mr. *Hobbes* ſays, will have a Right to "deſtroy ſuch Rebels: But then, ſays he, this Right moſt certainly God "might, and with Juſtice, with equal Juſtice, have exerted over them, "had they not tranſgreſſed and rebelled againſt him."

Now thoſe Perſons (if any ſuch there be) who thus at once throw off all Reverence towards God.——Even ſo far, as not to acknowledge his Laws and Precepts; and who do not dread his Threats and Vengeance, are not conſidered as his Subjects, but as Enemies, as Rebels in Exile,

quite

quite baniſhed from the Kingdom of God; and againſt whom Almighty God can and will, whenever he is ſo pleaſed, raiſe the Arm of Power, of Vengeance, of Deſtruction. And this is what Mr. *Hobbes* even himſelf inſinuates, in his Book *De Cive*, Chap. 15. Sect. 2.

Whereas, according to thoſe true, rational Principles which I defend and maintain, thoſe Atheiſts and *Epicureans* even, who deny a Providence, are obliged by the Law of Nature, it being once ſufficiently promulged, to pay Obedience to Almighty God; and are born his Subjects even without any formal Compact on their Part entered into; and, conſequently, are to be puniſhed for their heinous Sins by Almighty God as rebellious Subjects; they are not to be attacked barely as Strangers not born under his Juriſdiction.

But—thus far only by the Bye.

SECT. XXXII.

The Abſurdity of Mr. Hobbes in endeavouring to eſtabliſh the Right of All over All.

In his Book *De Cive* he deduces the War of All againſt All, from the Right of All over All.

In his Leviathan he aſſerts, that every one is at full Liberty, has a Right to act as he himſelf pleaſes, in ſhort, to do every Thing; and his Reaſon is, becauſe a State of Nature is a State of War.

WE ſhall now, as being not at all improper, take under our Conſideration thoſe Arguments which our Author, in his *Leviathan*, has produced to eſtabliſh this his *Right of ALL over ALL*.

For, in the *Leviathan*, he endeavours to ſettle this Doctrine upon other Principles: Whereas in his Book *De Cive*, from this [his] *Right of all over all*, he deduces and infers "the War of *all againſt all*, as the true, original Source which can render ſuch a War both lawful and neceſſary." *See his Book* De Cive, Chap. 1. Sect. 12.

But, in his *Leviathan*, what he principally and chiefly endeavours to eſtabliſh, is, "That a State of Nature is a State of War;" and from hence, "it is lawful to do and to act every Thing in ſuch a State."

Now—That this is Mr. *Hobbes*'s Doctrine, any one may ſee who pleaſes to conſult the thirteenth Chapter of this Book, and to compare what is there ſaid, and what goes before, with (1) the ſtrange Aſſertions maintained at the End of this ſame thirteenth Chapter.

Beſides,

(1) *The ſtrange Aſſertions maintained at the End of this ſame thirteenth Chapter.*] This thirteenth Chapter of the *Leviathan* is of ſo peculiar a Caſt, and comprehends ſuch a Fulneſs of *Hobbian* Sentiments, that I ſhall deliver the whole in his own Words.

Leviathan, Chap. 13. *Of the natural Condition of Mankind, as concerning their Felicity and Miſery.*

Nature hath made Men ſo equal, in the Faculties of Body and Mind, as that though there be found one Man ſometimes manifeſtly ſtronger in Body, or of quicker Mind than another; yet when all is reckoned together, the Difference between Man and Man is not ſo conſiderable, as that one Man can thereupon claim to himſelf any Benefit, to which another may not pretend as well as he: For as to the Strength of Body, the weakeſt has Strength enough to kill the ſtrongeſt, either by ſecret Machination, or by Confederacy with others, that are in the ſame Danger with himſelf. And as to the Faculties of the Mind, (ſetting aſide the Arts grounded upon Words, and eſpecially that Skill of proceeding upon general and infallible

Beſides, ſays Mr. *Hobbes*, " from the War of *all againſt all*, the Con-
" ſequence is, that nothing can be called *unjuſt*; the Terms *Juſt* and *Un-*
" *juſt*

ble Rules, called *Science*; which very few have, and but in few Things; as being not a native Faculty, born with us; nor attained, (as Prudence) while we look after ſomewhat elſe) I find yet a greater Equality amongſt Men than that of Strength. For Prudence is but Experience, which equal Time equally beſtows on all Men, in thoſe Things they equally apply themſelves unto. That which may perhaps make ſuch Equality incredible, is but a vain Conceit of one's own Wiſdom, which almoſt all Men think they have in a greater Degree than the Vulgar; that is, than all Men but themſelves, and a few others, whom by Fame, or for concurring with themſelves, they approve. But ſuch is the Nature of Men, that howſoever they may acknowledge many others to be more witty, or more eloquent, or more learned; yet they will hardly believe there be many ſo wiſe as themſelves: For they ſee their own Wit at Hand, and other Mens at a Diſtance. But this proveth rather, that Men are in that Point equal, than unequal; for there is not ordinarily a greater Sign of the equal Diſtribution of any Thing, than that every Man is contented with his Share.

From this Equality of Ability, ariſeth Equality of Hope in the attaining of our Ends. And therefore if any two Men deſire the ſame Thing, which nevertheleſs they cannot both enjoy, they become Enemies; and in the way to their End (which is principally their own Conſervation and ſometimes their Delectation only) endeavour to deſtroy, or ſubdue one another. And from hence it comes to paſs, that where an Invader hath no more to fear than another Man's ſingle Power; if one plant, ſow, build, or poſſeſs a convenient Seat, other may probably be expected to come prepared with Forces united, to diſpoſſeſs and deprive him, not only of the Fruit of his Labour, but alſo of his Life or Liberty. And the Invader again is in the like Danger of another.

And from this Diffidence of one another, there is no way for any Man to ſecure himſelf, ſo reaſonable, as Anticipation; that is, by Force, or Wiles, to maſter the Perſons of all Men he can, ſo long, till he ſee no other Power great enough to endanger him: And this is no more than his own Conſervation requireth, and is generally allowed. Alſo becauſe there be ſome, that taking Pleaſure in contemplating their own Power in the Acts of Conqueſt, which they purſue farther than their Security requires; if others, that otherwiſe would be glad to be at Eaſe within modeſt Bounds, ſhould not by Invaſion increaſe their Power, they would not be able, long Time, by ſtanding only on their Defence, to ſubſiſt. And by Conſequence, ſuch Augmentation of Dominion over Men, being neceſſary to a Man's Conſervation, it ought to be allowed him.

Again, Men have no Pleaſure (but on the contrary a great deal of Grief) in keeping Company, where there is no Power able to over-awe them all. For every Man looketh that his Companion ſhould value him, at the ſame Rate he ſets upon himſelf: And upon all Signs of Contempt or Undervaluing, naturally endeavours, as far as he dares, (which amongſt them that have no common Power to keep them in quiet, is far enough to make them deſtroy each other) to extort a greater Value from his Contemners, by Damage; and from others by the Example.

So that, in the Nature of Man, we find three principal Cauſes of Quarrel. *Firſt*, Competition; *Secondly*, Diffidence; *Thirdly*, Glory. The firſt, maketh Men invade for Gain; the ſecond, for Safety; and the third, for Reputation. The firſt uſe Violence to make themſelves Maſters of other Mens Perſons, Wives, Children and Cattle; the ſecond, to defend them; the third, for Trifles, as a Word, a Smile, a different Opinion, and any other Sign of Undervalue, either direct in their Perſons, or by Reflection in their Kindred, their Friends, their Nation, their Profeſſion, or their Name.

Hereby it is manifeſt, that during the Time Men live without common Power to keep them all in Awe, they are in that Condition which is called *War*; and ſuch a War, as is of every Man, againſt every Man. For War conſiſteth not in Battle only, or the Act of fighting; but in a Tract of Time, wherein the Will to contend by Battle is ſufficiently known: And therefore the Notion of *Time*, is to be conſidered in the Nature of War; as it is in the Nature of Weather. For as the Nature of foul Weather, lyeth not in a Shower or two of

" *juſt* carrying in them, in ſuch a State, no Signification, no Meaning " at

Rain; but in an Inclination thereto of many Days together; ſo the Nature of War conſiſteth not in actual fighting, but in the known Diſpoſition thereto, during all the Time there is no Aſſurance to the contrary. All other Time is Peace.

Whatſoever, therefore, is conſequent to a Time of War, where every Man is Enemy to every Man; the ſame is conſequent to the Time wherein Men live without other Security, than what their own Strength and their own Invention ſhall furniſh them withal. In ſuch Condition, there is no Place for Induſtry; becauſe the Fruit thereof is uncertain: And conſequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigations, nor Uſe of the Commodities that may be imported by Sea; no Commodious Building; no Inſtruments of moving and removing ſuch Things as require much Force; no Knowledge of the Face of the Earth; no Account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and, which is worſt of all, continual Fear, and Danger of violent Death; and the Life of Man ſolitary, poor, naſty, brutiſh and ſhort.

It may ſeem ſtrange to ſome Man, that has not well weighed theſe Things; that Nature ſhould thus diſſociate, and render Men apt to invade and deſtroy one another: And he may therefore, not truſting to this Inference made from the Paſſions, deſire, perhaps, to have the ſame confirmed by Experience. Let him therefore conſider with himſelf, when taking a Journey, he arms himſelf, and ſeeks to go well-accompanied; when going to ſleep, he locks his Doors; when even in his Houſe, he locks his cheſts; and this when he knows there be Laws and public Officers, armed, to revenge all Injuries ſhall be done him: What Opinion he has of his fellow Subjects, when he rides armed; of his fellow Citizens, when he locks his Doors; and of his Children and Servants, when he locks his Cheſts: Does he not there as much accuſe Mankind by his Actions, as I do by my Words? But neither of us accuſe Man's Nature in it. The Deſires, and other Paſſions of Man, are in themſelves no Sin; no more are the Actions, that proceed from thoſe Paſſions, till they know a Law that forbids them; which till Laws be made they cannot know: Nor can any Law be made, till they have agreed upon the Perſons that ſhall make it.

It may, peradventure, be thought, there was never ſuch a Time, nor Condition of War as this; and I believe it was never generally ſo over all the World: But there are many Places where they live ſo now. For the ſavage People in many Places of *America*, except the Government of ſmall Families, the Concord whereof dependeth on natural Luſt, have no Government at all, and live at this Day in that brutiſh Manner, as I ſaid before: Howſoever, it may be perceived what Manner of Life there would be, where there were no common Power to fear, by the Manner of Life, which Men that have formerly lived under a peaceable Government, uſe to degenerate into, in a Civil War.

But though there had never been any Time, wherein particular Men were in a Condition of War one againſt another; yet in all Times Kings, and Perſons of ſovereign Authority, becauſe of their Independency, are in continual Jealouſies, and in the State and Poſture of Gladiators; having their Weapons pointing, and their Eyes fixed on one another; that is, their Forts, Garriſons and Guns upon the Frontiers of their Kingdoms; and continual Spies upon their Neighbours; which is a Poſture of War. But becauſe they uphold thereby, the Induſtry of their Subjects; there does not follow from it, that Miſery which accompanies the Liberty of particular Men.

To this War of every Man, againſt every Man, this alſo is conſequent; that nothing can be unjuſt. The Notions of Right and Wrong, Juſtice and Injuſtice, have there no Place. Where there is no common Power, there is no Law: Where no Law, no Injuſtice. Force and Fraud are, in War, the two Cardinal Virtues. Juſtice and Injuſtice are none of the Faculties neither of the Body nor Mind. If they were, they might be in a Man that were alone in the World, as well as his Senſes and Paſſions. They are Qualities, that relate to Men in Society, not in Solitude. It is conſequent alſo to the ſame Condition, that there be no Propriety, no Dominion to mine and thine diſtinct; but only that to be every Man's, that he can get; and for ſo long, as he can keep it. And thus much for the ill Condition, which Man by mere Nature is actually placed in; though with a Poſſibility to come out of it, conſiſting partly in the Paſſions, partly in his Reaſon.

The Paſſions that incline Men to Peace, are Fear of Death; Deſire of ſuch Things as are neceſſary to commodious Living; and a Hope by

" at all." (1) *Force* and *Treachery* in War are Cardinal Virtues, *&c.*"

Here then, to be ſure, he has ſaid, that *the one may lawfully invade*; that *the other may lawfully reſiſt*. From whence, of Courſe, War neceſſarily ariſes; (2) from whence *a War on both Sides becomes juſt*.

Here

by their Induſtry to obtain them: And Reaſon ſuggeſteth convenient Articles of Peace, upon which Men may be drawn to Agreement: Theſe Articles are they which otherwiſe are called *the Laws of Nature*. Whereof I ſhall ſpeak more particularly in the two following Chapters.

(1) *Force and Treachery in War are Cardinal Virtues*, &c.] Altho' it be common to all Sorts of War, that the particular Nature, and, as I may call it, Genius of them is Violence and Terror; yet, it is alſo lawful to make Uſe of Stratagem and Fraud, againſt any Enemy; provided there be no Treachery, or Violation of Compact and Faith in it. For, as *Ageſilaus* ſaid, to break the Faith of Articles and Leagues is no leſs than a Contempt of God; but to circumvent an Enemy, is well enough conſiſtent with Juſtice, and may be attended with as much Glory as Succeſs. And the proper Senſe of that famed Saying of *Cleandridas*, implies no more; 'When the Lion's Skin fails, it is 'neceſſary to put on the Fox's.' Puffendorf's *Law of Nature and Nations*, Book 8. Chap. 6. *Of the Right of War*. *See* Cicero's *Offices*, Book 1. Chapters 11 and 12. and Book 3. Chap. 29.

(2) *From whence a War on both Sides becomes juſt.*] Mr. *Hobbes* dogmatically aſſerts, but without the leaſt Proof, that the War of All againſt All is juſt: and from hence his Conſequences are, That *nothing is unjuſt*, that *there is no meum and tuum*, &c. and then his favourite Concluſion is, *That any Thing whatſoever may lawfully be done againſt Enemies*. and pray who are *thoſe Enemies?*——Why——*all Mankind*.

If Mr. *Hobbes*, then, does not reaſon in a Circle, no Man ever did.

Whereas the firſt Point which the truly judicious Writers prove, is, that the War carried on be juſt; and then they ſhew, that even in the juſteſt War, all Things are not lawful.

Grotius in that excellent Treatiſe of his, entled, *Concerning the Rights of War and Peace*, ſays, That the Cauſes of War are either *juſt*, *unjuſt* or *dubious*. *See* Book 2. Chapters 1, 22 and 23. He obſerves, that moſt Men aſſign three Cauſes of a War, which may be termed juſtifiable, 1. For *Defence*. 2. For the Recovery of *Property* or *Debt*. And 3. For the Puniſhment of an *Offence* committed: Upon each of theſe he argues with Judgment, Clearneſs and Learning, and in direct Contradiction to Mr. *Hobbes*'s Principles.

Nothing, ſays *Puffendorf*, is more conſonant to the Law of Nature, than that no Man ſhould offer unjuſt Violence or Injury to another; and, on the other Hand, than that all Men ſhould ſhew Kindneſs and Humanity to one another, and be particularly exact in the Obſervation of Agreements and Compacts. And when Men duly attend to, and obey theſe Laws, they may be ſaid to enjoy Peace; which is a State moſt agreeable to human Nature; which tends moſt to promote its Happineſs and Security; and, indeed, which, the Law of Nature was given to Men, principally to eſtabliſh and preſerve.——Nay, further, Peace is a State proper to human Nature, as ſuch; ſince it ariſeth from a Principle peculiar to Mankind above the Brutes: Whereas War flows from Principles common to both. Brutes indeed, by Inſtinct of Nature, will endeavour to defend and preſerve themſelves as well as they can; but Man alone underſtands the Nature and Conſtitution of Peace. For it is he only that can voluntarily undertake or forbear the Performance of any Action which may bring Good or Harm upon another Perſon, upon a Conſideration of certain Obligations on one Side, and certain Rights on another; all which depends entirely upon the Uſe and Exerciſe of Reaſon.

The Cauſes of juſt War may be reduced to theſe three Heads. *Firſt*, To defend ourſelves and Properties againſt others, that deſign to do us Harm, either by aſſaulting our Perſons, or taking away or ruining our Eſtates. *Secondly*, To aſſert our Rights, when others who are juſtly obliged refuſe to pay them to us. And, *Laſtly*, To recover Satisfaction for Damages we have injuriouſly ſuſtained, and to force the Perſon that did the Injury, to give Caution for his good Behaviour for the future.

And hence ariſeth the Diviſion of juſt Wars into offenſive and defenſive; the latter of which I take to be thoſe Sorts of Wars, in which Men endeavour to defend, and keep

Here then, we are to obſerve, that Mr. *Hobbes* gives himſelf little or no Trouble about the Right of waging this War. *The War*, he ſays, *muſt ariſe from the Nature of human Paſſions*; and when this War is once begun, he inſiſts upon theſe and ſuch like Conſequences (but without the leaſt Proof) to follow, *viz.* "That nothing is unjuſt; that there is no "ſuch Thing as *meum* and *tuum*, mine and thine, no ſeparate, diſtinct, "divided Property, *&c.*"

This Kind of Reaſoning is, in his *Leviathan*, a good deal more popular, but much weaker.

Here, however, we cannot but obſerve, what is very remarkable, That amongſt all truly judicious Writers, the firſt Point which they prove is, *That the War carried on be juſt*; rather than it can, from hence be proved, that any Thing whatſoever may lawfully be done againſt Enemies.

Nay—ſo far are they from drawing ſo wild a Concluſion, that they will not allow, but prove quite the contrary, that, in a War waged and entered into, even upon the juſteſt Motives, all Things are not lawful.

From hence, therefore, it neceſſarily follows, that the *Law of Nature* muſt and ought to be acknowledged; and if ſo, according to the Dictates and Precepts of this Natural Law, we ought firſt to determine, Whether in undertaking a War, we act what is juſt and right; or, at leaſt, we ought to conſider, whether right Reaſon will permit ſuch an Undertaking: And theſe Determinations of *natural Truth* and *right Reaſon* ought firſt, I ſay, to be firmly ſettled before we can abſolutely determine, whether all

what is their own. The former are, when Men extort their Rights, that are denied, by Force, attempt to recover what hath been unjuſtly taken from them, and require Caution for the future. Sometimes, indeed, the Party that firſt began the War, may have the Credit of being on the defenſive. For Inſtance, ſuppoſe he be often alarmed and haraſſed with ſudden Incurſions upon him, the Enemy retiring always, when he appears to oppoſe him: Or, ſuppoſe a Man be aſſured that his Enemy hath formed Deſigns againſt him, and ſo diſables him for the Attempt, while he is making his Preparation.

But, in general, the Cauſes of every War, and eſpecially of the offenſive, ought to be evident, and without Mixture of Doubt and Uncertainty. For it is very uſual, in Caſes of this Nature, for Doubts to ariſe; either, perhaps, out of Ignorance of Matter of Fact, when it is not abſolutely certain whether it was done or not, with what Intention it was done; or elſe out of a negligent, ſlight Compariſon, between ſtrict Juſtice and the Laws of Love and Charity; or it may be, from a miſtaken Computation of the Proportion of the Utilities, which it is probable will be Effects of undertaking or forbearing the War: In theſe Caſes, therefore, as no uncertain Pretenſions ought to be made Uſe of; ſo neither ſhould Men immediately ſeek Redreſs by Arms, but ſincerely endeavour, and that theſe three Ways eſpecially, to compoſe the Differences, before they break out into a War. *Firſt*, By Conference between the Parties or their Agents. *Secondly*, By Appeal to Arbiters: Or, in the *laſt* Place, by Lot. But how evident ſoever the Cauſes of War may be, a wiſe Man, before he draws his Sword, ought to conſider what *Grotius* ſays, That it is a great Folly in particular Men, as well as Common-wealths, not to accept of Accommodation, or hear of Reconcilement, while Things ſtand whole on both Sides; but when they have ſufficiently puniſhed and mortified one another, then quietly to give over, without giving any body the Trouble of parting them. Puffendorf *of the Law of Nature and Nations*, Book 8. Chap. 6. *Of the Right of War*. Sections 2, 3 and 4.

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the Requiſites and Conditions neceſſary to carry on ſuch a War, be juſt and lawful or no.

And what is here ſaid, is indeed ſo clear and evident, that Mr. *Hobbes* even himſelf confeſſes the Truth of it: Altho' that, in the latter Part of this ſame Chapter, he ſtrenuouſly inſiſts upon it, That there is no Diſtinction, no Difference between *juſt* and *unjuſt*, in the natural State of Man: Yet, in the latter Part of this very ſame Chapter, he attempts to prove, that, in ſuch a State, the *Power* of waging War ſhould and ought to be granted to every Man, as an Expedient highly neceſſary to Self-preſervation; and which, by the Bye, is only, in other Terms, ſaying, that ſuch a War as this is juſt and lawful.

From whence ariſes this one ſelf-evident Truth, that this ſame Mr. *Hobbes* is very inconſiſtent with himſelf in this Chapter.

For, let the Argument be what it will, which proves a Thing juſt and lawful, in the natural State of Man; that very ſame Argument, let this ſame Thing be what it will, clearly evinces, that there is ſome Diſtinction, ſome Difference between *juſt* and *unjuſt*, *lawful* and *unlawful*, in ſuch a State. And this very ſame Argument, moreover, as manifeſtly ſuppoſes ſome Law to exiſt, and to lay an Obligation; whereby it appears that, by the Permiſſion, at leaſt, of this Law, *War* may be proved *lawful*.—Now —This is the principal Propoſition which we are, at preſent, willing to eſtabliſh; and this, it ſeems, is the very Propoſition avowedly rejected and diſowned by Mr. *Hobbes*, when he ſo peremptorily aſſerts, *nothing* to be either *juſt* or *unjuſt*.

Here then, in the next Place, let us try upon what Arguments he builds his Proof, that War, a War even againſt All, is neceſſary and lawful. We do not find, indeed, in his *Leviathan*, that cloſe, preſs, exactly-correct Method of Reaſoning, which with ſo ſtudious an Affectation he labours to purſue in his Book *De Cive*.

But——let this his Nicety of Reaſoning be as it will, he has, beyond all peradventure, deduced the Origin of War from three principal Cauſes.

1. *Competition.* 2. *Self-defence.* 3. *Glory.*

And, by a conſequential Kind of Reaſoning, he, then, ſtrenuouſly maintains, that War neceſſarily ariſes from the three following Paſſions,

1. *Hope.* 2. *Fear.* 3. *Love.*

Firſt, War is neceſſarily occaſioned by *Competition*, upon the Hope of Gain or Advantage.

Secondly, War is neceſſarily occaſioned by *Self-defence*, from an Apprehenſion, a Fear, leſt others ſhould have the Dominion over us: And this War muſt be carried on either by Force of Arms or by Treachery, in order to ſeize firſt, and hinder others by a prior Occupancy. And,

Thirdly, From the *Love of Glory* we will wage War, to ſecure Fame and Reputation.

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I do not, indeed, care to tranſcribe all that Mr. *Hobbes* has ſaid (and, to confeſs the Truth, with too, too looſe a Connection of Thought) by way of Proof, or in order to prove that, from theſe human Paſſions, *viz. Hope, Fear, Love*; War muſt neceſſarily ariſe.

Whoſoever pleaſes may conſult this Author himſelf.

As for my own Part, in my candid, impartial Judgment, the following general Anſwer may ſerve as a Reply to all he has offered upon this Argument, namely,

Mankind are not neceſſarily either led or driven by theſe Paſſions; but theſe, like all the other Paſſions, can in themſelves, from the very Nature of them, be governed and moderated by Reaſon and ſober Direction. So that Mr. *Hobbes*'s Poſition is, from common Experience, falſe, when he ſays, that theſe Paſſions hurry Mankind by a natural, irreſiſtible Impulſe into War.

From the very Fact, ſo well known and experienced by every reaſonable Man, we may fairly argue the Caſe to be as we have ſtated it.

As to the human Paſſions in general (1) we allow, indeed, that ſo much of each Paſſion as is neceſſarily cauſed in any Perſon from the Impulſe, or correſpondency of outward Objects, cannot be checked by any one natural Law whatſoever. But we are, at the ſame Time, to conſider, that the true End, Deſign, Office and Uſe of all theſe Paſſions, is to point out ſuch Actions only as are within our own free Choice, Power and Command.

Now, the Affections or Paſſions, from whence Mr. *Hobbes* would infer War to be neceſſary, and conſequently lawful, are of this Nature directly: For, ſince they are ſo framed and conſtituted as to ſee into Futurity, and very often into a Futurity very remote and diſtant; and ſince they depend very much upon human Reaſon, and ſober Direction, that therefore they may and can be kept under a due Subjection.

And thus much Mr. *Hobbes* even himſelf, at ſometimes, fairly confeſſes, as in his Book *De Cive*, Chap. 3. Sect. 31. "That Mankind who (upon "account of different contradictory Appetites and Paſſions) cannot agree "about an Object preſent, may yet agree about an Object future." Now the Knowledge of every ſuch future Object is moſt certainly the Work, the Employment, the Operation of Reaſon. "For, continues Mr. *Hobbes*,

(1) *We allow, indeed, that ſo much of each Paſſion as is neceſſarily cauſed in any Perſon from the Impulſe*, &c.] The *motus primo-primi*, the firſt Motions and Impulſes of Appetites and Paſſions, as excited by their own proper Objects reſpectively, are in themſelves involuntary, and conſequently innocent; and therefore, as ſuch, were never deſigned to be checked by any one natural Law; becauſe this muſt thwart the true original Deſign of them.

Our Appetites and Paſſions, however, may excite and influence human Reaſon to the Practice of Actions, free, moral, rational, uſeful, commendable, and perfectly conſiſtent with the true original End and Deſign of ſuch Appetites and Paſſions themſelves.

There is a wide Difference between feeling an Impulſe and receiving a Direction. The Impulſe is the natural Effect of the Appetite of the Paſſion. The Direction is the Act of a moral, free Agent. The Direction ought always to be the Effect of Reaſon; and in this Diſtinction is eſſentially laid the Virtue, the Vice, the Innocence of all our Appetites and Paſſions.

"Objects

" Objects preſent are perceived by our Senſes, whereas Objects future are " perceived by our Reaſon only."

And, this is the Foundation upon which Mr. *Hobbes* acknowledges, as to the Sum and Subſtance of the *Laws of Nature*, Mankind to agree in ſeeking, ſecuring and ſettling Peace.

If this be a true State of the Caſe, why then Mr. *Hobbes*, with monſtrous Inconſiſtency, in his *Leviathan*, drives all Mankind into War.—— Nay—and by the Dint, the Hurry of thoſe very Appetites and Paſſions, ſo eſſentially depending upon that ſame Reaſon, which, thro' a whole Courſe of the human Life, ſtretches its Views forward into Futurity.

But—beſides all this, Mr. *Hobbes*, in the Cloſe of his thirteenth Chapter, acknowledges, that Man is endowed with ſome Paſſions which have a prone Tendency, a ſtrong Propenſity towards Peace: Such as,

Firſt, The *Fear* or Apprehenſion of a violent Death.

Secondly, The *Love* of ſuch Neceſſaries and Conveniencies as render the human Life happy.

Thirdly, The *Hope*, the Expectation of acquiring theſe Neceſſaries and Conveniencies by Labour, Induſtry and Diligence.

Now, theſe three Paſſions moſt certainly are, if more accurately examined into, no other than thoſe very Paſſions which, he before aſſerted, drive all Mankind into War.

For, the Fear which Mr. *Hobbes* here deſcribes, is the very ſame as the Paſſion raiſed in us, leſt Mankind ſhould carry the full Dominion over us; and arbitrarily, without Controul, at any Time deprive us even of Life.

Now, from this Paſſion all are, as he juſt now affirmed, rouzed up to ſeek Security, both by preventing the Attacks of others, and by our firſt attacking them. And the ſame may be ſaid concerning Ambition, or the *Love of Glory*, which may likewiſe fall under the Notion of the Things neceſſary to Life. And the ſame likewiſe, in the third Place, may be ſaid concerning the *Hope* of Lucre, Gain, Advantage, Profit.

And therefore, by a neceſſary Conſequence, the ſame Cauſes, according to Mr. *Hobbes*, produce both Peace and War.

To be ſure, if any one Thing be abſolutely neceſſary in theſe Affections and Paſſions, ſuch a Neceſſity muſt and ought to be examined into, on both Sides of the Queſtion, in order to determine whether theſe Affections and Paſſions do more powerfully incline and draw human Nature to Peace than to War. But this is a Point, notwithſtanding the Importance of it in our preſent Argument, which Mr. *Hobbes* never once determined yet in all his Writings.

It is alſo, at the ſame Time, to the full as trifling, to pronounce any Thing concerning the State of Man, *i. e.* his natural Propenſity towards Acts future, from the Conſideration of thoſe Motives only which incline him to War, paſſing over in Silence, at the ſame Time, all ſuch Motives as may prompt him to Peace: Such partial Trifling as this would be juſt

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the ſame as to prognoſticate and foretel, how any future Turn of a Balance will incline, from the Knowledge of Weights which preſs only on one Side.

But——as to my own Part, who have, with all the Capacity and Diligence in my Power, compared and balanced the Cauſes and the *Momenta* of theſe Effects, as placed on the two oppoſite Sides; and who have not only conſidered theſe Cauſes and *Momenta* as natural Motions impelled by outward Forces; and have conſidered them, not only as in ſome meaſure depending upon the Frame and Structure of the human Body; but who alſo have (and which is a Point of much more important Conſequence) conſidered theſe Cauſes, *Momenta* and Motives, ſo far as they are actuated, influenced and directed by a Reaſon, by a Sagacity, which dives and penetrates into Futurity, even thro' a whole Period of the human Life.

Upon a full and impartial Enquiry, I ſay, into all theſe Cauſes, Motives and Powers, the Arguments appear ſtill ſtronger to convince us, That *Univerſal Benevolence*, and the Tranquillity, the Peace rationally to be hoped for and expected from the Exerciſe of ſuch a *Benevolence*, carry a more powerful Perſuaſion than a War, that univerſal War waged againſt All: In which, according to Mr. *Hobbes*'s Confeſſion, there is always the horrible Fear, Dread, Apprehenſion and Danger of a violent, untimely Death; and in which the human Life is always lonely, ſolitary, helpleſs, indigent, brutal and ſhort. And conſequently, in ſuch a State as this, not the leaſt Security can, upon any rational Grounds of Hope, be expected.

SECT. XXXIII.

Objection. THE one ſingle Point only which ſeems to carry a Difficulty in this Argument is, *That an entire Security in procuring to ourſelves all Kinds of Happineſs, cannot be obtained, even ſhould we, by the Exerciſe of a general Benevolence, purſue the common Good and Peace of All, by Reaſon of the unbridled Paſſions and Appetites of ſome, who, thro' Folly and Raſhneſs, don't propoſe to themſelves the ſame End.*

Anſwer. But,——even this Difficulty will ſoon vaniſh, if we conſider, that there is not any one poſſible Thing in our Power towards our own Happineſs, which may not, which cannot admit of a firmer Security in human Society: Or, which amounts to the ſame Thing, if we conſider that this perfect Security from all Sorts of Calamity is, thro' the looſe, unbridled Deſires of Mankind, abſolutely out of our own Power to effect. And therefore, in this Caſe, our only Wiſdom is to reſt contented, if, amongſt all the poſſible Means in our Power, we purſue ſuch as will contribute beſt to this End.—And—which Means are no other, than our conſtant, ſincere, hearty Endeavours to promote, as much as in us lies, the Happineſs of All;—Means which will, in the firſt Place, not only as effectually

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as poſſible, gain over to our Intereſt, their private Friendſhip; but as effectually alſo, in the ſecond Place, lay them under the ſtricteſt Ties of ſocial Obligation both Civil and Religious. And then, having thus far advanced them towards ſuch a State, we may, by Vertue of this very ſame *Benevolence*, confirm and eſtabliſh them in the ſame ſocial State and friendly Diſpoſition.

Now in whatſoever Proportion, Means fall ſhort of this ſo wiſe an End; or whatſoever means act contrary to it, in the ſame Degrees of Proportion exactly do ſuch Means prove deficient, and want ſo much of their full Efficacy in promoting the private Happineſs of Individuals, as well as the common Happineſs of All: Theſe being the very Means which, by the Light of Nature, we cannot but know are moſt ſuitable and convenient to promote this one grand, univerſal End: And—moreover, that all contrary Methods of acting tend to extinguiſh this natural Light of the human Underſtanding.

Upon this Foundation we proceed when we importune and ſolicit all rational Beings to aſſiſt us, in all Caſes of Self-preſervation and private Protection. For, ſince each ſingle Felicity of every one Individual in this rational Syſtem, collected and united into one general Sum total, is no other than that ſelf-ſame common Good which we deſire and purſue: All rational Agents therefore, not blinded by ſome violent Uneaſineſs of Mind, or who have not in ſome Sort diveſted themſelves of a rational Nature, will conſpire, unite and co-operate with us in the Proſecution of this very one End.

Suppoſing then, thro' any fickle Variety of Temper, it ſhould ſo happen that we neglect this End: Or, ſuppoſing that we, upon any falſe Motive, injure an innocent Perſon, it is, upon the true Principles of Moral Philoſophy, evident, that all, in ſome Degree, are either neglected or provoked.

Becauſe, it is very juſt and natural for every one to reflect within himſelf thus, "How ſacred a Dread, what juſt an Apprehenſion of Evil do I labour "under, from thoſe whom I have obſerved to have inflicted Puniſhments not "leſs ſevere upon the Innocent."—Nay, even Mr. *Hobbes* himſelf laboured under theſe very ſame Apprehenſions, when in his Book, *Concerning human Nature*, he comes to explain (according to his uſual, commendable Method of Definition) *Compaſſion* or *Pity*.

To ſum up all in one Word: The Efficacies of theſe Paſſions, *Hope*, *Fear*, &c. which oblige, neceſſitate, nay, even, if you will, drive Mankind into Peace as well as War, muſt be calculated from the ſeveral Influences of thoſe Cauſes, which have raiſed and excited theſe Paſſions in human Nature.

Now, ſince theſe Cauſes are either ſuch Sorts of Good, or ſuch Sorts of Evil, as our Reaſon judges may poſſibly ariſe in Time to come, from the Powers and Acts of ſome other rational Beings, that therefore there is no other poſſible Way of knowing the Influences of ſuch Cauſes, than by

conſidering the Natures reſpectively of the Agents who produce them. So that whenever we attempt to inveſtigate and trace out ſuch of our future Actions as are dictated and directed by Nature, the whole Sum and Subſtance of the Queſtion under Contemplation turns upon this one ſingle Point; namely,—Whether or no, leaving the whole Conſideration of Civil Compacts entirely out of the Queſtion, Man can diſcover (from ſuch Notions as may eaſily be collected concerning the Nature of both God and Man) which Method a rational Underſtanding would chuſe to prefer, *i. e.* Whether it be not better, *Firſt*, to conſult the Happineſs of All in general, and of *Self* in particular, by that *Univerſal Benevolence* which comprehends Innocence, Fidelity, Gratitude, and the other Virtues, rather than, *Secondly*, by an *Hobbian* Anticipation, or Præoccupancy, as taught by Mr. *Hobbes* in this Chapter. His Words are as follow,

Whether to promote the Happineſs of all by univerſal Benevolence, &c. or, By an Hobbian Anticipation and Præoccupancy, &c.

" Ideoque, præſumptam in aliis Lædendi voluntatem, unuſquiſque do-
" cetur vi & dolo cæteros omnes tamdiù conari ſibimet ſubjicere, quamdiù
" alios eſſe viderit a quibus ſibi cavendum ſit." *i. e.* " And that, upon this
" very Account, the Inclination in others of doing Hurt, being firſt ſup-
" poſed, each Perſon is inſtructed to reduce all other Perſons both by
" Treachery and Violence under his own Subjection, and for ſo long a
" Time as he ſhall apprehend any Grounds of Fear and Caution."

Whoſoever commands his Paſſions beſt, conſults his Happineſs beſt.

Whereas, on the contrary, my Aſſertion is a Truth plain and evident: That whoſoever beſt conſults his own Happineſs, as well as the Happineſs of others, is he who compoſes and calms all thoſe Paſſions which raiſe in him groundleſs Tumults and Commotions; ſuch, for Inſtance, are all empty, vain Hopes and Fears, *&c.*

The principal Cauſes of Happineſs are under the Direction of rational Agents.

Neither is it a Point leſs evident, that the principal Cauſes of ſuch Happineſs are in the Power, and under the Direction of rational Agents.

Nature directs us to conſult the moſt effective Principles of Action in the Nature of Agents to procure Happineſs.

And therefore, he beſt conſults the Attainment of this End, who moſt effectually ſecures to himſelf theſe Cauſes. For which Reaſon, he beſt conſults the true Means towards this End, who employs his chief Endeavours in reconciling and bringing over to his own Intereſt theſe Cauſes; who fitly applies his whole Conduct and Behaviour to the moſt operative Principles of Action naturally implanted in theſe Cauſes (*i. e.* to the Underſtanding and Will, as under the Direction of right Reaſon) by his purſuing that Happineſs only wherein the happy State of All is moſt nearly concerned; and to promote which happy State the Principles, Capacities and Powers of rational free Agents are beſt ſuited, and moſt amply furniſhed. Becauſe, upon this one Foundation alone it is that each Individual can ſecurely, and with a full Preſervation of his own rational Appetite after Happineſs, heartily agree and co-operate with us in effecting the ſame End.

Now, according to Reaſon, no one either deſires or ſeeks after higher Degrees of Happineſs from abroad, than can ariſe from the Nature of other rational Cauſes, Cauſes upon whom this Happineſs mutually depends;

pends; and conſequently, theſe Degrees can be only ſuch as are conſiſtent with that Happineſs which all other Cauſes ſo naturally deſire. From whence it is evident, that the common Good of All muſt be a greater Good than the Good of one, or of ſome few only, and in the ſame Proportion that the Whole is greater than any of its Parts: And it is moreover as evident alſo, that other rational Beings every where are influenced and perſuaded to think in the ſame Manner, from the Nature and Neceſſity of Things.

From hence alſo it comes to paſs that rational Agents, but more particularly they who have improved their Knowledge by ſuch Enquiries, underſtand, that the common Good is the greateſt Good; and that all the conſtituent Cauſes of it will moſt effectively produce the greateſt, the moſt ſubſtantial Happineſs of each, as far as, in the Nature of Things, is poſſible.

All theſe Agents, I ſay, will moſt certainly conſpire and co-operate with us, in producing this End, and, conſequently, always are willing and ready to afford us their Aſſiſtance.

Theſe Principles, however, of living well, are not, in Truth and Reality, ſo very difficult to be apprehended and known.—Nay—the Fact, from Experience, is ſo far otherwiſe, that theſe Principles are preſuppoſed, preſumed, and taken for granted; and are even conſented to and approved of by almoſt all rational Beings; or, at leaſt, all rational Beings are capable of ſo much Inſtruction, as to conceive and believe them true. Some few Exceptions may perhaps ſometimes (altho' very rarely) be found; but ſuch Exceptions are ſuch Perſons only who have given the moſt infallible, demonſtrative Proofs, that they are become abſolute Slaves to their Appetites and Paſſions.

Some few Exceptions no Argument againſt a general Rule.

(1) For, here there happens what Logicians call an *Æquipollentia* in Terms,

(1) *For, here there happens what Logicians call an* Æquipollentia *in Terms.*] Every Being deſires Happineſs. No one Being can deſire greater Degrees of Happineſs from abroad, than can ariſe from rational Cauſes. Theſe Degrees of Happineſs muſt be ſuch only as are conſiſtent with other rational Cauſes. All theſe rational Cauſes naturally deſire Happineſs. Common Good the greateſt Happineſs.

Rational Agents, but more eſpecially they of improved Underſtandings, know, that the common Good is the greateſt Good.

The common Good of all, a greater Good than the Good of, *&c.* in Proportion as the Whole is greater, *&c.*

From the Nature of Things, rational Beings are influenced to think in the ſame Manner.

From whence all the conſtituent Cauſes of the greateſt Good, will moſt effectively produce the moſt ſubſtantial Happineſs of each Individual.

From whence it muſt happen, that all theſe Agents of Happineſs will co-operate with us in producing this End.

And ſince common Happineſs is the greateſt Happineſs, the Happineſs of each is eſſentially included in the Happineſs of the Whole.

And conſequently, the Happineſs of the Whole, and the Happineſs of all the Parts taken together is the ſame.

All rational Agents whatſoever are, at leaſt, capable of ſo much Inſtruction, as to conceive and believe theſe Principles, and the Truth of them.

Terms, which Terms appear to me the cleareſt imaginable, (1) and are nothing inferior in their Self evidence to the Axioms uſed in Mathematics.

AXIOM

And from hence ariſes the *Æquipollentia*, the Happineſs of the Whole is the Happineſs of all the Parts.

The Happineſs of all the Parts is the Happineſs of the Whole. An *Æquipollentia*, then, to define it, is the Agreement of Propoſitions in Senſe and Meaning, but ſignified under different Terms and Forms of Expreſſion.

Two *æquipollent* Propoſitions are therefore equally true.

From whence it follows, that if one *æquipollent* Propoſition be an Axiom, the other *æquipollent* Propoſition is an Axiom alſo.

(1) *And are nothing inferior in their Self-evidence to the Axioms uſed in Mathematics.*] Noemata quædam ſive principia intellectualia, in quæ omnis ferè ratio moralis reſolvitur.

1. Cæterùm cùm ſint quorum animis exolevit omnis ſenſus Dei rerumque divinarum, quique nullum certum principatum in facultatibus agnoſcunt, ſed ei paſſioni obediendum eſſe contendunt quæ imperium ſibi fortè fortunâ inter cæteras arripuerit, illiuſque deſideria implenda, atque in hoc ſummam humanæ felicitatis poſitam eſſe ſtatuunt: Hoſce certè homines (modò homines ſint, non turpiſſima pecora) alia adoriendum eſt viâ; menſurâque rectæ rationis proponenda, quæ non a diviniſſima illa animæ parte petitur quam boniformem appellamus, ſed ex intellectuali propriè dicta. Eſt enim eorum terminorum intellectus quorum non eſt ratio.

2. Depromam igitur ex hac penu principia quædam immediatè vera nulliuſque indiga probationis, ſed in quæ omnis ferè ratio moralis (quemadmodum demonſtrationes mathematicæ in communes ſuas ſententias) perſpicuè facilèque reſolvitur. Quæ cùm fructus ſint illius facultatis quæ propriè Nũ appellatur, minimè abſonum fore putavi ſi noemata nuncuparem moralia. Cujuſmodi ſunt quæ ſequuntur, quæque, nè quis ab illis ſibi malè metuat, fidem do nullam ſapere ſeveritatem vel auſteritatem, ſed planè mellea eſſe admodumque ſuavia & dulcia, utpote quæ nullum bonum proponunt niſi quod gratum jucundumque eſt percipienti.

NOEMATA.

1. Bonum eſt quod vitæ alicui perceptivæ, vitæve hujus gradui, gratum jucundum & congraum eſt, & cum conſervatione percipientis conjunctum.

2. Quod verò vitæ alicui perceptivæ vitæve hujus gradui, ingratum, injucundum & incongruum eſt, malum eſt; atque ſi cum deſtructione percipientis tandem conjunctum, omnium peſſimum. Exempli gratiâ, ſi quid aures vel oculos non modo offenderet, ſed etiam ſurditatem & cæcitatem ſuperinduceret, hoc peſſimum eſſet. Eſſet autem ſuppar malum, quamvis viſus indè ſolummodo debilitaretur, vel hebeſceret auditus. Eademque ratio eſt de reliquis facultatibus.

3. E ſpeciebus vel gradibus vitarum perceptivarum quæ reperiuntur in rerum univerſitate, aliæ aliis ſunt præſtantiores & excellentiores.

4. Unum bonum poteſt eſſe altero præſtantius naturâ, duratione, vel utriſque.

Hoc per ſe clarum eſt, illuſtrari tamen poteſt ab hoc incommodo, quod aliter una vita non eſſet præſtantior alterâ, nec una felicitas alterâ major. Unde æquè felices eſſent Deus, Angelus, Homo, equus, & viliſſimus quivis vermiculus. Quod nemo, niſi planè inſaniat, ullo modo admittere poteſt. De duratione nè minima quidem ſuboriri poteſt dubitatio aut difficultas.

5. Quod eſt bonum, eligendum eſt; malum verò fugiendum: præſtantius autem bonum eligendum præ eo quod minùs præſtat; minuſque malum tolerandum nè majus ſubeamus.

6. In eo quod ipſi nondum experti ſumus credendum eſt eis qui profitentur ſe expertos, modò vitam degant profeſſioni conformem, nullaque fraus ſuboleat, mundanique commodi aucupium.

7. Abſentia boni quod ſe habet ut octo eligibilior eſt quàm præſentia mali quod itidem ſe habet ut octo, quoad pondus & durationem; & adhuc tantò eligibilior, quantò malum excedit bonum pondere & durationе.

8. Quod certò futurum eſt rationem habere debet præſentis, utpote quod aliquando revera nos præſens præſentes occupabit. Eſtque ſuppar ratio de eo quod valde probabiliter eſt futurum.

9. Minùs præſtantia bona menſurantur à præſtantioribus quoad pondus & durationem.

Præſens

AXIOM I.

The Good of the Whole is greater than the Good of a Part.

AXIOM

10. Præſens bonum omittendum vel minuendum eſt ex probabili expectatione boni futuri infinitis vicibus præſtantioris præſenti quoad pondus & durationem; ideòque multò magis ex expectatione certa.

11. Præſens malum eſt tolerandum, ut evitemus malum probabiliter futurum infinitis vicibus majus præſenti quoad pondus & durationem: Quod adhuc conſtantiùs faciendum eſt cum certò ſit futurum.

12. Mens affectuum præjudicio libera rectiùs judicat, quàm cùm paſſionibus ulliſve corporeis impreſſionibus irretitur vel perturbatur.

Quemadmodum enim cœlum nubilum turbidumque æquor lumen non tranſmittunt; ità animus perturbatus obnubilatuſque paſſionibus, vel clariſſimam rationem vix admittit. Hâc ſimilitudine egregiè rem illuſtrat Boethius in illo carmine,

Nubibus atris. Fundere poſſunt,
Condita nullum, Sidera lumen, &c.

Eſt verò prolixius quàm ut huc tranſcribi debeat.

3. Atque hæc ferè ſunt Noemata quæ faciunt ad ingenerandum animæ prudentiam, temperantiam & fortitudinem, quæ ſpectant ad officium erga nos metipſos. Quæ ſequuntur ſpectant ad officium erga alios, homines putà atque deum, virtutemque, ac proinde ſunt fundamenta ſinceritatis, juſtitiæ, gratitudinis, miſericordiæ & pietatis. Pietatem enim numero inter morales virtutes, cùm Deus cognoſcibilis ſit ex lumine naturæ.

13. Summum abſolutiſſimumque bonum affectu ſummo, media mediocri, minimâque minimo, proſequi debemus; nec ſummum ſummôve cognata bona mediis minimiſve, ſed media minimaque ſummo, ſubordinare.

14. Quod tibi bonum præſtari velles in datis circumſtantiis, idem debes ipſe alteri præſtare in eiſdem circumſtantiis, quoad fieri poteſt citra tertii alicujus injuriam.

15. Quod malum tibi fieri nolles, à faciendo illud alteri ipſe debes abſtinere quoad fieri poteſt abſque tertii alicujus injuriâ.

16. Bono bonum compenſandum eſt, non malo.

17. Bonum eſt homini ut habeat unde bene beatèque vivat.

18. Si bonum eſt ut uni homini ſuppetat unde bene beatéque vivat, ex certa analogiâ planéque mathematicâ ſequitur, quód duplo melius eſt ut duobus hominibus ſuppetat, triplo, ut tribus, milleeuplo ut mille, & ſic deinceps.

19. Melius eſt unum hominem non voluptuosè vivere, quàm alterum calamitosè ac miſerè.

20. Bonum eſt parere magiſtratui in rebus adiaphoris, etiam citra omnem ſupplicii formidinem.

21. Melius eſt Deo parere quàm hominibus propriiſque noſtris cupiditatibus.

22. Bonum juſtúmque eſt ut ſuum cuique tribuatur, illiúſque uſus & poſſeſſio ipſi ſine moleſtatione permittatur.

23. Manifeſtum tamen eſt, quòd ità quis ſe gerere poſſit, ut quod acquiſitione vel donatione ſuum eſt, de jure deſinat eſſe ſuum.

4. Hæc horûmque ſimilia Effata rectè nuncupaveris *Noemata moralia*, ut quæ per ſe tam clara ſunt & manifeſta, ſi quis ſepoſito omni præjudicio ipſa ſecum velit conſiderare, ut nullis rationum ambagibus longioribùſve argumentorum deductionibus indigeant, ſed primo aſpectu de ſe vera eſſe deprehenduntur. Habemus igitur jam in numerato quod reſpondeamus quærenti quid ſit recta ratio: Illa enim eſt quæ certis & neceſſariis ſequelis tandem reſolvitur in aliquod intellectuale principium immediatè verum. Quod ſi porrò quærat exemplum ejuſmodi principiorum in moralibus, præſtò ſunt quæ modo recenſuimus. *Vid.* Hen. More, S. T. P. *Enchirid. Ethic.* Lib. 1. Cap. 4.

The great Dr. *John Wilkins*, late Lord Biſhop of *Cheſter*, in his *Principles and Duties of Natural Religion*, *Lond.* 1715. ſeventh Edit. 8vo. Chap. 2. Page 11. lays down two Schemes of Principles relating to practical Things, whether natural or moral, propoſed in the Method uſed by Mathematicians, of *Poſtulata*, *Definitions* and *Axioms*.

I ſhall offer, ſays his Lordſhip, ſome particular Schemes of Principles relating to practical Things, whether natural or moral, in the ſame Way and Method as is uſed in the Mathematics,

AXIOM II.

The Cauſes which moſt effectually preſerve and raiſe to Perfection the aggregate, entire Whole, whoſe Parts require the reciprocal Aid of each other,

thematics, conſiſting of *Poſtulata*, *Definitions* and *Axioms*.

A Scheme of Natural Principles.

POSTULATUM.

Every Thing is endowed with ſuch a natural Principle, whereby it is neceſſarily inclined to promote its own Preſervation and well-being.

DEFINITION I.

That which hath in it a Fitneſs to promote this End, is called *Good*; and, on the contrary, that which is apt to hinder it is called *Evil*. Amongſt which there are ſeveral Degrees, according as Things have more or leſs Fitneſs, to promote or hinder this End.

DEFINITION II.

The leſſening or eſcaping of Evil, is to be reckoned under the Notion of Good.

The leſſening or Loſs of Good, is to be reckoned under the Notion of Evil.

AXIOM I.

That which is good is to be choſen and proſecuted, that which is evil to be avoided.

AXIOM II.

The greater Good is to be preferred before the leſs, and the leſſer Evil to be endured rather than the greater.

AXIOM III.

Such Kinds of Things or Events, whether good or evil, as will certainly come to paſs, may fall under Computation, and be eſtimated as to their ſeveral Degrees, as well as Things preſent; becauſe, when ſuch a Space of Time is elapſed, that which is now future, will become preſent, which is the Ground of Mens dealing for Reverſions.

AXIOM IV.

And thus likewiſe is it, for ſuch Things as may probably come to paſs; tho' this Probability ſhould be ſomewhat remote, it is counted a valuable Thing, and may be eſtimated at a certain Rate; for a Man to be one amongſt four or five equal Competitors for a Place, to be the fourth or fifth Expectant of an Inheritance; tho' in ſuch Caſes there be the Odds of three or four to one, yet the Price that is ſet upon this, may be ſo proportioned as either to reduce it to an Equality, or make it a very advantageous Bargain.

AXIOM V.

A preſent Good may reaſonably be parted with, upon a probable Expectation of a future Good which is more excellent; which is the Caſe of Merchants, who have large Eſtates in their own Poſſeſſion, which they may ſafely keep by them, and yet chuſe to venture them upon a thouſand Hazards, out of an Apprehenſion that there is a greater Probability of their gaining, than of their loſing by ſuch Adventures.

And this would be much more reaſonable, if, beſides the Probability of gaining by theſe Adventures, there were the like Probability of their being utterly undone and ruined, if they ſhould neglect or refuſe to venture.

The greater the Advantage is, the more reaſonable muſt it be to adventure for it; if it be reaſonable for a Man to run the Venture of twenty Pounds for the Gain of an hundred Pounds, much more for a thouſand.

The Reaſon why Men are moved to believe a Probability of Gain, by adventuring their Stocks into ſuch foreign Countries as they have never ſeen, and of which they have made no Trial, is from the Teſtimony of other credible Perſons, who profeſs to have known thoſe Places, and the Advantages of Traffick thither, by their own Experience. And this is generally accounted a ſufficient Argument to perſuade others unto the like Trials.

The Reaſon which moved Men to adventure for the firſt Diſcovery of unknown Countries, is, becauſe they had fair Probabilities to perſuade them, that there were ſuch Places, which would very probably afford very gainful Traffick.

And upon the ſame Ground, if any conſiderable Number of Men, ſuch whom we eſteem the moſt wiſe and the moſt honeſt, ſhould aſſure us, that they did firmly believe (tho' they did not know it by Experience) that there was ſuch an undiſcovered Country,

to

other, equally preſerve and render perfect the Parts of ſuch an aggregate, entire Whole.

This

to which if Men would make any Ventures, their Gains would be a thouſand times more than could be expected by any other Way of Traffick, and that, upon this Perſuaſion, they themſelves did reſolve to venture their Eſtates, and ſhould, withal, offer ſuch Arguments for the Reaſonableneſs of what they aſſert, as to any Men, whoſe Judgments were unprejudiced, would render it much more probable than the contrary: In this Caſe, he that would act rationally, according to ſuch Rules and Principles as all Mankind do obſerve in the Government of their Actions, muſt be perſuaded to do the like, unleſs he would be counted fooliſh, and one that did affect Singularity.

AXIOM VI.

A preſent Evil is to be endured for the avoiding of a probable future Evil, which is far greater, which is the Reaſon of Mens undergoing the Miſchiefs Hardſhips of War, the Charges and Vexa. of Law-ſuits, the Trouble of Faſting and Phyſic. A Man will endure the Pain of Hunger and Thirſt, and refuſe ſuch Meats and Drinks as are moſt grateful to his Appetite, if he be perſuaded that they will endanger his Health, eſpecially if he believes that they are poiſoned. He will chuſe to take naſeous, offenſive Phyſic, upon a probable Expectation that he may thereby prevent or cure a dangerous Sickneſs.

AXIOM VII.

The greater the Evil is, the more Reaſon is there to venture the Loſs of a leſs Good, or the ſuffering of a leſs Evil, for the eſcaping of it.

A Scheme of Moral Principles.

POSTULATUM.

There are ſeveral Kinds of Creatures in the World, and ſeveral Degrees of Dignity amongſt them, ſome being more excellent than others, animate more than inanimate, Senſitives more than Vegetatives, and Men more than Brutes. It is a greater Pre-eminence to have Life, than to be without it; to have Life and Senſe than to have Life only; to have Life, Senſe and Reaſon, than to have only Life and Senſe.

DEFINITION I.

That which doth conſtitute any Thing in its Being, and diſtinguiſh it from all other Things, is called the *Form* or *Eſſence* of ſuch a Thing.

DEFINITION II.

That State or Condition by which the Nature of any Thing is advanced to the utmoſt Perfection of which it is capable, according to its Rank and Kind, is called the *Chief End* or *Happineſs* of ſuch a Thing.

The Nature of Plants doth conſiſt in having a vegetative Soul, by which they receive Nouriſhment and Growth, and are enabled to multiply their Kind.

The utmoſt Perfection, which this Kind of Being is capable of, is to grow up to a State of Maturity, to continue unto its natural Period, and to propagate its Kind.

The Nature of Brutes (beſides what is common to them with Plants) doth conſiſt in having ſuch Faculties, whereby they are capable of apprehending external Objects, and of receiving Pain or Pleaſure from them.

The Perfection proper to theſe doth conſiſt in ſenſitive Pleaſures, or the enjoying of ſuch Things as are grateful to their Appetites and Senſes.

The Nature of Man (beſides what is common to him with Plants and Brutes) doth conſiſt in that Faculty of Reaſon, whereby he is made capable of Religion, of apprehending a Deity, and of expecting a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments. Which are Capacities common to all Mankind, notwithſtanding the utmoſt Endeavours that can be uſed for the ſuppreſſing of them; and which no other Creature in this viſible World, except Man, doth partake of.

The Happineſs of Man doth conſiſt in the perfecting of this Faculty; that is, in ſuch a State or Condition as is moſt agreeable to Reaſon, and as may entitle him to the divine Favour, and afford him the beſt Aſſurance of a bleſſed Eſtate after this Life.

That which every Man doth and muſt propoſe unto himſelf, is the being in as good a Condition as he is capable of, or as is reaſonable for him to expect. And the Deſire of this is not properly a Duty or a moral Virtue,

about

None but they who acknowledge these elementary Principles will concur in promoting the Good of All.

This Aid, this Assistance, then, must either not be sought from those who do not acknowledge such elementary Principles of acting right as these; or it must be procured whenever Occasion requires, by the Mediation of those who allow such Principles.

Mr. Hobbes's Principle of Domination and Violence, involves in it Contradictions and Impossibilities.

Whereas, on the contrary, this dreadful anticipating Apprehension, struck into human Nature by Mr. *Hobbes*, attempts a Power, a Domination, a Violence upon All of acting downright Impossibilities—Impossibilities contrary to Fact and Nature—Impossibilities no less contradictory to the Free Agency of Man, than to the natural Capacities, Powers and Abilities of human Nature.

For, to be sure, upon the *Hobbian* Principle, it follows, that Each must act so as to force and compel All to an absolute Subjection and Slavery of All to Each, as to the one, supreme, only Dominion.

The Absurdity of One compelling All.

And since this so despotic, arbitrary Dominion of each Individual respectively, diametrically opposes the Powers, the Dominions of All, it is therefore as full a Contradiction, as strong an Impossibility, that the several Powers and Abilities and Dominions of All, should, at the same Time subsist and operate, as that the same Body should move to ten thousand diametrically opposite Places at one and the same Instant of Time.

about which Men have a Liberty of acting, but 'tis a natural Principle, like the Descent of heavy Bodies, it flows necessarily from the very Frame of our Natures; Men must do so, nor can they do otherwise.

DEFINITION III.

The customary Actions of Men, considered as voluntary, and as capable of Reward or Punishment, are stiled *moral*.

DEFINITION IV.

As that which hath a Fitness to promote the Welfare of Man, considered as a sensitive Being, is stiled *natural Good*; so that which hath a Fitness to promote the Welfare of Man as a rational, voluntary and free Agent, is stiled *moral Good*, and the contrary to it *moral Evil*.

AXIOM I.

That which is morally good is to be desired and prosecuted, that which is Evil is to be avoided.

AXIOM II.

The greater Congruity or Incongruity there is in any Thing to the Reason of Mankind, and the greater Tendency it hath to promote or hinder the Perfection of Man's Nature, so much greater Degrees hath it of moral Good or Evil. To which we ought to proportion our Inclination or Aversion.

There is in some Things such a natural Decency and Fitness, as doth render them most agreeable to our Reason, and will be sufficient to recommend them to our Practice, abstracting from all Considerations of Reward. As in loving those who are kind to us, and from whom we receive Benefit: In compensating Good with Good, and not with Evil.

It is most suitable, both to the Reason and Interest of Mankind, that every one should submit themselves to him upon whom they depend for their Well-being, by doing such Things as may render them acceptable to him.

It is a desirable Thing for a Man to have the Assistance of others in his Need and Distress; and 'tis not reasonable for him to expect this from others, unless he himself be willing to shew it to others.

AXIOM III.

The rational Nature, and the Perfection belonging to it, being more noble than the sensitive, therefore moral Good is to be preferred before natural; and that which is morally Evil is more to be hated and avoided, than that which is natural.

AXIOM IV.

A present natural Good may be parted with, upon a probable Expectation of a future moral Good.

AXIOM V.

A present natural Evil is to be endured for the probable avoiding of a future moral Evil.

These

These, and such like Impossibilities as these, are pretty much the same as to imagine that Mankind (when once such Contradictions are understood) will pursue them; not to say any Thing that they never can put them in Execution and reduce them to Practice.

Mankind cannot practice such Impossibilities, neither will they attempt them when once the Contradictions they involve are understood.

These Truths therefore, as drawn, indeed, both from the Nature of rational Agents, and from the practical Precepts of sound Judgment (which, as such, actually are in rational Beings) fully demonstrate, how, from hence, we may learn, that an *Universal Benevolence* towards All is a greater, a more substantial Good, than that abominable, hostile Anticipation or Preoccupancy established by Mr. *Hobbes*.

Universal Benevolence a more solid Good than an hostile Anticipation.

Whatsoever other Articles come under this Head, we shall speak to, more particularly, when we come to treat upon human Nature, as a Subject separate, distinct, and more immediately the Object of our Enquiry.

SECT. XXXIV.

I SHALL only here add two Remarks, confirmed by the united Experience of all Ages; and which also fully prove the very Point under our present Consideration.

The first Remark, or Observation, is, *That bordering Kingdoms experience and feel a fuller Security, they reap and enjoy the more delicious Fruits of Peace and Tranquillity, by the binding, effectual Obligations of social Compacts, mutually settled and agreed upon (the Energy and Essence of which Compacts entirely consist in Fidelity, and some sort of reciprocal Benevolence) than when an open, public War is waged; and when some fall foul and seize upon the rest, whether by Rapine and Plunder, or by Treachery and Deceit.*

Bordering States and Kingdoms much securer and happier by social Compacts of Peace and Tranquillity, than by public Wars grounded upon Violence and Treachery.

The second Remark, or Observation, is, *That there are, even in Civil Society, numberless Instances wherein the Authority and restraining Power of Governors cannot exert their Influence: And yet, notwithstanding this, we may constantly observe Mankind mutually to regard the Laws of* Innocence, Fidelity, Gratitude, *and the other* Virtues, *and to practice them towards each other.* And, to which we may also farther add, that they are much more cautious how they assume to themselves a Privilege of injuring the Innocent, than in a State of War.

Mankind, even in Civil Society, will regard Innocence, Fidelity, Gratitude, where the Civil Magistrate cannot exert an Authority.

No one has a better, a firmer Security, that either his Life or his Property shall not forceably be taken away from him, by the Perjury and False-witness of his Fellow-citizens and Fellow-Subjects, than that Security which arises from the Faith and Integrity of Mankind: The Violations of which Faith and Integrity the Civil Magistrate seldom can discover, much less punish.

It is not, however, necessary here to answer those Suggestions of Mr. *Hobbes*, touching either the Necessity, the Liberty, or the Privilege of

each and every one Individual to war againſt All, from the Nature of the human Paſſions.

It is an Argument quite new alſo, which Mr. *Hobbes* has here ſubjoined in the following Words:

Mr. Hobbes's Reaſon why human Paſſions, and the Actions reſulting from them are not Sins, abſurd.

" Paſſiones hominum peccata non ſunt, neque, quæ inde oriuntur actiones, quamdiù, quæ illas prohibeat, poteſtatem nullam, qui faciunt, vident: Neque enim lex cognoſci poteſt quæ non ſit lata; neque ferri, quamdiù in legiſlatorem conſenſum non eſt."

" The Paſſions and Deſires of Mankind are not Sins, neither are the " Actions ariſing from them any Sins, ſo long as they who act thus do " not obſerve that there is a Power lodged any where to prohibit and re" ſtrain ſuch Actions: Neither, becauſe (ſays he) can any Law be known " and underſtood which is not enacted: Neither can any Law be enacted " before it is agreed upon who the Lawgiver is."

ANSWER.

Every Tranſgreſſion of right Reaſon (which is the natural Law of God) a Sin.

To this Objection I anſwer, That ſuch Actions as are prohibited and forbidden by right Reaſon (which is the natural Law of God) are actually Sins, notwithſtanding that Mankind have never ſeen the Lawgiver, nor have by any formal Conſent ſubmitted to his Power and Authority; but always, however, under theſe two following Conditions.

Submiſſion to a Lawgiver's Authority, by a formal Aſſent and Conſent, not neceſſary, if we ſuppoſe his Right upon full Evidence proved, and that theſe Laws are eſtabliſhed upon his Authority.

1. Provided always, *Firſt*, that upon full, demonſtrative Proof it be made ſufficiently evident, that this Lawgiver has the Right of governing and ruling over All.

2. And alſo, *Secondly*, that this Lawgiver has enacted and eſtabliſhed theſe Laws.

And theſe two Conditions are Points which Mr. *Hobbes*, over and over again, has allowed in the other Parts of his Writings, notwithſtanding what he ſo ſtrenuouſly maintains here, That Mankind are not bound down by any Laws, to which they themſelves have not actually, and in Form, given their Aſſent and Conſent.

Mr. Hobbes, upon this Head of the Lawgiver's Authority, guilty of a Contradiction.

Now, ſince it is undoubtedly true, that *Sin is the Tranſgreſſion of the Law*; if we, therefore, can prove Laws of Nature actually to exiſt, notwithſtanding that a Perſon ſhould not, perhaps, conſent to the Authority of Almighty God in eſtabliſhing thoſe Laws; yet that the Violation of theſe Laws, is really, actually, and truly a Sin.

If Laws of Nature actually exiſt, the Violation of them is a direct Sin, whether there be any formal Conſent to the Authority of Almighty God or no.

But—becauſe the Proof of this, ſo very odd a Propoſition, aſſerted by Mr. *Hobbes*, has, by what we have already offered, been diſcuſſed (altho' in a very conciſe Manner) and becauſe I ſhall, in the future Arguments of this Diſquiſition, conſider the Strength of Reaſoning he here offers; there is no need at preſent to detain my Reader any longer. I ſhall not, however, here diſmiſs this Article of his at Chap. 13. before I acquaint my Reader by what a triumphant, brave Argument he has ſupported this Theſis or Poſition of his, *viz.*

De

De Jure Bellandi in omnes extra Civilem Societatem, concerning the *Right of waging War* againſt all out of Civil Society. And, near the Cloſe of this Chapter, in his laſt Edition, he has ſubjoined to all he aſſerted before, the following Words. " Sed quid hominibus doctis conamur " demonſtrare, id, quod ne canes quidem ignorant, qui accedentibus obla- " trant, interdiù quidèm ignotis, noctu autèm omnibus."

His Argument that a State of Nature is a State of War, drawn from barking Cur-dogs, conſidered.

" But, why do we waſte our Time and Pains in demonſtrating before " learned Men a ſelf-evident Point: A Point of which even Cur-dogs " themſelves are not ignorant, who bark at all who approach and come " near to them; in the Day-time, indeed, at Strangers (it may be ſaid at " Strangers only) but in the Night-time at all."

Moſt nobly argued, to be ſure, of Mr. *Hobbes!* The *Laws of Nature* (that is, the Privileges granted and allowed by right Reaſon) muſt be learned and taken from the Example, the Practice, of brute, irrational Cur-dogs!

Obſerve the Reaſoning. They bark at all who approach and come near to them in the Dark. Therefore Mankind lawfully may (when not cemented into Civil Society) murder all,—nay—even their Friends and Acquaintances, at Noon-day.

If ſo, the whole ten Commandments and all Morality, &c. carry no Virtue, no Force, no Obligation, out of Civil Society.

But, let Mr. *Hobbes* and his Votaries learn, that others are warned rather by an innocent Bark to guard and defend themſelves: But they are not, as Mr. *Hobbes* has inſinuated, taught to ſeize and fall foul upon all they meet, altho' unprepared and off their Guard, either by open Violence, or by Guile and Treachery.

The true Doctrine here is, Let not only the *Hobbiſts*, but all Mankind, watch and lie in wait in their own Defence: But let them not, at the ſame Time, by Fraud and Violence, invade the Rights of others—nay—of all Mankind.

The true Concluſion from Mr. Hobbes's Cur-dogs.

But—as ſuch Points as theſe are in themſelves of little or no Conſequence, they may be paſſed over without any farther Examination.

What Mr. *Hobbes* ſubjoins a little afterwards, in the very ſame Chapter, and directly to the ſame Purpoſe, carries in it ſomewhat more of Subtlety. " Non ſunt juſtitia & injuſtitia, corporis aut animæ facultates, nam " ſi eſſent, homini ineſſe poſſunt, qui in mundo ſolitarius eſſet & unicus. " Qualitates quidèm (inquit) hominis ſunt, non autem, quatenus homo eſt, " ſed quatenus civis, *&c. i. e.* Juſtice and Injuſtice are not Faculties, " Powers or Abilities, either of Body or Soul; for if they were, we " might ſuppoſe them in Man when alone, ſolitary and in a Deſart- " world; theſe Qualities (*i. e.* Juſtice and Injuſtice) it is true, indeed, " ſays he, belong to and are in Man, not merely as he is Man, but as he " is a *Civis*, a Member of Civil Society."

Mr. Hobbes's Notion of Juſtice and Injuſtice conſider'd.

The Aſſertion, however, here which Mr. *Hobbes* would ſeem to inſinuate, is, beyond Queſtion, falſe; provided that, by Civil Society, we underſtand a Society inſtituted upon human Compact and Agreement.

We confeſs, indeed, that the external Acts of Juſtice do, for the moſt part, relate to others: (notwithſtanding, at the ſame Time, that a Man may prove much more injurious and unjuſt to himſelf) That Propenſity or Will,

Our Author here very judiciouſly diſtinguiſhes the Nature of Juſtice.

Will, however, of rendering to every one what is his Due (in which the Eſſence, the true Nature of Juſtice conſiſts) can be, and ought to be, in Man, when alone, ſolitary and in a Deſart.

Man, altho' quite alone, without any Companion, may and can be ſuppoſed endowed with a Diſpoſition, a Will, a Readineſs to act right and equal by other Creatures, altho' not as yet exiſting.

Neither can there be any true Reaſon aſſigned, why ſuch a Diſpoſition as this ſhould not be deemed natural; altho' it cannot be elicited or drawn forth into Action, whilſt one only ſolitary Man lives in the World. Mr. *Hobbes*, then, ſurely will not deny, that the Propenſity in Man to propagate his Species is a natural Propenſity (ſo far, at leaſt, as Man partakes of the Animal in his Compoſition) and that this Propenſity is natural to him, even in a State of Nature, ſolitary and quite alone; becauſe this undoubtedly, and beyond all Queſtion, was *Adam*'s Caſe before the Creation of *Eve* (1).

SECT. XXXV.

Mr. Hobbes's whole Hypotheſis is built upon the Right which each Individual, in a State of Nature, has of waging War againſt All.

TO ſum up all. Since Mr. *Hobbes*'s whole Hypotheſis is eſtabliſhed upon this one Principle; and ſince Mr. *Hobbes* himſelf, as far as I can judge, perceives, That the Right of waging War againſt All, that the Right of aſſuming and arrogating ALL to SELF, carries in it a Contradiction to the true Definition of Right (which he himſelf has delivered in that Quotation of his juſt now mentioned.)

Mr. Hobbes's two Definitions of Right contradict each other.

To ſolve, therefore, as well as he can, this Contradiction, he has, at the Beginning of the 14th Chapter of his *Leviathan*, given another Gloſs to his Definition of Natural Right, in the following Terms. "Jus naturale, eſt libertas, quam habet unuſquiſque potentiâ ſuâ, ad naturæ ſuæ conſervationem, ſuo arbitrio utendi. *i. e.* Natural Right is the Liberty which each Perſon has of uſing, according to his own Will and Pleaſure, his own Power to the Preſervation of himſelf."

No Definition of Right can be true, where Right Reaſon is not taken into the Queſtion.

Here then, to be ſure, in this ſecond Definition of his, there is not the leaſt Notice taken of *Right Reaſon*; no Suppoſition of any *Natural Reaſon*; but *an arbitrary Will and Pleaſure.*——*The Liberty of acting without Reſtraint*, muſt, forſooth!——paſs for the Name, Title and Definition of LAW.

(1) May not Appetites exiſt, although no fit correſponding Objects are preſent to ſatisfy ſuch Appetites? Are not the three Angles of every right-lined Triangle, equal to two Right-angles, before any Lines, Surfaces or Solids were ever formed? Are not Juſtice, Temperance, Fortitude and Prudence, Cardinal Virtues, Virtues of immutable Truth and Certainty, when no other Man exiſted beſides *Adam*. — Nay — even when no other Beings exiſted beſides *the one eternal I AM*. *See the Notes at* Section 7. *of this* Chapter.

Now,

Now, that Mr. *Hobbes* ſhould not ſeem too palpably to contradict himſelf, I ſhall endeavour, in order to reconcile him to himſelf, to repreſent the Affair, as well as I am able, juſt as it is.——It is thus.——He himſelf formerly, in his Book *De Cive*, underſtood by the Term *Right Reaſon, the Opinion peculiar to each Perſon*; as any one may obſerve who looks into his Annotations upon Chap. 2. Sect. 1. and here he does not except any Opinion, altho' the moſt abſurd.—Nay—he does not even except any Opinion of the ſame Perſon, however contradictory it may be at different Times with itſelf, as well as contradictory to the Senſe and Sentiments of all Mankind.

Mr. Hobbes's Definition of right Reaſon, in his Book *De Cive*, falſe.

Beyond all Contradiction, then, to be ſure, according to this Interpretation, right Reaſon is to pay an Homage, muſt ſtoop and bend to the private Opinion of every one: And yet right Reaſon cannot, neither can what is lawful and right, bend to the arbitrary Will of any Man, much leſs of every Man. For *right Reaſon* and *Right* are as inflexible as the Beam in Statics, which proves and demonſtrates the Weight of a natural Body.

For *right Reaſon* eſſentially conſiſts in a ſtrict Conformity, in an exact Agreement with Things themſelves, whoſe Natures are conſtant, invariable, as we ſhall hereafter more at large and fully demonſtrate.

Now, *Right* cannot ſtretch itſelf beyond thoſe Rules which *right Reaſon* allows and declares conſiſtent with that ultimate End which right Reaſon lays down for all rational Agents to purſue and follow. Vain, empty, and without any Authority or Foundation, is Right called compatible to any one Being, to act ſuch Things as are neither warranted, granted, nor allowed by any Law whatſoever.

Whatſoever is in its own Nature right, is eſtabliſhed upon right Reaſon.

No one can doubt but, Man is naturally endowed with that Faculty, or Energy, or Ability, called *the Power of Freedom*, capable of a Determination any one Way, according to each Perſon's own Will and Pleaſure reſpectively.—Such a Power or Faculty as this muſt undoubtedly be allowed. But—yet, whenever we take under cur Conſideration *the Right of acting*,—the Queſtion then is, *What Actions, amongſt all the poſſible Acts in our Power, can and may lawfully, and of Right, be done?*

Freedom capable of Determination, according to the Will and Pleaſure of each Agent reſpectively.

Now, my Anſwer to this Queſtion muſt ſtand for nothing, if Regard be not firſt had to ſome Law, at leaſt to ſome natural Law.—Any one can, for Inſtance, either hang, or throw headlong down a Precipice, an innocent Perſon—nay—even himſelf.—And yet no one will ſay, that any one has a Right to act thus. And the Reaſon is, becauſe not only what really and truly is in itſelf right, but alſo right Reaſon itſelf, which governs ſuch a Right; they both, I ſay, regard *Good* as their ultimate, true End: That is to ſay, in other Words, ſuch an Happineſs as is poſſible, and with a Saving always to theſe two neceſſary Conditions, *viz. That the Rights and Properties of Mankind be*, in the firſt place, *conſidered, preſerved and ſecured: As alſo*, Secondly, *all the Means neceſſary and miniſterial to this End.*

Now,

Now, the arbitrary, licentious Will of Man, raſhly flies off, both from what is right, and from right Reaſon itſelf.

Liberty is ſuch a natural Right as is granted by the Laws of Nature.

All other Perſons, beſides Mr. *Hobbes*, who have thought proper to expreſs *Liberty* under the Title of *Natural Right*, underſtand ſuch a *Liberty*, as is granted and authorized by the *Laws of Nature*.

Objection.

But,—if Mr. *Hobbes* ſtill inſiſts upon it, that he lawfully may expreſs the Liberty of doing every Thing for his own Self-preſervation, by the Title of *Right* (altho' no one, except himſelf, ever applied the Word to this Senſe) and if, in Confirmation of this his Definition, he produces the Authority of Philoſophers, who limit and fix the Significations of Words to ſuch Notions, Conceptions and Ideas as are explained and ſet forth in their Definitions; why then my following Anſwer to him, at this Time, will be ſufficient.—Namely—

Anſwer. The Liberty of doing every Thing for Self-preſervation, under the Title of Right, anſwered.

That allowing the limited Signification of the Term which he, and only he, applies to this Meaning (and no one is obliged to underſtand this Term in his Meaning): Suppoſing, I ſay, that we allow even all this, yet it ſtill lies upon him to prove, that this Liberty of doing whatſoever any one pleaſes for Self-preſervation, either actually at preſent has, or that it ever had any Exiſtence at all in ſuch a State, that is, in a State of Nature: Or, he is in the next Place to prove, that, in a State of Nature, there cannot poſſibly lie any Prohibition; and, by Conſequence, that there cannot lie any Hindrance to reſtrain all the reſt of Mankind from acting after the ſame Manner exactly, the inſtituted Obligations of all Civil Societies being once removed.

There are, in the State of Nature, Dictates of right Reaſon. Theſe Dictates of right Reaſon declare Puniſhments, &c.

Now—We, in Contradiction to this whole Scheme of his, affirm, That, in a State of Nature even, there are certain Dictates of right Reaſon which Almighty God, in the Natures of Things, has ſuggeſted to the Mind of Man: And—which Dictates fully declare beforehand, that Puniſhments, the moſt ſevere and rigorous, await thoſe who attempt any Thing againſt the common Good upon account of Self-preſervation merely.

Neither is this an Aſſertion trifling only and groundleſs; but—we prove the Truth and Reality of it by demonſtrative, clear, ſolid Arguments. Whereas Mr. *Hobbes* by no other Argument proves, that there is this Liberty which he calls *Right*, than by ſaying, "That we *willingly would* "act otherwiſe, but *can't*." *De Cive*, Chap. 1. Sect. 7. Which is an Aſſertion directly and manifeſtly againſt Experience. As to my own Part, I freely own, indeed, that I will and can act otherwiſe. And—it is my firm Opinion, that great Numbers have chearfully and willingly ſuffered Death upon account of the public Good. So very weak and ſandy, therefore, is that Foundation upon which all the reſt of Mr. *Hobbes*'s Philoſophy, both in Morality and Politics, totters.

Self-preſervation is, from Experience in many Caſes, a falſe Rule to go by.

We are here then, in the mean while, to obſerve, That all thoſe Poſitions which we aſſert, in order to eſtabliſh the *Law of Nature* (ſo far as this Law regards the Good of others) will, at the ſame Time, prove, that

that before any Eſtabliſhment of Civil Society, no one had any lawful Right to preſerve himſelf, by violating and tranſgreſſing the Laws of Nature.

No one has a Right to preſerve himſelf by tranſgreſſing the Laws of Nature.

Theſe Arguments, therefore, render vain and ridiculous that ſavage, unbounded *Hobbian Right*, which [*Right*] according to Reaſon, ought not to be, is incapable of being, reduced into Practice, unleſs the Will of each and every one Individual agrees with the Decree of ſome Law; and, by Conſequence, limits and circumſcribes all ſuch pretendedly-unlimited *Right*.

No Right can be eſtabliſhed and ſecured where there is not ſome one Law to adjuſt ſuch a Right.

But, to what End or Purpoſe am I ſo officious as to prove this Right of acting and doing every Thing againſt ALL, to be mere nothing? Eſpecially, and in particular, ſince Mr. *Hobbes*, who in this Argument monſtrouſly contradicts himſelf, has ſaid what amounts almoſt to the ſame Thing. For he acknowledges, in his Book *De Cive*, Chap. 1. Section 11. "Jus hoc inutile eſſe: *i. e.* Such a Right as this to be uſe-"leſs."

A Contradiction proved upon Mr. Hobbes in his Notions of Right.

Let us connect and reconcile this Gentleman with himſelf if we can. This very ſelf-ſame, individual Mr. *Hobbes*, (who, in the Words immediately preceding this Article, concludes, "Menſuram juris eſſe utilita-"tem: *i. e.* That the Meaſure of Right is Convenience, Advantage;") here declares at once, and without the leaſt Scruple, any ſuch Sort of *Right* uſeleſs; notwithſtanding that he has, but juſt before, ſtrenuouſly laboured to eſtabliſh ſuch a *Right*.—Nay—and what is ſtill more, the very Terms themſelves, *Jus* or *Right* (according to his own Definition) and—*inutile* or *uſeleſs* (which he has clapped in at the Cloſe of this Article) are irreconcilable, incompatible, utterly inconſiſtent, Ασυγατα. For the Term [*Jus*] *Right*, in both his Definitions, is referred to the Uſe of *Liberty*: Whereas he tells us, talking upon the very ſame Subject, that the *inutile* or *unprofitable* is not, by any Means, the Uſe of Liberty.

Right Reaſon, however, all this while (for ſuch is its Happineſs) does not commonly reconcile Notions ſo very contradictory as theſe. Neither, indeed, is *Right Reaſon* ſo careleſs and improvident of Futurity, as to eſtabliſh ſuch a State of War the neceſſary Means of Preſervation to All, when at once *Right Reaſon* cannot but ſee, that ſuch a State muſt prove deſtructive of All.

To conclude. That Reaſoning therefore of Mr. *Hobbes*, and upon which he endeavours to eſtabliſh his Opinions, is not, by any Means, *right*.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Concerning Human Nature *and* Right Reaſon.

SECT. I.

What is meant by the Term *Man*.

BY the Term *Man*, we underſtand *an Animal endowed with Mind, or a rational Soul.*—And—even Mr. *Hobbes* himſelf, in his Book *concerning Human Nature*, Chap. 1. Sect. 3. allows Mind, or a rational Soul, to be one of the principal, conſtituent Parts in the Frame and Compoſition of Man.

Now, both ancient and modern Philoſophers, as *Carteſius*, *Digby*, *More*, &c. have demonſtratively made out this Diſtinction between Soul and Body; in which [*Body*] the animal Faculties and Powers are contained: And this very Diſtinction that excellent Writer, Dr. *Seth Ward*, has well vindicated againſt Mr. *Hobbes*, in his *Epiſtolary Exercitation*, which I ſhall juſt now mention with the Honour it deſerves, in my 4th Section of this Chapter; ſo that it would be to light a Candle to the Sun at Noon Day, ſhould I attempt to add any Thing.

Mr. Hobbes miſtaken in diſtinguiſhing the Faculties of human Nature.

This one Remark, however, I think, ſeems neceſſary, which is, That Mr. *Hobbes* has egregiouſly and moſt unfortunately blundered in the very firſt Page of his Book *De Cive*, where he diſtinguiſhes all the Faculties of human Nature into four Kinds; namely, 1. A Corporeal Force. 2. Experience. 3. Reaſon. 4. The Affections.

Now, not to mention the firſt of theſe, a Corporeal Force, which, according to Mr. *Hobbes*'s Opinion, fully comprehends all the other three (becauſe he does not acknowledge any other Faculties or Powers, than ſuch Faculties or Powers as are merely corporeal): Not to mention, I ſay, this egregious Blunder, yet what he farther aſſerts, is, againſt the common Uſages of Speech, *That Experience is a Faculty of our Nature.* When, in true Propriety of Speaking, Experience muſt be numbered amongſt thoſe Things which fall under the Cognizance of our (1) *Senſes, both internal and external*, and frequently cauſes Memory; but cannot, according to his own Definition, in his Treatiſe *De Naturâ Humanâ*, pag. 36. be *the*

Why Experience is not a natural Faculty.

(1) *Senſes, both internal and external.*] *External Senſes*, are the five Senſes, *viz.* 1. Seeing. 2. Hearing. 3. Taſting. 4. Smelling. 5. Feeling.

Internal Senſes, are Ideas of Reflexion, or reflex Acts of the Mind, excited and put into Motion by theſe outward Senſes.

And, conſequently, Senſes neither internal nor external can be the Memory. Experience is acquired by repeated Obſervations. All our Obſervations muſt ariſe from our Senſes external or internal.

Memory

Memory itſelf (1). 2. Beſides all this, it is univerſally known, that ſuch Objects as, from Experience, are moſt familiar to the Mind, quite ſlip out of the Memory. Now, if Mr. *Hobbes* is pleaſed to underſtand by the Term *Experience*, an Habit acquired and ſettled from frequent and repeated Experiments, he muſt certainly be guilty of huge Abſurdity, if he reckons Experience amongſt the Faculties; unleſs perhaps he has a Mind to reckon Geometry *Juriſprudence*, the Knowledge of Laws and other Diſciplines, both ſpeculative and practical (as confeſſedly being Habits), amongſt the Faculties of our Nature. But ſuch *Minutiæ* as theſe are too trifling and inſignificant to take up more of our Time; let us rather turn our Thoughts a little upon the Definition of Man juſt now premiſed.

What is comprehended under the Term *Animal.*

3. Under the Term *Animal*, I would have all that comprehended which is diſcoverable in Brute Creatures, and concerning which all the different Sects of Philoſophers are agreed; ſuch as the Powers of *Nutrition, Loco Motion, (that is of moving from Place to Place) Generation*, &c. —Nay—and what is much more, we muſt, without Scruple, allow to Brutes *ſome Sort of Senſe*; becauſe, I do not ſee any Reaſon why we ſhould not attribute to the Brute Creation ſuch Motions, and ſuch Degrees of Senſation, as ariſe from Impreſſions made upon their bodily Organs by outward Objects, and which from thence are conveyed by Nerves, ſubſervient to theſe Senſes, into the Brain; and which Motions are from the Brain communicated to Muſcles, in order to cauſe a Motion in the Heart, the Lungs, and very likely in the Viſcera or Bowels: By the Help and Means of all which Motions in the inward Animal Parts, ſeveral Affections (*i. e.* Appetites, Paſſions, Animal Motions, *&c.*) may be raiſed. However, notwithſtanding all this, we cannot but think that the Power of Obſervation peculiarly belongs to Reaſon; that is, the Power of perceiving diſtinctly theſe Motions, ſo as with Freedom and Energy to ſearch into, diſcover and view what is contained in each of them.

Thus, for Example, we aſſert that Reaſon muſt determine what is the Figure or Degree of every Object; what that Situation reſpectively is which each Object carries in the Retina, different from what the Situation really is in the Object itſelf; what is its Magnitude; what its Velocity or Motion; what appears upon the outward Surface of it; or what are the

(1) *Memory itſelf.*] Sometimes a Man ſeeks what he hath loſt; and from that Place and Time wherein he miſſes it, his Mind runs back from Place to Place, and from Time to Time, to find where and when he had it; that is to ſay, to find ſome certain limited Time and Place in which he begins a Method of ſeeking again: From thence his Thoughts run over the ſame Places and Times, to find what Action or Occaſion might make him loſe it. This we call *Remembrance*, or *calling to Mind:* The *Latins* call it *Reminiſcentia*, as it were *a re-conning* of our former Actions.

Sometimes a Man knows a Place determinate, within the Compaſs whereof he is to ſeek; and then, his Thoughts run over all the Parts thereof, in the ſame Manner as one would ſweep a Room to find a Jewel; or as a Spaniel ranges the Field, till he finds a Scent; or as a Man would run over the Alphabet to ſtart a Rhime. *Leviathan, Folio Edition in Engliſh*, Part 1. Chap. 3. Pag. 10. London 1651.

ſeveral Degrees of Refraction, in a Medium, which with ſuch infinite Variety, diverſify the Actions of Light, ſo as to repreſent all the Phænomena of Colours. For, I cannot ſee what there is in the Corporeal Bulk, the natural Subſtance of the Brain, capable (when once they pour in altogether upon the Eyes, by the very ſame Impulſes of the Rays) of ſeparating them from each other, of comparing them together, and of diſtinguiſhing their Differences, or of hindering them from being any Cauſe why they ſhould be apprehended, and perceived in ſtrict Conjunction, as they appear in a darkened Chamber, or (1) in the Bottom of the Eye of an Animal. From whence (that is, from which *fundis oculi animalis*) they pour in, upon the *Thalami Nervorum Opticorum*; which *Thalami* are evidently perceivable in the very inmoſt, intimate Subſtance of the Brain. But as to theſe Speculations, they truly are the Subject of anatomical Philoſophy.

Camera Obſcura.

We generally attribute to the Mind, *i. e.* to the human Soul,

(1) *In the Bottom of the Eye of an Animal.*] It perhaps may be ſome Difficulty to know what Change muſt be made in the Eye, in order for it to have a diſtinct View of Objects placed at different Diſtances: For, as in the *Camera Obſcura*, the Rays which flow from Objects that are near, unite at a greater Diſtance from the Lens, than the Rays of thoſe which are more remote; ſo the very ſame Thing happens in the Eye, where the Rays, which proceed from the Pillars of this Gallery *, unite at a greater Diſtance from the Cryſtalline Humour, than thoſe that come from theſe Trees which are farther from it. What Change then muſt be made in the Eye, in order that when we look upon theſe Trees, after having looked upon the Pillars, the Rays which proceed from them may be united upon the Retina; or, in other Words, that we may have a diſtinct View of them.

The Retina, anſwered ſhe, muſt be brought nearer the Cryſtalline Humour, juſt as the *Camera Obſcura* is brought nearer the Lens, in order to give us a diſtinct Image of the more remote Objects.

There are ſome Perſons, however, who cannot bring the Retina ſo near to the Cryſtalline Humour as is neceſſary, in order to give them a diſtinct View of diſtant Objects. There are others who, on the contrary, cannot preſs it back far enough to make Objects which are near, appear diſtinct; the firſt of theſe, who are vulgarly called ſhort-ſighted, are by Opticians named *Myopes*; and the ſecond, commonly long-ſighted, *Preſbytæ*; theſe may be conſidered as the Extremes betwixt which that Sight, which is called juſt and perfect, ſtands.

Notwithſtanding the Honour of being diſtinguiſhed in Optics, by Names derived from the *Greek*, theſe Perſons could not help perceiving they had a Defect in their Eyes, which led them to ſeek for ſome Remedy. The *Myopes*, in order to have a diſtinct View of diſtant Objects, and the *Preſbytæ* of thoſe at Hand; theſe laſt found Relief in Convex Glaſſes, which applied to the Eye removed their Defect; for theſe making thoſe Rays to become converging, which would, without their Aſſiſtance, have fell diverging upon the Cryſtalline Humour, unite them at leſs Diſtance than they would otherwiſe have done; and the Image of thoſe Objects which are oppoſite to the Lens, is drawn diſtinctly upon the Retina. The *Myopes* found their Remedy in Concave Glaſſes, which diſperſe the Rays, and make them diverge, contrary to the Convex ones, which make the diverging Rays become converging: Theſe Concave Glaſſes then give a Diſpoſition to the Rays, as if they came from a nearer Object than they really do, and applied to the Eye of a *Myop*, they, in a certain Manner, tranſport the diſtant Object to a nearer Situation, and thus a diſtinct Image of it is drawn upon his Retina; for there is nothing more required to give ſhort-ſighted Perſons a diſtinct View of any Thing, than to bring it near their Eye. *See Sir* Iſaac Newton's *Theory of Light and Colours, and his Principle of Attraction, made familiar to the Ladies*, Vol. 1. Page 153.

* *This Converſation is ſuppoſed to be held in the Gallery of a magnificent Building placed in a Foreſt.*

1. The *Understanding*.
2. The *Will*.

First, To the *Understanding* we attribute, 1. Apprehension. 2. Comparison, or the Power of comparing Ideas together. 3. Judgment, or Affirmation and Negation. 4. Ratiocination, or the Power of inferring, concluding, *&c.* 5. The regular, methodical Disposition of Parts. And 6. Memory, or the Recollection of all such Objects and Ideas, and about whatsoever Things these several Operations of the Mind are conversant.

Secondly, To the *Will* we attribute all the simple Acts, not only of Willing and Nilling; but also the Violence, Vehemence, Perturbation, Agitation of them (*i. e.* of such Acts of Willing and Nilling as discovers itself in the Affections) *i. e.* Appetites, Passions, in a Degree superior to all Motion merely corporeal.

In the Memory, or in the Remembrance of Propositions, Theoretic and Practic, there actually arise and really exist—Habits as well,

1. Theoretic, as
2. Practic.

First, The Theoretic Habits are celebrated upon account of the Sciences.

Secondly, The Practic Habits are celebrated upon account of the Arts.

Thirdly, Here naturally, in the third Place, falls under our Consideration Ethics or Morality, which is the Art of Life; that is, the whole Art of managing and directing the Sum and Substance of all our Actions, in pursuing and attaining to the best End.

SECT. II.

HERE also, in the next Place, we must say something concerning the various Customs and Manners of several Nations, and, I had almost said, of Mankind in general.

Human Reason and human Passions the same in all.

Now, the various different Habits are acquired and superinduced, partly from a Diversity of Disposition, or of a natural Propensity, tending to such and such Manners and Behaviour; partly from the Temperature of Constitution, Climate, Country, Education, Religion, Fortune, and those several Employments, in the Discharge of which Mankind are severally engaged.

How moral Habits are formed.

From Manners and Behaviour thus acquired, there is, if we may so say, almost another Nature, as it were, superinduced upon Man: Such Manners and Behaviour, therefore, must be brought under Consideration in enacting and settling Laws; and this so far holds good, that Laws of very ancient Date, notwithstanding such Laws are not, if abstractedly considered, at all times the best, must however remain in Force; either, first, because they who have been for a long time used to them, may not perhaps,

haps, without public Diſturbance, and at the imminent Hazard of all Rights and Privileges, permit better to be ſubſtituted in their ſtead. We are here to make one Obſervation, which, in my Opinion, is very worthy of Notice; That we, conformable to the Sentiments of all other Philoſophers, in the following Enquiry into theſe Laws (which are ſo neceſſarily connected with, and perfectly agreeable to human Nature) always underſtand and ſuppoſe human Nature to arrive at mature, adult Age; at an Age when there is a ſound Mind in a ſound Body, or advanced at leaſt to ſuch a Degree of Maturity, as Reaſon and Virtue require. Becauſe Laws are never, rationally ſpeaking, enacted for Infants and Madmen, neither can Society be compoſed of ſuch; and therefore, conſequently, we muſt not form any Concluſion about either the Right or the Propenſity of human Nature, from the mean, low Deſire and odd Behaviour of either Ideots or Madmen: And yet, at the ſame time, we may, in my Opinion, embrace as a Criterion, or Mark, whatſoever appears in Man when he comes to mature Age, agreeable either to the animal or rational Nature; we may, I ſay, very well look upon all ſuch Acts as theſe natural to and born with Man. For we cannot but obſerve, how natural it is to hope and expect to find in Mankind, Pity, Compaſſion, and a Sympathy to be accounted for from Cauſes which hereafter ſhall be aſſigned; whereby we rejoice with them who do rejoice, and weep with them who weep.

Mr. *Hobbes* therefore, to very little Purpoſe, declares the Foundation of his Opinion, when in his Annot. to Chap. 1. Art. 2. he gives his Reaſons why (contrary to the general Opinion) he affirms Man not to be Ζωον Πολιτικον, an Animal in himſelf fit for Polity or Civil Society, a Term which, by the Bye, he applies to an Animal naturally ſocial, when he comes to declare the Reaſon of his Opinion; That ſince [" Societates ſint " fœdera; horum autem (ſcilt. fœderum) ab infantibus & indoctis, vis ig- " noratur: Ab aliis (quos poſtea indicat eſſe permultos, fortaſſe plurimos, " morbo animi, vel defectu diſciplinæ) qui, damnorum, a defectu Socie- " tatis, inexperti ſunt, utilitas ignoratur: Unde fit, ut illi ſocietatem in- " ire non poſſint, hi non curent. Habent tamen illi, tam infantes quam " adulti naturam humanam. Ergo homo ad ſocietatem aptus, non naturâ " ſed diſciplinâ factus eſt."] Societies are nothing elſe than Confederacies, Leagues, Covenants, the Young and Ignorant are entire Strangers to their Obligation: As to the reſt of Mankind, they are quite in the Dark as to the Uſe and Advantage of ſuch Confederacies; they never having experienced the Damages, the Loſs occaſioned from the Defect, the Want of Society: Which (reſt of Mankind) he afterwards declares to be the larger, very probably, by far the largeſt Share: That this Part of Mankind labours under, either ſome Diſtemper of Mind, or under ſome Defect as to neceſſary Inſtruction: From whence Mr. *Hobbes* ſays, it happens that the one (*i. e.* the Young and the Ignorant) are not capable of entering into Society: That the other (by far the largeſt Part) are quite careleſs about it:

it: And yet, notwithſtanding this, that they all, both Infants and Perſons of adult Age, partake of human Nature; therefore Man is not naturally, but by Diſcipline, Inſtitution, Inſtruction, made fit for Society.——This is Mr. *Hobbes*'s Sentiment in the Annotation; theſe are his Words, altho' ſomewhat abridged to avoid Prolixity. I paſs over in Silence, for the preſent, that falſe Suppoſition of his, wherein he makes *Societies* Leagues, and where he places Diſcipline or Inſtruction (which entirely adapts itſelf, and is ſubſervient to Nature) in direct Oppoſition to Nature itſelf. For whatſoever Inſtructions we receive from others, they certainly did receive them from Obſervations upon their own Nature, and the Nature of the Univerſe. However, here I obſerve that even Experience itſelf, from the want of which it is that ſo many are unfit for Society, is at laſt reſolved into Nature, which undoubtedly informs us, that *whatſoever Experience proves true, is ſo.*

Now, altho' great Numbers of Mankind draw moſt of their Knowledge from Words of arbitrary Impoſition, yet the Notions or Interpretations of Words, and the Agreement of ſuch Notions, upon which Agreement all affirmative Truth is eſtabliſhed, are from Nature: And hence it comes to paſs, that the ſame Notions prevail every where, altho' the Language or Words be different.

Mr. *Hobbes* has alſo, all this while, forgotten that he has made *Experience*, a *Faculty of human Nature*, when at the ſame Time he places *Experience* in direct Oppoſition to any ſuch Faculty. What I would here remark is only this, That all Philoſophers and Writers upon public Affairs very well knew, and always have taken Notice, how little qualified Infants, and adult Perſons diſtempered in Mind, are to enter into the Covenants, or to diſcharge the Offices of Society; and yet they all have determined, that Man is born for that very End, to which, at length in mature Age, by the Strength of Nature, he will arrive, unleſs ſome accidental Hindrance not common, ſuch as a diſtempered Mind, happens.

That Verſe of *Juvenal*, Sat. 14. Verſe 321. is well known.

Non aliud Natura, aliud ſapientia dicet.
Nature and Wiſdom agree in teaching us the ſame Leſſon.

And *Ariſtotle* in his *Politics*, Book 1. Chap. 2. (1) ſays, *That we muſt form our Judgment of Nature from the End or the Perfection of it.*

That, beyond all Contradiction, is a trifling, childiſh Inference, and ſavours more of the Grammarian than of the true Moral Philoſopher,

(1) Ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος ἐστίν· Οἷον γὰρ ἕκαστόν ἐστι, τῆς γενέσεως τελεσθείσης, ταύτην φαμὲν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἑκάστου, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπου, ἵππου, οἰκίας· Ἔτι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ τέλος, βέλτιστον· Natura finis eſt. Quale enim quidque, ortu ejus abſoluto atque perfecto, hanc cujuſque naturam eſſe dicimus, ut hominis, equi, domûs. Præterea id cujus gratiâ res fit, & cujuſque rei finis, optimum quiddam eſt. Lambino Interprete.

That

That " becauſe Men are born Infants, they therefore are born unfit for " Society. This Concluſion of his is exactly the ſame with that which he produces in his Phyſiology *(Problemata Phyſica)* where he deduces the Clap or Noiſe of a Thunderbolt from the craking of Ice, which, directly contrary to the Doctrine of Statics, he, in the midſt of Summer, ſuſpends or hangs in the Air. Now, altho' the Word NATURA, *Nature*, be derived from NASCENDO, *Naſcor, to be born*; yet it is well known that *Nature*, I mean *human Nature*, expreſſes that Strength of Reaſon, the firſt Seeds of which only are to be obſerved in Children newly born.

In like manner, Man is naturally fitted to propagate his Species, and yet neither is an Infant, nor a Perſon who from ſome Diſorder has loſt all ſeminal Vertue, qualified for this Office; neither can any Man execute this Office without a Woman. In like manner, we call the *Vertues* of *Plants* and *Fruits* uſeful to us, both in *Food* and *Medicine*, *natural:* And yet theſe Vertues do not immediately appear as ſoon as they begin to ſpring up and bloſſom, but it is after ſome time when, by the genial Aſſiſtance of Heat and Moiſture, they have grown to their perfect Maturity, and have eſcaped the deſtructive Blaſts of malignant Air.

Now, that REASON is a *Faculty of human Nature*, and conſequently *natural* to us, is a Point which Mr. *Hobbes* fairly allows, in the very firſt Article of his Book *De Cive:*——Nay, even that *Right Reaſon is natural to us*; concerning which he ſpeaks in his Second Chapter, 1. Art. he fairly owns. His Words are theſe, " Eſt igitur lex quædam recta ratio, " quæ (cum non minus ſit pars, humanæ naturæ vel affectus animi) naturalis quoque dicitur." Right Reaſon, therefore, is a certain Law, which ſince it is no leſs a Part of human Nature, than any other Faculty or Affection of the Mind, is alſo natural. And yet this very Doctrine Mr. *Hobbes* himſelf at ſome other times denies, as in his *Leviathan*, Chap. 5. Page 21. in *Engliſh*, where he ſays, " By this it appears that Reaſon is " not, as Senſe and Memory, born with us; nor gotten by Experience " only, as Prudence is, but attained by Induſtry, *&c.*"

Let Mr. *Hobbes*, if he can, get clear of ſuch Contradictions. I will not miſ-ſpend my Time and Pains in proving what is moſt evident, but more eſpecially ſince I have beforehand openly declared myſelf, That I conſider human Nature in the mature, adult, ſound State of Man, in that State when the Uſe of Reaſon naturally advances towards Maturity and Perfection.

SECT.

SECT. III.

Computations of Numbers, and Rules for the Conduct of human Life acquired much in the ſame Way.

WE ſhall ſufficiently prove, according to our Notions of Things, the Doctrine laid down to be true; if we can demonſtrate, That human Nature, by the very ſame Method, ſuggeſts certain Rules of Life, in which is ſuggeſted to us the Skill, the Knowledge of computing Numbers.

All rational Beings, when once they arrive at a mature Uſe of Reaſon, moſt readily (unleſs the Mind be ſome how diſtempered) diſtinguiſh different Things by *Numbers* (1). They add, ſubſtract, and they even multiply and divide theſe Numbers, without the artificial Rules of Arithmetic, provided always that the Numbers be not very large. All Nations think entirely the ſame way, and that neceſſarily too, concerning the Sum Total of two Numbers, the Addition of them being *once* determined; as alſo concerning the Subſtraction of them, their Difference being once ſettled; altho' they may widely differ as to the Terms and Marks of their *Numbers*, which are all arbitrary, according to the different Inſtitutions of each Country.

By the ſame Parity of Reaſoning, Nature being our Guide, it is, in my Opinion, univerſally agreed (and of Neceſſity it muſt be ſo) that the Good of all Rationals is a greater Good than the like Good of any Part belonging to the ſaid *All* or *Whole*: Or, in other Terms, that ſuch a Good is really and truly the greateſt: As alſo, in purſuing ſuch an aggregate Good which concerns the Whole, we find the Good of Each, and all the ſingular Parts to be comprehended.

We find, moreover, that the ſeparate Good of the ſingle Parts requires the Uſe, the Benefit of ſuch Things, and rational Endeavours, whereby Things may be rendered pleaſing and agreeable to All; namely, *Firſt*, That due Reſpect, Honour, Glory and Worſhip be paid to Almighty God; and, *Secondly*, that each and all of Mankind be preſerved in Life, Health and Vigour; becauſe under theſe two Articles we ſhall find the radical Principles and operative Effects of all natural Laws to be comprehended.

Towards a perfect Skill in numbering, Induſtry and artificial Marks of arbitrary Inſtitution, with the Order and regular placing of ſuch Marks, are of ſignal Advantage; and yet all theſe Helps originally ſpring from Nature as the Source, the Fountain Head: Neither can it ever poſſibly happen that ſuch Things as we, without any Art and Pains, know to be true and neceſſary to the ſeveral Uſes of Life, become falſe, or be proved empty, vain, without Foundation. Nay—even after all the additional Aſſiſtance of Art, the whole Effect muſt yet ſtill be attributed much more to Nature than to Art. The Caſe is exactly the ſame here as in preparing

(1) *See* Ch. 5. Sect. 46. *of this* Enquiry. *See* Lock's *Eſſay concerning Human Underſtanding*, Ch. 11. Sect. 6, 7. *and* Chap. 16. Book 2.

Food;

Food; after the Cook's Art has prepared the Food, and made it fit for our Nouriſhment, nobody will deny that we are nouriſhed by the Powers, the Operations of Nature; for ſuppoſing the Caſe otherwiſe, our whole Life would be *unnatural.*

Now, I judged it proper to premiſe this one Poſtulatum, which no one, in my Opinion, can take amiſs, That the human Soul or any Faculty of it (but more particularly any one intellectual Faculty) is inclined to Acts proper for its Operation, as often as any Opportunity ariſes, and a fit Subject Matter is ſuggeſted to it, either from outward Objects, or from the Body which in neceſſary Conjunction acts with it. And this Truth daily Experience confirms. Whenever, for Inſtance, from the Senſes, Light and Colours are conveyed by the Eyes to the Soul, Sounds by the Ears, the Soul in an Inſtant is ready and active to take Notice of the Object repreſented to it; and the Caſe is exactly the ſame in its Notices of theſe ſeveral Degrees of Pain and Pleaſure, ariſing from the Habit of that Body to which, in this Vale of Mortality, it is ſo cloſely and intimately joined.

The primary Apprehenſions or ſimple Perceptions are likewiſe in ſome Sort neceſſary; the more obvious Compariſons, likewiſe, of Images and Objects with each other; as alſo certain Judgments, *i. e.* Affirmations and Negations, or Propoſitions, conſtituted and made up of ſuch ſimple Apprehenſions; and, beſides all this, the clear Connexion between Cauſes and their Effects, leads the Mind to compound and conſtitute ſuch Propoſitions as declare and affirm this Connexion; and theſe Propoſitions recur to the Mind, even whether we will or no (whenever there is Occaſion) by Vertue of the inherent Vigour and Strength natural to the Memory: Neither can the Freedom of our Will abſolutely hinder theſe ſeveral Operations, notwithſtanding that the Will may greatly contribute towards ſuch Acts and Operations as theſe.

We are able, for Inſtance, by the voluntary, free Uſe of our Faculties, to rouze ourſelves up and recollect ſeveral Ideas and Circumſtances, which are almoſt worn out of Remembrance; and alſo ſuch remarkable Objects, as are and ought to be more critically examined into by our Senſes, and to form exacter, more diligent Compariſons between Things, from Propoſitions thus compared and joined together; to form Syllogiſms, and, by Conſequence, to draw new Concluſions.

Now every one Man of mature Age, in Proportion to the Strength of that Underſtanding with which he is naturally endowed, is freely carried from his own natural Diſpoſition, towards ſuch Acts and Operations as theſe, by a Propenſity of Mind equal to an indiſpenſable Neceſſity.—Into this natural Impetus or Tendency may be ſolved many Dictates of Reaſon, which we call *natural*, eſpecially ſuch Dictates as firſt offer themſelves to the Mind, and are ſelf-evident: Into the ſame natural Propenſity may be ſolved likewiſe thoſe ſeveral Acts of *the Will*, which are converſant about Happineſs,

Happineſs, are in the general conſidered, and univerſally relative to all; or as ſuch Happineſs is conſidered in the aggregate Whole, of all Sorts of poſſible Good.

Now, the Judgment is under no Neceſſity of forming any Compariſon; becauſe this Kind of Happineſs comprehends all Sorts of Good, according to *Cicero*'s Definition; the accumulating, collecting, and joining into one, all Sorts of Good poſſible: Neither, in this Caſe, is the Mind under the leaſt Neceſſity of employing itſelf about thoſe ſeveral Branches of our Happineſs which are in themſelves amiable and to be deſired, ſuch as Wiſdom, Health, a diſtinct Viſion without too great a Glare of Light, and all ſuch other Impreſſions which appear congruous, and are fitted to the Senſes which offer themſelves to us.

Neither ſhall I, in my Opinion, have Mr. *Hobbes*'s Mouth open upon me, how great ſoever a Patron he may be of Neceſſity, in all its Shapes: Becauſe he has informed us, in *Human Nature*, Page 69, 70, "That "all Perception is a corporeal Motion in the Brain, and that this Motion "is communicated to the Heart; if this Motion at any time helps the "Heart's vital Motion, then are eſſentially cauſed Pleaſure and Love; but "if it ſo happens that this Motion retards, or proves any Hindrance to "the vital Motion of the Heart, then as eſſentially are cauſed a Chagrin, "and an Hatred, *&c.*"

And then Mr. *Hobbes* proceeds to tell us, That this Motion naturally courts and excites us to enquire more cloſely into its Cauſe; and then, in this Caſe, there ariſes an Appetite, a Deſire, or it admoniſhes us to recoil and ſtart back, and then enſues Diſtance, Averſion.

But I am very far from acknowledging this mechanical Operation of Matter upon the human Soul; and yet I agree with all other Philoſophers of my Acquaintance, that our Minds are carried, by ſome Sort of a Neceſſity, into our firſt Thoughts or Notions of Things; and that the Mind is carried alſo towards the Appetite, the Deſire of Good, and alſo to the Avoidance of Evil.

For that natural Energy, radically implanted in the more ſublime Part of our Nature, will not ſuffer any one to grow quite ſtupid, thro' a ſluggiſh Indolence: Neither can a rational Nature act otherwiſe, than (in Proportion as fit Objects of Activity come before it) apprehend, underſtand, will and nill, as alſo direct and determine the ſeveral corporeal Motions, towards the Attainment of ſuch Objects as pleaſe, and are agreeable to a rational Nature.

SECT. IV.

BUT ſince the Laws of Nature demand no other Behaviour, than ſuch as can ariſe from Principles of Action naturally implanted in us, it is therefore reaſonable that we narrowly examine into the Condition and Powers of Soul and Body, both ſeparately and in Conjunction, ſo as to lay before the Mind what human Nature, from the inward, eſſential Conſtitution of its very Being, is capable of performing.

Now, that the Soul of Man is more excellent than his Body, and created for much nobler Ends, than to ſubſerve as the Agent miniſterial to the Life and Preſervation of one diminutive Animal only, are Points which come to be proved, and upon the cleareſt Evidences of Demonſtration. We muſt not, however, firſt paſs over in Silence, That the Nature of an human Soul is *ſpiritual*, *immaterial*, and (1) made in God's Image after his own Likeneſs; that it claims and is naturally fitted for nobler Employment than is ſuitable to the Soul of a Swine, which ſerves only in the Place of Salt, to preſerve the Fleſh from Corruption. We alſo may and ought, in the ſecond Place, to obſerve in general, That Endowments much inferior to thoſe at preſent obſervable in Man, would ſuffice to preſerve and lengthen out human Life to a long Continuance; and this we may obſerve in ſome long-lived Brutes.—Nay, thus much is obſervable even in Trees, in the Oak for Inſtance, a Tree of long Life, of a vegetative Life only, quite devoid of all Senſe, to ſay nothing of Reaſon. And what is ſtill more, the Acuteneſs, the Sagacity of the human Underſtanding, does not eſſentially conſiſt in diſcovering ſuch Aliments, Medicines, Employments, Exerciſes, *&c.* as ſerve to protract and lengthen out Life here; for, we may obſerve that the moſt eminent Phyſicians are not, as to theſe Articles, greatly at a Loſs; whereas the Excellency of Man's Nature chiefly conſiſts in Points which concern the Knowledge and Worſhip of Almighty God, and which concern the Doctrines of Moral Philoſophy and of Civil Polity. But—in this Province, that moſt excellent Philoſopher, the Right Reverend
*A.D. 1672. Dr. *Seth Ward*, * *now* Lord Biſhop of *Saliſbury*, has eminently out-ſhined all Philoſophers, both ancient and modern, in his Defence againſt the violent Inſults and outrageous Attacks of Mr. *Hobbes* upon Nature and Society.

It will be neceſſary, however, here to lay before our Readers, ſome certain Powers and Operations of the human Soul; from whence it may evidently appear, that the Soul is naturally adapted to enter into Society the moſt extenſive; and to prove, that unleſs the human Soul does ſubmit to enter into ſuch a Society, it neglects its principal Uſe and Employment, and lets go the beſt Advantages of its own natural Diſpoſition: And this Doctrine holds more ſtrictly true, when applied to human Nature, than

(1) *See* Prolegomena, Sect. 10.

when

when we affirm, that the Earth, which in one Place produces plentiful Fields of Corn, and in another, fruitful Trees, is naturally adapted to encourage and feed the Induſtry of the Husbandman and Gardener. (1) Becauſe, [*Quippe ſolo natura ſubeſt*, Virg. Georg. 2. Ver. 49. *i. e.*] the Soil is naturally fitted for ſuch Productions.

For, really and truly ſpeaking, from the natural Frame, inward Conſtitution and Make of the human Faculties, in themſelves fitted to enter into Society, we prove,—*Firſt*, That Mankind is capable of knowing and obſerving the *Laws of Nature*. Now, that this one Point which ought chiefly, and in the firſt Place, to be clear and evident, is beyond all Queſtion; becauſe otherwiſe (that is, if they are not clear and evident) all the Notices, Hints and Obſervations impreſſed upon our Minds by other

(1) *Becauſe the Soil is naturally fitted for ſuch Productions.*] Or, as Mr. *Martyn* tranſlates it, *Becauſe Nature lies hid in the Soil.* By Nature's lying hid in the Soil, the Poet ſeems to mean, That there is ſome hidden Power in the Earth which cauſes it to produce particular Plants, which, therefore, grow fair and ſtrong in that Soil which is adapted to give them Birth. *Vid.* Martyn *in locum.*

In what Manner our Author applies this Sentence of *Virgil*, has appeared to many a Point of real Difficulty. From the Nature of the human Soul he proves, that its Powers, Capacities and Operations are almoſt infinite; that Man is naturally fitted for Society the moſt extenſive; that unleſs he does enter into ſuch a Society, and perform the ſeveral Duties and Obligations from thence ariſing, he omits the principal Uſes and Employments of his Being, and neglects the beſt Advantages of his own natural Diſpoſitions. For the Nature of Man is as ſtrongly diſpoſed, from the inward Frame and Make of it, to produce the largeſt Good of the moſt extenſive Society, as any particular Soil, from ſome hidden Power in the Earth, is to nouriſh one particular Species of Plants above any other. It is this hidden Power which cauſes the Soil to invigorate particular Plants; and they therefore grow fair and ſtrong in that Soil which is adapted to give them Nouriſhment and Increaſe.

Quippe ſolo natura ſubeſt.

Here there is a lively Hint from the Poet, and the Reader is left to make the Application. The Nature of Man is capable of producing all ſorts of ſocial Happineſs, and with as pregnant an Energy, as a right Soil is fitted for that Kind of Vegetation which the ſeveral Plants, Trees and Seeds reſpectively, require moſt and love beſt.

This Side of the Argument is managed by our Author with maſterly Skill and Dexterity. —But—there is another Side of the Argument which he handles with profound Learning, with deep Penetration, and with an equal Perfection of Reaſoning.—For he demonſtrates, notwithſtanding this mighty Extent of Abilities, how helpleſs and inſufficient each, individual, mortal Man, from his own ſingle Sphere of Capacity merely, is to promote and effect Self-happineſs, independant of rational Society, and the compounded Abilities of many Agents, who may or may not, juſt as they themſelves pleaſe, act either for or againſt him. The Connexion of his Reaſoning is cloſe, intimate and indiſſoluble: Every Man living is endowed with Capacities, Powers and Abilities, large, extenſive, and more than abundantly ſufficient to gratify the Deſires and Purpoſes of SELF:—And yet—that all the Capacities, Powers and Abilities of the *one Individual*, are utterly inſufficient to anſwer the Ends of his own Being, and the true Happineſs of it, unleſs aſſiſted by external Aids, unleſs ſtrengthened by many other rational Cauſes, much ſuperior in Strength and Abilities to himſelf.

The Concluſion, which from this ſeeming Oppoſition of Argument follows, is, *The indiſpenſable Obligation, the moral Neceſſity, of acting univerſal Benevolence, as the beſt, the only Security of Self-happineſs*; or, in the Words of a moſt ingenious Poet,

That true Self-love and ſocial are the ſame.

Perſons, and alſo all our own Endeavours, muſt prove fruitleſs, vain, and to no manner of Purpoſe. *Secondly*, The Obſervance of theſe Laws is in itſelf agreeable and pleaſant; and the very Precepts which direct us to perform ſocial Acts (becauſe they lead us to Objects naturally delightful) aſſure us of a Reward upon faithful Obedience, and imply in it [*i. e.* in ſuch an Obedience] a Practice, a Behaviour ſuitable to an eſtabliſhed Recompence, highly valuable; namely, ſuch a Complacency or Portion of our Happineſs as is naturally connected with the Exerciſe of thoſe Faculties, ſo peculiar to Man, naturally tending to the chief End and ultimate Deſign of the beſt Life; and as naturally leading us towards Means fitteſt to accompliſh ſuch an End. For, the full Employment of all our Powers, but more eſpecially of ſuch Powers and Abilities as are in themſelves moſt excellent, and where, in the Exerciſe of which, we neither ſtray out of the right Path, nor deviate from the chief End; ſuch an Employment of ourſelves as this, I ſay, is naturally pleaſant: Neither can Pleaſure (which, as is commonly ſaid, conſiſts in Motion) be underſtood in any other Acceptation, than as it is perceivable from ſuch a Behaviour, and from ſuch Acts as theſe, "A Freedom or Deliverance from Evil, and a certain State of Quietude, "*i. e.* ſome actual Paſſiveneſs not diſagreeable, may happen to us from ex- "ternal Cauſes."—But—no other Sort of Pleaſure can ariſe from ourſelves, than ſuch a Pleaſure as either immediately, or at leaſt mediately, depends upon ſuch a Behaviour, upon ſuch Acts as I have juſt now mentioned.

It is into ſuch an Happineſs as this only that Moral Philoſophy leads and directs us; neither, indeed, can we poſſibly receive the leaſt Inſtruction in any Knowledge quite independant of our own Acts, Habits, Faculties and Powers; and therefore, from hence it follows, that the more extenſive the Faculties of Man, fitted to know and obſerve the *Laws of Nature*, and by Conſequence to practice the ſeveral Virtues are, juſt ſo much the nobler are the Rewards annexed to the moral Acts of theſe Faculties; or, in other Words, that the Happineſs to be obtained from a Courſe of Virtue, is in the ſame Proportion greater, and becomes more ſtrictly and properly a Man's own; becauſe each and all the Faculties and Powers of every Man are bleſſed and rendered happy by Acts of public Benefit.—— And—for the eliciting and drawing forth all the natural Power of ſuch Acts, Man is by Nature made and fitted.

When theſe Points are once well ſettled, we ſhall afterwards ſhew, That the Happineſs flowing from ſuch human Acts as are truly natural, is the cleareſt Criterion, or Characteriſtic Mark, according to Nature, whereby to judge that the Will, the Command of the firſt Cauſe, obliges Mankind to ſuch a Behaviour, to ſuch Acts as theſe (1); or, in other Words, That the firſt Cauſe lays this Injunction upon us, by his own natural, divine Law. I have therefore ſelected out and choſen ſome certain Fa-

(1) *See* Prolegomena, Sect. 7. *in the Notes*.

culties

culties and Powers in Man, as ſeem moſt appoſite to my preſent Purpoſe.

1. *Right Reaſon*, and the Rule whereby to determine the Rectitude of Reaſon. *See the next Section.* Right Reaſon.

2. *Abſtraction.* We ſelect general Apprehenſions or Ideas, abſtracted from Particulars; as for Inſtance, of human Nature, and the Judgments from hence formed upon the Attributes, either agreeing or diſagreeing with theſe abſtracted Notions. *See Section* XI. *of this Chapter.* Abſtraction.

The next Procedure of the Mind is to conſider univerſal, indefinite, undetermined Affections, ſo far as they are congruous to, and conſequent upon the ſeveral Judgments thus formed. Univerſal Affections.

To this ſecond Article may alſo be referred the Power of framing arbitrary Signs, ſuch as articulate Sounds, or written Words accommodated to theſe general Ideas, to the ſeveral Judgments formed, and to the ſeveral Volitions or Motions of the Will. Arbitrary Signs.

Here we may refer alſo Speech; becauſe as Speech greatly aſſiſts Memory and Reaſon, it proves of much more Service to Virtue than Vice, of much more Service to peaceable Society than to Civil Commotions. Uſes of Speech.

Here alſo, from Notions of ſuch Acts as, in their general Nature, agree with the Notion of human Nature, may ariſe that powerful Efficacy, that advantageous Uſe of inſtituting Laws for the Conduct and Management of human Life in general, and for all the Modes of Behaviour. Becauſe the ſeveral Judgments which we, according to this Method form, are more eaſy, more familiar to the Memory; provided ſuch ſeveral Judgments expreſſed, conveyed under proper Words, adapted to this very End and Purpoſe, and provided ſuch Expreſſions agree with the general Notions of Mankind, and be applied by common Conſent to ſignify theſe Notions. Abſtraction of ſingular Uſe in inſtituting human Laws.

In the next Place, under this ſame Head likewiſe fall in ſuch Rules of Action as are common to many, *i. e. Public Laws*; which, as the Circumſtances of Affairs from time to time ſhall require, may be enacted, abrogated or altered; juſt as a ſkilful Phyſician wiſely preſcribes to the ſame Patient, at critical times, a different Regimen, now a more ſparing, then a more generous Diet; To-day aſtringent, To-morrow cathartic Medicines. Of Uſe in the Alteration and Amendment of Laws.

3. Another Power of human Underſtanding, is the Power of knowing Numbers, Meaſure and Weights; in which Knowledge is contained the Power of collecting many Particulars into a Sum Total; as for Inſtance, many ſmaller Sorts of Good into one Sum Total Good, with the Power likewiſe of comparing theſe ſeveral Sorts of Good together, according to their Differences and Proportions. The Knowledge of Number, Weight and Meaſure.

By this Method we may find out the *Summum Bonum*, the chief Good, *i. e.* the Aggregate, whoſe Good compounded and made up of all the ſe- How to compute Good.

veral

veral Sorts of Good: And, upon comparing Good thus together, we ſhall be able to diſcover, whether one be greater or leſs than another: From hence we may ſubſtract ſome from others, *i. e.* the leſs from the greater, and ſo eſtimate the Ratio, the Proportion between ſuch as are equal and unequal. For *all the Laws of Nature* are in ſuch a Manner employed about Moral Actions, as to make them anſwer the very beſt End.

The Knowledge of Order.

4. Another Power cloſely related to that of Computation, is the Power either of obſerving an Order which already actually exiſts, or of eſtabliſhing an Order in ſuch Operations as are to be performed; and alſo of perceiving how materially neceſſary Order is, in uniting ſuch Forces as are to produce one and the ſame Effect; but more eſpecially, of what mighty Conſequence Order is to the Common Good, as may be eaſily obſerved in conſtituting and regulating either an Army or a Commonwealth.

Now, whilſt I am ſo very deſirous to employ my cloſeſt Attention upon theſe Things, I am inclined to think, that the true Nature and powerful Efficacy of Order, may be diſtinguiſhed in the cleareſt, moſt ſeparate Manner, if we conſider it in the eaſieſt, moſt ſimple Caſe, and wherein its Effect is demonſtrated to be of the eaſieſt, ſimpleſt Kind: Now, I do not know where Order is uſed in an eaſier, more ample Caſe; or where an eaſier, more ſimple Effect is deduced from it, than that geometrical Order of Right Lines, and of Compound Motion, from which *Carteſius*, in his ſecond Book of Geometry, has demonſtrated, how his Geometrical Curves are or can be generated.

For *Carteſius*, in his ſecond Book of Geometry, has, by the Elements of Algebra, proved this one Point, namely, That the Nature and Properties of a Line, deſcribed by Compound Motion, cannot fall under an exact *Calculus* or Demonſtration, unleſs all the ſeveral inferior Motions, in a regular Subordination of ſome upon other ſome, be influenced and guided by one, ſupreme, ruling Motion. And this Obſervation he makes upon a Line, as being, indeed, the eaſieſt, the ſimpleſt Effect of Compound Motion.

Now, the very ſame Reaſoning holds equally true, in all Effects which depend upon the Concurrence and Co-operation of many Cauſes; that is to ſay, how neceſſary it is, amongſt all ſuch Cauſes, that ſome ſhould depend upon others in a regular Order, and that they all, ultimately, ſhould depend upon one, ſupreme, moving Power; becauſe, otherwiſe, the future Effect of their Concurrence and Co-operation muſt be Matter of great Doubt; and conſequently, that either no one certain End could be produced, or that it could not be produced by proper Means, which (for any Thing we could tell to the contrary) may or may not be the Means fit and proper for the End deſigned.

The Efficacy of ſuch a Knowledge as this being well obſerved and made obvious to our Senſes, the human Mind will be enabled, from a Series, a Chain of ſubordinate Cauſes, moſt diſtinctly to find out the firſt Cauſe, which

which is God the Governor of the World; and from the effectual Working of all rational Cauſes, placed in a well-known Subordination to ſee into Futurity; and both theſe Diſcoveries, when compared together, will perſwade us, that Mankind muſt ſubmit themſelves to the regular Order, to the ſubordinate Direction of that unlimited, moſt extenſive Society, in which ALL (as in the City, and under the Government of Almighty God himſelf) are contained.

A proper Conduct and Management of the Paſſions.

5. Hence follows, in the next Place to be conſidered, that exalted Privilege of the human Soul; a Privilege of powerful Sway and Efficacy, in uniting, reconciling and eſtabliſhing the Society juſt now mentioned; the Power of the human Soul in raiſing, controuling and moderating the Affections and Paſſions; as alſo the Power of directing them towards the Appetite of a greater Good, and the Avoidance of a greater Evil, than can poſſibly come within the Knowledge of any other Animal: Becauſe, we can comprehend ſeveral Sorts of Good, *viz.* ſuch Sorts of it as are univerſal, the Total Sums of them reſpectively, with their regular Order and Subordination. We cannot but know what Influence we carry over the Mind, as well in diverting it from thoſe Thoughts and Affections which aim at our private Intereſts only, as in directing it to a Care, a Concern for the Public Good; and in this the Perfection of human Liberty ſhines conſpicuouſly.

But I ſhall not enter into the ſeveral Controverſies about Liberty, they having been ſo often handled by other Writers.

It appears, indeed, an inconteſtable Point, That the Nature of Man is nearly concerned in that Kind of Liberty, which as to external Acts, (ſuch as Contracts, and the Performance and Violation of them) is not to be determined without the Intervention of his Judgment, where he can, in determining, call up to his Aſſiſtance not only his Senſes, but alſo his Memory; and conſequently can argue with himſelf thus: *Will what I am now about to do, prove convenient to the public Good; which Good, if not preſerved whole and entire, the private Good of Individuals cannot be ſecured? Is it conſiſtent with the ſolid Motives and Inducements to Virtue?*

Now, I could not help obſerving, That even in the Politics which Mr. *Hobbes* has eſtabliſhed, this one Poſtulatum is very juſtly premiſed, Chap. 5. Sect. 6. *De Cive*, That "Mankind can agree and bargain with "each other, about transferring their Rights over to others, for the Be- "nefit and Good of the Public:" Notwithſtanding what he may urge in other Paſſages, "That Man can conſult no Good but his own."

Since then there naturally is in Man ſo extenſive and noble a Faculty, a Faculty ſo extenſive and noble, as to ſearch into and comprehend that unbounded, that greateſt, that complex Good of all Rationals, my Reader will eaſily determine, whether or no the chief Happineſs of Each may not fitly conſiſt with the full Energy and Strength, with the conſtant Employment upon, and Exerciſe of ſuch a Good.—We do not, by any Means, ſay,

ſay, that this Faculty is diſtinct from the Powers of the Underſtanding and the Will.—It is fully ſufficient if, from the Concurrence and Co-operation of the Underſtanding and Will, the Power I now mention immediately flows.

Now, no one can be at a Loſs to perceive how cloſely, how attentively ſuch a Power, ſuch a Vigour of Mind as this, diſpoſes and inures Mankind to bridle their Paſſions, and refrain from any ſudden Ruffle; and how highly it conduces to regulate the whole Behaviour, according, *Firſt*, to the Rule of Laws Natural, and—*Secondly*,—according to the Rule of Civil, Social Laws.

But—concerning Right Reaſon and Univerſal Notions, we ſhall treat more at large. Whereas the reſt, *i. e.* Abſtraction, the Knowledge of Number, Meaſure and Weights, the Knowledge of Order, and the Power over our Paſſions, may be fully explained under much fewer Words.

SECT. V.

Right Reaſon. 1. WE muſt in this Place, then, diſcourſe upon *Right Reaſon*, with the greater Accuracy and Care, as well becauſe that what is *right* both diſcovers itſelf and what is *oblique*; (and to what is *right*, we muſt allow the ſame Place in Morality, that we allow to Health in Phyſic; the Knowledge of which Health is antecedent to the Theory of Diſeaſes, and its Nature more clear and intelligible) as well becauſe it is agreed both by Mr. *Hobbes* and the other Philoſophers, that *Right Reaſon* is the *Meaſure*, the *Rule of human Actions*, even before the Commencement of any inſtituted Laws whatſoever. *See his Book* De Cive, Chap. 2. Sect. 1. *and his Annotations.* And what is more extraordinary, if Mr. *Hobbes* be at all conſiſtent with himſelf, there will be but little Difference between us about his Definition. For in his 2d. Chapter, 1ſt. Section, *De Cive*, where (under a Parentheſis) he is pleaſed to place his Definition, he ſeems to ſay, That "*Right Reaſon* is the Truth collected from true Principles, "by reaſoning right." Whereas, in my Opinion, the Term *Right Reaſon*, carries in it ſomewhat of a larger Signification, becauſe it contains under it, not only Principles or ſelf-evident Truths, but alſo the Concluſions deduced from them, and may alſo ſignify [*effectum judicii tam noetici quam dianoetici, i. e.*] any Reſult of our Judgment, whether ſimple or compounded. The *Etymology* of the Word favours this Interpretation, which ſuppoſes alſo a confirmed Opinion, *i. e.* a fixed, ſettled Opinion, agreeing with Things themſelves, whether it be ſelf-evident, or proved by the Help of ſome Medium or Argument. Cuſtom alſo, which always determines the Propriety of Expreſſion, favouring this Interpretation: Becauſe all are agreed in acknowledging, That Propoſitions the moſt evident (ſuch as, *it is impoſſible for the ſame Thing to be and not to be*, &c.) are

no

no leſs Dictates of Reaſon than thoſe Propoſitions which require Proof: And perhaps Mr. *Hobbes* himſelf will not object againſt a more enlarged Application of Words. We agree with him, in the mean Time, that this Faculty muſt not be underſtood as infallible (in which Acceptation he affirms, that there are many who take it, but who they are I know not) and yet this Faculty is not from theſe ſeveral Acts of Judgment to be looked upon as falſe; neither is it underſtood properly as the Act of Reaſoning, as he raſhly has determined, but the Effects or Concluſions of Judgments, *i. e.* true Propoſitions ſtored up in the Memory, whether they be Premiſſes or Concluſions; amongſt which, ſuch as are practical come under the Denominations of Laws. For Actions are compared with theſe Laws, that the Morality of them may be examined into.—But—Actions are not compared with the Acts of Ratiocination themſelves, altho' it is by Vertue of ſuch Acts that theſe Laws are formed; and yet I ſhall readily grant, at the ſame Time, that theſe ſeveral Acts of Reaſoning are not to be neglected.

Now, what Mr. *Hobbes* a little afterwards ſubjoins is moſt groſsly falſe. It is in that Annotation where he is giving an Account why he has placed *Ratiocination properly ſo called, in his Deſcription of Right Reaſon.* "Out of Civil Society, ſays he, where no one can diſtinguiſh Right Reaſon from Falſe, unleſs he draws the Compariſon from his own Reaſon, "the private Reaſon of every Man ſerves not only for a Rule, by which "he is to regulate his own private Actions (and which Actions he commits at his own Peril) but this ſame private Reaſon muſt, in all Affairs "relating to himſelf, be conſtrued as the Meaſure alſo of other Mens "Reaſon."

Now, in Anſwer to this, we ſay, That out of Civil Society every one is able to diſtinguiſh Right Reaſon, without forming any Compariſon between it (*i. e.* Right Reaſon) and his own Reaſon. For there is one common Rule whereby every one's own Reaſon or Opinion, as well as that of others, muſt be tried; and the Rule is, the *Nature of Things*, as this Rule is carefully repreſented to, and laid before all our Faculties, to be examined into, obſerved and tried. It is that Rule with which Premiſſes as well as Concluſions muſt be compared, whether ſuch Premiſſes and Concluſions be formed either by me, or by any one elſe, or even by the whole Civil Society itſelf, at what Time ſoever inſtituted.——For no one can doubt that the Truth, *i. e.* the Rectitude or real Certainty itſelf, of Propoſitions concerning Things and Acts, either now exiſting, or in Time future to exiſt, conſiſts in the Conformity, the Agreement of ſuch Propoſitions with the Things themſelves to which they are relative. And the Reaſon is, becauſe the whole Truth, all the Perfection of *Images*, conſiſts in an exact Correſpondence with the Things they are conſtituted to repreſent: And therefore ſince our Ideas of Things, *i. e.* our Images or Repreſentations.

Ideas of Senſation are Images or Repreſentations of outward Objects, impreſſed by the Help of our Senſes upon the Mind.

ſimple Apprehenſions are Images of Things; and ſince true Propoſitions may be either Affirmative or Negative, *i.e.* may be either the joining together and uniting of Apprehenſions, impreſſed upon the Mind from the ſame Object by an Affirmation; or, *Secondly*, the diſuniting, disjoining, ſeparating, dividing of our Apprehenſions and Notions, concerning different Things by Negation, or by ſaying ſuch or ſuch a Thing is not ſo, or ſo. From hence neceſſarily it follows, That the Truth, the Rectitude, the Reality of Propoſitions, intirely depends upon their Conformity, their Agreement with Things themſelves. And it is as confeſſedly acknowledged alſo, that the Truth of our Apprehenſions muſt be taken from the ſame Correſpondence.

Upon the Whole, this Concluſion is infallibly true, That whoſoever determines Things different from what they really are, does not determine according to Right Reaſon, neither does he employ his Judgment right.——And it is indeed as certain alſo, That whoſoever the Man be that either affirms or denies, juſt as the Nature of the Thing is, pronounces his Judgment according to Right Reaſon.

SECT. VI.

The Truth of Propoſitions not precarious.

NEITHER is it, in this Caſe, a Matter of any Conſequence who it is that determines contrary to what the Thing in itſelf is, whether he be ſupreme Judge, or one who is under a Superior. Becauſe the Truth, the Rectitude, the Reality of the Propoſition, does not depend upon any inſtituted Ranks, Stations and Conditions amongſt Men, but upon that Agreement entirely which ſuch Propoſitions carry with the Things themſelves about which they are concerned. Neither indeed is it any Objection againſt what is here offered, That there are certain Mathematical Propoſitions (or even other Propoſitions like unto them) invented and called true, (1) *altho' nothing really exiſts whereunto ſuch Propoſitions are conformable.*

Such

(1) *Altho' nothing really exiſts whereunto ſuch Propoſitions are conformable.*] 1. Acts future, ſo far as they depend upon the voluntary Choice of a free Agent, whether they ſhall exiſt or not, are contingent.

2. The Effects of ſuch future Acts, as to their Exiſtence, are contingent alſo.

3. Acts, whenever determined, executed and brought into Exiſtence by a Free Agent, are neceſſary.

4. The Effects ariſing from theſe Acts are neceſſary alſo.

5. The Connexion, then, between theſe Acts actually paſt, and the Effects which depend upon them, is neceſſary, natural, and becomes the Subject Matter of Demonſtration.

6. The ſame holds good in Geometrical Operations, which are no leſs free, no leſs arbitrary, than any other human Acts whatſoever.

7. A Perſon ſkilled in Geometry is at free Liberty whether he will perform a Geometrical Operation or not.

8. The Practical Geometrician is alſo at free

Such Suppoſitions as theſe, to be ſure, (becauſe they expreſs nothing external to the Mind) muſt not be compared with Things external; but the Agreement between them is to be found only in the Terms themſelves which conſtitute ſuch Propoſitions. Such Propoſitions as theſe, however, are not of any Uſe in human Life, unleſs ſome Operation actually performed be diſcovered; or unleſs it be ſuch an Operation as may be performed quite ſeparate and diſtinct from our Thoughts: And yet ſuch a Separation as this may not, in the leaſt, differ from Conceptions already formed, and actually laid in the human Mind.

Suppoſing *the Subject* (*i. e.* the *Subjectum*, as the Logicians call it) of theſe Propoſitions; or ſuppoſing any Thing very like ſuch *a Subject*, not to exiſt, why then ſuch Propoſitions are nugatory, are trifling, and all are mere Equivocation. For that complex Truth which conſiſts intirely in the Agreement of Terms (ſuppoſing the Terms not poſſibly to exiſt) is not of the ſame Nature with ſuch a Truth as ſhews the Agreement of Terms at leaſt poſſible; provided always that no future, poſſible Exiſtence can be ſuppoſed.

The firſt of theſe two Suppoſitions is evidently uſeleſs; but yet, however, thus far may with evident Truth be affirmed, *(viz.)* That whatſoever Propoſition whoſe Subject either now does, or will in Time future exiſt; or, in other Words, the Propoſition whoſe Subject is conformable to Things exterior to *mind* (ſuppoſing ſuch exterior Things either exiſting now, or to exiſt) requires alſo a Predicate in Conformity and agreeable to ſuch preſent and future Exiſtences reſpectively; and conſequently, the Whole ought, for this very Reaſon, to agree with Things exterior to us; and this is the chief Point which I, in this Place, endeavour to defend.

It is as certain alſo, That not only every one Man, but the Right alſo of every one Man, over Things and Perſons (let ſuch a Right, in the End, prove what it will) is not merely chimerical, notional, but ſomething real; and muſt be conſidered as external, ſeparate too, and diſtinct from Thought. For ſince the ſeveral Rights of Individuals, are and muſt be referred to ſuch an Uſe in Things, and to ſuch Effects as are agree-

free Liberty whether he will conſtruct a Geometrical Figure or no.

9. The Effects and Conſequences of ſuch a particular Operation, of ſuch a practical Conſtruction, before either of them exiſts, with reſpect to the Agent whether either ſhall exiſt or not, are alſo arbitrary and free.

10. But,——when once this Geometrical Operation is wrought, when once this Geometrical Figure is conſtructed, then immediately there ariſe, as neceſſary Effects, the ſeveral Conſequences, Ratios, Proportions, Agreements and Diſagreements, which either Lines or Angles reſpectively, bear amongſt themſelves and carry to each other.

11. In both Caſes then, and upon the ſtricteſt Principles of Mathematical Philoſophy, can be demonſtrated many Concluſions and Conſequences ariſing, not only from the Flow of one ſingle Line, but alſo of one ſingle human Act, which unavoidably muſt impreſs a ſenſible Motion upon a phyſical or natural Body, as ſuch a Body is ordered and ſettled in the Syſtem evidently well known of other phyſical or natural Bodies. *See* Chap. 1. Sect. 8.

able to Mankind; and, conſequently, as neceſſary alſo is it, that Propoſitions or Dictates of Right Reaſon which concern theſe Things, ſhould be true; and that ſuch Propoſitions, or Dictates of Reaſon, ſhould be conformable to the State and Condition of Things: And this is the Point which I am ſo deſirous to eſtabliſh, the more effectually to demoliſh the whole Foundation of Mr. *Hobbes*'s Reaſoning; for from hence this one Concluſion directly and immediately follows, *That contradictory Propoſitions, concerning the Right of any two Individuals to the ſame Things or Perſons, cannot poſſibly be the Dictates of Right Reaſon.* And this is the principal Support of all Mr. *Hobbes*'s Doctrine.

SECT. VII.

Practical Propoſitions.

BUT here, by the Bye, I would have my Reader take Notice, That by Dictates of Practical Reaſon, I underſtand ſuch Propoſitions which demonſtrate *the End* and *Means* in our Power: Becauſe, all Practice whatſoever is ultimately reſolvable into theſe two, *i. e. Ends* and *Means*. In ſhort, all Practical Reaſon is then, and only then, called *Right*, when it truly determines under ſignificant, explanatory Propoſitions, what End is beſt and chiefly neceſſary; as alſo what are the fitteſt Means to purſue: Or, which is much the ſame Thing, what Kind of Reaſon that is which faithfully declares ſuch Effects of our own Wiſdom and Choice as will render us, and all around us, the moſt happy; as alſo, by what Skill and Sagacity of our own we can, with moſt Certainty, ſecure ſuch Effects.

The Caſe holds exactly the ſame here as in Geometry; *e. g.* The Speculative Reaſoning is right, which concludes one Quantity greater than another, when really and in its own Nature it is ſo. That Practical Propoſition is right which preſcribes ſuch a Method in conſtructing Problems, which if we purſue, actually produces the Effect required: Neither is ſuch a Determination or Propoſition more ſure or more true, whether pronounced by a King or a Peaſant.

For, ſince all Right Reaſon is conformable to thoſe Things upon which we paſs our Judgment; and that Things which are reſpectively ſingle or one, are ſimilar, and correſponds each to the reſt: It follows, that the Right Reaſon of one Man cannot dictate any Thing which contradicts and is repugnant to the Right Reaſon of another Man, concerning the very ſame Point. Upon this Principle alſo follows, what in the general, may and ought to be determined concerning the Actions of all Mankind, (*viz.*) That all the Actions of every Man, thro' the whole Courſe of his Life, ought to be uniform and conſiſtent with each other; and conſequently,

that

that no Man can conſtantly act according to Right Reaſon, who, in the Words of *Horace*,

Æſtuat, & toto diſconvenit ordine vitæ.
Epiſtol. Lib. 1. Ver. 99.

fluctuates and is inconſiſtent thro' all the Parts of his Life.

It muſt, beyond Doubt be confeſſed, as eſſentially comprehended under the very Notion of a true Propoſition (let us ſuppoſe, for Inſtance, a Practical Propoſition) and of Conſequence, it is as eſſentially neceſſary a Perfection alſo in the Man who determines true and right, to agree and correſpond with other Truths, compounded of the like Materials; whether we ſuppoſe ſuch a ſimilar Caſe to happen at any other Time, or to be the Concern of any other Man. And conſequently, if any Man ſhall judge that Act of his own, ſerviceable to the Beauty and Perfection of Things in general, whereby he aſſumes to himſelf thoſe Neceſſaries of Life which hitherto were left unoccupied by any other; it is as neceſſary alſo, in order to preſerve the Judgment uniform and right, that the like Act of another Perſon, placed exactly in the ſame Condition and Circumſtances, ſhould lead to the very ſame End. And conſequently, it is eſſentially included in the Notion of a Perſon who judges right, to determine that the ſame Things in a like Caſe may lawfully be done by others, which ſuch a Perſon truly thinks either were or may be lawfully done by himſelf. And this Doctrine muſt be extended even to all thoſe Means, in which a Man truly imagines himſelf to claim a juſt Right, they being the Aids and Aſſiſtances procured for his own Preſervation, according to Right Reaſon. For, it is but barely reaſonable to think, that any other Man, under the like Circumſtances, may juſtly claim from him the like Aid, the like Aſſiſtance.

This is Reaſoning by Analogy.

Now, it appears to me moſt evident, why Mr. *Hobbes* committed ſuch egregious Blunders in his Reaſonings upon this very Point: And the Reaſon is, becauſe Mr. *Hobbes* did not obſerve, that there is one and the ſame Rule common to all, and by which Rule the Reaſon of each and all muſt be tried, in order to find out whether ſuch Reaſon be right or no.

This common Rule is *the Nature of Things*, which, to expreſs in cloſer Terms, is the Nature of the End chiefly neceſſary for all rational Agents to purſue; as alſo the Nature of thoſe Means which naturally lead to this End.

SECT.

SECT. VIII.

BUT here it may not be improper, in a curſory Way, to hint what honourable Sentiments Mr. *Hobbes* entertains of God—of that God who, according to the Dictates of Right Reaſon, naturally rules over ALL. —This ſame Mr. *Hobbes* gives us to underſtand that, according to the Dictates [but, to be ſure, he means his own Dictates] of Right Reaſon, Almighty God, from his divine, original, natural Right of Sovereignty, delivers manifeſt Self-contradictions. For, at one Time this worthy Friend to Mankind peremptorily argues, That War neceſſarily muſt be waged by ALL againſt ALL.—And conſequently, he ſends all into the Field of Battle. Well then—and what are they to do there? Why, to carry on a moſt bloody, a moſt deſtructive War, in which all of every Party, without Diſtinction, muſt promiſcuouſly periſh. But—upon what Pretence is this ſo univerſal an Havock, ſo total a Deſtruction? Why, upon a Pretence not leſs groundleſs than that of univerſal, notorious Injuſtice; becauſe All endeavour only to recover their own natural Rights.—Admirable Reaſoning truly! This is one Side of the Self-contradictions.—Let us proceed with him a little farther.—At another Time this Gentleman ſays, That God, upon the ſame Principles or Dictates of Right Reaſon, forbids Mankind to enter into War: Becauſe, upon theſe Principles or Dictates, he commands them to relinquiſh their natural Rights.—And yet—at the ſame Time he ſays, that theſe very Rights (becauſe they are Rights) juſtly may be maintained and vindicated by War. From hence he concludes, the Neceſſity of aſcribing unto God all thoſe Self-contradictions, which he maintains are in the Right Reaſon (as he calls it) of Mankind, who, [*i. e.* Mankind] as to the Neceſſaries of Life, profeſs, declare and act theſe Self-contradictions. For, ſays Mr. *Hobbes* in his Book *De Cive*, Chap. 15. Sect. 8. "God governs by ſuch a Reaſon as this, as by a Law." And conſequently, God permits all thoſe Things which this kind of Reaſon permits: And alſo inſtructs us, that all thoſe Things may ſafely be done without any Tranſgreſſion, which this ſame Right Reaſon has inſtructed us may be done by the Right of Nature.——This ſelf-ſame Mr. *Hobbes*, however, does not extend this Right beyond the Liberty of uſing our Faculties according to Right Reaſon; which Definition he introduces artfully enough, and with a particular View in the Place where he has it. *De Cive*, Chap. 1. Sect. 7.

Here then, from what has been ſaid, it is manifeſt that this Idol God of Mr. *Hobbes*'s own Invention, grants, in the firſt Place, a Right to every one, of plundering and invading the whole Property and all the Poſſeſſions of others; that this Right Reaſon of his comprehends in it a licentious, unbounded Liberty of committing all Kinds of Villainy; and that truly (which appears a Conſequence natural enough) he involves all Mankind

kind in the Calamities of a deſtructive War.—Well—but—what comes next? Why, then miſerable Mortals are thus plunged into Deſtruction, from the fatal Conſequences of Wickedneſs and War. He then paves his Way to Juſtice thro' a milder Path; but ſuch a Juſtice is it as to eſcape all the Penalties of civil, inſtituted Laws. His Path to Peace is much the ſame, and ſuch to be ſure is it, as the Juſtice he has already eſtabliſhed will ſuffer, and into which, at laſt, he endeavours to draw wretched Mankind. But—*the Reaſon which I call right*, principally and chiefly conſults all the conſtituent Branches of our own and of all other Beings Happineſs; and penetrates, long before, into Cauſes placed within our own Power: Reaſon obſerves theſe Cauſes to be in their very Nature ſo intimately interwoven and blended together, that, by their united Force, a prudent, wiſe Care of our own Happineſs, cannot be ſeparated from a *ſtudious Concern for the Happineſs of others*, i. e. *the univerſal, ſocial Happineſs of All.*

From whence Reaſon commands us to obſerve the ſtricteſt, the higheſt Juſtice imaginable, both to God and Man reſpectively; and, conſequently, Reaſon wiſely foretels, what that happieſt State of Peace and Unity is which muſt from hence ariſe. By the ſame Operations of human Underſtanding likewiſe, Reaſon knows beforehand, that ſuch Acts of Mankind as arrogate and aſſume *All* to *Self*, or any ſuch like Behaviour, muſt mix, confound and involve all in War, Miſery and Deſolation.——There is not, indeed, the leaſt Neceſſity for learning ſuch manifeſt Truth as this, by running the leaſt Hazard of Danger or Loſs; much leſs by the deſperate Experiment of a ruinous War, raſhly entered into. And—conſequently—Reaſon will never grant a Power to commit ſuch Acts as theſe; but Reaſon will, on the contrary, ſtrictly injoin the Unity of Friendſhip; it will eſtabliſh Civil Government wherever neceſſary, and it will more particularly, in the beſt Way, ſupport and preſerve every Civil Eſtabliſhment, wherever ſettled, by theſe Means. Not only all the Calamities of War will be oppoſed, warded off, and prevented, as far as human Wiſdom and Foreſight can perceive theſe Evils to ariſe from the Rage and Madneſs of ſome turbulent Tempers; but, by theſe Means alſo, the moſt effective Aſſiſtances may be ſecured, for the Service and Perfection of Virtue as well as of Happineſs. Mr. *Hobbes* then, truly, imagined that all this could poſſibly be done—nay—that it neceſſarily was done; and why he thought ſo is plain, becauſe he did not obſerve that there is one *Rule common to all*, i. e. *the Nature of Things*; by which [*Rule*] muſt be tried the Reaſon of all, in order to determine whether ſuch Reaſon be right or not. Upon this ſolid Foundation then, [*Nature*] muſt, in my Judgment, be laid the fundamental, chief Corner Stone of the Temple of *Concord.*

For, from this one Foundation ſprings that natural Law which unites and cements all rational Beings (*i. e.* all Beings that are wiſe) into one Society with Almighty God, the moſt ſupremely wiſe, rational Being; becauſe

Wiſdom

Wiſdom is no other than mature, adult, ſound Reaſon. *See* Prolegomena, Sect. 10.

This natural Law then is expreſſed thus, *Every one Being who exerciſes Right Reaſon, Judgment, and the natural Deſire which theſe direct, muſt and ought to agree with all other Beings, who judge likewiſe by Right Reaſon about the ſame Thing.* From whence follows alſo that Hypothetical Propoſition (which we ſhall hereafter conſider more at large, and upon its own proper Principles) That if each rational Being, (*i. e.* if each wiſe Being) would by fair Deductions of Reaſoning exerciſe, for the Public Good, the ſeveral particular Offices incumbent upon him in all Caſes of Duty reſpectively, that then all other Beings who think right, would conſent and agree in like manner to promote the ſame End. But of this more hereafter.

SECT. IX.

WE ſhall obſerve hereafter (in order to preſerve our Reaſon right) how cautiouſly we are to avoid, whenever we reaſon, not only Paralogiſms (*i. e.* falſe Reaſoning) but more particularly alſo all raſh, over-haſty Judgments; that ſo, from theſe Errors we do not admit any Thing as ſelf-evident Truth, which is not ſo, without Proof. And next we muſt, in an eſpecial Degree, be careful that our ſimple Apprehenſions are clear, diſtinct and adequate.

1. Our ſimple Apprehenſions or Ideas become clear, from the ſtrong and repeated Impreſſions of the ſame Object, by many Trials, by our ſeveral Senſes, and by various Experiments.

2. Theſe our Apprehenſions become diſtinct, by obſerving exactly and ſeparately the ſeveral ſingle Parts of an Object.

3. They become adequate (ſo far as our Apprehenſions can be ſo) by the Help and Aſſiſtance of Memory and Intellect in Conjunction with the Reports, the Diſcoveries of our Senſes.

We are here to underſtand, that in theſe Impreſſions made upon the Imagination by outward Objects, there cannot be any Falſhood, any Deluſion. From Diſtance, indeed, it ſometimes ſo happens, that careleſs, unguarded Perſons take Occaſion to judge falſly, from the yellow Colourings of the Rays of Light in jaundiced Eyes.

If all Circumſtances, however, be conſidered in the Medium ſituated between the Faculty perceiving, and the Object perceived, which indeed ought to be conſidered before we paſs our Judgment; as for Inſtance in this Caſe, if the Craſis or Temperature of the Blood itſelf, of the Spirits and Humours from thence ſecreted, and of the Brain, are all Circumſtances which here ought to be conſidered, we ſhall certainly avoid this Error.

In

In a Medium, there are at ſometimes only partial (*i. e.* not full, ſufficient) Cauſes of the Impreſſions made upon us; and which, of Conſequence, ought neceſſarily to be taken into the Account.

We are, in the next Place, diligently to try and examine the Terms themſelves, before we can determine any Thing about either the Identity and Agreement, or the Diverſity and Diſagreement of ſuch Terms. For Truth cannot be conſtituted, altered and changed at our Will and Pleaſure. But, all Truth muſt be perceived in the Coherence in the Agreement of Things themſelves, in Conjunction with ſuch diſtinct Conceptions as are impreſſed upon us from them. For whatſoever Objects we perceive, we neceſſarily perceive, and at all times, whenever the Faculty exerts and applies its Attention, yet the Attention very often depends upon our own voluntary Choice.

Now, upon this one Rule truly depends the whole Sum and Subſtance of our preſent Debate: For, ſince the whole Truth of affirmative Propoſitions is contained in the Coherence or Agreement of their two Terms; and ſince the two Terms naturally agree, becauſe the very ſame Object impreſſes both upon the Mind; and ſince theſe two Terms may evidently refer to the ſame Object in a different Reſpect; it is therefore clear and evident, that Truths do not depend upon the arbitrary Will of Mankind, who make Words, and then join them together at Pleaſure. But Truths depend upon the Natures of Things themſelves, which truly point their own Images or Repreſentation to the Imagination. Whatſoever Motions therefore are impreſſed upon us, from the Nature of Things, are neceſſary Motions, and take their original Source from the principal, Firſt Mover of Nature, the Creator or the Author of it, *Almighty God.* Whatſoever Notions, then, impreſſed by a Motion plain and natural to the Senſes, and impreſſed upon the Imagination, repreſent to the Mind practical Truths, concerning Actions moſt highly ſerviceable to the common Good: Such Truths as theſe, I ſay, are natural Laws (as we ſhall demonſtrate hereafter) and the impreſſing them upon the Mind is the engraving and Publication of Laws. And ſuch Truths may, upon the ſame Strength of Reaſon, be called Impreſſions laid by the firſt Mover, the Nature of Things operating as Means, in the ſame Way as ſpeculative, ſelf-evident Truths (*e. g.*) all the Radii of a Circle are equal, *&c.* may juſtly be called Truths conducted into the Mind by the firſt Cauſe, ſecondary Cauſes operating as the neceſſary Means.

With full Propriety, therefore, does the Saying agree to the *Law of Nature*, which *Marcian* in his *Pandects* has borrowed from *Demoſthenes*, and applied to his general Deſcription of Laws, that it is Ευρημα καὶ Δωρον Θεου, *The Contrivance and the Gift of God.*

They who do not acknowledge, that the Being and Attributes of God can be traced and proved from the Neceſſity of a Firſt Mover, *i. e.* a firſt Cauſe of Motion (a Point which Mr. *Hobbes*, by the Bye, admits) ſeem totally

A ſeeming Objection.

totally to overturn the earlieſt, the firſt laid, and (in my Opinion) the firſt Foundation of Religion.

But,—notwithſtanding any ſuch Objectors, if from the Order and Regularity, the Reſpects and Relations of Things to each other; and, if from the Beauty hence ariſing; or, if even from this one Argument, that ſuch various Parts of this beautiful Univerſe ſeemed deſigned and fitted for our Uſe and Service, as the principal End of their Creation: Theſe Objectors, I ſay, muſt acknowledge, that the Being and Attributes of God can be demonſtrated; and, of Conſequence, they will be obliged to confeſs, from this our Medium, or Argument, that God is the neceſſary Author of theſe Impreſſions, from the very Reaſon and Neceſſity of Things.

SECT. X.

All ſimple Apprehenſions, all natural Impreſſions are true.

OF ſuch weighty Importance ſeems this one Obſervation, drawn from the Nature of ſimple Apprehenſions, *&c.* of all natural Impreſſions, that neither Nature without us, nor Nature within us ever did (and I dare venture to conclude from it) force us, by an inevitable Neceſſity, to err in our Judgment; and, by Conſequence, Nature never did determine us to chuſe and act ill; becauſe all ſuch Kinds of Choice and Acting proceed always from Doubt, Uncertainty, and from ſome Error in the Underſtanding. And therefore, if we at any Time either determine, deſire, or act any Thing contrary to Nature, and to all the Criterions or Marks of Truth, it muſt, in my Opinion, be imputed to a precipitate, raſh Uſe of our own Free-will; of that Free-will which is, generally ſpeaking, deluded by the delicious Expectancy of ſome ſeeming Good almoſt preſent, and in the Enjoyment:—A Temptation which ſtrongly preſſes and urges the Judgment on to determine concerning ſuch Things as are not yet ſufficiently cleared up and diſcovered.

For, we owe all Truths (the Truths of Morality not excepted, Truths unchangeable, and which cannot deceive us) to Nature and to neceſſary Determinations, concerning Things clear and evident; we therefore muſt attribute all our falſe Judgments, Opinions, inordinate Deſires, and irregular Actions to the precipitate, raſh Uſe of our Freedom, and not to Nature: Unleſs we groſsly wrong our own Faculties (not one of which, at any time forces us neceſſarily to embrace Falſhood;) unleſs we groſsly wrong the Things of Nature external to us (all which, in their own eſſential, inward Capacities, are incapable of the leaſt Deceit or Falſehood:) And conſequently, unleſs we groſsly abuſe and blaſphemouſly affront Almighty God himſelf; it being a Contradiction in his Nature to ſuppoſe him even inclined to deceive and impoſe upon his Creatures.

We

We eſtabliſh theſe our Principles upon firmer Grounds and Reaſons, than thoſe upon which the Principles of Phyſicians ſtand, when they declare that ſuch Motions (*e. g.* of Humours, Muſcles, *&c.* in the Animal Oeconomy) are natural, which contribute to the Preſervation and Health of the Individual. Whereas, on the contrary, they ſay, that ſuch Motions as tend to Sickneſs and Death are preternatural: And they talk here indeed with an accurate Propriety; becauſe when they ſpeak thus, they underſtand one particular, individual Nature, the Care, Health and Preſervation of which, for the Time being, concerns their Art: And yet how can it, at the ſame Time, be denied but that theſe moſt pernicious, mortal Changes, in Sickneſs and Death, [*Metaſteſes*] happen according to the general Laws of univerſal Nature; whereas with reſpect to Man, as he is an Agent, the Miſtakes of an erroneous Judgment, and all Depravity of Will, are quite inconſiſtent with the Efforts of any particular human Nature towards its own Perfection: Neither do theſe Errors of Will and Judgment proceed from an unavoidable, neceſſary Influx of external Circumſtances upon the Individual, but they ariſe either, in the firſt Place, from mere Inadvertency and Raſhneſs, or, in the next Place, from Habit and Example.

Mr. *Hobbes* has therefore, upon this Argument, diſcovered himſelf the very worſt of Mortals, by his Obſervations upon the Cabals, Meetings and Revellings of ſpendthrift, vagabond Idlers, and by propoſing theſe Obſervations as his moſt ſerious Meditations upon human Nature, and then to complete all, by eſtabliſhing ſuch Cabals and Meetings as theſe, as the ſolid Baſis and Foundation of his new Politics.

It is my firm Opinion, that not only ſpeculative Axioms, but the firſt Principles alſo of moral Diſcipline muſt be eſtabliſhed upon that Neceſſity I have been hitherto contending for. For ſuch Dictates as are to determine many particular Acts, and the Circumſtances reſpectively belonging to them, are Proof ſufficient that ſuch Dictates are grounded upon probable Reaſons:—Nay—ſuch Reaſons as the Weakneſs of our Minds can underſtand and attain to, notwithſtanding that the Mind cannot ſearch into all Things preſent, much leſs provide againſt all poſſible Conſequences, ſo as to purſue and act what ought to be done upon every Emergency.

The Dictates which approach the cloſeſt to theſe natural and neceſſary Dictates, are ſuch as ariſe from Enquiry, Examination, and ſtrict Scrutiny; from Deliberation and Caution; from long Experience; as alſo from the authentic Teſtimony of Perſons thoroughly experienced. Such Dictates as theſe are the Laws of Civil Society, and ſuch are the Caſes or Matters decreed and adjudged by Courts of Civil Judicature. We are therefore to form our Judgments and Opinions upon the Tendencies and Propenſities of human Nature, by theſe Dictates, preferable to the raſh Behaviour of hot, giddy-headed Men. Becauſe ſerious Deliberation, ſtrict Caution, long Experience, together with all the other Helps attaining to

Truth, muſt always draw us much nearer to that State of Mind, in which we cannot think otherwiſe than we do, upon account of thoſe ſeveral Objects, and the Nature of them, which daily ſupply the Mind: And this is always the Caſe, when the Mind judges and determines upon the true Evidences of Senſe, and of clear Demonſtration. And conſequently, the more neceſſary and unavoidable every Judgment we form is, the more natural it is; or at leaſt muſt be deemed ſo, as very nearly approaching to what is natural. Whereas, on the contrary, Mr. *Hobbes*'s Blunder determines what human Nature is, from the raſh, hot Behaviour of Mankind; which is exactly the ſame as to affirm, that the Nature of any Tree is ſpecifically to be diſtinguiſhed from every other Tree, by the fungous Subſtance and Moſs, which are, at ſome particular Times, found ſticking cloſe, and growing to it.

SECT. XI.

Abſtraction.

CONCERNING a ſecond Faculty of the Mind (mentioned in the Fourth Section of this Chapter) and which is called *Abſtraction*.

Abſtraction defined.

(1) *Abſtraction* is that peculiar Force, Energy or Power of the Intellect, by which the human Mind forms univerſal Notions by Preciſion, or cutting off ſuch Accidents as diſtinguiſh each ſingle Particular from the reſt.

1. *Abſtraction*

(1) *Abſtraction is that peculiar Force, Energy and Power*, &c.] Sumendo unitatem, in ſuâ amplitudine, alia eſt *Realis*, *i. e.* realiter rebus conveniens, alia *Intentionalis*, *i. e.* rebus conveniens tantùm, cùm [res] ab intellectu concipiuntur. Hæc *Unitas Intentionalis* appellatur a ſcholaſticis *Unitas Præciſionis*: idque quia eſt unitas quædam conveniens rebus cum [res] ab intellectu abſtrahuntur & præſcinduntur a differentiis individualibus, *e. g.* Natura humana per differentias individuales in ſingularibus ſuis diviſa eſt, multiplicata eſt, & facta multæ humanitates; intellectus verò humanus concipiens hanc naturam humanam, quæ eſt in omnibus hominibus, abſtrahit eam a conditionibus individuantibus, eamque multiplicantibus, abſtrahit, inquam, concipiendo eam per ſe, ſine differentiis individualibus, &, per hanc abſtractionem efficit, ut, ea Natura, quæ priùs erat plures, jam ſit ſimpliciter una.

Hæc *Unitas Præciſionis*, ſic definitur a ſcholaſticis, *eſt naturæ indiviſio in ſua ſingularia*. Ratio definitionis eſt, quia natura ante abſtractionem diviſa erat in multas ſingulares naturas, jam vero, cum laboratur ab illis differentiis individualibus, expers eſt illius multitudinis & diviſionis quam prius habebat. Vid. Rob. Baron. Metaphyſic. General. Part 1. Sect. 3. Pag. 20. Edit. Cantab. 1685. 12mo. The Uſe of Words being to ſtand as outward Marks of our internal *Ideas*, and thoſe *Ideas* being taken from particular Things; if every particular *Idea* that we take in ſhould have a diſtinct Name, Names muſt be endleſs. To prevent this, the Mind makes the particular *Ideas*, received from particular Objects, to become general; which is done by conſidering them as they are in the Mind ſuch Appearances, ſeparate from all other Exiſtences, and the Circumſtances of real Exiſtence, as Time, Place, or any other concomitant *Ideas*. This is called ABSTRACTION, whereby *Ideas*, taken from particular Beings, become general Repreſentatives of all of the ſame Kind, and their Names general Names, applicable to whatever exiſts conformable to ſuch *abſtract Ideas*. Such preciſe, naked Appearances in the Mind, without conſidering how, whence, or with what others they came there, the Underſtanding lays up (with Names com-

1. *Abstraction* greatly assists the Memory, and of Consequence the Wisdom or Prudence arising from it: *Abstraction* remarkably adds also to all that The Uses of Abstraction.

commonly annexed to them) as the Standards to rank real Existences into Sorts, as they agree with these Patterns, and to *denominate* them accordingly. Thus the same Colour being observed To-day in Chalk or Snow, which the Mind Yesterday perceived from Milk, it considers that Appearance alone, makes it a Representative of all of that Kind; and having given it the Name WHITENESS, it by that Sound signifies the same Quality, wheresoever to be imagined or met with: And thus *Universals*, whether *Ideas* or *Terms*, are made. *See* Locke's *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, Book 2. Chap. 11. Section 9.

The sagacious Dr. *Peter Brown*, late Lord Bishop of *Corke*, treats Abstraction in a Manner somewhat different. Another Act, says his Lordship, of the pure Intellect, in Relation to the Ideas of Sensation, commonly reduced to this Head of Judgment, is said to be *Abstraction*, which is usually distinguished into two Sorts, and both of them equally groundless.

I. The first is *a Logical Abstraction*, in order to form general Ideas; which is thought to be performed by withdrawing the Mind entirely from all the *Individuals*, and then forming one single Idea which shall represent the *whole* Kind or Species at once; as when we remove our Thoughts entirely from all the Individuals of *Men*, and frame to ourselves one general Idea, distinct from them all, to represent the whole Race. And these general abstract Ideas shall, in the modern, refined Method of forming them, prove the strangest and most inconsistent Monsters in the World. Thus the general abstract Idea of Man, shall not be of a black or white, short or tall, thick or slender Man, but shall be all these and none of them at the same Time: The general abstract Idea of a Triangle shall be neither of an equilateral, nor equicrural, nor scalenum; neither oblique nor rectangle, but all and none of them at once.

Now this is utterly impracticable, and therefore Abstraction, in this Sense, is a hard Word, and without any determinate Meaning; for if the Intellect abstracts from all the Ideas of every Individual, it can have no Idea at all left to operate upon. When we say *Mankind*, it expresseth no one distinct, abstract, general Idea which stands in the Mind for all the Individuals at once; but it signifies the Idea of one Individual, which is no otherwise made general, than by our conceiving all the rest of the same Kind by that one; so that in Truth it is the single Idea of any one Individual which is made to stand for and represent the whole Species. There is no such Thing in Nature as any Universal really existing, either to strike upon our Senses, or to be an Object of our Reason; and consequently there can be no such general abstract Idea in the Mind. If there were any such, it would be equally simple and original with that of one Individual; and, which is yet more absurd, whether such an Idea were supposed to be from Nature or from Abstraction, or Creation of the Intellect, it would necessarily imply this plain Absurdity, That it would not only be both a particular and universal Idea, as you differently considered it, which is very allowable and may be true; but it would be actually, and in itself, both a simple and compounded Idea at the same Time, which is a downright Contradiction; simple, as it represented the whole Kind at once, in one simple Idea abstracted from all the Individuals; and compounded, as it included them all.

And now we may have Leave to wonder at those Persons, who single out this Sort of imaginary Abstraction for the only perfect Distinction between Men and Brutes; and chuse to place the only Difference between them in that Sort of Abstraction which one would think could never enter into the Head of Man or Beast. Nay, we may with good Reason say, that of all the Operations of the pure Intellect they are least distinguishable in this, of making the Idea of one Individual stand for all of the same Kind, which is the true Abstraction. When we have an Idea of one particular Man, this serves us to distinguish the whole Species from any other: And thus far even Brutes seem to approach to this Power, namely, that the Idea of a particular Man whom a Dog, for Instance, hath seen, serves in his Imagination whereby to distinguish any Individual of the same Species, (as often as it is excited again by the Presence of any other Man) from the Individuals of any other Species.

II. The other Sort of Abstraction is called *metaphysical*, and is said to be performed by taking,

that Virtue which is connected with Prudence.—Nay,—it remarkably adds to all thoſe Acts and Habits which ſtrengthen and improve the human Life, with Conſtancy and Reſolution, with Knowledge and Politeneſs, with Eaſe and Happineſs.

2. The Attributes and Qualities belonging to Things, either regard their Nature and inward Conſtitution, or their Cauſes and Effects, as theſe Attributes agree only to one Nature, or to few Natures in the general conſidered.

3. The human Mind can, with little or no Trouble, apply theſe Attributes to numberleſs Individuals, together with their various Relations and Circumſtances.

All Sciences take their Source from *Abſtraction*, as being conſtituted and made up of Univerſals. By the Efficacy and Power of *Abſtraction*, all the compendious, hiſtorical Accounts of Nature, and their chief Heads, or Topics are eaſily collected.

Upon Sciences and the Hiſtory of Nature (not to mention ſome other Helps) may quickly be known what Things are neceſſary both to our own and to other Beings Preſervation, and Perfection of Nature. Upon theſe Attributes and Abſtractions depend alſo the ſeveral Rules belonging to the Arts, whilſt ſuch Rules remain univerſal; by the Means and Aſſiſtance of which Rules, all Men endowed with Faculties ſufficient, either do or can arrive at the Ends they propoſe. Thus, for Inſtance, Logic, Medicine, *i. e.* the Art of Phyſic and Ethics [or the Art of Morals] Navigation, Architecture, *&c.* theſe ſeveral Arts reſpectively do not, I ſay, definitely and particularly inſtitute and inſtruct one ſingle Man only. Logic does not, for Example, inſtruct *Ariſtotle*, and him only, how to direct his own Reaſon alone, in the Search of Truth, and upon one ſingle Subject Matter of Knowledge only. Neither, *Secondly*, does the Art of Medicine inſtruct *Hippocrates*, and him only, after what Manner he ſhall either preſerve or recover his own Health only, without extending its Uſe any farther. Neither, in a *third* Inſtance, does the Art of Navigation teach *Palinurus*, and him only, how to ſhape his Courſe into one ſingle Port, and no more. In ſhort, no one Art was ever yet deſigned for ſo poor, ſo narrow, ſo contracted an Uſe as this. Whereas, the Truth is, all Arts

king the Mind entirely off from all the Objects or rather *Ideas* of Senſation, and all its Compoſitions out of them; and from all thoſe *Complex Notions* and Conceptions of Things in this World, which are made up of Ideas of Senſe, conſidered together with the Mind's Operations upon them, in order to form abſtract Ideas of heavenly Things and incorporeal Beings. But this is utterly impracticable in this Life, as any one may find upon a Trial; after the utmoſt Efforts of the pureſt Intellect, to conceive or frame ſuch an *abſtract* Idea, he will find his Attempt vain and trifling. If any one ſuch Idea could be aſſigned, and a proper Name found out for it, we might the leſs wonder how Men could purſue this Notion ſo far as they do, to the great Obſtruction of true Knowledge, and Perplexity of human Underſtanding. *See Biſhop* Brown's *Procedure, Extent and Limits of human Underſtanding*, Book 2. Chap. 4. *Of Abſtraction*, Pag. 186, 187, 188, 189. 195 and 196. London 1729. 2d. Edit. Octavo.

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teach all Artiſts indefinitely to conſider *the End in general of any Man*; and conſequently, the whole general Good deſigned and intended by every ſuch Art.

The Arts chuſe out alſo univerſal Means, they lay down and ſettle the Uſe and Application of theſe Means; and conſequently both Maſter and Scholar, Teacher and Learner, in any of theſe Arts, ſtudy and purſue their Knowledge in them, as they are chiefly and principally concerned about Things general and univerſal. And this, by the Bye, proves, that Mankind not only can, but that they uſually do, conſider in every Art the Good, the Advantage of it, as a Good, an Advantage more general than juſt what merely concerns SELF. We muſt here, however, at the ſame Time obſerve, That there cannot poſſibly be any juſt Hindrance, why the determined Influence of general Precepts ſhould not have a Direction, a Tendency to a Singular, a Particular, an Individual: Why, for Example, ſhould not *Hippocrates*, by his general Art, preſerve his own Life and Health, as well as preſerve the Life and Health of Multitudes? Why ſhould not *Vitruvius* deſign and plan out an Houſe for his own comfortable Uſe, as well as deſign and plan out Buildings for all Mankind? Beſides all this, the Obſervation, moreover, of univerſal Conceptions, of ſpeculative and practical Propoſitions (all which are naturally formed by the human Mind) carries in it this farther Advantage, *viz.* That from ſuch univerſal Notions as theſe, *unchangeable*, and conſequently, in ſome Reſpects, *eternal Rules* are conſtituted for the Direction and Conduct of human Actions.

Such Propoſitions as theſe, *i. e.* the ſeveral Rules of Action, we ſhall lay before the Reader, in the enſuing Parts of this *Philoſophical Diſquiſition*, from which Rules our Reader may clearly perceive, what theſe univerſal Notions are, which conſtitute theſe Rules; how natural and well adapted to the human Mind, and of what important Conſequence they are in the Service of true Religion, and Civil Government, and in promoting the Peace and Commerce of Nations far and near.

We muſt, however, here, firſt, make ſome few Remarks upon the Energy and ſtrong Propenſity of the human Mind, in the Invention of Words, written Marks, and other arbitrary Signs; by Help of which the Mind is both able to recollect univerſal and particular Notions, and alſo ſignify or communicate them to others. And this ſo diſtinguiſhing, ſpecific a Characteriſtic of Man above all other Animals, is of mighty Conſequence in eſtabliſhing firſt, and then preſerving Civil Society.

Beſides this—As to the Uſe and Application of thoſe Signs, we ſhall eaſily underſtand how far Mankind is agreed, if we but conſider (which as Chriſtians we ought) the Account delivered to us in the Holy Scriptures; namely——that all Mankind ſprung originally from one common Root, *Adam* and *Eve*; and that *Eve*, without any Difficulty, uſed Words in the very ſame Senſe and Meaning *Adam* had appointed, and that their Poſterity had imbibed

bibed the Signification of them with their firſt Nouriſhment. Suppoſing, then, that Mr. *Hobbes* ſhould take the Fancy into his Head, of conſidering the whole human Race, in a State of Nature, like Muſhrooms, ſtarting at once out of the Earth, and as inſtantly arriving at full Maturity, without the leaſt mutual Obligation or Tye to each other: Reaſon, even upon this Suppoſition would, I ſay, prompt and adviſe all to agree in the ſame Words, Marks and Signs, and in the ſame Application of them to the ſame Things, ſo far, at leaſt, to be ſure, as the ſeveral Parts of Mankind held any Communication, Commerce or Dealings with each other.

Who it was that firſt had applied ſuch or ſuch a Sign to this or that Notion or Thing, is not an Enquiry worthy of much Notice; but the Conſideration of Conſequence to all, is, That Mankind ſhould agree amongſt themſelves, by what Device and Contrivance all might become acquainted with ſingle Things. For, from hence the ſeveral Individuals, every one of them, will each be able (upon conveying his own Sentiments and Obſervations to the Underſtanding of others) to ſtore his own Mind with a more fruitful Increaſe of Knowledge; and conſequently, the Experience, and the laborious, ſtudious Enquiries of the preſent Age will, in all Probability, point out a readier Road to future Ages, how to arrive at true Wiſdom and real Happineſs, that ſo all Sorts of Virtue may, with more Eaſe and greater Pleaſure, be univerſally ſpread abroad and propagated. Mankind will, from hence, be able to conſult and debate about Compacts and Laws, mutually between each other to be agreed upon and enacted; to examine or enquire what they were; whether they were obeyed, to produce noted, well-obſerved Authorities; and, in a Word, to pronounce Sentence according to Proof and Evidence. Now, that ſuch Circumſtances and Particulars are properly fitted to human Nature, and prepare Man for Society, Mr. *Hobbes* himſelf will not deny.

SECT. XII.

What Power the Mind has over itſelf.

CAN I omit to mention ſeveral other Perfections of the human Underſtanding? How it can, by its own innate Power of Sagacity, penetrate into and reflect upon itſelf: How narrowly it can examine into the Habits and Diſpoſitions of the Soul, as made up of paſt Acts often repeated: How well it can retain all its own Dictates: How it can recollect and recover ſuch as have ſlipt out of Remembrance: How it can compare theſe Dictates with Acts under its Deliberation: And, in a Word, how it can direct and determine itſelf to purſue whatſoever ſeems to it beſt and fitteſt to be done? Our Mind is thoroughly conſcious of all its own Acts, it can obſerve, as often it does, upon what Motives and Views Acts begin and

and operate. It naturally can paſs Judgment upon itſelf, and from hence ariſe in it either Tranquillity and Joy, or Anxiety and Sorrow.

In this operative Energy, then, of the human Underſtanding, together with the Acts ariſing from it, the whole Power of *Conſcience* conſiſts; by which, [*Conſcience*] as a Rule, the Underſtanding preſcribes Laws to itſelf, examines into Acts paſt, and regulates Acts future. The Office of Conſcience.

There are not any Traces of ſo noble a Faculty in any other Animal beſides Man. The Operations of this Principle are very large and extenſive, both in promoting and increaſing Virtue, and are as powerfully extenſive in eſtabliſhing and preſerving Societies, both amongſt Subjects of the ſame Civil Community, and thoſe of different Communities. Man the only Animal endowed with Conſcience.

The principal Scope, the chief Deſign of this whole Diſcourſe, is to demonſtrate, by what Method, truly, this Energy of the Soul in us either exerts itſelf, or how it is exerted upon by its own proper Objects, in order to make, conſtitute and frame ſuch certain, univerſal, practical Propoſitions, as will diſcover all the poſſible Happineſs attainable by Man; And then, in the next Place, to declare to us, by what Acts in our own Power ſuch an Happineſs, under all the Varieties of Circumſtance, can be obtained. "These univerſal, practical Propoſitions are Rules of Action "and the Laws of Nature."

I ſhall not here add any Thing to what I have already mentioned, concerning the Knowledge of Number, Meaſure, Order, or concerning Free-will, *&c.* Altho' all theſe Sorts of Knowledge are peculiarly natural to Man, and will prove very material and uſeful to our preſent Purpoſe.

I chuſe now to apply myſelf to the Conſideration of an human Body; in the Make and Structure of which, ſeveral Obſervables, and to our preſent Purpoſe, come under our Notice: And, they are ſuch Obſervations as have been hitherto, in the general, neglected, or, at leaſt, not mentioned by any other Authors who have written upon this Subject. The human Body conſider'd.

SECT. XIII.

THE Life and Health of an human Body, and the moſt perfect State of which it is capable, conſtitute one Branch of that principal End which Right Reaſon has always in view; due Regard, at the ſame Time, being always had to all other Beings, according to their Nature, Order and Dignity. The various Powers and Uſes of the human Body are moſt uſeful Means, as to the whole of Man, both in improving the Perfections of his Mind, as well as ſerviceable to the common Good.

If the Caſe then actually ſtands thus, it muſt happen, that proper Obſervations upon the human Body will afford us ſome Light in clearing up and determining *the End*, and *the Uſe of Means*. My Deſign then, here, is to enquire into the Origin and principal Branches of the *Law of Nature*;

which Law is chiefly employed about such Dictates as concern *the End*, and *the Means* necessary leading to *it*.

And first of all, we may, in the general, pronounce this Proposition true, *(viz.)* That *whatsoever (from the Structure of an human Body, so compleat a Piece of Divine Contrivance) demonstrates all human Happiness to depend upon many Causes, the principal and chief of which are rational Causes; demonstrates also, of Consequence, that no Happiness can be hoped for, or expected, independent of the common general Happiness.*

And, *Secondly*, what is still more, *Whatsoever Arguments prove that every human Creature can, by his own corporeal Powers, produce something beneficial and useful to this End, and procure also the Aid and Assistance of others; prove also, that each Person, from his very Endeavours to effect these two Points, renders himself as happy as it is in his Power to be.*

The Conclusion from hence arising is demonstrably true, *viz. That the Characteristic, or Mark, fairly representing the Obligations to perform such Acts, is evidently discovered and seen in the Frame and Structure of an human Body.*

And this is the Conclusion which will clearly appear to follow, from the Tendency of that natural Obligation or Law, hereafter to be cleared up and enlarged upon. It also follows, as a farther Consequence, That, *in Proportion as the Discovery is well grounded, which proves the Necessity upon us, and All, to co-operate with united Endeavours for the common Happiness: And in Proportion, also, as each Person's Abilities, Propensities and Inclinations, to such Acts as these, are stronger, that therefore, consequently, every such Person can, with a proportional Ease and Readiness, contribute his Endeavours towards the public Good; and, of Consequence, every such Person's Crime is the greater, should he violate that Law which this Obligation lays upon him:* And from hence most certainly may be collected, That the Necessity of performing such Acts and Duties as these is still the stronger and more evident. Wherefore, I intend to lay before my Readers some Discoveries to my present Purpose, which have been made upon the human Body: To which Discoveries, the Experience and Penetration of the Learned may add more, or, perhaps with better Success, improve those very Discoveries which I shall mention.

1. The first Properties which fall under our Notice, in considering an human Body, are such as inhere in it, as it is a Physical, Natural Body.

2. Such Properties as inhere in it, as it is an animated Body endowed with Senses like other Animals. And,

3. Such Qualities, Properties and Attributes as peculiarly belong to itself.

First Head. "1. The human Body has some Properties in common "with all the physical or natural Bodies thro' the whole Universe."

The Preservation of Life, Health and Strength, is a very substantial Part of that End, which is laid down for every one Man to follow. Now,

all

all the Motions of an human Body, and of Conſequence, all thoſe Motions in which its Life, Health and Strength conſiſt; they all, I ſay, originally flow, *Firſt*, from a *Firſt Mover*. *Secondly*, They all are ſuch Motions as are neceſſarily involved in the numberleſs Motions of other Bodies, placed in the ſame Syſtem; and, *Thirdly*, They are ſuch Motions as, in ſome Meaſure, depend upon the Motions of thoſe other Bodies.

Of all the Bodies which firſt fall under our Notice, we are principally to obſerve and regard the Bodies of our Fellow Creatures: What Capacities of Motion they have, which can limit our Motions; and what Motions they have which are governable by Reaſon. For, upon Reaſon it is that all our Hopes depend, of inducing and influencing their Reaſon, to act in Concord, Agreement and Conjunction with our Reaſon.

Secondly, The Caſe is exactly the ſame in an human Body as in all other natural Bodies; for its Motion is propagated far and near, every Way; a Motion which does not periſh and die away; but it is a Motion which concurs and co-operates with other Motions, in continuing the natural Succeſſion of Things, and in preſerving the Whole. And therefore,

As the firſt Principle eſtabliſhed has inſtructed us, That the principal, the chief End of each Individual depends upon the united Endeavours of all: So, this latter Principle ſhews us, that the Abilities of each and every Individual, can prove of a moſt extenſive, public Benefit to all. The firſt of theſe two Principles forbids us to hope for the Good of Individuals, ſeparate from the Good of the Whole; and conſequently, this Principle adviſes us to purſue the *Common Happineſs*, as the moſt fruitful and beneficent Parent of all private Beatitudes, Bliſs and Happineſs. The ſecond of theſe two Principles teaches us, That a ſtudious Concern for the common Good will not be vain and fruitleſs, provided ſuch a ſtudious Concern to agree and co-operate with the united Endeavours of all.

But, beſides this, there is a certain regular Order preſerved in this double, complex, mixed Motion, namely,—*Firſt*, in that Motion wherein *the general Whole* concurs in Reſpect, to preſerve for ſome certain Time ſome one, ſingle, individual Body; as well as, *Secondly*, in that Motion wherein each ſingle Individual, in Conjunction with all the reſt, concurs in the Preſervation of the whole Syſtem. By Virtue of ſuch a regular Order as this it is, that ſome Motions are determined by other Motions, and that all the ſeveral Motions in the Parts are adjuſted and regulated by the Motions of the whole Syſtem, turning round and revolving into itſelf.

We are not, by Way of flying for Refuge, under the leaſt Neceſſity to embrace any particular Hypotheſis of the Syſtem of the World, to prove what we here urge, about the neceſſary Order to be obſerved amongſt compound Motions, and their ſeveral Energies of Operation. Becauſe the Whole of what I here offer about Motion is demonſtrated upon ſuch geometrical Principles, as muſt and ought to ſtand unſhaken, let the Hypothe-

ſis be what it will.——And notwithſtanding that ſuch a Contemplation as this ſeems far removed above common Practice, yet it is not, however, quite inſignificant and uſeleſs in human Affairs. For, ſuch a Contemplation as this, diſtinctly and clearly ſhews us, and upon the moſt general Principles, how neceſſary a certain eſtabliſhed Order is amongſt ſuch Cauſes as act by a phyſical, corporeal Force; in order that the larger Number of ſuch Cauſes may concur and agree in producing an Effect foreknown, and long before ſettled in the human Mind.

Such a Contemplation as this will alſo ſhew us, how, by the moſt certain Method, to eſtimate what Degree of Power, either more or leſs, any Cauſes carry towards producing the Effect deſired; and from hence we may know and determine with Certainty, what is the proper, natural Power of Cauſes reſpectively; what their Order and Precedence in producing any Effect.

Here then, in the very Nature of Things, we are taught, what Cauſes are firſt to be regarded, not only upon account of Effects already produced by them, but alſo what Degrees of Aſſiſtance they can afford in compaſſing ſuch Ends, as with Anxiety, Diligence and eager Deſire we muſt at the preſent purſue. By ſuch an Inveſtigation as this, we underſtand, that theſe Cauſes, which Philoſophers call univerſal Cauſes, (namely, the Motion of an æthereal Fluid, or celeſtial Matter, *&c.* and God the original, firſt Cauſe and Mover of All) are the principal Fountains of all that common Good which we all either actually enjoy, or which, from the Nature of Things, we hope to enjoy.

I ſhall not mention at preſent any of theſe Cauſes which do not, in the leaſt, depend upon human Power. My preſent Enquiry is employed upon Cauſes, more or leſs within, or under, our Influence.

Amongſt all thoſe Cauſes, therefore, which are under the leaſt Influence of Man, and capable of being moved into Action by him; upon an equal Foundation of Reaſon it is manifeſt, that the Motions ariſing from the univerſal Benevolence of all rational Beings towards All, are the moſt prevailing Cauſes of that univerſal Happineſs which all enjoy; and from which univerſal Happineſs eſſentially flows the private Beatitude or Bliſs of each. For, from hence flow all theſe Acts whereby Innocence and Fidelity are preſerved, whereby Humanity, Gratitude, and all the other Virtues, are exerciſed; and upon theſe Virtues intirely it is, that not only all Dominion over private Property, but all mutual Intercourſe amongſt Mankind, ſubſiſts.

Now, all theſe ſeveral Acts and Virtues receive the ſame Tendency and Direction that particular, natural Motions do, which are directed and determined by that one grand, univerſal Motion which prevails in the Syſtem of the World; or they exactly reſemble the ſeveral Offices of Animal Spirits, of Bowels, of Veſſels, of Secretory Ducts, and of Limbs, in the Animal Oeconomy, all which draw their Energy and Force from the Circulation of the Blood.

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If then, upon a ſtill cloſer Examination into *the Nature of Things*, we ſhall eſtabliſh this as our firm Opinion: The neceſſary Effect from hence ariſing is, *viz. That we, from a real Concern for the public Good, will not only ourſelves ſincerely obey all the Laws of Nature, but employ alſo our beſt Diligence in influencing others to perform the ſame; from whence it will appear, that nothing in our Power can be wanting to render ourſelves, and even others, happy; neither can Reaſon propoſe to our Practice a nobler End to purſue.*

SECT. XIV.

The Difference between a phyſical and a rational Syſtem.

NOTWITHSTANDING, however, that we may very juſtly compare the aggregate Sum of Mankind, or the whole human Species, ſo far as they act by a bodily Force, to a Syſtem of natural Bodies; yet, I am very ſenſible how manifeſt the Difference is between them: For, *Firſt*, The Effects of Syſtems, merely phyſical, are produced by Contact between the Bodies moving and the Bodies moved. *Secondly*, Theſe Effects frequently indeed happen without any animal Senſation. And, *Thirdly*, Theſe Effects always happen without any Interpoſition either of Deſign or Choice.

Whereas in the Syſtem of Mankind there, *Firſt*, frequently interpoſes a wide Diſtance between the Agents; and, *Secondly*, there is an Application conſtantly of the Reaſon proper to each Agent.

A cloſe Similitude, notwithſtanding all the Differences between them.

Now, notwithſtanding theſe remarkable Differences between a phyſical and a rational Syſtem, yet it is at the ſame time manifeſt, that not only the bodily Force of Mankind (in the actual Exerciſe of ſuch Force) comes under the ſame Laws of Motion with other natural Bodies; but alſo, when ever two or more human Agents co-operate in producing any Effect relating to others (which every Day happens, even beyond Expectation) that there is the ſame Neceſſity of Subordination between ſuch Motions, as take place in the Motions of any other natural Bodies whatſoever. We don't here carry our Notions farther than the Compariſon hitherto drawn will allow; and yet, ſo far the Compariſon may be allowed, becauſe it is rational and juſt.

Now—it is only concerning phyſical or natural Motions we ſpeak, in the Compariſon juſt now made. For which Reaſon our Compariſon is eſtabliſhed upon the well-known, regular Laws of Matter and Motion. I ſhall not, however, here ſcruple to aſſert (becauſe it is at preſent a very juſt Obſervation) that the whole human Kind may, with a ſignificant Propriety, be conſidered as one Syſtem of natural Bodies; becauſe frequent are the Opportunities of mutual Communication and ſocial Intercourſe amongſt Mankind, whereby they may, and actually do, either benefit or injure one another:——And theſe Influences of Good and Evil, both by Word and

and Deed, may, and do, affect Individuals at very remote Diſtances.—— And—this Compariſon holds, in a more eſpecial manner, true, if the whole Series of Time which each Perſon reſpectively has to live be reduced to any Degree of Certainty.—Calculations both of future Good and future Evil, are naturally and conſtantly made by every conſiderate Man living, and at ſome certain determined Value. Such Calculations as theſe are not only fixed in Reaſon, but blended with the firſt Appetite of our Being, the Appetite of Self-preſervation, that radical Inſtinct by which every rational Agent continually deſires for himſelf in the Whole, let the Period of his Life now exiſting be what it will, an happy Futurity of Time.——And, conſequently from hence it follows, that no Matter, of any the leaſt moment, can be carried on by any one Individual, concerning the Life, Property and Family of another, which does not, more or leſs, affect Bleſſings equally dear to many others alſo;—and, juſt after the ſame Manner, that the Motion of one Body in the Syſtem of this viſible World makes ſome Impreſſion, and cauſes ſome Impulſe upon many other Bodies, but more particularly upon thoſe which are nigh.

So exalted a Privilege as that of a very comprehenſive Knowledge, conferred by Almighty God upon Man, ſupplies the Place and Energy of that Contiguity or Contact, requiſite in all other natural Bodies to communicate Motion from one to the reſt. For, Mankind are put into Motion by ſome certain Signs, even the minuteſt (whether ſuch Signs be natural or arbitrary) by Vertue of which Signs they can, in an Inſtant, underſtand what Acts, Perſons at the remoteſt Diſtances, either are doing, or ought to do.

But, beſides this, the Memory of Man retains the Senſe of Gratitude for ſuch Obligations as have been conferred, either upon themſelves or upon thoſe they love; from which Remembrances they are acted upon, to requite the Obligations as Opportunity ſhall offer itſelf.—And, what is ſtill more—they naturally are cautious, provident and wary; they look forward, and take antecedent Signs from the Actions, which, as they themſelves have obſerved, ſome Men have performed to others: And that the like Uſage is manifeſtly to be expected, as well from themſelves, as from others whom they love. And from hence, upon this Foundation, they act with the utmoſt, ſtricteſt Caution, both in preventing Evils, and in eſtabliſhing the ſure and certain Hope of Bleſſings to come, of Bleſſings laid in a long Series of Futurity.

For, the Remembrance of Things paſt, and an Inſight into what is to come, are Cauſes, by whoſe Influence and Operation, Men even at great Diſtances from each other, can be and are moved to thoſe good Offices which are due to others; and this Power, or Ability of doing good Offices, is more effectual and much ſtronger, than the Contacts and Colliſions of inanimate, natural Bodies in cloſe Conjunction; and which, (*i. e.* inanimate,

nimate, natural Bodies) unleſs they are near to each other, cannot act at all.

Now, the Reaſon why the Influence, in this Caſe, upon Mankind is more powerful, is, becauſe a ſtrong, well-linked Chain of Reaſoning at once comes into the Mind, whenever paſt and to come are compared together and conſidered; ſo that, by reaſoning from the Nature and Parity of Circumſtances, with regard to ſuch Events and Things as muſt neceſſarily happen, they collect and conclude very rationally, That the like Obligations, Duties and good Offices are, and muſt be, expected from themſelves.

From hence therefore it comes to paſs, that we cannot but be moved by thoſe Motions, by thoſe Acts of ſome Perſons towards others; the natural Power, the operative Efficacy of which Motions and Acts being ſuch, that altho' repeated over and over again by the very ſame Perſon, or ſuppoſing the Motions and Acts to be cloſely imitated by others, that a notable Alteration, an indefinite Variety of Conditions and Circumſtances amongſt others, muſt happen either for better or worſe.

It muſt, however, at the ſame time be acknowledged, that all are not equally affected by theſe Acts, by theſe Motions; but ſome more, ſome leſs, according to the different Degrees of Penetration or Sagacity in each, as applied to the real Cauſes, or to the ſuppoſed Impediments of the common Good.—And, yet—the Communication between Mankind is not, for this Reaſon, leſs natural in ſuch Motions and Acts as regard the common State and Condition of all, than the Communication between Bodies of the ſame Syſtem in their natural Motions; theſe natural Motions, according to *Carteſius*'s Philoſophy, are more plentifully impreſſed and actuated by a more flexible, ſubtle, active Fluid, by a *Materia Subtilis*, than by a thick, heavy, phlegmatic, dull, ſtupid, inert Matter. It is fully ſufficient to our preſent Argument, that the human Underſtanding has Capacity enough to perceive the Similitude of Nature, the ſeveral Conditions and Circumſtances of it, in all the material Concerns of Life between Man and Man: That the Underſtanding can naturally reaſon upon, and compare together, Acts paſt relating to others, with the like Acts to come, and which in Expectation are to be either hoped or feared: And that this rational Operation of the Mind always holds good, and is as effectual to put Mankind into Action, as the mutual Contact between Bodies moving and Bodies moved, is to communicate Motions thro' the ſeveral Parts of this phyſical or natural Syſtem of the World.

The whole Concluſion which fairly from hence follows is, to be ſure, evident: A Concluſion clear, and built upon other good Proofs alſo: A Concluſion which ſeems of itſelf ſpontaneouſly, without any Labour of our own, to intrude itſelf upon us, and ſuggeſt itſelf to us.

The Concluſion is this, *(viz.) Therefore each and every one Individual may from hence learn, That his own private Security from Evils, and his*

whole

whole Expectation of gaining Aſſiſtance from others, towards the Attainment or Enjoyment of his own Good or Happineſs, neceſſarily depend upon the voluntary Aſſiſtance of many; and that thoſe Many alſo reſpectively, ſtands each as much in need always of Aſſiſtance from others, towards each his own private Happineſs.

From whence this one Concluſion inſtantly ſtrikes us, *viz. That the mutual good Offices of All, are uſeful and neceſſary to All.* Which Concluſion as exactly holds true in this Caſe, as it does when we ſay, *That natural Bodies in the ſame Syſtem ſtand in need of the Approaches and Retreats of other Bodies, in order to perform their own Motions.*

The Concluſions ariſing from this Compariſon between moral and phyſical Nature.

From the Neceſſity, therefore, of mutual good Offices, this farther Concluſion alſo neceſſarily follows; *That in the ſame Proportion as every one is able and willing to regard and conſult his own Happineſs, in the ſame Proportion muſt he, to the utmoſt of his Power, endeavour to procure to himſelf the Aſſiſtance and Benevolence of all other rational Beings.*

A natural Body acts in Conjunction with, &c.
A moral Agent acts in Conjunction with, &c.

For, this one Truth may be eaſily known, *That each Perſon is endowed with Abilities, by the Exerciſe of which he can afford Aſſiſtance, and do numberleſs good Offices to others, that he can unite and co-operate with the whole Syſtem of Rationals, in effecting and bringing about one grand, univerſal End, an End which is directed and aimed at the common Good of ALL.*

And, *Secondly*, this Truth alſo, on the contrary, may be as eaſily known, *That the minute Powers of any one human Agent are not, by any Means, ſufficient to counter-act, oppoſe and compel all Agents around him (each of which Agents ſingly having equal Power with his own) ſo as to arrogate and aſſume all their Aſſiſtance to himſelf; all theſe ſeveral Agents at the ſame time, neglecting and foregoing all thoſe natural Helps, which their own various Wants reſpectively and neceſſarily require.*

Such a Suppoſition as this, is as abſurd and impoſſible as to imagine, that one ſingle Pound Weight placed at one End of a Ballance, ſhould preponderate and weigh down ſome thouſands of Pounds Weight, ſuſpended at the oppoſite End. For, all the Endeavours of Mankind, ſo far as they depend upon a phyſical, corporeal Force merely, are always, as to their Operations and Effects, adjuſted and proportioned according to the natural Laws of Motion: And,—the two moſt celebrated Writers upon this Subject, Sir *Chriſtopher Wren* and Mr. *Chriſtian Huygens* have demonſtrated, how all theſe Laws can be proved and determined, in a Scale or Beam p'aying either upon one or two Centers of Gravity.

Neither, in this Caſe, does the Craft, Subtlety or Cunning of any one Man above all the reſt, carry the leaſt Weight in raiſing the Beam acted upon by the phyſical, corporeal Powers of Multitudes for the common Good, ſo as to cauſe an Inclination towards the oppoſite End of the Beam, *i. e.* to the Side where the private Good of *one ſingle Perſon only*, is conſider.d.

From

From the general Nature, therefore, of human Forces, it cannot but appear evident that the Powers arising from a ſtudious Concern for the common Good, can with more Certainty be influenced to afford us Aſſiſtance, than any brutal Force, than any ſubtle Treachery, than any rapacious Violence: And to ſuch indirect, violent Means as theſe it is, Mr. *Hobbes* ſays, all Men, even the beſt of Men, muſt have Recourſe in a State of Nature; and that ſuch Means, becauſe eſtabliſhed upon the natural Right of Self-preſervation lodged in every one, can be no Crime, he has avowedly declared in the Epiſtle Dedicatory before his Book *De Cive*.

SECT. XV.

WE may alſo farther add, to what has been already ſaid, That the general Principles of mathematical Philoſophy afford great Light to theſe our Sentiments; in which Principles, and in theſe only, Mr. *Hobbes* ſeems to agree with us.

Our Author's Syſtem of moral Philoſophy true, upon the Principles of Sir Iſaac Newton, for which Reaſon the Tranſlator does not take upon him to confute here the Carteſian Philoſophy. See Note, Sect. 25. chap. 1.

Now, thoſe mechanical Principles, which are neceſſary to obſerve in every Hypotheſis, fix it as the firſt Maxim, That the Motion of the whole natural World, as diſtributed amongſt all the Parts, be preſerved by ſuch a Communication of all the Motions with each other; by ſuch an Yielding and Succeſſion, by ſuch Degrees of Velocity, as the Abilities and Forces of each ſingle Body reſpectively, by an exact Calculus computed and adjuſted, require.—And yet this Eſtimate, this Calculation, is ſo to be underſtood, that the compound Motion of the whole Syſtem, about one common Center, muſt not only be always preſerved inviolably the ſame, but muſt direct and regulate alſo the Impetus, the Determination and the various Tendencies of all its Parts. For, the compound Motion of the general Syſtem is no other than an aggregate Whole, collected and made up of Motions in all the ſingle Parts which conſtitute ſuch a Syſtem.

This paſſive Power or Neceſſity in all Bodies, of perſevering in and continuing their Motions, is the ſame which in each ſingle Body is proportioned to its Magnitude, *i. e.* its Figure and Solidity: And yet this paſſive Power or Neceſſity in each, is, in a regular Subordination, ſubject to the Motion of the whole Syſtem; and conſequently, the Force impreſſed upon each Part, and the Power of the Whole, are preſerved by that general Motion or Cauſe which at firſt determined the Tendencies, Ends and Deſigns of all.

After this manner it is, that the Motions in all the ſingle Parts correſpond with, and miniſter to, the general Motion of the Whole; and after the ſame manner it is, that this Motion of the general Syſtem (the Nature of the Whole and all its Parts being in perpetual Motion) governs and preſerves, as much as poſſible from the Nature of Things can be, the Powers and Capacities of each, and all ſin-

gle, individual Bodies, or material Parts. Thus, for Inſtance, all Things are to be tempered, mixed and blended together, that no Quantity, even the minuteſt, either of Matter or Motion, is loſt; and this is a Truth eſtabliſhed upon mechanical Principles: The Experience and Obſervation likewiſe of all Mankind, confirmed by the moſt authentic Hiſtories and Authorities of Ages paſt, prove, that the ſeveral Species of Animals are ſtill preſerved the ſame; that their Numbers are rather increaſed than diminiſhed, all Oppoſition of ſome wild, paſſionate Monſters in Nature, to the contrary notwithſtanding.

In this firm Stability of Matter and Motion, in this regular Continuance of all the various, diſtinct Species of Animals, preſerved by the conſtant Succeſſion of Individuals, conſiſts the Preſervation of the whole phyſical or corporeal World; that is, the Preſervation of all that natural Good, towards which all have a natural Tendency, according to the unalterable Laws of Motion.

Neither can there be any ſufficient Reaſon or Cauſe aſſigned, why the Preſervation of the human Species ſhould not be thought defended and ſecured by as ſure and natural an Operation of Cauſes, as the Succeſſion of any other Animals whatſoever; which Succeſſion entirely and only depends upon the firm, laſting Continuance of the corporeal Univerſe or phyſical World, and upon the neceſſary Laws of Motion.

And that Mankind ſhould not be as well guarded and defended as the other animal Creation, would be very ſtrange, ſince all Animals, both rational and brutal, entirely agree in the eſſential Qualities of *Animal*. *Man*, however, has a very remarkable Superiority above *Brute*; becauſe the Union of a rational Soul to an animal Body, always, almoſt without Exception, renders the State and Condition of Mankind better than that of Brute Creatures, but never renders it worſe. For, whoſoever rightly conſiders this Point, muſt certainly underſtand, That the Benefits which we, as Animal Creatures, receive from the Dominion of Reaſon, abundantly recompence ſuch Inconveniencies as happen to the Body from any Error of Judgment: And it is, moreover, a moſt undoubted Truth, That ſuch Miſapprehenſions and Miſtakes about Aliments, Pleaſure, and the other good Things deſigned originally to preſerve and ſecure the Body, ariſe from hence, *That the Mind, exceeding the Bounds and Dictates of Reaſon, becomes enſlaved to Appetite, to carnal Affections, to brutal Luſts.*

We muſt here, indeed, take Notice, that what has hitherto been ſaid concerning thoſe Cauſes, which preſerve the corporeal Univerſe, or phyſical World; concerning thoſe cauſes which preſerve all the various Species of Animals in general, and conſequently of Mankind in particular; all, I ſay, all muſt impreſs ſuch Notions and Sentiments upon the human Mind, as cannot but powerfully ſtrengthen my preſent Argument, and ſolidly eſtabliſh the Doctrine before us.

Now,

Now, that the Preſervation of Mankind, that is, the common Good of ALL, is not only a Thing poſſible, but alſo what actually depends upon Cauſes perfectly well known and determined, and which we aſſuredly underſtand, and upon the moſt demonſtrative Evidence muſt continue and laſt, let any one Μισάνθρωπος, or Man-hating *Timon*, ſay what he will to the contrary.

This Effect is, in its own Nature, the moſt noble: It is an Effect moſt ſtrictly and intimately united with the full Preſervation, with the Happineſs, as much as poſſible, of each and every one Individual.

The Subſtance, the Matter of every one individual, natural Body, and conſequently of every human Body; the Motion of Body in general, and conſequently of every human Body in particular, do, in ſome Reſpect or other, and whether we will or no, miniſter and contribute towards Preſervation, that is, *the Common Good*; at leaſt ſo far, to be ſure, as each individual Body is, in its Motion, determined by the general Motion of the whole Syſtem: Upon which Syſtem depends the Security, the Continuance, the Preſervation of each Individual.

Does not then the *Nature of Things* (and conſequently God, the Author of Nature, powerfully perſwade, command and enforce a ſtudious Care and Concern for the common Good of all Mankind? Have we not a clear, full Indication that ſuch a Good is poſſible; that it is the greateſt Good; that it is more intimately blended and interwoven with the private Happineſs of each Individual, than any other Effect which human Skill, Sagacity, Foreſight and Power can poſſibly produce? Do not theſe deep Impreſſions, imprinted upon our Minds by God and Nature, occaſion that we in ſome reſpect, neceſſarily, whether we will or no, actually promote this general Good?—Nay—even at the very Time we are gratifying our brutal Appetites, and acting, even as much as we can, againſt ſuch a Good.

Is it not manifeſt, that he acts moſt ſuitable, moſt conformable to his practical Reaſon, and to the impreſſed Notices of ſuch Cauſes as moſt effectually produce public and private Good, who purſues the firſt Attempts and Efforts of corporeal Nature, and then, who immediately raiſes and exalts his Purſuits higher, by taking in and joining the Aſſiſtance of human Reaſon?

But, upon this one Account, more particularly, is ſuch a Knowledge as this clearly expoſed to the View of all; becauſe the whole Employment of the Mind, neceſſary to compleat human Happineſs, may be deduced, drawn and taken from what we have already ſaid concerning the Manner how the natural World is preſerved. This whole practical Knowledge, then, conſiſts in theſe two Points:

" 1. That the Endeavours of each and every one Individual, in the Pre-
" ſervation of himſelf, be in a regular Subordination governed and directed

" by all such Attempts, Endeavours and Actions as are evidently necessary " to the Preservation of the Whole.

" 2. That the Powers and Abilities of Individuals be so poised and " ballanced, that each, by preserving himself against outward Force and " Violence, must not destroy any other Being, to the Danger, Detriment and " Loss of the Whole."

This is Cartesius's Notion of a Plenum, whose Philosophy our Author follows.

Something analogous to this discovers itself in the natural Motions of the World around us, and which Analogy arises from a *Plenum* (*i. e.* from a Fluid Medium without any Space or Vacuities) and from the Contiguity or Contact of natural Bodies, and by Consequence, that some such Power as this extends its Influence over all.

It is therefore the proper Office of the human Intellect, and of Reason in general, to observe, That the private, single Happiness of each Individual respectively, does by a nobler Connection depend upon the free, voluntary Acts of all other rational Creatures (even supposing them at great Distances, and consequently that the private Happiness of each must secure all such human Acts, which also more remarkably tend to the common Good of all rational Beings universally) than the Motions respectively of all natural Bodies tend to preserve the whole corporeal System; which, indeed, must be the Case, if, in all voluntary Acts relating to others, the two Cautions just now mentioned be strictly observed.

According to this Method, therefore, it is, that we, from *the Nature of Things*, are taught, upon what Foundation we are to provide for universal Happiness, and for private Happiness of Consequence necessarily comprehended under it:—And which, in other Words, amounts only to thus much. We are instructed what Acts are prescribed by the Law of Nature. In Fact, the Prudent and the Wise, in all their serious, considerate Determinations (and where the Laws of Civil Institution are either no ways concerned, or, at least, leave the Matter to the natural, private Discretion of each and every Individual) fix their whole Attention upon these two Points (*i. e.* public and private Happiness): These are the Points they endeavour to inculcate, and they endeavour to agree in those Points only which may contribute to the common Good of the Parties under their Deliberation, and consequently (1) to ballance Powers and Forces

(1) *To ballance Powers and Forces so*, &c.] The true Meaning of a Ballance of Power, either without or within a State, is best conceived by considering what the Nature of a Ballance is. It supposes three Things: First, the Part which is held, together with the Hand that holds it; and then the two Scales with whatever is weighed therein. Now consider several States in a Neighbourhood: In order to preserve Peace between these States, it is necessary they should be formed into a Ballance, whereof one or more are to be Directors, who are to divide the rest into equal Scales, and upon Occasions remove from one into the other, or else fall with their own Weight into the lightest. So in a State within itself, the Ballance must be held by a third Hand; who is to deal the remaining Power with utmost Exactness into the several Scales. *Doctor* Swift's *Discourse of the* Contests and Dissentions in Athens and Rome. *in his* Miscellanies, *printed* London 1713. Page 5. 8vo.

so

ſo, as to render it the Advantage of all, that no one ſhould have Strength ſufficient to cruſh and oppreſs another.

Thus the Caſe exactly ſtands between different neighbouring States, under different Adminiſtrations of Civil Government. The Point chiefly conſulted, in all their Embaſſies, Negotiations, Treaties, Leagues and Covenants, is, how the ſeveral Franchiſes, Liberties, Privileges, Rights and Authorities may be ſo poiſed, ballanced and ſettled, by mutual, ſocial Alliances, as to render it extremely difficult and hazardous for any one to cruſh and deſtroy another; but,—on the contrary, that all be allowed the ſufficient Means of Self-preſervation, as alſo the Means, in ſome Degree or other, of bettering and enriching themſelves: Security and Commerce being the firſt original Cauſe of all Society in general, and of Civil Society in particular.

SECT. XVI.

UPON exactly the ſame Foundation of Reaſon, in the firſt Inſtitution of each Civil Eſtabliſhment, the Powers and Abilities of all the ſeveral Orders, of all the ſeveral conſtituent Members, were, and from the Nature of the Thing muſt have been, with the exacteſt Care and niceſt Accuracy, adjuſted and ballanced; all muſt be ſubject to one ſupreme Authority; all muſt be ſo mutually aſſiſting to each other, as that none might, if poſſible, be able to injure or hurt another.

The Security, moreover, of the Community from Civil Commotions and inteſtine Convulſions, as well as a Security from all Apprehenſions of foreign Invaſions; ſuch a Security, I ſay, is only the ſame Eſtabliſhment of Things continued, and which ariſes from Cauſes evidently the ſame.

We may alſo farther add, That at whatſoever Time any new Laws are to be enacted; when any old Laws are either to be amended or explained according to an equitable Conſtruction, all candid, fair, impartial Judges have Recourſe always to the Principles we have here eſtabliſhed.——Nay—to ſpeak as extenſively, as univerſally as poſſible, in all theſe Caſes, where poſitive Laws are either ſilent, or where they cannot, by a timely Relief, redreſs particular Grievances; or 3*d*. where they allow a diſcretionary Power to particular Perſons, both in their public and private Capacities of acting and determining Matters of Doubt; (and Caſes of this Sort Mr. *Hobbes* allows, Chap. 13. Sect. 15. *De Cive*, to be always infinite) In all which Caſes the natural Rules, I ſay, to go by, cannot be framed upon any other Plan than upon the Conſideration of *common Good, as the principal End*, and thoſe Advantages which follow from the ballancing and poiſing of Powers; which Ballance or Poiſe, Nature either has eſtabliſhed, or the Civil Community has ſettled and adjuſted.

I cannot

I cannot, however, here, at the ſame time, deny, That the Force and Beauty of Order, that the operative Power of one general Scope or Deſign, as alſo, that the Neceſſity of a finite and of a ballanced Power, conſequently, amongſt all the ſingle Parts, for the more laſting Preſervation of every Syſtem: Who can deny, I ſay, that all theſe wiſe Deſigns either actually are, or in the general may be obſerved to take place, but more eſpecially in the Contexture and joining together of the moſt obvious Parts, as compacted and fitted either by Nature or Art? Obſervations of this Sort may be made, without the leaſt Knowledge or Skill either in pure or mixed Mathematics.

Such Obſervations as theſe work upon the Mind, juſt in like Manner as many Operations employed about the Number and Magnitude of Things, which are underſtood without Arithmetic and Geometry, or any other Aſſiſtance than an habitual Familiarity with the Things themſelves thus computed and acquired, without either Study or Literature.

Now, notwithſtanding all that Diſcernment into Nature which may poſſibly be acquired by Obſervation and Habit only; yet I judge it neceſſary, in this our more thorough, deeper Examination into Cauſes (wherein we are very ſtrictly and accurately to inveſtigate this whole Subject) to take frequent Notice of thoſe Sciences, wherein theſe Motions are moſt diſtinctly and clearly explained, where they are explained under univerſal Propoſitions; that ſo, from the Perſpicuity and Abundance of Light which theſe Sciences afford, thoſe univocal Notions may, with leſs Difficulty, be transferred and applied to human Nature and the Concerns of it.

Thus, for Inſtance, we may uſually have Recourſe to the artificial Rules of Arithmetic and Geometry, whenever any Doubt or Scruple ariſes in the Mind about Objects, whoſe Number or Meaſure we have, by a natural Sagacity of our own merely, already computed: Or (ſuppoſing our Knowledge of ſuch Objects tolerably juſt) whenever we deſire to render our Ideas more compleat, perfect, clear, full, diſtinct, adequate. Upon this very Account therefore it is, that we choſe as an Inſtance or Example, fitted to our preſent Purpoſe, the Syſtem of the World.

Becauſe, *Firſt*, ſome general Notions, altho' ſomewhat confuſed, of this Syſtem, are always familiar to the Obſervation of every one: The human Obſervation, upon this Syſtem, ſuggeſts to the Minds of all ſome general Idea of the common Good, which, in our Syſtem of Morality, we call *the one, chief, principal End.* Mutual Help and Aſſiſtance, reciprocal Benevolence and Kindneſs, (the Sum and Subſtance of all Means neceſſary towards this principal End) are equally obvious to every human Underſtanding.

Secondly, Becauſe, from the general Motions of this ſtupendous Frame, and regular Courſe of Things, as from univerſal Cauſes, are deduced (by ſpeculative, learned Minds, and by them only) the natural Powers, the

Forces,

Forces, the Order, the Regularity, the Limits of all leſſer Motions. So that, in this Scrutiny and Search into Cauſes, the enquiring, inquiſitive Mind cannot (neither indeed ought it to) reſt ſatisfied, till it arrives at the Knowledge of ſuch created Cauſes as are truly principal Cauſes; and, which Cauſes will immediately demonſtrate to us the Being and Attributes of God, the one, ſupreme, original Cauſe of all.

The general Limits, however, hitherto delivered, will be fully ſufficient, whereby we can eaſily demonſtrate, That ſuch Powers and Forces, whether ſimple or compounded, and altho' extremely odd and unequal, are yet (notwithſtanding all ſuch apparent Irregularities) capable of being fitly and advantageouſly poiſed and ballanced with each other, as, in the whole Syſtem and Connexion of Things, to promote the Preſervation of the Whole. In all my Reaſonings and Concluſions I have induſtriouſly avoided any one particular Hypotheſis, relating to the univerſal Frame or Syſtem of Nature.

Firſt, Becauſe, the Analogy between the Methods and Cauſes which preſerve this corporeal, material World, and, conſequently, the whole human Species, does not extend itſelf, in any one Hypotheſis, to all poſſible Circumſtances; it being, likewiſe, no ways neceſſary that the Mind ſhould learn any material Point of public Advantage from any one Hypotheſis.

Sir Iſaac Newton's mathematical Principles of natural Philoſophy, ſeems beſt fitted to our Author's Scheme of Morality.

And, *Secondly*, becauſe all thoſe Propoſitions which I have hitherto advanced are ſo manifeſtly true, that they cannot but be admitted into every Hypotheſis.

See Prologomena, Sect. 29.

And, *Laſtly*, becauſe to ſearch any deeper, or to add any Thing in ſpeculative Reaſoning, is not neceſſary for Perſons fond of mathematical Philoſophy: And as to all Perſons leſs ſpeculative, any thing more muſt appear, not only too laborious and troubleſome, but alſo, to the laſt Degree, idle and impertinent.

SECT. XVII.

(1) FROM the general Nature, then, of Matter and Motion it appears, that the Power, the Neceſſity of ſubſerving and miniſtring to the Motions of other innumerable Bodies, muſt exiſt in all Bodies ſo long as they continue in Motion. The ſame Power and Neceſſity are likewiſe, as we have proved, diſcovered in human Bodies.

(1) *From the general Nature, then, of Matter and Motion.*] From the general Laws of Matter and Motion (which univerſally exiſt in all phyſical or natural Bodies) we find that their neceſſary Operations and powerful Efficacies are employed in aiding aſſiſting the Capacities and Powers of other innumerable Bodies; and yet, at the ſame time, that each perſeveres and continues in that Motion, properly and reſpectively beſt adapted to itſelf.

Theſe Arguments carry in them ſo univerſal a Perſwaſion, as muſt lead all Mankind into a ſuitable Practice; into a Practice conformable to ſo much Perſwaſion, and adequate to ſuch full Demonſtration.

But—if to theſe Arguments we ſubjoin thoſe ſpecific Differences, which diſtinguiſh animal Bodies from all other natural Bodies, they muſt ſtill much more powerfully perſwade and excite in us a Motive operative enough to elicit our whole Induſtry and Concern for Animals of our own Species, ſo as to afford them all Means of Aſſiſtance in our Power, even to the laying aſide almoſt all Sorts of Regard or Care for all other, either natural or animal, Bodies whatſoever.

2. The Properties of an human Body as it is an animated Body.

Second Head. Concerning ſuch Properties as inhere in an human Body, as it is an animated Body, endowed with Senſes like unto other Animals.

We come now to ſettle the Diſtinction between an animate and an inanimate Body, *i. e.* a Body merely natural.

The Diſtinction between animal Bodies and natural Bodies.

The Nature of animal Bodies is diſtinguiſhed from that of the natural Bodies, by the Structure and Temperature of their Parts, and by ſuch a Formation of their Organs as are fitted for Nouriſhment, or Preſervation of the Individual, the Generation or Propagation of the Species, Senſation, Imagination, the Affections, and ſpontaneous or voluntary Motions: And it is, indeed, generally agreed on all Hands, that, by ſuch Powers and Acts as theſe, all the ſeveral Species of Animals do endeavour after their own Preſervation, Perfection or Happineſs, and for as long a Time as is limited and preſcribed by theſe univerſal Cauſes which regulate this World. Neither is it, indeed, a difficult Taſk to explain, in a tolerable Manner, the Efficacy, Power and Cauſes of ſo univerſal an Endeavour, from thoſe Obſervations and Diſcoveries which have been made in Anatomy and Phyſic, concerning the Circulation of the Blood, and the other beneficial Animal Juices; concerning the diffuſive branching out of Nerves thro' the whole animal Body; together with thoſe Concluſions which Phyſiologiſts and Naturaliſts have from hence deduced, concerning the Cauſes of Hunger, Thirſt and muſcular Motion.

But—ſince theſe Diſcoveries are ſo univerſally known and agreed upon, it would not anſwer our Deſign to dwell any longer upon them; only ſo far as this, That from Principles allowed and taken for granted, we may draw ſuch Concluſions as will anſwer our preſent Argument and Deſign.

From the Conſtitution of Things, in a State of Nature, there ariſe ſome certain Characteriſtics, Marks and Tokens, which diſcover to us, that private and public Happineſs are inſeparable.

From that radical, inherent Conſtitution of Animals, whereby they are prompted, by their beſt Endeavours, to preſerve themſelves, there are particularly, in the *firſt* Place, clear, manifeſt Marks and Tokens repreſented to us, declaring, that ſuch Actions of Animals, as are innocent and harmleſs to thoſe of their own Species, are both beneficent to their own Safety, and alſo neceſſary to the moſt perfect State of Happineſs.—And —in a Word, *Secondly*, That, from the Co-operation and Concurrence of the ſame internal Cauſes (*i. e.* of the ſame radical, inherent Conſtitution in Animals) they unavoidably make theſe Diſcoveries, obſerve theſe Marks

and

and Tokens, and treasure them up in the Memory. The first of these two comprehends, in few Words, the Sense or Meaning, and the Sanction also, of the Laws of Nature. The second regards their Promulgation, or the Manner how these natural Laws are discovered to us. We shall explain them more in their Order.

We are therefore, first, to take Notice, That the Body, with the Size of all Animals respectively, is circumscribed within very narrow Limits; and that the time of their Preservation (*i. e.* of their Duration and Continuance here) is very short. And therefore from hence it is, to a Demonstration, evident, that each individual Animal has need of but very few Things to render Life comfortable; and, even upon the Supposition that many Things are, in some sort, necessary to concur and unite in preserving each, yet such many Things are no other than such as may be communicated and serviceable to many, at one and the same time. And consequently from hence it is, that in a State truly natural, each Animal, separately and singly, is prompted and urged on to desire only few Things for himself; and then, when once his own frugal Nature is moderately satisfied, he is led by as natural a Desire to covet all such Things in common with others, which imply and carry, in their own Nature, an Use common to all; and such are the Enjoyments, in common, of Air, Light, *&c.*

The first Characteristic or Mark is, that the Wants of each Individual, from his Nature, Frame and Constitution, are very few.

We may here also add, That the same outward Surface of Skin, which in each Animal confines the Circulation of Blood within its own proper Channel, and, of Consequence, prevents the Extravasency and Effusion of it, does, by the same Efficacy of Power, fix and limit Bounds to *these Necessities* which urge and press each Animal to secure the Means of Self-preservation. For, all the necessary Wants of the animal Oeconomy are contained within the Circumference of a Circle described by the Blood's Motion in each Individual: The few Necessaries, therefore, which prove sufficient to regulate this vital Blood (the Source of all animal Fluids) prove sufficient to the Preservation of Life, Health and natural Strength. The very same small Quantity of Juice, which twitches the Stomach and Jaws of an hungry Animal, of course raises the Appetite of Hunger or Thirst; and, consequently, no great Quantity, either of Meat or Drink, is required to blunt the Edge entirely of every such Appetite.

Lastly, The Capacity and Contents of those Vessels themselves, in which the Aliments are macerated, ground small, and fermented; the Capacities and Contents of those Vessels which prepare and convey the Chyle to the *Receptaculum Chyli*, and up the Thoracic Duct; and the Capacities and Contents of those Arteries and Veins which receive this Chyle, when once turned into Blood, are all so compleatly comprehended in each Individual, within such narrow Bounds and Limits, that from such evident Facts no Animal, no not even a Brute Animal, in my Opinion, could fall into so gross a Blunder as that of Mr. *Hobbes*, wherein he pronounces all Things necessary to the Self-preservation of each Individual. From these Premisses,

miſſes, therefore, this Concluſion evidently follows, which Concluſion I ſhall eſtabliſh as the firſt Criterion or Mark whereby to judge concerning Benevolence, and a limited Uſe of Things, *viz. That the natural Structure and Make of the inward Parts of all animal Bodies, inform us how neceſſary to the Preſervation of each, and all, it is, that few Things only ſuffice Hunger, Thirſt, and guard againſt the Inclemencies of Weather.* And conſequently, *That all the Neceſſaries and Comforts remaining over and above (of which our fruitful Parent, Mother-Earth, produces ſuch Abundance) muſt be freely left to all other Animals who have Occaſion and Uſe for them.*

After this Manner, then, beyond all Queſtion, it is, (the Quantity or Size of each animal Body being thus naturally limited) that the Appetites of each are as naturally limited in their Deſires and Searches after few Things only, as neceſſary to Self, leaving all that remains over and above to the Uſe of others.

From whence there naturally ariſes a Diviſion, in ſome ſort, of Things amongſt various Animals; and in which ſeparate Diviſion is laid the Foundation of Peace, Harmony, Agreement, Unity, and of that mutual, reciprocal Benevolence which is the Subject of my preſent Enquiry.

Now, for the very ſame Reaſon that this φιλαυτια, or Self-love, becomes a Principle natural and innate to the Animal Creation (which Principle we have juſt now demonſtrated to be circumſcribed and limited within certain Bounds) and is ſufficiently gratified, there cannot poſſibly be any Motive why the Preſervation of others ſhould be oppoſed, or, why the leaſt Hindrance ſhould be offered againſt their free Enjoyment of ſuch Things. Nay—even why they ſhould be denied Help and Aſſiſtance, but more eſpecially, if ſuch Help and Aſſiſtance are, for the preſent, uſeleſs to the Individual itſelf.

But the Caſe, on the contrary, muſt be ſo far otherwiſe, namely, that the Animal Creation will be diſpoſed and inclined to afford Help and Aſſiſtance to each other, whether, from the Delight and Pleaſure (altho' not perhaps over-great in Brutes) which they feel from the Society of others; or, whether, from the preſent Enjoyment which they reap and perceive in the actual Performance of ſuch good Offices; or, whether, from an Expectation of the like Aſſiſtance and Help which they themſelves hope, and which, in all Probability, will be amply recompenced upon future Occaſions.

The whole Animal Creation muſt, in my Opinion, be ſenſible of ſuch Impreſſions as theſe; and Mankind, I am ſure, cannot be ignorant, That when once the Neceſſaries of Life are ſufficiently ſecured, no one remaining Conſideration can prove more truly advantageous to Each and All, than a Tranquillity, a peaceable Society with all Animals of the ſame Species or Kind; which peaceable State, even amongſt ſuch Animals themſelves, can be procured and preſerved ſecure by *Benevolence* only.

SECT. XVIII.

THE ſecond Criterion, or Mark, whereby we are to judge concerning theſe univerſal, benevolent Affections, ſhall be drawn from the Effects and Operations of Senſe, Imagination and Memory, as employed and exerciſed towards Animals of the ſame Species.

The ſecond Characteriſtic or Mark is drawn from the Effects and Operations of Senſe, Imagination and Memory, as they are exerciſed towards Animals of the ſame Species.

For, ſince Impreſſions, made by outward Objects upon their Senſes, ſhew that Animals of the ſame Kind partake of a Nature very ſimilar, and much alike; theſe ſame Impreſſions immediately paſſing into the Brain (where they become Images in the Imagination) diſpoſe and influence ſuch Animals in general, to cheriſh Affections for their own Species, ſimilar and much alike to ſuch Affections, as, from the very ſame Conſtitution of Nature, they cheriſh for themſelves.

Animals of the ſame Species partake of a Nature very ſimilar, and much alike.

Here, however, by the Bye, I ſhall (becauſe not very material to my preſent Argument) induſtriouſly avoid all Controverſy about the Knowledge of Brutes, let the Degrees of it, more or leſs, be what they will.

Neither, in the next Place, ſhall I ſay any thing concerning the Manner how their Paſſions and Affections are moved by the Imagination.—Thus much only I ſhall take here for granted, *Firſt*, That their Imaginations put their Paſſions and Affections in Motion, and upon Action. And, *Secondly*, That a ſimilar Imagination really does (ſo far as it is ſimilar or alike) excite the like Paſſions and Affections in them.

The ſecond of theſe two Poſitions is only a natural Conſequence of the firſt; for, Cauſes being ſimilar, alike, or the ſame, the Effects muſt be ſo too.

All that I mean to collect from hence is only this; That a remarkable, well-known Similitude of Nature greatly contributes towards the exciting and raiſing up a reciprocal Benevolence and Affection between Beings of a ſimilar Nature: Provided always, that, there be not, at the ſame Time, annexed ſome prevailing Diſſimilitude, or Repugnancy, which domineers, ſo powerfully, as to create Averſion, Hatred or Diſlike.

From hence it always comes to paſs, that Animals cannot poſſibly avoid remembring thoſe of their own Species, whilſt they are able to carry any Remembrance of themſelves; for, Animals ſimilar, of a like Nature (ſo far as they are alike) are repreſented under the ſame Image. They neceſſarily know alſo, that thoſe of their own Species are urged by the ſame Uneaſineſs of Hunger and Thirſt: That they, conſequently, are ſtimulated and rouſed by theſe acute Uneaſineſſes to procure Food for themſelves: That a grateful Senſation muſt, of courſe, be raiſed in them, either, when they are admitted to the free Uſe of Objects ſuited to their Wants; or, when they are aſſiſted by their Fellow-creatures and others, in procuring ſuch Objects of Gratification.

Since therefore, in all Animates of the ſame Species, the ſame Images conſtantly and invariably are impreſſed upon them concerning their own Kind, and always take place: And, ſince Affections (*i. e.* ſome certain Efforts of Love and Benevolence) do neceſſarily, from the very Being and Condition of their Nature, ariſe; it muſt follow, that, in Proportion as the natural Conſtitution or Frame of ſuch Animals is thwarted, in Proportion as Attempts, either thro' Sloth or Indulgence, or any violent Appetites and Paſſions, are oppoſed to theſe Efforts; juſt, in the ſame Proportion, does the Caſe hold, and which all muſt imagine to be as the Caſe with a Dog, who in a diſtempered, præternatural ill Habit of Body, poſſeſſed with Fury and Madneſs, is provoked, in an odd, unuſual Way, to bite whatſoever Dogs happen to be near him.

Neither can I, in Truth and Reality, ſee any Reaſon why all theſe Paſſions and Affections which remarkably diſturb the natural State of any particular Animal, ſo as to drive him headlong upon Acts evidently deſtructive to others of the ſame Species, ſuch as Malevolence, Envy, over-violent Anger, *&c.* No Reaſon, I ſay, can be aſſigned, why all ſuch turbulent, uneaſy Paſſions ſhould not be looked upon as an ill Habit of Blood, or of Brain perhaps; and which, in ſome Degree, is allied to the wild Fury of a mad Dog. They, who are any ways thus affected, betray manifeſt Symptoms of their Diſorders, ſuch as, the overflowing of the Gall, a dangerous Efferveſcence or boiling of the Blood, a jaundiced Liver, paralytic, nervous Tremblings, and other Symptoms of Malady, ſo well known to Perſons ſkilled in Phyſic and the Animal Oeconomy.

But, not only a wrathful Madneſs againſt thoſe of the ſame Species, is a diſtempered Affection, an unnatural Paſſion; but alſo, too daſtardly a Dread, too cowardly a Fear of the Species is not leſs unnatural; it being quite contrary to the natural, uſual Behaviour of Animals, I mean of the ſame Species towards each other; contrary to that Behaviour which ariſes from a ſound, healthy Habit of Body: Such a fearful Horror as this, like malignant Diſeaſes, is quite deſtructive of Self-preſervation; by driving the Individuals affected by it to Melancholy, to Solitude, broken Reſt, Interruptions and Startings in Sleep, irregular Watchings, and all the other Symptoms of an over-ruling Deſpair; from ſuch a State as this an untimely Death muſt quickly enſue. Such a frighted Condition as this admits neither of Bound nor End; becauſe it is deeply laid in a diſtempered Imagination and falſe Opinion, that there is radically and neceſſarily implanted in all Animals, of whatſoever Species or Kind, a Propenſity, a Tendency, a Will, an Inclination, a Deſire of injuring and waging War upon each other, and, in ſhort, of deſtroying All.

The Condition of ſuch miſerable Creatures (and ſuch is the Condition which Mr. *Hobbes*, in a State of Nature, has deviſed for Man) exactly reſembles the deplorable Circumſtances of Perſons labouring under an Hidrophobeia, who have a mortal Antipathy againſt Water, and all Kinds of Fluids,

Fluids, altho' their ſeveral Uſes are ſo abſolutely neceſſary to preſerve Life; and yet, at ſome times it may accidentally ſo happen, that Water and Fluids prove hurtful to the Conſtitution of Animals.

Now, as ſuch an Opinion as this does not ariſe from the Nature of Water, but from an Imagination diſturbed and diſordered by the Bite of a mad Dog, ſo likewiſe does it proceed from ſome irregular Temperature in the Imagination and Brain, that any one Individual is under ſuch Horror and Dread of Evil from all thoſe of his own Species. Whereas, in Truth and Reality, nothing is more delightful to Animals of a ſound Imagination and Brain than Society.

For, it is a Truth too well known to need any Proof, That Animals of the ſame Species, if by Accident it ſo happens that they are ſeparated, whenever afterwards they eſpy each other, even at a great Diſtance, rejoice, ſeem delighted, leap for Joy, and are eager to meet; they freely eat, drink, and play together, rarely, if ever, fight; and ſhould it now and then ſo happen that they do, immediately after the Victory, which is generally gained without Blood, they will, with all Contentment and Joy imaginable, aſſociate again and keep together.

Now, ſince it is manifeſt, that the Cauſes of ſuch comfortable Society and friendly Intercourſe (ſo radically inherent in the Brute Creation) are thus plainly neceſſary; and that theſe Cauſes are abſolutely no other Cauſes, than thoſe Cauſes by which their Blood, Spirits, Brain, Nerves, *&c.* are preſerved in a State of Health:——It therefore, from hence, demonſtrably follows, That the private Security of the Individuals cannot poſſibly, by any Force whatſoever, be ſeparated from that ſtrong, natural Propenſity towards a friendly Communication, which they all have with their own Like.——Nay——the Caſe is ſo far from being any other than what is here ſtated, that the very private Security, even of Each, is, with all the Eaſe imaginable, and in the moſt natural Manner, preſerved by ſuch a ſocial Communication and Intercourſe. And this was the Concluſion which I propoſed to demonſtrate from this ſecond Criterion, or Mark: A Mark of Diſtinction common to all the Species of Animals in general, and, by Conſequence, to that of Man.

SECT. XIX.

The third Characteriſtic or Mark is drawn from the Pleaſure and Delight of thoſe Affections which are exerciſed and employed upon ſuch a Good as is univerſal and common to many.

THE third Criterion, or Mark, whereby we determine the Reality of theſe univerſal, benevolent Affections, bears a near Relation to the ſecond; and it is ſuch a Characteriſtic as is drawn from the Pleaſure and Delight of thoſe Affections which are exerciſed and employed about ſuch a Good as is univerſal and common to many.

This third Characteriſtic, or Mark, for this Reaſon, I ſay, bears a near Relation to the ſecond; becauſe the Riſe and Origin of theſe Affecti-

ons,

ons, with all their Energies and Powers of Operation, entirely depend upon the Imagination.

Now, it is a Truth as clear and evident as poſſible to Phyſiologiſts, and the Enquirers into Nature, That in Love, Deſire, Hope, Joy (but more eſpecially when theſe Paſſions are exerciſed about any great Good) that the Motion of the Blood and Heart, ſo neceſſary to animal Life, is greatly helped and promoted; in ſo much that the Arteries and Veins become repleniſhed with a much more complacent, and yet with a much quicker, flow of Blood; the animal Spirits are enlivened; the whole Circulation of the ſeveral Juices alſo (and by Conſequence all the Offices in the animal Oeconomy) muſt be much more readily performed.

Neither is it a Truth leſs evident, That ſuch a Good as is well known to extend its general Influence to the greateſt Number imaginable (in which Calculation the individual Animal we are now ſpeaking of is comprehended) muſt, upon this very Account, appear the greateſt.

From hence neceſſarily it is, that the very ſame Affections which delight all Animals of the ſame Species, do moſt remarkably delight the Individual itſelf: And upon this very Account it is that each, in the very Eſſence of his own Nature, feels ſuch an inward, pleaſing Senſation.

From hence it is, that each Individual cannot but cheriſh a ſtrong Propenſity towards thoſe Affections, becauſe remarkably ſerviceable in the grand Article of Self-preſervation; and then the natural Conſequence is, that Reward which is naturally annexed to thoſe Affections.

But—I juſt now ſaid, That every Animal perceives the pleaſing Effect, the Delight of ſuch Paſſions as theſe; and yet, at the ſame time, we muſt acknowledge, that the Manner how theſe Paſſions produce ſo general a Delight, remains a Secret quite concealed from Perſons unſkilled in Philoſophical Enquiries; and, of Courſe, muſt remain a Secret more deeply concealed from Brutes. It is, however, ſufficient, as to the Source and Origin of theſe natural Propenſities which I have juſt now mentioned, that all Animals feel their Influence and perceive their Effects.

Now, on the contrary, in Hatred, Envy, Fear, Sorrow; the Motion of the Blood is obſtructed; the Heart is ſo contracted and preſſed that the Syſtole of it, with great Difficulty, drives the Blood forward; from whence the human Countenance not only turns very pale, but innumerable other Diſorders alſo follow, particularly in the Offices of the Brain, Nerves and animal Spirits; ſuch Diſorders as are common to ſplenetic, melancholy People.

But as this is a Subject proper for the Conſideration of Phyſicians, I ſhall the more willingly refer it to the Sons of that Faculty, who ſo ſtudiouſly employ their whole Time in improving and adorning the Science of Phyſic with the moſt curious, moſt valuable, nobleſt Inventions, in order to preſerve the Life and Health of Mankind.

I ſhall

I ſhall here, however, take the Liberty to tranſcribe only one very remarkable Paſſage from the great Mr. *William Harvey*'s *Anatomical Exercitations, concerning the Circulation of the Blood*; and which illuſtrates, in a moſt glorious Inſtance, the Doctrine I am now maintaining. Mr. *Harvey*'s Relation, in his own Words, is as follows, Edit. Cantab. Page 89. (1)

" Virum cordatum novi, qui, pro irâ & indignitate ob acceptam injuriam a potentiore & illatam contumeliam, adeo æſtuans exardeſcebat, ut invidia & odio indies, ob inhibitam vindictam auctis, & animi paſſione vehemente, quâ maximè exulceratus erat, nemini patefactâ, tandem in mirum morbi genus incidit, ſaltèm, atque oppreſſione & dolore cordis & pectoris miſerè conflictebatur; ut nullis adhibitis ex peritiſſimorum auxiliis ſufficientibus, in *ſcorbuticam* tandèm, poſt aliquot annos, *Cachexiam* incidens, contabuit & moritur: huic tantùm modò aliquid ſolaminis accidit, quoties & quamdiu, tota pectoris regio comprimebatur: huic quoque arteriæ jugulares pollicis magnitudine diſtentæ tanquam utravis eſſet *Aorta*, aut arteria magna decendens, altè, & vehementèr pulſabant, & tanquam (2) *Aneuryſmata*, duo oblonga apparebant in cadavere

(1) I find this ſame Relation tranſlated into *Engliſh*, and told in the following Manner. *See* Harvey's Anatomical Exercitations, *publiſhed at* London *in the Year* 1653, *by Doctor* Zacharie Wood, *Phyſician at* Rotterdam, *and Doctor* James De Back, *Phyſician in ordinary to the Town of* Rotterdam, *Exercitation concerning the Circulation of the Blood*, Page 63. I knew another ſtout Man who did ſo boil with Rage, becauſe he had ſuffered an Injury and received an Affront from one much more powerful than himſelf, that his Anger and Hatred being increaſed every Day (by reaſon he could not be revenged) and diſcovering the Paſſion of his Mind to no body, which was ſo exulcerated within him, at laſt he fell into a ſtrange ſort of a Diſeaſe, and was tortured and miſerably tormented with great Oppreſſion and Pain in his Heart and Breaſt, ſo that the moſt ſkilful Phyſicians Preſcriptions doing no Good upon him, at laſt, after ſome Years, he fell ſick of the ſcorbutic Diſeaſe, pined away and died.

This Man only found Eaſe as often as his Breaſt was preſſed down by a ſtrong Man, and was thumped and beaten down, as they do when they mould Bread: His Friends thought he was bewitched or poſſeſſed with the Devil.

He likewiſe had his jugular Arteries diſtended about the greatneſs of one's Thumb, as if either of them had been the Aorta itſelf, or the Arteria magna in its Deſcent, and did beat vehemently, and were to the View like two long Aneuryſms; which cauſed us to try Blood-letting in his Temples, but that gave him no Eaſe: In his Corps I found the Heart and the Aorta ſo diſtended and full of Blood, that the Bigneſs of his Heart and the Concavities of the Ventricles were equal in Bigneſs to that of an Ox. So great is the Strength of the Blood when it is ſhut up, and ſo vaſt its Force.

(2) *Aneuryſmata.*] Aneuryſms, Ἀνεύρυσμα, *Dilatatio*, a Dilatation, an Expanſion, is derived from the *Greek* Verb Ἀνευρύνω, *dilato*, to dilate to expand.

Aneuryſm, as it ſignifies a Dilatation in the Animal Oeconomy, is a ſoft, throbbing, ruddy Tumour, occaſioned by the Dilatation, *i. e.* preternatural Diſtention, and ſometimes by the Rupture of an Artery.

Aneuryſms uſually proceed from an Artery being accidentally cut or pricked in Bleeding; or from ſome preternatural Diſtention; or from a Corroſion of its Coats.

1. If an Artery happens to be cut, the Blood guſhes out impetuouſly, and by Starts; is not eaſily ſtopped.——An Inflammation, a Diſcolouration and a Tumour of the Part enſues, with an Inability to move the Part.

2. When a Corroſion in the Coats of an Artery happens, the Symptoms are much the ſame, only leſs violent.

If

" vere diſſecto. Inveni cor, & aortam adeô diſtenta, & ſanguine repleta, " ut cordis moles, & ventriculorum cavitales, bovini cordis magnitudinem " adæquabant." Thus far Dr. *William Harvey*.

From this Account we may obſerve, That the Motion of the Blood is obſtructed by ſuch violent Paſſions and Affections as theſe.

If the Blood ceaſes to flow from a wounded Artery, and pour itſelf between the Interſtices of the Muſcles, Recourſe is had to manual Operation; which being neglected, the Extirpation of the Limb frequently becomes unavoidable.

An Aneuryſm from a Diſtention of the Canal, is ſeldom fatal, though reckoned, when large, incurable; the chief Inconveniencies are the Magnitude of the Tumour, and the Pulſation.

M. *Littre* gives us the Hiſtory of an Aneuryſma of this Kind in the Aorta; the Cauſe whereof he attributes to an extraordinary Diminution of the Cavity of the axillary and ſubclavian Arteries. *Hiſt. del. Acad. R. An.* 1712.——Another Hiſtory of another Aneuryſma of the ſame Part, we have by Mr. *Lafage*, in the *Philoſophical Tranſactions*; it was occaſioned by ſome violent Shocks the Patient received on the Breaſt, which threw him into ſpitting of Blood, and ſoon after formed the Tumour whereof he died: Upon Diſſection, the Aneuryſma was found ſo big, that it filled the whole Cavity of the Thorax on the right Side. Numb. 265. *See* Chambers's *Dictionary*, *under* Aneuryſm.

The great *Harvey* (ſays a very ingenious and well-experienced Phyſician of *Dublin*, Doctor *John Fergus*) relates a Story of one of his Acquaintance, a Man of Senſe, that had received a groſs Injury from a Perſon in high Rank, and was ſo galled on account of the Contumely, and his Incapacity and Thirſt of Revenge, that the daily Increaſe of his Rage and Hatred, and his never giving them Vent, brought him at laſt into a ſtrange and obſtinate Diſorder. He was tormented with a prodigious Oppreſſion and Pain at the Heart and Breaſt, without any the leaſt Abatement, but while the whole Region of his Breaſt was preſſed, and, as it were, kneaded and wrought together, with all the Force of a ſtrong Man.

His Friends thought him bewitched, or poſſeſſed with an evil ſpirit.

The jugular Arteries were expanded to the Thickneſs of a Man's Thumb, and had, each of them, like the Aorta, a deep and ſtrong Pulſe, and made two oblong Aneuryſms.

The temporal Artery was opened to no manner of Purpoſe.

All other Applications, of the moſt celebrated Phyſicians, availed as little. He languiſhed miſerably till, in few Years, a ſcorbutic Cachexy waſted him to Death.

Upon opening the Body, the Heart and great Artery were ſo diſtended and crammed with Blood, that the Size of the Heart and Expanſion of its Ventricles equalled thoſe of an Ox.

This extraordinary Phænomenon was owing to the frequent Succeſſion of two miſchievous Paſſions, *viz.* Anger and Grief: Anger, on account of the Injury done him; and Grief for his Inability to redreſs it.

In Anger, the Motion of the Heart is hurried, the Blood boils, the Brain is crouded, Thoughts, Words and Actions are confuſed; and, if any thing lurked in the Body or Mind, it is ſet to work.

Grief produces the Reverſe in every Reſpect: The Syſtole of the Heart is impeded; the Outlets from it are contracted, and the Motion of the Blood languiſhes; the Viſage drops, the Voice trembles, and the Limbs fail.

As the Changes were from one Extreme to another, and each violent and often returning, one of two Things muſt have happened; Either,

Firſt, The burſting of ſome of the ſmall Veſſels, in Conſequence of the ſudden Vehemence of the Blood's Motion during his Fits of Anger. Or,

Secondly, Its Accumulation in the larger Veſſels during the Increaſe of the Reaction in his Fits of Grief; but Grief, from his Deſpair of Revenge, muſt have kept him longer in the laſt. Conſequently the large Veſſels, at long run, being forced to give way, were dilated into Aneuryſms: The Heart, by reaſon of its being employed but imperfectly, was, by Degrees, ſtuffed far beyond its natural Dimenſions. Thus far Dr. *John Fergus*.

Now,

Now, theſe Obſtructions, as the Fact appears, are cauſed in the minute Ramifications of the Arteries, interſperſed thro' the Brain; from whence in the Heart, and conſequently in the whole animal Oeconomy, proceed very malignant Diſorders; and they prove ſuch melancholy Symptoms of Diſeaſes as muſt endanger Life itſelf; that Life in common to Man with the reſt of the animal Creation.

Man, then, may, upon the whole, learn from his own animal Nature, and from the Nature of his Paſſions, a very uſeful Leſſon; *To cheriſh, indulge and exerciſe a Benevolence, as much as in us lies, an univerſal Benevolence towards ALL: Seeing that a rancorous, raging Hatred, furiouſly kindled againſt one ſingle Man only, brought ſuch terrible Calamities upon the Man-hater.*

SECT. XX.

A FOURTH Characteriſtic, or Mark to the ſame Purpoſe, is drawn from this Argument, That Animals, by Vertue of the ſame Cauſes which preſerve the Individual, are, by a ſtrong Propenſity, inclined to propagate their Species; ſo that theſe two Kinds of Inſtinct, or Deſire, are, by a very natural Connexion, linked together: And therefore, from hence it is that Animals of the ſame Species, but of different Sexes, are, by ſo very intenſe a Love and intimate Affection, joined together, as to propagate their own Species, which they love and cheriſh as tenderly as they do their own Fleſh and Blood. And theſe natural Propenſities always operate with an uniform Force and Direction, unleſs ſome particular, uncommon Accident happens, now and then, to alter their Tendency and give them a wrong Byaſs: Such particular, extraordinary Caſes as theſe, however, which ſo rarely happen, never ought to be brought into general Reaſoning, but more eſpecially when the ſtated, ſettled Courſe of Nature is to be examined into and determined.

The fourth Characteriſtic, or Mark, is, that Animals by Vertue of the ſame Cauſes which preſerve the Individual, are, by an equally ſtrong Propenſity, inclined to propagate, continue, love and cheriſh their Species.

In the Nature of Animals, the Propagation of the Species, and that Στοργη (or that radical, inherent Affection, ſo ſtrongly operating in them, tenderly and fondly to rear and nouriſh their Young) are moſt intimately connected and blended together: Becauſe, in ſome Sort, the Preſervation of a Thing is no other than a continual Generation of it: For the ſame natural Cauſes which prompt and excite an Animal to the one, raiſe as ſtrong a Propenſity, as prone a Tendency in him to the other.

Now, it is a clear Caſe, that the Young and Tender cannot be preſerved and reared, unleſs Animals of the ſame Species cultivate Peace and Good-will with one another. And, conſequently, they are as naturally deſirous, that ſuch a Peace, ſuch a Good-will ſhould be no leſs durable, no leſs laſting, than they are that their Young ſhould be preſerved, and continue in Being.

Now in ſuch a Benevolence or Good-will as this, in a Benevolence ſo extenſive and durable, conſiſts the ſtudious Concern, *about the common Good of the whole Species.*——Namely,——ſuch a Good as Animals, in their natural Capacity, can arrive at: Which Capacity, if you except the Powers of Man, is, to the laſt Degree, ſtupid, as well as utterly careleſs and improvident alſo. That faint Appearance, however, of Sagacity, in which Animals of all Kinds ſeem to exert ſome Ability, is ſufficient to produce a Concern, a Care, both for themſelves and their Young, by exerciſing ſome ſort of Benevolence towards thoſe of their own Kind.—— Since, then, we have given an Hint, That a natural Love for their Young ariſes, in Animals, from the ſame Cauſes which raiſe a Propenſity, a Tendency, an Inclination in them to propagate their Species; we are, in the next Place, to ſhew, That this Propenſity is natural, is radically inherent in them, even when they are arrived at the Ακμη, the full Bloom and Vigour of their Abilities: And, that the Propenſity flows from the very ſame Cauſes, which are ſo neceſſary to the Preſervation and full Health of the Individuals themſelves.

From hence it follows, That Animals, the very Moment they conſult and provide for their own Preſervation and Safety, at the very ſame Moment they conſult and provide for the Continuance of their Species; and, in the neceſſary Conſequences of Things, they, at the very ſame Moment, promote the Good and Happineſs of ALL.

And, theſe Truths are clearly evident, from the Manner how the Young is, at firſt, formed and nouriſhed.

For, it is a Point of the moſt undoubted Certainty, That theſe very ſame Cauſes, which form originally the Parts neceſſary to the Nouriſhment of the Individual (as for Inſtance, the Ventricle of the Heart, the Heart itſelf, *&c.*) whether in the Womb, or the Egg, do, at the ſame time, form and produce all the ſpermatic Veſſels; the ſpecific, diſtinguiſhing Difference of Sexes, even in the firſt Rudiments, the Semina of Animals, as the great Doctor *Harvey* has judiciouſly obſerved, in his 69th Diſſertation, *De Generatione Animalium.*

One Part of the ſame, common nutritious Juice, diſpatched to the Blood, is employed in nouriſhing the Individual; and another Part is aſſimilated, and changed into Seed, for the Propagation of the Species.

The whole Circulation of the Blood, and all thoſe Supplies and Helps, which the Blood receives (as for Example, the muſcular Force of the Heart, the artificial Structure of Valves in the Blood-veſſels, by the one, ſelf-ſame Power of Operation) ſerve, at the ſame time, both to nouriſh the Individual; as alſo, to diſcharge that one Office, ſo very neceſſary to propagate the Species, when the Blood ſends into the ſpermatic Veſſels, that Subſtance out of which the Seed is elaborated, filtrated, ſecerned, ſecreted.

Whatſoever

Whatſoever Offices, in a Word, any of the Bowels; whatſoever Offices the other Parts of an Animal Body execute and diſcharge, in preſerving a right State of the Blood, as fitly contribute (from the Diſcharge of their ſeveral Functions) to the Life and Preſervation of the Individual, and as fitly, tho' perhaps more remotely, contribute to the Propagation of the Species: As fitly,—I ſay, help to propagate the Species; becauſe, it is too well known, even to univerſal Experience, that the Energy of Propagation is much enervated, retarded and obſtructed, from an irregular, bad State of Blood.

We might, indeed, upon this ſo copious and fruitful a Subject, largely expatiate, and run into a very ample Field; but, to avoid too tedious a Narrative, I choſe to leave the other uſeful Branches of Knowledge, relating to this Subject, to the further ſtudious Purſuits, and curious Enquiries, of Phyſiologiſts and Phyſicians;—Branches of Knowledge, which, from an Analogy of Reaſoning, may be applied to the important Purpoſes we have already ſuggeſted, as diſcoverable by clear Inveſtigations of Nature.

The one Obſervation which I ſhall further add here, is only this, That Animals, from the cleareſt Indications, are prompted, in the Manner I have deſcribed, *to the Love of a different Sex*; *to the Love of their Young*.—And, conſequently, that this ſo contracted a φιλαυτία, or Self-love, (which Mr. *Hobbes* and ſome other minute Philoſophers maintain) may be thrown off:—And when this poor Narrowneſs of Soul is once baniſhed, we may, by an eaſy Tranſition, be led to love ſome, afterwards more, and ſo on, by a continual Progreſs, to love many; till at laſt, from an Analogy, a Similitude of Nature, our Benevolence, our Love, may grow ſo general, ſo extenſive, as to comprehend the whole Species. And, ſince it is radically implanted, in the common Nature of all Animals (which is confirmed from daily Experience) it is alſo in Man, That, from the Moment they commence Parents, they naturally grow fond of Peace and Tranquillity; —and—that—all their Propenſities towards the Propagation of Children, as naturally diſpoſe their Minds to the Love of Peace.

We muſt not, however, here, paſs over in Silence, that common Refuge frequently uſed, and by many, to evade this, and the other Criteria drawn from the Propenſity of Nature,——namely, "That, altho', "from theſe Propenſities it may frequently ſo happen, that Multitudes at "once are benefited, yet, that all thoſe Propenſities, notwithſtanding, "proceed entirely from that Love, properly ſpeaking, which each Indi-"vidual has implanted in him, to gratify and pleaſe himſelf; and, of Con-"ſequence, that all Acts, flowing from this Motive, cannot have any "other End in View. And, therefore, that theſe Propenſities prove no-"thing more than mere φιλαυτία, or Self-love."

By way of Reply to this Objection, I anſwer,

Firſt, That it is clearly manifeſt, from what has been hitherto premiſed, that I have not drawn *the Diſcovery of the Law of Nature*, in purſuing the common Good, from that End which Animals propoſe to themſelves; for I aſſert nothing concerning their Intentions. *Secondly*, It cannot, however, in the ſecond Place, be proved, that Animals, in their free, voluntary Acts, whereby they really and truly promote the Good of others, as well as of themſelves, do not conſider and incline to both, with exactly the ſame View and Intention. It is, certainly, by far more probable, that they equally intend both Effects, ſince the Fact actually happens ſo, in all Caſes, where Mankind act with Deliberation and Deſign, namely—That they intend to produce all ſuch Effects of their own Acts, as ſuch Acts are naturally fitted and deſigned to produce, notwithſtanding that ſome of theſe Effects may carry a much ſtronger Influence over their Actions, than other ſome; and likewiſe, probably, may raiſe an higher Joy, a ſweeter Complacency in them, when even the Acts themſelves ceaſe and are at an End.

And, conſequently, ſuch Effects as free Agents intend to produce, may, with exact Juſtice and Propriety, be called *the End and Deſign of their Actions*.

Thirdly, It being, for the preſent, allowed, altho' not taken for granted, that Animals ſtudy and ſeek their own Preſervation and Happineſs only, as the principal Motive, the chief End; and, that they exerciſe Good-will and Benevolence, towards their own Kind, as being the Means naturally, and always neceſſary, to the End they propoſe.—Even upon this Suppoſition, it could, I ſay, be eaſily evinced, that Nature points out and dictates, *That a Good, common to the whole Kind or Species, muſt be promoted; and that, even upon this Footing, an Obligation, as equally binding and ſtrong, muſt ariſe (as to the Choice and Uſe of Means, ſo eſſentially neceſſary) as the Obligation to the End ſuppoſed could poſſibly be*, i. e. *Self-preſervation*.

And the Reaſon is ſelf-evident; becauſe the Obligation, to perform neceſſary Means, is as binding and ſtrong as the very End itſelf.—And—what is ſtill more—ſuch an Obligation as this, is, to the full, as binding and ſtrong as any Obligation can be, which ariſes from the Penalties of inſtituted Laws. For inſtituted Laws (by which I mean Laws of Civil Compact merely) cannot either threaten or inflict any Puniſhment ſeverer, and greater, than Death: And this Obligation, or Sanction, is, by far, the greateſt:—Nay, in Truth—it is the only, one, real Obligation, which they maintain, and contend for, who raiſe theſe Objections.

For this Reaſon, therefore, amongſt many others, Mr. *Hobbes* is quite miſtaken, who (in order to deſtroy the natural Obligation of promoting, with ſtudious Concern and Endeavours, *the Common Good*) attempts to account for and ſolve all thoſe natural Propenſities which carry and bear any Tendency this way, by Self-preſervation.

Some

Some Portions of Mr. *Hobbes*'s Reaſonings, to this Purpoſe, may be found in his Book *Concerning human Nature*, written in *Engliſh*, Chap. 9. Sections 10, 15, 16, 17. and the other Portions of like Argumentation, the Reader may, if he pleaſes, find in his Book *De Cive*, Chap. 1. Sect. 2.

Here then, worthy Reader, take a Specimen of this Gentleman along with you: Mr. *Hobbes*, for Inſtance, aſſerts, That not only the Deſire whereby Mankind is prompted and urged on to propagate the Species; but even that ΣΤΟΡΓΗ, or that radical, inherent Affection, whereby the Young (as ſoon as born) is taken up, tenderly nurſed and reared; and—that—not only all Kinds of Affection, howſoever, and towards whomſoever, exerciſed; but, even, all Compaſſion and Pity for the Afflicted and Diſtreſſed, alſo. Mr. *Hobbes*, I ſay, has the Confidence to affirm, That all theſe Deſires take their Riſe, either, *Firſt*, from ſome private Self-advantage which Animals, by theſe Impulſes of Appetite or Deſire, may procure: Or, *Secondly*, that they may, at leaſt, from hence, raiſe to their Imagination, mighty Thoughts of their own Abilities: Or, *Thirdly*, that they may cheriſh and indulge very favourable Opinions of themſelves. And—which—by the Bye—is the *Hobbian* Definition of Glory.

Whereas, in direct Contradiction to this Doctrine advanced by Mr. *Hobbes*, we may, moreover, here, alſo, further add, That the intrinſic, radical, inherent Force of theſe Affections, and the Effects of them (by which Effects others receive much more Advantage than the Agents themſelves) are clear and open Evidences to the contrary.—And—that—the very Animals themſelves, in whom theſe Affections vigorouſly operate, feel them by ſo lively and full a Senſation, that they cannot but deſign the Good of others, rather than their own.

If it, then, be once allowed, that theſe Affections have a neceſſary Exiſtence in Animals, where they reſide, in order to render themſelves happy by ſome certain Advantages: Nay—even by this imaginary Vain-glory—the Obligation ſtill, however, of performing Acts beneficial to others, muſt remain in full Force and Vertue——notwithſtanding that they themſelves may not ſo immediately ſtand in need of ſuch Benefits. For, if, according to Mr. *Hobbes*, ſuch Affections are natural and neceſſary, they muſt, of Conſequence, be, at all times, deſirable, and conſtant Motives to act.

Now, from the very Nature and Reaſon of Things, it cannot happen otherwiſe, but that Man muſt (as by the ſtrongeſt Ties of Obligation) be affected and influenced from the Hope of enjoying; and as powerfully influenced and affected with the Dread, the Fear, the Apprehenſion of loſing thoſe Bleſſings, in caſe ſuch Acts, as regard the Good of others, be neglected.—Nay—and even Mr. *Hobbes* himſelf acknowledges, that a natural Obligation is to take place, where the human Liberty is coerced and reſtrained, either by Hope or Fear.

I cannot,

I cannot, indeed, help, here, confeſſing, that this Reaſoning, in Confutation of Mr. *Hobbes* and his Followers Objections, appears to me demonſtrative and full.—And—as to the Nature of a moral Obligation, and wherein the Eſſence of ſuch an Obligation conſiſts, we have fully explained in another Part of this *Philoſophical Enquiry*. I ſhall therefore, only, here, obſerve thus much, namely, That, according to the true Rules for the Regulation of moral Behaviour, ſo poor a limited End, as *the Preſervation of one, ſingle, individual Man only*, is not to be regarded; but, that *the common Happineſs of all rational Agents* in general, is the ultimate End, the chief Deſign of all *ſound Morality*.

Whereas Mr. *Hobbes*, in flat Contradiction to all the Truths in Morals, lays down ſo minute, ſo low an End as *mere Self-preſervation*, for the Rule of all human Acts; and the only End, the only Deſign which he ſeems, in my Judgment, to have in view, is this, That each Individual might, and ought to, neglect all Acts whatſoever; to overlook and thwart all thoſe ſtrong Propenſities in human Nature (which ſubſerve, miniſter, and prove inſtrumental in promoting the Good of others) whenever, truly, he is pleaſed to take it into his Head to imagine, that theſe Acts and Propenſities might not anſwer and ſerve a preſent Turn and Purpoſe.—When, at the ſame time, it muſt, indeed, be allowed, that a ſtudious, active Concern for the public Good, fully expreſſed by outward, viſible, effective Acts, always proves ſome of (at leaſt, if not all) the Means neceſſary to the ultimate, beſt Happineſs of each, and every one, individual Man.

In a Word (not to dwell too long upon the Confutation of this Objection) it muſt be conſidered, that we have not formed our Judgment, nor taken our Criteria and Marks of Truth from thoſe voluntary Acts, which, in different Animals, aim at different Ends; nor from ſuch voluntary Acts, even in the ſame Animal, as are irregular, and which, at different times vary;—but we eſtabliſh our Judgment, and form our Sentiments, upon ſuch Acts and Propenſities as are evidently neceſſary, and which inhere in Animals entirely rude and ignorant: In Animals, oftentimes at great Enmity and Variance, there are Acts and Propenſities, as we have already mentioned in few Words, which immediately flow from the Structure, Make and Complexion of the Animal Body itſelf.

For, it is not either from Choice or Freedom in the Agent; neither is it from the Deſire of Self-preſervation; but it is from the natural Syſtole of the Heart, that the Blood is diſpatched into the ſpermatic Veſſels, and that the Seed is ſecreted from the Blood and fermented: From the ſame Cauſe, likewiſe, are raiſed up and kindled thoſe Titillations of Luſt, thoſe inbred and radical Propenſities and Deſires, of both propagating and preſerving our young Offſpring: For the ſame Source of Appetite produces both, *i. e.* Generation and Nutrition of the Offſpring.—As for Example, The Animal is primitively and originally formed out of the very ſame Maſs of Matter [with the Parents of it] and is, for ſome Time, nouriſhed and increaſed in this primitive

mitive State; it alſo grows and expands itſelf, in the Womb or the Egg: And yet theſe Effects are ſo produced, that, without any Knowledge of the generating Parents, how ſuch a Generation and Increaſe operate; and, notwithſtanding, that the generating Parents exert their united Vigour, in the Act of Generation, yet they are utterly ignorant, before the Birth, whether the Young be Male or Female; whether it receives Nouriſhment in at the Mouth, or Navel, or both; or whether it be inwardly nouriſhed, or no; and, laſtly, whether it lives at all, or no.

From hence, therefore, it is manifeſt, That neither in the Formation or Nutrition of the Fœtus not as yet produced to Light, are the Parents governed by any Knowledge of their own, which either directs, or even regards, the End or Effect produced:—Much leſs are they influenced to propagate their Species, from a longer Continuance of Life to themſelves, by this Method of Longævity: Becauſe the Conſtitution is rather weakened and impaired, than ſtrengthened and improved, by the frequently-repeated Acts of Generation; and therefore theſe Acts, and their Effects, are produced, without any View and Deſign in the Agents themſelves; and yet the Propenſities and Inclinations, to theſe Acts, ſtill, every Day, grow much more and more neceſſary.

For, in theſe Acts, Animals exactly reſemble Vegetables, who, altho' devoid of Animal-ſenſe, and who, altho' quite deſtitute of any View towards a deſigned End, yet they attract and ſuck in Nouriſhment, not only for their own Preſervation, but alſo for the Formation of Seed, in order to propagate their own Species. The Caſe in both is ſtrictly analogous; for, as in the Egg, not only the Subſtance of the Young is contained, but alſo, in the very ſame Egg, is contained the Aliment proper for Food, Nouriſhment, Nutrition, till it grows mature and ſtrong enough to break looſe, and ſo provide and cater for itſelf from abroad.—Juſt in the ſame Manner, alſo, in Vegetable-Seeds (beſides the ſmall, tender Buds, which are the firſt Rudiments, the Stamina of a future Plant) there is alſo contained a fit Subſtance; which, when once moiſtened, and, by a proper, genial Heat, ſtirred up into a juſt Degree of Fermentation, inſinuates itſelf into, and blends itſelf with, the tender Roots of the Seed, by which it is nouriſhed, till it arrives at ſo full a Portion of Strength, as to imbibe and ſuck in Nouriſhment from the Earth all around it.

In the Courſe of Animal-propagation according to Nature, the next Progreſs is; that as ſoon as the Fœtus appears, and is brought to Light, the generating Parents, perceiving an Animal of their own Species, of their own Fleſh and Blood, reſembling themſelves, and, by their own Energy of Propagation, generated and produced; the next Step, I ſay, is, that the Parents are, from an inward, radical Propenſity, unwilling that their Young be deſtroyed by any voluntary Commiſſion or Omiſſion; for the Truth, indeed of all theſe Aſſertions, they are fully evidenced by the moſt curious Phyſiologiſts and Enquirers into Nature.

And,

And, whoſoever is willing to have a more clear, a more diſtinct and fuller Inſight, into theſe truly noble Diſcoveries, may conſult our moſt deſervedly eminent Phyſicians and Anatomiſts, Perſons of no leſs Eminence than Dr. *Harvey De Generatione Animalium*, Dr. *Higmore De Generatione*, and Dr. *Needham* in that elaborate Treatiſe of his, *De Formato Fœtu*.

Harvey, Higmore and Needham.

The few Obſervations and Remarks, which, I myſelf have hitherto made, are ſufficient to prove thus much,—namely,—That, in the original Formation, in the natural Complexion and Make of Animals (nay, even of Vegetables) there ariſe, from univerſal, determined Cauſes, irreſiſtible Propenſities, both to propagate and to cheriſh their Young.—But—beſides all this, it is fully confirmed, and by common Experience, that theſe ſtrong Propenſities increaſe and grow vigorous from Years, Uſe and Habit.—With how pungent a Senſe of Feeling, do the bittereſt Pangs of Grief ariſe in the human Breaſt, whenever any Accident happens to thwart theſe Tendencies?—How often do Tears flow from the Eyes of the Brave, Manly, Courageous, upon the Croſſes and Diſappointments of Love? Do not Cauſes of Barrenneſs, the Loſſes of Children, cauſe real Pain, occaſion ſubſtantial Miſery? And, conſequently, from theſe, and from numberleſs other Inſtances of the like Nature, which daily happen, it is eaſy to collect and conclude, That Animals, generally ſpeaking, according to their ordinary, common Nature, would be very diſagreeable even to themſelves, unleſs they, as much as poſſible, eſtabliſh a friendly Intercourſe with each other; unleſs they promote and cheriſh ſuch a Benevolence, ſuch an Affection towards one another, as is reſpectively natural to their own Species: Becauſe, from theſe friendly, ſocial Alliances, Intercourſes and Communications, ariſe their beſt Help, their beſt Aſſiſtance, their Security to propagate their Species, and rear their Young.

Since, therefore, in a Word, the whole, inward, eſſential Structure of Animals, is the neceſſary Cauſe of thoſe habitual Actions, Functions and Offices which they daily diſcharge: This very ſame, neceſſary Cauſe, alſo, demonſtrates clearly, That their Acts of Self-preſervation, and that their Appetites and Paſſions (ſo far as they are benevolent Affections) ariſe from the ſame inward Structure, Frame and Make; at leaſt, it proves a Cauſe ſo far ſufficient, as to produce a friendly, ſocial Intercourſe with thoſe of their own Kind.

Becauſe, from Fact and Experience, theſe two (namely, the Love of Self-preſervation and of the Species) are, as much as poſſible, exerted by all Sorts of Animals; notwithſtanding that it might, at ſome particular times, altho' but very rarely, ſo happen, that either thro' groſs Ignorance, or ſome unruly Paſſions, they hurt either themſelves or their own Species.

Since, therefore, amongſt Animals of the ſame Kind or Species, Agreement is ſo very general, and Contentions, conſequently, ſo very infre-

quent;

quent; it neceſſarily follows, that thoſe natural Cauſes of Peace and Concord, ſo inſeparable from them, muſt be alſo very powerful and operative; or, in other Words, that the Nature of Animals, independent of Help and Aſſiſtance, from Civil Compact and Society, is impreſſed with Tendencies and Propenſities, much more ſtrongly inclined to Peace and Good-will, than to War and Malevolence, Strife and Contention.

Here then (unleſs it can be firſt proved, that the Animal Nature in Man is much more hoſtile and ſavage, than the Animal Nature in Brutes) what we have already advanced will ſufficiently prove, that, in all our Thoughts, Reflections and Conſiderations upon Futurity (in which Conſiderations we muſt determine by Events as they generally happen, and by them only) a friendly, peaceable Aſſociation with others, is very agreeable to our true, natural Propenſities; and, that the like Aſſociation may rationally be expected from the ſame Propenſity in others, notwithſtanding, that, from ſome accidental Cauſes at particular times, the Event may happen otherwiſe.

For the Caſe holds here exactly the ſame, as, (1) in the *Doctrine of Chances: it is much more natural to ſuppoſe, that Six will not turn up at the firſt*

(1) *In the Doctrine of Chances*, &c.] 1. The Probability of an Event is greater or leſs, according to the Number of Chances by which it may happen, compared with the whole Number of Chances by which it may either happen or fail.

2. Wherefore, if we conſtitute a Fraction, whereof the Numerator be the Number of Chances whereby an Event may happen, and the Denominator the Number of all the Chances whereby it may either happen or fail, that Fraction will be a proper Deſignation of the Probability of happening.

Thus, if an Event has three Chances to happen, and two to fail, the Fraction $\frac{3}{5}$ will fitly repreſent the Probability of its happening, and may be taken to be the Meaſure of it.

The ſame Thing may be ſaid of the Probability of failing, which will likewiſe be meaſured by a Fraction whoſe Numerator is the Number of Chances whereby it may fail, and the Denominator the whole Number of Chances, both for its happening and failing: Thus the Probability of the failing of that Event has two Chances to fail and three to happen, which will be meaſured by the Fraction $\frac{2}{5}$.

3. The Fractions which repreſent the Probability of happening and failing, being added together, their Sum will be always equal to Unity, ſince the Sums of their Numerators will be equal to their common Denominators.

Now, it being a Certainty that an Event will either happen or fail, it follows, that the Certainty which may be conceived, under the Notion of an infinitely great Degree of Probability, is fitly repreſented by Unity.

4. Theſe Things will eaſily be apprehended, if it be conſidered that the Word *Probability* includes a double Idea; *Firſt*, of the Number of Chances whereby an Event may happen. *Secondly*, of the Number of Chances whereby it may either happen or fail. If, I ſay, that I have three Chances to win any Sum of Money, it is impoſſible, from that bare Aſſertion, to judge whether I am like to obtain it: but if I add, that the Number of Chances either to obtain it, or to miſs it, is five in all; from hence will enſue a Compariſon between the Chances that favour me, and the whole Number of Chances for or againſt me, whereby a true Judgment will be formed of my Probability of Succeſs: From whence it neceſſarily follows, that it is the comparative Magnitude of the Number of Chances to happen, in reſpect of the whole Number of Chances either to happen or to fail, which is the true Meaſure of Probability.

4. If, upon the happening of an Event, I be intitled to a Sum of Money, my Expectation of obtaining that Sum has a determi-

Compare this Paſſage upon Chances with Chap. 5. Sect. 58. (Quemadmodum contingere poteſt, ut, qui ſuſceperit)

firſt Caſt of a Die, than that Six will; becauſe there are five poſſible Chances againſt ſuch a Caſt, and but one Chance only for it.

Now, that Animals, devoid of Reaſon, ſhould act in a benevolent, amicable way by thoſe of their own Kind, is very eaſily proved, by fairly and candidly conſidering all the Principles eſtabliſhed in the firſt Chapter of this *Philoſophical Enquiry*, wherein is demonſtrated, how, and in what Manner, Means are capable of ſubſerving and miniſtring to a public Good of any Kind. For the Truth, from Obſervation, is, That Animals of the ſame Species, abſtain, as much as poſſible, from injuring one another.

Juvenal has this memorble Paſſage concerning Serpents, Scorpions, Tygers, Lyons, *&c.*

——————————Parcit
Cognatis maculis ſimilis fera. Quando Leoni,
Fortior eripuit vitam Leo? Quo nemore unquam,
Expiravit aper, majoris dentibus apri?
Indica Tigris aget rabidâ cum Tigride pacem
Perpetuam. Sævis inter convenit urſis.

Juvenal, Sat. 15. Ver. 160.

nate Value before the happening of the Event.

Thus, if I am to have 10 *l.* in caſe of the happening of an Event, which has an equal Probability of happening and failing, my Expectation before the happening of the Event is worth 5 *l.* for I am preciſely in the ſame Circumſtances as he, who, at an equal Play, ventures 5 *l.* either to have 10 *l.* or to loſe his 5 *l.* Now, he who ventures 5 *l.* in an equal Play, is Poſſeſſor of 5 *l.* before the Deciſion of the Play; therefore my Expectation, in the Caſe above mentioned, muſt alſo be worth 5 *l.*

5. In all Caſes, the Expectation of obtaining any Sum is eſtimated, by multiplying the Value of the Sum expected by the Fraction which repreſents the Probability of obtaining it.

Thus, if I have three Chances in five to obtain 100 *l.* I ſay, that the preſent Value of my Expectation is the Product of 100 *l.* by the Fraction $\frac{3}{5}$, and, conſequently, that my Expectation is worth 60 *l.*

For, ſuppoſing that an Event may equally happen to any one of five different Perſons, and that the Perſon, to whom it happens, ſhould, in Conſequence of it, obtain the Sum of 100 *l.* it is plain, that the Right which each of them in particular has upon the Sum expected is $\frac{1}{5}$ of 100 *l.* which Right is founded in this, that if the five Perſons, concerned in the happening of the Event, ſhould agree not to ſtand the Chance of it, but to divide the Sum expected amongſt themſelves, then each of them muſt have $\frac{1}{5}$ of 100 *l.* for his Pretenſion.

Now, whether they agree to divide that Sum equally amongſt themſelves, or rather chuſe to ſtand the Chance of the Event, no one has thereby any Advantage or Diſadvantage, ſince they are all upon an equal Foot, and conſequently each Perſon's Expectation is worth $\frac{1}{5}$ of 100 *l.*

Let us ſuppoſe farther, that two of the five Perſons, concerned in the happening of the Event, ſhould be willing to reſign their Chance to one of the other three, then the Perſon to whom thoſe two Chances are thus reſigned, has now three Chances that favour him, and conſequently has now a Right triple of that which he had before, and therefore his Expectation is now worth $\frac{3}{5}$ of 100 *l.*

Now, if we conſider that the Fraction $\frac{3}{5}$ expreſſes the Probability of obtaining the Sum of 100 *l.* and that $\frac{3}{5}$ of 100 *l.* is the ſame Thing as $\frac{3}{5}$ multiplied by 100, we muſt naturally fall into this Concluſion, which has been laid down as a Principle; that the Value of the Expectation of any Sum is determined by multiplying the Sum expected by the Probability of obtaining it.

This Manner of Reaſoning, tho' deduced from a particular Caſe, will eaſily be perceived to be general, and applicable to any other Caſe. De Moivre's *Doctrine of Chances, the Introduction.*

From

From ſpotted Skins the Leopard does refrain:
No weaker Lion's by a ſtronger ſlain:
Nor, from his larger Tuſks, the Foreſt Boar
Commiſſion takes his Brother-Swine to gore:
Tyger with Tyger, Bear with Bear you'll find,
In Leagues offenſive and defenſive join'd.

TATE.

Beſides all this,—Brute Creatures of the ſame Species, with ſtill greater good Nature, Gentleneſs and Kindneſs, behave themſelves towards thoſe, with whom they have for a long time reſorted.

The Ἀντιπελαργία (1) or Gratitude, or filial Piety (dare we venture to uſe ſo bold an Expreſſion) of the Ciconiæ, or Storks, to their Parents, is very remarkable, very ſurpriſing. In theſe Creatures, we find ſtrong Traces of Gratitude: In them all, there is obſervable a certain Portion of Love limited to their own Kind, and to their Young: They are always ready to perform mutual good Offices one to another; good Offices not of a trifling, inſignificant Nature, as when they ſport and take Paſtime,—but—good Offices of Weight and Importance; for, in all Dangers and Diſtreſſes, they prove to one and all, a mutual Defence againſt common Enemies; and—that, they expect ſuch a Defence, ſuch an Aſſiſtance as this, whenever Occaſion requires, they plainly diſcover by a certain, ſuitable Tone of Voice, whereby the Generality of Animals, whenever they apprehend themſelves in Danger, implore the Aſſiſtance of others, for their own Defence and Protection. See Chap. 3. Sect. 2.

Now, in caſe we, really, and in earneſt, regard the true, ſubſtantial Nature and Eſſence of *Acts*, the Acts of Brutes are exactly the ſame with thoſe which, as we have defined, are neceſſarily included in, and comprehended under, a true Concern for, and Care of, the public Good: Which Acts, indeed, altho', when performed by Brutes, appear very imperfect; yet they are performed with Degrees of Accuracy, proportioned exactly to the ſlender Extent of that Knowledge, which they exert in all Matters neceſſary to their own Preſervation.

(1) Ἀντιπελαργία] Beneficii accepti remuneratio ab Ἀντιπελαργεῖν vice rependo, beneficium retribuo ex Ἀντι & πελαργὸς Ciconia quæ parentes ſenio confectos viciſsim alere creditur. *Vid. Hederic. Lexicon in locum* πελαργὸς, *per Antiſtoich. pro* μελαργὸς.

Πελαργὸς Ciconia [ab albis nigriſque pennis] avis quæ ſerpentibus pullos nutrit. *Vid. Plin. Nat. Hiſt.* Lib. 10. Cap. 23.

——Serpente ciconia pullos
Nutrit, & inventâ per devia rura, lacertâ.
Juvenal, Sat. 14. Ver. 74.

Ubi Juvenalis Romanos arguens, quorum liberi tales evadebant quales a parentibus inſtituebantur. Alludit ad naturam ciconiæ ejuſque pullorum. *Vid. Rob. Stephan. Theſaur. Ling. Latin.*

SECT. XXI.

IF we examine into, and take under our Conſideration, the Cauſes, intrinſic and natural, in Animals, which generally determine them to act independent of thoſe Cauſes from whence we have drawn the four (1) Characteriſts, Criteria, or Marks juſt now laid down, we ſhall find them to be Cauſes proper and peculiar to Animals themſelves, ſo far, at leaſt, as we can know and diſtinguiſh them from inanimate, phyſical, natural Bodies.

For, in the firſt Place, the Structure of Animals, as compounded of various, different Parts and Members, ſtands in need of many more Helps and Aſſiſtances, for its Preſervation, than either Plants or Minerals. Becauſe the Blood and other Juices, natural to Animal Bodies; as for Inſtance, the Lympha, the Bile, the Pancreatic Juice, and, very likely alſo, the Æthereal Fluid, or Nervous Liquor, or Animal Spirits, are ſo very ſubject to Changes and Alterations; and are, from the daily Waſtes they ſuffer, ſo conſtantly conſumed and evaporated, that they all as daily ſtand in need of conſtant Supplies: And, all require perpetual Refreſhment from Exerciſe, Reſt, Sleep, Watching, calm Affections; that, from hence, the whole Animal Oeconomy may be preſerved in a whole and entire Temperature, and a good Habit; that, from ſo perfect a Regimen, the Waſtes and Supplies may regularly ſucceed; and, that the ſeveral Repairs may exactly anſwer all the ſeveral Conſumptions.——Since, from theſe Cauſes proceed the uneaſy Senſations of Hunger and Thirſt, and all the various Kinds of Animal-uneaſineſs:——And, ſince, from theſe Cauſes, Animals are irritated and moved to ſeek and try the fitteſt Ways of procuring Food, Medicines, and the other Supplies neceſſary to their own Preſervation.—*By the fitteſt Ways of procuring Food, Medicines*, &c. I mean, ſuch Ways and Means, as a Conſciouſneſs of their own natural Powers, and the Knowledge of ſuch Objects as fall under their Notice, naturally ſuggeſt to them.

There are not, as daily Experience ſhews, any Objects more familiar to Animals in general, and with which they are more intimately acquainted, than with Creatures of their own Kind; Creatures, I ſay, of their own Kind, whoſe Powers, Abilities and Capacities, Neceſſities and Wants, they moſt readily underſtand, upon comparing, adjuſting and ſettling their Nature with their own, and with what paſſes in themſelves; and, from this ſo exact a Similitude of Nature, they ground ſome ſure and certain Hopes of Love, Care, Aſſiſtance, Protection, *&c.*

Now

(1) *Four Characteriſtics, Criteria, or Marks*, &c.] The firſt Criterion, or Mark, ſee Section 17. of this ſecond Chapter.
Second Criterion, or Mark, ſee Section 18.
Third Criterion, or Mark, ſee Section 19.
Fourth Criterion, or Mark, ſee Section 20.
Theſe four Characteriſtics, or Marks, ariſe from Cauſes neceſſary, wherein the Freedom of Animal-agency is no way concerned; as in Vegetables, Foſſils, *&c.*

Now—the Cauſe of ſuch an Hope, ſuch an Expectation as this, partly is, *Firſt*, Becauſe, Objects of a ſimilar Nature, generally ſtrike the Imagination with like Impreſſions, and, conſequently, excite like Affections and Paſſions; and, with ſo ſtrong, ſo powerful an Energy, that they love their own Kind equal to themſelves: Provided, always, that no grievous, unnatural Impediment; ſuch as Violence of Paſſion, an accidental Miſtake, ſome very diſagreeable Contraſt of Nature, or ſuch like, happens. Such Hopes, ſuch Epectations as theſe, are cauſed, *Secondly*, becauſe, partly, Animals can, with a Sagacity very eaſy to them, perceive that Evils, both intolerable and numberleſs, muſt ariſe from Strife and Contention; and, that ſcarcely the ſmalleſt Degree of Good can poſſibly ariſe from ſuch a State as this.—For, upon weighing and ballancing Powers together, that is, upon comparing the various, numberleſs Accidents, which counter-act and counter-poiſe greater and leſſer Powers acting againſt each other, it frequently muſt happen, that theſe Powers injure themſelves, and haſten their own Deſtruction. Such Kinds of Accidents and Chances as theſe, are Sleep, Fatigue, Diſtempers, the Aſſociations and confederating Alliances of many weaker Powers, the repeated Opportunities of Time and Place, which afford Advantage to the Weak over the Strong. Becauſe, if, by any Contrivances whatſoever, contending, oppoſite Forces can be made equal, they exactly reſemble Weights poized and placed in Equilibrio; in which State, each of the two can hinder the other from inclining towards that Center of Gravity to which it naturally tends, ſo that neither of them can arrive at that Point towards which it naturally gravitates.

After the ſame Manner, exactly, like Inconveniencies happen in an Equality of Animal-forces, when one Animal contends with another; altho' they both, at the ſame Time, are at perfect Peace and Unity with all the reſt of the Species: Whereas,—whenever it ſo happens that they all engage in a general War, there muſt as often happen an Engagement of ſuperior Power; ſo that no Hope of eſcaping with Life can poſſibly remain. In a Word, it is more than probable (according even to the Determination of Brutes themſelves) ſince all the Species of Animals are plentifully ſupplied by Nature, and from the Natures of Things, with whatſoever can moſt conduce to the Preſervation of Individuals reſpectively, themſelves, and of all around them, That it is much better, amicably, to ſeparate and divide a diſtinct Uſe in Things, as the ſeveral Neceſſities and Occaſions of each ſhall require; and, to uſe only ſuch Things as are neceſſary for the preſent, than to expoſe themſelves to the Dangers and Hazards of endleſs War, in order to heap up the Stores and Burthens of Things unneceſſary and uſeleſs. For, in the voluntary Conceſſion to ſuch a natural Diviſion of Things, and of mutual Aſſiſtances as this; and, in the Preſervation of ſuch a Diviſion, when once agreed upon, entered into, and ſettled, is comprehended the whole Sum or Subſtance of all Acts, whereby the Good common to a whole Species of Animals is procured.

Upon

Upon this Foundation, Brutes, even themſelves, perceive, in ſome meaſure, the Connexion between Self-preſervation and Acts conducive to the common Good of their whole Species; and upon this very Foundation (let it be Inſtinct, or whatſoever other Principle you are pleaſed to call it) they act a ſort of Benevolence towards each other. And—this is the very Propoſition which we intended to prove.

I have now only two or three Words more to add, namely, *Firſt*, That all the Properties, all the Qualities, which we have hitherto obſerved to inhere in Animals, muſt be taken and conſidered together, as Cauſes in Conjunction, co-operating to adminiſter and ſupply them with Energies, Powers and Capacities to act.—And, to create in them, *Secondly*, a natural Propenſity towards the common Good of their own Kind.——And, *Thirdly*, That this Propenſity in them is powerful, operative, conſtant. For, upon the Suppoſition that Animals act and rebel againſt the Motions and Inſtincts of this Propenſity, they unavoidably muſt want the moſt ſubſtantial Share of their own private Happineſs; becauſe the Happineſs of all Animal-beings eſſentially conſiſts in this one ſingle Article—namely—That, they act in exact Conformity to their own true, natural Inclinations: I ſay, to their own truly natural Inclinations; becauſe, they cannot but feel (and very ſenſibly too) that Uneaſineſs, that Pain, which inevitably ariſes from the Struggles and Tumults of vain, empty, fruitleſs Paſſions, which rebel and war againſt theſe, the moſt natural Principles and Propenſities; the Efficacy of them not depending upon any falſe Appearances, upon any airy Deluſions.—And, conſequently—theſe natural Propenſities, Inclinations and Principles, are rightly diſtinguiſhed from thoſe Paſſions which I have termed vain, empty and fruitleſs, as proceeding from an odd, fantaſtic, abſurd Imagination.

With this very End and Deſign, therefore, I choſe to enquire into the true Cauſes of that Benevolence, which Animals of the ſame Species exert towards each other;—a Benevolence ſo very remarkable, between Brute-creatures of the ſame Kind. For I have determined and ſettled it in my own Mind, as a Point of the cleareſt Evidence, That all theſe Cauſes, with many more of much higher Importance, are diſcoverable in Mankind. And—conſequently, that the whole human Species, is, from theſe and ſuch like Cauſes as theſe, at leaſt, to ſay no more, naturally fitted for ſuch an Aſſociation, for ſuch an Intercourſe as this;—an Intercourſe which, beyond all Queſtion, beyond all manner of Doubt, is, generally ſpeaking, very friendly. It is ſuch an Intercourſe as is very obſervable amongſt Brute-creatures of the ſame Species. And laſtly, it is ſuch a friendly Intercourſe as is capable of being raiſed and exalted to a very high Degree of Perfection, by the Help and Aſſiſtance of Reaſon.

SECT.

SECT. XXII.

MR. *Hobbes*, notwithſtanding all that he has advanced to the contrary, is, nevertheleſs, very ſenſible, that this Doctrine is quite inconſiſtent with his Principles: For which Reaſon, he often inſinuates, in favour of an oppoſite Opinion, ſuch Poſitions as theſe which follow: "That "Man is more fierce and ſavage than Bears, Wolves and Serpents. That "the natural State of Man is a State of univerſal War, each and every one "againſt All. That the Nature either of public Good, or of public "Evil, does not exiſt prior to the poſitive, arbitrary Inſtitutions of Civil "Society. And, conſequently, that Mankind have no natural Knowledge, "no natural Deſire of ſuch a Good."

The particular Places of Mr. *Hobbes*'s Writings, where he mentions theſe Paſſages, I have, in former Parts of this Work, already quoted. There is, however, one Paſſage in the 17th Chapter of his *Leviathan*, exactly agreeable to his Book *De Cive*, Chap. 5. Sect. 5. very well worth our preſent Notice; becauſe he here palpably contradicts himſelf. Mr. *Hobbes* ſtarts the following Objection againſt his own Doctrine:—"Seve-"ral Brute-animals, ſays he, live very peaceably together, as, for Inſtance, "Bees in their Hives, and Ants in their Hillocks and Cells." And then he puts the Queſtion, "What can be the Hindrance why Mankind do not "live ſo too?"

To this Queſtion, of his own framing, he delivers his Anſwer under ſix Articles, the Sum and Subſtance of which are as follow. His firſt Article, in Anſwer, is, "Becauſe Mankind contend and quarrel about Ho-"nours, whereas other Animals do not, *&c.*"

But—to this Article I reply—that—Civil Honours, *i. e.* Honours of merely, arbitrary, human Inſtitution (and about which Contentions at ſometimes ariſe) do not fall under the leaſt Conſideration in a State of Nature, before any poſitive Inſtitutions of Civil Society amongſt Mankind commence. And, conſequently, concerning ſuch Things as theſe, Contentions cannot poſſibly ariſe amongſt Mankind, in ſuch a State, more than amongſt Brute-creatures.——And, a State of Nature is the State we are here arguing upon. And, in the ſecond Place I anſwer, That Glory or Honour, truly ſo called, which can eaſily be acquired in a State of Nature, independent of all Civil Society, is (according to *Cicero*'s Definition, in his third Book, *Of Tuſculan Queſtions*) *the united, agreeing Praiſe and Commendation of good Men, and the ſincere Approbation of the Judicious and Wiſe, in favour of the moſt exalted Virtue.*——Now—all Virtues imply a ſtudious Concern for the public Good. And, conſequently, this only is the Virtue which carries the Applauſe, the Praiſe, the Commendation of all good Men. *Thirdly*, I reply, That, from the want of a due Regard to ſuch an Honour as this, War, even an univerſal War, is waged by Each againſt All.

All. Whereas, on the contrary, from a due Regard paid to ſuch an Honour as this, Mankind are, much more than all other Animals, enlivened, inclined, actuated to the Practice of all Virtues: Which Virtues, even according to Mr. *Hobbes*'s own Confeſſion, are the neceſſary Means of common Peace.

The Anſwer contained in Mr. *Hobbes*'s ſecond Article, is taken from the 15th Chapter of his *Leviathan*. "Amongſt Brute-animals, ſays he, "both public and private Good are juſt the ſame: At the ſame time, "therefore, that they are naturally inclined and prompted to promote a "private Good, they promote, at the ſame time alſo, a common Good. "—But, as to Mankind, with reſpect to private Good, properly ſo call-"ed, nothing, according to them, is ſo pleaſant as the Thought, that ſuch "a Good far exceeds, and is greater than all the Good of others."

Now—my Reply to this ſecond Article is, That Mr. *Hobbes* has highly pleaſed me, by unwarily acknowledging a Good common and public, independent of all Civil Society and Government: And, that ſuch a Good can, really and in Fact, be procured even by Brutes. He is quite of another Mind elſewhere in his Writings, as you may obſerve by conſulting the very laſt Sentence in the 10th Chapter of his Book *De Cive*.

Here then, to tell the honeſt Truth, our eſtabliſhed Opinion is, That the Knowledge of public or common Good, is very fitly deviſed to lead all Mankind into Peace and Virtue: Becauſe it is that Good which is, in its own Nature, delightful and lovely; as alſo, becauſe it is the ſtrongeſt, moſt impregnable Defence of all private Good.

That Diſtinction, alſo, which Mr. *Hobbes* mentions of a private Good, belonging, in particular Caſes, to ſome, is no ſufficient Foundation why Mankind ſhould diſagree, more amongſt themſelves than Bees and Ants, whoſe common Good is, with the ſame Degree of Reaſon, to be diſtinguiſhed from ſuch a Good as is merely private.—And—what Mr. *Hobbes* farther adds concerning Mankind, conſidered univerſally as a whole Species of Creatures (if the Air of his Expreſſion imports any Thing) is more glaringly falſe: It is *Talk at Random, without either Proof or Foundation*, unleſs, perhaps, he is pleaſed to refer us to *that general Demonſtration of his*, as he calls it, *concerning ſuch Matters*: and at which time he juſt hints, in his *Proœmium* or *Preliminary Diſcourſe* to the *Leviathan*. Mr. *Hobbes*, to be ſure, was perfectly well acquainted with himſelf; and nothing, beyond all peradventure, could be more joyous to him, as to his own Affairs, than thoſe of his Neighbours. From hence, then, he concludes, (and without Doubt logically too) That theſe are the Sentiments of all Mankind. When Mr. *Hobbes*, however, preſumed to talk thus, it ſtood him upon to demonſtate, that there is ſomething in the Nature of Man evincing the Neceſſity of ſuch univerſal Sentiments as theſe.

Mankind,

Mankind, to be ſure, or, at leaſt, ſo many of them as think with Reaſon, know very well (from the neceſſary Wants of their Being, and from the Uſe, that is, the Application of proper Objects ſuited to theſe Wants) how to judge and determine upon their own Affairs, whether they are agreeable or not; and, to what Degrees, they raiſe a Pleaſure in them, independent of all Compariſon drawn between themſelves and others. Perſons, it is true, who are fooliſh and envious, exult and rejoice upon an eminent Superiority of their own Affairs above the Affairs of others.—Now, if Mr. *Hobbes* would have us underſtand his Opinion of ſuch Perſons as theſe, in a limited, qualified Senſe and Meaning, he then, certainly, does not aſſign a ſufficient Reaſon for this ſo univerſal a War of All againſt All.—— But he rather limits himſelf to ſome accidental, petty Contention, carried on and fomented by the Weak and Invidious.——But theſe kinds of Contention, the ſober Reaſon and the perſuaſive Influence of the more wiſe and prudent, can, with Eaſe, ſo far coerce and reſtrain, as to prevent any public Damage.

The third Article of Mr. Hobbes's Anſwer.

Let us proceed, then, to the third Article in Mr. *Hobbes*'s Anſwer, which is, That "all other Animals, beſides Man, (becauſe they are de- "void of Reaſon) do not perceive, neither do they appear to perceive, "any thing which they can blame in the Conduct and Management of "their own Affairs. Whereas the Caſe, with reſpect to Mankind, is "quite otherwiſe; and, therefore, from hence he concludes, War muſt "enſue."

Now, my Reply, upon mature Thought and Deliberation, to theſe bold Aſſertions, is, That this ſame Reaſon in Man does not, in the leaſt, intimate any Cauſe why Mankind ſhould not live peaceably and quietly with one another, even ſuppoſing that there is not any Civil Government to which they are ſubject: Under which Circumſtances (*i. e.* of Civil Society) their natural Inclinations and Propenſities to univerſal Benevolence, and to all the Laws of Nature, muſt take place, notwithſtanding the mighty Force of all Objections hitherto raiſed to the contrary. Mr. *Hobbes*, indeed, does not produce any one Argument why Perſons with ſuch a Complexion of Mind, with ſuch Diſpoſitions as theſe, ſhould not agree to enter into Civil Society (altho' this is the very Point, the Grounds and Reaſons of which we are now examining into); and yet the Objection he ſtarts, ſeems to lay a Stumbling-block in the Way againſt maintaining and preſerving any one Inſtitution of Civil Society upon mere Conſent only.

For, Mr. *Hobbes* might have perceived and ſeen (had he pleaſed to turn his Attention that Way) whether or no what he aſſerts, concerning the Diſpoſition of Man in general, will not equally ſhock, ſap and deſtroy the Foundations of Peace in every Civil Society, raiſed upon ſo precarious, imaginary an Unity as he endeavours to vindicate.

"There are very many, ſays he, who imagine themſelves wiſer and better "qualified to govern Civil Society, than the reſt of Mankind: And theſe

" wiſer governing Folks (whilſt each of them is fond of regulating Affairs " by his own Model) quarrel and contend; from whence ariſes War."

The Queſtion, in Anſwer to Mr. *Hobbes*, is, Whether Men, of this Turn and Complexion, uſually incline to violate and break thro' thoſe Compacts which cement and unite Mankind? Or, whether they incline rather to break out and kindle Civil Wars?

We are alſo, in the next Place, to enquire, Whether the Reaſon of Mankind more effectually inclines to Peace and Agreement, by detecting the Cheats, the Deluſions of Imagination, Fancy, and the falſe Appearances of human Paſſions, than it inclines to promote Diſcord, Diſagreement, Faction, by Sophiſtry and illogical Concluſions.

But, more eſpecially, when the Point turns upon ſuch Means as are always neceſſary to common Peace, to common Tranquillity;—Means always very few and very obvious.—Beſides all this—Mankind do not immediately, upon imagining that there are Faults to be found in the Adminiſtration of public Affairs, raiſe Civil Commotions:——Becauſe, that very ſame Reaſon, which diſcovers ſuch Faults, tells them alſo, that many Evils muſt be tolerated for Peace-ſake; and ſuggeſts alſo to them, the various Ways of trying how to correct ſuch Faults peaceably.

I appeal, upon calm Deliberation, to the impartial Judgment of every candid Reader, whether the Condition of Mankind be worſe than that of Brutes, becauſe they are branded (to uſe the moſt ignominious Term) with the Privilege, Exerciſe and Superiority of Reaſon?—Does not Mr. *Hobbes*, then, determine very iniquitouſly of Mankind, when he makes Reaſon the real Cauſe of all thoſe Miſeries which ariſe from War and Diſcord?—And,—for this very Reaſon, does he not ſtrenuouſly maintain, That Mankind live leſs peaceably amongſt themſelves, than the irrational Brute-creation? The whole, in ſhort, of Mr. *Hobbes*'s Anſwer upon this Topic, is extremely trifling, and nothing at all to the Purpoſe. He entirely miſtakes the Point; becauſe our whole Enquiry is upon the Obligation of thoſe Precepts, preſcribed by Right Reaſon, antecedent to all the Laws of Civil Inſtitution.

The fourth Article of Mr. Hobbes's Anſwer.

Mr. *Hobbes*'s fourth Article, in his Anſwer, is, That " Mankind can-" not, upon this Account, that is, upon the Account of Reaſon, live as " peaceably amongſt themſelves, as Bees, Beaſts, *&c.*—Becauſe theſe In-" ſects, theſe Animals, are quite devoid of all the Tricks, Arts and " Quibbles of Words, the common Contrivances of Mankind, uſual to " perſuade one another that *Good is Evil*, and *Evil Good*; and, Argu-" ments, why ſome Perſons ſo grievouſly reproach and find Fault with " others: From whence, ſays he, *Tumults and Diſturbances muſt neceſſa-" rily ariſe.*"

And—pray now—where lies the Force of all this Reaſoning? Why, truly, becauſe, at ſome times, it ſo accidentally happens, that Feuds and Contentions are kindled and fomented from the ambiguous Uſe of falſe Gloſſes,

Gloſſes, and forced Interpretations put upon Words: That, therefore, all Mankind (becauſe Words are capable of ſuch Abuſes) will not, upon any Terms, ſettle and ſecure Peace with each other. Pray, does not ſuch a Conſequence as this appear, at firſt ſight, looſe, wild, unconnected, unnatural? Whereas, the Point incumbent upon Mr. *Hobbes* to prove in this Place, is, That all Mankind either neceſſarily do uſe, or, at leaſt, that they always are infallibly (and that without the leaſt Variation) inclined to uſe ſuch ſeditious, quarrelſome Forms of Expreſſion as muſt, more or leſs, inflame War and Contention, Sedition and Striſe. This is the Point, I ſay, which Mr. *Hobbes* ought to have proved; but more eſpecially, ſince there are not only ſo many inherent, intrinſic Motives natural to Man, but alſo ſo many outward, viſible Inducements, which always muſt, and ought to, influence him to promote and ſecure Peace, rather than War.

Mr. *Hobbes* ought likewiſe, in the ſecond Place, in order to make good his Argument, to have proved, That ſome Forms of human Expreſſion either do neceſſarily, or, at leaſt ſo far, do always carry ſuch a Prevalency over all Hearers, as immediately to carry them into War.—It may yet, however, ſo happen, that human Sagacity is too penetrating, that human Curioſity is too inquiſitive to ſuffer the Deluſions and Impoſtures of varniſhed, falſe Expreſſions.

It may likewiſe, probably, ſo happen, that human Underſtandings will rather examine into and weigh the Importance and Moment of Things, than liſten to an empty Sound of Expreſſion: Nay—the very Nature of Man ſtrongly inclines and urges him on to ſuch Examinations and Reſearches as theſe.

For, Man cannot but know, that Words will neither ſatisfy his Hunger, nor defend him from outward Injuries: Whereas, the neceſſary Ends, Food, Raiment and Defence, can be fully anſwered by Acts flowing from mutual Benevolence.

What Perſuaſion can be more influencing, more irreſiſtible than the Perſuaſion of good Men? A Perſuaſion which claims the Aſſent, not only of the Orator, but of the Hearers: A Perſuaſion, to which the Voice of Nature conſents and agrees. Why ſhall not that Tongue which is employed in the Embaſſy of Peace and Good-will, carry a more aſcendant Sway than the Voice of War and Deſolation?

All Perſons, of Prudence and Caution, give a more diligent, a cloſer Attention to Actions than to Words: Nay—they carry their Caution ſo far, that they ballance the Powers of the Agents whom they truſt, by ſo critical a Weight, by ſo exact a Meaſure, that they can ſcarcely injure ſuch Agents, without running themſelves into the Danger of Damage and Loſs.

If, to all that has been already ſaid, the Reader will but ſeriouſly and impartially weigh within himſelf, of what important Conſequence, Words, both expreſſed and written, are, in ratifying all Contracts, and in preſer-

ving the Memory of Laws (and upon which *two Articles* the whole Peace of Society turns) beyond all peradventure he will agree with me in Opinion, that the Uſe of Words carries a more prevailing Influence in ſecuring and eſtabliſhing Peace, than in extirpating and rooting it out. And, conſequently, *Words* muſt be eſteemed amongſt the Bleſſings peculiar to Mankind, and not amongſt thoſe Cauſes which render the Brute-creation more humanized and civilized than the human Species.

The fifth Article of Mr. Hobbes's Anſwer.

But—Mr. *Hobbes* inſiſts upon it, in the fifth Article of his Anſwer, That "Brutes are ignorant of any Difference between *Injury*, *Loſs*, &c. "conſequently, ſo long as it is well with themſelves, they do not envy "others: Whereas, Man, when in the midſt of Eaſe, Affluence and "Plenty, is moſt remarkably envious and troubleſome." Becauſe, in this State of Life, he is fond of diſplaying his Wiſdom, in *finding Fault with the Adminiſtration of the ruling Powers.*

(1) The Antitheſis here produced by Mr. *Hobbes*, between *Injury* and *Loſs*, manifeſtly inſinuates thus much, That Mankind are leſs peaceable than

(1) *The Antitheſis here produced by Mr. between* Injury *and* Loſs, *&c.*] An Injury, to define the Word, *is an unjuſt Action, proceeding from Intention, and treſpaſſing on the perfect Right of another*: Which, if we would exactly ſtate, we muſt obſerve, that a Man, may be hurt three Ways, either, 1. If he be denied what he ought to have; or, 2dly, If that which he NOW hath for his own be taken from him; or, 3dly, If ſome Evil be put on him by another who hath no juſt Right of doing it. As to the firſt of theſe Ways, Things may be ſaid to be due to a Man, either by the bare Law of Nature, yet ſo as that he hath no perfect Right to them; of which Kind are the Offices of Humanity, Beneficence and Gratitude! Or elſe by Covenant, and that either ſuch as is expreſs and particular; or, ſuch as is contained under our Obligation to Civil Laws, by which we engage ourſelves to perform thoſe Things towards others which the Laws command us to exhibit. If Things of the latter Kind are denied a Man, an *Injury* is properly done; but there is no *proper Injury* in the Denial of Things which belong to the former Kind; tho' there be a Sin indeed committed againſt the Law of Nature. Yet neither doth the Law of Nature itſelf allow of compelling another by Violence to pay theſe Duties (eſpecially if the compelling Party have no Power and Authority over the other;) unleſs upon urgent Neceſſity: Since the Nature and Property of thoſe Offices requires that they be performed voluntarily, and without the Motive of Fear.—Thus far therefore, and no farther, will the Maxim of Mr. *Hobbes* hold true, That, "an Injury cannot be done, but "to a Man with whom a Covenant has been "made." But when we ſtudiouſly and induſtriouſly bring an Evil on another Man, unconſenting and unprovoking, either by taking from him any Good which he poſſeſſeth, or by poſitively inflicting on him an Evil: In theſe Caſes an Injury is always done, whether a Covenant hath intervened or not. For Nature hath given this Right to every Man, that no Evil be offered him from another Man, without his own preceding Demerit: Nor is it allowable for any Perſon, unleſs when provoked, to hurt another, any farther than the due Exerciſe of Government ſhall require. We add, *unleſs provoked*, becauſe to make an Action properly injurious, there is required The Τὸ πρότερον, *i. e. Something to be done firſt.* In an Injury properly ſo called, it is further required, that it proceed from Intention and deliberate Deſign of hurting or vexing another. And therefore the Harm that is done caſually in Ignorance, and unwillingly, is not uſed to come under the Name of *Injury*. Puffendorf's *Law of Nature and Nations*, Book 1. Chap. 7. Sect. 15, 16. The Word *Damnum*, *Loſs* or *Damage*, *Grotius* ſays, is derived probably from *Demo* to *take away*. It is Τὸ ἔλαττον, *i. e. when a Man has leſs than his Right*, whether that Right be merely from Nature or ſome ſuper-added human Act, ſuch as *Property*, *Contract*

than Brutes, becauſe they can, and do, diſtinguiſh between *Injury* and *Loſs*.

My Sentiments differ very widely, here, from thoſe of Mr. *Hobbes*; namely, That Man bears *Loſs* occaſioned by his Fellow-creatures very willingly,

Contract and *Law*. A Man's Life is his own by Nature (not indeed to deſtroy, but to preſerve it) and ſo his Body, his Limbs, his Reputation, his Honour, and thoſe Actions that peculiarly belong to him as a Man. Grotius *de Jur. Bel & Pac.* Lib. 2. Cap. 17. Now, altho' *Injury* and *Loſs* or *Damage* are very different Things; and altho' it be poſſible that the *Injury* of an Action may redound to one Man, and the *Damage* to another, yet the Inference which Mr. *Hobbes* draws from this Conſideration will not hold, That "a "bare Damage, and not an Injury, is done "to him who is either hurt or hath ſomething "taken from him, by a Man with whom he "had paſſed no Covenant." Nor, do the Inſtances which he brings to countenance this Conjecture make very much to the Purpoſe. "When the Maſter, ſays he, commands his "Servant to give Money, or to do a Kind-"neſs to a third Perſon; if it be omitted, "the Injury is done to the Maſter, but the "Damage to the third Perſon." But indeed, if the Servant does not pay the Money which is due, as he is ordered, the Creditor ſhall ſuffer no Damage, ſince his *Action* remains good againſt the Maſter. Nor, if a Servant, being commanded to do a Kindneſs to another Man, fails in performing it, ſhall the other Man incur any Damage: Tho' he is indeed guilty of Theft, or the like Crime, if he intercept and keep, for his own Uſe, what he ought, on his Maſter's account, to have delivered to others. For, beſides that from the not receiving of a Kindneſs which is not ſtrictly due, *Damage*, properly ſo called, cannot ariſe; yet the other Perſon may complain to the Maſter, who will be ſure to compel the Servant to his Duty. And tho' we ſuppoſe the Servant to have been never ſo far from doing an Injury to the third Perſon, yet for all this, 'tis certain he did not what by *Right* he ought to have done; becauſe he affords the other Man ſufficient Grounds of a Complaint againſt him.

His other Inſtance Mr. *Hobbes* thus propoſes in his *Leviathan*, Chap. 15. Page 75. "Private Men may remit to one another "their Debts, but not Robberies or other "Violences whereby they are endamaged: "Becauſe, the detaining of a Debt is an In-"jury only to themſelves, but Robbery and "Violence are Injuries to the Perſon of the "Commonwealth." Which we are willing enough to admit, provided he will not hence infer, that in Crimes an Injury is not likewiſe done to the particular Perſon who is hurt. But, as he propoſeth the ſame in his Book *De Cive*, Cap. 3. Sect. 4. "It is by no Means "to be endured, he ſays, that in a State, if "any one hurts another, with whom he hath "not covenanted, he damageth the Party on "whom he brings the Evil; but he doth an "Injury only to him who holds the ſovereign "Power in the State." For, if one of my Fellow-ſubjects hurts me by Violence, doth he offer an Injury to the King only, and not to me? Or, ſuppoſe we ſhould grant, as Mr. *Hobbes* deſires, that when Men live in a natural Liberty, each of them hath a Right to all Things, yet will this hold good amongſt the Members of the ſame Republic, who own one common Maſter? As to what he ſubjoins, That, "if the Perſon who received the Da-"mage; ſhould accuſe the other of injuring "him, he would be anſwered in this Man-"ner; What are you to me? Why ſhould "I act according to your Pleaſure, rather "than my own, ſince I don't hinder you "from acting by your own Will, rather than "by mine?" 'Tis ſo far from being true, that *if no particular Covenants have intervened, this way of ſpeaking will not be free from Reprehenſion*, that we ſhould rather imagine a Man to be out of his Senſes, who ſhould hope by ſuch a way of arguing, to ſatisfy the Complaints of one whom he had hurt. Yet, one Thing Mr. *Hobbes* hath well remarked, That "the Term of *Injuſtice* ſignifies with *reference* "*to the Law*, but the Term of *Injury* with "*reference both to the Law and to the particu-*"*lar Perſon*." For, when an *unjuſt* Thing is done, all may call that *unjuſt*, or it is *unjuſt* to all. But an *Injury* may have been done, not to me, or to him, but to a third Perſon, and ſometimes to no private Subject, but to the State only; as when a Man is killed in a Duel, for Inſtance, upon a fair Challenge.

For,

willingly, provided there is no Intention to injure him. I ingenuouſly confeſs, indeed, that the whole Diſtinction between Injury and Loſs, is eſtabliſhed upon the Knowledge of Right and Laws; a Knowledge which, I own, is peculiar to Man: But I cannot, at the ſame time, by any Means allow, that this Knowledge is the efficient Cauſe, why Man is more pronely inclined either to deſtroy Peace, or to trample upon Laws and their Fellow-creatures Rights, which are ſo much of a Piece and the ſame with their own.

It muſt be confeſſed, indeed, that Rights may be violated by Mankind, thro' the unruly Appetites and Paſſions of ſome; notwithſtanding all the Force, Power and Energy of ſuch their Knowledge.——And—yet—the Knowledge of that Diſtinction between *legal* and *illegal*, *Injury* and *Loſs injurious*, or otherwiſe, can never prove the Cauſe why Man, more than all the other Animal Creation, is inclined to commit *Injuries*.——" But " Mankind will, as Mr. *Hobbes*'s Antitheſis inſinuates, envy others, and " love to diſplay their Talents in abuſing Governors." Now—ſurely, ſuch Malevolence as this, to be found only in ſome few, cannot, without great Injury and Abuſe, be objected againſt the whole human Kind. And—which, by the Bye—is an Objection raiſed without the leaſt Foundation or Proof; unleſs, perhaps, Mr. *Hobbes* may feel ſuch Propenſities in himſelf, and from hence conclude them natural to all Mankind.——For, this Criterion or Mark, whereby to know and diſtinguiſh all Mankind, he recommends to the Rulers of Nations in particular, and to all other Perſons in general, in the Proæmium to his Introductory Diſcourſe prefixed to his *Leviathan*. Neither does he pretend to lay down any other Demonſtration to prove theſe his Poſitions true, than mere Advice only, *i. e. to try whether they correſpond and agree with our natural Sentiments*. To ſay the honeſt Truth of it, ſuch natural Sentiments as theſe do not at all agree with mine.—For, ſuppoſing that I myſelf am happy,—let other Folks be as much happier as they can, and with all my Heart:—I ſhall not envy them their Happineſs, provided no Part of mine be diminiſhed. As for me, I entertain a much modeſter, a much better Opinion of *human Nature*,

For, in this Caſe, the Party who received the Hurt cannot complain of having an *Injury* done him, ſince he himſelf agreed to the Chance of the unlawful Combat: But the Legiſlator may, however, proſecute the Survivor for tranſgreſſing his Prohibition. Puffendorf's *Law of Nature and Nations*, Book 1. Chap. 7. Sect. 13.

De damno per injuriam dato, ut nimirum id ſarciatur, is the peremptory Determination of *William Grotius* the Brother of *Hugh*, in that excellent Tract of his, entitled, *De Principiis Juris Naturalis Enchiridion*, Cap. 13. Sect. 11. And he enforces the Juſtice of this Precept in the following Words, Cujus præcepti æquitas, ſays he, pendet e duobus principiis naturalibus, quorum primum eſt, *hominem non debere alteri nocere*: alterum, *æqualitatem ubique ſervandam*. Cum enim *damnum & damnatio, ab ademptione & quaſi diminutione patrimonii dicta ſint*, certum eſt nemini licere hanc diminutionem alteri inferre; cum igitur quis tale quid fecit, quod facere jus non habuit, conſequens eſt ut ea res ad æqualitatem reduci debeat, atque ita ab eo qui damnum dedit, damnum reparari. Thus far *William Grotius*.

ture, than to ſuppoſe it delighted in finding Fault with *Kings*, *Rulers* and *Governors*.

That Man, whoſoever he is, muſt be fully hardened in the barefaced Impudence of daring any Thing, who either has proceeded, or will proceed ſo far, as to foment and ſtir up War and Contention. For, under this one ſingle Crime are contained endleſs Death and Slaughter, Rapin, Plunder, Devaſtation, and, in ſhort, complicated Villanies and Cruelties of all Sorts.

The Happineſs, however, of our preſent Argument is, that ſo much Wickedneſs as is abſurdly and inconſiſtently aſcribed and objected by Mr. *Hobbes* to Mankind, in that State which he ſuppoſes natural, is, even upon his own Hypotheſis, antecedent and prior to every Inſtitution of Civil Government whatſoever.

Sixthly, Let us ſee whether or no, in the laſt Article of his Anſwer, he proves upon ſtronger Demonſtration, that the human Kind are leſs fitted to live in a peaceable Correſpondence with each other than the Brute Creation. " The Agreement of Brute-creatures, ſays he, is natural, but the " Agreement of Man is upon Compact, is artificial, is forced; it is no " matter of Wonder, therefore, if to the ſolid and laſting Eſtabliſhment " of ſuch a peaceable Agreement, ſome ſtronger Tye is neceſſarily requi- " red beſides bare Compact only;—namely—a common Power, from " whence all Individuals are alarmed, and under Apprehenſions, each for " himſelf; and which common Power is to regulate the Actions of All for " the public Good." Sixth and laſt Article of Mr. Hobbes's Anſwer.

To this laſt Article in his Anſwer, I reply, That ſo far as Mankind are Animal Beings, ſo far are they the intrinſic, natural Cauſes which regard both Man and Brute, to all Intents and Purpoſes exactly the ſame. For which Reaſon theſe Cauſes ought, equally and neceſſarily, to produce in both, a full Conſent and Agreement in the Practice of mutual Benevolence. (1) Becauſe the Grounds and Reaſons of theſe natural Cauſes are, upon Examination, found to be the ſame exactly in Man, that they are in all other Animals; *e. g.* in Oxen, Lions, Bees, *&c.*—And this Truth we have already (by way of Specimen only) endeavoured briefly to evince; but it is a Truth of ſuch Importance, as to require a fuller and more particular Demonſtration in the Series and Chain of our future Enquiry.

It is not then, upon the moſt critical Searches and Examinations of our beſt Anatomiſts, within Mr. *Hobbes*'s Sagacity to ſhew any one ſocial Quality natural to Brutes, which is not as natural to Man; and, which Quality may not be aſſigned as a ſufficient Cauſe why a pacific, peaceable Agreement is not as natural to the one as to the other. For, " as to the " Epithet

(1) *Becauſe the Grounds and Reaſons of theſe natural Cauſes*, &c.] This is the Doctrine of Final Cauſes. *See the Notes upon Final Cauſes*, Prolegomena, Sect. 7. Pages 20, 21, 22.

" Epithet PACTITIAL, or artificial Conſent, *i. e.* ſuch a Conſent as is " originally founded upon arbitrary Compact; ſuch a Conſent, I ſay, is " conſequential, and entirely depends upon Art and Contrivance, but not " at all upon Nature."

Mr. Hobbes here takes for granted what ought not by any Means to be allowed, That there is no Conſent, no Agreement without arbitrary Compacts.

This Kind of Sophiſtry may, perhaps, impoſe upon vulgar, ignorant Minds; but—it is ſuch a Fallacy, as the wiſe and knowing can eaſily diſcover: Becauſe all ſuch Compacts as theſe are equally eſtabliſhed upon Animal Nature, whether rational or irrational. It is unqueſtionably true, that, ſuppoſing Mankind to have entered into any arbitrary Compacts at all;—nay—even ſuppoſing them never to have exerciſed their Reaſon (a bold Suppoſition indeed!) yet, as a Species partaking of the ſame common, animal Nature, their unanimous Agreement in a mutual, reciprocal Benevolence, would have been equally ſtrong, *i. e.* they would, at leaſt, have promoted a benevolent Agreement ſo far, as Brutes of the ſame Species in general do.——And——this, beyond all Queſtion, is a Conſent, an Agreement;——and ſuch a Conſent, ſuch an Agreement as may be called *natural*.

Where then, in the Name of God, can lie the Objection, why ſuch a Conſent, ſuch an Agreement ſhould not be as equally natural, when the Uſe of Speech and the Uſe of Reaſon are ſuppoſed the additional Qualities of Animal Nature.

Reaſon, to be ſure, does not deſtroy any Means, any Attempts, any Endeavours, any natural Propenſities towards Peace, Agreement and Concord.

Neither is a natural Conſent leſs firm, leſs unchangeable, leſs certain, becauſe expreſſed by articulate, artificial Sounds: For, to form a juſt Compariſon, the Appetites, *Hunger* and *Thirſt*, with the proper Objects *(Meats and Drink)* of Gratification, don't ceaſe to be Acts natural, becauſe expreſſed under proper, ſignificant Words; or, becauſe, according to Rules of Reaſon, the Time, Place and Quantities of Food, neceſſary and uſeful, are adjuſted, ſettled and determined. But,——here we may alſo farther add, That, ſince Mr. *Hobbes* acknowledges Reaſon " a Part " of *Human Nature*, and a *natural Faculty*," which he does in his Book *De Cive*, Chap. 1. Art. 1. Chap. 2. Sect. 1.—And—ſince all the reſt of Mankind, as far as I can underſtand, do acknowledge the ſame; from hence it follows alſo, that ſuch a Society or Conſent, as Reaſon judges neceſſary to be eſtabliſhed upon Compacts, muſt, to be ſure, ariſe from the *rational Nature* of Man; and, for this Reaſon therefore, may, with great Propriety, be called *natural*; notwithſtanding that ſuch a Conſent is more binding, and tied down to cloſer Conditions of Obligation than any Conſent, of which Brute-beaſts, upon a moſt critical Obſervance, are capable.

Such

Such a Conſent, therefore, as is founded upon Reaſon, muſt, with the ſtricteſt Propriety of Expreſſion, appear ſtill more natural, if we conſider, that practical Reaſon derives its Appellation, as ſuch, entirely from the Nature of the *beſt End* in our Power to foreſee and know; and of the *beſt Means* in our Power to uſe and apply.—And—what is a more convincing Proof, is, that Right Reaſon, with all its Energy and Operation, cannot produce any other Effect than that which the Propenſity towards Peace and Agreement amongſt Animals of the ſame Species produce; becauſe theſe Propenſities are natural to all Animals. In Brutes, indeed, theſe Propenſities exert themſelves with a confuſed, blind Inſtinct; but always towards their own full, adequate, natural Object: Whereas, in Man, the full, compleat Object of theſe Propenſities, is the whole Syſtem of rational Beings; and, upon theſe Propenſities it is, that, all and ſingular Acts muſt, according to Time, Place and other Circumſtances, be elicited and applied effectually to Practice. Thus, for Inſtance—ſuch Portions of Meat and Drink (ſolid and liquid Food) may, upon the beſt and ſureſt Grounds, be called *moſt natural*, which are reſpectively taken, according to the Conſtitution of the Animal in general, and which, in all particular Caſes, are under the Direction of that rational Law which ſecures and preſerves the Health of each Animal: Provided always, that theſe Portions of Aliment be ſound and wholſome.

The Rules, however, for the Regulation of Diet (the Efficacy and Truth of which Rules, Reaſon beſt diſcovers from the Nature of Things) can, with the juſteſt Propriety be termed *Rules of Art*:—Becauſe—*Art*, to define it, *is* neither more nor leſs than *that Habit, which directs Actions juſt as the Nature of the End and of the Means points out*. Now, ſuch an Habit as this may be deemed very natural to a rational Agent, ſince all the Acts of it (*i. e.* all the practical Precepts of it) are very few; and, conſequently, ſo very manifeſt as eaſily to be underſtood from the Nature of Things, without the ſtudied Labour of Inſtruction; *Practical Precepts of Information* very evident and capable of being perceived, even at the time we are engaged in other Employments; and, juſt with the ſame Eaſe that Brutes find out the Method of regulating their Dyet, by mere Experience only: Or that (1) Plants, without any Aſſiſtance of either Art or

(1) *Plants, without any Aſſiſtance of either Art or Senſe, ſuck in from the Earth*, &c.] That, natural Bodies act upon each other by the Attractions of Gravity, Magnetiſm and Electricity, is evident even to vulgar Eyes, from innumerable Experiments: And it is not improbable, but there may be more attractive Powers than theſe, which reach to ſuch ſmall Diſtances as hitherto have eſcaped Obſervation.

By this Principle of Attraction, a Sponge ſucks in Water; and the Glands in the Bodies of Animals, according to their ſeveral Natures and Diſpoſitions, ſuck in various Juices from the Blood; the Mouths of the evareſcent Arteries having a Power of attracting ſome, and of repelling other Particles: Thoſe, for Inſtance, which attract the watry Particles refuſe Admittance to the oily ones, and *vice verſâ*; not ſo much, perhaps, on account of

or Senſe, ſuck in from the Earth, and without any Miſtake, Juices fitting to their own Nouriſhment.

The firſt Elements of the Arts are, ſtrictly ſpeaking, Habits; as alſo are, indeed, the conſtituent Branches reſpectively of ſuch Arts: So that, upon this Foundation (and not perhaps without Reaſon) theſe Elements may be called *artificial*. And therefore, ſince theſe Elements, or firſt Principles, are known without any artificial Inſtructions, they muſt, by all Mankind, be acknowledged as ſo many Branches of natural Knowledge.—And—conſequently, whatever Authors write upon the Arts, take theſe Elements or firſt Principles for granted, and lay down no Precepts concerning them. Thus, for Example, the ſame Principle, in like manner, holds good in adding together, ſo as to collect a Sum total, the minuteſt Numbers in diſcrete Quantity, as alſo in the Addition of right and ſtrait Lines in continued Quantity.

The ſame holds good in the practical Operations of Quantity both diſcrete and continued.

Upon exactly the ſame Parity of Reaſoning, the Subſtraction of the ſmalleſt and moſt familiar Quantities from one another, may truly be called *Habit*, and a very eſſential Branch both of Arithmetic and practical Geometry.

Mathematical Teachers, however, ſuppoſe their young Students endowed with Habits of Computation previous to any Art or Inſtruction; and, of Conſequence, that theſe Habits are, from conſtant Experience, natural.

Euclid, likewiſe, under theſe common Notions, which he calls *Axioms* or *ſelf-evident Truths*, ſuppoſes, whenever equal Quantities are either added or ſubſtracted, that the Sum or Difference is univerſally well known to be equal. Thus, therefore, we cannot but obſerve, that a certain Skill of Operation, whether in adding or ſubſtracting, is not only an eſſential Branch of ſome particular Art, but alſo a Skill natural to every Man endowed with any Portion of Reaſon.

From

the Magnitude of their Orifices, as by this active Principle; otherwiſe the Glands that admit the Fluid, whoſe component Particles are the biggeſt, would alſo admit thoſe of every other inferior Size. Beſides, the Velocity of the Blood in the ſmall Veſſels is very little; and, perhaps, in ſome of the laſt branching of the Aorta, may not amount to more than the five thouſandth Part of what it is in the Aorta itſelf: The Slowneſs of the Blood's Motion, therefore, gives the Particles time to attract one another, and to be attracted by the Mouths of the Excretory Ducts, whereby the Secretion is performed. For, without this Principle of Attraction, 'tis ſcarcely to be imagined that the impreſſed Force, of itſelf, is ſufficient to impel the Fluid thro' all the Meanders of the vernal Syſtem; without which, we are to expect nothing but Obſtructions, Stagnations, Gangrenes, and, at laſt, an entire Diſſolution of the Animal Oeconomy.

Hence alſo, the Parts of Vegetables and Animals preſerve their ſeveral Forms and aſſimilate their proper Nouriſhment, the Juices aſcending by the mere attractive Power of the ſmall Veſſels, and eaſily change their Texture by a ſmall Heat and gentle Motion, till they become denſe, hard, dry and durable Earth; but, when the Nouriſhment grows unfit to be aſſimilated, or the Parts become too feeble, and unfit to aſſimilate it and attract, the Motion ends in Confuſion, Putrefaction and Death.

From theſe Principles I conclude, that Mr. *Hobbes* has not reaſoned right in affirming, That a Conſent expreſſed by Compact is ſo merely artificial as to oppoſe and contradict Nature. I ſhall not, however, at the ſame time, deny, that Words, whether written or ſpoken, by which Compacts are ſignified and expreſſed, ariſe from arbitrary Inſtitution: And yet the Harmony, the Agreement of Sentiments, in mutual good Offices of Benevolence (and of which Words are only outward Signs) is altogether natural notwithſtanding; for, in ſuch a Concurrence of Sentiments as this, as for Inſtance, in reciprocal good Offices, entirely conſiſts the Nature of Compacts: And herein is eſſentially laid all the Power, all the Force, all the Energy of Obligation.

Words are arbitrary Signs, and yet the Sentiments expreſſed by them are natural.

All true Compact is grounded upon a Concurrence of Sentiments in reciprocal good Offices, and from hence ariſes all Obligation.

Now, the Knowledge and the Will alſo of an arbitrary Inſtitution, in the Choice of Signs or Marks, whereby ſuch a Conſent is communicated from one to another, is ſo very eaſy and obvious to all Mankind, and that without any previous Inſtruction, that ſuch a Conſent may very deſervedly be called *natural*; notwithſtanding that the Uſe of ſuch or ſuch Signs and Marks is arbitrary: And here—in my Opinion, the Epithet *Arbitrary* is preferable to the Term *Artificial*.

In ſhort—A Conſent, either actually expreſſed already, or which is to be in future Time expreſſed by any particular, inſtituted Compacts, is not merely the Work of Art; and much leſs is it ſo, when ſuch a Conſent is employed upon the moſt general and diffuſive Acts of Benevolence. And, this is the grand Queſtion which we want to prove; becauſe ſuch Acts only are the ſole Objects of a *Philoſophical Diſquiſition into the Laws of Nature*: Or, even upon the Suppoſition, that ſuch a Conſent as this be called *artificial*, yet it is a Term always underſtood as conſiſtent with Nature, and not at all repugnant to it, as being leſs ſolid and permanent than even the natural Conſent itſelf;—and thus much is allowed according to Mr. *Hobbes*'s own Hypotheſis. For, expreſſing, either by artificial Signs, or reducing into Words eſtabliſhed upon Compact, a natural Conſent, does neither weaken the Security, or ſhorten the Permanency of ſuch a Conſent.

Our firſt Principle, therefore, laid down, continues firm and unſhaken, namely—That there are in Mankind, conſidered as Animal-beings only, Propenſities of Benevolence towards each other, at leaſt in as high a Degree, as there are benevolent Tendencies obſervable in other Animals towards thoſe of their own Kind.

And, under theſe Propenſities (as we have already obſerved) the principal Heads of *the Laws of Nature* are, in many Caſes, to be taken for the Model or Rule of human Knowledge. For theſe Reaſons, therefore, I thought it very well worth my while thus critically to obſerve and take in Pieces Mr. *Hobbes*'s Anſwers. Partly, *firſt*, that the Reader may ſee how groſs an Error our Adverſary is forced to defend, in order quite to deface, if he can, the clear Characteriſtics of that Sanction ariſing from

the Laws of Nature, which is eſtabliſhed upon natural Propenſities: —— And, partly, becauſe, in the *ſecond* Place, as I have already obſerved, that the very Articles from whence Mr. *Hobbes* would infer Man to be leſs ſociable and more malevolent to thoſe of his own Kind, than the Brute-creation, may, as fairly as poſſible, be retorted back upon himſelf: For, it very unluckily happens, that theſe very Articles of Objection are the cleareſt moſt manifeſt Tokens, that Man is, by Nature, fitted for a more exalted Benevolence towards his Fellow-creatures, than any other Kind of Animal whatſoever.

For, in the *firſt* Place, Man loves, and is fond of that Honour, of that Glory, which naturally flows from this Kind of Beneficence.

Secondly, Man perfectly well underſtands the effective Energy of a public Good, in procuring to himſelf his own private Happineſs or Good.

Thirdly, Man employs and exerciſes this his Faculty of Reaſon, which equally diſpoſes him (as the Nature and Circumſtances of Things require) both to command and obey.

Fourthly, Man knows how, under the moſt ſignificant Forms of Expreſſion, both to whet and to adorn the Edge of his Reaſon.

Fifthly, Man underſtands what Law that is, which, with a powerful Efficacy of Diſtinction, ſeparates an Injury offered, from a Loſs introduced without an Injury.

Sixthly, and laſtly, To ſuch an univerſal Conſent, agreed upon and entered into amongſt Mankind, as this, Nature not only communicates a Firmneſs, a Stability; but, alſo Art aſſiſting Nature, communicates both by Words expreſſed and written, and in ſeveral Ways, cautions againſt all Caſes of Surprize, with a Security, a Duration, beyond the uſual Period of human Life.

I ſhall not here, therefore, at preſent, conſume any more of my Reader's Time, in explaining Points which are already rendered ſo intelligible and obvious; but chuſe rather to ſubmit the Determination to his impartial Judgment, Whether Mr. *Hobbes*'s Anſwers, or our Replies, to this grand Queſtion, carry a better Air of Truth? or, Whether or no the Qualities, Powers and Faculties, peculiar to human Nature, do not rather aſſiſt the Propenſities, the Inclinations to Benevolence (ſo inſeparably inherent in the whole animal Nature) than eradicate, root out and blunt the Efficacy, the Power, the Energy, the Edge, and, in ſhort, the Operations in general of theſe Propenſities, of theſe Inclinations.

SECT.

SECT. XXIII.

THE regular Series of our Method laid down, leads us now to consider some Properties peculiar to human Bodies only; in order to try and examine, whether or no such Properties and Attributes do not render Mankind fitter and better qualified, for the mutual Exercise of Benevolence, than the other Animal Creation: And, consequently, enable them to form a more friendly Intercourse, a more amicable Community? Such an Enquiry as this comes very fitly under our Consideration at this time;—because, these Qualities and Attributes, so peculiar to Man, belong to Human Nature, as it is an Animal Nature: And, consequently, these Attributes are not to be considered as effectually operative in themselves, but co-operating and acting in Conjunction with those Qualities, which, as we have before observed, subsist and inhere in the rest of the Animal Creation; from whence, by an Addition, by an Increase of Forces, we may reasonably hope for and expect an Effect similar and alike;—but yet, at the same time, an Effect more sure, more regular, more noble.

An human Body is an animal Body endowed with Properties peculiar to itself.

Upon these Accounts, therefore, we shall dispose these Qualities and Attributes under so regular a Subordination, in so just an Order, as to bear the nearest, the closest Affinity to these Heads we have already proved;—namely, "That the Nature of all Animals is carried with that self-"same operative Energy and Force to a Benevolence, a Good-will, towards "Animals respectively of their own Species, which inclines and prompts "them to their own Preservation."

Now, we do not, it is true, discover any thing remarkable in an human Body, which can be referred to the first visible Mark, drawn from a limited Magnitude of Parts; but we refer what is observable to the second Mark rather, which is taken from the powerful Operations, or rather Effects, of *Imagination and Memory*.

For, we are to refer many Effects to such Excellencies as are discovered in human Bodies, preferable to all other animal Bodies whatsoever.

We judge it, then, proper here, to premise thus much, *viz.* That, "whatsoever increases the Powers and Operations of Imagination and Me-"mory, and promotes a Duration of these Powers and their Energies in "Mankind, rather than in other Animals, carries great Weight in it, when "collectively considered, to prove, That Man may, by an Experience na-"tural and obvious, receive fuller Informations than all other Animals, con-"cerning the *efficient Causes*, not only of private Happiness, but of the com-"mon, social Good or Happiness also.—And consequently—these Causes "are such as produce those Effects, which place it in human Power to act "with a Superiority, with an exalted Degree of Prudence, in forming both "the Ability and the Inclination, to elicit and exercise voluntary Acts, in

"favour

" favour of both private and public Good; which (two Kinds of Good) are,
" from the Nature and Diſpoſition of Mankind, intimately blended and in-
" ſeparably connected together. Whatſoever Means, therefore, are fitly
" ſuited to promote ſuch a Wiſdom, ſuch a Prudence as this, are Means
" equally qualifying, proper and ſuitable to promote the Practice of all
" moral Virtues, *i. e.* to promote the Obſervation of all the Laws of
" Nature."

Having premiſed and ſtrengthened the Remarks hitherto made, not only from the Writings of Anatomiſts, but alſo from our own, as well as the Obſervation of other Enquirers; I ſhall then, in the next Place, examine into ſome Qualities and Properties diſcernable in an human Body, which eminently contribute to ſtrengthen and extend the Imagination and Memory in Man.

Theſe Qualities and Properties, however, when viewed apart, ſeparate and diſtinct, as irrelative and without Connexion, will carry little or no Proof: Whereas, when they are conſidered in a neceſſary, united Conjunction, and relative alſo to thoſe Properties and Qualities common to Animals of all Sorts: When they are conſidered in a regular Subordination to each other, and under the immediate Direction of an immortal, rational Soul (of a Soul ſtamped with the divine Image of God himſelf); and, laſtly, when we conſider that theſe ſeveral Parts of an Animal-body ſerve as Inſtruments of Action, miniſterial and eminently uſeful to the human Body: Under this united and connected View, I ſay, Reaſon can form Demonſtrations ſatisfactory, full, uſeful and excellent, in proving the Argument under our preſent Enquiry.—And, in the *firſt* Place, the Bulk of the human Brain (which, in Proportion to the Size of the human Body, is remarkably larger than in any other Animal-ſubject) greatly aſſiſts the human Imagination and Memory.

1. Brain.

2. What proves, in the next Place, of ſignal Service to the Imagination and Memory, is the much larger Quantity of Blood, *cæteris paribus*; and, conſequently, a greater Abundance of Animal-ſpirits ſecreted from it in every human Subject, than in any other animal Body whatſoever.

2. Blood.

3. What proves, in the third Place, remarkably uſeful to the Imagination and Memory, is the Purity and Cleanlineſs from Dregs of all the Animal-juices, occaſioned by an erect Poſition of the human Body.

3. Erect Poſture of Body.

4. Another Advantage, in the fourth Place, is a more lively Energy, a quicker Motion of the Animal-juices, cauſed by larger aſcending Paſſages into the Brain, thro' the whole Entablature of the *Carotides*, *i. e.* the Veins and Arteries of the Neck.

4. Quick Velocity of animal Juices.

5. The Length of the human Life, in the fifth and laſt Place, is remarkably ſerviceable to the Increaſe and Strength of Memory, whether we conſider the Memory in a State of Childhood (during which Period there is lodged and ſtored up in it an abundant Supply of Things, Objects, Ideas,

5. Length of Life.

Ideas, Notions and Words); or whether we conſider Memory in our more advanced Years, when ſuch Ideas and Objects, as were at firſt taken Notice of, as well as thoſe lateſt obſerved, are recollected, reviewed and diſtinguiſhed by a clearer, more-ſeparating Judgment, and, of Conſequence, are ranged under proper Heads and Claſſes.——We ſhall here treat briefly upon each of theſe five Articles, in order to form ſuch a Strength of Argument as may, from the rational Connexion and Adjuſtment of them all, ſtrike the human Underſtanding more powerfully with Evidence, Truth, Conviction.

Article the firſt, concerning the human Brain.

In treating upon this Article we are, firſt of all, to take Notice, that under the Term *Brain* we include all that white Subſtance involved and rolled up [in *the Meninges*, (1) *i. e.*] in *the Pia Mater* and the *Dura Mater*, covered and defended by the Cranium or Scull.—The whole Subſtance of the Brain, when ſtrictly diſtinguiſhed, is divided into the *Cerebrum* and the *Cerebellum*.

Upon this Subject, *Bartholinus* in his *Anatomy*, Book 3. Chap. 3. has the following Paſſage: *The Bulk of the human Brain is remarkably large, in Proportion to the Size of an human Body: And, in general, Man has a Quantity of Brain double to that to be found in an Ox; namely, a Weight of Brain equal to four or five Pounds.* Upon this Authority, allowed as a Fact, I reaſon in the following Manner.——The middle Weight of an human Body does not exceed the fourth Part of an Ox's Weight; and yet, in Fact, it appears, that there is double the Quantity of Brain for the Regulation and Management of ſo ſmall a Body: From whence it follows, that there is (2) eight times the Quantity of Brain allowed to regulate an equal Weight of Fleſh, Limbs, *&c.*

I myſelf, who am no profeſſed Anatomiſt, have found, upon Experiment, the Carcaſs of a large Sheep, as alſo the Carcaſs of an Hog, equal in Weight to an human Body; and yet, the Brain of either not to exceed the eighth Part in Weight of an human Brain. From this Fact, then, what

(1) *In the* Meninges, *i. e. in the* Pia Mater *and* Dura, *&c.*] The *Meninges*, a thin Membrane which encloſeth the Brain; whereof there are two, the one thicker, called *Dura Mater*, the other thinner, called *Pia Mater*.

(2) *Eight times the Quantity of Brain allowed to regulate an equal Quantity of Fleſh and Limbs*, &c.] Suppoſe the middle Weight of an Ox ſix Hundred Weight, or forty-eight Stone. The middle Weight of an human Body is *(per Hypoth.)* one Hundred and two Quarters, or twelve Stone. The Propoſition here to be proved, is, That the Brain of a Man is to the Brain of an Ox as 8 is to 1.

Let B ſtand for the Brain in an human Body.

Let *c* ſtand for the human Body itſelf.

Let *b* ſtand for the Brain of an Ox.

Let C ſtand for the Body of an Ox itſelf.

Then, according to *Bartholin* (as quoted from *Ariſtotle*) in his *Anatomy*, Book 3. Chap. 3. $B=2b$. And from the Experiments and Obſervations of Anatomiſts, $c=\frac{C}{4}$ that is, $4c=C$; and therefore $2b\times 4c=B\times C$: Which Equation thrown into an Analogy will ſtand thus, $B.4c :: 2b.C$. Suppoſing the Body of a Man equal to the Body of an Ox, why then the Brain of a Man muſt be eight times as large. For, ſince $B.4c :: 2b.C$, then, as above, $2b\times 4c=B\times C$, and $2b\times 4c=8bc=B\times C$. But *(per Hypoth)* $C=c$; and conſequently, $B=8b$. *Q. E. D.*

what other Concluſion can we draw upon this remarkable Diſproportion, between the Animals of another Species and Man, than this, that, *Man is naturally framed and conſtituted ſo, that the Powers and Capacities of his Brain are larger, nobler and more extenſive, for the Regulation, Conduct and Management of human, rational, free Acts.*

I ſhall not trouble my Reader with enumerating other Uſes of the Brain common to all other Animals in general; becauſe, from ſuch an Enumeration, no Cauſe can be aſſigned for this exceſſive Difference of Weight: And yet, I cannot, however, here avoid obſerving, "That, Man, by the "Aſſiſtance and Operation of ſo remarkably-large a Brain, can, *Firſt*, make "more accurate and curious Obſervations upon Ideas and Objects, convey-"ed into the Mind by the Senſes; that he can compare and weigh theſe ſe-"veral Ideas and Objects together, and in as full and ample a Degree as "the Natures of Things (ſuited and adapted to our Capacities) are capable "of producing Good or Evil, either to Individuals ſingly, or to Numbers "conſidered in Conjunction; not to mention ſeveral other natural Effects of "leſs Moment and Conſequence."

2. Since, in the ſecond Place, all the Nerves branched throughout the whole Body take their Riſe, either from the Brain itſelf, or from the Spinal Marrow, which is only a Continuation of the ſame homogeneous Subſtance with the Brain: "That therefore, from hence it follows, as a moſt "demonſtrative Truth, That all thoſe Motions of the human Body, which, "in any Sort or Degree, depend upon and are governed by us, as voluntary Agents, are regulated and directed by the Operations and Motions of "the Brain." The Doctrine here advanced may, with clearer Evidence, and with a more ſatisfied Conviction, be diſcovered and known by conſulting Doctor *Willis*'s curious anatomical Obſervations upon the Origin of all thoſe Nerves which ſubſerve and miniſter to voluntary Motion: Wherein the Doctor proves that they all (*i. e.* all the Nerves of voluntary Motion) take their Riſe originally from the Brain ſtrictly ſo called.—The natural Concluſion, which from hence offers itſelf, is this, *viz. That the Brain, in being both remarkably larger, and more operative in an human Body, than in any other Animal, is naturally fitted to conduct an infinite Variety of Acts and Motions abſolutely depending upon it, with Diligence, Deliberation, Deſign, Caution: Theſe being the peculiar and eminent Uſes of the Brain.*

See Doctor Willis's Life in the Appendix, Page 117.

So ſublime, ſo exalted an End as this, intended by the all-wiſe Cauſe of ALL, never poſſibly could, by any other Method, be anſwered, than by the Mind propoſing to itſelf an End, the very beſt of Ends, namely, *the common Good of the Univerſal ALL, but of rational Agents more eſpecially*; and by purſuing and exerting the beſt Means, and after the moſt rational Contrivances, *i. e.* by linking and uniting (each to himſelf) all rational Agents, by the moſt effective, actual, operative *Benevolence* and *Good-will*.

A leſs

A leſs-complex, a much more ſimple Apparatus of Organs (ſuch as is uſually obſerved in Trees and Plants) would fully have anſwered the End and Preſervation of one ſingle Individual only: For, it is remarkable that Trees, in the general, live and flouriſh longer than the ordinary Period of human Life: To which we may alſo farther add, (and, indeed, it is ſomewhat extraordinary) That this, ſo ſimple an Apparatus, might fully anſwer even the Propagation of the Species, under which there is always comprehended and plainly implied ſomething of a common Good.

But—when we conſider the extenſive Powers and Capacities of the human Brain; when we conſider the ſurpriſing Apparatus of Machines, Inſtruments and Contrivance inſeparably belonging to it: As for Inſtance, all the various Organs of the Senſes; all the various Inſtruments ſubſervient to voluntary and inſtantaneous Motions, *&c.*—When we, I ſay, conſider, with Awe and Attention, ſuch nobly-extended Capacities and Powers as theſe, we cannot but conclude, that the human Brain is deſigned, and was originally contrived, for much more exalted Uſes than for either the bare Preſervation of *Self*, or *Continuation of the Species.*

In ſome kinds of Birds and Fiſh, it is remarkable, that the Quantity of Brain is ſo very minute, that it ſcarcely is equal to,—nay—is often exceeded by, the Bulk and Weight of Eyes. For this, and many other curious anatomical Obſervations, I am indebted to my ingenious, candid Friend, Doctor *Hollings*, a Phyſician of exalted Eminence in the Republic of Letters, and one of a moſt happy Experience. Now—notwithſtanding this very ſmall Quantity of Brain, both in Birds and Fiſh, yet, obvious is it to common Obſervation, that, they have Genius and Capacity enough to live peaceably with thoſe of their own Kind: How ſurpriſingly leſs, even to Wonder and Admiration, is ſuch a Power, ſuch a Capacity as this, wanting to Mankind in general (even ſuppoſing the individual Happineſs of each ſufficiently ſecured) who are amply furniſhed with all the Materials, all the Inſtruments, all the Means of an uſeful, inſtructive, active Knowledge! But more eſpecially, and what is above all; ſince, in the Application of the Brain, towards the Attainment of Truth and the ſupremeſt Good, the higheſt Degree of human Happineſs eſſentially conſiſts!

Under this Head we may alſo place what Dr. *Willis* has delivered to us in the 26th Chapter of his Treatiſe upon the Brain. In diſſecting the Body of *a natural Fool*, the Doctor ſays, " he could not obſerve any one " peculiar Defect, except this, that the *Brain was remarkably ſmall.*

The Doctor, in his Diſſections, has likewiſe obſerved, That " the " Monkey differed very little from the Dog and the Fox;" If we except theſe two Marks of Diſtinction, " that the Monkey's Brain is much " larger; and, *Secondly*, that there are many more Meanders, Windings " and Circumvolutions in it."

The Reaſon, uſually aſſigned for thoſe Differences, is, that, the Monkey approaches nearer to Man in his Underſtanding, than any other Animal whatſoever.

SECT. XXIV.

Article the ſecond, concerning the Human Blood and Animal Spirits, in aſſiſting the Imagination and Memory.

THE ſecond remarkable Particular is the purer Refinement from Dregs, and the more lively, vigorous Energy of the Blood, and of the Animal Spirits ſecreted from the Blood, in an human Body, than can be diſcovered in Brute-creatures. Now,—this remarkable Difference is deſervedly reckoned and eſteemed amongſt thoſe aſſiſting Cauſes of Imagination and Memory;—nay—even of a rational, wiſe Prudence itſelf.—— The Quantity of Blood, upon many Accounts, varies in all Animals; and, conſequently, in Man. Anatomiſts, as for Inſtance, Dr. *Charleton*, Dr. *Lower*, and others, have computed, that the Quantity of Blood in an human Body rarely exceeds twenty-five Pounds, and as rarely falls ſhort of fifteen Pounds; ſo that the mean Proportion may be computed at twenty Pounds nearly. Let us now ſuppoſe an human Body of a Size, deducting the Blood, to weigh two hundred ſuch Pounds, which is a Weight rather heavier than the ordinary Size of Men: Upon this Suppoſition, the whole Weight of Blood will be to the Weight of the whole Body (deducting the Weight of the Blood) as one is to ten; or (including the Blood as Part of the whole bodily Weight) the Blood makes one eleventh Part.

Our Countryman Dr. *Gliſſon*, in his Computation, at Chapter the 7th. of his *Treatiſe upon the Liver*, is pretty near the ſame. For the Doctor tells us, that the whole Maſs of Blood is one twelfth Part of the whole Weight. I myſelf have found, from repeated Experiments, that, in Sheep, Calves, Hogs, and ſome other Animals, the Blood bears to the whole Body the ſame Proportion, that, Unity, or one does to twenty nearly; or, to be more exact, the Proportion of a fractional Number leſs than Unity to eighteen. The rational Concluſion, then, which from hence fairly may be drawn, is this, *viz. That the Blood in an human Body bears to the human Body itſelf, double the Proportion that the Blood, in any other Animal Body whatſoever, bears to every ſuch Animal Body reſpectively.* Nay—and what is ſtill more: In Fiſh and Fowl, the Maſs of Blood bears a yet remarkably-leſs Proportion to the Size and Weight of each Body reſpectively.

Double quantity of Blood.

There is alſo another Truth of equally-uncontеſted Certainty amongſt Anatomiſts, *viz. That the Blood in an Human Body is intenſely warmer than in any other Animal-Body.*——Hence it is very natural to conclude, both from a ſuperior Quantity, as well as from a more intenſe Warmth, *what* an Abundance of Animal-Spirits muſt be in the human Body; and, with

with what an active, lively Energy theſe Spirits muſt move and flow.—— I would not, by any Means, have my Readers believe, that I am peremptory in my Notions upon the Nature of *Animal-Spirits*. (1) I ſhall not poſitively aſſert whether or no, what are called Animal Spirits, be an æthereal, aereal Fluid: An Opinion vigorouſly oppoſed and ſtrenuouſly contradicted by Dr. *Harvey* and his Followers.——Our Notion of Animal-Spirits, is; That, there are in the Blood ſome certain, very lively, quick, agil Particles, which, *Firſt*, from the Blood itſelf are diſpatched into the Brain, in order to ſupply the Uſes of Imagination and Memory. From the Brain, *Secondly*, they inſinuate themſelves into the Nerves and Muſcular Fibres, to anſwer all the Ends and Purpoſes of Animal-Motion.—Now, theſe are *Data* which Dr. *Harvey* himſelf does not deny.—But—how and after what Manner theſe Animal Spirits, or, if you will, theſe more active, ſubtile Particles of the Blood are ſecreted and diſengaged from the whole Maſs of Blood, is a Diſcovery, in all Likelihood, not as yet found out by the moſt curious, moſt ſkilful Enquirers into Nature: By the wiſeſt, I mean, and moſt learned Phyſicians. It fully anſwers our preſent Purpoſe, to find the ſkilful and learned in Anatomy and Phyſic, thus far, in the general, agreed; namely, "That the purer, more ſpirituous, more "refined and moſt active Particles of the Blood are freed and diſengaged, "in ſome ſort, let the Manner how be what it will, by Fermentation, "from the groſſer, heavier Parts; and then, that they are diſpatched and "carried up to the Brain, in order to undergo, from the Action and Ope-"ration of the Brain, a compleat Refinement or Purification into Animal "Spirits, or an æthereal, aereal Fluid."

How Animal Spirits (if any ſuch there be) are ſeparated from the Blood, a Diſcovery not yet known.

The only one Obſervation, therefore, which I would here make, as appoſite to my preſent Argument, is this; That, from ſo much a larger Bulk of Brain, and from ſo much a more copious Quantity of Blood, a much larger Quantity of Animal Spirits muſt ariſe and flow in an human, than in any other animal Body whatſoever: Let the Manner, how ſuch different Effects in both happen, be what it will. As a farther Proof alſo

(1) *I ſhall not poſitively aſſert, whether or no what are called Animal Spirits be an æthereal, aereal Fluid*, &c.] Is not Animal Motion performed by the Vibrations of this Medium, excited in the Brain by the Power of the Will, and propagated from thence thro' the ſolid, pellucid and uniform Capillamenta of the Nerves into the Muſcles, for contracting and dilating them? I ſuppoſe that the Capillamenta of the Nerves are each of them ſolid and uniform; that the vibrating Motion of the æthereal Medium may be propagated along them from one End to the other uniformly, and without Interruption: For, Obſtructions in the Nerves create Palſies. And that they may be ſufficiently uniform, I ſuppoſe them to be pellucid when viewed ſingly, tho' the Reflexions in their cylindrical Surfaces may make the whole Nerve (compoſed of many Capillamenta) appear opaque and white. For, Opacity ariſes from reflecting Surfaces, ſuch as may diſturb and interrupt the Motions of the Medium. *Sir* Iſaac Newton's *Optics*, Page 328. *Query* 24. *ſecond Edition, printed at* London 1718. *in* 8vo. *See that accurate and ſagacious Philoſopher and Mathematician, the ingenious Dr.* Bryan Robinſon *his Treatiſe on the Animal Oeconomy*, Sect. 2. Page 83. *and* Prop. 8. Page 87. *See alſo the Doctor's Diſſertation on the Æther of Sir* Iſaac Newton.

of our preſent Doctrine, it may not be altogether improper to produce here what the learned Profeſſor of Phyſic in our Univerſity of *Cambridge*, Dr. *Gliſſon* has obſerved *in ricketty Children*, namely, " That the Head is " larger, by reaſon that all the other Parts of the Body are ſo very lean " and emaciated; as alſo, that the Genius, in Conſequence of a larger " Brain in them, is quicker and more extenſive: And, this enlarged Ca- " pacity, as the Doctor has obſerved, proceeds from a greater Quantity " of Blood employed in the Head."

Ricketty Children.

Article the 3d. The ſuperior Excellency of Man's Memory from an erect Poſture of Body.

There is alſo another Obſervation, which ought not to be paſſed over here in Silence, *viz.* (1) That an erect Poſture of the human Body (which is the Poſture generally when we are awake) contributes not a little to produce this very ſame Effect, *i. e.* in aſſiſting the Imagination and Memory. For, from hence we are, not only figuratively and metaphorically, initiated into the Contemplation and Knowledge of Cauſes ſublimer and more excellent (the Influence of which Cauſes equally affects all Mankind *every* where, *and*, by Conſequence, *this whole inferior World*;—an Obſervation confirmed over and over again by ancient Experience); but—from theſe Cauſes alſo it is, that the human Brain is better qualified and diſpoſed to prepare, elaborate and form Animal Spirits, more lively and nervous, as well as more copious; by which Means human Nature becomes naturally better furniſhed with all Abilities to execute the Offices and Duties of Reaſon.—The Sum and Subſtance, then, upon the whole, of all theſe Operations, Functions and Offices, is eſſentially connected with, and contained under, a friendly Aſſociation with all other rational Beings.——Now, the principal Reaſon why the Situation of the human Brain, as it is at preſent contrived, helps not a little to form a much larger, as well as a much more active, lively, agil Quantity of Animal Spirits, is, in the main, drawn from the Principles of *Statics*. Becauſe theſe Principles are well fitted to anſwer the Offices and Poſitions of thoſe Arteries and Veins which belong to the Brain. For, altho' the Principles of Statics may ſeem, indeed, to the Generality of Mankind, quite foreign, and at too remote a Diſtance from our preſent Enquiry; yet, however, as theſe Principles ſeem to afford ſome Light, ſome Knowledge to the whole corporeal or natural Syſtem of the World, ſo they ought, conſequently, in my Opinion, to carry no ſmall Weight in tracing out the Qualities and Properties of an human Body.——From theſe ſtatical or mechanical

Statics.

(1) *That an erect Poſture of the human Body*, &c.]

Sanctius his animal, mentiſque capacius altæ
Deerat adhuc, & quod dominari in cætera poſſet
Natus homo eſt. Sive hunc divino ſemine fecit
Ille opifex rerum, mundi melioris origo:
Sive recens tellus, ſeductaque nuper ab alto
Æthere, cognati retinebat ſemina cæli,
Quam ſatis Japeto, miſtam fluvialibus undis,
Finxit in effigiem moderantum cuncta Deorum.
Pronaque cum ſpectent animalia cætera terram;
Os homini ſublime dedit: cœlumque tueri
Juſſit, & erectos ad ſidera tollere vultus.
Ovid. Metam. Lib. 1. Ver. 75—86.

nical Principles, therefore, I conclude; That, altho' the whole Maſs of Blood receives a full, intire Impulſe from the Syſtole of the Heart; and, that, from this Impulſe it ruſhes, and is impetuouſly carried into the Aorta: Yet all the ſeveral Particles of the Blood, at the ſame time, do not receive, from this Impulſe, an equal Impetus, an equal progreſſive Motion, upon account of their different Magnitudes, Figures, Solidities and Motions: But—on the contrary, that ſome Particles move with a quicker, more lively Velocity than others, as being more active; and, for which Reaſon, theſe very Particles may very juſtly be called *lighter*. For, as the Blood is a Liquor compounded of very heterogeneous, different Particles; and, as theſe Particles are fluid, hot and fermented, they muſt, of courſe, be endowed with various Degrees of Motion; and, conſequently, are impreſſed with heavier or lighter Degrees of Gravity.——It is very natural, therefore, to imagine that theſe ſmaller Particles, being ſo very light and numerous, diſengage themſelves from the heavier, in their various Turns and Windings thro' the Arteries; by which Means they can, with much more Eaſe, aſcend into the upper Regions, from the Force of Impulſes often repeated; by which the Motion of theſe Particles is unequally impelled, *i. e.* ſome of theſe Particles move quicker, other ſome more ſlow. From hence I am inclined to believe, that the Blood riſes with a quicker Velocity thro' the aſcending Trunk, whoſe Diameter is ſmaller, than when it paſſes thro' the deſcending Trunk, whoſe Diameter is much larger, and thro' which, the heavier, more phlegmatic Parts of the Blood are more eaſily propelled and conveyed. For, from the aſcending Trunk the Blood grows ſtill purer and purer, till it reaches the Carotid-arteries, and the Arteries of the Vertebræ, from whence a Supply of Animal Spirits is formed for the Brain. There is not, as I take it, any great Difference between that arterial Blood which ſupplies the Head, and the arterial Blood which diffuſes itſelf thro' the inferior Parts next adjoining to the Head.—And, yet—the minuteſt Differences (which ſeem clearly deducible from univerſal Principles) ought not, in my Opinion, to be entirely paſſed over in Silence; but, more eſpecially, when they naturally and fairly fall in with the Chain of our preſent Reaſoning.

Article the 4th. The ſuperior Excellency of Man's Memory and Imagination, from a quicker Motion of all the Animal-juices.

I ſhall alſo farther add here, another Obſervation of a like Nature with the former: An Obſervation drawn from the perpendicular Poſition of thoſe Veins which ſubſerve to, and communicate with the Brain; from whence it comes to paſs that the Blood muſt, from its own Gravity, deſcend much quicker. By which Contrivance the Ramifications of the Jugular Veins, and of the Veins belonging to the Vertebræ, are conſtantly emptied; and, conſequently, Way is immediately made for the Influx of new Blood from the carotid and vertebral Arteries, which, upon the Suppoſition of any other Contrivance, muſt be retarded and ſtopped, from too long a Continuance of the Blood in the adjacent Veins.

Now,

Now, from the happy Concurrence and Co-operation of theſe two Cauſes, *viz. Firſt*, The Aſcent of the purer, more vigorous Blood thro' the Arteries, appropriated and peculiar to the Brain. And, *Secondly*, the ſudden Deſcent of the ſame Blood thro' the Veins, (when once the lively, animal Spirits are ſecreted and ſeparated from it) occaſioned by the erect Poſition of an human Body. From theſe two Cauſes, I ſay, it muſt follow, that the Velocity of the Blood in the Head, is quicker than in any other Part of the Body; or, than it poſſibly can be in the Head of any other Animal whatſoever.——And, conſequently it muſt happen, that, from this, ſo much a quicker Circulation of Blood, the Supply of Blood itſelf increaſes faſter: And, from hence, the Animal Spirits will, in much larger Abundance, be ſeparated from it.

We might, without much Difficulty, produce abundantly-more Arguments, whereby Anatomiſts fully demonſtrate that the Blood, in its Aſcent thro' the Arteries into the Brain, is much finer and more ſpirituous: And, theſe Arguments are chiefly drawn from thoſe very frequent Obſtructions which happen in the Parts of the Lower Belly, occaſioned by a fœculent, groſs Impurity of Blood; as alſo, from Tumours and Swellings in theſe Parts: And, laſtly, which at ſome times happens, from the flowing and voidance by Stool of Blood from the Hæmorrhoidal Veins, Piles, *&c.*

The Piles a Diſtemper peculiar to human Bodies.

This Diſtemper called the Piles, is, in my Opinion, a Diſtemper peculiar to human Bodies only; and which is a Diſtemper, as far as the Curious can obſerve, very much, if not entirely, owing to an erect Poſition of the human Body.—But,—as this is a Branch of Knowledge which does not properly lie within my Province, I rather chuſe not to dwell too long upon it. The curious Reader, who is deſirous to be informed more fully in theſe Matters, may, if he pleaſes, conſult that very learned Treatiſe written by the moſt ingenious Dr. *Richard Lower* upon the Heart, from Page 133. Chap. 2. to the End of the ſaid Chapter. Now, altho', by far the largeſt and moſt material Parts of what the Doctor ſays, be intended to anſwer another Deſign, yet the judicious Reader can eaſily apply what he has there offered to our preſent Purpoſe.

The Objection taken from Birds anſwered.

It cannot, indeed, be raiſed as any good Objection againſt the Doctrine before us, that there are ſome Birds with erect Heads and very long Necks. In ſuch Birds we will allow, to be ſure, that their Blood, as in human Bodies, aſcends lighter, finer and more ſpirituous.—And,—yet, no great matter of Argument can be deduced from hence, in Proof of their great Genius: Becauſe, the Quantity both of Blood and Brain in them, is in Proportion to the Bulk of their Bodies.—And,—what we may alſo farther add; ſo very ſmall a Quantity of Blood as they have, ſuppoſing it not of a finer, more ſpirituous Nature, might, by an eaſy Impulſe of the Heart's Syſtole, aſcend thro' the Carotid Arteries; becauſe, the Diameters of theſe Arteries are ſo minutely ſmall as to reſemble, very naturally, Capillary Tubes made of Glaſs, thro' which, we may obſerve common Wa-

ter

ter (but more eſpecially when it is ſomewhat warmed) to aſcend ſpontaneouſly, as it were, to the Height, even of ſome Inches.

The particular Contrivance of the Carotid Artery in an human Body.

What now remains is only to make one particular Obſervation, concerning this more than ordinary quick Velocity of the Blood into the human Brain, *viz.* The Reaſon why the Carotid Artery in moſt Brutes is divided into a thouſand Furrows, Plicatures and Foldings, reſembling Network; the Deſign of which Contrivance is to retard the Impetus of Blood in them: Whereas, in Man, the Blood flows thro' the Carotid Artery in one, large, extended, open Channel, till it enters the Brain. From whence it neceſſarily muſt happen, that all the Particles of Blood, and, conſequently, the Animal Spirits themſelves, muſt move with a more impetuous Velocity; by which Means, the whole Circulation is ſooner performed, and, of Courſe, a larger Capacity or Space muſt be allowed from an additional Influx of new Blood: And—all theſe Cauſes greatly contribute to the Motion, Activity and Plenty of the Animal Spirits. But, as theſe are Points which the celebrated Dr. *Thomas Willis* and Dr. *Richard Lower* (in the above-quoted Treatiſe) have with ſuch Satisfaction and Accuracy handled, that they have not left the leaſt room for any Search or Labour of mine, let the Curious, without going any farther, chuſe rather to conſult theſe two great Geniuſes, as the Fountain-writers upon theſe two Subjects. *See* Willis's *Anatomy of the Brain*, Chap 7. Line 23. It ſufficiently anſwers my preſent Purpoſe, to mention and apply ſuch Quotations from thoſe excellent Writers as are moſt ſuitable to the preſent Argument.

The Operations of the human Mind not to be accounted for by the Laws of Matter and Motion.

The only one Obſervation which I ſhall here farther add, is only this, That, notwithſtanding there are ſo many various Imaginations lodged in the Head of Man; and, notwithſtanding that there are ſo many Helps to Memory, which prove ſo uſeful to the human Underſtanding,——all theſe Aids and Aſſiſtances do not yet, however, by any Means, lay a Foundation for ſolving all the Operations of the human Mind into the mechanical Laws of Matter and Motion. And, the Truth of this evidently appears, from the Powers and Efficacies of the mechanic Powers and Laws which we have already mentioned. Nay—the Caſe is ſo far otherwiſe, that *Malpighius*'s Aſſertion is undeniably true, *viz. That, the more intimately and clearly we underſtand the Nature and Offices of the Brain, the more we ſhall deſpair of ever being able to account for, and explain the Operations of the Mind, from the Motions, Actions, Energies and Functions of the Brain.* Vid. *Malpighi* De Cerebri Cortice, Cap. 4.

Marcellus Malpighius Philoſophus & Medicus Bononenſis.

SECT.

SECT. XXV.

Article the 5th. The ſuperior Excellency of Man's Memory, from the Period and Length of the human Life.

I NOW paſs on to the fifth and laſt mentioned Help or Aſſiſtance to the human Memory, and, of Conſequence, to the human Sagacity, Wiſdom, Prudence; an Advantage allowed to Man by the Author of Nature, in a Degree ſuperior and far more excellent than what is granted to all the other Animal-creation: And this Superiority ariſes from the uſual Conditions and Circumſtances of long Life here, as we are Men.—It is unqueſtionably true, That the Strength of our Memory is, to an evident, well-known Experience, aſtoniſhing! The Memory of Man can retain ſome thouſands of Words, nay, and Sentences or Propoſitions (compounded of Words) to a Variety equally infinite; and (not to mention Things and Actions as numberleſs and various) all which we cannot but obſerve in the whole Courſe of human Life.

Now, let the Period of human Life be compared even with eternal future Duration; or, with that Immortality which we ſo naturally deſire; or, with that extenſive Length, in the firſt Ages, which we find recorded in Scripture: Suppoſing, I ſay, upon ſuch Compariſons, we view the Exiſtence of Man in its preſent, ſhort-lived Duration; and yet we ſhall, however, find it a Life, even as ſhort as it is, much longer than the ordinary Life of any other Animal within our Knowledge. For, as other Animals ſooner arrive at their full Age and Maturity, ſo they dye much earlier than to arrive at ſixty or ſeventy Years,—the Period uſually allotted to human Life. It is, therefore, moſt wiſely and conveniently contrived by divine Providence, that, during the tender Years of human Life, the Memory (of Children, I mean) is moſt tenacious and retaining. From this one Advantage, even before we are ripe enough to tranſact worldly Affairs, we retain many Truths concerning God and Man in general, *the efficient Cauſes of Common Good, and of all that Happineſs which we can poſſibly expect.*——And, conſequently, from hence we are inſtructed in this one important Leſſon; namely, *How abſolutely neceſſary it is, not only to purſue this one ultimate End; but, how abſolutely neeeſſary alſo it is, to exert the moſt diffuſive, active Benevolence towards both God and Man, as being the only Means neceſſary to this one, chief, principal End.*

But,——Mr. *Hobbes*, in flat Contradiction to all thoſe demonſtrative Proofs produced to the contrary (and upon the Topic even of Memory, as well as of many other ſuperior Faculties in human Nature) prefers Brutes to Men. For, upon this Scheme, *Leviathan*, Chap. 3. where he treats concerning human Wiſdom, Sagacity, Prudence, Underſtanding, he poſitively affirms, and ſays, "That other Animals are more obſervant of ſuch "Things as contribute towards the End proper for them to purſue; and "that they proſecute ſuch an End by wiſer Means, even at a Year old, "than a Child poſſibly can even at ten Years old."

As

As to my own Part, I have, indeed, with Aſtoniſhment obſerved the Sagacity of Children; who, in their little Plays and Diverſions, in their pertinent *a-propos* Anſwers to Queſtions, and their remarkable Happineſs of Memory in learning Languages, diſcover ſo quick a Readineſs, that nothing, as far as ever I could obſerve of the Kind, ever appeared in Brutes: And, therefore, I ſhall ſubmit it to my Reader's Judgment to determine, whether this ſo bold an Aſſertion, maintained by Mr. *Hobbes*, is not rather invidiouſly, and with Reproach, than ingenuouſly and with Truth defended. Mr. *Hobbes*, however, frequently acknowledges and owns, That the Experience of many Years, eſpecially at an adult Age, naturally creates a Wiſdom; and yet, at the ſame time, he either does not, or will not, ſee, that ſome certain Benefits muſt from hence ariſe to Mankind, ſuperior to any of thoſe to be found in Brutes; whoſe Period of Life is much ſhorter, and whoſe Genius, let it be what it will from ſo narrow a Period, can make but a very poor Progreſs: Neither can Brutes (notwithſtanding all their Degrees of Knowledge from Experience) communicate to others, eſpecially if at any Diſtance of Time or Place, this their Knowledge, in ſo very commodious and apt a Manner as Mankind can and commonly do, Nay, and to ſuch a Degree of Perfection can the human Mind communicate this their Knowledge, as to make the moſt ſurprizing Progreſs in Wiſdom, Years, Underſtanding, Experience, and in the reciprocal, mutual Happineſs and Society of each other.

SECT. XXVI.

HAVING, then, with no ſmall Labour and Pains, finiſhed what I had to ſay concerning the human Imagination and Memory, (1) with thoſe five Helps neceſſary to increaſe and improve the Capacities, Powers and Energies of them; I may now, in the next Place, proceed to thoſe Properties peculiar to human Bodies, which ſeem more nearly to concern the Regulation and Management of the Affections, *i. e.* the Appetites and Paſſions, with the Government and natural Tendency of them, in purſuing the ſeveral Degrees of GOOD rather than thoſe of EVIL to OTHERS. As the neceſſary Foundation, therefore, of the Properties here to be conſidered, we ſuppoſe that the third Characteriſtic or Mark (laid down at the Nineteenth Section of this Chapter) drawn from the Nature of *Animals in general*, is allowed and taken for granted, *viz. That thoſe very Affections which are exerciſed in the Purſuit of any Good,*

Concerning the Government and natural Tendency of the human Affections, *i. e.* the Appetites and Paſſions.

(1) *With thoſe five Helps neceſſary to*, &c.]
1. A larger Bulk of Brain.
2. A greater Quantity of Blood; and, conſequently, a more copious Flow of Animal Spirits.
3. An erect Poſture of Body.
4. A quicker Motion of all the Animal-Juices.
5. The Period of human Life.

carry naturally a prone Tendency to pleaſe and delight all Animals in whom theſe Affections inhere.——And,——that they (i. e. *all Animals*) *incline, upon this very Account, to ſuch Affections as, by a Propenſity equally natural, favour and tend to promote the Preſervation of (each reſpectively) their own Lives.*

In theſe Propenſities are laid all thoſe radical, inbred Principles, determining them rather to ſecure the Means of each his own Life and Health reſpectively, than to draw down upon themſelves Ruin and Deſtruction.—What is here ſuppoſed being allowed; there are two Properties, or ſpecific, diſtinguiſhing Inſtances of wiſe Contrivance in the Make and Structure of an human Body, which muſt contribute to make Mankind regard, with their cloſeſt Care and beſt Diligence, the Regulation and Conduct of their Affections, their Appetites and Paſſions, above all the other Animal-creation.

1. The firſt of theſe two Properties demonſtrates, That the human Body can, from the Make and Structure of it, (1) effect ſuch an End much better than any other Species of Animals, from their reſpective Make and Structure, can effect.—And, *Secondly*,—That the other of theſe two Properties is better fitted, *cæteris paribus*, to promote the Health, and, conſequently, the Life of each Individual himſelf in the human Species, than of all the other Species of Animals reſpectively whatſoever.

If, however, in both or either of theſe two Inſtances of Contrivance, or Properties peculiar to Man, my Reader ſhould ſeem to doubt the Cogency of ſuch an Argument, and the Concluſions deducible from it, notwithſtanding all the Proofs here offered to convince him: If this ſhould, I ſay, happen to be the Caſe, let him not, if he pleaſes, forget to carry this one Caution along with him, namely, That theſe anatomical Obſervations are, in our preſent Argument, rather adventitious, ſuper-added, over-weighty, [*Superpondii loco*] than that they carry any Power, any Weight which our Argument really wants, or has the leaſt Occaſion for.—And—the Foundation of this poſitive Aſſertion is:—Becauſe, the whole Sum and Subſtance of our Proof is eſtabliſhed upon a Foundation ſufficiently firm, ſolid, weighty;—and—from other Arguments, demonſtrative, inconteſtable, concluſive—ſuppoſing that theſe anatomical Remarks had been left entirely out of the Queſtion.—And yet,—I cannot help thinking, that the mention of theſe two Properties (ſo peculiar and obſervable in an human Body) cannot prove quite uſeleſs:—Becauſe, perhaps, ſome future Writers may, by a more happy Turn and Connexion of Thought, explain, at leaſt, (in caſe they do no more) the full Application and all the Uſes of theſe Properties.—As to myſelf, I entertain no Doubt, but, that, theſe two Properties in human Nature will, upon ſtricter Enquiry, appear prevailing

(1) *Effect ſuch an End*, &c.] *i. e.* The Regulation and Conduct of their Affections, their Appetites and Paſſions.

prevailing Cauſes in anſwering many other excellent Purpoſes.—And, at preſent I think it, at leaſt, highly probable, that they have their Uſes towards producing thoſe moſt noble Effects which I here endeavour to ſet forth and confirm. Now—theſe two Inſtances of Contrivance or Properties, ſo peculiar to an human Body, are,

Firſt, *That Plexus Nervorum, that Complication, that Plicature of Nerves proper to Man.*—And,

Secondly, *The Connexion of the Pericardium and Diaphragm, together with that Communication (ſo nearly allied to this Connexion) which appears between the Nerve of the Diaphragm and that Plexus of Nerves thus peculiar to Man:—A Plexus ſo very miniſterial and uſeful to the Offices of the Heart and to the Regions round about it.*

Concerning theſe two Contrivances, I ſhall only quote briefly ſome Remarks made by Anatomiſts, and what Inferences they, in general, have drawn upon ſuch Affections, Appetites and Paſſions as ariſe from them: Obſervations and Remarks applicable and well-fitted to the Point at preſent under our Contemplation.

Now—it is an evident Caſe that the ſtrongeſt, moſt vehement Paſſions of human Nature are employed about, and exerted upon the Subject-matter of *Laws* both *natural* and *civil:* Becauſe, in theſe two Sorts of Laws are treated the original Inſtitution and Eſtabliſhment of a diſtinct Diviſion and of a ſeparate Uſe, both in *Property* and *Induſtry*, that is, in *meum* and *tuum*, or *mine* and *thine*,—and, which, indeed are the moſt intereſting Motives which influence Mankind.——And, therefore, it cannot admit of the leaſt Doubt, but that all thoſe Inſtruments and Powers of Action in an human Body (which naturally ſubſerve and miniſter either to raiſe or moderate the Paſſions) vigorouſly act their Parts and perform their Offices, in eſtabliſhing and ſupporting the Diſtinction between *what is our own*, and *what belongs to another:* And all this, only in other Words, is telling us, *what the whole Subject-matter of the Laws of Nature is.*

1. *Concerning the Plexus Nervorum*, i. e. *that Plicature or Complication of Nerves ſo remarkable in an human Body.* 1. Plexus Nervorum.

In the firſt Place, therefore, as to this Plexus of Nerves, I ſhall tranſcribe ſome few Paſſages from Dr. *Thomas Willis* Treatiſe upon the *Anatomy of the human Brain*, Chap. 26. Such Readers as can readily come at this Book may conſult the moſt learned Author himſelf,—that ſo, with a more delicious Taſte, they may imbibe the Sweets from the pure Fountain-head of the excellent Original, let them peruſe and ſtudy the ninth Copper Plate, in which this Plexus of Nerves is moſt beautifully delineated. This *Plexus Nervoſus*, then, ſo peculiar to an human Body, is ſituated near the Middle of the Neck, at the Baſe of the intercoſtal Nerve: This Plexus tranſmits Fibres into the *Vaſa Sanguifera* and the *Oeſophagus*; it tranſmits

See Dr. Willis's Life in the Appendix, Page 117.

The Reader may find this Copper Plate in the Rev. Mr. John Maxwell's Tranſlation of our Author, between Pages 150 and 151.

Plexus Nervoſus, is a great Number of minute, complicated Branches of the Nerves. Rev. Mr. Maxwell. In nervo intercoſtali conſiſtit Plexus Nervoſus, Sect. 27. Page 144. Latin Quarto.

tranſmits *Surculi* or ſlender Branches, which it diſpatches into the Baſes or Trunks of the diaphragmatic Nerve and of the *Par Vagum* :—It tranſmits theſe *Surculi* alſo into the recurrent Nerve ; and this Plexus does, moreover, ſend out two Branches on either Side towards the Heart ; the one of theſe two Branches, taking its Riſe ſomewhat lower down, purſues thoſe Nerves cloſe ; and then theſe Nerves altogether, in Conjunction meeting with ſeveral Blood-veſſels on the oppoſite Side, at laſt form the *Plexus Cardiacus*. From hence ariſe not only the moſt remarkable Branches of thoſe Nerves, ſpread over the Regions of the Heart ; but, alſo the *Anſulæ Nervoſæ* or *Nervous Loops* which ſurround both the Pneumonic Vein and the Pneumonic Artery : Which Vein and which Artery are the principal Channels of that Blood from whence thoſe Spirits (which are the animal Principles of the Affections) grow warm, efferveſce and boil. This ſame intercoſtal Nerve alſo, in its next Courſe, braces the ſubclavian Artery, even before the vertebral Arteries leading to the Brain ſpring and take their Riſe.

" The intercoſtal Nerve, ſays Dr. *Willis*, ſerves, thro' theſe ſmaller " Branches, in the Place of an eſpecial, correſponding Meſſenger, moving, " as it were, backwards and forwards, on purpoſe to keep up a con- " ſtant Intercourſe between the Senſations of the Brain and the Heart." By Means of this Intercourſe, the Conceptions of the Brain affect the Heart, and occaſion that the Veſſels of the Heart, together with thoſe of the Diaphragm, are put into Motion : And, from hence it is, that, the Syſtole and Diaſtole of the Heart, and the Motions, conſequently, of the Blood and of Reſpiration, are altered and changed. And, from hence alſo it is, that the State and Condition of the Animal-Spirits, which are generated from the Blood, ſuffer ſome new Impulſe.

The Doctor alſo farther adds, " That the Thoughts employed about " the Acts of *Appetite* and *Judgment* may be fairly elicited, and fully " drawn forth ; in which Thoughts the Efficacies and Workings of Wiſ- " dom and of the Virtues are plainly diſcerned."

He further obſerves, " That flowings of Blood in the Cheſt are re- " ſtrained ; that the irregular Throbbings, of even the Heart itſelf, are " moderated by the Veins, and even, as it were, by Bit and Bridle ; and " from hence it muſt happen that theſe irregular Throbbings are compoſed " and ſettled into regular Motions."

The Doctor has alſo obſerved, in his anatomical Diſſections, " That " the *Plexus Nervoſus* in a Fœtus, at his Birth, is very ſmall ; and, that, " it is defended by a Sort of leſſer Safe-guard.

He alſo farther obſerves,—" That, in a Monkey (an Animal ſtrictly, " indeed, reſembling the Cunning and Paſſions of the human Species) he " has, upon Diſſection, diſcovered theſe minute Branchings diſpatched " from the intercoſtal Nerve into the Heart and Parts thereunto belonging,

" ing, before that the intercoſtal Nerve had been inſerted into that Plexus " or Plicature of the Thorax, called the *Plexus Thoracicus*. And, laſtly, " that this *Plexus Nervoſus*, in Monkeys, widely differs from any thing " of the Kind diſcoverable in all the other Species of Brute Animals."

I ſhall not here tranſcribe any more from this moſt ingenious Phyſician and curious Anatomiſt. The Quotations already produced are fully ſufficient to demonſtrate, That, Man is naturally provided with ſuch Organs and Inſtruments, (beſides thoſe of a rational Nature) and perhaps, with many others in the Brain likewiſe, which are not as yet diſcovered:——All properly fitted and contrived to govern and modulate his Affections, his Appetites and Paſſions.——Now——theſe Obſervations and Diſcoveries are not of trifling, inſignificant Moment to our preſent Point of Enquiry, notwithſtanding, that, Inſtruments and Contrivances, ſomewhat ſimilar and analagous, might be diſcovered in Brute-creatures, for the better Preſervation of that Peace and Society which they naturally require amongſt themſelves.

But—ſince, according to the ſtrict Truth of Obſervation, theſe Properties of an animal Body are peculiar to an human Body; Man, therefore, cannot but be fully ſenſible, how indiſpenſably neceſſary that Duty is which he lies under, to manage and govern, with Care, Diligence and Caution, that important Truſt committed to his Charge; and to regulate his Affections, his Appetites, his Paſſions and Deſires with Prudence, Wiſdom and Moderation.

SECT. XXVII.

I AM come to the ſecond remarkable Contrivance, juſt now mentioned, obſervable in human Bodies (and in them only) and that is, the Connexion between the Pericardium and the Diaphragm; and, this is a Connexion no where to be obſerved in other Animals. To this we may ſubjoin the Connexion between that *Plexus* (juſt now mentioned) *peculiar to Man*, and *the Nerve of the Diaphragm*. For, as Dr. *Willis*, in that ſame excellent Treatiſe of his *De Cerebro*, has obſerved, " there are *two* (and " in ſome Subjects *three*) *Nerves* diſpatched from this *Plexus Nervoſus* into " *the Nerve of the Diaphragm*." Neither ought we to paſs over in Silence, that from the very intercoſtal Nerve itſelf (and in which this *Plexus Nervoſus* is ſituated) numberleſs Branches are interſperſed thro' all the Regions of the Lower Belly, in order that the Heart may carry a Correſpondence, more or leſs, with them all.

The Connexion between the Pericardium and Diaphragm, not to be found the ſame in other Animals that it is in Man.

It would be too tedious to purſue minutely all thoſe Particulars;—and it muſt, indeed, appear a raſh Preſumption to aſſert particularly any thing in a peremptory Way, concerning the certain and full Uſes of all thoſe Nerves

Nerves reſpectively: Becauſe, ſo curious and nice an Inveſtigation as this, has not as yet been fully traced.

Let ſuch inquiſitive, critical Diſcoveries as theſe ſtand as they will, it ſufficiently anſwers my Purpoſe to remark only, in the general, ſome few Obſervations concerning the Uſe of thoſe Nerves; and, in the which, Anatomiſts are entirely agreed. And the *firſt* is, *That theſe Nerves are very inſtrumental, and ſignally ſerviceable in impreſſing and ſtopping Motion.*

Secondly, *That theſe Nerves, from all the ſeveral Parts of the Body in which they are inſerted, do convey the Senſe either of Pain or Pleaſure to the Brain.* And,

Thirdly, *That theſe Nerves cauſe the other Nerves, with which they are complicated, to ſympathize and fellow-feel with themſelves.*

Theſe three Points being ſuppoſed and allowed; I take for granted one remarkable Truth (becauſe it is a Truth confirmed by many repeated Experiments) namely; *That, in an human Body, the Heart and Diaphragm, as alſo all the Bowels of the Lower Belly* (e. g. *the Liver, the Spleen, and the Spermatic Veſſels*, &c.) *are differently and variouſly affected in all the more violent and boiſterous Paſſions, concerned either about Good or Evil, relating either to ourſelves or others.* But moſt eſpecially ſo, ſince human Affairs are, from the Nature of Things, ſo remarkably mixed, interwoven and blended.—And—this Mixture in human Affairs is, at all times, eaſily obſervable, upon account of a noted Similitude, a Sameneſs of Condition, and of natural Circumſtances amongſt all Mankind.

Now, it is evident, that theſe Affections and Motions are cauſed by the Help and Miniſtration of Nerves, deeply implanted and deeply fixed in the Bowels and inward Parts juſt now mentioned; and, very likely, not without the Concurrence and Co-operation of the Blood carried thro' the Arteries.

The ſame Wants, the ſame Infirmities, the ſame Appetites and Paſſions ſympathize, fellow-feel, compaſſionate, &c.

From all which Obſervations, therefore, taken as Premiſes, I conclude, That the Heart of Man, in theſe ſeveral Paſſions, becomes more affected than it either is, or can be in other Animals. Becauſe, upon account of thoſe peculiar Connexions of Nerves and of the Pericardium (already mentioned) the Heart aſſociates and ſympathizes with the other Bowels.—And alſo, in the ſecond Place,—becauſe the human Heart, as well as the other Viſcera or inward Parts, in all Kinds of Affections, are impelled and agitated by the Powers and Energies of a more active Brain, as well as by the ſtronger Impetus of quicker, more lively Animal Spirits. For, ſince the Heart (and the Blood impelled, whoſe Motion is impreſſed by the Heart) is the Fountain of Life and Health, and, conſequently, of all Pleaſure which we feel and enjoy; it neceſſarily muſt happen, that ſuch Affections as, with more than ordinary Vehemence, either increaſe or retard the Heart's Motion, affect the Heart more vehemently in Man than in Brute; and ſuch Affections are more weightily and ſenſibly felt by Man, than

than they poſſibly can by Brutes, whoſe Hearts do not correſpond by ſo many Communications with their Bowels and inward Parts.—And, what we may further add, the Brain in Brutes is much more inert and ſluggiſh, and their Animal-Spirits, whether they be conſidered in their Blood or in their Nerves, are leſs active as well as leſs copious.

Of what weighty Conſequence, therefore, it is to our preſent well-being, to obſerve thoſe Admonitions, daily ariſing from our very Frame and Make, concerning that indiſpenſable Neceſſity, which we are always under, of regulating, with all poſſible Care, Caution and Diligence, our Affections, *i. e.* our Appetites and Paſſions——A Leſſon which they can beſt underſtand who ſeriouſly weigh this one important Conſideration,—*That the whole ſubſtantial Eſſence of all Virtue, and of that whole Obedience, conſequently, which is due to the Laws of Nature, is comprehended under the Regulation of thoſe Affections and Paſſions which are uſually employed either in ſettling, or, in preſerving when once ſettled, diſtinct Properties and ſeparate Poſſeſſions, diſtributed and divided amongſt all.*

But—ſince our Anatomiſts (beſides the general Topics of Anatomy hitherto mentioned) have further obſerved two very particular Phænomena, which, with great Accuracy, they account for and explain, by that operative Communication connecting the Heart and ſome other inward Parts of an human Body (and which Phænomena are, 1. *Riſus*, or Laughter. 2. *Suſpirium*, or Sighing.) From hence, I ſay, it came into my Head to imagine, that theſe two Phænomena, or Appearances, are certain Symptoms or outward Signs of two very governing Paſſions in human Nature, namely, *Firſt*, Joy, *Lætitia*; *Secondly*, Grief, *Dolor*.

Riſus, or Laughter, is the Phænomenon, the Indication, the Symptom, the outward Sign of the moſt diffuſive Joy.

Suſpirium, or Sighing, as ſure an Indication or Sign of violent Grief or Pain.

Now, if we ſtrictly examine into the true Source of all our Affections and Paſſions we ſhall find, that, all the other Affections and Paſſions, more or leſs, reſembles theſe two, *i. e.* Joy and Grief. And—which, from a Parity of Reaſon, we ſhall be able alſo, I hope, to diſcover in ſome future Parts of this *Enquiry*: And, upon the ſame Analogy of Reaſon likewiſe, that the Qualities and Effects of theſe Paſſions may as rationally be accounted for and explained. The Hints here given are intended by way of Specimen of ſuch Affections as, before mentioned, we in the general only exhibit, as they directly tend to anſwer our preſent Deſign and Purpoſe.

In the firſt Place, therefore, we remark, from the Chapter already quoted out of Dr. *Willis*'s Treatiſe upon *the Anatomy of the Brain*, That, from that Communication (juſt now mentioned) between the *Plexus Nervorum* proper to human Bodies only, and the Nerve of the Diaphragm, a genuine,

a genuine, true Cauſe is aſſigned, why *Riſibility* is an Attribute peculiar to human Nature: That, both the Heart and Diaphragm are each affected by any agreeable Senſation raiſed in the Imagination; as alſo, that the Heart (by this Communication of Nerves, as they paſs from the Plexus Nervorum) is drawn upwards, and, as it were, into repeated Palpitations. For, the Pericardium being cloſely connected and joined as a Covering to the Heart; from hence it is, that, the Heart and the Lungs alſo are put into Motion. And, *Secondly*, becauſe this ſame intercoſtal Nerve continues to run ſo far upwards as to join the Nerves of the Cheeks and Jaws; from hence (that is to ſay, from this Sympathy and Correſpondence) the Poſtures and Geſtures of both Mouth and Face pathetically anſwer to, and correſpond with, the *Cachinnus* or Laugh, firſt raiſed and formed in the Heart.

Since the intercoſtal Nerve is ſituated in the Plexus Nervoſus, our Author here uſes them both (i. e. Nervus Intercoſtalis & plexus Nervoſus) promiſcuouſly.

Dr. *Willis* has a great deal more to the ſame Purpoſe.

Dr. *Lower* differs in ſome Points from Dr. *Willis*. However, in the main, the two Doctors Sentiments correſpond well enough. Dr. *Richard Lower*'s Treatiſe *upon the Heart*, Chap. 2. Page 90. is very well worth the Reader's while to look over.

To all that theſe two great Men have ſaid upon this Subject, as applicable to my preſent Purpoſe, I ſubjoin, that Laughter is the moſt delicious, ſweetening, joyous Pleaſure of the human Life; but more eſpecially of a Life amicable, friendly, ſocial: And, on the contrary, that Laughter is of little or no Uſe in either Solitude or in thoſe Paſſions which are exerciſed upon any anxious Evil; as for Inſtance, in Anger, Envy, Hatred, Fear: And, in the next Place, that Laughter muſt be reckoned amongſt thoſe pleaſurable Things which render a ſocial Life agreeable; and—but very ſeldom the contrary.

Now, becauſe ſuch a Motion (that is, the Motion of Laughter) as this, repeated at proper Intervals of Time, is wonderfully agreeable, and with a powerful, active Oppoſition throws off all the Anxieties of Sorrow; we may, from hence, rationally conclude that, Human Nature, for the very ſelf-ſame Reaſon that it is wiſely framed to contrive its own Self-preſervation, is alſo, from this wiſe Contrivance, at the ſame time likewiſe, carried by a very ſtrong Propenſity to this one enticing, agreeable *Charm of Society* proper only to Man. And, conſequently, that thus far the Connexion is very cloſe and intimate, between *the Care of Self*, and an earneſt Deſire of rendering our Being *agreeable and pleaſurable to others*.

All the Inconveniencies of Sighing ariſe from the Connexion of the Pericardium and Diaphragm.

As to the ſecond outward Sign obſervable in Man, namely, *Suſpirium*, or Sighing; altho' it be not the Property of human Nature only, yet it is very frequently obſerved in Man: Neither, indeed, is this Property, as far as ever I could learn, reckoned in Brute-creatures, amongſt their Symptoms of Grief or Melancholy. Whereas the Truth is, that Sighing (upon account

account of the Connexion between the Pericardium and Diaphragm in Man, (and by the Motions of which Connexion, Sighing is cauſed) produces more violent Diſorders in the human Heart, than it does in the Heart of any other Animal whatſoever: And the Reaſon is very evident; becauſe the Motions of the Heart (ſo abſolutely neceſſary to the Continuance of Life) are much agitated and diſturbed by any violent, extraordinary Motion of the Diaphragm; and, to which the Heart is annexed.

From an infrequency in Sighing, little or no Inconvenience ariſes; but, if Sighs return frequent and increaſe in Length, the Heart becomes wonderfully enfeebled, cannot execute its Office, and, at laſt, quite loſes all its Powers of Action.

The Evil to an human Body, which next immediately follows this Diſorder, is that Diſtemper which the Phyſicians call *Singultus*, the Hickup or Hiccough—a Diſtemper moſt judiciouſly deſcribed by Dr. *Richard Lower* in his ſecond Chapter *De Cordis Motu*.

Now, altho' this Diſtemper may oftentimes immediately cauſe ſome Hurt (or, at leaſt, prove the remote Occaſion of ſome Hurt) to the Ventricle of the Heart; yet it is truly (properly ſpeaking) an Affection or a Diſtemper of the Diaphragm, which, altho', when its Continuance is ſhort, has little or no Effect upon us; yet, when it perſeveres, grows long, and is attended with other Symptoms, (which, from *Hippocrates's Aphoriſms*, are well known to Phyſicians) proves often the Meſſenger, and is, in ſome ſort, the Cauſe of Death.

The Singultus or Hiccough is properly a Diſtemper of the Diaphragm.

In the Courſe of my Reflections upon Sighing, (the natural Conſequence of Grief) a Conjecture, not at all improbable, came into my Mind concerning the Cauſe of Tears; one Effect, uſually reckoned amongſt others, of Grief—an Effect of Grief proper only to Man. My Opinion is, That, in Grief, the Motion of the Blood, at the Extremities of the Veins and Arteries in the Head, is ſomewhat obſtructed, ſo as not to admit of a free Circulation.

The Cauſe of Tears.

The Motion of the Blood obſtructed.

There are alſo other Marks, whereby to judge concerning theſe Obſtructions in this Paſſion: In this Caſe, the Lachrymal Glands, or Secretory Ducts which ſeparate the Tears, are capable of diſtilling a watry Humour in great Plenty from the Blood, and to pour it thro' their Orifices into the Eyes. The firſt Diſcovery of the Lachrymal Glands we owe to *Steno*.

Steno.

What gave Riſe to this Conjecture of mine, was that remarkable Experiment of Dr. *Lower*, where, upon tying the Jugular Veins in a living Dog, all Parts of the Head ſwelled monſtrouſly, Tears flowed from the Eyes in abundance, and the Saliva ſo copiouſly iſſued forth from the Mouth, as if a Salivation had been raiſed upon him.

Dr. Lower tied the jugular Veins in a living Dog, &c.

The Reader may, if he pleaſes, have Recourſe to an Account of this Experiment, ſo very ſignal, and, upon many Accounts, uſeful, in the Doctor's ſecond Chapter *De Corde*, juſt now mentioned.—And this Conjecture

ture of mine may not, perhaps, appear quite trifling. For, from hence, in all Probability, Man is the only Animal who weeps: Either, becauſe, in the Paſſion of Grief, greater Obſtructions happen in the Blood of the Head, proportionable to the Magnitude of the Brain, and to the quick Senſation of a reflecting, recollecting, animadverting Faculty: Or, becauſe the Blood of an human Brain, being more copious, warmer, and moved with a quicker Velocity in the Head, cannot ſo well carry off any ſuch Obſtructions, without ſeparating a ſaltiſh Liquor by thoſe Glands from whence Tears naturally, and of Courſe, muſt flow.

Tears in Man accounted for anatomically.

But—even ſuppoſing, in the Paſſion of Grief, that no ſuch Obſtructions as theſe happen in the Brain; yet, however, if, during this Paſſion, the Blood grows more ſizy than to paſs with its uſual eaſy Flow thro' its Channels: Or, if the Blood, upon a contrary Suppoſition, becomes more rarified: Or, ſuppoſing it driven with a very ſmall Increaſe of Velocity, from the Heart towards the Head, (becauſe thro' theſe Windings, Meanders and mazy Canals in which the Blood paſſes, a quicker Paſſage into the Veins is not allowed) it neceſſarily muſt happen that the Arteries ſwell and grow fuller. And therefore the Cauſe for this Overflow of Tears will ſtill remain the very ſame, as if the Obſtructions, which we ſuppoſe, had moſt vigorouſly oppoſed the Courſe of Blood in the Head.—And theſe Aſſertions can, by Experiments, be eaſily proved upon (1) Hydragogical Principles, *i. e.* Principles and Experiments peculiarly fitted to diſcharge ſerous or watry Humours from the Blood.—Let the Truth of the Fact, however, be what it will, the Eruption of Tears, from theſe Obſtructions, is a ſure Token, that the Health of an human Creature is in much more Danger from an indulged Paſſion of Grief, than it is in any other Animal. For, from an Evacuation of the whole Serum in the Blood, when once the Serum has made an Irruption into the ſeveral Parts of the Head, the Lachrymal Glands cannot ſecrete a ſufficient Quantity of Tears, notwithſtanding, that, the Perſon, affected with Grief, may receive ſome ſmall Relief, even from ſo partial an Evacuation by theſe Glands.

Suppoſing the Blood more ſizy or more rarified, or the Velocity of it, from the Heart towards the Head, increaſed; upon any of theſe Suppoſitions the Arteries of the Head muſt ſwell and grow fuller.

An Imagination lowered, over-caſt by a Cloud, and heavily overburthened with Symptoms of various Diſtempers (which, according to the State and Habit of Body reſpectively, in Perſons affected with Grief, but more particularly in hypochondriac, melancholy Conſtitutions, which uſually follow) fully demonſtrates, that the whole Diſtemper of Grief is not carried off by Tears. For, Tears are obſervable in but very few Men of adult Age;—and yet—it is commonly remarked, that the Blood of a Stag (eſpecially of an hunted Stag, when his Blood is warmed and rouſed into

(1) *Hydragogical Principles.*] Hydragogue, [*i. e.* Ὑδραγωγία] the Draining or Diſcharge of a ſerous, watry Humour: A Term made familiar and well underſtood in Phyſic. Dr. *Quincy* obſerves, (in his *Diſpenſatory*, Part 2. Sect. 8. *of Cathartics*, Page 190) that whatſoever Medicine is good in Dropſies and all watry Corpulency tending thereunto, is called *Hydragogue.*

into a quicker Motion) nearly reſembles human Blood: And, when he finds himſelf unable to baffle the Chace of a Pack in full Cry, will, at the Approach of Death, burſt into Tears.——Not to dwell any longer upon Speculations of ſo nice a Curioſity; my laſt Obſervation in this Section, is That, *from the common, well-tried Experience of Mankind, unleſs the human Paſſions be coerced and reſtrained by the Government of Reaſon, they will foment and inflame numberleſs Diſorders.—But—more eſpecially thoſe of an hypochondriac Kind, Diſorders to which Mankind, of all other Animals, is moſt ſubject.* Whereas, on the contrary, *When theſe our Paſſions are rationally managed, they render us lively, active, vigorous; and, qualify us for the Exerciſe of any Employment: And, conſequently, a ſtudious Care, a diligent Concern in managing and modulating theſe our Paſſions, is highly neceſſary, in order to ſweeten and perfect the human Life.* The Concluſion, therefore, which we here endeavour to eſtabliſh, holds inviolably true: Whether or no we have, after all our Pains, diſcovered the original Sources and Cauſes of theſe our Affections: Or, whether we continue in the Dark about them: And, that they ſtill require a deeper Search, a ſtricter Scrutiny, a clearer Inveſtigation.

The Concluſion is, That the human Paſſions muſt, and ought to be reſtrained by the Government of Reaſon.

From Effects ſufficiently well known, the indiſpenſable Obligation fully appears, of applying ſome certain Rules of Reaſon to confine our Paſſions within regular, limited Bounds. Theſe very Rules will then, upon Examination, be found no other than thoſe which command and direct the Exerciſe and Application of them to ſuch *Means* only, as will, and muſt, conduce to the moſt exalted, the beſt End; namely, *the univerſal, common Good of all.*—Now—*the Means*, placed within human Power, and neceſſary to this *End*, are thoſe merely-voluntary, moral, free Acts only, which both *cauſe* and *preſerve* a diſtinct Diviſion of, and a ſeparate Property in, ſuch multiplied Poſſeſſions, ſuch Labour and Induſtry as can moſt contribute to the *Happineſs of ALL.*

The Effects of our Affections demonſtrate the Neceſſity of their Obedience to the Rules of Reaſon.

Theſe Rules point out Means to attain the beſt End.

Theſe Rules, in a Word, are no other than the very *Laws of Nature* themſelves, as ſhall be demonſtrated hereafter.—And—the moral or free Acts here meant, are no other than Acts of *univerſal Juſtice, i. e.* Acts of *Virtue——of Virtue under the whole complex Idea, as conformable to theſe Laws.*

Upon the whole, therefore, we may, from theſe Premiſſes, conclude, *That, all the conſtituent Parts of an human Body, which contribute, either in Whole or Part, to the better Regulation of our Appetites and Paſſions: Or, which prove the Duty of ſuch a Regulation, (neceſſarily more incumbent upon us than upon the Brute-creation) greatly conduce, not only to the Knowledge of Nature's Laws, but alſo, in ſome reſpect, create a Propenſity, an Inclination, a Tendency, a Deſire to perform and to obey whatſoever theſe Laws direct.*

SECT. XXVIII.

Why the Propenſity to Venery in Man is not limited to a time, or a Seaſon, as it is in other Animals.

See Sect. 20 of his Chapter.

WHAT we now further add, to all we have already ſaid, ſhall be delivered in few Words. To that fourth Characteriſtic, Criterion, or Mark laid down, common to all Animals in general (and which is drawn from a Propenſity to propagate the Species) we ſhall here ſubjoin a Peculiarity, which, as I have obſerved, is proper only to the human Body itſelf;—namely—That, the Propenſity to Venery is not, as in moſt other Animals, limited in human Nature to certain Seaſons and times of the Year, but is, more or leſs, perpetual and conſtant. From hence, therefore, it is, that, to the Generality of Mankind, a married State becomes neceſſary: And—from hence alſo—as neceſſarily ariſes an Appetite or Deſire, ſtronger and more vehement in them than in other Animals, to produce their Young.—Nay—this Appetite, this Deſire is ſo radically inherent, ſo deeply rooted in human Nature, that it cannot, by any Art or Device, be extirpated. Nay—even Marriage-articles themſelves concerning Alimony, Separate-maintenance, Family-ſettlements, *&c.* carry over this Appetite but very little Power.

Seeing, then, that all theſe Effects, viſible and neceſſary, proceed from a more active, lively Blood in the human Body, and, from a more vigorous Energy in the Spermatic Veſſels; it neceſſarily follows, that theſe Effects muſt grow larger, and laſt longer in Man than in Brute. And alſo—*Secondly*, That the Care to ſupport, manage and govern a Family ſhould grow more ſtudious, more intenſe, and increaſe in Proportion.—Now, ſuch a Care, ſo ſtudious a Concern as this, could not poſſibly ſubſiſt, unleſs there be ſome Knowledge of the Laws of Nature: And, unleſs there be ſome natural Propenſity to obſerve and obey theſe Laws. Upon a fair, impartial Enquiry it appears, that no one Duty, of real Advantage, can be performed for the Service of a Family, if there be not originally ſome Diviſion, ſome diſtinct Separation of Property, mutual Induſtry and Labour, agreed upon, maintained and continued. Becauſe ſuch a Suppoſition as this muſt, at leaſt, be premiſed as neceſſary to the Care, Managenagement and Support of one ſingle Family. And, from an exact Parity of Reaſoning, it follows, that the ſame Sort of Diviſion is as equally neReaſoning from Analogy. ceſſary in all other Families as to all ſuch Property, Induſtry and Labour as are neceſſary to the Preſervation, Support and Happineſs of each reſpectively. So that, the Obligation of ſuch a Diviſion, of ſuch a diſtinct Uſe in Property and Induſtry, ought, by an equal Neceſſity, to be ſuppoſed. Neither can any ſolid, ſubſtantial Reaſon be aſſigned, why, ſuch a Diviſion, ſuch a ſeparate Uſe ſhould not meet with an equal Degree of Conſent and Approbation: And, conſequently, in like manner, the ſame rational Suppoſition comprehends and extends itſelf to all Mankind. Becauſe, in the clear Determination and full Approbation of ſuch a Diviſion as this,

(ſo

(ſo neceſſary to the univerſal Good of all) the Knowledge of, and the Aſſent to, *the Law of Nature* is contained.

Now, notwithſtanding all theſe plain, viſible Effects which ariſe from natural Cauſes, yet, after what Manner the ſeminal, active Particles of Blood in the Buſineſs of Generation, form (according to any Hypotheſis of Natural Philoſophy) a Notion, an Idea, an Appetite, a Deſire, remains ſtill a Secret to be explained by the Philoſophers. For, whilſt ſuch ſubtle Particles as theſe elude all our Senſes, it never will be within the Philoſophers Reach to account for all theſe Effects and Motions ſeverally, in their natural, diſtinct Order.—I have, thro' the whole Courſe of this *Enquiry*, upon this very Account, kept myſelf as clear of all Hypotheſes as poſſible; ſo that, every one is at full Liberty to chuſe for himſelf any Hypotheſis moſt agreeable to his own Obſervation, Experience and Reaſon. It ſufficiently anſwers my preſent Purpoſe to demonſtrate, That the ΣΤΟΡΓΗ, or natural Deſire implanted in us of rearing and preſerving our Young as ſoon as it is born, is the ſame Appetite continued, and no other than that which is implanted in us to propagate our Species, and which proves, in ſome ſort, the Author of their Exiſtence; or, in other Words, it is the Deſire of applying all the proper Means in our Power, of Life and Preſervation for them.——And, this Appetite or Deſire alſo implies in it a ſtrong Reſiſtance, a firm Oppoſition to all Attempts upon their Life and Preſervation. But, upon this Head we have already ſaid what is ſufficient and full to the Purpoſe.

I ſhall only add here one Obſervation more, *viz.* That, ſince every Child of Man continues longer helpleſs than other Animals, and requires, for a longer Period, the Care and Aſſiſtance of Parents; that therefore, from ſo continued an Uſe, from ſo habitual an Exerciſe of Parental Love, the Affection grows ſo predominant and powerful, that Parents, with great Anxiety and Dread, fear for them every Evil, but, above all, the Evil of Death. And, *this Anxiety, this Dread, this Love riſes, increaſes proportionably, in a compounded Ratio of the Time multiplied into the Care employed in rearing and educating them.* And, conſequently, all the Difficulty itſelf, all that Weight of Labour which appears in forming Man for Society and for public Uſe, is quite overcome; becauſe it is ſuch a Difficulty, ſuch a Weight as is eſtabliſhed upon a natural Hope radically implanted in the original Conſtitution of our Being.——And, this is the effectual Motive, the efficient Cauſe, why Parents, with more than ordinary Care and Diligence, labour this one Point: And, that they daily, more and more, betray fuller Proofs of this Στοργη, of this natural Affection, than ever yet could be diſcovered in any other Animals whatſoever.

What we may alſo here farther add, is, That all thoſe Characteriſtics, Criteria, Characters and Marks, which have been deduced from this one Principle, ought, with more than ordinary Diligence, to be obſerved; becauſe, into this ſingle *Principle, Cauſe* or *Source* is ultimately reſolvable alſo

alſo the reciprocal Love, the reflected-back Affection of Children towards their Parents: And likewiſe, all the mutual, benevolent Love of Relations by Blood; and—this Progreſs and flowing of Affection will, at laſt, naturally lead us into a Love for all Mankind. This kind of Inveſtigation is ſtill more firmly eſtabliſhed upon a farther Evidence; becauſe, it is a well-known Fact, recorded in Hiſtory of the moſt authentic Authority, (and upon which Kind of Teſtimony only, Facts of ancient Date can be known) That, Mankind originally ſprung from the ſame one Pair, the common Parents of all, *Adam* and *Eve*.

Human Society principally owing to the human Soul.

To the laſt Criterion, Characteriſtic or Mark, as drawn from the whole Structure, when unitedly conſidered and taken together, of animal Bodies and their ſeveral Operations, (the reſpective Members and Parts of each Body acting in Conjunction) to this Mark, I ſay, we are to refer thoſe manifeſt Effects of a ſtrict Aſſociation; which fully prove, that Man is fitly and peculiarly made to diſcharge the Duties and Offices of a friendly Society; and alſo, that theſe manifeſt Effects of a ſtricter Alliance between Man and Man, than Brute and Brute, are all demonſtrable in that Sort of Government which has at all times prevailed over the Face of the whole Earth: And—more particularly, in that kind of Government and Oeconomy in Families, where the Father of the Family has ruled and preſided reſpectively over each. It muſt at the ſame time, however, be allowed, that the Kind of Government here meant, is not entirely owing to the Animal-make of human Bodies, ſuperior to that of Brutes:——But, that it is much more eminently owing to a governing, ruling, rational Soul in Man, which, like a wiſe Pilot in a Ship, ſits at the Helm and directs the Steerage.

For, in this Caſe, the peculiar Privileges of ſome few particular Parts and Members, do not ſo immediately fall under our Deliberation, as the fitteſt and beſt Diſpoſition of all the Parts and Members relative to each other; and, in ſuch a Manner, that the beſt Effects may be produced for the Service and Advantage of others: And yet, at the ſame time, it muſt be confeſſed, that this wiſe Diſpoſition of the ſeveral Parts and Members can, with much more Eaſe, be apprehended from the good Effects produced than can be accounted for, or explained, from the ſeveral Parts and Members themſelves.

Now—notwithſtanding this, it muſt however here be remarked, that all the Parts and Members, ſingly, in an human Body can execute much larger Powers, and diſcharge much ſuperior Offices than the Parts and Members of any other animal Body whatſoever, *cæteris paribus*: Becauſe, in the *firſt* Place, we are to obſerve, that human Acts and Powers receive their Impulſe, their Determination from the Energy and Influence of a much larger Brain: Becauſe, *Secondly*, they are put in Motion by a more copious Abundance of Blood; and, of Conſequence, becauſe, *Thirdly*, they muſt be animated and invigorated by a larger Supply of animal Spirits.

See Sect. 23 of this Chapter, larger Brain.

See Sect. 24 of this Chapter, more Blood.

Fourthly,

Fourthly, and laſtly, becauſe they are ſpirited into Motion by an Heart much more wiſely and happily governed, directed and acted upon by Nerves proper to itſelf, and more ſuitably adapted to its own ſeveral Uſes and Offices, than can be diſcovered as belonging to the Heart of any other Animal whatſoever.

See Sect. 24 of this Chapter, larger Supplies of Animal Spirits. Contrivance of the Heart, Sect. 27.

Here then we may begin, and with great Propriety take Notice of ſome Peculiarities very remarkable in two Parts of the human Structure; whereby it appears, that Man is very fitly, and in an eſpecial Manner, contrived for mutual Society, and a friendly Intercourſe; namely, 1. The Contrivance of Man's Face or Countenance, and, 2. The Make or Structure of his Hand, *&c.*

Concerning the human Countenance and Hand, &c.

1. Concerning the human Face or Countenance, *Cicero* has of old obſerved, that the ſame Countenance cannot be diſcovered in any other living Creature: "Becauſe there are not, ſays he, in any other Face, ſo "many Traces of Thought and of *Affections*." Such viſible Marks and Tokens as theſe are very well contrived for the firſt Commencement of Society amongſt Mankind; and they are as wiſely fitted alſo for the Security and laſting Continuance of it. Whereas, in Solitude, theſe viſible Marks and Tokens are not of any Uſe, of any Significancy at all. We are, indeed, fully ſenſible what theſe Signs and Tokens are, notwithſtanding that we cannot minutely expreſs them by Words. And—yet, however, we can with great Eaſe diſtinguiſh and particularize ſome of them: As for Inſtance, 1. A Bluſh of Face in Baſhfulneſs and Modeſty: 2. A paleneſs of Face in Fear and Wrath. Now, theſe two outward Signs of inward Commotions are viſible in the human Countenance; becauſe, as the Cuticula, or Scarf-ſkin of the Face is thin and clear, the Increaſe or Decreaſe of Blood, and its ſeveral Motions under this Skin, are ſoon perceived.—But—beſides this, in the ſecond Place, from the conſpicuous, bright clearneſs of this outward Skin (ſo very peculiar to Man) ariſes, in a great Meaſure, that beautiful Complexion which blooms in the human Face.—This pleaſing Complexion is alſo, in the third Place, of prevalent Efficacy in creating and engaging a mutual Benevolence, a reciprocal Good-will amongſt Mankind; and therefore, upon this very Account, it ought not to be paſſed over in Silence. From hence alſo, in the fourth Place, it is, that this lively Bluſh, this charming glow of Blood is obſerved to appear ſo beautifully intermixed with the Bloom and Colour of the Skin. And from hence alſo, in the fifth Place, it is, that the various Motions of the Blood, according to the Variety of human Paſſions, are obſerved to produce ſo many pleaſing Aſpects.—We may alſo, to theſe viſible Marks and Tokens, add, Sixthly, That, Laughter and Weeping, with thoſe ſeveral Sympathies and Symptoms of Paſſions and Affections, which give a Reliſh to human Society, are of ſignal Service in baniſhing all Ferocity, all Cruelty of Nature from amongſt Mankind. As to the ſeveral Cauſes of all theſe Sympathies, Symptoms and Paſſions, ſo peculiar to,

Cicero de legibus, lib. 1. Sect. 9. Plin. Nat. Hiſt. lib. 11. p. 779. tom. 1. N° 113c.

Our Author, thro' his whole Book, underſtands by *Affections* the Appetites and Paſſions.

to human Nature, we have already, and very lately, given ſome uſeful Hints. All the Diverſities of Looks in each Countenance, according to the Variety of Affections, Appetites and Paſſions, (and—all which are ſcarcely capable of an Enumeration) proceed either, *Firſt*, from different Velocities of our Blood; which Velocities are, in ſome Degree, perceivable from a change of Colour in the Cuticula, or outward Surface of the Face: Or, *Secondly*, perhaps, from the different Motions, Actions and Drawings alſo of thoſe Muſcles which miniſter to the Eyes, and to the reſt of the human Face. For, as theſe Muſcles are put into Motion by the Nerves of the fifth and ſixth Pair, and which Nerves (*i. e.* of the fifth and ſixth Pair) give Riſe to the Intercoſtal Muſcle; ſo, conſequently, theſe Nerves, above all others, communicate, in an eſpecial Manner, with that Plexus of Nerves ſo peculiar to Man, and which we have already deſcribed, as taken from Dr. *Willis*. Upon theſe Cauſes, as relative to human Nature, in ſome meaſure, are grounded theſe two proverbial Sayings; 1. *The Countenance is the Image of the Mind*; and, 2. *The Eyes are the Diſcoverers of the Mind* (1).

See above, at Sect. 26 of this Chapter.

Infinite Variety of human Faces.

We may alſo here farther add, the infinite Variety of human Faces: From whence it is, that, amongſt ſo many Millions of Perſons, ſcarcely two ever yet known found to be juſt alike. And, now—This, ſo infinite a Variety of Faces, is of the moſt important Uſe, Conſequence and Service in the Eſtabliſhment and laſting Security of Civil Societies. For, from ſuch infinite Variety, each and all Faces can ſoon be diſtinguiſhed; ſo that every one can eaſily recollect and know again the Perſon with whom he has once engaged in any Buſineſs, Contract, Agreement, Bargain or Converſation: And—at once ſeparate him (2) *from all the reſt of Mankind*.—Now, this is a Teſtimony ſo authentic, as does not admit of the leaſt Fallacy or Miſtake; becauſe, this is a Teſtimony which can be brought in Proof of whatſoever Things any one Perſon has either ſaid or done, or even has attempted to perpetrate and effect. It then, both from Experience and Obſervation, is, to a Demonſtration, evident and certain; That, ſo clear, ſo diſtinct, ſo ſeparate a Knowledge of Perſons, of Things and Rights reſpectively, could never ſo punctually be obſerved, unleſs ſomething appeared in each Countenance; whereby, ſome could be known and diſtinguiſhed from the reſt.

Concerning the Structure and Make of the human Hand.

The Structure of the human Hand, together with the Contrivance and the ſeveral Articulations of the whole Arm, are very particular, are very remarkable, are very ſurpriſing. The Powers and Capacities of the Arm and hand are numerous, are many; *e. g.* in Agriculture, in Planting and Gardening, in Architecture, Ship-building, and in all the other mechanic Arts. All theſe very uſeful, beneficial Crafts and Trades, would ſcarcely

(1) Vultus eſt animi imago: Indices oculi.

(2) *From all the reſt of Mankind.*] The Inſtances which *Valerius Maximus* produces in his Chapter *De Similitudine Formæ*, make nothing againſt this Doctrine.

ſcarcely turn to any Account at all, did not Mankind prepare and contrive mutual Works of Defence for each other, did they not enter into amicable, ſocial Alliances.

Ape, Monkey.

I had not the Opportunity of diſſecting either an Ape or a Monkey ſo accurately as to compare, under all the ſeveral Circumſtances of Compariſon, the two Fore-legs (ſo ſtrictly reſembling the Figure of our Hands) with the Hand, Arm and Shoulder of an human Subject diſſected. To draw a Compariſon between Man and Brute in this Particular, there is no need of any recourſe to Anatomy: Becauſe, it is obvious to common Obſervation, to daily Experience; that, no ſuch Acts, and of ſo much ingenious Dexterity, can be performed by any other Animals, as the Arts and Contrivances of Man, juſt now mentioned, fully demonſtrate. We may alſo here farther add, how ſignally remarkable are the Muſcles of the Hand which are placed at the Extremity of the Arm; how much ſtronger, in Proportion to the Bulk of Body, are the Muſcles of the Arm and Shoulder; and, laſtly, how much more active, ſupple, and pliable every way, are the Joints in the whole Arm, from the Scapula or Shoulder-blade down to the Fingers-ends. In Man, it is alſo farther evident, that the *Os Brachii*, or Bone of the Arm properly ſo called, (*i. e.* that Bone which connects the Elbow and the Shoulder together) is ſo remarkably long, as greatly to exceed in Length the two Bones of the Elbow which terminate in the Carpus or Wriſt. This *Os Brachii* in human Bodies is alſo ſo wiſely and curiouſly inarticulated into the Scapula or Shoulder-blade; and, that, not by a lateral Inarticulation, as it is in Brutes; but this Connexion ariſes from the Back, by which Means the Parts are ſo happily connected, ſo fitly placed under the Direction and Power of proper Muſcles, that the Hands, from this very Contrivance, extend themſelves to a much wider Diſtance from each other. They can be either ſo turned backward, or ſo bent forwards, that they can, both comprehend a much larger Bulk, and alſo raiſe a much heavier Weight. By this evidently-ſingular and truly-mechanical Contrivance in Nature, it is, that the human Hand is not only framed and adapted to anſwer many more different Motions, Operations and Exerciſes; but, that, it can alſo collect and exert a more vigorous Animal-ſtrength, in both ſuſtaining and carrying very large and heavy Weights: And, that, it can, likewiſe, by its very remarkable, ſuperior Force, make, in both throwing and ſtriking, a much deeper Impreſſion. For, whenever any great Weight is either to be ſuſtained or carried by the Hand, we are to remark that the Hand itſelf (together with the Weight which it ſuſtains and holds) falls ſo upon the Side of the Body by the Motion of Joints in the Arm, that as nearly as poſſible it approaches to the Line of Direction. From whence, upon mechanical Principles, it muſt happen, that a Weight may, by a ſmaller Force, be poized upon that Center of Gravity which poizes the whole Body.

Muſcles of the Hand, Arm and Shoulder.

The Os Brachii, or Bone of the Arm.

Articulations of the Arm.

Arm joined to the Body how.

(1) Now, this Center or Ballance of Gravity is formed by the human Body itſelf, and by the Weight to be ſuſtained: Becauſe, the Line of Direction, here meant, may be conceived as drawn from the aforeſaid Center of Gravity to the Center of the Earth. This Expertment is, indeed, ſo natural, ſo ſpontaneous, that Perſons quite Strangers to the mechanic Powers, and to central Weights, are well acquainted with this Experiment from downright Experience only. Now,—ſuch a Knowledge as this never could be drawn from Experience, unleſs the Hand was, by ſo very advantageous a Connexion, thus fitted and joined to the Arm, the Shoulder, and to a Body of an erect Poſture naturally. Whereas, on the contrary, when a Force is to be impreſſed by the Hand upon a ſmaller Body, (as for Inſtance, upon a Stone in caſting, or upon an Anvil, or upon any other Inſtrument

(1) *Now this Center or Ballance of Gravity is formed*, &c.] Aſk an Atheiſt, aſk a Sceptic, aſk a great Mathematician and Philoſopher, aſk all Men without Diſtinction, and let them ſay, after what Manner, in ſuch tender Threads of Muſcles as are thoſe of which the Fleſh of Men and Beaſts is made up, a Faculty is lodged, by which, upon their contracting themſelves, ſuch a ſurpriſing Force can be produced as is exerted by them in their Motions.

And let no body think that we are ſpeaking hyperbolically, to magnify the Matter, or to excite their Aſtoniſhment: For, *Firſt*, can any one believe, if it had not been demonſtrated by that great Mathematician *Borelli*, Par. 1. Cap. 15. Prop. 87, 88. and Cap. 17. Prop. 127. That, when a Man lifts up with his Mouth a Weight of near two hundred Pounds, with a Rope faſtened to the Jaw-teeth, (which, according to him, has been done even as far as three hundred Weight) that the Muſcles, named the *Temporalis* and *Maſſeter*, with which People chew, and which perform this Work, do exert a Force of above fifteen thouſand Pounds Weight?

Secondly, Can any one ſee, without Aſtoniſhment, that when a Weight of fifty-five Pounds is held up in Equilibrio by the Elbow of the Arm, the Muſcle named *Deltoides*, which only raiſes the Arm in this Poſition, exerts a Force of above ſixty thouſand Pounds? *See the ſaid* Borelli.

Thirdly, If any one, hanging his Arm directly downwards, liſts a Weight of twenty Pounds with the third or laſt Joint of his Thumb, can he learn, without Amazement, that the Muſcle which bends the Thumb, and bears that Weight, uſes a Force of about three thouſand Pounds? He, that doubts of it, may conſult the above-mentioned *Borelli*, Prop. 86. 126.

But, *Fourthly*, he who ſees that the *Muſculi Glutæi* which together compoſe the greateſt Part of the Buttock, and move the ſame about the Top of the Hip-bone backwards, do exert a Force of above three hundred thouſand Pounds, when they raiſe a Weight of ſixty-five Pounds by extending horizontally the Bones of the Leg and Thigh, according to the Experiment of *Borelli*, Prop. 125. Part 1. Chap. 17.

Fifthly, Calculating all the Forces of the Muſcles that are exerted when a Man, ſtanding upon his Feet, does only leap or ſpring upwards the Heighth of about two Foot; if the Weight of ſuch a Man be an hundred and fifty Pounds, the Muſcles in that Action will exert above two thouſand times more Force, that is to ſay, about three hundred thouſand Pounds. *Borelli* in the 175th Prop. Cap. 21. Lib. 1. computes it yet higher. And,

Sixthly, That the Heart, at each Pulſe or Contraction, by which it protrudes the Blood out of the Arteries into the Veins, exerts a Force of above one hundred thouſand Pounds. *See the ſame* Borelli, Prop. 76. Cap. 5. Lib. 2. We chuſe rather to ſpeak of theſe Matters in round Numbers, than exactly to follow his Caſes, (which are every where larger) that we may prevent any cavilling in theſe ſurpriſing and wonderful Matters. *Dr.* Nieuwentyt's Religious Philoſopher, *tranſlated into* Engliſh *by* John Chamberlayne, *Eſq*; *firſt Volume*, Contemplation 10. Sect. 14. Page 153. *in Octavo*, Lond. *Edit.* 1718.

The general Rule to obſerve in moſt of theſe Calculations, is, *That the Forces*, i. e. *the Powers and Weights at Diſtances from the Center of Motion, are reciprocally proportionable to themſelves.*

Inſtrument made to receive Force) we know, from this very commodious Structure, how to raiſe the Arm: And, conſequently, in Proportion to the Length of Diſtance in which the Hand is raiſed from its Center of Motion, it is proportionably moved with a quicker Velocity; and, therefore, the Impreſſion cauſed is with a ſtronger Impetus, with a greater Force.——In this Caſe the Motion of the Arm reſembles a Sling. For, the longer a Sling is, upon account of a greater Diſtance from the Center of Motion, the ſtronger the Force, *cæteris paribus*, which is impreſſed upon the Stone caſt. And—in like Manner, that Center of Motion from whence the Diſtance of the Hand, and, conſequently, the Increaſe of Forces, is computed, does not always lie in the Articulation or joining of the Arm with the Scapula; but in many Caſes it happens otherwiſe. As for Inſtance; when the whole Body, and, of Conſequence, the Arm and Shoulder, are all put into Motion by the Action of Striking, the Center then changes into that Foot upon which the whole Body ſtands: And the Diſtance between the Hand thus raiſed, and the Foot, muſt be computed, in order to determine the Increaſe of Velocity, and the Increaſe of Force conſequent upon ſuch a Velocity. Let theſe different Forces of Motion and Percuſſion, however, be what they will, yet, certain it is, that ſome additional Energy ariſes in the Percuſſions and Strikings of a Man's Arm, the like of which are not to be found in any other animal Body whatſoever. From theſe evident Cauſes, therefore, it is, that the human Hands are naturally endowed with a more diffuſively-powerful Activity, peculiar to us above all other Animals: A Power as peculiar to us as the erect Poſture of Body. For, ſo extraordinary an Activity in our Hands and Arms could not be, were it not for an erect Poſture of the human Body.

Reſembles a Sling.

Action of Striking.

Wiſe Contrivance of the human Hands.

We may alſo here farther add, That, a certain Elaſticity in moſt of all the Muſcles diſperſed thro' the whole Body, not only greatly promotes all theſe various active Motions; but alſo, when once they are ſet a going, vigorouſly co-operate, in Conjunction with the Diſtance from the Center, juſt now mentioned, to accelerate their Velocities. It muſt be confeſſed, indeed, that theſe Inſtruments and Powers, of ſo much ſuperior Force, may be miſapplied, and turned into Slaughter, Deſtruction, and many other Evils, to which Mankind is capable of being expoſed. A clear Caſe, however, in my Opinion, it is, that all thoſe Helps which furniſh Mankind in general, with a ſuperior Power, (ſuppoſing that a Ballance of Power amongſt the reſt of Mankind be always equally preſerved) may ſatisfy and convince the Underſtanding of each and every one Individual, that *All* will be more readily inclined to benefit than to hurt thoſe of their own Species: And, conſequently, muſt and ought to perſuade, to influence All in the Practice of that mutual, univerſal Benevolence, which we now are ſo ſtrenuouſly endeavouring to inculcate and eſtabliſh.——And——This, indeed, is the only one GRAND POINT,

which, by a Gradation of Reaſoning, is fully demonſtrated in all the Propoſitions of this PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY.

SECT. XXIX.

Our Author, in this 29th Section, draws four excellent Concluſions, &c.

First Concluſion.

THE Power to commit an Injury, is ſufficiently ballanced by an equal Power in others of committing the like: And This, either upon a Principle of Defence or Retaliation. For which Reaſon, ſuch a Power cannot, to the Man who prudently conſults his own Preſervation and Safety, prove any ſort of Argument, why he ſhould chuſe rather to hurt than not to hurt others. For, upon the Suppoſition, that, the Momenta of Power on both Sides to be equal, no Reaſon hitherto ever has been (neither can any Reaſon be) aſſigned, why the Scale ſhould incline to one Side rather than the other. The Suppoſition, indeed, holds quite otherwiſe; becauſe, upon any Struggle of Force, if the contending Parties once enter the Liſts, it is evident, that both may be either ſlain or maimed: And it is as evident, alſo, that to neither of the Parties ſo great an Advantage can ariſe from Victory, as he loſes who is killed in ſingle Combat: Neither, in the next Place, does he expoſe himſelf to ſo much Danger, who hazards his Life in the common Chance of a public War. And, therefore, it is to the Advantage of each Party, not to engage in any ſuch ſingle Combat. The Danger, for Inſtance, of loſing my own Life, robs me of a greater Good than I can poſſibly gain; becauſe, the Life of mine Enemy is expoſed to the ſame Danger. Neither is mine Enemy's Safety better ſecured, becauſe my Safety is become more precarious. The Caſe is ſo far from ſtanding thus, that we both are, in ſome ſort, Loſers, ſince neither of us receives any Advantage. This Suppoſition may, upon rational Principles, be carried ſtill farther. For, ſuppoſing us, even for the ſmalleſt Portion of Time, to lay aſide the Thoughts of Life and Health; and to conſider only *external Bleſſings*, (*i. e.* the good Things of Life, as they are called) it is yet moſt notoriouſly true, that the Spoils of Conqueſt do not always fall a Prey to the Conqueror. Whereas, in Truth, ſuch Perſons, generally ſpeaking, gain moſt conſiderably who are ſtudious to preſerve that Peace, whereby a reaſonable Part of ſuch good Things, may with Safety and Security be enjoyed.

The ſecond Concluſion.

But, Secondly, *the Power to aſſiſt others, being ballanced againſt an equal Power of Aſſiſtance to be found in others, ſuggeſts an excellent Argument to All, how ready and willing each and every one ought to be in aſſiſting others: but, more eſpecially, ſince undeniably true it is, that each and every one of us can grant ſuch Aſſiſtance, without any Loſs or Detriment to ourſelves.* For a Recompence, or a Return barely poſſible, carries in it ſome Degree of Good: And, conſequently, is a Motive ſufficient to influence the human Will.—But—more particularly, when, generally ſpeaking, by

by our own Beneficence (the Return for which Beneficence is but barely poſſible only) we are not deprived of any thing which is truly worthy of any Conſideration, of any Eſtimate, of any Calculation. Upon comparing this ſecond Concluſion with the firſt, it is evident, that their Conſequences, howſoever contingent *both* are equally ſuppoſed to be, (*i. e.* as equally contingent as poſſible) yet, upon ſuch a Compariſon, I ſay, it is evident, that the Conſequences of a Force or Power, directed or determined towards Benevolence, carry a ſtronger Influence over the Mind which has ſuch Conſequences in view; than the Conſequences of a Force, a Power bent upon Miſchief, can have, in alluring the Mind over to the miſchievous Side.—And this is ſufficient to my preſent Argument. The Foundation of this Reaſoning is ſolid and well laid. For, the Mind is, in an eſpecial Manner, moved by the premeditated, foreſeen Conſequences of its own voluntary Acts and free Operations.

In the firſt Caſe, (that is to ſay) in the firſt Concluſion, we ſee the Poſſibility, which in us lies, of bringing Evil upon others; and the Poſſibility alſo, which lies in the Power of others to bring Evil upon us. The Evil on both Sides is, according to this Suppoſition, equal. There is nothing, therefore, upon this Hypotheſis, capable of enticing the human Will, which is ſo readily inclined to follow the greater Good.

In the ſecond Caſe, *i. e.* in the ſecond Concluſion, we ſee, what Good that is which we are capable of both acting and receiving; there being no ſort of Damage or Injury ſufficient to counter-act the Tendency of a Ballance thus inclined.—Neither is it poſſible, according to this Hypotheſis, that both Sides ſhould loſe by ſuch Acts as theſe: Or, that, on the one Hand, a greater Advantage ſhould accrue to another, than I, on the other Hand, ſuffer a Loſs. By Innocence, by Humanity, by a faithful Diſcharge of Compacts and Contracts, ſerviceable to the public Advantage, I can benefit others: And, in the mean time, all Circumſtances being duly conſidered and well weighed, no one Portion, not even the ſmalleſt Portion, of my own Happineſs is thereby diminiſhed.——So far from it—That in the very Act, in the very Performance of theſe worthy Engagements, I enjoy a ſweeter inward Serenity, and Health of Mind; I breathe Delight, and I ſow the Seeds of that ſure and certain Hope, whoſe grateful Harveſt is to grow from the Labour and Induſtry of others:——An Harveſt which, allowing any Increaſe, can hardly be ſo minutely ſmall, as is that ſcarcely-diſcernable Particle of Happineſs which I ſubſtract from myſelf, ſuppoſing me to diſtribute, amongſt the Whole, all the poſſible Good which in me lies, by all poſſible Acts in my Power. For, I am ſo poorly-helpleſs and deficient a Being in myſelf, if conſidered alone (and each Individual is certainly one only) without the Benevolence, the allowed Quietude, and the friendly Aſſiſtance of others, that I am, in myſelf, by no Means equal to anſwer the Purpoſes of my own Being and Happineſs:—But—am ſo cloſely preſſed on all Sides with the

ſevereſt

ſevereſt Neceſſity, and moſt craving Wants, that, by proving ſerviceable to others, I can ſcarcely make my own wretched Condition worſe.——And——this Doctrine muſt deeply ſtrike the Underſtanding of every Man, who ſuppoſes the State of Man, *in a War of All againſt All*, to be abſolutely, and to all Intents and Purpoſes, unjuſt.

There is not then, here, the leaſt Occaſion for joining with Mr. *Hobbes* in his Aſſertion, "That ſuch a War as this is unjuſt; or, that ſuch a War "(according to the ſuppoſed Right Reaſon of Individuals ſingly, who de-"termine all Things neceſſary, *each for himſelf*) is neceſſary, before any "Eſtabliſhment of Civil Society." I freely own, indeed, (neither can this Obſervation be conſidered without all its Advantages) how deſtructive the Evils are which ariſe from univerſal Injuſtice, and from the falſe, fantaſtic Notions of ſuch Men as are for arrogating and aſſuming *All* to *Self*.—This Opinion, however, is at the remoteſt Diſtance from Mr. *Hobbes*'s Miſtake: For, he has endeavoured to prove, "That, *the Right Reaſon*, as he calls "it, *of All*, when out of Civil Society, neceſſarily introduces All into theſe "Evils, ſo as to leave them without the Power of benefiting others, un-"leſs it be ſuch a Power as is derived upon them from the Authority of "the Civil Magiſtrate." Whereas we, on the contrary, maintain and urge the Impoſſibility, that Right Reaſon ſhould teach us to arrogate and aſſume *All* to *Self*.——Nay,——ſo far from it, that, Right Reaſon commands a benevolent Conſent, a voluntary Agreement, in ſettling and eſtabliſhing the Diviſion of Property, whereby each Perſon may take and enjoy what is his own: And that, as well upon many other Accounts, ſo likewiſe upon this one very material Account, that Right Reaſon eaſily foreſees the *Iliads* (thoſe Infinitudes) of Evils common to All:——Evils which threaten all Individuals themſelves, reſpectively and ſingly. And all theſe Evils neceſſarily follow upon this one ſingle Suppoſition only, namely——"That all Individuals are ſuppoſed to carry ſingly, each for "himſelf, a Reaſon of his own reſpectively, which regards Self only, and "to aſſume and to arrogate all to himſelf, by a boundleſs, inſatiable Luſt "of Deſire, Avarice, Ambition, *&c.*"

Theſe two Concluſions, therefore, make greatly for my Purpoſe; and, upon this one Suppoſition only, That the Power of each Individual, ſingly, be conſidered, as ballanced and counterpoized with the Power of any one, other, ſingle Individual only. The Point, however, now under Deliberation, will ſtill appear much clearer if we conſider the third and fourth Concluſions.

The third Concluſion. *That the Power lodged in any one ſingle Individual only, of hurting and injuring others, is infinitely exceeded by the Power lodged in Multitudes; whereby they can, not only defend themſelves, but alſo amply retaliate any Injury offered.* And

The Fourth Concluſion. *—That the Power whereby any one Perſon, ſingly, can benefit others, is infinitely ſurpaſſed by thoſe Returns of Gratitude and of good Offices,*

Offices, which the MANY or ALL are able to expreſs and perform in Return.

The Arguments, then, comprehended under theſe four rational Concluſions, are of the moſt perſuaſive Kind, and muſt convince us, That, all our Powers and Abilities, let their Degrees of Energy be what they will, muſt and ought to be directed, much rather in reconciling and gaining over the Favour and Affection of all rational Agents, than in offering Injuries, Affronts and Reproaches to all or any of them. It cannot, indeed, upon any Shew or Appearance of Reaſon, enter into the Mind of Man to imagine, that, in this general State of War deviſed by Mr. *Hobbes*, the human Forces and Powers always are ſo diſtinctly and clearly ſeparated, that one ſingle Perſon only engages and combats with another ſingle Perſon only: Becauſe, in whatever Caſe, it ſhould ſo happen, that, an Inequality in Number engage; as for Inſtance, two againſt one; the two, upon this Suppoſition, will engage in Combat to a more certain Probability of Deſtruction to the one: And, even ſuppoſing, that the Number of Combatants on both Sides, at firſt, to be equal; yet, upon the Death of one ſingle Perſon, the Chance muſt be reduced to an Inequality.

Theſe Arguments, then, in ſhort, prove abundantly-ſufficient to demonſtrate, That, the Powers and Capacities of Men, even ſuppoſing them to be nearly equal, furniſh us with Arguments in favour of *reciprocal Benevolence* and *Good-will*, rather than with Arguments to favour the Attempts of *mutual Death* and *Deſtruction*. As to the other Qualities and Properties, which we have demonſtrated to be ſo peculiar to human Nature, they more forcibly ſtill inculcate and prove the very ſame Point, as we have already, and in a full Manner, ſhewn.

SECT. XXX.

BUT—before I finiſh this Chapter, I would have my Reader attentively obſerve, that Mr. *Hobbes* has not produced, any where, the leaſt Proof ſo natural, to both the Soul and Body of Man, as thoſe Proofs which I have already urged.—No one Proof, I ſay, has Mr. *Hobbes* produced, which could furniſh a reaſonable Man with a Motive ſufficient to determine: Or, which could, from any Neceſſity, determine him to act in a Manner different from what I have preſcribed. For, had he produced any ſuch Proof, ſuch a Proof muſt, from the neceſſary Conſequences of it, compel Mankind to conclude, "That all Individuals may, and "ought to arrogate and aſſume, *each to himſelf reſpectively*, all Things." Whereas, inſtead of any ſuch Argument as this, it is obſerveable, that Mr. *Hobbes*, at ſome times, attributes this ſo arrogant, over-bearing a Principle to the human Paſſions.——But——the Abſurdity of any ſuch impulſive Motive as this to act, I have already expoſed.——At other times,

times, it is as obſerveable, that Mr. *Hobbes* ſpeaks only in general Terms. As thus, " That Mankind would not ſubmit to the fair, equal Conditions " of Society, notwithſtanding that they might, perhaps, have an Appe- " tite, a Deſire for Society." *De Cive*, Chap. 1. Sect. 12. *at the firſt Annotation.*

Now, in Anſwer to this ſecond Poſition of his Doctrine, I ſay, that altho' there may, perhaps, be ſome Men, who, at particular times, are unwilling to accept the neceſſary, fair Conditions of Society; yet, neither the univerſal Nature of Things: Nor, That Nature which is intrinſic, and inſeparable from Man, do inſtruct or determine the Wills and Inclinations of Mankind, to reject and rebel againſt ſuch Conditions. The raſh, abſurd Behaviour of particular Men at particular times; (and, from which ſort of Behaviour, the Life and Actions of Mankind in general,—nay—very frequently, of ſuch Men themſelves, are widely different,) muſt not be attributed to human Nature, or conſtrued as the univerſal Rules of Behaviour and Morality.—But—on the contrary, as, ſuch Actions and Behaviour are quite arbitrary, accidental and contingent, ſo, they take their Riſe from a contingent Cauſe, *i. e.* from the perverſe, obſtinate Determination of an arbitrary Will, in ſuch particular odd kind of Creatures.

Whoſoever has a Mind to draw any fixed, determined Concluſions from Nature, ought thoroughly to conſider thoſe regular, conſtant, neceſſary, intrinſic Powers and Endeavours, Capacities and Propenſities in all Beings and Things, but eſpecially in Mankind, whereby Happineſs and Life itſelf are uſually, in the ordinary Courſe of Things, preſerved; rather than to ſpend Thought and Time upon thoſe accidental Commotions, Convulſions and Paſſions, whereby both (*i. e.* Happineſs and Self-preſervation) are greatly endangered. For, it is a fixed, determined Point, That, whilſt we are alive and well, the Cauſes of both Life and Health are more operative and powerful, than thoſe Cauſes which diſturb and unſettle our Nature.—And therefore, by a neceſſary, rational Conſequence, we are, from hence, to take the true Eſtimate of our own Nature, as really and truly *our Nature in itſelf is.* Upon an equally-ſtrict Parity of Reaſon, we are to form our Judgment concerning the whole human Nature, *i. e.* concerning Mankind in all Ages, who (like the flowing Streams of a River) are in one perpetual, uninterrupted Succeſſion. Let the Actions, then, the Behaviour, and the Conduct of Mankind be as precarious, contingent, fickle and uncertain as poſſible; yet, in general, it holds true, that they (*i. e.* Mankind) are willing to accede, agree to and embrace the fair Conditions, the equal Terms of Society. For, we cannot but obſerve, if we employ any Obſervation at all, that ſuch Societies as were, at firſt, *upon voluntary Conſent*, entered into, are, generally ſpeaking, if not always, better fitted to continue, and to hold for a long Period of Time, than they are, to decay and fall

fall into Ruin: Becauſe, not only the Propenſity, the Inclination to preſerve Civil Society, but alſo the Deſire of ſecuring Peace and Unity with any other,—nay—even with every other Civil Society, is no other than the conſtant, the perpetual Deſire of eſtabliſhing every ſuch Society.—— And,——we may alſo ſtill farther add, that it is, at ſome particular times, in ſome reſpect, more difficult to defend a Civil Eſtabliſhment of Society, than it is, to enter into, and form the firſt Eſtabliſhment of it. This is a Difficulty, however, which, we cannot but obſerve, is daily ſurmounted and overcome, by the Generality of Mankind; and—that—not coolly and in an indifferent Manner, but ſincerely, heartily, and upon all the ſtrongeſt Ties of Nature and Reaſon. *Laſtly*, The Nature of Man does not only contain, in the Definition of it, Soul and Body, as the eſſential, conſtituent Parts; but the ſtrict Union, the firm Aſſociation alſo of theſe Parts, the one with the other. We are then, in conſequence of this, to obſerve alſo, That, from hence Mankind can be eaſily led into the Knowledge and into the Appetite, the Deſire of ſuch a Good as is common to ſeveral Natures in general; as alſo, into the Knowledge and Deſire of ſuch a Good, as is common to the Nature of Society and of Civil Government: And—be farther aſſured alſo, that theſe Impreſſions of Knowledge and Inclination, thus laid upon the human Mind, are perfectly agreeable and acceptable to the *firſt original Cauſe of all Things, Almighty God himſelf*. Becauſe, we cannot but know, and very ſenſibly too, that, the Body is, by Nature, (and, conſequently, by a divine, all-wiſe Contrivance) not only linked to the Soul; but, that the Body alſo is ſubject to the Direction and Management of the Soul, in the ſeveral Acts of Memory, of the Affections, the Appetites and Paſſions, and of many other Motions, but more eſpecially thoſe of the muſcular Kind.

And now, to conclude all: We are, at all times, fully inſtructed and admoniſhed, (as it were by the Idea or Model of Polity and Government in general, naturally ſtamped upon our Minds) to conſider, how manifold thoſe Objects of mutual Aſſiſtance are, which neceſſarily muſt be comprehended under the one aggregate Whole, when we are in the important Purſuit of, and Enquiry into the Cauſes of our own true Happineſs: How neceſſary alſo it is, from all the conſtituent Parts of our own Nature, to conſider, after what Manner Each and All ought to be regulated, reſpectively and reciprocally, by All: Of what important Advantage a regular Subordination of all the Parts amongſt themſelves, is, to the Oeconomy and Order of the Whole: How neceſſary a regular Concurrence and Co-operation of the ſeveral Cauſes, in producing almoſt all Effects which are agreeable to our Nature: Of what ſignificant Uſe are the mutual good Offices of the ſeveral Parts; and how deſtructive muſt, either, the Abuſe of theſe ſeveral Parts, or, the ſeparate, diſtinct Employment and Application of ſome from the reſt, prove in the natural Conſequences of Things.

Having now finiſhed thoſe ſeveral Propoſitions, which we intended to diſcuſs and prove in this Chapter; our Deſign, in the following Chapter, is to treat upon, and enquire into, the Nature of *Good*, of the greateſt Good placed after any Manner, Degree or Sort, within the Reach and free, voluntary Capacities of human Power, let the Degrees of ſuch a Good be, either more or leſs, what they will.

CHAP. III.

SECT. I.

Concerning Natural Good.

The Definition of Good.

WHATSOEVER preſerves the natural Faculties, Powers and Abilities of one or more Beings and Things:—But—chiefly and eſpecially—whatſoever ſtrengthens, improves and perfects theſe Faculties, Powers, Abilities, and the Operations of them, is what we call GOOD.

Natural Effects, the Fitneſſes and Unfitneſſes of Things diſcover what is Good.

Now—the Foundation of this Definition, or rather Deſcription, appears rational. Becauſe, from the natural Effects of theſe Powers and their Operations, is diſcovered that peculiar Correſpondency, Agreement, Fitneſs of one Thing with another: A Diſcovery ſo abſolutely neceſſary, in order to know and determine, what Object or Thing that is which muſt be eſteemed good for one Nature, preferable to every other Nature whatſoever (1).

The Term *Convenientia* rejected as equivocal.

2. In the above Definition or Deſcription of *Good*, I have induſtriouſly avoided to uſe the Term *Convenientia*, *Correſpondency*, *Agreement*, *Fitneſs*, as being a *Term* very *equivocal* and undetermined in its Signification. And yet,

(1) *Preferable to every other Nature whatſoever.*] Our ingenious Author, with penetrating Sagacity and extenſive Learning, lays before the Reader, in his firſt Chapter, *The Nature of Things*: In his ſecond, *the Nature of Man*; and, from an united View of *both*, as inſeparably connected, he now comes, in his third Chapter, to collect a true Notion of *Natural Good*. In this his Account of *Natural Good*, he rejects the Term *Convenientia*, *Correſpondency*, *Fitneſs*, *Agreement*, as a *Term equivocal*. For the Correſpondency or Agreement between a Faculty and an Object, does not, in many Caſes, take in all the Circumſtances which ought to be conſidered. *The Nature of Things and the Nature of Man* muſt never be ſeparated from the *Good* which concerns Human Nature. Where both or either of theſe two neceſſary Ingredients, in the Compoſition of Good, is wanting, the Correſpondency between a Faculty and an Object, let the preſent Fitneſs be never ſo exact, is an *Evil* and *no Good*. If Self-gratification, from this Correſpondency, produces, either in itſelf, or, in its Conſequences, more *Evil* than *Good*, ſuch a Correſpondency, upon a fair Eſtimate, falls under the Denomination of *Evil*. *See* Chap. 1. Sect. 33. *Notes*. Page 115, 116, 117 and 118. *See* Chap. 1. Sect. 8. Page 20. Note 1.

yet, notwithſtanding this Caution of mine, whatſoever thoſe Beings or Things are, whoſe Acts or Motions either contribute towards the Preſervation of other Beings and Things: Or, which increaſe their natural Energies; ſtrictly regarding, at the ſame time, the Truth of each Nature reſpectively, may, with full Propriety, be ſaid to *Agree*. What Things may be ſaid to agree.

3. And, the Truth of this is very evident; becauſe, we have no other way of judging whether the true, eſſential Nature of one Thing, agrees with the true, eſſential Nature of any other Thing, than by the Efficacy of ſuch active Qualities as directly flows from it. How this Agreement is diſcovered.

4. Such active Qualities, and the Efficacies of them, lay open the hidden Faculties and Powers of all Beings and Things: They diſcover the inward Frame, and eſſential Conſtitution of them: They enlighten our Minds with the true Knowledge of the Beings and Things themſelves: And, in theſe active Operations and Qualities elicited, are laid the ſolid Foundations, the true fundamental Principles of all Fitneſſes and Unfitneſſes, Agreements and Diſagreements, Correſpondencies and Repugnancies: And, in ſhort, of all Reſpects, Relations, Analogies, Proportions, *&c.*— Subjects of Enquiry, which to explain, define and account for, are ſo extenſive, as to comprehend and take in the whole Compaſs of almoſt all Philoſophy. The Qualities and Efficacies diſcover what in the inward Natures and Abilities of Things are. In the active Operations elicited of Things, are laid all Fitneſſes and Unfitneſſes, &c.

5. Thus, for Inſtance, with reſpect to Man, *Good* may be called that, whatſoever it is, which ſupports and increaſes the natural Capacities of both Soul and Body, or of each reſpectively, without any Loſs or Detriment to any other Being. What is the Good of Man.

6. Καὶ τοι τὸ γε ἑκάστῳ, ἀγαθὸν σώζει ἕκαστον· i. e. *The true, real Good of each reſpectively, preſerves each reſpectively*, ſays *Ariſtotle*, talking of Cities and leſſer Commonwealths, *Polit.* Lib. 2. Cap. 1.—And, the very ſame Poſition holds equally true in every Thing elſe. This, then, is the Whole of what we mean, when we talk concerning that Subordination amongſt many Things; and in which, inſeparably, are connected ſome certain Advantages, with ſome certain Diſadvantages, *i. e.* ſeveral Degrees of Good, with ſeveral Degrees of Evil. The real Good of each preſerves each; and, by Conſequence, the Good of all. Subordination neceſſary to produce Good.

7. Upon this very Account, therefore, it is, that Things *injurious* and *beneficial* muſt be compared together, and viewed at the ſame time. And—from the Predominancy either of *Good* or *Evil*, we muſt take the Eſtimate. Now—that Kind of Good which we look at, in a View quite abſtracted from the Conſideration of all arbitrary, inſtituted Laws whatſoever, may, without the leaſt Scruple, be called *Natural Good*. For, *Natural Good* regards, and takes in, every Nature, *i. e.* it is ſuch a *Good* as comprehends the Nature of *a Brute*, of *a Tree*, of *a Plant*, *&c.*——And, by ſuch a Good as this, it is, that the natural Powers and Capacities of each and all, reſpectively, may be, and actually are, preſerved and improved. Computations and Compariſons neceſſary to eſtimate the Degrees of Good and Evil. Natural Good what it is.

The whole Creation can contribute to the Good of each Nature of each Individual.

8. We may, in the next Place, alſo, farther add, That all the many, various Beings, – nay—even the univerſal, whole Creation, may miniſter, may contribute to the Happineſs of each Nature; nay, even to the Happineſs of each Individual: Or may, at leaſt, contribute to the Improvement of a more perfect Knowledge.

How Natural Good is diſtinguiſhed from Moral Good. Moral Good what.

9. Natural Good, becauſe it is of a more extenſive, general Nature, is diſtinguiſhed from that Kind of *Good* which is called *Moral Good*. *Moral Good* is aſcribed to the Acts and Motions of rational Free-agents only. *Moral Good*, ſtrictly and intimately, denotes the Agreement, the Correſpondency, the Relation of theſe voluntary Acts and free Motions, with the Laws, for Inſtance, either of Nature, or with the Laws of ſome particular Civil Inſtitution, *i. e.* of Society by Compact. *Moral Good* is, however, ultimately reſolveable into the univerſal, public, natural Good. All Laws, both of Nature and of Civil Society, (ſo far as theſe Laws are eſtabliſhed upon a juſt, rational Foundation) muſt chiefly, ultimately, and only direct all our Behaviour, towards the Preſervation and Perfection of *Natural Good*. As to what concerns *Moral Good*, we ſhall hereafter treat upon it more at large. We ſhall, at preſent, turn our Thoughts ſomewhat more particularly to the Conſideration of *that Good* which is called *Natural*.

Moral Good reſolveable into what. All Laws deſigned to advance Natural Good. See Sect. 9. Chap. 5.

10. It then, from Fact, Obſervation, Experience and Reaſon, is a clear Caſe, that both the Idea and the Definition of *Natural Good* muſt determine every Man, who either thinks or ſpeaks concerning it, to conclude, That, *Natural Good* is not limited to one individual Man only, but is equally relative, equally applicable, to each and all the other conſtituent Individuals of the ſame human Species.

Natural Good not limited to one, but common to all.

11. The Relations which *Natural Good* carries in it, are likewiſe ſo extenſive, as to comprehend all Beings who live and breathe.

All Beings, animate and inanimate, can, in ſome Degree, partake of Natural Good.

12. And here we may alſo further add, did Occaſion require it, That all inanimate Beings even partake of a *Natural Good*; or, at leaſt, ſo far as they are capable of either Preſervation, or of ſuch a farther Perfection as ariſes from, and conſiſts in, a juſt Order, in a regular Motion of the Parts, reſpectively belonging to each Whole: So far, at leaſt, I ſay, do all inanimate Beings partake of *Natural Good*.

Good concerns Aggregates.

13. All theſe ſeveral Particulars being, in Fact, true, and readily allowed; we ſhall now, according to natural Order, proceed to the Conſideration of Aggregates, *i. e.* of Natures in Conjunction, as conſtituted and made up of many,—nay—of all Animals.

Reaſon in God, and *Reaſon in Man*, differ in Degree, but not in Kind: and therefore all rational Beings may be conſidered as one Integral Whole.

14. And here alſo, under the Notion of an Aggregate or Integral Whole, I ſhall ſubjoin all ſuch Beings as partake of and exert Reaſon: how widely differing ſoever the Natures of theſe rational Beings may be; as for Inſtance, *God* and *Man*. *See the Notes at Section* 10. *of the Prolegomena*.

For,

For, as the human Mind contemplates upon, and views all aggregate, total Sums, *i. e.* every integral Whole, under an Idea or Notion indefinite, general, and applicable to Singulars and Individuals in common; ſo the human Mind alſo, can contemplate upon, and conſider in one View, all the ſingular Individuals with which it is acquainted, and repreſent them unto itſelf under one general Term, *viz. Omnis* or *All*. Now, the general Term *All*, is ſo very extenſive, as to comprehend and take in all Particulars, all Individuals ſingularly: Notwithſtanding that the Mind may, concerning Numbers of them, be as groſsly ignorant as can be imagined. That is, in other Words, the human Mind can compound and make up *One Whole*, which we call an *Integral Whole*: A *Whole* collecting into *one* all the Singulars (1).

The Mind can view a Whole, as made up of all its Parts, and all the Parts with which it is converſant, taking in alſo all the other Parts unknown, as comprehending a Whole.

How the Term *Omnis* or *All* is to be underſtood.

The Mind can, then, ſurvey all theſe Singulars, Individuals or Particulars as one Body; which, in the future Parts of this our PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY, we ſhall call a *Political Body*.

Our Author's Notion of a political Body, and how it is conſtituted.

The Mind can, then, in the next Place, by ſuch a Progreſs as this, inveſtigate and diſcover the *Good* or *Evil* which may be ſaid to concern each: The *Good* or *Evil*, public and common to the whole human Kind, or, even, to the whole Syſtem of rational Beings.

How the Good or Evil is to be inveſtigated which concerns ſuch a Body.

Now, from Oppoſites and Contraries, thus ſtated and laid down, the next Step is to judge and determine what Event *(as to Good or Evil)* is either poſſible or impoſſible; and, *what Good* or *what Evil*, is, either greater or leſs.

What Event (*i. e.* what Good or what Evil) either poſſible or impoſſible, is greater or leſs.

Neither, indeed, in many Caſes, is the Determination difficult; or, at leaſt, there is no Difficulty in forming a *general Determination*. And the Reaſon (why ſuch a Determination cannot be very difficult) appears extremely evident: Becauſe, *that Nature* which belongs to the Individuals, how numerous ſoever they be, is exactly the ſame with *that Nature* which belongs to any one ſingle Individual. From the well-known Happineſs of *one* we can ſoon determine, what that Happineſs is which muſt, and ought to, be purſued and ſought after, by all, and each in particular.

Computations of this Sort are not difficult, and why? Becauſe the Nature of one and of all Individuals in the whole is the ſame.

For, it is a clear Caſe, that the natural Perfections of Mind, and a ſound Conſtitution of Body, with a vigorous Energy as to the Exerciſe of both, (and in which the whole Happineſs of the Individual conſiſts) comprehend alſo, if univerſally diffuſed thro' the whole human Species, the whole Felicity or Happineſs of all. And, conſequently, it is as clear a Caſe alſo, that, the great Diverſity or Variety, as to the Degrees of this Happineſs;

Happineſs conſiſts in what.

Means of Happineſs the ſame.

(1) *Collecting into one all the Singulars.*] Suppoſe I am acquainted with one hundred Creatures of the ſame Species: Suppoſe the whole Species to conſiſt of ten thouſand Millions, my Mind can ſubſtitute *The All I know*, for *the Whole*. *See Biſhop* Peter Brown, *late of* Corke, *his Notion of Abſtraction, in his* Procedure, *&c. as quoted at* Page 157. Sect. 11. Chap. 2.

Happineſs: As alſo, the Nature of the Means neceſſary towards the Attainment of ſuch Happineſs, poſſibly may be, and are, very ſimilar, and much the ſame: And become, conſequently, as neceſſary to the Whole as to any one Part. And—ſuch, for Inſtance, are *Aliments*, *Exerciſe*, *Reſt*, *Sleep*, &c. upon account of that Identity or Sameneſs which ſubſiſts between *the Parts* and *the Whole*.

Whatſoever adds to the Happineſs of one Individual, contributes to the Happineſs of all.

From hence alſo it is, That, whatſoever gives an additional Strength or Force, even to one, ſingle, individual Part of this Whole, (all the other Parts continuing, without any Loſs or Damage, exactly in the ſame State) this ſame Whole, I ſay, (compounded of this one, ſingle, individual Part, and of all the other Parts) receives an Addition, an Increaſe, an Advantage. Whoſoever confers a Benefit upon one ſingle Man, without any Detriment to all the reſt of Mankind, may juſtly be ſaid to benefit the whole aggregate Body. Whatſoever concerns the due Regard of ourſelves, without the leaſt Injury offered to any other Perſon; but more particularly where the public Good is in view, reaſonably may, and ought to animate and influence every other Individual.

SECT. II.

The Term *Convenit* may be allowed in ſome Caſes.

UPON this Foundation, then, I freely acknowledge, That, *whatſoever Thing (Convenit*, or*) is convenient and ſuitable to another Thing*, may be called *Good*; and, conſequently, aſſumes the Name of *Relative Good*. Relative Good, however, in the firſt Place, does not carry and imply always a *Relation or Reference to Appetite*: Neither is it always, Secondly, *relative to one Perſon*, i. e. *to the Perſon deſiring and excited by Appetite*.—In theſe two Points it is very evident, that, Mr. *Hobbes* is very often groſsly miſtaken; notwithſtanding, that, at ſome times, even in ſpight of himſelf, he happens to ſpeak Truth.—And—in theſe two groſs Miſtakes, by way of Foundation, is laid the moſt of thoſe raſh, indigeſted Opinions which he has delivered "concerning the Right of War "againſt All in a State of Nature: As alſo, of an abſolute, deſpotic "Power in a State of Civil Society."

Relative Good does not always concern Appetite.

Relative Good does not conſider the Individual only.

Mr. Hobbes miſtaken in his Notions of Good and Evil.

Mr. Hobbes's Opinion ſtated, as taken from his own Works.

As to Mr. *Hobbes*'s Opinion, which makes whatſoever is *deſired*, *Good*; the Reader may, if he pleaſes, conſult his Treatiſe *De Homine*, Cap. 11. Sect. 4. where he ſays, "Good is the common Appellation "of all ſuch Things as are deſired, *&c.*——And, when different Per-"ſons deſire different Things, it neceſſarily muſt happen, that ſome "Things are Good to ſome and Evil to others, *&c.*"—And his Concluſion, therefore, is, that "Good and Evil, as to Deſire and Averſion, are Correlates,

" Correlates (1), *&c.*"—And his Sentiments are much to the ſame Purpoſe in his Book *De Naturâ Humanâ*, Cap. 7. Sect. 1. compared with Sect. 3. where he tells us, That, " the *Motion* in which he would have " the Conceptions of Things to conſiſt, paſſes, *without the leaſt Intervention of Judgment*, from the Brain into the Heart; and there, (that " is, in the Heart) in Proportion as this Motion either promotes or retards the Vital Motion, it is ſaid (as Mr. *Hobbes* affirms) to be either " *agreeable or diſagreeable, to pleaſe or diſpleaſe*. For, whatſoever, in " this Manner, *pleaſes any Perſon*, he calls *Good*; and whatſoever, in like " Manner, *diſpleaſes him*, he calls *Evil*. And hence it ariſes, that, from " a different natural Conſtitution and Temperament of Body, different " Opinions are formed concerning Good, and, (all this Progreſs of " Motion) to be ſure, is natural, and, conſequently, neceſſary; and, ac" cording to the Opinion of the Perſon himſelf, in a State of Nature, is " blameleſs and innocent."——And—Pray now—Why ſhould not all this be as blameleſs, as harmleſs, as innocent, in a State of Civil Society; where

(1) *Good and Evil, as to Deſire and Averſion, are Correlates*, &c.] In order to detect and lay open the Fallacy of this Poſition, advanced by Mr. *Hobbes*, it ſeems neceſſary to explain what Correlates are.

PROP. I. Whatſoever a Man deſires is Good.

PROP. II. Good is whatſoever a Man deſires.

In the firſt Propoſition *Deſire* is the *Relatum*, *Good* is the *Correlatum*. In the ſecond Propoſition *Good* is the *Relatum*, *Deſire* is the *Correlatum*. In theſe Propoſitions we are to obſerve, *firſt*, That the Relatum and Correlatum bear a mutual Reference to each other; *i. e.* They carry not only a ſingle but a double Relation.——And in this Reciprocation, or double Relation, we are to obſerve, *Secondly*, That the Relatum of the firſt Propoſition is the Correlatum of the ſecond; and that, the Relatum of the ſecond Propoſition is the Correlatum of the firſt. On the contrary,

PROP. III. Whatſoever a Man hates is Evil.

PROP. IV. Evil is whatſoever a Man hates.

In this third Propoſition *Hatred* is the *Relatum*, *Evil* is the *Correlatum*. In the fourth Propoſition, *Evil* is the *Relatum*, *Hatred* is the *Correlatum*. And here we are to obſerve, as before, *firſt*, That the Relatum and Correlatum bear a mutual Reference to each other, *i. e.* They carry not only a ſingle but a double Relation: And, *Secondly*, That the *Relatum* of the third Propoſition is the *Correlatum* of the fourth: And the *Relatum* of the fourth Propoſition is the *Correlatum* of the third.

From this Account we may form ſome Notion of Mr. *Hobbes*'s Meaning, when he ſays, That *Good and Evil, as to Deſire or Appetite, and Hatred or Averſion, are Correlates*. If a Man, for Inſtance, has a preſent Averſion or Hatred againſt Good; why then, Good becomes Evil. If afterwards he changes this Hatred, this Averſion, into a Deſire, into an Appetite for Good; why then, Good alters, and at once from Evil becomes Good again. So that, Good and Evil vary, are mutable, and change their Natures, juſt as the Love or the Hatred for both, or either, takes place. Suppoſe, again, that ten thouſand different Men deſire ten thouſand different Objects; upon this laudable Scheme of Appetite and Averſion, all theſe Objects (notwithſtanding that they carry ten thouſand Contradictions in the very eſſential Nature of them) at once change their Natures, unite and become Good—And—pray why? Why truly—becauſe, the Appetite, the Deſire of every Man is good, and the Cauſe of Good—the Averſion, the Hatred of every Man is Evil, and the Cauſe of Evil.—Excellent Logic!—Noble Correlates!—Wonderful Morality truly!—It is, indeed, a Shame to dwell longer upon ſuch pedantic Jargon. And it would be happy for the World if *Ariſtotle* had never invented his ten Categories, were they not capable of a better Application than the Uſe which Mr. *Hobbes* has made of his *Relata* and *Correlata*. But our Author has handled the Doctrine of *Good* and *Evil* ſo well, that it requires no additional Argument here. And, thus much for *Correlates*.

where the beſt, the ſoundeſt Philoſophers determine, *That a Neceſſity of Nature effectually takes away all the Imputation of Blame and Fault?*

And, in his Book *De Cive*, Cap. 14. Sect. 17. he ſays, "The Nature of Man is ſuch, that every one ſhould call, whatſoever he deſires to happen to himſelf, *Good:* And whatſoever he ſhuns and avoids, *Evil.* And, conſequently, from the Diverſity of human Paſſions and Affections, it comes to paſs, that, What one Perſon calls *Good*, another calls, *Evil:* As alſo, that, the ſame Perſon will call a Thing *Good, To-day*, which, *To-morrow* he will call *Evil:* That, he juſtly may pronounce the ſame Thing *good* for himſelf, and *bad* for another. Becauſe, *we* ALL take our *Eſtimate of Good* and *Evil*, from *Delight* and *Uneaſineſs*, from *Pleaſure* and *Pain.*"

Here then, and, to be ſure, moſt extraordinary Philoſophy it is! Mr. *Hobbes* ſtrenuouſly maintains "All This to ariſe from the Nature of Man: Conſequently, that, it is neceſſary and always the ſame."—Nay—he ſtill carries his Aſſertion farther, and ſays, that "there is no Imputation of Guilt or Fault incurred before the Eſtabliſhment of inſtituted, arbitrary, human Laws of Civil Society; becauſe, no ways proceeding from any avoidable Corruption or Fault in the Will."

In the ſixth Chapter of his *Leviathan*, Mr. *Hobbes* gives us What is juſt of the ſame Stamp, and farther adds, that "Things *Good or Evil*, and *Vile or Baſe*, are always underſtood as relative to the Perſon who uſes and applies theſe Terms; becauſe nothing is, in its own Nature, abſolutely and ſimply ſo: Neither is there any Common Rule whereby to judge What is either Good or Evil, or Vile or Baſe, as originally taken from the Natures of the Objects themſelves. For, out of Civil Society, they take their Denomination from the Nature of the Perſon who ſpeaks: Or, where Civil Societies are eſtabliſhed, from the Nature of the Governor who rules and repreſents the People: Or, from the Arbitration, the Decree, the Judgment, the Sentence of a Perſon, for this Purpoſe, inſtituted and appointed."

Anſwer. We, on the contrary, in Anſwer, ſay, That Things are firſt judged and determined Good; and then, in the next Place, they are deſired as ſuch; or, at leaſt, ſo far as they carry in them the Appearance of Good. Any one Thing, therefore, really and truly may, upon this very Account, be determined *Good*; becauſe, the genuine Effects of its own native, intrinſic Energy, really and truly help and aſſiſt Nature.—Thus—for Inſtance—Whatſoever helps and aſſiſts the Nature of *one*, is *Private Good:* Whatſoever helps and aſſiſts the Nature of *many*, is *Public Good.* Neither is *any ſuch Good* as this deſired; becauſe, upon mere Opinion only, (whether true or falſe) it is ſo imagined: Or, becauſe it can afford Delight at this or t'other Moment of Time.—No.—For Man, in the inward, conſtituent Frame of his Being and Make, requires that Degree of Reaſon which ſhall examine into and weigh the Natures of Things:—Such a Degree

gree of Reaſon as ſhall always invariably, upon the Evidences flowing from Nature, determine his Mind, as to what is Good, and form a regular Judgment concerning it. And—theſe are the natural Steps we muſt take before we either can, or ought, to deſire any Good: Or, that we can, in any Degree, be delighted with it. Neither is the Caſe at all altered, whether, our own Affairs, or the Affairs of others, are concerned. It is the true, diſtinguiſhing Characteriſtic of Brutality, to meaſure the Good of Objects and of Acts by Appetite only, independent of all Reaſon.—— Mankind, when once they begin to brutalize, experience and feel in themſelves ſuch Effects of Phyſical or Animal Virtue as theſe: They are pleaſed to hear, out of Mr. *Hobbes*'s own Mouth, that the Gratifications of Brutality are ſo humanized, and rendered ſo agreeable to human Nature:—They are delighted, I ſay, with the Sanction of the great Mr. *Hobbes*, a Man of ſo much Penetration, Sagacity, and of ſuch exalted Eminence in the Learned World! Mr. *Hobbes*'s Followers, however, to ſpeak the Truth, are moſtly taken from this Herd of human Brutes.

Here, then, notwithſtanding all that we have ſaid to the contrary, we allow it, as moſt undoubtedly true, that, even a Madman will run into and ſuffer Evil; and yet, at the ſame time, his own Madneſs will moſt wonderfully delight him. And—notwithſtanding that, a Medicine is excellently well-fitted to reſtore Health to the ſick Patient; yet, he may, perhaps, obſtinately refuſe to take it. And, here we muſt obſerve, that, even Mr. *Hobbes* can, at ſome times, come to himſelf; altho' (and very often he inſiſts upon it) that every Thing is either *Good* or *Evil*, according to the Will and Pleaſure of Governors,—nay—even of every other individual Perſon, where Civil Society is entirely out of the Queſtion. Yet, in his *Leviathan*, Chap. 30. where (amongſt the Duties of a ſupreme Governor) he fixes it, as the fundamental Article, *That every ſuch Governor ought to frame good Laws:* And, in this ſame Chapter, Mr. *Hobbes*, as openly, as poſitively, declares, That "all Laws are not good, altho' they may con-"ſult the Utility, the Advantage of the ſupreme Magiſtrate." And, here he defines good Laws, to be "ſuch as are neceſſary to the Good and Ad-"vantage of the People; and, that they are Laws ſo clear and expreſs, as "to be eaſily and univerſally underſtood."

Reader, behold (and with Admiration!) the *Good* of the People!——A *Good*, moſt certainly, common to many, according to Mr. *Hobbes*'s own Confeſſion: And, it is ſuch a Good, as, even he himſelf eſtabliſhes, as the ultimate, chief End in view of every legiſlative Act. Now, an End deſigned is always ſuppoſed to be known before-hand: And, conſequently, the Nature of every ſuch End is determined, antecedent to any poſitive Law, which, either has, or can preſcribe to the People what is to be either *Good* or *Evil*.—Much to the ſame Purpoſe alſo, in his *Leviathan*, Chap. 6. he defines "Benevolence and Charity, by Acts which expreſs and deſire the "Good of others."

Now, it cannot be imagined that Mr. *Hobbes* could have defined, either Benevolence or Charity, any ſuch Affection as this; had he not believed ſuch an Affection poſſible. In the *Engliſh* Edition of his *Leviathan*, he acknowledges this Affection; which, when it becomes ſo diffuſive as to extend to all Mankind univerſally, is a good natural Propenſity, or Diſpoſition. In his *Latin* Edition, he has omitted any mention of it, imagining, as I apprehend, ſuch a Diſpoſition, ſuch an Affection, inconſiſtent with his other Opinions.

In true Propriety of Thinking and Speaking, the Nature of Good and the genuine Efficacy of Things are altogether confined, limited and determined to the Preſervation and Perfection of Nature; either in one or more; and muſt be eſtimated, either, upon a ſuitable Agreement and Fitneſs of Things to all the Powers and Faculties (for Inſtance) of human Nature: Or, upon ſuch Principles as Things themſelves diſcover, which agree with human Nature; a due Regard, at the ſame time, being always had to the whole Period of human Life: Or, at leaſt, to the more excellent, more valuable Portions of it. Upon this Foundation, I ſay, we are to form a real Eſtimate, a true Notion, concerning the Nature of Good——And therefore, not to calculate upon any abſurd, irregular Paſſion and Affection; or build our Opinion upon any airy, volatile Motion of Blood, which, perhaps, is too warmly either puſhed on, or as coldly retarded, by ſome firſt faint Impreſſion in the Imagination.

Infancy, Childhood, Youth, Manhood and Age.

SECT. III.

Good in its now Nature unchangeable:

IT is a Matter, therefore, we ſee, of important Conſequence, that a ſettled, well-eſtabliſhed Notion of Good be maintained and preſerved unchangeable, and for ever the ſame.—Becauſe, if our Notion, concerning Good, fluctuates and changes; it neceſſarily follows, that, all the Knowledge, which we can form about Happineſs, muſt be as precarious and uncertain. (For *Happineſs*, to define it truly, is *the greateſt Good of each individual Being reſpectively*). And our Knowledge alſo muſt be, as precarious and uncertain, concerning the Laws of Nature, and all the particular Virtues: Such as, *Juſtice*, *Temperance*, *Prudence*, *Fortitude*, *Patience*: All which Laws and Virtues, are no other than the Means of purſuing ſuch a Good; and are, in ſome meaſure, the partial, altho' not the total, Cauſes of it.—NOW—notwithſtanding, that, upon account of ſome Peculiarity in a different Complexion and Temperament of human Conſtitutions, it may, at ſome times, ſo happen, that either Food or Medicine proves hurtful to one Perſon, which, from repeated well-tried Experience, is innocent and ſalutary to human Bodies in general:—And—notwithſtanding, that, ſome ſuch Peculiarity may be obſerved alſo in the Genius, the Complexion, the Habits and Cuſtoms of ſome Nations and Countries:——Yet, ſome few ſuch

And why it is unchangeable.

The Definition of Happineſs.

All the Virtues are Means of that Good which produces Happineſs.

Particular, extraordinary Inſtances no Argument againſt general Truths.

ſuch Exceptions as theſe, can no more deſtroy the common Conſent of Mankind, (as to the general Nature of Good, and the ſeveral Parts, the particular Branches of it) than, a trifling Difference of Countenance can, the Conſent, the Agreement, in the common Definition of Man: Or, than it can deface that Similitude, that Sameneſs between them, in the Structure and Uſe of the ſeveral principal Parts and Members.

There is not any Nation under Heaven, which may not perceive and know, That, Acts and Duties, flowing from the Love of God, carry in the Performance of them, not only a preſent Delight, but alſo the ſure and certain Hope of future Happineſs.——And the ſame may be ſaid concerning the ſeveral other Inſtances of Duty which follow from, and depend upon, the ſame Principles of Nature and Reaſon. And—theſe are Points which Mr. *Hobbes* himſelf, at ſome times, acknowledges: As, in his Book *De Cive*, Cap. 15. Sect. 9. and the following Sections.—Notwithſtanding, that, at other times, he raiſes a loud Clamour in Contradiction of himſelf; and ſays, that, "the Honour, the Duty to be paid to Almighty God, is "ſolely placed in Fear only, and in the Opinion, the Apprehenſion, the "Dread of Power." As, in his *Leviathan*, he maintains, Part 1. Chapters 10 and 11.

There is no Nation under Heaven which denies [an Αντιπελαργία] a filial Piety, a Gratitude to Parents and Benefactors, to be ſalutary and beneficial to the whole human Kind. No Diverſity in the human Complexion of Mind, no Difference of Temper, can create an Opinion in any human Creature, that it is not a Good, to preſerve and defend the Life, the Limbs and the Liberty of every innocent Man. And—conſequently, That, the ſhedding of innocent Blood is every where prohibited.—What particular Mixture, what ſtrange Compoſition of Conſtitution [Ιδιοσυγκρασία] was ever yet ſo odd and fantaſtic, in any Creature, as not to judge it happy; and, for the Good of every one and all Families; and, conſequently, for the Good and Happineſs of every one, and all Nations, that, the plighted Faith and Purity of the Marriage-bed ſhould be preſerved undefiled? And—the ſame may be ſaid as to all Dominion over, all Right and Property in, the Uſe and Enjoyment of ſuch external good Things in Life as are neceſſary to the Preſervation of Health, Reputation or Honour; to the Nurture and Education of Children; to the Culture and Improvement of Friendſhip, *&c.*—In the Judgment which we form concerning the Good and Happineſs of ſuch Bleſſings as theſe,—The Agreement is ſo univerſal, that the whole ſolicitous Care and Buſineſs of Laws, both in a State of Nature and of Civil Society, is employed to ſecure, protect and defend them.—Nay—all Mankind as univerſally agree, every where, in theſe ſeveral Points; as, that, all Animals reſemble each other in the Motion of the Heart, and in the Pulſe of the Arteries: Or, that all are agreed in the ſame Opinion (as to the Whiteneſs of Snow and the Splendor of the Sun) that Snow is white, and that the Sun ſhines.—And—even Mr.

Αντιπελαργία. See Ch. 2. Sect. 20. Page 195.

Ιδιοσυγκρασία?

The Agreement between a natural and a moral Senſe.

Hobbes confeſſes, that, the Laws of Civil Society teach this whole Leſſon.

In all Caſes where written Laws are ſilent, and which Caſes (according to Mr. *Hobbes*'s own Confeſſion) are not only almoſt-infinite; but, are capable, alſo, of producing almoſt infinite Contentions: In all ſuch Caſes, I ſay, the Law of *Natural Equity* is and ought to be the *Rule of Direction*. In conſequence of this, Mr. *Hobbes* grants, That "The Laws of "*Natural Equity* may be known, without the Aſſiſtance of Laws eſta-"bliſhed upon Civil Inſtitution: And, that more Caſes can clearly-"enough be determined upon ſuch an Enquiry, than can be determined "by the Laws of Civil Inſtitution, which are not even almoſt-infi-"nite."

Caſes in which Equity is to govern.

The only Point which I here contend for, is, That ſome certain Rules of Equity are, by the Light of Nature, ſo well known, that, concerning them, Perſons of Diſpoſitions in the leaſt ingenuous, cannot diſagree.—— We, however, at the ſame time, moſt readily grant, that, there are ſeveral Points quite [*adiaphora*,] entirely indifferent, *i. e.* ſuch Points, concerning which, human Reaſon cannot univerſally determine any thing poſitive: And yet, the common Good neceſſarily requires, that a Point thus ſeemingly-indifferent ſhould be determined one way rather than another. In ſuch Caſes as theſe, the different Conſtitutions of different Civil Eſtabliſhments are concerned.——Now, there are ſeveral Things, which, before they receive the Sanction of Civil Authority, may, and without the leaſt Imputation of a Crime, be condemned: But, when once they become eſtabliſhed, and are guarded by the Injunctions and Sanctions of public Authority, muſt inviolably and religiouſly be obſerved; both, upon the Principles of Conſcience towards God, whoſe Vicegerents Civil Magiſtrates are; and in regard to the Quiet, the Happineſs of the Civil Community: The Security of Which, principally depends upon the inviolated, ſacred Authority of Civil Governors. And, the Foundation of this Doctrine is extremely evident; becauſe, it contributes much more to the common Good, that, in Matters of an indifferent, doubtful Nature, the Determination of the Civil Magiſtrate ſhould prevail, and be eſteemed, by the Parties governed, binding upon them, and obligatory, (ſince it appears ſo in the Judgment of the Magiſtrate or Party governing) than that Feuds and Animoſities, concerning any ſuch Point, ſhould eternally ſubſiſt:—And, from whence, nothing elſe can be expected than inteſtine Wars, Civil Commotions, Bloodſhed, Slaughter, Death and Deſtruction; *All which*, beyond all Peradventure, are ſore and terrible Evils.

Some things in their own Nature indifferent.

Matters indifferent may become obligatory, and how. See Fides's Theologia Speculativa, Cap. 13. Book 1. Part 2. Page 124.

SECT.

SECT. IV.

MR. *Hobbes* is, alſo, guilty of another very groſs Error, in his Notion of Good, when he ſays, *De Cive*, Cap. 1. Art. 2. "That, the "Object of the human Will lawfully may be Whatſoever appears, in the "Opinion of each Perſon reſpectively, good for himſelf." And the ſame Sentiment is expreſſed pretty nearly in theſe Words in his Book *De Cive*, Cap. 3. Sect. 21. "Every Perſon is preſumed to ſeek out what is *good* "for himſelf upon a Principle of Nature: And, to purſue what is *juſt*, "for the Sake of Peace only; and, As it were, by Accident, to ſerve a "preſent Turn only." Juſtice, to be ſure, concerns the Good of others: And this Virtue Mr. *Hobbes* does not ſuppoſe any Man would chuſe, were it not for the Apprehenſion, the Dread of Evils, the natural Conſequences ariſing from a State of War.

The Paſſages which we have already quoted from Mr. *Hobbes*, fairly prove theſe Notions upon him; and ſeveral Paſſages, every where ſcattered thro' his Writings, inſinuate very broad Hints to the ſame Purpoſe. From ſome ſuch Origin as this, flows that Paſſage in his Book *De Cive*, Chap. 2. Sect. 8. "Whatſoever is committed voluntarily, and happens "ſo, happens upon account of ſome Good to the Perſon himſelf who "wills it."

Now, the Tendency of all what Mr. *Hobbes* here offers, evidently is to prove, That, Man is ſo framed and contrived, that it is a direct Contradiction to his Nature, and, conſequently, a plain Impoſſibility for him to feel *an Appetite, a Deſire* for any thing, which does not immediately relate to *Self-advantage* and *Self-glory*. *See his Book* De Cive, Chap. 1. Sect. 2.

Mr. *Hobbes*'s Reaſoning, therefore, runs thus, "Since it is a clear "Caſe, That, each Perſon can, more amply and fully, ſecure to himſelf "theſe Ends from a Dominion over others, than in a ſociable, amicable "Alliance with them: That, therefore, all Mankind are endowed with "a natural Appetite or Deſire this way, and are, conſequently, impetu- "ouſly and forcibly turned into War, into an open, public, general War "againſt All, purely for the Sake of this ſo deſirable a Dominion: That, "Fear is the only Hindrance which prevents ſuch a War; and, that, this "Paſſion is the only Motive which compels Man to accept the Conditi- "ons of peaceable Society." Whoſoever will be at the Pains to examine into the Principle, which led Mr. *Hobbes* into an Opinion ſo directly-oppoſite to the Sentiments of all ſound Philoſophers, muſt evidently find it no other than what he has hinted in the very ſame ſecond Section of this Chapter, juſt now mentioned; in which he fixes his "Defi- "nition of human Nature upon the Affections and Paſſions implanted in "all Animals; until, from Rudiments, Inſtructions, and Precepts often

"inculcated

" inculcated, it may ſo happen, that, the Edge of Appetite, or Deſire " for Objects preſent, may be quite turned and blunted by the Remem- " brance of Things paſt." Mr. *Hobbes* takes his *Eſtimate of human Nature*, as alſo *of an Object compleat and adequate to the Will*, from ſuch Paſſions and Affections as anticipate and prevent the Uſe of Reaſon, and all the genuine Effects of Experience, of Arts and Sciences: From, ſuch Paſſions and Affections as are obſerved in Children and Madmen. The Reader may, if he pleaſes, conſult the Preface to his Book *De Cive*, in order to ſatisfy himſelf farther.—Whereas, our Opinion (which perfectly correſponds with all true Philoſophers, as far as I can underſtand) is; *That the Meaſure, the Extent, the Excellency of Man, is rather to be taken from Reaſon: And, conſequently, that, the human Will is capable of extending itſelf to all thoſe Objects which Reaſon has declared to be ſuitable and agreeable, ſeverally and reſpectively, to every Nature.*—Whereas, ſuch irrational, abſurd Affections and Paſſions as theſe, are to be called, rather *tumultuous*, and, conſequently, *preternatural Commotions of the human Mind.* And thus much—even Mr. *Hobbes* himſelf (after the Publication of his Book *De Cive*) confeſſedly owns in his Book *De Homine*, Cap. 12. Sect. 1. We alſo—ſo far agree with Mr. *Hobbes*, as to allow it a Caſe poſſible.—But—a very particular Caſe, however, indeed it is, (and perhaps owing to a wilful Depravity) That, ſome one ſingle Inſtance or other may be found of a Man, narrow, mean and contracted in Spirit; perverſely vitiated and corrupt; who regards nothing but his *own, dear, worthleſs Self*;—and, Who ſcarcely has any other Propenſity, than, towards ſuch Objects as he judges advantageous to his own private Intereſt. I never have been able to diſcover any Indications of ſo ſelfiſh a Diſpoſition in any one Man alive, except in the one Individual, Mr. *Thomas Hobbes* himſelf. There are, certainly, Perſons, of a much nobler and more generous way of Thinking than this, who not only imagine That, *to be Good*, which is Good for *themſelves*; but, alſo, *whatſoever contributes both to the Preſervation and Perfection, to the Regularity and Decorum of the whole human Kind.*—Nay—their way of Thinking is ſo generous, ſo comprehenſive, as to extend, as much as poſſible can be conceived, to the one GRAND UNIVERSAL WHOLE.——This, in a Word, is that Sort of GOOD which Minds, truly generous and noble, value: This is the GOOD they Will and Deſire: This GOOD is the Foundation of all their future Hopes; This, the true Happineſs of all their preſent Enjoyment.—Neither can I, indeed, find out any Reaſon why, the Object, which, according to my Judgment, is ſuitable to every one, or any one Nature, ſhould not be the Object of my Will, my Deſire; and, in ſo full, ſo ample a Degree, as exactly to correſpond with each Nature reſpectively. And, if ſo, no Reaſon can be aſſigned, why, I ſhould not, as much as in me lies, endeavour to cauſe this ſo exact a Correſpondence, between every Faculty and its own proper Object reſpectively.

Now,

Now, the whole human Capacity is fitly and fully exerted, in caſe it is applied to an adequate Object, ſuited to all its Faculties: And—if ſo, the human Will, conſequently, is as fitly applied, if exerciſed upon the ſame adequate Object.—And—to this Head may be referred what *Ariſtotle* lays down as the true Character of a good Lawgiver. *It is the Duty*, ſays he, *of a wiſe Lawgiver* (1) *to provide for, and take Care of, that political Body where he preſides and governs, of human Nature in general, and of all other Communities: He is to provide for, and take Care of them, by ſuch Rules and Laws as may beſt promote a Life of Virtue, and may beſt advance the various, proper Degrees of Happineſs in a due, regular Subordination.* And, in other Parts of his Writings, but more eſpecially in his *Politics*, Book 3. Chap. 13. *Ariſtotle* ſays: *That, whatſoever is Right, is equally beneficial and advantageous to the whole Body Politic, and to all the Members of it.*——And,——The one principal Point which He, in the laſt Place, aſſerts, concerning the Laws of Civil Government, muſt be underſtood as relative, not only to the Good of any Part, but of the Whole. And this [*i. e.* the Good of the Whole,] is, and muſt be, he ſays, the *Meaſure of Right to be regarded and purſued by the Lawgiver.*

Suppoſing, then, that the whole World be conſidered as one grand, univerſal Commonwealth; we are, from this Doctrine, ſufficiently inſtructed, as to What is *Right in general:* And, conſequently, What muſt be looked upon as ſuch, according to the general Laws of the Univerſe and of Nature. Since, therefore, in Truth and Reality, any one Lawgiver is but

(1) Τὸ δὲ Νομοθέτῃ τὸ σπουδαίῳ ἐστὶ, τὸ θεάσθαι πόλιν, καὶ γένος ἀνθρώπων, καὶ πᾶσαν ἄλλην κοινωνίαν, ζωῆς ἀγαθῆς πῶς μεθίξουσι, καὶ τῆς ἐνδεχομένης αὐτοις εὐδαιμονίας. Eſt autem boni legum ſcriptoris diligenter conſiderare & videre quomodo civitas, & genus hominum & omnes aliæ ſocietates, vitæ cum virtute conjunctæ, & beatitudinis ſibi convenientis & in ſe cadentis participes eſſe poſſint. *Ariſtotelis Oper. omn* Vol. 3. Page 572. *Edit.* Paris, 1654. *Fol. Dion. Lambino interprete, de Republicâ*, Lib. 7. Cap. 2.

Ariſtotle does not ſeem in this Place to mean, that the Lawgiver or Governor of a particular State is to lay down Laws either for Mankind in general, or for all Communities of Men.—But—the natural Interpretation of what he here ſays, is, That every wiſe Lawgiver will provide for his own political Conſtitution, according to all thoſe ſeveral Relations and Circumſtances of Well-being, Happineſs and Virtue, which muſt render it firm and laſting: He will conſider the Members of it as Members and Parts of Human Nature, and provide for all their Occaſions and Wants accordingly:—And, he will conſider neighbouring and foreign States and Kingdoms ſo nearly relative to his own, as to preſerve a Ballance of Power; and, enter into ſuch Leagues, offenſive and defenſive, as may beſt preſerve the Welfare and Happineſs of his own particular Community and all the Members of it.

Now,—nothing can be for the *Good* of any Civil Society, which is not a *Good* fixed in the Laws of Nature; in the Nature of Things, and in the Nature of Man. And—if ſo,—nothing can prove for the *Good* of any Civil Society which does not prove *a Good, a common Good*, to all the Members of it, in all the Relations and Circumſtances of their Being and Well-being. For, *Ariſtotle*'s Aſſertion is, (as our Author juſt now quotes) Τὸ δ' ἴσως ὀρθὸν, πρὸς τὸ τῆς πόλεως ὅλης συμφέρον, καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τὸ [συμφέρον] τῶν πολιτῶν *i. e.* Fortaſsè verò id rectum eſt quod ad totius ſocietatis utilitatem, & ad rem omnium civium communem & publicam pertinet. *Ariſtotelis Oper. omn. id. ibid.* Cap. 13. Lib. 3. *De Republicâ*, Page 473. *Fol.*

but one Man only: And, ſince, as ſuch, he both can and ought to, conſult the *Common Good*, (becauſe, this is the very End of his being appointed) what poſſible Objection can lie againſt our concluding, *That it is placed in the Power of each and every other Man alſo to do the like?*

See Prolegomena, Sect. 1. Page 10. Note 1.

Now, this very Argument, moreover, is capable of the *Demonſtration a priori*; and is allowed to be ſo by all thoſe who acknowledge, That, the Nature of the human Will conſiſts in the Conſent, the Approbation of the Mind with the Judgment, (* *The laſt Determination of the Underſtanding*) concerning all ſuch Matters as carry a Relation, an Agreement to each other. For, it is a demonſtrable Truth, That, the human Underſtanding is, as capable of judging and determining what theſe Things are which miniſter and produce the Good and Happineſs of others; as well as, what can miniſter to, and produce the Good and Happineſs of ourſelves: Neither, indeed, in the next Place, can any Reaſon in Nature be aſſigned, why we cannot *Will* thoſe very Objects, which we have judged and determined to be Good. Nay—and, if we conſider the *true Perfection of Human Freedom*, it can ſcarcely be imagined otherwiſe, than that we ſhould *will and deſire thoſe very Objects which we have judged and determined to be Good.*

* See Letters, concerning Liberty and Neceſſity, which paſſed between Dr. Samuel Clarke and a Gentleman of the Univerſity of Cambridge, printed at London 1717.

Obſervation 1. We are, then, here to obſerve,—firſt, That, whatſoever Object, a Perſon can will, he can alſo (as far as in him lies) reſolve and determine, to produce and effect. The *Good*, therefore, which is thus *Willed*, is called *the Object of our Intention.* And, *by Virtue of this Intention, the Good, thus Willed, forms the compleat Notion of an End.*

Obſervation 2. The common Good of the whole Univerſe can and may, conſequently, be the *one Grand End* for all Mankind to purſue.—Now—becauſe, ſuch a Good as this is the greateſt Good which we can poſſibly will, the Underſtanding, therefore, whenever it judges and determines Right, muſt judge and determine ſuch a Volition, *i. e.* ſuch an Act and Habit of the Will as this, to be more neceſſary, more intrinſically and intimately connected with the Perfection and Happineſs of that Man, who rightly conſiders and underſtands what the Common Good is, than any Volition or Act of the Will employed about a leſſer Good.—It abundantly anſwers, therefore, my preſent Purpoſe to have demonſtrated, That the *Common Good* can be the End:—Nay—indeed, and *the principal, the chief End of Man:* Provided it be firſt proved, that this Common Good be a greater Good than any other poſſible Good whatſoever. Whether then any one is, in Fact, obliged to purſue *this one End*, we ſhall hereafter clearly underſtand, when once we come to Enquire into, and Settle the Obligation of, *the Laws of Nature.*

The only one Remark which we ſhall here add, relating to Mr. *Hobbes*, is, That in Chap. 31. Section the laſt of his *Leviathan*, *Latin* Edition, he groſsly contradicts all thoſe Articles which before, in his other Writings, he has endeavoured to eſtabliſh, in inveſtigating and tracing out

that

that Good which he has laid down as proper and peculiar to SELF ONLY. And—that, he not only acknowledges the public Good, to be a Good which poſſibly can be regarded; but he alſo, by the plaineſt, moſt manifeſt Inuendoes and Hints, ſeems big with Expectation, that this his own beloved *Leviathan* will, at ſome time or other, act as the Miniſter and Servant of this great End. Mr. *Hobbes*'s Words are as follow: "(1) Non deſpero quin re-"gibus interius in ſua jura, et doctoribus in officia ſua poſthæc attentiùs "inſpicientibus, hæc ipſa doctrina conſuetudine mitior facta, tandem ali-"quando ad bonum publicum communitèr recipienda ſit." Here, then, Mr. *Hobbes (and to be ſure a moſt excellent Prophet he is!)* prognoſticates and preſages, that this his *Leviathan*-doctrine, altho' not as yet eſtabliſhed by Kings and Governors, will, in future times, become of Uſe and Advantage to the public Good. And, That, this very ſame *Leviathan*-doctrine, as he inſinuates, is well adapted, is ſuitably fitted, not only to the Advantage, to the Good of one particular Civil Society only; but, to the Advantage, to the Good of all Mankind in general, at all Times and in all Places.

Notwithſtanding, however, That, this whole *Leviathan*-doctrine, ſtated even in this Light, appears, according to my Judgment, moſt groſsly falſe; yet, it abundantly demonſtrates, that, this very End (namely, the *Public Good*) was, at ſome certain times, uppermoſt in his Thoughts: And as fully proves likewiſe, how thoroughly convinced Mr. *Hobbes*, in his own Mind, is, that, ſuch an End, if with Sincerity and Truth purſued, is attainable. For, in caſe it is not an attainable End, Mr. *Hobbes* would be ſo far from making an Enquiry into it, that he would not even pretend that he ever had made any ſuch Enquiry. Add, likewiſe, to what has been already ſaid, and which we can prove from Mr. *Hobbes*'s own Mouth, that, *to pleaſe or to be agreeable to others, is, in its own Nature, in the very Act, agreeable to Man:* A Delight delightful to Man, and, conſequently, muſt appear to him *Good*. For, Mr. *Hobbes*, in his Book *De Naturâ Humanâ*, Cap. 9. Sect. 15. declares openly, That, even "the "Pleaſure of Luſt is, in Fact, partly a Pleaſure of the Mind; that is "to ſay, a Pleaſure ariſing from a Perception, a Conſciouſneſs, a "Senſe in the Perſon who has communicated Pleaſure, Delight to an-"other."

There cannot, therefore, be imagined a groſſer Abſurdity, than to ſay, That, Pleaſure of Mind ariſes in him who gratifies one Individual only, and in a Matter of the moſt trifling Conſequence: And yet, at the ſame time,

(1) *Non deſpero*, &c.] I do not at all deſpair, but Kings, upon a cloſer and ſtricter Enquiry into their Privileges and Prerogatives; as alſo Paſtors and Teachers, upon a more diligent Examination, in times to come, into their ſeveral Duties, Offices and Employments, will receive this Doctrine: I do not at all deſpair, ſays Mr. *Hobbes*, but when theſe happy Diſcoveries are once made, that this very Doctrine of the *Leviathan* having, by Uſe and Cuſtom, become more mild and gentle, will at laſt, ſome time or other, be commonly received as a Doctrine for the public Good.

to deny a greater Pleaſure to ariſe in the Mind from a Conſciouſneſs that we at once gratify and pleaſe Multitudes: And—with a much more exalted, a more intenſe Delight, when we improve and advance the Faculties of both their Souls and their Bodies——When we procure and advance the *Common Good of All* by Fidelity, Gratitude and Humanity—nay, even, and upon the Suppoſition, that All are not Members of, and ſubject to, the ſame Civil Government.

Laſtly, to conclude this Chapter, Mr. *Hobbes*, in his Book *De Homine*, Cap. 11. Sect. 14. (where the particular Subject of his Enquiry is to inveſtigate and trace out the different Sorts of Good, as to their various Degrees of *greater* or *leſs*) openly declares *That* to be the *greater Good*, exteris paribus, *which benefits Multitudes, rather than the Few.*

End of the First Part.

A

PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY

INTO THE

LAWS of NATURE;

With a CONFUTATION of Mr. *HOBBES*'s Philoſophical Principles, *&c.*

PART II.

CHAP. IV.

SECT. I.

Concerning Practical Precepts.

BY way of preliminary Introduction to this Chapter upon *Practical Precepts*, we are to premiſe, in the firſt Place, That all the Acts, Notions, Ideas, Apprehenſions and Motions in general, of Mankind, muſt not be taken for, and underſtood as, ſo many practical Principles.—Becauſe, *Firſt*, Primary or Simple Apprehenſions; *Secondly*, Motions cauſed by the Animal Spirits; *Thirdly*, The ſeveral Images of Imagination;—and very often, *Fourthly*, Many Muſcular Motions, ſuch, for Inſtance, are Winkings of the Eye, ſudden Recoilings and Startings-back at the unexpected Sight of Friends, *&c.* Theſe and all theſe are obſerved to happen without any Precept or Rule at all.

1. There are ſeveral Acts, Notions, Motions, &c. which cannot be called Practical Principles.

We are alſo to premiſe, in the ſecond Place, That the many Acts performed by Children (ſuch as, comparing, judging and determining, concerning Objects which appear either pleaſing or injurious to them) do not fall under *Practical Precepts*: And yet, out of all theſe Materials is

2. The Acts of Children cannot be called practical.

collected, improved and increaſed a large Fund of Knowledge; ſuch a Fund as is various and almoſt-infinite.

Acts of bare Volition cannot, &c.

3. To theſe, very likely, and with a rational Probability, may be added, alſo, the bare Volition, the *motus primo-primi*, the firſt Motions of the Will towards Good, as ſimply conſidered: Such Motions as theſe, alſo, muſt, I ſay, be excluded out of all *Practical Precepts*.

When the Mind is ſtored with Impreſſions of Senſe it begins to compare.

Univerſal Nature has, to be ſure, formed us ſo, that, in our tender Years, we receive many Impreſſions of Senſe, and tenaciouſly hold them in our Memory: And then, after ſome time, by a ſpontaneous, voluntary Compariſon, we judge whether ſome Objects are not larger than other ſome; as alſo, whether they be ſimilar or diſſimilar, advantageous or diſadvantageous.

We cannot but know what Power we have over ſeveral corporeal or bodily Motions, and that theſe Motions are voluntary.

But, above all, what ſtill farther demands our cloſeſt Attention, is, that, ſince, *we ourſelves are always preſent with ourſelves*, we neceſſarily and unavoidably muſt, (1) from the peculiar Conſtitution of our Mind, and its *reflex Acts*, perceive the *Acts* of both our *Underſtanding* and our *Will*: What our own free Power or Dominion over certain corporeal, bodily Motions is; and, which Motions uſually are, for this very Reaſon, called *voluntary*. And, from hence it is, that, we cannot but know what the Acts of theſe our Faculties and Powers are, which draw down and bring either Evil, Hurt and Imperfection: or, Good, Advantage and Perfection upon us.

We cannot but know what Acts in our own Power draw upon us Good and Evil, &c.

The Object either of Deſire or Averſion how to be known.

From a Similitude of Nature Objects of Deſire and Averſion the ſame to all.

To this very ſame Knowledge alſo, may, appoſitely enough, be referred and joined the Deſire and the Act of proſecuting any one Object: And, on the contrary, the Averſion, and the Act of baniſhing any ſuch Object from our Nature. We may alſo, by an exact Parity, upon an equal Strength of Reaſoning, further conclude, That we can readily and eaſily, without any other Guide than mere Nature, underſtand, that the very ſame Objects which both appear to be, and really are, either advantageous or diſadvantageous, agreeable or diſagreeable to ourſelves, will be equally ſo to others; in as much as ſuch other Beings carry an exact Correſpondency of Nature, either as to Soul or Body, or both, with ourſelves. Upon this ſubſtantial, ſolid Foundation it is, that we eſtabliſh ſome certain practical Propoſitions concerning ſuch moral, free Acts as are pleaſing and agreeable to Almighty God: And, upon the ſame Foundation it is, that, we eſtabliſh many more Propoſitions of a practical Nature likewiſe, which concern ſuch Advantages and Diſadvantages as relate to all Mankind. When, in an adult Age, we have once arrived at mature Reaſon, we then *think* and *reflect* upon the whole Sum, Subſtance and Period of human Life; *i. e.* upon the whole future Employment and Exerciſe of all our Faculties.

From hence are formed practical Propoſitions.

Practical Propoſitions.

Now,

(1) *From the peculiar Conſtitution of our Mind and its reflex Acts*, &c.] See Mr. *Locke*'s Eſſay concerning Human Underſtanding, Book 2. Chap. 1. Sect. 3, 4, 5. See the Notes, Sect. 5. Chap. 1. Pages 11, 12, 13, 14.

Now, ſince the Number of *Actions* and *Events* probably future; as alſo of ſuch *good Effects* as we, hope from thence will ariſe, is, at this Age, much greater than what ever before offered themſelves at once to our View. And, ſince a longer Series, Connexion and Chain of Events (which are to ſucceed in their own natural Order, and which are cloſely linked to each other) will be ſettled and regulated by the human Mind, now it is arrived at a mature State of Reaſon, the Mind, conſequently, not only recollects, by the Help of Memory, bare Signs, Repreſentations or ſimple Conceptions; but alſo applies Enunciations or Propoſitions (1). Becauſe, by the Help and Aſſiſtance of theſe Enunciations or Propoſitions, properly applied, the Connexion of all our Acts, with the Effects properly depending upon them, is ſettled, and in a clear, more diſtinct View repreſented; let the Kinds and Degrees of theſe Acts be what they will.—Such Propoſitions as theſe are called *practical:* Neither is there the leaſt Neceſſity to ſuppoſe them ſtated *in the Form of a Gerund*, i. e. *the Form, wherein a Neceſſity is implied, that this, or t'other Thing muſt be done* (as ſome of the Schoolmen are pleaſed to have it). Becauſe, that *Debitudo, ought* or *muſt*, (which is implied *in the Voice of a Gerund)* greatly wants Explanation:—And, this *Debitudo, ought, muſt* or *fitneſs*, is to be diſcovered, either, from that neceſſary Connexion which it (*i. e.* this *Debitudo* or *Fitneſs*) bears to the End itſelf: Or, from the Obligation of ſome Law eſtabliſhed. But—by thoſe who are making an Enquiry into the Origin of Laws, The Obligation of Laws is not to be ſuppoſed as yet known. Whereas, the neceſſary Connexion between *Means* and *Ends*, is ſufficiently expreſſed in the Connexion of them, *i. e.* as it is the neceſſary Connexion of *Cauſes* with their own deſtined, appointed *Natural Effects*.

We may alſo add, That, as we improve in Years and Reaſon, we naturaly compare together the *Powers of Cauſes* in producing *ſimilar Effects:* And we alſo, as naturally, join together the various Degrees of Perfection, which, Effects ſeverally produce. From which Compariſon, we form our Judgment, and ſay, That, *ſuch or ſuch a Thing is either greater or leſs, or equal to any other Thing.* And—from hence, conſequently, (as for Example) we conclude, That, out of all the poſſible Acts in our own Power, Some, in Preference to others, or even in Preference to all others, are capable of contributing moſt to the Happineſs of ourſelves and others. Such Practical Propoſitions as theſe are, therefore, called *Comparative Propoſitions* or *Precepts.* Comparative Propoſitions.

In this our PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY, which ſearches into the original Formation only, of the Laws of Nature, it is not neceſſary to aſſert and maintain, that, ſuch Dictates as theſe (even after we diſcover them to carry the Efficacy of Laws) do always determine Mankind to act. It is fully

(1) *Enunciations or Propoſitions.*] See Supplemental Notes, by way of Recapitulation, at the End of Section 10. Chap. 1. Page 31.

fully ſufficient that theſe Dictates lay down the Obligation of a future Determination to act one way rather than another.—As to the Efficacy of ſuch a Determination, there are different Opinions.—But—we ſhall not enter into any Controverſy about them, or any Determination upon them. All Mankind, however, in my Opinion, muſt agree in, and will acknowledge, thus much, *viz.* That, a *Practical Precept* is previouſly required in all deliberate Acts; as alſo, that ſuch a Precept, in ſome ſort fixes, and points out the Method how to determine Acts future.—And yet—the eſſential, conſtituent Branches of a *Practical Precept*, as alſo the Form in which ſuch a Propoſition is laid down, muſt, notwithſtanding all this, be conſidered ſomewhat cloſer, and with ſtricter Attention:——Becauſe, from hence, the Geneſis, *i. e.* the original Formation of ſuch a Propoſition in the Mind, will, with greater Eaſe and Clearneſs, be conceived and underſtood.

A practical Propoſition determined by the Underſtanding. See Sect. 4. of this Chapter.

A practical Propoſition is, at ſome times, expreſſed in the following Form.

First Form.

Firſt, This, or that poſſible Act, (as for Inſtance, *Univerſal Benevolence*) will, preferable to all other poſſible human Acts, for the Time being contribute moſt to my own Happineſs, and to the common Happineſs of others: *i. e.* (to be more full and expreſs) This Practical Propoſition, of *Univerſal Benevolence*, either is an eſſential Part of Happineſs: Or, it is a Cauſe, which, at ſome time or other, will effectually produce the principal, eſſential Part of it.

Second Form. A practical Propoſition or Precept is commanded by the Agent himſelf who obeys it.

Whereas, *Secondly*. Under ſome Circumſtance, ſuch a practical Propoſition, or Act, may be elicited, under the Form of an Imperial-act, or Command, abſolutely within the Agent's own Power to determine: And, which Act is, under given Circumſtances, moſt ſubſervient to the *Common Good*, preferable to all other poſſible Acts in the Agent's Power to elicit, perform, and exhibit to View.

Third Form.

Very often, in the *third* Place alſo, this Act is to be elicited and exerciſed under the Gerundal Form.

As to my own Part, I cannot, however, but think, indeed, that theſe ſeveral Forms and Modes of Expreſſion (as they are relative to a Natural Law) carry the ſame Signification abſolutely, either, *Firſt*, Whether the human Underſtanding judges ſuch or ſuch an Act, beſt and fitteſt to be done: Or, *Secondly*, Whether the Underſtanding commands the Performance of it: Or, *Thirdly*, Whether [*ex vi Gerundii*, i. e.] *from the Obligation of Neceſſity, or Fitneſs*, &c. my Underſtanding informs me, that, I am bound, by a moral Neceſſity, to act ſo, or ſo.—And—That—Theſe ſeveral Forms or Modes of Expreſſion are much the ſame, is evident;—becauſe, the Underſtanding (which, when it acts in this Manner, is called *Conſcience*) ſufficiently declares to you a natural Obligation, when it informs you, That, the Performance of ſuch or ſuch an Act *cæteris paribus* is beſt and fitteſt to be performed, both by you and by others.—And, for this

The Foundation of a natural Obligation.

this evident Reaſon: Becauſe, if I neglect to perform any Act, which, upon full Evidence, is declared to me to be the beſt, it is, from the very Neglect, evident, that I draw upon myſelf an Evil, which may, with Truth and Propriety, be called a Puniſhment. But——if, *Secondly*, the Act be conſidered under the Form of an *Imperative*, or *Command*, the very ſame Point is inculcated, by repreſenting the private Underſtanding of every Man as a deputed Governor, commiſſioned with the Power and Authority of enacting Laws. This Kind of Expreſſion may, perhaps, (becauſe it ſounds ſomewhat metaphorical) appear leſs philoſophical; and, yet, this Manner of Expreſſion is, however, very uſeful:—Becauſe, the Similitude, the Reſemblance ſtands upon a Foundation, as juſt and natural as can poſſibly be imagined. And, in the *third* Place, the Gerundive Form lays down the very ſame Point; but, in the Manner of a ſubordinate, inferior Judge or Counſellor, who, upon ſome Law already eſtabliſhed, adviſes us to ſubmit, and demands from us a Conformity of ſome future Act to ſuch a Law.

The firſt Method is much fitter for a Philoſopher: Which Method, if you conſider the Form of it, expreſſes a theoretic or ſpeculative Propoſition. But—if you conſider the Energy, the Subſtance, the Matter comprehended under it, you find a practical Propoſition implied: A Propoſition which inſtructs us in *the natural Foundation of an Obligation.*

The firſt Form is fitteſt for a Philoſopher,

The ſecond Method ſeems better fitted for the Office and Employment of a Magiſtrate and Governor.

The ſecond ſeems fitteſt for Magiſtrates and Governors.

The third Method is better calculated to the Duty of a Divine.

The third Form fitteſt for Divines.

A practical Propoſition, however, may very juſtly be applied, by any and every one, at Pleaſure: Provided always, that a due Regard be had to the Diſtinction (ſuch as it is) between theſe three Methods or Forms.

The *Nature of Things* lays before the human Mind what is *beſt* and *fitteſt* to be done. The Mind, obſerving the regular Order, Government and Diſpoſition of Things, from an Idea That, God Wills and Commands ſuch a Diſpoſition and Government, concludes the Whole as already performed: And ſo, lays down and commands, in the Name of God, a Law to itſelf according to the ſecond Form.

How the three Forms collectively are to be applied.

In the third Form, the human Mind conſiders, recollects and reflects upon the two foregoing Forms; and pronounces an Act (conformable to ſuch a Determination, to ſuch an Order, to ſuch a Government) to be the juſt Decree of a legal Court of Judicature, in Oppoſition to every unjuſt Act whatſoever.

SECT.

SECT. II.

This Manner of expreſſing the Laws of Nature imperfect, and why.

THERE is, alſo, another way of expreſſing the *Laws of Nature*. As for Example, thus: *This, or t'other, poſſible Act in our Power, is moſt agreeable and beſt ſuited to human Nature.* Here, we are to obſerve, that, the Terms of this Propoſition expreſs a doubtful Signification.

1. Becauſe it denotes the particular Happineſs of one Individual only.

For, *Firſt*, human Nature either denotes the particular Happineſs of one ſingle Agent only: And Then, in this Caſe, It does not ſufficiently declare all theſe antecedent Circumſtances, which ought to be conſidered as previous to the Act itſelf. Becauſe, it is not the *particular Happineſs* of one ſingle Agent only, which ought to be conſidered;—but it is *the greateſt Common Good:* Or,

2. Becauſe it excludes the Notion of Good.

Secondly, Human Nature comprehends all Mankind, and Mankind only; and then, by this Means, Almighty God is excluded from *The Notion*, LAWS OF NATURE. For, ſuppoſing, that, under either the one or the other of theſe two Notions, is, conſequentially, included the *Public Good*; yet, Either Manner of Expreſſion coincides ſtill with the FIRST FORM. All the Preference, which, this firſt Notion deſerves, is only This: That, it is free from that Ambiguity which we here condemn.—But then, in the next Place, the Misfortune is, that this relative Term *Convenit*, carries in it ſome Ambiguity, ſome Doubt, as to what one ſingle Agent, or to what individual Thing, it is applicable. For, an Act may be ſaid, *Convenire*, *(to agree* or be *ſuitable to any Nature)* either, *Firſt*, when it proves ſuitable to the Principles of acting, in *that Nature:* To which Principles, muſt be referred *Faculties* and *Habits:*—And all ſuch Objects, as, either, lie cloſely concealed within the Memory: Or, which outwardly ſollicit and prompt the Nature of an Individual to act. For, under theſe Heads ought to be referred and placed *Practical Precepts:* That is to ſay, *Propoſitions* which are *Rules of Action.* As to the Terms, of theſe Precepts and Rules, they are cauſed by their own proper Objects; they are treaſured up in the Memory. Theſe Terms are formed by the Mind into Propoſitions:—And, from hence it is, that, they ſettle Acts either *Morally Good*, or *Morally Evil*; and conſtitute *Habits*, whether *Virtuous* or *Vicious.* Or, *Secondly*, An Act may be ſaid, in the ſecond Place, to agree with Human Nature, when the Tendencies and Effects of it, either *Preſerve* or *Perfect* the Nature of any one or more of Mankind.

See firſt Section of this Chapter at Page 270.

The firſt Form is the beſt. In the firſt Section, at Page 270.

The latter Senſe, or Meaning, of theſe two Interpretations, agrees well enough with the *firſt Form* laid down: *A Form* free from all Doubt, from all Ambiguity:—Nay—and even the firſt Interpretation of the Congruity, Agreement and Fitneſs of Acts, juſt now mentioned, may, in a great meaſure, be reduced to the ſame Form. For, practical Propoſitions, ſo far as they are concerned about internal Principles of Action, ariſe from the Appetite, the Deſire of *an End*, chiefly, and above all other Ends,

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THE BEST:—And alſo, from an Application of Means, the fitteſt and beſt ſuited to bring ſuch an End about. Let the Determination, however, be what it will, which, practical Propoſitions pronounce, concerning the *ultimate, deſirable End*; yet, theſe Propoſitions, only declare thus much, *viz.* That, ſuch, or ſuch, an Object deſired, is, in its own Nature, Good; or, a Part of human Happineſs: And, that, it really is ſuch a Part, or Portion, of human Happineſs, which is, *(cæteris paribus)* under given Circumſtances the greateſt. And—as to what theſe practical Propoſitions determine concerning the Means, they only declare thus much; namely, That, ſuch, or ſuch, an Expedient contributes towards the Attainment of ſuch or ſuch a Good: And this Expedient, in the given Caſe, is ſuppoſed the very beſt.——And, theſe Terms of Expreſſion coincide with the firſt Form. To uſe this firſt Form, therefore, is preferable. Becauſe, The Analyſis or Solution of that Propoſition which I have propoſed and laid down, concerning the Correſpondency, the Suitableneſs, the Fitneſs of a moral Act, is not, in the general, obvious to every Underſtanding.

And, what is alſo, in the third Place, further to be conſidered is, That, the Scope of my preſent Deſign is, to ſearch into, and lay open, the Origin of thoſe firſt Dictates, with which, moral Acts ought to agree. And, conſequently, it does not ſufficiently anſwer my Deſign to ſay, That, An Act agrees with Dictates already eſtabliſhed:——Becauſe, Dictates, let them be what they will, are the immediate Principles, or Motives, of human Acts.

It may not, perhaps, however, here be amiſs to make this one Remark, *viz.* That, all good Acts, (*i. e.* in other Words, all Virtues) can and may, with Truth, be affirmed, perfectly and eſſentially to agree with the Notion or Idea of a Rational Agent, whoſe Reaſon is improved, and has arrived at that full Maturity of Wiſdom and Prudence, to which it (*i. e.* Reaſon) naturally tends. For, Prudence, in the true, eſſential Nature and Notion of it, comprehends both the Volition of, and the natural Tendency towards, the beſt, the nobleſt End, at which the Faculties, the Powers, the Capacities of each Being reſpectively, can arrive:—— And, alſo——The Proſecution of ſuch an End, by the moſt effectual Means.——Now——This beſt, this nobleſt, ultimate End, is, in the firſt Place, ſuch a Good, as is common to all Rational Agents.——And, *Secondly*, the mutual, univerſal Conſent of all Rational Agents, in united Endeavours towards the Attainment of it, (this End) is the moſt effectual Means in the Security of it. Becauſe, upon Acts, reſulting from ſuch a Conſent as this, depend all Religion, Morality and Virtue.——Nay—— and, We may very fairly preſume, that, all Mankind (even before any arbitrary, poſitive Compacts) might, and ought to, agree in this End, as The *one, principal, ultimate End*: And, in the Means laid down and eſtabliſhed, as the only Means evidently neceſſary: For, no other Cauſe can, according to Reaſon and Nature, be aſſigned, beſides *the Conſent of the Will*,

why human Acts ſhould thus, ſo univerſally concur in an Aſſiſtance mutually-united, general, ſocial. Such Dictates of Reaſon as theſe, whilſt they continue depoſited in the Memory, determine the human Will to act. And, therefore, we may reckon theſe Dictates amongſt the internal Principles of human Actions.—And, this, in Truth and Reality, is a very ſubſtantial Foundation: Becauſe, theſe Dictates and Principles, eſſentially contain in them the whole Energy and Efficacy of Habits. Upon this Foundation, and upon this Foundation only, truly and according to the Hypotheſis which we have eſtabliſhed, it can be ſaid, That, *every Act is Right and Juſt, which exactly correſponds with theſe Principles, and with the Laws of Rational Nature.*

SECT. III.

See the firſt Section of this Chapter at Page 270.

I JUST now told my Readers, That, the *Firſt Form* laid down, is beſt ſuited to Nature; and is the Form which Nature chiefly purſues, in diſcovering to us *what are the Laws of Nature.*

The next Queſtion, which now comes under our Examination, is, Whether or no, this ſame Law, or practical Propoſition, of *Univerſal Benevolence,* be ſo clearly taught and diſcovered, as to carry in it the full Sanction of a Law promulged and publiſhed?——And, this Queſtion muſt appear very natural; becauſe, it nearly concerns, and relates to, The *Firſt Form,* juſt now mentioned: And alſo, *Secondly,* becauſe, the Terms of this Propoſition are rendered very plain and obvious. And, the Connexion, conſequently, of theſe Terms (*i. e.* the Truth of the Propoſition itſelf) is as plain and obvious alſo. For, theſe Terms are placed in the clear, open View of thoſe who will attend to the natural Effects of their own voluntary Acts: Or, in caſe, that, This is not the Point, why then, the Queſtion, in the ſecond Place, muſt be, Whether or no, we can imagine, that, Nature has not ſufficiently declared the Truth of this practical Propoſition, ſo as to lay an Obligation upon thoſe, who, either thro' ſome Accident, or from violent Diſturbances of Mind, do not join together and connect the Terms of it: Or, upon thoſe, who do not form any ſuch practical Propoſition, for the Regulation and Conduct of their future Lives?

The firſt of theſe two Opinions ſeems to me the moſt probable; becauſe, upon Evidence clear enough, we are well aſſured, that the two Sides of a Triangle are longer than any third Side; altho', perhaps, we may not underſtand the Propoſition itſelf, but only place in View the Figure of a Triangle before him who delineates or draws the triangular Figure. Thus, in like Manner, we conclude, that, the Terms of thoſe Propoſitions, which are defined *Laws of Nature,* are ſufficiently and clearly, in the Formation and Structure of Things, laid before the human Mind:

Mind:—And—That the Minds of Mankind (either from their own inward Nature, or from their ſtrict Union to Matter in Conjunction with the other material Parts of this natural World) are moved and influenced ſo, as to notice thoſe Terms, to abſtract them, and to compare them with each other: And then proceed, in the next Place, to form Propoſitions, according to the Nature and Tendency of human Acts. And, conſequently, That, all Perſons, of ſound Mind and Memory, do retain, remember, and treaſure up theſe Sentences and Propoſitions: Notwithſtanding, at ſome particular times, it may, perhaps, ſo happen, that Theſe Sentences, or Propoſitions, are confounded and mixed with ſome falſe, erroneous, diſorderly Notions and Opinions: And, by Conſequence, from ſuch a Confuſion, are rendered dark and obſcure. Now, the Terms of theſe *Practical Propoſitions*, called *the Laws of Nature*, are ſuch human Acts as are capable of being directed and governed by the Advice, Wiſdom and Determinations of Reaſon:—And, alſo, are ſuch Acts as, when once produced and committed, can in Conjunction contribute, either more or leſs, to the happieſt State of rational Nature in general, and to the private Happineſs of each of us in particular. Theſe Acts, therefore, are not improperly, according to the vulgar Diviſion of them, diſtinguiſhed into the *Actus Eliciti* and the *Actus Imperati*. The *Actus Eliciti*, or Elicit Acts, are Acts of the Underſtanding and of the Will, and, by Conſequence, of the Affections alſo: Or, at leaſt, ſo far as the Affections (*i. e.* theſe Appetites and Paſſions) are ſtronger in the Mind than in the Body: And, *Secondly*, into the *Actus Imperati*, or ſuch Acts as are exerted by the Body, from an Energy, a Force, a Power of the Mind.

Actus Eliciti.

Actus Imperati.

SECT. IV.

Practical Propoſitions conſidered.

HERE, then, It will be highly neceſſary, before we take a more accurate, particular, exact View of the *Laws of Nature*; It will, I ſay, be very well worth while to dwell ſomewhat longer in ſettling and digeſting the Nature of practical Propoſitions. And, firſt of all, we are to demonſtrate, How cloſe the Affinity is between practical and ſpeculative Propoſitions, let theſe Propoſitions be either *Categoric* or *Hypothetic*. And, *Secondly*, in all theſe Propoſitions, we muſt conſider the *Effect*, as the *End*; And, All the poſſible *Acts* in our *own free Power*, as the *Means*.

Speculative and practical Propoſitions have a cloſe Affinity.

A categoric Propoſition is an Enunciation or Sentence, in which the Mind affirms or denies abſolutely, without any Condition.

An hypothetic Propoſition in which a Condition is always expreſſed.

The firſt Obſervation, which we here make, is, That, ſuch Propoſitions are, truly and properly ſpeaking, *practical*, which pronounce and declare the Geneſis, the Production, the Flowing of an Effect from free, voluntary human Acts. I ſhall endeavour to render the above Definition clearer and more intelligible, by Illuſtrations of two or three Examples,

Inſtance from Arithmetic, Addition, Subſtraction,

Inſtance from Geometry.

An equilateral Triangle.

As for Inſtance: In Arithmetic, The Addition of Units, or Numbers, makes up the Aggregate of them; that is, generates and forms the Sum total: And, the Subſtraction of a ſmaller Number from a greater ſhews the Remainder or Difference. Thus, likewiſe, in the Elements of Geometry, the Praxis or Conſtruction laid down in the firſt Propoſition of *Euclid*'s Elements will make an Equilateral Triangle. This is a practical Propoſition, which declares or affirms concerning the Effect of ſeveral Acts ſucceeding each other in a certain Series or Order. In the ſame Manner, likewiſe, the Mind as certainly underſtands the Truth of ſuch a practical Propoſition, and, with as ſure a Certainty as it either does, or can, underſtand the Truth of any Theorem or ſpeculative Truth whatſoever. For, by ſtrictly examining into the Terms of ſuch a Propoſition, one of the Terms includes and comprehends the other. Thus, in like manner, the Conſtruction of a whole entire equilateral Triangle is formed, by placing and uniting all the ſeveral conſtituent Parts together: And, this Praxis is diſcovered to be true, juſt after the ſame manner as the following Theorem, or ſpeculative Propoſition: A whole entire equilateral Triangle differs nothing from, but is juſt the ſame, as all its conſtituent Parts united and taken together.

An Inſtance of a Problem converted to a Theorem.

This whole Affair, then, comes juſt to the ſame Thing: Whether the Conſtruction of the whole entire Triangle be conſidered as the End deſigned: Or, Whether the ſeveral various Motions, by Vertue of which the three Sides are conſtituted and joined together, be looked upon as the Means neceſſary to this End.

This very ſame Propoſition, then, as to the Senſe and Meaning of it, will ſound thus, *viz.* It is neceſſary to the Conſtitution and Conſtruction of a whole entire equilateral Triangle, that all the Sides of it be conſtituted and joined together, in the ſame, or ſome ſuch, Manner as is laid down by *Euclid*. Now, the End is, in real Fact, no other than the Effect intended and deſigned: And all the Means taken together, as the whole efficient Cauſes, include and comprehend the Aptitude, the Fitneſs of all the ſeveral Parts.

The Analogy between the Mathematical Conſtruction of a Propoſition and the Conſtitution of Moral Acts towards the Attainment and Perfection of the Ends reſpectively, which the reſpective Operations of each require.

What we have hitherto ſaid, concerning Conſtitution or Conſtruction, may, with all the Eaſe imaginable, be applied alſo to thoſe Operations, the Conſervation or Perfection of (an entire Whole) which ſtands in need of, and requires ſuch Operations. For, if we rightly define *Conſervation* or *Preſervation*, we ſhall find it, *The Continuance only of thoſe Acts, whereby a Thing at firſt is conſtituted, made and framed.*

An univerſal, Practical Propoſition in Morality.

From hence, then, ariſes the following practical Propoſition, *viz.* It is neceſſary, in order to procure, by our beſt Abilities, the Preſervation of the whole Syſtem of rational Agents, That, We Protect and Defend, as much as in us lies, all its ſeveral Parts, and the firm, laſting Union of them with each other; And, in ſuch Degrees, as the true Perfection of ſuch a Syſtem requires. This practical Propoſition, I ſay, carries in it an equal

Strength

Strength of Demonſtration with that Theorem, or ſpeculative Propoſition, which declares the Identity, the Sameneſs, between the *Whole* and all its Parts taken together. For, in this practical Propoſition, when once well underſtood, we ſhall demonſtrate, that, the true, ſolid Grounds of all the Laws of Nature are comprehended.—And, therefore, what we have already premiſed, concerning the Reduction, Inveſtigation, and Tracing-back of this moſt obvious practical Propoſition, (which teaches us the Solution of the firſt Problem in *Euclid*'s Elements of Geometry) we would have underſtood and taken univerſally, and upon an equally-ſtrict Parity of Reaſoning.—For, no poſſible Reaſon can be aſſigned, why, the Solution of all ſuch practical Truths ſhould not be perfectly well-ſtated in the Solution of a Theorem, *i. e.* of a ſpeculative Truth:——And, about ſuch Truths, the Enquiry generally is, in the Solution of a Problem. For this very Reaſon, *Archimedes*, in his ſecond Book upon the Sphere, ingenuouſly owns, that he himſelf had formed Theorems from Problems, the Solution of which was entirely made up of Propoſitions directly tending to Practice. And *Ramus*, following *Archimedes*'s Example, in demonſtrating *Euclid*'s Elements of Geometry, converts all the Problems into Theorems. And, in the *Analytica Specioſa*, or the *Algebraic Analyſis*, (and which is the happieſt Method of ſolving Problems) at the End of each Operation, there is always a Theorem laid down, which diſcovers the Solution of the Problem. It is alſo a Truth, of as unqueſtionable Certainty, that *Deſcartes*, *Vietta*, *Wallis*, and other eminent Mathematicians, have demonſtrated, and with great Succeſs, that, the practical Propoſitions, uſeful and neceſſary in pure Mathematics, (as they are called, *viz.* *Arithmetic* and *Geometry*) are rendered ſhorter and more expeditious (1) by the Invention and

How this univerſal, practical Propoſition, or univerſal Problem in Morality, is turned into a moral Theorem.

Archimedes.

Ramus converts all the Problems in Euclid's Elements of Geometry into Theorems.

Analytica Specioſa.

Deſcartes, Vietta, Wallis.

Pure Mathematics.

(1) *By the Invention and Demonſtration of an Analyſis.*] Analyſis or Algebra. The Method of reſolving Queſtions in Arithmetic is either *Analytical. i. e.* the taking of that which is enquired after, as if it were known, and thence going back by Conſequences, until it is found to be equal to ſomething really known: Or elſe, contrarywiſe, *Synthetical*, *i. e.* the taking of that which is granted or known, and thence proceeding by Conſequences to the Diſcovery of What is enquired after, and unknown. The analytical Art of reſolving difficult Queſtions in Arithmetic is commonly called ALGEBRA. *See* Parſons's *Arithmetic in Species.*

In treating of the Analytic Art, we aſcend to the higheſt Pitch of human Learning: By it we may, by calculating Quantities in general, find out ſeveral Truths in the Mathematics, conſidered either as *Pure*, or *Applied to Uſe*. He, that is inſtructed in the Elements of *Arithmetic* and *Geometry*, may by the Help of this *Art* find out many Things, which he never could have diſcovered from the Writings of others, without much Labour and Difficulty: For, it lays open Truths unknown before: And, indeed, that muſt be the moſt uſeful, perfect Method of Study, which, by a few Things committed to Memory, enables us to make uſeful Diſcoveries, at a time we have moſt Occaſion for them. Nor, can a greater Perfection of the Mind be conceived, than readily to find out, by a few given Truths, many unſought. Moreover, there occur in the modern Analyſis, moſt perfect Examples of the Art of Reaſoning: For, our Thoughts being expreſſed by Marks or Signs, they repreſent to our Imagination what would otherwiſe be far above our Sphere. A long Train of Reaſoning, which, by great Attention and Circumſpection, may diſcover a Connexion between Things, is here

and Demonſtration of an Analyſis. Theſe Praxes, or practical Propoſitions, can be performed alſo in the *Mixed Mathematics*, as they are called: As for Inſtance, not only in Aſtronomy, (a Branch wherein, that moſt excellent Man, Dr. *Seth Ward*, has ſo eminently excelled) but alſo, in Mechanics, Statics, *&c.* In ſhort, theſe ſame practical Propoſitions can be applied to almoſt-all the Branches of Philoſophy in general. And, what we may alſo ſtill, here, farther add, That, the Principles of Morality and of Civil Government, can, and ought, in ſome meaſure, to imitate the Analytic Form, as the beſt Method of Science. Under the Denomination of *Analytica*, I comprehend, not only the (2) *Extraction of Roots*, but alſo all the ſeveral Branches of *the Arithmetica Specioſa*, or *Algebra*.

Mixed Mathematics.

Seth Ward.

Arguments why the Principles of Moral Philoſophy and of Civil Government are capable of Mathematical Demonſtration. See Chap. 1. Sect. 33. Page 116, 117, 118.

I now proceed, in the next Place, to aſſign four Arguments, why, the *Diſciplina Moralis* and *Diſciplina Civilis* can admit of this Method.

The firſt Reaſon why the Principles, *Firſt*, of *Moral Philoſophy*, and, *Secondly*, of *Civil Government*, ought to be treated in this Method, is, becauſe, they both deliver their Rules of Practice, and the whole Subſtance of their Inſtitutions, under ſome certain univerſal Theorems.

First Argument. The Certainty of Truth the ſame in Morality as in Mathematics.

Here we are to obſerve, that, the Certainty of ſuch Truth is not rendered more precarious, or its Uſe leſs extenſive, purely becauſe that, in external Operations employed upon a Subject involving ſo complicated a Variety of Circumſtances, we cannot always form preciſe, exact Determinations. For, the Certainty of Truth, in this Caſe, I ſay, is no more leſſened and deſtroyed, than, the Truth, the Certainty, the Utility of Geometrical Principles, is leſſened or deſtroyed from Lines, Surfaces, and the Menſuration of Solids; by reaſon, that, we cannot, either by the Help of our Senſes, or of any Mathematical Inſtrument, draw a Line remote from ourſelves exactly ſtraight: Or, a Surface, perfectly either plane or ſpherical: Or, any Body, in all reſpects, either regular or reducible to any Degrees of exact Regularity. Neither, indeed, is ſo critical an Exactneſs as this neceſſary: Becauſe, it is fully ſufficient, if we can arrive [at ſuch an Ἀκρίβεια, *i. e.*] at ſuch a Degree of Exactneſs, that no one Article, no one Point is omitted, which can prove of the leaſt Moment or Conſequence to the Uſes and Conveniencies of Mankind.——To ſuch Degrees of Perfection as theſe, then, we can arrive, even upon the Strength of Principles

here changed into the Art of combining a few Marks and Signs together, always the ſame, and built upon a few manifeſt Principles. And, indeed, it is very wonderful, that, by the Help of the Analytic Art, one may ſometimes diſcover in one Line, more Truths than could be contained in whole Volumes, if they were explained and demonſtrated by the common Method. Hence it is, that, by viewing one ſingle Line, we may learn almoſt whole Sciences in the ſpace of a few Minutes; which, Men could ſcarce comprehend otherwiſe in as many Years. *See* Wolfius's *Preface to his Treatiſe of Algebra*.

(2) *Extraction of Roots.*] See Dr. *Edward Wells*'s Arithmetica Numeroſa & Specioſa, Cap. 9. Page 79. De Involutione & Evolutione, ſeu de Geneſi & Analyſi Poteſtatum. See alſo his Young Gentleman's Arithmetic, Chap. 12. Page 126. of The Extraction of the Square and Cube Root.

ples in Moral Philoſophy. We muſt, however, at the ſame time, acknowledge, that, in the Subject-matter of Moral Prudence, the Objects laid down as *Data*, and allowed as well-known, namely, *God* and *Man*, with their ſeveral Acts, and mutual Relations to each other, are not ſo accurately underſtood, as the *Data* or *Objects* which, in the *Mathematical Science*, are laid down by ſome certain Meaſure and Quantity:——And, conſequently, that, the Concluſions, which follow from them, labour under the ſame Defect of critical Exactneſs, as to accurate Demonſtration.—And yet—*in Both*, the Method, the Rules of Operation, and the Inveſtigation, according to rational Principles of one Thing from another, are All exactly the ſame. Neither, indeed, is there any Occaſion for ſuch a Nicety of exact Demonſtration, in the common Uſes and Occaſions of Life; ſince ſo ſtrict a Nicety is not required in the practic Geometry of meaſuring Planes and Solids.

Morality as little defective in the Principles of Knowledge as Mathematics.

In Both, i. e. Morality and Mathematics, the Analytic Method of Inveſtigation the ſame.

The ſecond Reaſon, why the Principles of Morality and of Civil Government ought to be treated in the ſame Method with Mathematical Principles, is, That, the Mathematical Method (beginning with Truths the moſt compounded, difficult, intricate and involved, where, in an Equation given, both the known and unknown Quantities are promiſcuouſly blended, at laſt, after a diligent Compariſon of the Quantities amongſt themſelves, diſcovers the Mathematical Method, I ſay) diſcovers ſomething ſo clear and ſimple, that, by Vertue of it, the conſtituent Parts of the Compound are ſo formed and traced, that the Parts or Quantities unknown may be formed out, and clearly explained, by ſuch Parts or Quantities as are known. The Method is exactly the ſame in Moral Philoſophy. For, Moral Philoſophy, in the firſt Place, conſiders an *End*, very intricate and involved: And *Means*, in the ſecond Place, very complicated, perplexed and diverſified under great Variety.

Second Argument.

See Chap 5. Sect. 45.

The Analytic Method.

Firſt, The END, then, of Moral Philoſophy, is the aggregate Whole, or compounded united Sum total of all thoſe ſeveral Degrees of Good in our Power, which can exalt the Kingdom, the Glory, the Power of God, the whole intellectual Syſtem of the Univerſe, and all the ſeveral, diſtinct Parts of it.

1. The End of Moral Philoſophy.

Secondly, The MEANS, in the ſecond Place, by Vertue of which this End is to be obtained, are, All the free Acts within our own Power and Election: And, ſo far, as theſe Acts poſſibly can be influenced, directed and extended, towards all poſſible Things and Objects.—NOW—From the given Equality which ariſes between theſe two Notions, *i. e.* END and MEANS: Or, which is the ſame Thing, between *the Powers of a Cauſe*, and the *adequate Effects of theſe Powers*, All the Rules of moral Behaviour are to be elicited and fully drawn forth into Action: As alſo, All Acts of the *Virtues* which are to be influenced and commanded by them. That *Theſe Two*, therefore, can be placed under the Form of an Equation, is clear and evident: Becauſe, *Firſt*—the End is the whole Effect

Here is laid the Foundation of what our Author calls a Geometrical Analyſis in Morality See Chap. 5. Sect. 4.

to

to be produced: And—*Secondly*—All the poſſible Acts in our Power (*i. e.* in the Power of each human Agent) employ, exerciſe and conſume the whole Integral Force of each and every ſuch efficient Cauſe or Agent reſpectively. From hence we learn, That, the whole Art of Life conſiſts in this one ſingle Point;—namely—*So to try, and examine into, not only, all the ſeveral Sorts of public Good, which poſſibly can come within the Reach of our own free Powers and Abilities to effect: But, alſo, into all our own, ſingular, particular* Acts; *into the Order, Nature and Coherence of them, whereby ſome* Acts *will be, either able to prepare Subject-matter for other Acts, or afford an additional Supply of Strength to them.* So that having, by ſuch a Proceſs as this, at length found out the cleareſt, ſimpleſt, eaſieſt Moral Acts which prove miniſterial to the End, we may, by the Help and Aſſiſtance of theſe Acts, proceed to Acts of a more difficult, complicated Nature; until, at laſt, we arrive at the ultimate, moſt difficult, intricate Bounds, of all our Powers, Abilities and Faculties.—In a Word, ſuch a Praxis as this carries a very near Similitude, a very cloſe Reſemblance to the Praxis of an Analyſis.

Third Argument.

See the Young Gentleman's Arithmetic, by Dr. Wells, Chap. 13. of Equation, or the Method of ſolving Queſtions by the Rule of Algebra.

The third Reaſon, why the Principles of Morality and of Civil Government ought to be treated in the ſame Method with the Mathematical Science, is, That, as the Analyſis ſuppoſes the unknown Quantity (that is, the Quantity ſought, or to be found out) by a Prolepſis of Mind, as already known: So, It then marks down ſuch an unknown Quantity by a proper Mark or Character. When the unknown Quantity, or ſubſtituted Character, is written or marked down (the Analyſis, *i. e.*) the Equation, deſcribes the given or ſuppoſed Relations which ſuch an unknown Quantity bears to the known Quantity; from which Relations, the unknown Quantity is at length diſcovered.—Thus, likewiſe, according to the ſame Method, Morality ſuppoſes an End or Effect, in ſome way or other, purſued and ſought after, by the human Mind, with the Help and Aſſiſtance of ſuch Relations as this *End* or *Effect* bears to Operations, in ſome general way at leaſt, known. Morality, or the Moral Equation, diſtinguiſhes this End or Effect by the Term *The Chief Good*, or Happineſs from all other Effects or Ends converſant with the Mind. NOW—This Propoſition is ſtill the ſame, notwithſtanding that, the Mind, all this while, is perſuaded and ſatisfied, that, ſuch an End or Effect as this has not as yet any real Exiſtence: And, notwithſtanding alſo, that, the Human Mind does not as yet diſtinctly underſtand, what that End, or Effect, will, in Reality, appear, which is to ariſe out of its own Operations in Conjunction and Co-operation with the external, viſible Objects and Works of Nature all around us:—And, therefore, from hence it is, That, this End or Effect, or Chief Good, may very properly be called *Unknown*, or *the Unknown Quantity*. But—by the Operation of thoſe Acts, Powers and Faculties, and to Which, this End or Good carries a Relation, equally near, with any other Effect, to its own proper Cauſes reſpectively,

The Summum Bonum, or Chief Good, is here as yet ſuppoſed an unknown Quantity.

tively, (and, conſequently, upon which Cauſes, as upon efficient Cauſes, the whole Effect, beyond all Diſpute, entirely depends). From hence, I ſay, by a gradual Progreſs, what this End or Effect is, at laſt is diſcovered, and becomes evident and well-known.

The Happineſs of all Rational Beings is the greateſt Good we can produce.

What we are farther, here, to ſubjoin, by way of *Corollary*, is this, *viz.* That, ſince the chief End of every Agent is that Whole (or that greateſt) Good, which each and every Agent reſpectively can, in his own proper Sphere of Action, contribute to the compleat, univerſal Syſtem of rational Agents; And, conſequently, to Himſelf, *&c.* it will follow, that, *This End* muſt be conceived and determined as the Aggregate, or Sum-total of all ſuch good Effects, as are moſt pleaſing both to *Almighty God, and to all Mankind in general:* And, that, this Sum-total of Good is the largeſt Sum of all that poſſible Good, which can moſt effectually be produced by our own Labour, Induſtry, Care and Ability, thro' the longeſt Series and Period of all our future Exiſtence, But——there are ſome Conſequences which very frequently happen (and they are ſuch Conſequences, as we ought to take particular Care ſhall as frequently as poſſible happen) *viz.* That, the good Effects of our own Powers and Abilities, do (1) increaſe in a Geometrical Progreſſion, a Calculation which takes place in *the Intereſts upon Uſury*; And, in the Returns of Profit which ariſe from Agriculture and Merchandize; where it is obſerved, that, in each Year, the Produce of the former Year is added to [*Sorti,*] The Capital Stock. From ſuch a continued Progreſſion of Advantage as this, there ariſes an Increaſe of both public and private Happineſs ſo very large, as cannot, with any Degree of Exactneſs, be calculated, determined or foreſeen.

Anni Proventus ſorti additur.

Fourth Argument.

The fourth Reaſon, why the Principles of Morality and of Civil Government, ought to be treated in the ſame Method with the mathematical Science, is, That, Man, without God, can do nothing;——And, Without the Concurrence and Aſſiſtance of his Fellow-creatures, can do next to nothing, towards the common Good, (namely, the Glory of God and the Happineſs of Mankind). Whereas, on the contrary, by any Act (which either inſtitutes or preſerves the Intercourſe, the Correſpondence, the Society, with God and Man) each Perſon can contribute,

No one human Creature, ſingly, can do any Thing without the Aſſiſtance of God and Man.

(1) *Increaſe in a Geometrical Progreſſion,* &c.] Proportion is either Arithmetic or Geometric. Arithmetic Proportion is, when the Terms exceed one another, by having the ſame Number either added to or ſubſtracted from them; as, 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. *&c.* or, 6. 5. 4. 3. 2. 1. *&c.* Where the Difference is the ſame both in the Increaſe and in the Decreaſe. Geometrical Proportion is when the Terms do exceed one another, by being either multiplied or divided by the ſame Number, as, 2 : 4 : : 4 : 8. For 2×2=4 and 4×2=8 and 8×2=16 and 16×2=32, *&c.* If Proportion (whether Arithmetic or Geometric) proceeds beyond four Terms [*i. e. Progreditur*] then it is peculiarly ſtiled *Progreſſion:* Thus, 2 : 4 : 6 : 8 : 10 : 12, *&c.* conſtitute an Arithmetic Progreſſion: And, 2 : 4 : 8 : 16 : 32 : 64, *&c.* conſtitute a Geometric Progreſſion. A Geometric Progreſſion takes place in Calculations of Uſury and Compound Intereſt: *In Lucris per anatociſmum,* as our Author expreſſes himſelf.

not a little, (comparatively ſpeaking) towards the public Good: It is, therefore, upon theſe Accounts, abſolutely neceſſary, that, the Determination of Reaſon ſhould lay the Obligation upon each Perſon, to perform every Act tending to promote either, the original Inſtitution, or Preſervation of the Society, thus compoſed of God and all other rational Agents.—And—as to the Society maintained and kept up amongſt Mankind, there is ſcarcely any Matter tranſacted, which does not depend upon the Science of Computations, of Number and Meaſure in Arithmetic and Geometry. And therefore, if all the ſeveral Acts of ſocial Duty be exactly and accurately conſidered and examined into, The Requiſites, neceſſary to a ſocial rational Practice, may be reduced to a mathematical Evidence and Certainty. Of this Nature, are All the Calculations of Values, as well in Things themſelves, as in the ſeveral Degrees of Labour and Induſtry, *i. e.* in the ſeveral Sorts of human Actions, (whether we compare Things, Labour, Induſtry, Acts, Operations, *&c.* together and amongſt themſelves): Or, Whether we compare Singulars, Individuals, Particulars, with ſome third Thing, as a Standard (a *Nomiſma* or *Numiſma*); and of which *Nomiſma*, or Standard, there are ſeveral Sorts. Let the Subject-matter, however, under Deliberation, be what it will; An exact Calculation requires, either a natural, or an artificial Arithmetic; in order to reduce the Values of different Species or Denominations to a *Nomen*, a Name, a Term the fitteſt, moſt convenient; And, Which, in the general, is beſt underſtood.

Moral Duties, i. e. the Efficacies of them, reducible to a mathematical Certainty.

Under this ſame Head, may be referred, alſo, the Calculations of Values in all Commerce and Trade; Computations, as to the Times and Periods for making a Return; Inveſtigations, as to the Proportion of Loſs and Gain, which ſeverally fall to the Lot of each individual Member in Society. *See the Note at* Page 193. Chap. 2. Sect. 20.

Calculations and Computations unavoidably muſt happen in the common Dealings and Affairs of Life.

It would prove a Labour almoſt-infinite, ſhould I attempt to enumerate the Uſe, the Application of Mathematics, in *the Art Military in Navigation*; in the Invention and Application of *Machines* of all Sorts; in *Surveying*, *Fortification*, *Architecture*, &c. It will, ſufficiently anſwer my preſent Purpoſe to declare in few Words, That, the Science of Mathematics is of ſignal Uſe and Service, as well in the private Affairs of each Individual, as well as in the moſt public, univerſal Matters, in order to regulate, and adjuſt with Certainty, a regular, juſt Equality of Behaviour, Conduct and Management, in both public and private Life:—But—more particularly, where any Nicety of Calculation, or ſtrict Computation, as to *Virtue* or *Vice*, *Good* or *Evil*, *Gain* or *Loſs*, is required.

The general Uſe of Mathematics. Mathematics uſeful both in public and private Life.

What I have omitted, as to the Praiſe and Commendation of Mathematics, (which muſt have appeared nugatory and trifling, were it not to prove a mathematical Certainty, in Morality and the Rules of Life) is purely upon this account, That, our own natural Sagacity can, almoſt-always and without Exception, uſe and apply the Help and Aſſiſtance of

Certain

Certain Science: Or, in other Words, apply ſelf-evident Principles, Axioms and Maxims, as the true, ſolid Foundation of all Morality.

Under this Head, may, according to my Sentiments, be placed alſo the following *Poſtulata.*

1. Altho' we do not, for certain, know a Thing or an Event future; yet, That a Thing, or an Event, poſſible in Futurity, can be known. — First Poſtulatum.

2. Things poſſible are capable of being compared together. — Second Poſtulatum.

3. It can with Certainty be known and determined, Which One, out of Two poſſible future Things or Poſſibilities, will, not only be of greater or leſs Value, when they Both exiſt; but alſo, Which, out of more or fewer Cauſes, either exiſting at preſent, or to exiſt ſoon, will be moſt effectual. — Third Poſtulatum.

4. Whatſoever can Exiſt, or BE, after ſeveral Modes of Exiſtence, or Being, carries greater Degrees of Probability that it will Exiſt, or BE: And, therefore, the Expectance, in this Caſe, is, according to the Doctrine of Chances, more valuable. — Fourth Poſtulatum.

5. In the Courſe of human Affairs, it is, to be ſure, of important Conſequence, even to know in what Affair, or in what Effect, the Probability is ſtronger, and, conſequently, more valuable. — Fifth Poſtulatum.

To know the Degrees of Probability uſeful in the Affairs of Life.

We are obliged, according to the preſent Condition of Things, to reaſon from the Degrees of Probability.

Theſe are Poſtulata, or Truths, which may be eaſily allowed without much Proof. They are Truths, which carry in them a Sort of Neceſſity. For, the Condition and Circumſtances of human Life, are, indeed, ſuch, that, almoſt-all our Labour and Pains are conſumed; Our whole Fortune often expended;—nay—and even Life itſelf, muſt, in many Caſes, be expoſed to Dangers, from the Hope, the View, the Proſpect of ſome Events, conducive, in time future, to the Preſervation and Happineſs either of ourſelves or others: Notwithſtanding, that, ſuch an Hope, ſuch a View, ſuch a Proſpect, does not carry in it any Certainty, but bare Probability only. Is not this the very Caſe, even in the tranquil, quiet Employments of Peace, ſuch as Agriculture and Commerce: Not to mention the Dangers and Hazards of War.

The Analytical Mathematics (which all Mankind even naturally, without any ſtudied Rules of Art, uſe and apply to Practice) teach us beſt how to Form theſe Calculations. And—in what Method ſuch Calculations as theſe carry a determined Value from the Analyſis itſelf, as laid down according to Rules of Art, that moſt celebrated Mathematician and Philoſopher, *Chriſtopher Huygens*, has moſt beautifully delivered in his Rules of Computation upon the Doctrine of Chances. This Treatiſe may be ſeen at the End of his *Exercitations, Mathematicæ Miſcellanicæ*, publiſhed by *Schotenius.*

Doctrine of Chances. See Chap. 2. Sect. 20. Page 193.

We may alſo here, in the laſt Place, farther add, That, in Matters which, as to the Conduct and Management of them, depend upon the human Skill and Sagacity, are we not to try at ſome times, one Method, and at different times, another, before we can, with any Certainty, determine,

by which Method, The Effect designed will best answer our Expectations? Before we can know for certain, whether we can obtain any End, altho' most apparently desirable in itself? Thus, likewise, in the Analytical Examen or Process, The Antitheses, or opposite Sides of the Equation, often vary: At some times it so happens, That many Kinds of Division and the other Methods of Reduction must be tried, before we can arrive at a Solution of the particular Problem sought after.

I might also, in this Place, as Apposite to my present Design, carry on the Comparison between Mathematics and Moral Philosophy, by demonstrating, after what manner the Process in Both discovers, at some times, an Hypothesis both false and impossible; and with as happy Success, as, at other times, it discovers a different Hypothesis, either true, or possible.

This Comparison might, also, be carried on still farther, by representing, after what manner Negative Signs can express Motions opposite to, and destructive of, a Motion destined and intended:—And, on the contrary: By what Means, The Endeavours of several human Agents in Conjunction promoting the same End, conspire and unite in such compound Motions as describe the same Line of Direction. But—since Points of such a Nature are not so evidently clear; And—since some remarkable Disparity may very frequently happen, I am therefore determined to stop here, That, Persons, either superficially acquainted with Mathematical Principles; Or, who being naturally endowed with Capacities capable of such severe Studies, may accompany me in the farther Prosecution of this PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY. This, I say, is my Determination at present, rather than from a Comparison with any Point less obvious, I should prove so unhappy, as to cast a Cloud of Darkness and Obscurity over the clear Science of Moral Philosophy, instead of the bright Sun-shine of Demonstration and Conviction.

CHAP. V.

SECT. I.

Concerning the Law of Nature, *and its* Obligation.

HAVING, in the foregoing Chapters, cleared the Way, and effectually settled the Foundation necessary to establish all our *future Conclusions* of Moral Philosophy upon: We shall begin, in this Chapter, with a Definition of *the Law of Nature.*

The Law of Nature defined.

The Law of Nature, to define it, *is a Proposition, which, with an Evidence sufficiently clear from the Nature of Things, is impressed by the Will*

of

of the first Cause, upon the human Mind; declaring, What Agency (or Method of free Action) answers best to the common Happiness of all Rational Beings:——From which PROPOSITION or LAW, if steadily pursued, sufficient Rewards necessarily follow; and, from which PROPOSITION or LAW, if neglected, sufficient Punishments do as necessarily arise: And BOTH (that is, the Rewards and the Punishments) flow essentially from the Nature of Rational Agents.

The first Branch of this Definition comprehends the *Precept* or *Command.* The second Branch contains the *Sanction.* And THEY BOTH, that is, the COMMAND and the SANCTION, are powerfully enforced from *the Nature of Things:* The REWARDS and the PUNISHMENTS of them being effectually sufficient, in themselves, to answer the intended End. For, we can, with a full, a clear, a distinct Certainty, discern, THAT, it manifestly conduces more to the pure, unmixed Happiness of all Individuals respectively, to act constantly as Instruments in the public Good, than to attempt any contrary Behaviour. And—for this so evident a Reason also: Because, it is such an Happiness as all are capable of attaining to: And, *which,* ALL, from the very Nature of Things themselves, necessarily (*i. e.* by a Moral Necessity) desire. Moral Commissions and Omissions contrary to this one End *The Public Good,* And the Evils inseparably annexed to them, are both equally, and in the same Manner, declared and prohibited; They being always best understood, when considered as Evils or Privations from their direct Opposites; *i. e.* from the Degrees of Good or Happiness which such several Evils contradict, oppose, and are privative or destructive of. For, *Whatsoever is Right is the Measure, or Rule, both of itself and of what is wrong.*

Command.

Sanction.

See the Definition of Law in general, at Sect. 35. of this Chapter.

By Moral Commissions and Omissions, in this Place, our Author means, such as are within the free Power and Direction of a rational Agent.

Major Proposition.

But, from any given Point: Or, in other Words, from that State of Things which proceeds directly, and, in short, to that very End which is the best, (From That very Point or State, I say, which, in a translated borrowed Sense, is taken from the Mathematical Property of a Right Line) is defined Right.

Minor Proposition.

And therefore such a State is Right.

Conclusion.

Now—this very Comparison, *i. e.* Comparing Right and Wrong thus together (by which, what is Right is discovered) naturally, and of Consequence supposes all Circumstances so well weighed together, and examined into, as to discover, not only, What those Things are, which prove less effectual towards the Attainment of an End proposed; But also, and with much more Ease, discover to us, what Hindrances and Obstacles Let and Oppose the Prosecution and Perfection of such an End. It seems, however, here, more immediately to our Purpose, to examine critically, and with a Philosophical Exactness, into all the several Parts and Members of our Definition, just now advanced.

The

The Law of Nature is a true Propoſition, and why.

The *Law of Nature*, we ſay, is a Propoſition, that is, a true Propoſition; as, what is to follow plainly proves. The Term *Propoſition* ſeems to me a much eaſier, more-ſimple, leſs-compounded Term, than the Phraſe *A Dictate of Right Reaſon:* Which Phraſe (all Ambiguity of Senſe and Expreſſion being removed) terminates ultimately in the very ſame Meaning with Propoſition. I alſo, in the ſecond Place, have carefully avoided, in the Genus of this Definition, to uſe the Word *Sentence*, [*Oratio*] a Miſtake Mr. *Hobbes* has unluckily fallen into: Leſt any of my Readers might falſely imagine, that the Uſe of certain arbitrary Words and Signs is neceſſary, to conſtitute the true Nature and Eſſence of a Law.

Words carry no Signification naturally: And, why.

Words, in this Caſe, cannot be neceſſary; becauſe, they all are arbitrary, changeable, and of mere human Impoſition. And, *Secondly*, becauſe the Knowledge, that is, the Conceptions or Ideas formed in the Mind concerning the human Actions, with their good or evil Effects upon our Nature (but, more eſpecially, as ſuch Good and Evil are the Rewards and Puniſhments annexed to Moral Behaviour): Theſe Ideas and Conceptions, I ſay, when once connected into the true Form of Practical Propoſitions, are amply ſufficient to conſtitute the true Nature and Eſſence of a Law. Becauſe, ſuch Ideas and Conceptions as theſe, can, and may, from Obſervation, ſpring up in the Minds of thoſe born (and who naturally are) deaf. Nay, even upon the Suppoſition, that, the Incapacity of Hearing be ſo invincible, as not to receive the leaſt Impreſſions from Sounds, either *Articulate* or *Inarticulate*. And, therefore, from hence, by a neceſſary Conſequence, it follows, That, *the Laws of Nature* carry the full Force and Power of a Promulgation, even over the Deaf Themſelves. *Secondly*, We, in our Definition, affirm, That, *the Law of Nature is a Propoſition, which, with an Evidence clear enough, from the Nature of Things*, &c.

The Term Nature how to be underſtood.

The Meaning of the Word NATURE muſt be taken in this Definition from the Mind or original Intention of the efficient Cauſe, namely, *God*. For, The Definition of a Law, ſimply as ſuch, is not here required:—But—What, we, in this Place, want, is, a *Definition* of *the Law of Nature:* Which Term expreſſes in Meaning, altho' not in Words, the Author or efficient Cauſe, *Almighty God*, the Creator and Maker, the Contriver and Preſerver of the univerſal ALL. *Lex Naturæ eſt Propoſitio a Natura rerum*; i. e. *the Law of Nature is a Propoſition ariſing from the Nature of Things.*

The Nature of Things what.

The Nature of Things does not only comprehend this ſublunary, inferior World, of which we all (*i e.* all Mankind) are ſo many conſtituent Parts: But—it alſo expreſſes GOD, *as the Creator, Author and Governor of Nature and of Nature's Laws.* For this very End and Purpoſe, therefore, in order to form a true Judgment concerning Acts neceſſary to the public Good, not only, The Viſible World without us and around us, muſt concur and co-operate; But, in a more eſpecial Manner alſo, muſt Mankind, who

are

are principal Agents upon this Earth, and who (as the fit and proper Objects) excite and raiſe in us, right Notions and Reflections *upon Human Nature and the Welfare of it:* And, in forming this true Judgment, our own Concurrence and active Aſſiſtance muſt alſo greatly contribute; not only, as we ourſelves are Parts and Members of *the human Nature*; But, as we are, alſo, the free, voluntary Cauſes of our own Moral Acts: Nay—and what is ſtill more, and above all, in forming this true Judgment, Almighty God himſelf concurs and co-operates, as the univerſal Creator and Governor of ALL: Whoſe Authority and Power, ſo frequently and ſo unavoidably, muſt fall within our Notice and View. It is, indeed, a Maxim equal to Self-evidence; That, all true Propoſitions, whether ſpeculative or practical, are impreſſed upon our Minds from the Nature of Things: Becauſe, every natural Act can only prove thus much, and no more; namely, *Its own Exiſtence:* Whereas, the real, true Cauſe of every ſuch Act is laid in *That*, wherein nothing is, or can be, falſe. For Falſhood, in general, proceeds from a ſelf-willed, precipitate Raſhneſs, which connects or diſunites, joins or ſeparates ſuch Notions and Ideas, as Nature never once joined or ſeparated. Whenever, therefore, the Terms of any one Propoſition agree in Nature, the Affirmation of ſuch a Propoſition, as to thoſe Terms, is always true. Now—The Terms of Affirmative Propoſitions may (according to the beſt Determinations of our Judgment) be ſaid to agree:—Either, *Firſt*, when they ariſe from the ſame Thing, viewed in all its own conſtituent Parts, and in all the different Reſpects, Habitudes and Circumſtances, which more immediately concern, and relate to, itſelf, in general: Or, *Seeondly*, The Terms of Affirmative Propoſitions may be ſaid to agree, when they ariſe from the very ſame Thing compared with its ſeveral, ſeparate, diſtinct, ſubordinate Parts, and in all the particular Relations and Circumſtances of it. The different Kinds of Conception concerning the ſame Thing, are actually impreſſed upon the Mind: And yet, they are Kinds of Conception, generally ſpeaking, very far from being compleat and adequate.—And—as to the Terms of Negative Propoſitions, it is no difficult Matter to form a Judgment concerning them. Let the Deciſions of the human Mind be, however, what they will, as to theſe ſeveral Kinds of Propoſitions; yet the Laws or Propoſitions, at preſent under our Deliberation, are, with the exacteſt and juſteſt Propriety imaginable, aſcribed to Nature. Becauſe, Nature places before us in a clear View, not only, the Terms of theſe Propoſitions or Laws themſelves; but alſo, the Coherence, the Connexion, the Agreement of them. We may alſo, here, farther add, and upon the ſame ſolid Foundation, That, Agents are eſteemed rational, in proportion to the Degrees of Perception and Apprehenſion, which they apply, in knowing and underſtanding the Terms of theſe Propoſitions or Laws; and by that ſame Neceſſity of Coherence which really ſubſiſts in the true Nature of them. And in Proportion, *Secondly*, as they are, by an inherent

1. This holds good in the Structure of that Propoſition called the Law of Nature.
2. This holds good in the ſeveral Applications and Uſes of this Law, &c.

Theſe two Kinds of Conception, ſo far as they are true, are natural, are neceſſary.

inherent Propenſity, led naturally to compare theſe Terms together, ſo, as to form, from ſuch Terms as agree, Affirmative Propoſitions; and Negagative Propoſitions, from ſuch Terms as diſagree. And, *Laſtly*, in proportion, as they are apt and ready, from any two natural Propoſitions thus fitly diſpoſed, to deduce and infer, as from Premiſſes, a third Propoſition or Concluſion. The very Nature of Rationality itſelf exacts, beyond all Contradiction, thus much from us: Namely, That, not only, *Firſt*, The Two Propoſitions themſelves ſhould become clear and evident, (and more particularly ſo, if employed about ſuch Effects of our own voluntary Acts, as concern either our own Happineſs, or that of others); But, alſo—— *Secondly*, That, The Third Propoſition or Concluſion, ariſing from them, ſhould appear clear and evident; of which Kind are the primary Laws of Nature. And then, from theſe firſt Propoſitions, or Primary Laws, that other Propoſitions or Concluſions ſhould be drawn or deduced: Which Propoſitions may be called (1) *Secondary Laws*, or *Laws of Nature leſs-obvious*, *i. e.* Propoſitions not ſo immediately clear in their Evidence, becauſe laid in a longer Series of Reaſoning and Demonſtration.

This truly is Natural Logic.

See Chap. 6, 7, 8 and 9.

No poſſible Doubt can ariſe in our Minds concerning the Nature of created Beings; becauſe, not only external Objects, obvious to Senſe, excite and form our Ideas or Thoughts; but, the Mind alſo itſelf, which compoſes or joins ſuch Ideas and Thoughts together, occaſions and forms ſuch neceſſary Varieties.

Concerning the Nature of the Firſt Cauſe and Creator of All, why he ſhould not be eſteemed and looked upon as the original Author of theſe neceſſary Varieties, no poſſible Reaſon can be aſſigned: But, more eſpecially, if we ſeriouſly weigh within ourſelves, as well, All that has been already offered, as well as, What we now ſubjoin; Namely, *That, All Truth ariſes from the firſt Cauſe of thoſe Things, in which ſuch Truth is founded: Neither does ſuch Truth ſuffer any Alloy or Tincture from the preternatural Corruption of Mankind: But, ſuch Truth is the pure, uncorrupted Effect*, i. e. *the divine Work or Operation of Almighty God himſelf.* And, conſequently, whenſoever any one true Propoſition demonſtrates, what Office or

(1) *Secondary Laws.*] When I uſe the Word *Primary* Law of Nature, I refer to the two States of Mankind: The firſt, before; the other, after the Fall. And, according to theſe two different States, I ſuppoſe there are different Sorts of Natural Laws; and, different Rights and Obligations.

For, whatever is, in the Nature of Things, abſolutely neceſſary to our Happineſs, either to be done or enjoyed, Nature gives us a Law as to that Thing; and not only lays an Obligation upon us, but conveys a natural Right to us, either to do or enjoy it; And, as 'tis evident there are a great many more Things, neceſſary to our Happineſs ſince our Nature became corrupted, than before; ſo, by Conſequence, there muſt be a great many more natural Obligations and natural Rights in this, than in the former State. And, accordingly, I diſtinguiſh the Laws and Rights of Nature into *Primary* and *Secondary* Laws and Rights: And it is in this Senſe that I ſay, Government could not be founded in any primary Law of Nature: That is, there could be no natural Neceſſity of it in a State of pure Nature, for the Security of Property, if there was no ſuch Thing as Property to be ſecured by it. *See* Burnet *on Government*, Page 16, &c.

or Duty must be performed by any Moral Agent, the same true Proposition demonstrates also, that, every such Office or Duty is derived from the Authority and Sanction of Almighty God himself.

See Notes upon Final Causes, at Sect. 7. of the Prolegomena.

Neither does it admit of a clearer, fuller Demonstration, that the Course of Nature was created by Almighty God to produce its natural Effects: As for Instance, that the Sun was created to enlighten the Atmosphere; (the whole Regions of Air) or that, Rain, was created to refresh and moisten the Earth; than that, such Propositions, as are naturally to direct and govern human Acts, were given by Almighty God as Rules; this being the proper Office of them: And, of which Office only these Propositions are capable, namely, to direct us.——And, this Office or Business they necessarily perform from their inward, inherent, intrinsic Nature. Any one Proposition is, with an Evidence fully sufficient, represented to, or impressed upon, the human Mind by proper Objects; provided the Terms of it and the Coherence of these Terms with the Nature of Things, are so represented to our Senses and Understanding, that, every Person, arrived at mature Reason, free from Disorder, (provided he be inclined to give heed and to apply his Attention) can, and may, easily observe such Truth; namely, any such Kind of Truth as is discoverable by evident or common Experience.

As for Example, *First*, That the Animal-life may be destroyed by too extravagant an Effusion of Blood, from Suffocation (or Choaking) and from Famine, *&c.*

Secondly, That the Animal-life may, for some certain Time, be preserved from Respiration, (or the breathing of Air) from the proper Use of Aliments, Cloathing, *&c.*

Thirdly, That the mutual, united Endeavours of Mankind greatly contribute to render the Human-life much happier.

SECT. II.

The Law of Nature being useful and necessary to the Support and Perfection of human Life, is no Argument against the Principles hitherto laid down.

IF any one, however, is pleased to subjoin a Reason different from the plain Effect, and, not so strictly conformable to our Manner of Thinking, by saying, "That, the *Laws of Nature* are so called, because they "supply the Necessities of Life, and render our Being here (*i. e.* the human Life) more perfect," I shall never quarrel with him upon this Score. Because, such a Person may have substantial Reasons, why, he calls the very same Thing by various Names: Whence, consequently, and with much more Truth and Propriety, may Multitudes be inclined, by several different Motives, to affix one Name to the same Thing.—But, since The LAW or RIGHT OF NATURE (both Terms being used promiscuously by the *Roman Lawyers)* is defined in a Meaning quite different from the common Interpretation, as well in the Pandects, as in the Institutes,

The Law of Nature and Right of Nature, Terms indifferently used by the Roman Lawyers in the Pandects and Institutes.

The Law is that which Nature hath taught to all Animals. And the Right, or Law of Nations, is that Law which natural Reason has eſtabliſhed amongſt all Mankind. See the Appendix, No. 3. Page 59.

Book 1. where the Law of Nature is defined, " That, which, Nature " hath taught to all Animals." And, in this Manner, it is diſtinguiſhed from the *Law* or *Right* of NATIONS: Which Law or Right, the Nations of Civil Inſtitution uſe and follow. And, " It is that, which Natu- " ral Reaſon has eſtabliſhed amongſt all Mankind.

It is therefore, in my Opinion, very proper, in Oppoſition to ſo ſovereign an Authority, to produce one equally powerful; and, to aſſign ſuch a Reaſon as carries great Weight and Conſequence with the Philoſophers.— As to what concerns the *Firſt* of *Theſe Two*, The ſame Emperor *Juſtinian*, in the firſt Book of his *Inſtitutes*, *Concerning the Diviſion of Private Property*, has theſe Words. It being to be enquired into, How a Dominion over, or a Property in, Things, is to be acquired? Why, truly, " It is to be acquired by a Natural Right: Which Right, ſays he, " ac- " cording to our Laws, is, THAT, which is called, *the Law* or *Right* " *of Nations.*" Every one muſt here obſerve, That, what the Emperor, juſt before, called (*Jus Naturale*, i. e.) (1) *the Law* or *Right of Nature*, ſignifies the ſame with *(Cum Jure Gentium) the Law or Right of Nations.*——Now——This Definition of his, in the *Inſtitutes*, exactly agrees with our Definition. Beſides All This——(and which is much more to be regarded) that great Maſter of Language, *Marcus Tullius Cicero*, who, for the Glory of writing in a true *Roman* Stile, need not yield the Crown even to an Emperor, in the third Book of his *Offices*, has introduced the true Expreſſion [*Naturâ*, id eſt, *Jure Gentium*] *By Nature*, that is, *by the Law of Nations.*——And Then——He enumerates Thoſe Precepts of Religion, which, according to the Law of Nature, peculiarly belong to Man; but, not-common to the other Animal-Creation.

Both Ancients and Moderns are agreed, that the Laws of Nature and the Laws of Nations are the ſame Laws.

Therefore, upon theſe ancient Authorities, we, with Truth and Juſtice, call and underſtand *the Laws of Nature*, and *the Laws of Nations*, the *very ſame Laws.* So that, from hence, it is quite needleſs to quote Philoſophers, of a modern Date, who ſpeak exactly in the ſame Phraſe.

The Reaſon why the Laws of Nature are proper to Man only.

The Reaſon, then, which prevails with me to affirm, That, the Laws of Nature are proper to Man only, in preference to all other Animals, is

(1) *The Law or Right of Nature*, &c.] Theſe two Definitions in the *Pandects* and *Inſtitutes*, altho' apparently different, are ſtill much the ſame.

1. The *Law of Nature* is that *Law* which *Nature* hath taught to all *Animals*.

2. The *Law of Nations* is that *Law* which *Natural Reaſon* has taught to all *Mankind*.

The only Difference lies between *Animals* and *Mankind*. And, in his ſecond Book of the *Inſtitutes*; when the Queſtion is, " How " Dominion over, or Property in, Things, " is to be acquired?" Why, The Anſwer is, " By a Natural Right." If the Queſtion be aſked, What is this Right? Why, truly, according to the *Roman* Laws, it is the Law of Right of Nations. Pray, in theſe two Definitions, is there not a Diſtinction without a Difference? So that *Jus Naturale* and *Jus Gentium* are the ſame. And—This exactly agrees with our Definition; and alſo, with *Cicero*, who expreſſeth himſelf juſt in the ſame Manner, *Naturâ, id eſt, Jure Gentium.* If there be any Diſtinction between the *Jus Naturæ* and *Jus Gentium*, it muſt ariſe from the Difference between Primary and Secondary Laws of Nature.

is, that, These Laws are Propositions conversant about Effects, flowing from Moral Acts as their constituent Causes, *i. e.* That, These Propositions are the Decrees and Determinations of the Human Judgment, which affirms or denies those Terms whose principal Authority and Sanction turn upon a Natural Revelation as coming from God. Upon the Whole—I cannot discover the least Traces capable of proving, That, Brute-creatures can put together Propositions, but, more especially, such Propositions as these: Much less, are they capable of discovering, That, such *Propositions* or *Laws* are impressed upon their Minds by Almighty God: Or, that, these Laws exact an Obedience from them, in all or any of their Acts, as being the practical Rules laid down in such Proposition or Laws for irrational Animals to observe and follow.

Brutes cannot connect, &c.

No such Laws impressed upon the Minds of Brutes.

Brutes not accountable, &c.

SECT. III.

WE now pass on, in the Progress of our Definition, to the Term *Indicat* or *Indicans*, *Declaring*, *Promulging*, *Shewing*, &c. *See* Page 271.

I am fully apprized of what *Modestinus* says concerning Laws, *F. Tit.* 3. "The Vertue of a Law, says he, is to *Command*, *Forbid*, *Permit*, *Punish*." To which Sanctions we may also add, to *Requite according to the Merit of Obedience*, i. e. *to confer Rewards*.

Herennius Modestinus, the Disciple of Papinian, lived in the time of the Emperor Alexander.

1. Now, notwithstanding that I have made no mention of These, in my *Definition of the Law of Nature*: Yet, I freely and ingenuously confess, That, under my Definition, are comprehended all these Ties, and effectual Motives. For, *All these Motives* or *Sanctions*, seem actually to follow from this one clear Discovery of these Notions, Ideas, Impressions or Thoughts, which principally and materially regard the Public Common UNIVERSAL GOOD: And, in Truth, is the essential, material Substance of such Notions.

See Appendix, Page 59. No. 3.

2. *Philosophy (Natural* and *Moral)* and the Notions impressed upon our Minds by Things (whether from Sense or Reflection) clearly represent WHAT these Notions or Impressions are: And, WHAT are their Capacities, in producing their genuine Effects.

3. For, the Verbs, *Imperare Command*, *Vetare Forbid*, *Permittere Permit* or *Suffer*, *Punire Punish*, seem better adapted to such Forms of Expression as the Magistrate uses in declaring his Will and Pleasure, than, the simplest and plainest Discoveries of Things themselves:——And yet, from these simplest Discoveries, the whole Force or Sanction of *Commands*, *Injunctions*, *Precepts*, *Prohibitions*, *Forbiddings*, *Punishments*, *Pains*, *Penalties*, *Encouragements* and *Rewards*, may, at once, and with the greatest Ease, be deduced. *See* Chap. 4. Sect 4.

4. For, *First*, as ſoon as any *Governor* or *Magiſtrate* has ſufficiently ſignified his Will and Pleaſure, in promoting the Public Good: When he diſcovers what the true Tendency of his Will and Pleaſure is; His Command becomes ſufficiently binding; and, by that very ſame Authority of his, He as clearly Prohibits and Forbids all poſitive Acts and negligent Omiſſions deſtructive of ſuch a Good.

5. And, *Secondly*, whoſoever has Willed that the Private Happineſs of each Individual and a Tranquility of Mind, from his ardent Endeavours in promoting theſe laudable Ends, are inſeparably contained in the public Happineſs, and entirely depend upon it. Whoſoever, I ſay, has Willed and Decreed thus, has affixed a ſure Reward to the Perſon (whoſoever he is) who promotes the Public Good; and has, at the ſame time, given a full Sanction to the Puniſhment inſeparably joined to the Vice, deſtructive of ſuch a Good. And this, only in other Words, is ſaying and declaring, That, every ſuch Perſon muſt neceſſarily want his own proper Share and Proportion of a Good or Happineſs, which is to flow and ariſe from the Public Good, unleſs every individual Perſon can be ſuppoſed alone, ſolitary, and independent of ALL.

6. As to the Term [*Permittere*] *To Permit*, When it clearly declares an Action not neceſſarily requiſite to the *Common Good*; and yet, at the ſame Time, ſufficiently affirms ſuch an Action no ways inconſiſtent with, or repugnant to it:——If any ſuch Action as This (altho' not ſo immediate and neceſſary to the *Common Good*) is obſtructed and prevented by the Civil Magiſtrate, Nature may be injured moſt manifeſtly: Becauſe, Nature eſſentially conſiſts in ſuch a Kind of Motion as always tends to a reſtleſs, perpetual Variety. Concerning *Puniſhments* and *Rewards* adjectitious, or annexed as Sanctions, we ſhall treat elſewhere: Becauſe, our Thoughts upon theſe Points will appear more evident, when once we come to explain what the Nature of the *Public Good* is; And, what are the efficient Cauſes which conſtitute ſuch a *Good*.

7. The remaining Words (not yet explained in this Definition) carry ſome relation to the Subject-matter of poſitive Laws: That is to ſay, ſuch Acts as the Schoolmen call *Human*. By Human Acts we are to underſtand ſuch Acts, only, as are capable of Direction and Management, from Deſign, Prudence, Liberty, Freedom; effectually excluding Fate, Neceſſity, Chance, *Impoſſibility*. And, the Reaſon why, we thus define *an Human Act* is, becauſe the Law of Nature (or Reaſon, which weighs and conſiders the Capacities and Powers of Nature) cannot propoſe either to our Obſervation, or to our Practice, an impoſſible End: Neither can it preſcribe to us Means to be purſued beyond the Sphere of our Capacities, and which exceed the Limits of our Strength. Becauſe, both theſe Suppoſitions are prepoſterous, vain, and quite repugnant to the Faculties and Powers of Human Nature. For, *Reaſon* evidently abominates, and is abhorrent from, every Thing inſignificant and unfitting.

Human Acts what.

8. However,

8. However, notwithſtanding *This*, It may, poſſibly, thro' an unexpected Conjunction of External Cauſes, happen, that, Events, in this Life proſperous, may fall to the Lot of them, who have neglected thoſe Means of SELF-Happineſs, (which, uſually prove beſt; yet, ſuch Events are merely contingent and happen but very rarely: It is therefore evident, that, neither Reaſon nor Judgment does direct Acts leading to this End: Much leſs, does the Law of Nature command any ſuch Events.

9. This one Point, by the Bye, with an Evidence clearly ſufficient, Natural Reaſon demonſtrates; namely, That, It conduces and with an higher Degree of Probability to Happineſs in general, to act for an End wiſely foreſeen, with Caution propoſed, and by the beſt Means in our Power fitted to ſuch an End: Than, by a total Neglect of all Prudence and Caution, to commit ourſelves entirely to the Uncertainty of Hazard and Chance. Neither, indeed, does the Law of Nature ſecure a greater Felicity than ſuch as emerges immediately out of a Rational Correſpondence or Behaviour both towards GOD and MAN.—An Happineſs infinitely beyond any which can poſſibly be expected from a Life ſpent at Random and by Chance. For, the Foundation of a much better-grounded Hope is fixed upon a Principle that, *our Reaſon will not prevent any Bleſſings ariſing from External Cauſes* (from Cauſes independent of our own Care and Caution), but, on the contrary, will add all other Bleſſings which Reaſon itſelf can either effect or procure both from God and Man.

To what I have already ſaid, I ſhall likewiſe farther add, That, I mean to exclude and baniſh from the Definition of an Human Act, all Acts, which, without any ſort of probable Reaſon, place their whole Expectation of Good rather than of Evil, upon Fortune, or Chance, or Accident entirely.

10. *An Act*, under the Deſcription here laid down, is, in an univerſal general Meaning, to be underſtood; and, not as the Act of one ſingle individual Man only; nor, as the Acts, whether more or leſs, which belong to one: But, they muſt be underſtood as human Acts univerſally, and without Exception, of All, directed and carried on, at all times, for the common Good and Advantage of All.——Now, we juſtly may ſpeak expreſly and literally, without either Metaphor or Analogy, concerning the Acts of Mankind only, becauſe they are obvious to our daily Obſervation and Experience. But—if we are, according to the Laws of Nature, to talk as Philoſophers concerning the Acts and Operations of *God* and *Angels*, we muſt deduce and fix the Whole upon the Doctrine of *Analogy*, as explained and laid down in the foregoing Part of this ENQUIRY. (1) See Prolegomena, Sect. 10.

11. The

(1) See Biſhop *Butler's Analogy of Natural and Reveal'd Religion. Introduction*, Pages 2, 3, 4. See the Rev. Mr. *Barton's Analogy of Divine Wiſdom*, Pages 37, 38, &c.

* * *

11. The Words, as laid down in the Definition, (*Agentis Rationalis*) *Rational Agent*, carry in them, indeed, no definite, fixed, certain Meaning; and, by Conſequence, may be applied to any one ſingle Man; as for Example, to *Adam*, the firſt, and at that time, the one only created Man. And therefore, at that time, when *Adam* was the one only ſolitary Man, the *Common Good* muſt be whatſoever was moſt agreeable to *GOD* and *Adam*. But, ſince we are now engaged in a *Subject*, which the Schoolmen call *neceſſary*; we are to obſerve, that theſe Kinds of *Indefinites* are commonly underſtood to extend and diffuſe themſelves to all and every the ſeveral Parts of Mankind, taken either ſeparately or in Conjunction, whenſoever, afterwards, according to the preſcribed Natures of Things, they multiplied and grew numerous. I judged it then proper, here, for this Reaſon, to make the foregoing Obſervation; becauſe, the moſt remarkable Laws of Nature, which are to direct us in the Exerciſe and Practice of mutual Charity and Juſtice, ſuppoſe Mankind greatly multiplied. And, theſe Laws of Nature give this one Direction, chiefly upon this Account, that, it may be more evident, what Acts, drawn into Practice and mutually compared together, could render Mankind the happier.

The *Laws of Nature* and of Civil Society, therefore, addreſs themſelves uſually to great Multitudes at one and the ſame time; which is the uſual Practice of Civilians. From hence it is, that, Civilians (*J. Cti*) call *the Law, a Common Precept:* And, *Solon*, if I remember right, has delivered it as a Maxim down to us, That, *no Law ought to be eſtabliſhed and enacted, which concerns any one Individual only.* Moreover, the joint Endeavours and Acts of Numbers can effect ſomething which may very notably contribute to the *Common Good.* And——conſequently, the Truth of this Propoſition; namely, that, *Fidelity*, *Gratitude*, στοργη, (or the natural Affection for our Young), and the *Innocency* of All; (or, at leaſt, *of the Generality*) conduce much more to the Public Good; than, that, the ſame Acts, elicited and performed by any one ſingle Perſon only, can produce the ſame Effect.

SECT. IV.

FROM hence we learn, That, the principal Characteriſtic Mark of the *Laws of Nature*, is taken from their *Effect:* Namely the PUBLIC GOOD. *This Effect* is produced by ſuch Acts as the *Laws of Nature* preſcribe and command.—And This Effect is no other than, that very Effect, which the Nature of the Thing requires. Becauſe—The true eſſential Conſtitution of thoſe Acts which properly fall under and come within the Direction and Regulation of theſe Laws, is beſt diſcerned from the Effects themſelves. Now, Theſe Laws are Enunciations or Propoſitions; and, therefore, as ſuch, are made up of Notions and ſimple Apprehenſions

Apprehenſions or Ideas combined and joined together: And therefore, theſe Laws or Propoſitions take their ſpecific Differences from the Objects about which they are concerned and employed. For which Reaſon, the True Conſtituent Nature of theſe Laws, or Propoſitions themſelves, is diſcerned in thoſe Effects which they are to direct, and at which, they aim. For, the Effect of a Rational Agent (ſo far as the Idea of ſuch an Effect is preconceived by the Mind) determines Him, not only, *Firſt*, To an Intention in producing ſuch an Effect;——but alſo, *Secondly*, the Effect ſettles and fixes the Bounds to Acts thus deſigned, determined and deſtined. Theſe Bounds or Limits we call THE END. All Mankind, it muſt be here obſerved at the ſame time, allow it neceſſary, in every Agent who acts with Deliberation and Deſign, That he ſhould, *Firſt*, propoſe to himſelf AN END. And, *Secondly*, That he ſhould cloſely examine into, chuſe and apply the Means neceſſary and moſt conducive to THIS END.—It is perfectly conſiſtent with the Conduct of a rational Underſtanding, therefore, to ſuppoſe that Laws, ſo entirely ſuited (as thoſe of Nature are) to a Rational Being, ſhould both preſcribe the beſt End, and Means alſo the moſt exactly ſuited, adapted and fitted to ſecure this End.—For which Reaſon, in our Definition ſtated and explained, what we determine upon and ſettle as *The End*, is, *The Public Common Good*. Now—This End *(i. e.* the *Public* or *Common Good)* we underſtand and explain under a larger, more extenſive Comprehenſion than *Ulpian* has done: For, he defines the *Public* or *Common Good* to be, whatſoever concerns the Polity of the *Roman* Republic only; and *this Good*, he ſays, as to Religious Matters, depends entirely and only upon Prieſts and Magiſtrates. Whereas our Deſign, in the Definition which we have ſtated, is, to comprehend and take in, all theſe Points, which any way concern both the Glory of Almighty God, and the Good of all Mankind in general. And, therefore, this one univerſal End, thus complicated, united and complex, is, moſt certainly, *the greateſt poſſible Good* which can fall within the Sphere of the Human Capacity.

Ulpian. See Appendix, Page 58.

Secondly, As to *The Means*, All the poſſible Acts, Powers and Operations of Human Abilities, (which, under given Circumſtances, can any ways conduce and miniſter to the End propoſed) execute the *Office of theſe Means*. But—ſince the Terms END and MEANS, carry in them a very doubtful, ambiguous Signification, and expreſs the free Intention of a Rational Agent in many Reſpects changeable, and, very imperfectly underſtood. And, conſequently, (That, the Terms *End* and *Means*, which furniſh Subject-matter for Demonſtrations) are not ſo immediately adapted to our Manner of conceiving and apprehending Things; for theſe Reaſons, therefore, I determined within myſelf to conſider the Subject-matter before us under a different Form of Thinking: Still, however, at the ſame time, preſerving the Subject-matter as it is, in itſelf, pure and without the leaſt Alteration.———And———why I came to this Determination, was; becauſe the Connexion is clear, and evidently indiſſoluble,

luble between efficient Cauſes and thoſe Effects, which are to ariſe from them.——As alſo, becauſe conſtant Experience and repeated Obſervation more familiarly inſtruct us, what Effects muſt, and are, to follow from ſuch fixed, determined Cauſes, as are given and laid down. This is the Reaſon why, in our Definition of *the Law of Nature*, we have ſtated and ſettled *Public* or *Common Good* as THE EFFECT: And, why, we have grounded and eſtabliſhed *Human Actions and Human Abilities*, (from whence ſuch an End as this is any how to be expected) as the EFFICIENT CAUSES. For, upon this ſolid ſubſtantial Foundation, the Queſtions in Morality and (Civil Society, or) Politics, concerning *Ends* and *Means*, are reduced into Terms well-underſtood by Natural Philoſophers. As for Inſtance, *Whether or no ſuch, or ſuch, Efficient Cauſes, are able to produce ſuch, or ſuch, an Effect?* and Queſtions of the like Nature. The Anſwer given to this, or to any ſuch Queſtion, is demonſtrable from the well-experienced Efficacy of Human Acts, as well, when they are tried ſimply and in themſelves; as, when they are tried in Concurrence and Co-operation with other Cauſes not very different from thoſe now laid down.

After what Manner the Acts of moral Agents, with the Conſequences of them, are connected ſo as to produce neceſſary Effects.

For, notwithſtanding, that, any Act future, when under our Deliberation and Choice, may, and with great Juſtice, be termed *Free*.—And—notwithſtanding, that, Effects, which (after any Manner in time to come) are to ariſe from theſe our free Acts of Choice and Liberty, may very properly be called *Contingent*; yet it is, to a full Demonſtration as true alſo, That, when once we have determined to act, the Connexion between theſe our Acts, and all the Effects which depend upon them, is *neceſſary*, is evidently natural; and, conſequently, becomes the Subject-matter of full, inconteſtable Demonſtration. And this, as we may obſerve, is the very Caſe in Geometrical Operations, which are no leſs free, no leſs arbitrary, than any other human Acts whatſoever: And, conſequently, juſt as we can, with the ſtricteſt Truth, deduce a long Chain of Conſequences (far ſurpaſſing the Thought and Imagination of Perſons unſkilled in the Mathematical Science, concerning the ſeveral Ratio's and Proportions, which either Lines or Angles bear amongſt themſelves, it being very well known, that, almoſt (1) every one can draw ſome few Lines according to the eſtabliſhed Rules of Practical Geometry): So, in like Manner, and upon the ſtricteſt Principles of Mathematical Philoſophy, can be demonſtrated many Conſequences, ariſing from one Human Act: Which Human Act impreſſes a ſenſible Motion upon a Phyſical or Natural Body, as ſuch a Body is ordered and ſettled in the Syſtem evidently well-known of other Natural Bodies. And—conſequently

Geometrical Propoſitions demonſtrated by an Analyſis, and human Acts compared.

(1) *Every one can draw ſome few Lines, according*, &c.] *As he who draws ſome few Lines*, according to the Rules of Practical Geometry, cannot, with any Degree of Certainty, calculate all the Concluſions ariſing from the ſeveral Ratio's, Proportions which, &c. So neither can He, who elicits a Moral Act, ſettle, to any Degree of Certainty, all the Natural Conſequences which may and can, &c. *See* Chap. 4. Sect. 4. Pages 277, 278. Note 1.

ſequently—it very frequently happens, That, " *Whatſoever* hurts the " Life, Health and Moving Powers of any one Individual (in the " voluntary Uſe and Exerciſe of all which, Freedom, ſo directly oppoſite " to Slavery, eſſentially does conſiſt): As alſo, *Whatſoever* injures the Pro- " perty and Fortune of any one Individual: Or, on the contrary, *What-* " *ſoever* promotes and enhances all theſe, or any of theſe, Bleſſings to him, " certainly can, and will, produce the very ſame Effects to any other In- " dividual; nay, even to many others, at one and the ſame time."

Now—this more excellent Kind of Mathematical Philoſophy (in caſe the Judgment and Concluſions which I frame be right) proves and evinces, beyond all Controverſy, *Firſt*, That, all the Viciſſitudes, all the Changes, of Natural Bodies, (not excepting Human Bodies, ſo far as they are acted upon, from without, by external Cauſes) happen according to thoſe Theorems upon Motion, which are inveſtigated, calculated and demonſtrated by a *Geometrical Analyſis* (1). And, *Secondly*, this Philoſophy proves equally

(1) *Demonſtrated by a Geometrical Analyſis.*] By a Geometrical Analyſis, I underſtand, the Solution of Geometrical Problems, and the Diſcovery of Theorems contained in thoſe Problems, by Algebra, or, the Analytic Art.

The Application of Geometry and Arithmetic to Nature in general, and, to the Laws of Motion in particular, ſeems to be the Maſter-piece of Human Invention. Our Author carries the Application ſtill farther, *Evicit autèm (ſi quid ego judico)* ſays he, *præſtantior phyſiologia mutationes omnes corporum omnium etiam humanorum quæ ab extrà veniunt (nam excipiendæ ſunt determinationes ab internâ voluntatis libertate) ſive in melius, ſive deterius, fieri, ſecundùm ea de motu Theoremata, quæ, per Analyſin Geometricam inveniuntur & demonſtrantur.*

That certainly is a moſt excellent Philoſophy, which applies Mathematics to Nature in a rational way.

Many Philoſophers have demonſtrated the Theorems concerning Motion. What Dr. *John Keill* ſays *Introductio ad veram Phyſicam*, will fully explain our Author. The Doctor having, in his ninth Lecture, demonſtrated the Theorems concerning Motion, begins his tenth Lecture thus.

In the Demonſtrations of the preceding Lecture we have ſhewn a Method, whereby Phyſical Matters may be firſt reduced to Geometry, and afterwards to Arithmetic: For, ſince, it is there demonſtrated that the Motions of Bodies are as Rectangles under their Celerity and Quantity of Matter: from the Celerity and Quantity of Matter of any Body being given, there will be given its Momentum, *viz.* equal to a Factum or Product made of the Celerity of the Body into its Quantity of Matter. As, for Example, Let the Body A be 8 Parts, Let B be 6 Parts, the Celerity of A as 5, and the Celerity of the Body B as 3; the Motion of the Body A will be 40, and the Motion of the Body B but 18 Parts.

In like Manner, from the given Momentum and Quantity of Matter of any Body, may be known its Celerity, *viz.* If its Momentum be divided by its Quantity of Matter, the Quotient will be its Velocity. For, Let the Motion in the Body A be 40 Parts, and its Quantity of Matter 8 Parts: Let alſo the Motion in the Body B be 18 Parts and its Quantity of Matter 6 Parts: Divide 40 by 8 the Quotient will give 5, *viz.* the Velocity of the moving Body A; and by dividing 18 by 6 the Quotient will give 3 the Velocity of the moving Body B.

Since, by Examples, Things become more plain; and, ſince Numbers are to be made Uſe of in Practice: Let us illuſtrate the Science of Motion by Numbers, and make Uſe of both Specious and Numerical Arithmetic. For, from Specious Arithmetic are diſcovered general Canons, which afterwards may be applied to particular Numbers.

Thus, Let A denote the Quantity of Matter in any given Body: Let C ſtand for its Celerity, and let its Momentum be called M: Or, rather. Let theſe Letters be put for the Numbers that are proportionable to theſe

equally excellent, whether ſuch Viciſſitudes and Changes in Natural Bodies alter, either for the better, or the worſe. *See* Chap. 4. Sect. 4. Page 277. Note 1.

But

Quantities: Then it will be, $C \times A = M$, and $C = \frac{M}{A}$, and $A = \frac{M}{C}$.

In like Manner, ſince the Space run over is always proportionable to the Rectangle under the Celerity and the Time: If the Space be called S, the Time T, and the Celerity C, then $S = C \times T$ and $C = \frac{S}{T}$, and $T = \frac{S}{C}$. And therefore ſince $M = A \times C$, that $M = \frac{A \times S}{T}$: Or, if T be given, then is $M = A \times S$. That is, the Momentum of any Body is as the Quantity of Matter multiplied into the Space deſcribed in a given Time.

Many other Concluſions likewiſe, relative to the Laws of Motion, may be from hence demonſtrated.

Upon theſe Principles it is demonſtrable, that the Momentum of any Body ariſes from the Motion of all its Parts: For in each Particle of the Body there is an Impetus or Force of Moving: And, from the Sum of theſe Forces is compounded the Impetus or Quantity of Motion of the whole Body.

This is that more excellent Kind of Philoſophy which Dr. *Cumberland* here mentions. He acknowledges, that very few Diſcoveries of any Conſequence, to this Purpoſe, were made in his Time. *Pauca fateor ſunt licet magni momenti quæ adhuc de eâ re fuerint exhibita.*

By more modern Diſcoveries and Improvements in Natural Philoſophy, we diſcover how univerſally the Laws of Matter and Motion take place and hold good. Laws which prevail, not only in the inanimate World, but alſo in the whole Syſtem of the Animal Œconomy: Of that Animal Œconomy which comprehends as well rational as irrational Animals. *Mutationes omnes corporum omnium etiam humanorum quæ ab extra veniunt.*

So far as any Animal-body, whether rational or irrational, is ſubject to the general Laws of Matter and Motion, ſo far is every ſuch Body a Phyſical or a Natural Body. Our Author, therefore, with deep Penetration and a truly Philoſophical Judgment, places the Human Body under three diſtinct Points of View.

Firſt, That an Human Body is a Phyſical or a Natural Body.

Secondly, That an Human Body is an Animal-body, endowed with Senſes like other Animals.

Thirdly, That an Human Body is an Animal-body, endowed with Properties peculiar to ſelf.

Upon each of theſe Topics he diſcourſes in a learned, maſterly way. From theſe judicious and clear Diſtinctions which he forms, concerning an human Body, we ſhall be able to come at a full Knowledge of his Two Expreſſions: *Mutationes corporum humanorum quæ ab extrà veniunt:* And, *Nam excipiendæ ſunt determinationes ab interna voluntatis libertate.*

Under the firſt Expreſſion He makes all the Changes and Alterations of Human Bodies as ſo many Phyſical or Natural Motions, and as much ſo as any of thoſe Motions to which inert, inanimate Matter is ſubject.

Under the ſecond Expreſſion He diſtinguiſhes between Phyſical, Natural Changes and Motions, and the Acts of Human Creatures as they are free, voluntary Agents, under the Direction and Government of Reaſon: As they are Agents capable of Moral Good and Moral Evil; and, conſequently, as they are Beings accountable for all the natural Conſequences of their own Acts, of their own voluntary Choice.

The Term *Mutationes* conveys to us the Idea of phyſical, natural, neceſſary Alterations and Changes, occaſioned by the mere Laws of Matter and Motion, *mutationes ab extrà*, where the Human Body is acted upon from external Cauſes merely, in like manner as all the other inanimate Creation. Whereas *Determinationes ab internâ voluntatis libertate*, implies, The free Choice and voluntary Determination of a Rational Agent, in purſuing ſome deſigned End, and applying the Means neceſſary towards the Attainment of it.——In ſhort, the *Firſt* is a Phyſical Neceſſity, the *Second* is a Moral Agency.

The next Queſtion which ariſes from our Author's three-fold Diſtinction of an Human Body, is, How Faculties and Operations of a Rational Soul are capable of being affected by

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But—here, however, we are cautiouſly to obſerve, That, when we ſpeak concerning theſe external Viciſſitudes, Changes and Motions in Human Bodies, we conſider them as Phyſical or Natural Bodies merely: And, conſequently, We exclude all the internal Powers of Will, of free Determinations, and of intellectual, rational Faculties. I muſt here acknowledge, indeed, that there are but *very few Theorems* (notwithſtanding the mighty Conſequence of ſuch Inventions) *hitherto produced on this Subject:* And, yet, a Method, however, has been diſcovered for reducing Motions, how complex and complicated ſoever, to a Geometrical Calculation; as alſo, a Method for the Inveſtigation of Theorems by Lines and Figures, together with all the poſſible Determinations and Concluſions which can follow and ariſe from ſuch Motions and Theorems. And, conſequently, ſince the whole Phyſical Eſſence of a Natural Body is reſolveable into its Extenſion, Figure, and various complicated Motions: The Method is, upon this very Foundation, clearly pointed out, for reducing, under the Form of Demonſtration, all Effects of the ſame Kind. What, therefore, I have here, in a curſory Way, offered to my Readers, is only with a View to ſettle the Method we are to purſue, in order to form perfect Demonſtrations. For Demonſtrations of Moral, as well as of other Truths, are, from univerſal Obſervation and conſtant Experience, ſufficiently diſcovered to carry a real Exiſtence in the very Nature and Reaſon of Things; and, to depend upon each other, in as cloſe a Connexion as Cauſes and their Effects do: And, moreover, That, Theſe Theorems (to ſhew how rational and extenſive they are) were either actually deduced from (or at leaſt have been attempted upon) different Philoſophical Principles.——The Theorems I here mean, are employed and converſant about Acts, by which, Mankind, from conſtant Practice, uſually either deſtroy or preſerve the Life, Liberty and Property of each other.

See the Note at Chap. 1. Sect. 25. Pages 77, 78.

SECT. V.

THE Sect of the *Stoics* may, with great Juſtice, here be cenſured, who call nothing *Good*, excluſive of Virtue: Nothing *Evil*, excluſive of Vice. For, whilſt, They, with very little Conſideration, buſy themſelves in eſtabliſhing the excellent Goodneſs of Virtue, and the odious

The Stoics. Zeno was the Father of the Stoics, he was born at Cittium, a Seaport Town in Greece.

an Human Body? I ſay, by an Human Body, rather than an Animal-body; becauſe the Human Body, as our Author very well obſerves, is an Animal-body endowed with Properties peculiar to itſelf.

Suppoſe an Human Body to be organized in each minute Structure of Parts (both as to Quantity and Quality) as other Animal-bodies are, the Queſtion, upon this Suppoſition, is, Whether ſuch a Body would be fitly organized for the Acts and Operations of a rational, immortal Soul? I anſwer, No. And, for this plain Reaſon, Becauſe the Author of Nature has framed the Human Conſtitution with Powers and Capacities ſo much more excellent than thoſe of any other Animal.

Malevolence of Vice, they utterly deſtroy the one only true Cauſe *Why Virtue is Good, and Vice Evil.*

Poſitive univerſal Juſtice.

1. Now, it is for this Reaſon only, That, Virtue is *The Good* (and muſt, indeed, according to Truth, be thought *the greateſt Good)*; becauſe, " Vir- " tue determines Human Acts to produce Effects which conſtitute the prin- " cipal Branches of the natural Public Good." And—conſequently, the Aim and Deſign of Virtue, is, to render all Mankind moſt perfect:—To furniſh and ſupply them, in the beſt and ampleſt Manner, with natural Perfections of both Soul and Body:—And, to promote, above all Things, the Glory and Honour of God, by the ſtricteſt Imitation of the Divine Beneficence. *See Prolegomena, Notes, at* Sect. 10.

Negative univerſal Juſtice.

2. To which we may, alſo, farther add, in the ſecond Place, That, ſince the other Branch of *Univerſal Juſtice* (which is the very Soul and Eſſence of Virtue itſelf) ſhines moſt commonly in *Innocence, i. e.* in reſtraining all ſuch Acts, as come under the Denomination of Murder, Theft, *&c.* It is, therefore, manifeſt, That, the Law prohibiting ſuch Injuries as theſe, carries in it no Foundation of Reaſon, unleſs, it be, firſt, acknowledged, that all ſuch Acts, namely, depriving the Innocent of Life, or of thoſe good Things (which are eſſentially, and in their own Nature, the preſerving Cauſes of Life) are Evils or Injuries to the *Individual*, or to the *Many*, even antecedent to any inſtituted Law: And, conſequently, without any Regard being had to that Virtue which depends upon Obedience to every ſuch inſtituted Law.

I do not know whether Mr. *Hobbes* has denied this Point or no: But, this I know, that, he openly confeſſes all ſuch Acts as theſe to carry a Damage, a Loſs, in the Execution of them: And, that, every ſuch Act proves an Evil to him who ſuffers the Damage. In his Book *De Cive*, Chap. 3. Sect. 4. his Words are as follow; (1) " In civitate ſi quis ali- " cui noceat quîcum nihil pactus eſt, damnum ei infert cui malum: In- " juriam, ſoli illi, qui civitatis habet poteſtatem."

Mr. *Hobbes*, however, in other Places of his Writings, avowedly maintains a quite contrary Opinion: As for Inſtance, in his Book *De Cive*, Chap. 12. Sect. 1. his Words are as follow: (2) " Leges civiles " eſſe regulas boni & mali, ideòque, quod legiſlator præceperit, id pro " bono:

(1) *In civitate ſi quis*, &c] In a State of Civil Society, if any Perſon injures another, with whom he has not entered into any Engagement, Compact or Agreement, he brings a Loſs upon him who ſuffers the Evil: But as to the Injury, it only concerns him in whom the Civil Authority is lodged. *See the Notes at* Pages 204, 205, 206. Chap. 2. Sect. 22. *where, in Confutation of Mr.* Hobbes, *the Difference between* Injuria *and* Damnum *is very well diſtinguiſhed by* Hugh Grotius, Puffendorf *and* Will. Grotius.

(2) *Leges civiles eſſe regulas*, &c.] That the Laws of Civil Society are the Rules of Good and Evil: And, by Conſequence, that whatſoever the Lawgiver commands and preſcribes muſt be held as Good: And whatſoever he forbids muſt be looked upon as Evil: And that it is ſeditious to affirm, the Knowledge of Good and Evil to belong to Individuals.

" bono: Quod vetuerit id pro malo habendum esse; et seditiosum esse di-
" cere cognitionem boni & mali pertinere ad singulos."

I would willingly reconcile these two Passages together, by the Distinction of an ambiguous Term, *i. e.* by making the Term *Evil*, in the first Passage, to stand for whatsoever is noxious and hurtful to *Nature*: And, in the second Passage, by calling *Evil*, Whatsoever is incongruous and contrary to the Laws, *i. e.* to the established Laws of a Civil Institution. Such a Reconciliation, however, of Mr. *Hobbes* with himself, as this, will not, I am afraid, be very agreeable to him: Because, upon this Foundation, it may be inferred, That, some certain Evils or Things hurtful, either to some one Individual, or to an Aggregate compounded of many, may be discovered before any positive Notion of an established Law can be formed: And, by Consequence, from hence it may be proved, That, some certain Constitutions of Civil Government are Evils, or prove destructive of the People. And, therefore, Mr. *Hobbes*, in his Book *De Cive*, Chap. 17. Sect. 12. with consummate Prudence and Caution guards himself against this Inconveniency, so very opposite to his Scheme of Politics. His Words are these: (1) " Ne qua definitio in totâ matheſi, philo-
" sophiâ naturali, aut civili; ne qua ratiocinatio hominum in illis discipli-
" nis rata sit, nisi accedat authoritas civilis."

Now, we cannot but observe here, That, the very Point which Mr. *Hobbes* denies to *Christ*, (namely, that he came into the World to instruct Mankind in the Art of Reasoning) he strenuously affirms, belongs and is annexed to the Prerogative of Monarchs, and of the Supreme, Civil Authority.—Such all-powerful Magistrates, *to be sure*, are raised to this supreme Authority in order to teach Mankind Logic, and the other Natural Sciences.—Happy, *certainly*, are such Ages, not only of our own Times, but of all Nations and People at all Times.—I say, *All*.—That, Emperors, Kings, Potentates and Governors should All—that, all regal States and Republics should eternally, and without Interruption, All philosophize: That, all their Decrees, Determinations, Arbitrary Impositions, Laws and Acts, always have been, and always shall and will be, the Κυρίαι Δόξαι, the favourite Maxims, the standard, ratified Opinions: Notwithstanding the many Heaps of Contradiction which they may carry, both in themselves, and to one another. But, perhaps, Mr. *Hobbes* may, with an uncommon, very peculiar Felicity, be able to adjust these Contradictions; so that, I shall leave them with him. And, yet, I cannot, at the same time, help beseeching him to remove this one Difficulty, *i. e.* How the two following Sentiments can be reconciled.

1. " That

(1) *Ne qua Definitio in totâ*, &c.] Which Words, in plain *English*, stand thus: It is impossible to settle any Definition in the whole Compass of the Mathematical Science; nor in the Science of Natural Philosophy; nor in the Philosophy of Civil Society: Neither can there be established any Ratiocination, *i. e.* any true Inferences, upon Reasoning Principles, in these or any of these Arts and Sciences, unless such Definitions and Reasonings be first confirmed and ratified by the Sanction of Civil Authority.

1. Neceſſary Agent, a Contradiction in Terms.

1. " That all the Effects of Natural Agents, and, conſequently, of " Mankind, are neceſſary: And, therefore, that, whatſoever they com- " mit, which proves either hurtful or beneficial to each other, may, from " hence, be termed either *Good* or *Evil*." And yet, at the ſame time,

2. To depend upon the arbitrary Will of another; equally abſurd.

2. " That the Determination of all ſuch Acts, as to Good or Evil, " depends entitely upon the changeable, arbitrary Will of Princes."

Theſe are the two favourite, reigning Opinions of the admired Mr. *Hobbes*: And yet, they flatly and notoriouſly contradict each other. But—we are likewiſe farther to obſerve, That, the latter of theſe two Opinions is repugnant to the Requiſites eſſential in Society:—Requiſites acknowledged neceſſary by Mr. *Hobbes*, in the very *Laws of Nature* themſelves, *viz.* 1. A total Renunciation of Right over *All Perſons*, as well as *All Things*. 2. The faithful Obſervance of Agreements, Covenants and Contracts. 3. Gratitude.—Concerning theſe very Points Mr. *Hobbes* has treated in the third Chapter of his Book *De Cive*.—Now—it is as undoubted a Truth, That, any Civil Governor, enforcing the Sanction of general Laws contrary to theſe inviolable Obligations, in order to eſtabliſh his own Form of a Commonwealth, muſt act with the ſame probable Proſpect of Succeſs, as if he commanded and enforced the Uſe of Poiſon, or of Air and Cloathing infected with the Plague. in order to preſerve the Life and Health of his Subjects. For, the Neceſſity is, in one Caſe, as equally unchangeable, and the Operation of Cauſes as forcibly ſtrong, in producing, amongſt Mankind, the Evils of Diſcord and Diſſention, *i. e.* in producing Slaughter and Murder, Rapine and Plunder: As, in the other Caſe, the Operations of Poiſons and the Plague carry a neceſſary Tendency to corrupt the Blood, and to deſtroy the human Body. And——as the *Helleſpont* would not obey *Xerxes*, altho' he laſhed its Waves; ſo, neither can deſtructive Things be changed into Things ſalutary by the Decrees of Princes.

Effects ariſing in the general, from Natural and Moral Neceſſity, equally unavoidable.

Xerxes.

A Law might be contrived, commanding all the Subjects of every State and Kingdom to deſtroy all their Fellow-ſubjects who come in their way, without the leaſt Diſtinction of either Sex, Age, Perſon or Behaviour: Commanding to violate Compacts. Commanding to exerciſe all Ingratitude. Let us ſuppoſe Subjects in general to obey ſuch Edicts, and ſee, (notwithſtanding that internal Obligation of Conſcience which Mr. *Hobbes*, in order to impoſe upon weak Minds, ſeems to allow) whether the mutual, univerſal Deſtruction of Citizens and Subjects, would inſtantly produce the one particular Effect, ſo much admired by the *Hobbiſts*, and no other; namely, " That one, ſingle, individual " Perſon only, out of the Whole, ſhould ſurvive.—This, ſo particularly- " favourite a Perſon, (grown inſolent by the Conqueſt and Slaughter of " All) no Fears or Apprehenſions of a ſuperior Force (the only Tye " acknowledged by Mr. *Hobbes)* would reſtrain from murdering a Prince, whom

" whom he ſuppoſes, and with Safety too, leſs-powerful than him-
" ſelf."

Let Mr. *Hobbes*, moreover, prove, how this his Syſtem of Philoſophy is demonſtrative and neceſſarily true, prior to any Eſtabliſhment of Civil Society.—So far from it, That—there are ſeveral of Mr. *Hobbes*'s Dogmata (as for Inſtance, the Doctrine of *Neceſſity*, in Oppoſition to Free-will) which ought to be condemned by all Chriſtian Princes. Let Mr. *Hobbes*'s own private Opinion, however, be what it will, it is not much to the preſent Purpoſe: It is more charitable, however, rather to determine, That, Mr. *Hobbes* was either impoſed upon himſelf, from an Ambiguity of the Terms *Good* and *Evil*: Or, that, he had a mind to amuſe careleſs Readers: Than, to imagine him arrived at ſo high a Pitch of Madneſs and Folly, as to judge That, *Natural Good* and *Evil*, *i. e.* That, Acts, See Chap. 3. and in particular, Human Acts, are not (in their own intrinſic Natures) adapted and fitted to give either Pleaſure or Pain to the Body and Mind of Man, whether, in particular, or, in the general: Or, That, ſuch *Natural Good* and *Evil* (*i. e.* Human Acts) carry no inward Propenſity to produce their own natural, determined Effects. But—on the contrary, That, all theſe various Effects produce either *Good* or *Evil*, at the Pleaſure of Princes and of Civil Magiſtrates.

SECT. VI.

WE, therefore, from the Principles hitherto eſtabliſhed, rationally ſuppoſe, That, ſuch Phænomena or Appearances as are well known to us upon the Evidences of Senſe; ſuppoſing, even, that theſe Phænomena are not as yet clearly demonſtrated upon Mathematical Principles of *Natural Philoſophy*, are, however, capable of Demonſtration, and may, in time, be demonſtrated: And, the Foundation of ſuch a Suppoſition is, That, theſe Phænomena are confirmed and ſettled, (as having a real Exiſtence) by a daily, an unalterable Experience. Becauſe, the true End and Deſign of the Mathematical Philoſophy, is, not only, to trace out and inveſtigate the Cauſes and Reaſons of ſuch an Experience; but, the peculiar, the principal Office, alſo, of ſuch a Philoſophy, ſtrictly ſpeaking, is, to demonſtrate the Effects flowing from theſe Cauſes. As for Inſtance, That, Mankind, 1. By a Regimen in Diet, wiſely choſen and prudently obſerved: 2. By the Energy of a reciprocal Benevolence and Good-will: 3. By allowing to Individuals the Bleſſings of Life neceſſary to Health and Self-preſervation, which, Each, for himſelf reſpectively, is able to procure from his own proper Labour and honeſt Induſtry: 4. By an Innocency of Behaviour: 5. By Acts of real Uſe and Benefit to others: 6. By a punctual, faithful Diſcharge of Promiſes, Contracts, Engagements: 7. By Gratitude to Benefactors: 8. By that ſingular Kind of Love

Love called στοργή, or that radical, inherent Affection flowing from Parents towards their Children, and towards the other Relations of Blood and Conſanguinity, both in the aſcending and in the deſcending Line of Family-alliance: (where, under this Eighth Article, we are to obſerve, That, the Relations of Blood and Conſanguinity are, in ſome meaſure, ſeparated from the reſt of Mankind, by a diſtinguiſhing Characteriſtic Mark of ſuch natural Principles as imply a Dependance upon, and an Identity a Sameneſs with, one original Head, Fountain and Parent) That, Mankind, I ſay, producing Effects, by Vertue of theſe Cauſes, have, in all former Ages, proved reciprocally uſeful and beneficial to one and all—And—will, for perpetual Ages to come alſo, in Proportion to the Product of ſuch Effects, prove equally uſeful and advantageous, in promoting Health and Vigour of Body; in exalting Knowledge, Wiſdom and the pure Pleaſures of Mind; in ſettling a calm Serenity of Being——and——above all——in enlivening a ſure and certain Hope of a bleſſed Immortality hereafter——even at the Hour of Death. Whereas, on the contrary, by an oppoſite Courſe of Behaviour: Errors, Doubts, Uncertainties and Anxieties, ſtagger, perplex and confound the Soul.—And—as to the Body—the Maiming and Loſs of Limbs:—The Malignity and Inſult of Diſeaſes:—The Fury and Rage of Hunger and Thirſt; and, laſtly, Death, in all its moſt ghaſtly, terrible Shapes, invade and deſtroy All, without the leaſt Diſtinction. When, at the ſame time, if Mankind had acted in a different way, (and, which certainly was in their own Power to act): Theſe various and calamitous Evils might have been provided againſt, warded off, and prevented: As for Inſtance, Civil Wars and Inteſtine Commotions, Anarchy and Confuſion are Conſequences, which, in no leſs a common Courſe of Things, ariſe from Strife and Contention, than, natural Effects do, which flow from their own proper Cauſes. In like Manner, Rapin and Plunder from War and the Sword; Devaſtation and Deſolation from Fire, are Evils as inevitable, as Death and Mortality are from a Plague: Or, as the Waſtes and Abſorptions of Houſes, Villages, Towns, Cities, *&c.* are from Earthquakes, which at ſome particular Times happen. Evils of theſe different Kinds are Evils equally natural: Evils not confined to one, or to ſome few Individuals; but, are common, are univerſal. And, therefore, wholeſome, moderate Diet, mutual Love and Agreement, Fidelity, Gratitude, *&c.* are, from the very Nature of them, Bleſſings, as public and as wholeſome, as pure Air is to the natural Conſtitution of Animal Bodies: Or, as the benign, genial Influences of the Sun are to the whole Face of the Earth.—Now, The Operations and Activities of theſe Diſpoſitions, Propenſities and Tendencies, (notwithſtanding that they diſpenſe a ſcattered Energy thro' the Individuals of Mankind) may be conſidered and taken in Conjunction, and as the general Effects of theſe Operations upon the whole aggregate Body of the Human Kind, and are Effects, for the moſt Part, aſcribed

and

and owing to theſe Operations, as their genuine, phyſical, natural Cauſes. For, the Caſe equally holds as true here, as it does in the Generation of Plants and Animals: Where, Nature has ſeparated, has ſcattered far and near, the Rudiments, the Seeds and firſt Principles of them: But yet, ſo, as to fall and lodge themſelves in ſuch Strata, Cavities, Cells and other Places, as are reſpectively and ſeverally ſuited to Each: And, from theſe Stamina, Rudiments, Principles and Seeds only, it is, that, they All, *i. e.* Plants and Animals, exert, operate and produce their various Species and Kinds ſeverally. When—at the ſame time, (notwithſtanding theſe Stamina, or Ovaria, or Seeds are diſtinct, various and ſeparate, yet) they may, and ought to, be conſidered in an united, cloſe Conjunction: And, of which, we can, with Truth, from Obſervation, affirm, That, they are the Principles, the conſtituting Cauſes of Life, of Nurture, of Increaſe of Growth, and of the other Effects at all times diſcernable in Them. The Evidence of all this Reaſoning is undeniable: Becauſe, The whole Sum or Total Aggregate of Effects does not leſs-neceſſarily cohere and agree with the whole Sum or Total Aggregate of Cauſes, than ſingular, particular, individual Effects do (cohere and agree) with their own proper particular Cauſes reſpectively. It may, therefore, be allowed as a firm eſtabliſhed Maxim, That, Propoſitions, of eternal, unchangeable Truth, may be produced from Effects which are to flow and ariſe out of human Acts; and ſuch Acts, for Inſtance, are the Virtues and Vices:—But, always upon this Suppoſition, that, the internal Motives to act, determine the Agent to elicit, draw forth and produce external outward Actions. And, on the contrary, it can as certainly alſo, be known and determined, from the Effects of human Actions, either hurtful or beneficial to the Few, or, to the Many more eſpecially, whether the inward, practical Principles of human Nature be either wholeſome or noxious to the Public Good: Or, To expreſs the ſame Meaning in fewer Words, whether ſuch internal, practical Principles be either naturally Good, or naturally Evil.

Now——the only Difficulty in underſtanding before-hand, whether from an Action given, the Effect to enſue will prove either Good or Evil, proceeds from hence; That, we often are ignorant and at a Loſs, in determining, whether, and how far, other Cauſes will concur in promoting the End we deſign and propoſe. Becauſe, from hence it is probable, That, an End propoſed, which, to all human Appearance, is the beſt, may, in a Courſe of Things, fail our Expectations, and turn out quite contrary.—But—upon the Whole—from human Actions in general, abſtractedly and in themſelves conſidered, what Effects, by their own inherent Virtue, They can produce, from many certain Concluſions, are, and with great Eaſe, demonſtrated:—Concluſions of equal Certainty with thoſe which ariſe from the Effects, of Motions obſervable in Phyſical or Natural Bodies, ſimply and abſolutely underſtood, according to the Method

purſued by Mathematicians in their Conſtruction of the Lines and the Figures flowing from theſe natural Motions. And, from hence alſo, we infer and conclude, That, the ſublimeſt Perfection, of both Moral and Political Prudence, conſiſts in a moſt intimate, thorough Knowledge of all ſuch Circumſtances as may either promote or obſtruct human Actions, and the Effects to ariſe from them. The principal Branch of this Knowledge is a cloſe Familiarity, a near Acquaintance with every one of, and all thoſe particular Perſons reſpectively, with whom, or againſt whom, we are to act: Not only, as to the Strength and Capacity of Underſtanding in Each: Not only, as to the ſeveral Practical Principles purſued by Each: Not only, as to the particular Propenſities and Tendencies of Appetites and Paſſions in every one of them:—But—we are, alſo, to underſtand well, what Reinforcements of Friends and Relations, of Dependants and private Fortune, each and every one of theſe Perſons, applies, employs and has at his Command.—And all theſe Circumſtances, Helps and Aſſiſtances muſt be conſidered, not ſo much in a State of Nature, as in a State of Civil Society already conſtituted and ſettled.

SECT. VII.

THE whole Sum or Subſtance of the Argument at preſent before us, turns upon this one Point: That, the Conſideration of our Faculties, Powers, Operations and Acts, as Cauſes; and, of an End deſired, ſought after, and determined, as the Effect, ſeems to comprehend the fitteſt Method in general, happily to account for the Rules of Morality, from the Phænomena or Appearances of Nature; and, juſt Obſervations u, on them, [*i. e.* upon theſe Phænomena]. This, indeed, ought to be the principal Scope and Deſign, of every Writer upon the *Law of Nature*; as well as, of every one, who is to form his Life and Manners, according to this Law, as his Rule of Action and Behaviour. For, Acts or impreſſed Motions, and the Object (let ſuch an Object be either *this* Individual, or *that* Multitude, and) upon which, theſe Acts and Motions are to operate, being given: The Science of Nature will inſtruct us, whether the Object's Preſervation and Perfection (which, we call *Good*): Or, its Deſtruction and Imperfection (which, we call *Evil*) will follow. By this Method, therefore, alone it is, that, we can bring into Contemplation, the whole Knowledge of our own Capacities, and the Capacities of other Cauſes acting in Conjunction with us: And—the Nature, alſo, of other Beings and Objects, upon whom, theſe Capacities are to operate.—From hence will ariſe ſo clear, ſo diſtinct a Sagacity, as to pre-conceive and apprehend before-hand, what Effect will follow from all theſe united Cauſes.

See Chap. 3. Sect. 1. Page 250.

Having

Having thus well-weighed, conſidered and compared together, thoſe various Effects which will follow from thoſe ſeveral Acts placed within our own Power, we ſhall ſufficiently guard, provide for, and take Care of theſe two principal Articles. See Axioms and the Notes upon them, Chap. 1. Sect. 33. Pages 116, 117, 118, 119, and 120.

1. *That, we always attempt a poſſible End or Effect; and, of Ends and Effects, to purſue the beſt in our Power.*

2. *That, we always apply ſuch Means or Cauſes,* i. e. *Human Acts, as adequately agree to, and correſpond with the End or Effect deſigned.*

For, in theſe two Points conſiſts the ultimate, ſupreme Wiſdom of all Morality and of Civil Society. Becauſe, the Dictates of all true Wiſdom, which are to direct human Acts at all Times and in all Places, in producing the Public Good, (that is, the common Good of all Rational Beings) are no other Dictates than the very Laws of Nature themſelves. Now, if theſe Dictates, or Laws, demand the Aſſent of every human Underſtanding, and, conſequently, (by the Act and Power of the Underſtanding over the Will) determine a Choice to act in Conformity to theſe Dictates: And, if theſe Dictates, being laid and treaſured up in the Memory, may, upon all Occaſions, according to the Nature of the Call, recur to the Mind ſo, as to determine the Will and Action of every Man: Thoſe Dictates or Laws, thus reduced to Practice, moſt certainly conſtitute the Habit of common Virtue.

Suppoſing, then, as to theſe Dictates, that, a Doubt of Controverſy ſhould ariſe, which peculiarly regards the Conſtitution and Polity of any particular Civil Society, or of any particular Perſon in ſuch a Society, either in his public or private Capacity, ſuch Dictates become Dictates either of a Civil Political Prudence, or Dictates of a Private Prudence and Particular Concern; juſt as ſuch a Prudence, Concern, or Wiſdom requires, reſpectively, the additional Epithet of *Political* or *Private* to be annexed to it. But, I ſhould, in all Likelihood, appear too prolix, ſhould I ſay, at large, all that can be offered upon this Subject.

SECT. VIII.

I PROCEED next to explain, in a more accurate, exact Manner, what I mean by the COMMON GOOD, and which I alſo call the PUBLIC GOOD.

By the Terms *Common* or *Public Good*, I would be underſtood to ſignify and mean, *The whole Aggregate or Sum-total of all* thoſe various and ſeveral Kinds of *Good*, from which all Individual Rational Beings, collectively conſidered, can, be benefited and, receive an additional Happineſs or Advantage by our Abilities, Means, Powers and Interpoſition: And, according to that Order which we find appointed and ſettled amongſt ſuch Beings: Or, which are neceſſarily required to conſtitute their Happineſs.

See Prolegomena, Sect. 10.

For, as repreſented under this one Notion of Rational Beings, I underſtand ALMIGHTY GOD and ALL MANKIND in general, upon account of ſome Sort of Similitude, or Analogy of Reaſon and of an Intelligent Nature. To which Deſcription, the Notion of [*Omnis*] *All*, or of the [*Summæ*] *Sum-total*, being added, is the Reaſon why, the Term extends itſelf to all Singulars and Individuals. Becauſe, the Notion of Rational Beings, in general, is eaſily underſtood by every human Underſtanding: As alſo, of that (1) *Syncategorema* [*Omnis*] *All*, by which, the whole Sum is deſcribed and ſet forth.

See Chap. 2. Sect. 11. Page 156.

See Prolegomena, Sect. 10.

Neither does ſuch a Power as this, fall within the Capacity of Brute-animals, who know nothing of Abſtraction, or of Numeration, (*i. e.* Numbering) ſo as to collect a Sum total: And, conſequently, much leſs, are Brutes capable of comprehending ſuch a Nature as is compatible both to God and Man. For this Reaſon, amongſt others, Brute-animals cannot regard *the Common Good*; neither are they capable of any *Moral Virtue*; or, of any Society with Mankind: Which Society is eſtabliſhed eſſentially upon the Conſideration or Suppoſition of *Moral Virtue*.

Now, altho' I have affirmed, That, *the Common Good* of all Rational Beings is more immediately regarded by, and the Object of, *the Law of Nature*; yet, notwithſtanding this, I cannot, at the ſame time, deny, but that, theſe Laws have committed to the Care and Management of Mankind, not only the inferior Brute-creation, (evidently irrational) but alſo the Inanimate, Phyſical, Natural World. As for Inſtance, *The Laws of Nature* have committed to Man the Paſturage of Animals, Planting and Gardening, Agriculture and Tillage, Plowing and Sowing; nay, even digging the Earth, and all the other Improvements of Nature: Or, at leaſt, ſo far as theſe Degrees of Management, Toil and Labour can promote the Glory and Honour of Almighty God, and adminiſter to the Good and Happineſs of Mankind: And yet, at the ſame time, when they are engaged in theſe Employments, they do not ſtrictly and properly, or at leaſt not ultimately, regard the Perfection of theſe Things; but, they regard rather the immediate Uſes of them, and their Concurrence with Human Induſtry: And ſo—that, the *Good* of all Rational Beings is the primary and principal Conſideration in View. We are here, however, very carefully to obſerve, in all our Searches into Nature, that, all Bodies are actuated, moved and governed by Almighty God, the Principal, the Firſt, the Prime Rational Agent: Whereas, our own Bodies, and many other Bodies by our Mediation and Influence alſo, are neceſſarily determined, acted upon, and governed by, Human Reaſon. For, we cannot but know from Experience, that, at the Direction and Command of our Judgment and Will, the Muſcles of our own Bodies are put into Motion; and, that, many Bodies

(1) *Syncategorema.*] Συνκατηγορημα. or *Syncategorema*, in Logic, denotes a Word, which ſignifying little or nothing of itſelf, yet, when joined with others, adds Force thereto, as, *All*, *None*, *Certain*, &c.

dies near us are alſo moved. And, therefore, from the very Frame and Conſtitution of univerſal Nature, we find, that, there is a Subordination of Bodies. The Reaſon of ſuch a Subordination as this, is evident, becauſe, between the Cauſe determining, and the Effects determined, it is impoſſible, but the Mind muſt obſerve a certain Order, and in ſuch a Manner, that, in the Operation and Action, the Cauſe determining is prior or firſt: The Effect determined is poſterior or laſt. It is of important Concern, conſequently, and Moment to us, that, we inviolably obſerve *That Order* which we find eſtabliſhed in Nature; and, that, We, from this eſtabliſhed Order, promote, to the full Extent of all our Abilities, the End, *i. e.* the Perfection of our own Nature.

From theſe Premiſſes we may very juſtly draw this brief Concluſion, by the Bye, That, he who purſues the *Chief Good* of all Rational Agents, purſues *the Good, the Perfection, the Order, the Regularity* of the whole Syſtem of the World: And, from any Determination or Tendency, which has been obſerved in the Nature of Motion, that, ſome Idea or Notion of Order, Subordination and Dependency is raiſed, generated and formed in the Mind: Which Idea or Notion, when it proceeds and ariſes from the Judgment of a Rational Mind, is properly termed *Regimen*, or *Government*, or *Regularity*, or *Order*. When we, therefore, experimentally feel and perceive, from within, ſuch Effects, Concluſions and Obſervations to ariſe in our own Nature: And, when we, likewiſe, from the natural Determination and Report of our Senſes, obſerve Concluſions and Effects exactly correſpondent to happen and ariſe, extrinſic to ourſelves, outwardly and from abroad, we may conclude, with ſtrict Juſtice and Propriety, that, we have grounded our Idea or Notion upon the true Nature of *Regimen*, *Order*, *Subordination* and *Regularity*. Thus much may ſerve for an Explanation of the Term *Public* or *Common*.

SECT. IX.

BY *Good*, as in the Definition of it laid down, (at the Beginning of the Third Chapter) I would be underſtood to mean, that Kind of *Good* which, by the Philoſophers, is generally called NATURAL GOOD: And, which Kind of *Good* (i. e. *Natural Good*) we have, in the aforeſaid Chapter, already defined ſo far, as it concerns the Nature of Creatures, in that, it preſerves, perfects and renders ſuch a Nature more and more happy. With reſpect to the Divine Nature, as it is intrinſically in itſelf moſt tranſcendently happy, we define *Good* to be, Whatſoever is grateful, pleaſing or agreeable to the Eſſence and Nature of Almighty God. Thus, for Inſtance, the Term Μακαριοτης *Fælicitas, Happineſs*, is to be underſtood *analogically*. Becauſe, whatſoever thoſe Objects or Means are which we apprehend either to preſerve or perfect our Nature, we term *grateful* or *agreeable*

The Good of *Perfection* in God only.

agreeable to us: *i. e.* Such Objects leave the Human Mind ſerene, complacent, and full of Joy:——But, ſince, to be preſerved and to be made perfect, abſolutely contradict and are abhorrent from Infinite Perfection, That, therefore ſuch a Serenity and Joy, or Complacency, as are capable of being perceived and underſtood quite abſtracted and free from all poſſible Shadow of Imperfection, may, without the leaſt Danger of Impiety or Affront, be ſafely attributed to the Divine Majeſty of *Almighty God*, THE SUPREME RATIONAL BEING.

See Sect. 10. Prolegomena.

But, that I may not dwell too long preſumptuouſly upon ſo tranſcendant an Object as Compleat Perfection, I ſhall return to Man.

The Kinds of *Good* which naturally belong to Man are of two Sorts.

The Kinds of Good which belong to Man.

The *firſt* are ſuch as improve, adorn and rejoice the Soul: The Foundation of all which Kinds of *Natural Good* ſeems to be radically fixed in all ſuch Objects as render our Underſtanding and Judgment more perfect: To which, if *our Will* accords, conſents and agrees, it is alſo equally perfect.

The *ſecond* Kinds of *Natural Good*, are ſuch as ſecure and ſtrengthen our Animal Abilities and the Powers of our Bodies.

In Truth and Reality of Speaking, the ſeveral Kinds of *Public Good* are no other than (but are exactly the ſame with) the Good of Individuals: And, from the true Happineſs of every one Man, there may, by an eaſy Analogy, be deduced the Happineſs which is to be ſought for and expected, as it either regards one particular Civil Society: Or, even all Mankind collectively taken and conſidered.

For, every particular Civil Polity or Society (as being neceſſarily conſtituted, compounded and made up of Individuals) is arrived at its full, compleat Happineſs, when all the ſingle individual Members of it, but, more eſpecially, the principal governing Parts or Heads, enjoy Minds endowed with the natural Perfections of Underſtanding and Will: And ſound, healthy Bodies, vigorous and ſtrong; and obediently miniſterial to the Powers and Operations of the Soul.

We are here, however, to obſerve, That, thoſe Kinds of *Good* which are called *Natural* I have underſtood in a Meaning where the Terms (being taken in a larger Extent, appear more general, and, conſequently, being ſooner, according to Nature, underſtood) are eaſier diſtinguiſhed from the ſeveral Kinds of *Moral Good*. For, by *Moral Good* I underſtand ſuch voluntary Acts only, as are conformable to any Law, but more eſpecially, to *the Law of Nature*. And, conſequently, [*Bonum*] *Good* muſt not be taken in this Senſe, where it is annexed to, and made a Part of, *the Law of Nature*: Becauſe, any Definition becomes abſurd, when made up of ſuch conſtituent Parts as ſuppoſe the *Definitum*, or Thing defined, to be already known: There being many Kinds of *Good* which are natural, *i. e.* which contribute to the Happineſs of Man, and which are not *morally Good*, as not having any thing to do, either, with voluntary Acts, or with

Moral Good defined.

with the Command, the Precept, the Injunction of any Law: Such, for Inſtance, are *Great Natural Parts, the Improvements in Arts and Sciences, an Extraordinary Readineſs and Tenacity of Memory, a remarkable Strength of Body and Activity of Limbs, the Helps and Advantages of the outward external Bleſſings of Life* as they are commonly called, *&c.*

Whereas, on the contrary, I do not imagine, that, any Acts of the Will are commanded, enjoined or impoſed by *the Law of Nature*, and, conſequently, can be *morally-good*, which do not contribute ſomething, either more or leſs, to the Happineſs of Mankind. The Moral Philoſopher is ſuppoſed to know, either naturally, or from Experience, whatſoever preſerves and improves the Powers and Faculties of the Human Soul; the Means likewiſe which invigorate, ſtrengthen and prolong the human Life; and alſo, amongſt many other Things, what thoſe Human Acts are (ſtiled by the Name of *Virtues*) which principally and chiefly contribute to produce theſe happy Effects, and how, ſome may perfectly conſiſt and agree with others. The Human Mind, conſcious of, and well knowing, its own Power in eliciting and fully drawing forth into outward Practice ſuch Acts as theſe: The Mind alſo obſerving in all ſingular Inſtances or Examples, relating either to itſelf, or to any other Perſon with whom it is acquainted, concludes, from the Similitude of Natures, that ſuch Acts as theſe will render all Mankind the happier: Or, at leaſt, will conſiſt perfectly-well with the Happineſs of ALL, Such general Concluſions as theſe, therefore, are called *The Laws of Nature*. As for Example. From the remarkable, well-known Similitude between Human Bodies: And from the well-approved, wholeſome Uſe of Aliments, of Solids for Meat, and Liquids for Drink, of Sleep, of Exerciſe, and of the whole *Materia Medica*, are eſſentially formed and conſtituted the general Aphoriſms and Maxims upon Dyet and Medicine, which prevail and take place every where: Notwithſtanding, that, there may be many particular Points of Practice in Phyſic which vary, alter, differ and change, in order the better to anſwer that Diverſity or Difference which is to be found between the Laws of Civil Arbitrary Inſtitution in divers Countries.

The many excellent Uſes which ariſe from this Similitude.

Non-naturals.

Aphoriſmi Dietetici & Therapeutici.

When once, therefore, we have exerciſed and practiſed theſe Acts and Habits upon the Strength and Evidence of ſuch Concluſions as theſe; And, when we have compared them together, we find a ſtrict Conformity, Harmony and Agreement between them. From whence it is, That, to ſuch Acts and Habits, (even before we ſtamp them with that eminent Title of *An extraordinary-natural Goodneſs*) is affixed that diſtinguiſhing Characteriſtic of *Moral Goodneſs*, in that, their Moral Practices and Behaviour are ſtrictly conformable to the Laws of Nature, which were before eſtabliſhed and ſettled in the original Conſtitution of Things.

I ſhall not mention one Word here concerning the Term [*Poſſibilis*] *Poſſible*, which I have inſerted: Becauſe, the ultimate Ends of an Obligation

tion never exceed the Limits, the Capacities of the Object, or of the Faculty laid under such an Obligation.

We must likewise here farther observe, That, altho' the Term [*Bonum Publicum*] *Public* or *Common Good*, carries a pompous Sound, even in the Expression; yet, (notwithstanding so mighty a Noise) no one is obliged to promote such a Good, beyond his own natural Powers and Abilities: The Word [*Maximè*] *Principally* or *Chiefly*, insinuates, That *the Laws of Nature* are *Affirmative* and *Positive* Laws commanding an *Act*; or something to be actually performed and done: And yet, the Act is only such an Act as I have just now described; because, the *Negative* Laws of Nature may, from hence, very easily be collected: And Nature itself (which entirely consists of Things *Positive*) seems to impress immediately *These Laws*, and these Laws *only*, as *Comparate Precepts*, Precepts capable of Practice, [*Comparata Dictamina*] and that, these Dictates, Precepts or Laws, command only such an Act, within our own Power, as is best and fittest to be performed; and, which, under any given Circumstances, we shall always think and declare to be, [Αεὶ τὸ βέλτιστον] *Always for the Best.*

We are, however, here, at the same Time, to remark, That, *Whatsoever is equal to the Best, may very deservedly be called the Best:* Or, in other Words, That *This Best* is not a Matter of any Moment (supposing us even to act as we please) if we act all the Good in our Power. And lastly, in all Cases of this Kind, there is a [*Locus*] Discretion, an Indulgence, a Liberty left to ourselves—and, which is allowed or permitted by *the Law of Nature.*

SECT. X.

The Sanction of the Laws of Nature.

THE last Terms of our Definition express the *Sanction of these Laws:* Which Sanction is sufficiently made known to us from the Happiness inseparably annexed to the *Observance*; and, from the Misery as inseparably annexed to the *Violation* of them. Now, under these Terms, it is necessarily implied and understood, That, *the Law of Nature* always, under all given Circumstances, demonstrates, that *Acts* promoting *the public, universal Good*, are the *only Acts* which, in themselves, sufficiently and powerfully can promote the full, compleat private Happiness of each and every Individual. Here, then, I have affirmed, That, the one only possible, compleat, supreme Happiness must be sought for, and can only be found in these Acts:——And——the Reason of this Affirmation is——Because, All Individuals naturally and necessarily desire, not only one single Particle of Happiness——But——That whole Happiness which, *by the Will of the First Cause*, is possible for Each and All to enjoy. And, therefore, such an Appetite as this is compleatly rational, and evidently

Human Happiness stated.

more

more perfect than any Appetite which has for its Object any leſſer Good. From this Origin, then, one Maxim ariſes (and which is of material Concern, of important Moment towards the Exerciſe of *Univerſal Juſtice)* namely, That, *This Propoſition* muſt not be miſtaken for any Law of Nature which points out what thoſe Acts are, which may, for ſome momentary Duration, procure, either Animal-pleaſures, or the Gratifications of Senſe: Or, the Luſt after Riches or Honours, or any other minute Particle of tranſitory Happineſs. But, "*That Propoſition only* is to be taken for "*the Law of Nature*, which directs thoſe Acts, and thoſe *only*, which, "with the beſt Degree of Certainty, determine, before-hand, by what Means "we may obtain and enjoy the largeſt Sum-total of all poſſible Sorts of "*Good:* But, more eſpecially thoſe of the beſt Kind;—and, which, thro' "the whole Series of our Duration, may render all our intellectual Facul-"ties and Powers as happy as poſſible."

Upon theſe ſolid, ſubſtantial Grounds, it is neceſſary alſo, that, we ſettle, and determine within ourſelves, not only, the minute Particles of this tranſitory Life, (as for Inſtance, what is fit for us *now* to do, in order to paſs this, or the other Day happy) but our whole future Exiſtence; *What*, at all Times, in all Circumſtances, and under all Events, may probably help us on, and promote our eternal, durable Felicity. For, under that Sum-total of Acts, fully to be elicited and drawn forth into Practice, thro' the whole Courſe of our future Life, taken as a Cauſe, is comprehended that compleat, entire Happineſs either *now*, or *hereafter*, in our own Power to obtain, and which, we naturally deſire. For, all the Vices and Enormities of wicked Men, generally ſpeaking take their Riſe from hence, That, they regard Bodily-pleaſures, and thoſe of a preſent, of an immediate Enjoyment; and ſo direct their Moral or Voluntary Acts to this one End and Deſign only. But, as to thoſe Pleaſures which are pure, intellectual, ſpiritual; or, which Pleaſures, after a long Series of worthy, benevolent Acts, are to be enjoyed, Sinners are not in the leaſt ſolicitous or anxious about them. As to the Terms [*Singulorum Felicitas*, &c. *i. e.*] *The Happineſs of Individuals*, &c. they imply ſome Parts of thoſe Kinds of *Good*, which, according to the Will and Intention of the Firſt Cauſe, are conſtituted, ſettled and appointed ſo, as to produce the common Happineſs of All: And, by the ſame continued Act of Divine Providence, This Happineſs is allowed and diſpenſed to ſingle Individuals, in the natural Order and Preſervation of the World. And, conſequently, that, the meaſure of Happineſs, allotted to each Part, can be aſcertained and ſettled by human Reaſon, according to that Proportion in which the Individuals reſpectively and ſingly are eſtimated and compared with the whole Aggregate of all Rational Agents. Juſt like the Heart, which, by a Circulation of the Maſs of Blood, preſerves the Life of the whole Animal, and diſpenſes, at the ſame time, a due Proportion and Share of Nouriſhment to all the ſingle Members reſpectively: Only, with this remarka-

ble Difference, that, the bodily Members imbibe and receive reſpectively, each its own Quantity of Aliment, without any Reaſon, Thought or Deſign in the Part thus nouriſhed: Whereas, in Mankind, the Determination of Reaſon, ſettling and adjuſting the Proportion of each Part, aſſumes, each to itſelf, ſuch a Share of good Things only as is conſiſtent with the Health and Welfare of the Whole.

N. B. *Here ends the Explanation of all the Terms uſed by our Author in his Definition of* the Law of Nature.

SECT. XI.

BEFORE I proceed to conſider more minutely the ſeveral Species of Human Actions, either neceſſary to the *Public Good*, or conſiſtent with ſuch a *Good*; it appears highly neceſſary to demonſtrate theſe Two Propoſitions.

Propoſition firſt. 1. To demonſtrate, That, in this our Definition of *the Law of Nature* itſelf, are either actually contained; or, by a fair and rational Conſequence may be deduced as contained, all thoſe conſtituent Branches which are neceſſarily required in the general Nature of a Law. And,

Propoſition ſecond. 2. That, in this Definition are comprehended all thoſe peculiar Characteriſtics which, in an eſpecial Manner, ſpecifically and fitly diſtinguiſh a Natural Law.

The *Firſt Propoſition* is to demonſtrate, That, in the very Definition itſelf, which we have given of *the Law of Nature*, are either actually contained, or, by a fair and rational Conſequence, may be deduced as contained, all thoſe conſtituent Parts which are neceſſarily required in the general Nature of a Law.

Modeſtinus. As to what concerns this Propoſition, the Quotation juſt now taken (at Section the third of this Chapter) from the *Digeſts* of *Modeſtinus*, *F. Tit.* 3. very aptly comes in here; The Vertue, the Efficacy of a Law is to *Command*, *Forbid*, *Permit*, *Puniſh*. To which Ties and Enforcements, we may, as we do to ſome Laws, ſubjoin alſo, to *diſtribute and encourage by Rewards*.

Rewards as well as Puniſhments in the Sanction of a Law. Under theſe Terms, undoubtedly, is comprehended what ſome metaphorically expreſs by *Obligation*, and laying *the Demand of a Debt*.

Juſtinian. *Juſtinian*, in the third Book of his *Inſtitutes*, *Tit.* 14. defines an *Obligation* to be the Link or Chain of *Right*, whereby we are neceſſarily bound and tied down to the Payment or Diſcharge of ſomething, according to the *Rights*, *Uſages*, *Cuſtoms* and *Laws of our State*. "Juris vinculum quo, neceſſitate aſtringimur, alicujus rei ſolvendæ, ſecundùm "noſtræ civitatis jura." Not to mention, that, in this Definition, the Emperor regards the *Rights and Privileges*, the *Laws and Cuſtoms* of the *Roman State* only. Whereas the *Roman* Lawyer *Papinian*, (in his Com-

Papinian.

ment

ment upon another Part of *Juſtinian, Digeſt* Book 46. *Tit.* 3. *(Lege ſtichum parag. naturalis)* much more according to Truth and Reaſon, allows the Diſtinction between a Natural and a Civil Obligation, when he defines an Obligation to be that, which is ſupported by *the Tye, the Sanction of Equity only.*

The Roman Lawyers miſtaken in their Notion of Obligation.

Now, the Obſcurity of theſe Definitions ariſes from metaphorical Expreſſions, which carry in them a doubtful, arbitrary Senſe, Meaning uſed at Pleaſure. For the two Words [*Vinculum*] *Tye* and [*Obſtringimur*] *Bound*, are involved in as deep Obſcurity as the Word [*Obligatio*] *Obligation*, which is to be explained and defined.

But—if we ſearch and examine into this one Point ſomewhat cloſer, we ſhall find, that the following clear Interpretation is evidently meant, *viz. That there are Pains and Penalties, as alſo Privileges and Immunities annexed to Laws, by the Authority which eſtabliſhes and enacts them: And, that, Mankind are determined to act in Conformity to the Injunctions of theſe Laws: Partly, by the Hope of Good to ariſe from a ſubmiſſive Obedience: Partly, by the Fear of Evil to follow from an inſolent Diſobedience: Or, at leaſt, That, they are moved, by ſome Sort of Motive or other, to act as theſe Laws direct.* For, the Neceſſity which determines the human Will to act, is no other than the Deſire of avoiding Evil, ſo far as it appears Evil to us: And, on the contrary, the Deſire of proſecuting, purſuing and attaining to Good, ſo far as it appears Good to us. Now, ſuch a Neceſſity as this (which, in Truth and Reality, conſiſts with the moſt perfect Freedom of Enquiry into the Nature of Good) is, as far as I could ever learn, acknowledged by all Mankind to be natural and intrinſic to the Nature of Man.

See Page 40. Prolegomena, Notes Sect. 14.

The whole Power, then, of Obligation lies here, That, the Author and Maker of a Law has annexed to the Obedience of his Laws, *Good*; and to the Diſobedience of them, *Evil:* Which *Good* and *Evil* are natural: From the View and Expectation of which, *(Good* and *Evil)* Mankind are influenced to prefer, in their outward Behaviour and Deportment, Actions conformable rather than contrary to the Laws preſcribed.

In what the Force of Obligation lies.

Now, the ſeveral Degrees of *Good*, annexed to the Obſervance *of the Laws of Nature*, are no other than, (but, exactly the ſame with) thoſe Kinds of *Good* which conſtitute the ſupreme, the ultimate Happineſs of Man; and, by Conſequence, are evidently the higheſt Degrees of *Good:* And, on the contrary alſo, thoſe ſeveral Sorts of *Evil* which naturally follow a conſtant State of Acting in Oppoſition to theſe Laws, are ſuch Evils as conſtitute the higheſt Degrees of Miſery.

The Laws of Nature enforce their Obligation moſt powerfully.

The Coherence, the Concomitancy, the Connexion, the Agreement of ſuch *Good* and *Evil* with human Acts, is natural and neceſſary: *i. e.* Such a Connexion does not precariouſly depend upon the arbitrary Will and Pleaſure of Civil Governors; notwithſtanding, that, in every Civil Society, ſome Portion of Puniſhments and Rewards is, in ſome meaſure, diſtri-

The Rewards and Punishments of the Laws of Nature prior to Civil Government.

buted and dispensed, according to the Will of Magistrates: Nay, even supposing no Civil Government—yet—such *Good* and *Evil*, such *Natural Rewards* and *Natural Punishments* would necessarily follow; partly from the Nature of Human Acts: And would also, partly from the very Necessity of the Thing itself, be annexed by private Persons, in their natural Capacities, antecedent to any human Law or Power of arbitrary Appointment and Imposition whatsoever. But, since Civil Government is established every where: The Nature of such Establishments necessarily determines Magistrates, in all Places, to inflict Punishments and distribute Rewards, notwithstanding the several Differences, as to the Measure and Manner of them, which arise unavoidably from the Differences of Time, Place and other Circumstances.

SECT. XII.

Acts of Private and Public Good closely connected.

SINCE, then, this is the principal Κεφαλαιον, or chief Point under our present Determination in this Controversy, it is necessary to demonstrate, with a more than ordinary Degree of Accuracy and Exactness, That, all the Acts of each and every one single Individual respectively, during the whole Period of human Life, which promote as much as possible the *Public Good:* And, all the Acts which promote the principal Happiness, the highest Perfection of each and every one Individual respectively, are closely connected. This whole Connexion, therefore, if we are willing to talk clearly, must be considered under a two-fold Distinction. The first is called *a Connexion immediate:* And the second *a Connexion mediate:* Upon account of those several Sorts of *Good* procured from these Acts by the Influence and Co-operation of both God and Man. *See* Sect. 18. *of this Chapter.*

This Connexion either *immediate* or *mediate*.

The Connexion immediate.

Concerning the former of these two Connexions we shall treat first: And the Reason is, Because, the Reward of Virtue, arising from the very Act of Virtue itself, is inseparable; and can, with great Ease, be demonstrated: Since, the present NOW is not liable to the uncertain Chances and Accidents of Futurity: Neither is it involved in a complex Variety of several Causes; and, upon which Variety, future Rerwards very much depend. The immediate Connexion, then, between the greatest Happiness of Mind in each Human Agent respectively, which is in his own Power singly to effect: and the Acts, which he puts into Practice, contributing most to the *Public Good*, is this: That, these are the very selfsame Acts, in the Exercise of which, the Happiness of each Individual (according to the strictest Acceptation of the Term, so far as his own particular Power reaches) consists. The same, the very same Acts, whether considered as to their specific Differences, or, from their several Objects, or, from the Subject-matter about which they are concerned, or,

from

from their moſt extenſive viſible Effects, are termed *Acts which carry a Tendency to the Common Good:* Theſe very ſame Acts (conſidered as the Exertions and Executions in the Agent himſelf of his utmoſt Powers; And, as his higheſt Perfection in producing the moſt complacent and compleateſt Joy to himſelf, from the Senſe, the Conſciouſneſs of theſe Acts) are the moſt tranſcendant Felicity which every ſuch Agent is capable of drawing upon himſelf.

For, the Connexion, in this Caſe, is exactly the ſame as that obſervable between Health of Body with the entire Vigour of all its Members, and thoſe Acts both natural to him as *Man*, and common to him as *Animal*, which are exerciſed in a Preſervation of the Individual, and the Propagation of the Species. For, we ſuppoſe, as well-known from Phyſiology, or, at leaſt, as obſerved from Experience, That the two Articles, which here immediately follow in this Section, do remarkably belong to the natural Perfection of the Human Mind, *viz. Firſt*, IN THE GENERAL, That the Faculties of the Human Mind, namely, *the Underſtanding* and *the Will*, exert their Operations, their Powers upon all Sorts of Objects, but more particularly God and Man. For, They (*i. e.* Theſe Objects, both *God* and Man) are naturally endowed with ſomewhat *ſimilar* or *analagous* to that *Intellect* lodged in Each: And, conſequently, that, we are capable of knowing this common Nature by our own intellectual Acts and Operations: And, of which (Acts and Operations) we cannot but be ſenſible and conſcious. And, moreover, that numberleſs Acts of theirs (namely, God and Man) very intimately and nearly concern us: And, that, they, (*i. e.* both God and Man) as Beings, who act according to Right Reaſon, are capable of being prevailed upon, and influenced by, Acts of ours: So that, they may unite and conſpire with us in producing and effecting our private Happineſs.

See Chap. 2: Sect. 17, 18, 19, 20.

Perfections of the Human Mind in general.

See Prolegomena, Sect. 10. Notes.

Secondly, IN PARTICULAR, and more eſpecially, in order to improve and render the Underſtanding more compleat and perfect,

Perfections of the Human Mind in particular.

1. It is neceſſarily required, That, the Human Mind ſhould abſtract univerſal Notions from Individuals, from Singulars: And compare ſuch univerſal Notions with other Individuals and Singulars: And obſerve that the neceſſary Attributes of ſuch univerſal Notions, do belong to other Individuals and Singulars, which, from time to time, fall under our Notice. As for Inſtance, a Man, from the Survey and Knowledge of himſelf; from abſtracting, præſcinding and cutting off the Singulars, the diſtinct, particular Qualities which belong to the Individual, may learn thoſe eſſential, neceſſary Connexions which ſubſiſt, either, in a Rational, or, in an Animal Nature, *&c.* And, amongſt the reſt, that, there are in *All*, certain Tendencies, Propenſities and Endeavours towards the Preſervation and Perfection, each of itſelf, its own Being or Nature.

See Chap. 2. Sect. 4. Page 141. and Sect. 11. Page 156.

2. It is neceſſarily required, to the Perfection of the human Underſtanding, that, the Mind ſhould ſearch into the generating and preſerving

Cauſes,

Cauſes of Things; ſo far at leaſt, as theſe Cauſes depend upon Human Power.

3. It is neceſſary that the Mind ſhould form like Determinations in like Caſes: And, when ſuch Determinations are once rightly formed, always to judge, act and think conſiſtent with itſelf.

See Chap. 2. Sect. 5 and 6.

4. It is neceſſarily required, That, the Mind ſhould draw and infer, from well-known, ſelf-evident Truths and Maxims, not only ſpeculative, but alſo practical Concluſions.

5. It is neceſſarily required, That, the Mind ſhould always purſue ſuch an Order of Nature, as the particular Circumſtances and Reaſon of the Caſe requires; and, to vary its Method of Reaſoning either according to a Syntheſis or an Analyſis, as the Nature of the Reaſoning demands.

See Prolegomena, Sect. 1.

End and Means how to be conſidered.

Under this Article muſt be referred that noted Maxim, *viz. It is abſolutely neceſſary to the Perfection of Rational Agents, That, the Mind determines concerning the End PRIMARILY: And, then, about the Means neceſſary to the End, SECONDARILY:* Or, in other Words, That, the Effect intended be, firſt, as much as poſſibly it can be, well weighed, before any Application of Cauſes, concurring and neceſſary to produce ſuch an Effect, be tried. And, conſequently, That, every Rational Man ſhould propoſe to himſelf, *Firſt*, the End of his whole future Life, before he can, upon any Preſcript or Rule of Reaſon, ſettle, determine and apply himſelf to Moral Acts. For, it is the Influence, the Efficacy of ſuch Acts, as Means or Cauſes, which nearly concerns the State, the Series of the whole future Life: Becauſe, *this* it is, which will render Life, either more or leſs, happy. Now, we may eaſily perceive the Uſe of this Obſervation, in the whole Series of that Reaſoning which is to follow in this Diſcourſe: Wherein, we cannot but obſerve, That, *All, abſolutely All* our Moral Acts, and *without Exception*, are capable of contributing to the Sum-total, the Whole of the happieſt Life: Nay, even, (and what is ſtill more) neceſſarily either add to, or ſubſtract from, ſuch a Total of Happineſs: And, beſides this, in the ſecond Place, we cannot but know, That, Reaſon commands us to direct, with an uniform Regularity of Behaviour, all the Acts of our future Life to this *one End*.

See Chap. 6. Sect. 3. and Chap. 8. Sect. 1.

We are here, then, moreover, in the third Place, to obſerve, That, the Synthetic Order of treating and handling the whole Series and Progreſs of voluntary Acts, tends directly to this one Point. For, if a voluntary Act be conſidered in the Abſtract; *i. e.* if a voluntary Act be conſidered as a Noun-ſubſtantive, or an *Univerſal:* The Object of ſuch an Act, *i. e.* its *Effect*, is a *Good* moſt extenſive and diffuſive; whether we conſider the ſingle Agent himſelf, or any other Perſon, to whom alſo it muſt, in the ſame way, be moſt acceptable and grateful.

The Human Will.

We are to proceed, in the next Place, to the *Nolition* or *Nilling* of every *Evil* whatſoever: Whether ſuch an *Evil* concerns either one, or many: Whether ſuch an *Evil* is repugnant to, and contradicts, either

our

our own *Good*, or the *Good* of another. Our *Volitions* and *Nolitions*, our *Willings* and *Nillings*, then, according to the Sort and Degree of *Good* and *Evil*, (together with other Circumſtances) take upon them, and aſſume to themſelves ſeverally, the various Names of the Affections and Paſſions: On the one Hand, thoſe of *Love*, *Deſire*, *Hope*, *Joy*: On the other Hand, thoſe of *Hatred*, *Fear*, *Averſion*, *Sorrow*, *Grief*. The Paſſions.

We arrive, at length, to the Conſideration of particular Acts; not only Acts preſent, but alſo ſuch as, in future Times, according to a rational Probability, may be exerted and drawn into Practice: And, we arrive, alſo, at the Knowledge of ſuch an Order as is to be obſerved between thoſe Acts, which moſt contribute to the largeſt Sum-total of all the poſſible *Good* to be performed and enjoyed thro' the whole Courſe of Life: And which proves, in the End, exactly the ſame as the largeſt Sum-total of any *Progreſſion*, whether Arithmetical or Geometrical. And this is called the *Felicity*, the *Happineſs* of each and every one, of one and all: Or, the *Summum Bonum*, the *Chief Good*. See Page 281.

To the natural Perfection of the Human Will, we may refer, as neceſſarily required. What are the Requiſites neceſſary to the Perfection of the Human Will.

1. That, the Will moſt ſtrictly purſues, and acts up to, the moſt perfect Right Reaſon; as well in the calmer Acts of Election and Choice, which are called *Simple (Volitions* and *Nolitions) Acts of Willing and Nilling*: As well as in thoſe Acts of Election which are more active, energetical, operative, vehement: Which Acts of Election are uſually termed, and come under the Denomination of, *Affections*, *Appetites* and *Paſſions*.

2. From theſe ſeveral Acts of the Human Will, we may alſo collect, That, Acts of the Human Will contrary to theſe, are Imperfections and Diſeaſes of the Mind; in the ſame Manner as Lameneſs, paralytic and convulſive Motions, are ſure Marks and Tokens of Diſeaſes in the Body.

3. Of the ſame Nature are all thoſe Degrees of Aſſent given to contradictory Propoſitions: For, it is a demonſtrative Truth, That, one Side only of a contradictory Propoſition can poſſibly be true: And diſſimilar, varying Determinations of Judgment, in ſimilar, uniform Caſes, with many more of the like Kind.

SECT. XIII.

Whether Human Happineſs conſiſts in the Exerciſe of our Faculties, and the Acts ariſing from them: Or, Whether Happineſs conſiſts in the pleaſing Conſciouſneſs of having done well.

IT is not in my Intention to enquire, with too critical a Curioſity, Whether Human Happineſs be the aggregate Sum-total of the moſt nervous, the moſt vigorous Acts, which can poſſibly ariſe from our own Faculties, Powers and Abilities merely? Or, Whether it rather be the moſt grateful, the moſt agreeable Senſation impreſſed upon the Mind, from

from a Conſciouſneſs of Acts accompanied with that Complacency, with that Joy, which, according to ſome Philoſophers, is termed *Pleaſure?* Each of theſe, undoubtedly, is cloſely and inſeparably connected with the other: And, they both are abſolutely neceſſary to conſtitute Human Happineſs. Thus much I will venture to affirm, That, our own Powers and Faculties contain no more in them to render us happy, than the very Acts themſelves which theſe Powers and Faculties produce. Neither is there any Power, ſtrictly our own, (uſeful to private Happineſs) capable of any other Increaſe or Addition, than what is perceiveable in the inherent Energy and radical Vigour of ſuch a Power itſelf, in active Conjunction with the natural Excellency of the Object, upon which ſuch a Power is exerted, *i. e.* of the Effect produced.

Good Acts, and the pleaſing Senſation or Conſciouſneſs ariſing from them, are cloſely connected, and, both eſſential to Happineſs.

1. Pleaſures of the Imagination.

2. Pleaſures of the Intellect.

Since, then, the *Common Good* (*i. e.* the *Glory of God and the Happineſs of Mankind)* is the full compleat Object: And is a Work the beſt, the nobleſt, the moſt excellent we are able to perform, That, therefore, the moſt vigorous, operative Acts employed about ſuch a *Good* as this, and the agreeable Senſations which we feel impreſſed upon our Minds, from the Exerciſe of theſe Acts, will, of all other Acts in our own Power, render us moſt happy. (1) For, we ſhall find upon the Compariſon, That, as to every Individual diſtinct and ſeparate from the reſt, the Happineſs of each, and every one of them reſpectively, comprehends and takes in only, the Perfection of the Individual himſelf as to the Capacity and Power of Operation and Action; And, not the Operation and Action itſelf: Whereas, the *Common Good* is of an operative, effective Nature, which confirms, unites and conſolidates all theſe Individuals into one Society of mutual Commerce and Dealings in all beneficial commendable Offices for the Service and Uſe of All. Nay, even the moſt ingenuous and candid Heathen Philoſophers themſelves, almoſt-all without Exception, place both the *Happineſs and the Virtue* of the two ſupreme Faculties of the Human Mind (namely, *the Underſtanding* and *the Will*) in *Action.* And, this Doctrine *Plutarch,* in his Treatiſe upon *Conſolation,* comprehends in very few Words. (2) " The whole Sum and Subſtance, ſays he, of all Human " Happineſs,

(1) The Good of the Individual ſingly, and taken ſeparate from the reſt, eſſentially conſiſts in the Perfection of his Capacities, Powers, Abilities and Faculties, in enabling him to act equal, and up to ſuch Perfection. Whereas, the Happineſs of a common, general Good, (ſuch as I have deſcribed) conſiſts in mixing and blending all Individuals into (as Members and inſeparable Parts of a Whole) into one firm, well-eſtabliſhed, ſocial Body, by the moſt vigorous Acts, and beſt Habits of the higheſt Virtue, for the Uſe and Benefit of All. The firſt partakes more of a Natural Good. The ſecond is the very Eſſence, the very Soul of Moral Virtue. The firſt is rather the Capacity, the Power of doing Good, without the Good itſelf, and may terminate and end in mere Speculation only. Whereas the ſecond is the Capacity, the Power executed, put into Action and reduced to Practice.

(2) I have tranſlated this Paſſage in *Plutarch* diffuſively, and rather in the way of Paraphraſe, than literally, Ἐξ Ὀρθῶν Ἐπιλογισμῶν εἰς ἐνεργὸν Διάθεσιν Τελευτώντων ἤρτηται τὸ μακάριον. Beatitudinem pendere a rectis conſiliis in affectionem animi conſtantem deſinentibus. *Plutarchi conſolatio ad uxorem. Xylandro interprete oper. omn.* Vol. 2. Pag. 611. Lut. Par. 1624. Fol.

" Happineſs, entirely depends upon, and eſſentially conſiſts in, ſuch true " Calculations and Inferences of Right Reaſon, as produce and perfect a " fixed Order, a laſting Habit, and an effectual benevolent Practice of " the Moral Virtues, to the beſt of that Capacity, of that Power, which " is lodged in each Individual ſingly."

No ſatisfactory Account of Happineſs given by the old Philoſophers.

All theſe Philoſophers, however, do not, at the ſame time, explain to us, upon what Object or Effect directly and adequately it is, that, all theſe Happineſs-creating Actions muſt be employed. Becauſe, what, they ſay concerning *the End* or *the Happineſs*, is, not at all ſatisfactory: For, ſince Happineſs itſelf is a certain Aggregate, a certain Compound; the conſtituent Branches and Parts of which Happineſs we conſtantly enjoy; and which Happineſs, moreover, is ſaid to conſiſt (or, as they ſay, conſiſts) *in Action:* It will, in the End, appear the ſame as to ſay, That, we act for the Sake of Happineſs: Or, which is the ſame Thing, That, we *act* for the Sake of *acting*. Now, when it is ſaid, That, the *Object* and the *Effect* of ſuch of our Actions as render us happy, or, which conſtitute our Happineſs, are *the Honour and Glory of God*, ſomething, to be ſure, is here aſſerted: And yet, it is only one Part, or, one Branch of that Subject-matter, upon which, their Actions are employed, who lead good and happy Lives. It may, indeed, here be ſaid, That, from a ſtudious Concern and Regard for the Divine Glory, may be deduced the Knowledge of ourſelves, and of others: As alſo, the Duties of Charity and of Juſtice to all Mankind. And, yet—we cannot but obſerve, That, the Knowledge and the Love of ourſelves, and of all Mankind, carry in them an intrinſic, inward Perfection; a Perfection natural, and ſuitable in itſelf to ſuch a Knowledge; and, to ſuch a Love, (and in the Poſſeſſion of which Perfection, ſome Part, certainly, of Human Happineſs conſiſts).—But, we may arrive at the Knowledge of this Perfection, without drawing any Conſequence taken from *the Honour, the Glory of God.*

The Analytic Method. See Notes upon the Synthetic and Analytic Method at the Beginning of the Prolegomena.

For, in the natural Order and Progreſs of Science, the Knowledge and the Love *even of Mankind*, ſeem firſt to be fixed, ſettled and determined, before the Mind can ſoar ſo high as to preſume upon any Enquiry into *the Knowledge and the Love of God*, whoſe *Divine Exiſtence and amiable Goodneſs* are diſcovered in *the Works of his Hands*; but, moſt eminently and remarkably ſo, in the *Frame and Structure of Man. See Prolegomena*, Sect. 10.

The True and Full Account of Happineſs ſtated.

Let, therefore, in Conſequence of this demonſtrative Reaſoning, the fixed, direct, adequate Object of thoſe Acts, which chiefly and principally render us happy, be both *God* and *Man:* An EFFECT, which, with regard to them, muſt comprehend and carry in it what is good and acceptable to them both. For the Object of Happineſs-creating Acts cannot, moſt certainly, riſe higher in our Eſteem, than, ſuch an Object as comprehends and takes in all Beings and Things; together with their natural Order, Relation and Dependency upon each other: Neither

can ſuch an Object be conſidered under a more univerſal, a more perfect, a more delightful Notion, than what is expreſſed and underſtood by the Terms COMMON GOOD. For, not to mention, That, (1) *The Term (Bonum) Good*, is, to the full, as compleat, comprehenſive, large and extenſive *a Term* as the *Term (Ens) Being*: And, conſequently, comprehends all the Singulars of Things under one Univerſal; and, more eſpecially, *all the Individuals univerſally* of *Rational Agents*: But, the *Term (Bonum) Good*, beſides this, carries alſo ſomething in it, which does not only relate to the intrinſic, eſſential Perfections of Things; but relates, alſo, to all ſuch additional Ornaments and Graces as may in Futurity be acquired: Suppoſing, even, that, ſuch Perfections are conſidered ſingly, ſeparate and apart: Or, as they are, in any reſpect, relative and correſpondent to each other. And—beſides all this—what is ſtill more, [*Entia*] *Beings* are only ſo far conſidered and eſteemed, as they are capable of contributing to, or receiving *(Bonum) Good*: Since, according to the Laws of Metaphyſical Reaſoning, and Nature, as well as of Morality, our voluntary Acts are directed towards ſuch Objects as theſe. And, from hence it follows, That, the extenſive, infinite Latitude and Extent of ſuch an Object as this, has a full Right to demand and elicit the whole Energy of all our moſt enlarged Faculties; and is, the *compleat*, the *adequate Object*, for the full Exerciſe of them: *An Object* which muſt charm theſe Faculties with endleſs Pleaſure and Delight: Becauſe nothing, after all, poſſibly can be more amiable and delightful than *the Good and Happineſs of every one Being and Thing*. The Man, whoſoever he is, muſt, beyond all queſtion, be quite ſtupid and ſenſeleſs, who is not more enamoured, more delighted in the Spring and Summer with the flouriſhing, lively Bloom of the very Trees, nay, even of Shrubs and Plants, than with their wither'd, decay'd State in the dead, in the dreary dead of Winter. But—to be ſure—that Man, whoſoever he is, muſt be diveſted of the whole Human Nature, who (only by revolving in his own Mind the ſupreme Happineſs of the Human Kind, as eſſentially flowing from the Obſervance of, and from the Obedience to, the very beſt of Laws) does not perceive and anticipate a tranſcendent Pleaſure, from ſome certain Hope and Deſire for ſuch an Happineſs. It is imputed to ſome Defect in the Sight, if a jaundiced Eye ſhould tinge all Objects which come before it, with its own yellow Colour; or, ſhould any Object perceive no other Image than that of itſelf: It is a much greater Imperfection and Unhappineſs

(1) *The Term (Bonum) Good is, to the full, as compleat, comprehenſive, large and extenſive a Term as the Term (Ens) Being.*] When the Term *Good* is taken in ſo univerſal an Acceptation, it ought to be ſeparated into three diſtinct Sorts, 1. *Natural* Good, 2. *Moral* Good, and, 3. *Perfect* Good, or Good of *Perfection*. As to Natural and Moral Good, our Author already has clearly and at large explained. *See Prolegomena*, Sect. 14. 16. *See* Chap. 1. Sect. 33. Chap. 3. Sect. 1. *and many other Paſſages in this Enquiry*. The Two firſt Sorts belong, more or leſs, to created Beings. But a perfect Good, without any Alloy or Mixture of Evil and Imperfection, belongs only to God himſelf, the one Eternal I AM.

pineſs in the Human Soul, to employ all its Thoughts in preſerving that Animal-Body only, to which it is ſo cloſely and intimately united; Treating, at the ſame time, the Objects all around it with an utter Contempt, with an abſolute Neglect.

SECT. XIV.

IT is, at the ſame time alſo, as undoubtedly true, That, Nature has furniſhed the Generality of all Mankind with ſuch Capacities and Powers, (ſuppoſing them in a ſound State of Mind and Body) that, without any, the leaſt, Self-loſs or Self-detriment, they can execute numberleſs Acts, which may prove of very ſignal Advantage, Uſe and Conſequence to others; when, at the ſame time, thoſe beneficial Acts are of little or no Conſequence to the Perſons themſelves who exerciſe them. Such, for Inſtance, are the giving wholeſome Advice and good Counſel to others, whereby either Life or Health is preſerved: The pointing out the right Road to a wandering, bewildered, ignorant Traveller, *&c.* Now, ſuppoſing, that, as Opportunity offers, ſuch benevolent Aſſiſtances as theſe are denied, ſuch Capacities and Powers become inſignificant and vain, and only tend to the everlaſting Shame and Diſgrace of the Perſon thus gifted: He and his Capacity exactly reſemble an uncultivated Field, and Seed rotted thro' Neglect; which, with a fruitful Increaſe, and an Induſtry truly worthy of Praiſe, might have been improved. For, the very Act itſelf (and we certainly do act when we ſerve others) is, even as to ourſelves, more healthy and much pleaſanter, than, a downright negligent Idleneſs. For, by Exerciſe and Employment, we are not only made ſenſible of what new Endeavours and Attempts we are capable, (which is a Delight, a Pleaſure to Perſons in ſound Health) but alſo, the lively Energy of our Faculties and Powers is preſerved, and very often improved and increaſed: As alſo *our Habits*, by Means of which, we act with ſuch Eaſe and Readineſs, are alſo ſtrengthened. Whereas, otherwiſe, our Habits are quite enervated and loſt; and our Capacities grow languid, lifeleſs and entirely uſeleſs.

See Chap. 1. Sect. 21. Page 64. and Chap. 2. Sect. 4. Pages 138, 139.

The Exerciſe and Employment of Virtues and good Habits tend to the Perfection of them.

It is, then, a clear Point, That, there is no one Action relating to others, which can unite and agree with thoſe neceſſary rational Actions relating to our own private Good: Unleſs that thoſe Practical Precepts, which influence and determine us to theſe Actions, are evidently conſonant and agreeable to thoſe, by which, we are directed in the Purſuit of our own private Happineſs. That is, in other Words, unleſs theſe practical Precepts preſcribe the ſame Propenſities and Tendencies towards others, which we exert and expreſs towards ourſelves. For, as to thoſe Things which are neceſſarily determined ſimilar, analogous and alike, (and, in the natural Conſtitution of which Things, there is no notable Difference with regard to the Effects to be deſired, hoped for and expected, towards the Order, Regularity and Oeconomy of the Whole) it is neceſſary,

Beings of a ſimilar Nature require ſimilar Objects and ſimilar Gratifications.

ceſſary, that, we ſhould will and deſire ſimilar Effects and Events: Provided that the Determination of *The Underſtanding* contradicts, neither the Nature of Things, nor itſelf.—Nor, that, *The Will* contradicts any ſuch Determination: Neither of which can conſiſt with that inward Compoſure and Peace of Mind neceſſary to a rational Happineſs. From hence it alſo follows, That, we cannot but *Will* and *Deſire* the ſame Bleſſings and Advantages to other Perſons, (ſuppoſing ſuch Perſons, either unemployed, but harmleſs; or, employed, but uſeful; either Bond or Free, *&c.*) that we Will and Deſire to ourſelves. And—in a Word, ſuch Determinations of the Judgment as theſe, are ſo intimately interwoven into the Human Underſtanding, that, whoſoever acts according to theſe Determinations, acts perfectly conſiſtent with, and agreeable to, his intellectual Nature. For, whatſoever Object, is truly agreeable to all the Faculties, affords and yields a Joy, a Delight, a Pleaſure, a Comfort to every Nature, thus compleatly ſuited to its own true and proper Object. The Doctrine here eſtabliſhed, however, cannot prove any Argument why, from the Increaſe of Families, and from Civil Compacts in Societies, ſome Inequality ſhould not ariſe, whereby ſome are ſuperior and more excellent than others. But—beſides This—Since it is the higheſt Pleaſure, which the Mind of Man can feel, to ſee our Labours attended with the moſt proſperous Succeſs; and ſince it is, on the contrary, very grating and diſagreeable to us, to ſee our Attempts fruſtrated, and rendered abortive, fruitleſs and vain—That Human Underſtanding, conſequently, will much more happily employ its Pains and Labours in benefiting many, than in the Endeavours and Attempts of Miſchief. Becauſe, Mankind, generally ſpeaking, will moſt heartily accept and proſper ſuch an Employment: Who, at the ſame time, ſhould they obſerve us inclined to hurt them, ſtrenuouſly will ſet themſelves in Oppoſition to us: So that, we ſhould almoſt-always and without Exception, be fruſtrated in ſuch Endeavours and Attempts as theſe.—Now, thoſe ſeveral Sorts of Good, neceſſary to the Preſervation of Life, are, for this Reaſon, with more Certainty known, determined and deſired by All: Becauſe, the Connexion of Cauſes, even of neceſſary Cauſes, with their Effects, is naturally determined and fixed—and, can be inveſtigated by their Effects only: Nay, the very Inveſtigation of Cauſes, and the Application of them to their own proper Effects, is extremely pleaſant to the Nature of Man, which eagerly deſires *Truth* without the leaſt Uncertainty.

It is natural to deſire the ſame and alike Bleſſings for others that we deſire for ourſelves.

Here I alſo add, That, the Work of Preſerving and Perfecting Nature, (I mean, Human Nature) is a Work which requires a deeper Science and Penetration into the Natures of Things: As alſo, a more prying Sagacity and more intenſe Application, in finding out and applying Means for this very End and Purpoſe, than the Work of Deſtroying and Corrupting the very ſame Human Nature. For, the Corruption and Deſtruction of Human Nature may eaſily be effected, either, thro' Ignorance or Neglect;

and

and is often perpetrated, either, by the poor weak Abilities of the moſt feeble Wretch, or (which is generally the Caſe) of any other the moſt abject inſignificant Animal. The greateſt Wiſdom, therefore, imaginable is required, to purſue effectually the *Public Good*; under which *Good* is fully comprehended *All the poſſible Good of All Mankind*; and, conſequently, is the *greateſt Good:* And, alas! at the very ſame time time, any, even the leaſt Degree of Folly, can, more or leſs, diminiſh and interrupt ſo *glorious* ſo *univerſal a Good.* From whence we ſuppoſe, That, *Wiſdom* is more natural and intrinſic to every Rational Being than *Folly:* And, conſequently, the *Acts of the Will*, and thoſe *viſible*, *outward Endeavours*, which tend to the *Public Good*, are, indeed, naturally more perfect and more amiable; and, therefore, muſt of Neceſſity be more ſuitable and more agreeable to the very ſame Rational Nature: Unleſs, perhaps, ſome Error of Judgment; or, ſome Habit from ſuch Error ariſing, and, by Conſequence a bad Habit it muſt be, is ſuperinduced upon the Mind.——And, from hence it cannot but happen, That, whatſoever the Objects, which hurt Nature, are, appear, notwithſtanding, agreeable to Nature; juſt as Perſons, labouring under the unnatural Thirſt of a Dropſy, or of a malignant Fever, may feel Delight from large Draughts (and without meaſure) of Water.

Wiſdom natural to every Rational Being.

For, certain it is, "That, the inherent natural Perfection of the *Will*, "or, of the *Mind*, or, of *Human Nature*, conſiſts in this one ſingle Point, "To Will and Chuſe whatſoever the wiſeſt and beſt improved Under- "ſtanding (which always moſt plentifully comprehends the largeſt Number "and the nobleſt of Objects) ſhall, upon the Foundation of the moſt per- "fect Reaſon, determine to be *the higheſt Degree of Good to the moſt and "the beſt of Beings and Things*, in all their infinite Varieties, Degrees "and Subordinations, as to their Relations, Qualities, Quantities, Excel- "lency, Order, Perfection, *&c.*" Becauſe, the Agreement, the Harmony between the ſeveral Acts of the ſame Man (any one of which Acts, *e. g.* an upright Act of the Underſtanding; and, which Act is, alſo, acknowledged more perfective of Human Nature): Such well-connected, harmonious, uniform Acts, I ſay, diſcover, and upon the cleareſt, the fulleſt Demonſtration, a better State of Mind, than, Diſcord and jarring between Acts, whereby the ſame Agent is rendered quite diſtinct, ſeparate from, and even contradictory to himſelf: And, conſequently, whenever the Underſtanding is ſuppoſed to act with its beſt Perfection, then, neceſſarily, it muſt happen, that, the Perfection of the Will is fully elicited, exerted and drawn forth in complying with, and improving of, ſuch a Determination of the Judgment. The Underſtanding is ſuppoſed to act with its higheſt Degree of Perfection, when it fully weighs and duly conſiders the greateſt Number of Objects, and the beſt of them, in their ſeveral Sorts and Degrees: And, places them all, in ſo natural an Order amongſt themſelves, that, the very beſt State and Settlement in the Univerſe may riſe and appear in the very Idea itſelf: And alſo, that, all Beings, but more eſpecially

In *What* the *Wiſdom* of *chuſing* conſiſts.

eſpecially Rational Beings, may unite and agree with the moſt perfect Harmony. And—therefore, upon theſe Principles, it is, that, when theſe two Faculties, *The Underſtanding* and *The Will*, are employed in determining future (1) Acts (whether *Immanent* or *Tranſient*); The Determination, which immediately and neceſſarily always follows, is, *To do all the poſſible Good in our Power to the greateſt Number*. Becauſe, They are the *Acts*, and *no other*, required, in our Care and Concern about *the Common Good*, as *the one ſupreme End*. And, this is a Point of too clear a Self-evidence to ſtand in need of any Proof. And—conſequently, In theſe inward natural Perfections of the Mind are neceſſarily included, not only the *Act merely*, but ſuch an *Act* as is employed about *Good*; about ſuch a *Good* as is the largeſt, the moſt ſupreme:—A *Good* which relates to the nobleſt Beings, in the cloſeſt Conjunction and Affinity with ourſelves: And this, in Truth, is the greateſt Good which can, at one and the ſame time, await and be preſent with All. It is, in ſhort, ſuch an *Act* as muſt be elicited and drawn into Practice at all times, by the common Conſent, and in the natural Order and Diſpoſition of all our Faculties.

SECT. XV.

Love, Hope and Joy employed in the Happineſs of others an Happineſs to the Individual.

THE Experience by which we perceive ſuch Delight from the Exerciſe of Love, Hope and Joy, employed upon ſuch a Good as concerns not only ourſelves, but others alſo, abundantly proves the Argument, whereby we have demonſtrated, That, the Happineſs of the Human Will is placed in *the moſt diffuſive, extended Benevolence*.

The eſſential conſtituent Branches of Happineſs, are thoſe benevolent Affections which carry in their very Nature a real Pleaſure: And we, from daily Experience, feel and perceive ourſelves moved and pleaſed with the Happineſs of others. He, therefore, robs Man of a very conſiderable Share of his Happineſs, who takes from him that ſweeteſt Affection of Love and Benevolence towards others; And, of that Joy, which is principally employed in the Happineſs of others. The Subject-matter of that Joy, Complacency, Delight, is very poor, narrow and contracted, which is entirely employed upon our own private Intereſt and Advantage only: Whereas,

(1) *Acts whether Immanent or Tranſient*, &c.] The Diſtinction between an *Immanent* and a *Tranſient Act*, is a Logical Diſtinction (altho' ſometimes uſed in Natural Philoſophy) invented by *Ariſtotle*: A Diſtinction which falls under his Fifth Category. It is neceſſarily implied, in the Notion of every Act, that it is either, *Firſt*, *Intrinſic*, and produces ſome Effect in which the Agent itſelf is immediately and only concerned as the Patient or Object upon which the Act operates: Or, *Secondly*, It is an *Act Extrinſic*, whoſe Effect is external, and paſſes from the Agent which produces it, to ſome *Being* or *Thing* diſtinct and ſeparate——and——wherein the Agent is not underſtood to ſuffer or to undergo the Effect. The *firſt* is called an *Immanent* the *ſecond* a *Tranſient Act*.

Whereas, the Subject-matter of our Delight will be the nobleſt and moſt enlarged, if we ſincerely have at Heart the Happineſs of all other Beings. For, The one Sort of Delight will bear exactly the ſame Proportion to the other, that, the infinite Happineſs of Almighty God, and of all Mankind, bears to that minute Supply of unreal Happineſs, with which the Goods of Fortune can furniſh the invidious and malevolent Man. That Man is, moſt certainly, quite deſtitute of all Virtue, who has thrown off all benevolent Affections towards Mankind. Nay—Hatred and Spleen, which fill and gall the Heart of him who regards only his OWN DEAR SELF, are neceſſarily accompanied with Trouble and Sorrow, Fear and Anxiety——Evils evidently deſtructive of an happy Life. If we thoroughly examine into, and try every one of our Faculties ſingly, we ſhall find that all of them, when we have once arrived at Years of Maturity, are ſo ſtretched, as it were with Vigour, with Energy, that they ſwell with a plentiful Abundance: And, that, their Capacities and Powers of acting are much larger than can be exerciſed and employed merely upon SELF ONLY.

The Goods of Fortune cannot compenſate the want of Benevolence.

The Human Faculties are improved by Benevolence.

1. Our Underſtanding is, with a very prone, direct Tendency, carried into the Conſideration of thoſe Things which prove beneficial and uſeful, not only to ourſelves, but to others alſo. From this one Source originally, did ſpring all thoſe Arts and Sciences which, with ſo ſtudious and painful a Diligence are invented, improved and publiſhed for the public Good of all Mankind.

1. The Underſtanding is enlarged.

2. But, *Secondly*, as thoſe Paſſions and Affections of the Will, which have an Appetite, a Deſire, a Tendency to Good, to what is truly Good: For Inſtance, *Love*, *Deſire*, *Joy*; from the Exerciſe of which Paſſions, according to the Rules of Right Reaſon, we are rendered happy in the higheſt Degree of which we are capable. Such Paſſions and Affections as theſe, I ſay, ſcarcely, if ever, cheer the Heart of any *Timon* or Manhater: Neither, indeed, can ſuch Paſſions as theſe produce any Pleaſure, unleſs we, with Care and Application, contrive the Good of Numbers.

2. The Paſſions are pleaſed and cheered.

For, the common Reaſon of all Mankind, at the ſame time, that, it commands each Individual to endeavour after as much Happineſs as each reſpectively can enjoy, does alſo command every one of us to unfold, expand and exert All, even the moſt latent Energies of our Being, of both Soul and Body:——And then——with an united ſocial Force, to pour forth all theſe Energies into the moſt extenſive, prolific Soil of public Utility and Advantage:—And to promote ſo generous an Increaſe with all the Culture and genial Nouriſhment in our Power——That ſo——by cheriſhing the boundleſs Growth of ſuch univerſal Felicity, each may extract the delicious Sweets, and reap the plentiful Increaſe of his own private Happineſs: Strictly obſerving, at the ſame time, in the midſt of all his Care, ſuch an Innocency of Life and Purity of Manners, as may moſt fitly agree to both public and private Good.

SECT.

SECT. XVI.

By what Method private Happineſs is beſt ſecured.

BUT, becauſe there are many Concluſions in Morality, (and concerning which I am to treat) all depending upon the Principles eſtabliſhed already: I ſhall ſubjoin other Obſervations tending to the ſame one grand Concluſion.

Since, then, it has been clearly proved, from the Nature of the Human Will, and, from the Nature of voluntary Human Acts, That, the effectual Accompliſhment of the *Higheſt Good*, is the *Supreme Ultimate End* preſcribed by Reaſon: That, ſuch a *Good* as this muſt be either *the Higheſt Common Good*, (to which I refer every Thing conſiſtent with ſuch a *Good*) or that ſuch a *Good* muſt be *the higheſt Good which ſeems poſſible for each and every one Individual, ſeparately, ſeverally and diſtinctly, to compaſs*, in order, that, each may ſecure to himſelf *His own End*; *i. e.* proſecute all the greateſt Profits and Advantages which each can poſſibly deſire for his own dear individual *Self*: And, conſequently, that, he ſhould employ all his beſt Endeavours, as Means ſubordinate to this one ſo deſirable an End. For, according to Mr. *Hobbes*'s own Suppoſition in his Argument, no other Diviſion of *Good*, except of that into *Public* and *Private*, can be formed: Becauſe, the Good of any one Family, or of any one Civil Society, cannot, as yet, be imagined to demand any Regard: Or, even ſuppoſing, that, either, or both, ſhould be regarded; yet, the Conſequences are pretty much the ſame which muſt follow upon the Proſecution and Aim of any particular *Private Good*. Right Reaſon can never allow the Greateſt Private Good, which any one Individual can either deſire or imagine, to be fixed, determined and ſettled as the one ſupreme ultimate End. For, That Action is, moſt certainly, and beyond all Queſtion, a good Action, which directly and at once aims at ſuch an End as is truly an ultimate End; and which leads us to this End, in the moſt compendious Way: Becauſe, different ultimate Ends being propoſed, which are to be effected and brought about by oppoſite and different Cauſes, the natural Conſequence from ſuch a Suppoſition, is, That, *Acts truly good muſt act in Oppoſition to each other*: Which is an evident Impoſſibility. *e. g.* Suppoſe Right Reaſon to inſtruct *Titius*, that, all poſſible Happineſs, (and the one chief End he is to purſue) conſiſts in the Enjoyment of a full Property in, and Dominion over, the Lands occupied by, and belonging to *Seius* and *Sempronius*; And—in a Right over their Perſons: As alſo, in a Right over the Lands and Inheritances of all the reſt of Mankind. Sound, true Reaſon cannot, to be ſure, inſtruct *Seius* and *Sempronius*, that, the ſupreme Felicity, which they are to purſue, is placed in the Enjoyment of a full Dominion and Power over the Lands, the Inheritances and Perſons of *Titius* and of all the reſt of Mankind alſo. Becauſe, Two ſuch Dictates of Reaſon as theſe are impoſſible, as carrying

See the Syllogiſm at Page 285.

carrying in them a manifeſt Contradiction: And, conſequently, ONE ONLY, of theſe TWO DICTATES, can poſſibly be ſuppoſed the Truth.

Now, ſince no one true Cauſe can be aſſigned, why, the private Happineſs alone, of any one of theſe Perſons ſingly, ſhould be an ultimate End to himſelf, (in preference to the private Happineſs, as an ultimate End, of every one elſe) which does not prove as ſubſtantial a Cauſe, why any one, and all other Perſons, ſhould reſpectively, each for himſelf, make his own private Happineſs an ultimate End alſo: It, therefore, muſt, from hence, as a neceſſary Concluſion, follow: That, no one can, according to any Dictate of Right Reaſon, lay down his own private Happineſs (and *That only)* to himſelf, as his own one ſupreme ultimate End: But, on the contrary, that, The private Happineſs preſcribed by Reaſon for each Individual to proſecute, is eſſentially connected and joined with the Happineſs of others. And THIS is the *Common Good* which, we argue, ought to be purſued by all. Becauſe, That alone is *the one ſupreme End* conſiſtent with all the poſſible Happineſs of Individuals or Singulars, and moſt productive of it: Towards the Attainment of which End, the Inſtincts, the Impulſes of Nature directing (the Private) and Right Reaſon directing (the Public) Good, unite and conſpire.

Beyond all Contradiction, alſo, it is eſſential to the genuine Perfection of Practical Reaſon, *or Prudence*, (let this Attribute *ultimate* ſubſiſt in whatſoever Subject it will) to propoſe to all Beings, who are to be governed by Right Reaſon, one ultimate End: And, which *End* ſhall be the Rule or Meaſure of *Good* and *Evil*, common to All: Namely, "That, "All Rational Beings carry in their View, and aim, at one Effect; and, that, "the eſſential, conſtituent Parts and Branches, and the efficient, preſerving, "perfecting Cauſes of this one Effect, are termed *ſeveral Kinds of Good.*—" And, on the contrary, That, "Whatſoever Means prevent, obſtruct, hinder, defeat the Production, the Efficacy, the Virtue of ſuch an Effect, "are termed *Evils.*"

The Terms *Good* and *Evil*, apprehended under any other Notion or Meaning different from what is here ſtated, are, indeed, vague, undetermined, entirely equivocal, and carry a quite different Signification, when underſtood by other Perſons, (*i. e.* by Perſons no ways concerned in ſuch a Private Good). For, whatſoever is called a *Good* with reſpect to one Perſon, is, becauſe it miniſters and ſubſerves to ſuch a Perſon's own private, proper Uſes and Ends: And, *this very ſame Good* all other Perſons, at the ſame time, may, and for the ſame Reaſon, call *Evil*; becauſe, it does not ſubſerve, miniſter or anſwer to any one or more of their Deſires. And, this is quite inconſiſtent with Science, and all Communication of Knowledge, which is the very End and Deſign of all Speech. Whereas, if the Terms, GOOD and EVIL be applied to ſuch Objects of Happineſs as relate to, and concern all Mankind, they then carry in them a fixed,

The True Notion of *Good* and *Evil.*

fixed, determined, uniform Meaning: A Meaning, by far, the moſt intelligible and beneficial to All.

The Abſurdity of *Private Happineſs* being the one only *ultimate End.*

Here we may add, alſo, That, if any one regards his own particular, private Advantage only; and, for this one Purpoſe, ſhould endeavour to ſeduce and draw over all Rational Agents into THIS, the one ultimate chief End, which alone, they all are to purſue; ſuch a Perſon will work no other Effect, unleſs, perhaps, after much Pains, his own Deſtruction and Ruin. Becauſe, it is a manifeſt Impoſſibility, that All Things, that, All Beings ſhould be ſettled and determined, according to the Wills, Inclinations and Purpoſes of ſingle individual Mortals, who WILL ſuch Varieties, Oppoſites, Contrarieties and Contradictions. For, the Effect of every one, ſingle, human Will, over external Things or outward Objects, is a certain Determination of a Phyſical Corporeal Motion; as is evident in the Uſe, in the Application of Food, Raiment, Company, *&c.*—Now—The contrary, the oppoſite Directions of Phyſical, Natural Bodies, mutually deſtroy each other. For, if any one Body receive, at the ſame Inſtant of Time, a Direction moved towards oppoſite Points, it neceſſarily muſt be in ſeveral Places, at one and the ſame time, once. But, if it be impoſſible that all Perſons can be in Subjection to each Perſon; and, that all Things can be in Subjection to every one and each Thing reſpectively: Why, then, it muſt follow, that this Reaſon which propoſes to each, that very ſelf-ſame one End and View, which can only happen to one, would, and muſt, oftener than a million of times repeated, propoſe what is impoſſible; and but once only, on the contrary, what is poſſible: And, conſequently, whether any ſuch Determination of Reaſon, as *this*, be *right*, rather than *erroneous*, can, with perfect Eaſe of Calculation, be computed by every one. But, the unlucky Misfortune of this *Leviathan-doctrine*, is—That, all the reſt of Mankind are endowed with their own natural Powers, with their own innocent Deſires and Appetites, which (Appetites, Deſires and Powers) they will obey and ſatisfy, whether this one grand Monarch of a *Leviathan* pleaſes or no: And, beſides this, they all enjoy and feel the Light of their own Reaſon: Which Light of Reaſon, upon the moſt ſubſtantial Grounds imaginable, they will obey; as it is a Light which directs them to much-nobler Purſuits, than the arbitrary Will and Pleaſure of any one arbitrary Man: And, by theſe Guides, they will eaſily defend themſelves from the inſolent Violence, either of one, or of a few. It is abſolutely neceſſary, then, that ſuch a Man muſt be mad, inſtead of rational, who cannot foreſee and provide againſt ſuch Conſequences as theſe.—No—But, on the contrary, he will wage War againſt All, and ſo try, by Force of Arms, whether he is able to aſſume and arrogate to himſelf that monſtrous, abominable *Leviathan-right* eſtabliſhed by Mr. *Hobbes*. Mr. *Hobbes* himſelf defines "This Right to be the "Faculty or Power of acting according to Right Reaſon." Whereas, I on the contrary, in Oppoſition to Mr. *Hobbes*'s Notion, affirm, *That alone*

This is the Contradiction: But the Truth is, That a Body placed in the Center of a Circle, and drawn by equal Forces towards every Point of the Circumference, muſt continue in a State of abſolute Reſt.

The groſs Contradiction of this Leviathan doctrine.

alone to be *Practical Right Reaſon*, which allows us to attempt *poſſible Things only*; and, which ſtrictly forbids every Man to uſurp, each to himſelf ſolely, that empty Dominion over all Perſons and Things: Or, even upon the wild Surmiſe, that, ſuch an uſurped Power ſhould take place, muſt terminate in its own Ruin and Deſtruction. *See Mr.* Hobbes's *Book* De Cive, Chap. 1. Sect. 12. Whereas, upon my Suppoſition, when a Man is ſerving the Public, and acting for the Common Good, he never loſes his Labour, but his Power the Effect of his own Induſtry; altho' perhaps it may, for the preſent, concern one ſingle Perſon only; yet, it often renders the Agent himſelf of greater Uſe and Advantage to many: Nay, altho' even at ſome times, to the Perſons themſelves, who act Thus, there is no Hope, no Expectation, no Reward, except that Joy of Heart which ariſes from the Proſperity of others:—No very diſagreeable Return for our own Munificence and Good-nature.

The *Will* of Each is made more perfect by acting for the Whole.

We may likewiſe further add, That a ſtudious Concern for the Common Good, in each Rational Agent, ſtrengthens and increaſes the Perfection of the Will: Which (Perfection) conſiſts in an innocent [φιλαυτία, or] *Self-love*. Such a *Concern* ſuper-adds many parallel, ſimilar Acts; Acts truly great, noble, and employed upon Objects ſimilar, analogous: And brings to a compleat Perfection the good Habits neceſſarily cauſed by ſuch Acts, namely, a *Philanthropy*, [φιλανθρωπία] or, a general Love for all Mankind: Of which [φιλανθρωπία, or] general Love, [φιλαυτία, or] Self-love is a very minute, trifling Particle. For, we here ſuppoſe, that, every one Individual ſeeks and deſires his own private Good, and that, to act thus, eſſentially belongs to the Perfection of his Nature.——And——therefore, what is ſtill more, to act with a ſimilar, analogous Behaviour towards other Beings (of which Beings, Almighty God himſelf is tranſcendently the moſt excellent) will add to the Perfection of that Nature, which conſiſts in acting for its own private Good; namely, *That Joy* which flows from an Uniformity, an Agreement of its own Acts with each other. Becauſe, To keep a ſtrict Harmony and an exact Regularity with itſelf, and with its own Acts, is much more agreeable and pleaſing to the Human Mind, than is to be found in the Harmony of muſical Sounds, or, in the Regularity of Geometrical Figures.—And, for this plain Reaſon, Becauſe, as, to form ſimilar Judgments upon ſimilar Objects, and in ſimilar Caſes; ſo, alſo, to exert ſimilar Affections towards ſuch Objects, and in ſuch Caſes, eſſentially belongs to the Perfection of the Human Mind. To Form Contrary Judgments upon Things which agree and correſpond with each other, implies a Contradiction, and is a Species, a Kind of Madneſs: And, conſequently, in like Manner, as, any Diſeaſe or Error of the Underſtanding is always avoided in forming theoretic, ſpeculative Judgments; ſo, in like Manner, an Imperfection of the Underſtanding is no leſs a Diſeaſe, no leſs an Error; but, rather, is a mere Contradiction in Practical Precepts, when the Caſes are exactly alike. *E. G. In my own Caſe,*

and in the Caſe of another, If We determine in our practical Judgment to act quite differently, and with a Will, an Inclination conſequent upon ſuch a Judgment.

Nay, indeed, and what is ſtill more, ſince the Nature of each Perſon is always preſent with the INDIVIDUAL-SELF of *Each*, ſuch a Nature muſt be perfectly-well known to *Each*: And, from hence alſo it is, that the Nature of other Perſons cannot, conſequently, be leſs-known to *Each*, ſo far, at leaſt, as the eſſential and general Attributes, in which *All agree*, extend: And, upon which, not only our own Right, but the Right alſo of others, to all the Means neceſſary for the Preſervation of Life, is grounded. Such a Knowledge as this, is, I ſay, always preſent with *him*: It neceſſarily, therefore, follows, That, he who determines, concerning the Right of another, otherwiſe than what he determines as to his own Right, contradicts himſelf in a Matter moſt notoriouſly-well known, and always obvious to *himſelf*: Becauſe, ſuch a Contradiction as this, above all others, moſt forcibly breaks in upon the Soundneſs, the Integrity, the Peace of Mind; and as remarkably alſo, in all our Dealings and Actings, breaks in upon our Tranquillity and Contentment: Whereas, a regular Uniformity of ſound Judgment and *Rational Agency*, always produces the higheſt Tranquillity and moſt complacent Compoſure of Mind.

SECT. XVII.

According to the Law of Nature; whatſoever any one Perſon may do, every other Perſon, under the ſame Circumſtances, may do alſo.

UNDER this Head may alſo be referred and included: That, Whoſoever judges ſome certain Acts neceſſary to his own Happineſs, cannot, upon the Principles of ſound Reaſon, withhold his Aſſent from determining, That, every other Perſon may determine, Each for himſelf, in the ſame Manner, and perform the like or the ſame Acts for his own Happineſs: And, That, every other Perſon may and ought, upon this very Determination of Judgment, to purſue and execute theſe very ſame Acts. Whoſoever, therefore, brings into a ſtricter Examination the Subject-matter of thoſe Practical Propoſitions, which determine each Perſon to a ſtudious Care and Concern for himſelf, cannot but know, that, the ſame Practical Propoſitions command all other Perſons alſo, as well as himſelf, ſtrictly to conſult and take Care of, Each his own Preſervation reſpectively: And, Forbid, after as ſtrict a Manner likewiſe, every Sort of Oppoſition againſt thoſe who act in the ſame Manner, and for the ſame End.

See Chap. 4.

In full Contradiction, however, againſt All ſuch ſelf-evident Practical Maxims, we find the following Propoſition, *viz.* That, *It is lawful for that Leviathan-human-nature, invented by Mr.* Hobbes, *to arrogate and aſſume to itſelf, all thoſe Things which can either Preſerve or Perfect the Faculties of ſuch an Human Nature.* Now, in this Propoſition, there appears

appears ſomething which bears a real Reſemblance to *a Precedency, a Priority in Nature*—And wherein there is contained an indefinite Term, which, by a neceſſary Identity of Terms, converts, changes and ſlips, with all the Eaſe imaginable, into an univerſal Term. As for Example, in the following Propoſition: *It is lawful for the Human Nature of* Titius, *or of* Seius, *or of* Sempronius, *or of any Body, or of every Body; or, in ſhort, for the Human of all Mankind in general, to arrogate and aſſume to himſelf, to itſelf, and to all-ſelves, all thoſe Things; as alſo to act, whatſoever, will either preſerve or perfect the Faculties of this Nature, or that Nature, or of all human Nature in general.* See the laſt Section, at Page 328.

Here, then, let Mr. *Hobbes* tell me, what the Addition of a *Noun*, either *Proper*, or *Indefinite*, or *Common*, or *General*, or, *&c.* can do to prove, Why, The *firſt* Propoſition ſhould be a Dictate of Reaſon; *i. e.* Why it ſhould be *the Law of Nature*, rather than the *ſecond*, which declares juſt the very ſame Thing in favour of any and every other Perſon whatſoever? But, ſuppoſing Mr. *Hobbes* to acknowledge, That, the Right, the Power in Each to do every Thing, ariſes even from hence, *i. e.* from human Nature, (as he ſtrenuouſly argues in Vindication of this one Point, in his Book *De Cive*, Chap. 1. Sect. 10.) Yet, becauſe we have already expoſed the Abſurdities of ſuch a Suppoſition, we think proper in this Place, only to retort thus much upon him: That, the general Determination of ſuch a Law as this, with regard to the Nature of any one, ſingle, individual Man, *(e. g.* of Mr. *Hobbes)* cannot, either immediately, or by any good Conſequence, contradict the like Determination in favour of any other Perſon whatſoever: Neither can the Right or Liberty, permitted by any one Law to any one Perſon, extend ſo far, as to make it lawful for him to oppoſe the very ſame Means, which are commanded, *by the very ſame Law*, to be obeyed and performed by others, and, for the very ſame End. Nay, the Truth of the Caſe is, beyond all Contradiction, ſo far otherwiſe; That, each Perſon's Delight in a good Law, with the natural Propenſity to uniform, conſiſtent, regular Actions: As alſo, a Veneration, an Eſteem for the Law-giver himſelf, will all conſpire in operating unitedly as one Cauſe, namely, That, ſo long as no poſſible Damage can happen to Self-preſervation, each Perſon will incline to aſſiſt others in the Obſervance of ſuch a Law as muſt, and will, produce ſo happy an Effect: Which is, that, every one Perſon will ſubſerve and miniſter to the *Common Good*, who honeſtly applies his Mind to thoſe Principles which enjoin and command a rational, ſecure Self-preſervation. This Induction of Reaſoning, or Syllogiſm, ſhall put an End to our Arguments upon the *Immediate Connexion*, &c. and will clear the way to ſuch Conſequences as follow from *Mediate Effects*, and upon which we ſhall treat in the next Section. See above, at Sect. 12. of this Chapter.

Thoſe Acts of our own, which perfectly well inform us, that, we have done all in our Power, both, towards our own Happineſs, and the Happi- Syllogiſm. Major Propoſition.

neſs

neſs of others, ſurround us with the moſt delightful Joy, and, conſequently, render us happy.

Minor Propoſition. But, Acts, producing the Common Good, cauſe this Effect.——And——

Concluſion. Therefore, Acts producing the Common Good, delight and make us happy.

The Major Propoſition of this Syllogiſm is taken from the Definition of our own Happineſs, ſo far, in Truth and Reality, as ſuch an Happineſs lies within our own Power. And, The Minor Propoſition of this Syllogiſm is moſt readily proved, by conſidering the Condition of Human Nature to be ſuch, that, it cannot but, moſt intimately and ſenſibly, perceive its own Acts performed with Deliberation, Counſel and Deſign: Juſt, in like Manner, as, we ſuppoſe any other wiſe Agent ſtudious, careful and ſolicitous about the *Common Good*. Such an Agent cannot neglect his own true, private Happineſs, who wiſely endeavours to do Good to That *Whole* of which *he himſelf* is an Individual. His Concern for the End he has in view, will incline him to preſerve and improve all his Powers and Abilities, becauſe they are the *Means* by Vertue of which he is to purſue his *main End*. Nay—indeed—no poſſible Means can more contribute to reconcile to ourſelves the Aſſiſtance of Almighty God, of Mankind, and of all other the moſt effectual, efficient, operative Cauſes:——And, to unite them all in Co-operation with our own Endeavours, whereby we ſhall ſecure our own Happineſs, as well as the Happineſs of others.

For, What can more effectually ſolicit and prevail upon both God and Man, to aſſiſt that Agent in his Endeavours, than, ſuch an Agent's ſincereſt and heartieſt Affections and Endeavours, to do all the moſt acceptable Services in his Power to ALL; ſince, certainly, there is nothing, within the Powers and Capacities of Man, which is more excellent, and nothing nobler can be expected from him, both by God and Man. In a Word—amongſt thoſe Rewards immediately annexed by Nature *to a ſtudious Concern about the Common Good*, muſt be numbered that manifold and pure Delight which ariſes from the Exerciſe of all thoſe Capacities, Powers and Propenſities which are inherent to Human Nature; and which (as we have, in the ſecond Chapter, *Concerning Human Nature*, fully and at large proved) were originally framed and fitted to anſwer chiefly this one principal End; and to this Chapter we muſt refer the Reader. Thus much muſt ſerve for the *Connexion Immediate*.

SECT.

SECT. XVIII.

LET us, now, proceed to conſider thoſe good Effects, which, with a firm Certainty, are to be expected from God and Man: Provided always, that, we, thro' the whole Courſe of our Lives, chuſe rather to act thoſe ſeveral Degrees and Sorts of *Benevolence*, which, the Nature of God and the Nature of Man require and demand from us, than, thro' the WHOLE of ſuch a Period to arrogate and aſſume ALL to SELF, either by Treachery or Violence.

The Connexion mediate. Our Author divides this Connexion into Immediate and Mediate. Of the Connexion Immediate he treats Page 316 Sect. 12. of this Chapter.

The *Criteria* and *Marks* whereby to determine the Conſequences of *Things Future*, will appear much clearer if the Sum-total of Human Life, in all the Stages of it, be compared together, than, if ſome few Parts and Circumſtances only, be conſidered.—And, it is alſo fully ſufficient, whenever we take under our Deliberation *Two Future Acts*, *The one* of which [*Two*] unavoidably muſt be performed, to prove, that, there is an higher, a ſurer Probability of a more ſubſtantial Good from the one, than there is from the other—But—with This Reſtriction always; That, no demonſtrative Certainty can, on either Side, be abſolutely had. Upon this very Account it was, that, *Seneca* of old complained, *Ideò peccamus, quià de partibus vitæ omnes deliberamus, de totâ nemo deliberat: That, altho' Man meditates and deliberates upon ſome particular Parts of Human Life; yet, none meditate and deliberate upon the Whole*; *i. e.* after what Manner he ought to lead one conſtant, uniform Life. Whereas, had we regularly purſued an uniform Life, we muſt unavoidably, and with clear Sagacity, perceive, that, the Man who (overlooking and neglecting the Rights of Almighty God, and of all Mankind, except himſelf) always arrogates to himſelf all Things as of Right his own: And—who—moreover, conſtitutes and appoints his *own Dear-ſelf* the one ſole End and Object of all his Acts, muſt of Neceſſity, be odious both to God and Man: And—muſt, moreover, draw down upon his own Head inevitable Deſtruction.—But—on the contrary, The Man, who, with Love and Obedience to Almighty God; and—with Innocence and Benevolence to all Mankind, purſues his own Happineſs, as conſiſtent with the Happineſs of others, and dependent upon this Help and Aſſiſtance, acts with much more Wiſdom; And—upon the moſt meritorious Foundation, can hope for better Succeſs. For, altho' The Judgment, we are able to form concerning the future Acts of other Men whom we ſtudy to oblige and ſerve, be only probable: Yet, becauſe, This Probability carries in it the greateſt Evidence which can be had, concerning Things and Events thus contingent and future: And, becauſe the Neceſſity why Things thus carried on, requires the Human Mind not to be in ſuch an abſolute State of Indifference and Suſpence; but, on the contrary, incline rather in favour of ſome Acts as more probable in Futurity than other ſome:—From hence it muſt be more

By what Rule we can know Things Future.

Seneca, Epiſt. 71.

A partial View of human Life the Cauſe of much Evil.

The True Foundation of Happineſs.

Probability in many Caſes our only Guide as to Things Future.

more rational to act according to that Probability which promiſes to promote our Happineſs; than, even by an abſolute Sloth and Idleneſs, to neglect the Opportunities of ſecuring to ourſelves the Aſſiſtance of Mankind; or, of, even by Force and Treachery, attacking ALL: And ſo, place our whole Dependance upon the uncertain, precarious Chance of a State of War. It is undoubtedly a Maxim in Reaſoning, That, amongſt uncertain contingent future Events, ſome carry a much ſurer Degree of Probability than others: And, that, the Chance of ſome is much more valuable than the Chance of other ſome. *See* Abraham De Moivre's *Doctrine of Chances, and the Quotation above at* Page 193. Now, the Reaſoning, grounded upon Experience, knows how to compute and inveſtigate the Difference of Values between the one and the other Chance: And, can alſo reduce the Values to an exact Mathematical Calculation. And this the great *Huygens* has effectually done in his Inveſtigations upon *the Doctrine of Chances*; as alſo *De Moivre*, who has improved upon *Huygens*, *Halley* and *Newton*. The ſame moſt perfect Reaſon, therefore, will certainly command us to chuſe that Way which will more probably lead to our own Happineſs by the Help and Aſſiſtance of Mankind, ſince a greater Degree of Certainty cannot poſſibly be had.

From theſe Principles, we may alſo fairly conclude: That, if by meriting and deſerving the external good Things of Life, out of all poſſible Things, we cannot procure ſuch as are either the Neceſſaries of Life, or the Pleaſures and Comforts of it, we muſt at laſt determine Them to be [Τα ουκ εφ ημιν] Things not in our Power. And—This—is the Foundation of that Law of Natural Right, *That, Whatſoever we cannot lawfully do, muſt be reckoned amongſt Impoſſibilities.*

Impoſſibilities not to be expected, neither are they required from us.

The Precept, then, in the Point before us, may, with much more Safety, for this Reaſon, be commanded; becauſe it is an undoubted Certainty, that, by acting for the Good of the Whole, the Sum and Subſtance of the Thing is preſerved and ſecured: Becauſe, by this Means, we ſhall perform all that in us lies, Which is of the moſt material Conſequence to an happy Life; THE ONE GRAND TRUTH we have been hitherto demonſtrating. And, becauſe, in the next Place, we ſhall moſt certainly, by this Means, ſecure to ourſelves the Favour and Acceptance of Almighty God, who rules and governs all Things according to his own Will and Pleaſure. And this is a Doctrine which I intend preſently to demonſtrate, upon the Principles confeſſedly allowed and granted by Mr. *Hobbes* and *Epicurus*. For, ſince Man cannot perform any Duty more acceptable than Love towards all Rational Beings, (over whom Almighty God is the ſupreme Lord and Head) together with all the natural Conſequences and Effects of ſuch a Love: It then is moſt demonſtrably true, that, by the Light of Nature, Man is not in Duty bound to perform more: Becauſe we are not obliged to act Impoſſibilities.

And,

And, consequently, no Duty greater than Love can be demanded from us.

And, as to those who perform their Duty both to God and Man, they cannot but know the remarkable Favours of Almighty God towards all Mankind: And, This is a Truth which no one ever will deny, who acknowledges God (from the very Natures of Things) to be the Ruler and Governor of the World.

No Argument to be drawn from the Misbehaviour of others.

It is not, therefore, in the Thing itself, necessary that we should, upon demonstrative Evidence, be convinced, that, the rest of Mankind will act by us with Benevolence and Gratitude: Or, that, they will, with a faithful, a punctual Observance, keep their Promises and Contracts towards us: Unless it can be, also, first proved, upon the Principles of Reason, that, This can contribute any thing, either, to our own Happiness, or, to the Happiness of others: Or, that, it can preserve us innocent and free from Violence and Fraud: Or, that, we can, from hence, shew ourselves benevolent and advantageous to others.

SECT. XIX.

The Author's Opinion upon the present Point.

I SHALL now, in few Words, comprehend and explain the whole Sum and Substance of my Opinion. The Obligation which is necessarily incumbent upon every one individual Man, to elicit and produce Acts subserving and ministerial to the *Common Good of All*, (in which is essentially included the whole Sum and Substance of the Laws of Nature). This Obligation, I say, points out to us, by what Means [*i. e.* Arguments] we are to understand, that, God, the original Cause of all Things, WILLS such Acts as these to be performed by Mankind: Or, that, in the ordinary Course of his Divine Care and Providence over the World, He has disposed and determined the Faculties, the Powers, the Abilities of all Things, so, that, such Acts as these shall be crowned with Rewards; and, that, the contrary Acts shall be inflicted with Punishments.

Here then, however, we are to observe, That, it is not a Matter of any Consequence to our present Argument, whether the Distribution of these Rewards and Punishments be *immediate*, or *deferred for a time*, provided, that, the Interval, or, Distance of Time be fully recompensed by the Weight and Consequence of the Rewards and Punishments themselves. And—such an Event as this can, consequently, be so certainly foreknown and determined by every human Understanding, that, the Force of those rational Arguments which create this Persuasion, is manifestly stronger than any Causes of Surmise which can seem to incline towards the contrary.

We shall, at present, wave the Authority of that Divine Revelation delivered to Mankind by the inspired Writers of the Old and New Testa-

ment: Becauſe, The Will of Almighty God, upon theſe Points, is diſcovered to us by the Light of Nature: Either, *Firſt*, from ſuch Things as we know concerning God; which Things, in the *Synthetic Order* of a clear diſtinct Knowledge, are *prior* and antecedent to *That Will*, which is certainly to execute and enforce theſe Rewards and Puniſhments as Sanctions: Or, *Secondly*, from the Effects of the *Divine Will*, originally and in the Beginning, determined to diſtribute theſe Rewards and Puniſhments as Sanctions annexed to the Laws of Nature.

The Synthetic Method.

The Analytic Method.

Concerning the latter of theſe two Methods, whereby we are to diſcover the *Divine Will*, I have already treated in part: But—much more ſtill remains to be offered.

As to the firſt Method of Reaſoning, *i. e.* the *Synthetic*, we ſhall ſay very little, becauſe our Adverſaries will ſcarcely admit any thing: As alſo, becauſe we intend to demonſtrate all the Attributes of God *in the Analytic Method*.

See Prolegomena, Page 10.

This is called the Demonſtratio a Poſteriori.

From the Effects, the Works, the Operations of his Hands, it is proper, however, here to premiſe and ſuggeſt ſome few neceſſary preliminary Articles.

1. It is neceſſary, then, that we ſuppoſe and believe, that, the Author and Contriver of the Syſtem of the World is endowed with the moſt perfect Reaſon, Wiſdom, Prudence and Conſtancy. For, theſe are Perfections, ſome Parts of which, we cannot but know and feel in ourſelves, who are the Effects and Works of his Hands.

Syllogiſm: Major.

Now, it is not poſſible that any Perfection can be found in the Effect which is not contained in the Cauſe.

Minor.

But, theſe Perfections are prior and antecedent to that Divine Will of Almighty God, which we are now enquiring after; and are (*i. e.* theſe Perfections are) in ſome Manner of proper ſpeaking, the Cauſes which produce ſuch a Will in the Divine Nature.

See Prolegomena, Pages 20, 21, 22. in the Notes.

Concluſion.

And, therefore, it can be diſcovered by the Human Underſtanding, according to the Light of Nature, That, Such a Will as this actually is in God.

2. Now, the Minor Propoſition of this Syllogiſm is manifeſted and proved from hence: That, there is a neceſſary *Conſenſus*, or Agreement, between the Practical Right Reaſon of Mankind (with the Human Will conſequent upon it): And the Reaſon (or the Judgment and the Will) of Almighty God, concerning the ſame Object. For, the Judgment in both (*i. e.* in both God and Man, purely and merely becauſe it is *Right*) is alike the ſame, and conformable to the ſame Object; and, conſequently, that, theſe Faculties, both in God and Man, cannot diſagree and differ from each other.

See Prolegomena, Pages 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34 in the Notes.

3. Becauſe, the Point of our preſent Enquiry is, certainly, ſome one Object or other of the *Practical Judgment*: And, It is, either, *An End*, or,

Means

Means to an End: Concerning both of which, the Queſtion to be decided, is, *What is the Beſt?*

4. Now, for the very Reaſon, that, *This ſelf-ſame End is the Beſt*, Almighty God will judge and determine it to be the *Beſt:* Or, that, *this End* contains the moſt of all (what we call) *Natural Good:* And this very ſelf-ſame one End, the Reaſon of every Man truly determines to be ſo, *i. e.* to be *the End:* And, they both (*i. e.* God and Man) equally pronounce and determine the *ſame* concerning *the Means.*

5. This Point, which, perhaps, is a little too abſtruſe, will appear in a clear Light by an Example, or an Inſtance. Suppoſe, then, any one Man to rightly Judge and Determine, That, The *Common Good* of all Beings, who act according to the Rule of *Right Reaſon*, is a *Greater Good* than the *Good* or *Happineſs* of any one individual Man, (and which is, only, in other Words, determining, that, the Whole is greater than a Part) there is no manner of Doubt but that, Almighty God will agree in the ſame Judgment, in the ſame Determination. And, it will exactly come to the ſame Thing, if the Judgment, the Determination be, That, the Happineſs of All is greater than the like Happineſs of any Number, leſs than the Whole.

6. Now, That Happineſs, which is greater than any other poſſible Happineſs, is *the greateſt*. Neither is that Judgment different, in which, we affirm, that, ſuch a ſupreme Happineſs as is compatible to all Rational Beings in general, is the *higheſt End*, the *ultimate*, *beſt End* which every one and all rational Beings can proſecute. Becauſe, *a poſſible End* is no other than *that Good*, or *that Happineſs* which every and each Being lays down and propoſes to himſelf to purſue. And, conſequently, There cannot poſſibly be any Doubt, but, that, Almighty God will alſo, here, likewiſe agree with us in the ſame Judgment, in the ſame Determination. For, ſince Almighty God is a Rational Being, and the ſupreme, perfect Head of all Rational Beings, it cannot be conceived, that, God can act rationally without ſome ſtated End or Deſign, which He propoſes and lays down to Himſelf.

Syllogiſm. Major Propoſition.

But, there cannot be a greater, a nobler End, than the aggregate Sum-total of all poſſible Kinds of Good which I have juſt now mentioned.

Minor Propoſition.

And, therefore, we neceſſarily Judge and Determine, that, Almighty God will Judge and Determine this one End, preferable to all other Ends, to be the beſt, which He can lay down and propoſe to Himſelf.

Concluſion.

7. Neither can it admit of the leaſt Doubt, but, that, the moſt perfect Being will proſecute and bring about that very End, which, He has rightly determined to be the beſt: the Nature and Condition of all Circumſtances being accurately weighed and conſidered. Becauſe, no poſſible Reaſon can be aſſigned, why, Almighty God ſhould ſtop ſhort at an inferior End: Neither, can the moſt-perfectly upright Will act without Reaſon; much leſs, can it act contrary to any Dictate of Right Reaſon. For, altho'

the Obligation of a Law, in this Place, be properly called, *That Obligation which ariſes from the Will of ſome Superior:* Yet, ſuch an Obligation ought not here to take Place, it being an Obligation intrinſic and inherent to the Law itſelf: And, therefore, the uniform, regular Perfection of this Law will always, with a more ſteady Uniformity and Immutability, determine its own Nature and Tendency, to agree with an Omniſcient, Intelligent Being. Becauſe, it implies a manifeſt Contradiction to imagine, that, the ſame Will ſhould be Divine, or moſt perfect; and yet, at the ſame time, to jar and diſagree with the moſt perfect Dictate and Precept of the Divine Intellect.

8. It being, therefore, a Point allowed and taken for granted, That, Almighty God propoſes and lays down *The Common Good* as *The End* He principally deſigns; The Concluſion, then, becomes very Natural, That, the Divine Will and Pleaſure is, that, Mankind muſt and are to purſue the ſame End: And, it is alſo as evident, that, the reſpective Diſtributions of Rewards and Puniſhments are the Means principally neceſſary, whereby they themſelves (*i. e.* Mankind) are moſt unerringly brought to concur and agree with the Divine Will: Or, that, they freely co-operate in promoting this *very one End*: And—That, They are deterred and frightened from Acts contrary to, and deſtructive of, *this End.* Almighty God Wills, therefore, that, Puniſhments and Rewards, which, He Himſelf knew to be ſufficient and powerful enough to protect and guard this *one End:* Almighty God, I ſay, Wills, from the Natures of Things, as the various Circumſtances and Opportunities of Moral Acts require, both to decree and to diſtribute theſe Rewards and Puniſhments.

9. From whence we may collect: That, if any one Neceſſary requiſite to anſwer this *Grand End,* be wanting in this Life, that, ſuch a Neceſſary requiſite will be completely ſupplied in the Life to come. And, upon this *one principal Foundation* the Heathens ſettled their Preſages, their Prognoſtics, concerning the Happineſs or Miſery of Mankind departed this Life, according as their ſeveral Deeds were either *Good* or *Evil.* But, Theſe their Opinions may be eaſily learned from their own Writings.

SECT. XX.

Rewards and Puniſhments, from the Notion of Divine Providence, proved to be the Will of God.

See Prolegomena, Sect. 7. Pages 20, 21, &c. Notes.

FROM the Principles laid down, *Concerning the Rational Method of Acting, and the Final Cauſes or Ends purſued by Almighty God,* this one *Grand Concluſion,* I think, ought chiefly, and in the firſt Place, to be drawn: From theſe Principles, I ſay, Reaſon can demonſtrate, that, the *Beneficence,* the *Juſtice,* the *Equity,* and thoſe other Attributes which carry any Reſemblance to the human Virtues, do actually exiſt in Almighty

ty God, and, in the Diſpenſations of his Divine Providence. And—conſequently—That, Almighty God Himſelf *wills* to govern Mankind by Laws, Rules and Precepts, guarded and ſanctified by Rewards and Puniſhments: And, this one Principle, indeed, alone, (if there were no other) totally deſtroys [the Ἀπρονοησία, or] that improvident Neglect in the Gods maintained by *Epicurus*. Becauſe, upon this one Principle it is, that, all the Divine Attributes carry this one Tendency: And, that, the whole Office of *Dominion* or *Providence*, (and for the Vindication of which we here ſo ſtrenuouſly contend) in this one ſingle Point, as far as we can underſtand, conſiſts, *That, The Common Good of all Rational Beings be promoted by Means the moſt ſuitable and beſt fitted to anſwer this End.* But—this Article will appear in a clearer, more demonſtrative Light, when we come to conſider thoſe Arguments which will fall under our View, when hereafter we ſhall treat of the Virtues, and of Civil Government.

Epicurus and his Followers deny a Providence.

The only one Obſervation which I ſhall at preſent add, is *This*, That, the *Epicureans* have in vain beſtowed their Beatitude and Majeſty: Unleſs they allow, in the ſame Being, Wiſdom or Prudence and Juſtice; And, conſequently, all Kinds and Sorts of Virtues. Becauſe, all the Virtues are comprehended in Prudence, as in an original Source, which leads and directs us by the fitteſt Means to the *Beſt End:* And, this very Point *Epicurus* himſelf acknowledges.——And, as to univerſal Juſtice, all the Virtues are, indeed, only conſtituent Branches of it. There cannot poſſibly be, in the next Place, any Happineſs, any Majeſty,——not even the leaſt Shadow of Dignity in any Rational Agent, ſuppoſing him unendowed with Wiſdom or Prudence, and without Virtues ſuitable and adapted to ſuch a Wiſdom or Prudence. Neither, can there truly be any Prudence, unleſs *The very beſt End* be laid down, and Means proper and ſuitable to ſuch *an End.* Neither, can *Ends* and *Means* be applied, if they be not fixed and immutable in their own Nature: That is to ſay, in plainer Terms, if nothing be, in its own Nature *Good*, before it becomes the Object of our Choice and Election: As alſo, if *one End* be not, in its own Nature, preferable to *another*—And, if ſome Sorts of *Means* are not, in their own Nature, more ſuitable and more congruous than other ſome: *E. G.* If the *Public Good* be not greater and better, than a *Private Good*; And, if *Innocency*, *Fidelity*, *Gratitude*, &c. be not *Means* better fitted to promote this *End*, than *Barbarity*, *Perfidy* and *Ingratitude*. *Power*, ſuppoſing it as extenſive as poſſible, if it be ſimply conſidered, without the leaſt Regard, either, to *Juſtice* and *Wiſdom* or *Prudence*, contains in it, beyond all Queſtion, no higher Degrees of Beatitude and Majeſty, than what may be found in an heavy Maſs of Lead infinite in its Weight. For—*Weight* bears a cloſe Reſemblance to *Power*; and—*Which*, The Writers upon the Mechanic Powers very well know. And—To which, we may alſo further add, that, This Kind of Reaſoning carries, upon this very Account, a ſtill ſtronger Confutation of the *Epicureans:* Becauſe, the

See the Paſſage quoted by Gaſſendus in his Philoſophy of Epicurus, Page 1293.

the very *Epicureans*, if we credit *Gaſſendus*; or, (1) if we credit *Velleius* in *Cicero*, (who takes upon himſelf a Defence of the *Epicurean* Opinions) acknowledge, that, the Beatitude, the Felicity, the Happineſs of the Gods eſſentially lies in this very Point, that, *Each enjoys his own Wiſdom and Virtue.* The *Epicureans* cannot, poſſibly, have any other Way left to get clear of thoſe abſurd Difficulties, which ſo cloſely preſs their Philoſophy, than, by confeſſing, that, a Rational Wiſe Being muſt take care of, and regard *The one ſupreme ultimate common End*, to be purſued by the whole Syſtem of Rational Beings, As alſo, the *neceſſary Means* immediately and directly leading to this *one grand End.* For, *Means* and *Ends* being once baniſhed and deſtroyed, the empty Sound only (without any Signification) of *Wiſdom*, *Prudence* and *Virtue*, or even of *Deity itſelf* remains:—For, the *Subſtance*, the *Reality* is baniſhed.

SECT. XXI.

TO this Argument, drawn from the Divine Attributes, is nearly related the Argument taken from the Idea, the Notion of a Firſt Cauſe; by which Idea or Notion, God becomes known to Men from his Works of Creation: For, under this Idea or Notion is comprehended,

See Sect. 1. of this Chapter, Pages 286, 287.

That, *All Creatures, but more eſpecially Rational Creatures, receive their Exiſtence, or Being, from the Will of God: And, conſequently, that they receive, alſo, all the intrinſic, eſſential Powers and Abilities of their Nature.*

Now, ſince it is demonſtratively certain, That, *The Common Good of Mankind* carries in it no other Signification, than, the Preſervation of their Nature, and a Right State or Condition of all thoſe moſt vigorous, lively Powers, intrinſically inherent in them: The Human Underſtanding cannot, conſequently, but conclude and determine it more credible, more probable, that, the very ſame moſt regularly-conſtant, uniform Will (by which, Exiſtence or Being is granted to Man) chuſes alſo, that, Man ſhould, not only, have *Being*, but alſo, *Well-being:* That is, be preſerved, and enjoy Happineſs, in ſuch Degrees and Proportions, as the Nature of all the other Parts of the whole Syſtem can neceſſarily admit; And, *Both Which*, God created at one and the ſame Time: Is not This, I ſay, more credible, more probable, than to ſuppoſe, Man thrown out of that State and Condition in which the Creator placed him: But, more eſpecially,

(1) *If we credit* Velleius *in* Cicero, *&c.*] Et quærere a nobis, Balbe, ſoletis, quæ vita deorum ſit, quæque ab iis degatur ætas? Ea videlicet, quâ nihil beatius, nihil omnibus bonis affluentius cogitari poteſt: Nihil enim agit; nullis occupationibus eſt implicatus; nulla opera molitur; ſuâ ſapientiâ & virtute gaudet: Habet exploratum, fore ſe ſemper cùm in maximis tùm in æternis voluptatibus. *Cicero de Naturâ Deorum*, Lib. 1. Cap. 19. *See the Note under the Term* Epicureans, Chap. 1. Sect. 1. Pages 1. *and* 2. *of this Book.*

ally, ſince there does not appear the Neceſſity for ſuch a Suppoſition, from any Regard which the Preſervation and Good of the Whole require. For, here, I ſuppoſe it a Doctrine well-known and eſtabliſhed upon the true Principles of Natural Philoſophy, That, the natural Viciſſitudes or Changes, That, the Decays or Corruptions, and the Generations or Beginnings of Things, do always take their Riſe from thoſe Laws of Motion, whereby, the whole Syſtem of the World is preſerved. And, if ſo, it muſt, moſt certainly, proceed from the ſame Principle of Goodneſs, that, Man ſhould exiſt and continue in that State, in which (according to the inward, eſſential Frame and Condition of Human Nature) He ſhall be preſerved and aſſiſted ſo far, as the Reaſons and Natures of Things in general will admit. For, ſince, neither the Bodily Force, nor the Intellectual Capacity of Man, can purſue any End, relating to created Beings, greater than that End which immediately concerns *the Preſervation of the Human Kind*; it is, therefore, abſolutely neceſſary, that, Man ſhould conclude *This* to be *the one chief End* which Almighty God *Wills* him to preſerve, maintain and ſupport. Neither, can there be any Doubt, but, at the time when Almighty God intruſted Man with this *principal Care* and *chief Concern*, that, The Divine Will intended and reſolved alſo to honour Human Induſtry and Virtue with Rewards; And, to baniſh Treachery, Perfidy, Idleneſs and Sloth, by inflicting Puniſhments. Thus, then, to be ſure, from the Divine Will *in Creating*, is diſcovered and known the Divine Will *in Preſerving and Protecting* all Mankind.

From the ſame Divine Will, that Obligation, alſo, becomes known, which enjoins an Obedience to the Divine Will thus revealed to us and laid open to our Obſervation, Notice and Knowledge.

By juſt the like Method of Inveſtigation, we conclude and collect, that, It is the Will and Pleaſure of Almighty God, that, Mankind ſhould honour and obey HIM. For, ſince, in the *Creation* and *Preſervation* of the Syſtem of this World which we inhabit, God was pleaſed to diſcover, by ſo many ſure, clear, manifeſt Criteria, Characteriſtics and Marks, his own Divine Perfections: And, ſince He was pleaſed, alſo, to place Man in ſuch a Condition, that, if he exerted the Powers of his Rational Underſtanding, he could not but obſerve the Criteria, *&c.* of theſe Perfections: Therefore, Almighty God *willed*, that, Man ſhould find out and know the Divine Being and Attributes, and make Acknowledgments ſuitable to ſo glorious and tranſcendent a Nature. Becauſe, ſince it is *The Will* of Almighty God, that, Mankind are created Rational, *i. e.* regular, uniform, conſtant, ſteady, and, in their true original Nature, utter Enemies to all Contradiction; His Will and Pleaſure moſt certainly, therefore, is, that, their Words and Deeds ſhould agree with the natural Sentiments of their Minds concerning His Perfections: *i. e.* in other Words, Almighty God *wills* all Mankind to Worſhip, Honour and Obey Him.

SECT.

SECT. XXII.

The natural Conſequences of Moral Acts another Proof that Rewards and Puniſhments are the Will of God.

THE ſecond Method, whereby we underſtand it the Will of God, that, Mankind ought to perform Acts executing *the Common Good of Rational Beings:* Or, that, it is his Will to enforce ſuch Acts with *Rewards*, and to coerce or reſtrain Acts contrary, with *Puniſhments*, is drawn from the evident Effects of the Divine Will itſelf, *i. e.* from the *Puniſhments* and the *Rewards* which, in the ſtated Order and regular Courſe of Things, are the natural Conſequences of Human Acts themſelves: And, The Divine Will, in this Caſe, is likewiſe fully demonſtrated, from the Frame and Structure of all Mankind: As alſo, from the Formation and Compoſition of the whole Syſtem of this World: And, that, theſe natural Conſequences of Human Actions, either inflict Evils upon us, or enlarge the Bleſſings of Life. For, there can be no Doubt, but Almighty God has conſtituted the natural Courſe and Order of all Things ſo, that, this Courſe, this Order, ſhould, to the Agents themſelves, demonſtrate the natural Conſequences of their own Acts: And, moreover, That, The Divine Wiſdom has contrived and ordered Things in ſuch a Manner, that theſe *common ordinary Conſequences* may be foreknown and determined by Mankind themſelves: And alſo, that, *ſuch Conſequences* ought, upon the Foundations of Probability, to be expected by them.

See the two Axioms at Pages 117, 118. and the Notes upon them. See the Notes at Pages 193, 194.

It moſt certainly is the Divine Will and Pleaſure, that, *theſe Conſequences* ſhould be well-weighed and conſidered by Mankind, before they attempt to act at all: And—That, They ſhould be influenced and determined by *Conſequences*, thus prepared and foreſeen, as by Motives and Arguments comprehended under the Sanction of Laws: Theſe Effects being, in the *firſt* Place, not only ſuch inward Delights of Soul, as inſeparably await and attend thoſe who exert the beſt and nobleſt Acts, contributing towards, and conſtituting, the *Public Good:* But, as they are, on the contrary, alſo, thoſe Wrecks, Furies and Tortures (ſuch as Dreads, Fears, Apprehenſions, Diſtruſts, and thoſe other Anxieties of Mind) which purſue and laſh the Profligate and Wicked: And, theſe Effects are, *Secondly*, likewiſe, The extrinſic, outward Puniſhments, adventitious, which come from abroad: And Rewards, alſo, ariſing from other Rational Agents, who, (according to the natural Dictates of Right Reaſon, as applied to the *Beſt End*, and to the *Wiſeſt Means*) by this Method, defend the Human Kind from Deſtruction, and promote the *Common Happineſs of ALL.*

Internal Effects.

External Effects.

For, if Mankind in general do, or, at leaſt, ſuch of them as do form the right and true Judgment concerning the *Beſt End* and the *Beſt Means:* (As for Inſtance, If they rationally conclude, That, *Common Good* is the *beſt*, the *ultimate End*, which they can propoſe to themſelves: And, that, *Rewards* and *Puniſhments* are *Means* beſt fitted to this *End*) they may, then, from

the

the Nature of Things, be determined in a Practical Judgment concerning Points at any time under their Deliberation, and which become the Subject-matter of their Enquiry.——And the Foundation of this Reaſoning is demonſtrative: Becauſe, All Impreſſions, laid by Things natural upon the Mind, are neceſſary——and, more eminently ſo, becauſe, All the Determinations and Reſults of ſuch Impreſſions, (as Cauſes) take their true and immediate Origin from the Firſt Cauſe. It, therefore, neceſſarily follows, That, all thoſe Dictates of *Right Reaſon* (by Vertue of which, all, and every one of, Mankind determine, concerning the Neceſſity of diſtributive, reſpective Rewards and Puniſhments, in order to promote that *Common Good*, as the *beſt*, *ſupremeſt End* which they can purſue) take their firſt Riſe and Original, alſo, from the Firſt Cauſe, Almighty God. Which, to expreſs in other Words, is only thus much, That, all Mankind are obliged and determined (from the Will of Almighty God, by the Intervention and Informations of Natural Cauſes, as originally ſettled at the Creation) to judge, that, *the Common Good* is both *the beſt End, and the greateſt attainable Good:* And, that, in *this Good*, alſo, all Mankind naturally agree, as being *that Good* which comprehends the private Felicity of Individuals, at leaſt, ſo far as the Natures of Things in general will ſuffer and permit.——And, it is equally neceſſary alſo, as fitteſt Means to this End, That, Individuals reſpectively ſhould, ſo far as they poſſibly can, take Care, that *Puniſhments* and *Rewards* be diſtributed, by *which Sanctions*, Actions ſuitably fitted to *this one ſupreme End*, ſhould be applauded and honoured. And, that, All Acts contrary to *this End*, ſhould be ſuppreſſed, diſcouraged, *&c.*

Since, then, in theſe Propoſitions (concerning the *beſt End*, and *Means conducive to it:* Or, concerning the *greateſt Good* and the *Cauſes of it* within Human Power) are comprehended all thoſe *Concluſions* which we term and define *Laws of Nature:* It neceſſarily follows, That, all theſe *Concluſions* or *Laws* (*i. e.* All the *Propoſitions* conſtituted by them) are impreſſed upon and laid in the Human Mind, from *the Will of the Firſt Cauſe*; and, conſequently, that, the Firſt Cauſe *willed* ſuch *Puniſhments* and *Rewards* to be diſtributed by Mankind, as far, and in as high a Degree, as Human Power reaches, according to the true Intent, Meaning and Tenor of theſe Practical Precepts. From whence *This Concluſion* naturally ariſes, That, *All Puniſhments and Rewards thus diſtributed, are diſpenſed, according to the Will of the Firſt Cauſe: And, that, they All (both Puniſhment and Reward, thus diſpenſed) are Effects and Determinations of the Divine Will: Which Divine Will, being once ſufficiently publiſhed and known, the Obligation of all Mankind, ariſing neceſſarily from the Divine Will thus publicly declared, cannot poſſibly continue a Secret.* It is, beſides this, alſo, further manifeſt, That, the very ſame ſupreme all-wiſe God, (always conſiſtent with Himſelf and his own Attributes) who willed, that, Mankind ſhould defend and protect, as far as in them lies, *the Com-*

mon Good, will alſo, where Human Power and Sanction are inſufficient, (and upon the ſame Principle of Reaſon) protect *this Common Good* with his own Divine Care and Providence. I judge it, then, proper to dwell ſomewhat longer than ordinary upon this Argument: Becauſe, I greatly hope, That, our Adverſaries will more readily grant the Efficacy of ſuch Reaſoning, ſince they are ſo immoderately fond of their own Preſervation: And, moreover, becauſe there are many Proofs of this Argument which will fall under our Conſideration in the *Nature of Things:* And, Which will require a more accurate Enquiry, a clearer Explanation. We reduce, therefore, in Conſequence of what we have already ſaid, *a Moral Obligation* (which is the immediate Reſult and Effect of Laws) into the Principal Original Author of theſe Laws, namely, the *Will* and *Deſign* of Almighty God promoting the *Common Good*, and ſanctifying thoſe *Practical Propoſitions*, which aim at *This End*, with Puniſhments and Rewards annexed to the Form and Importance of Them.

The Foundation of a Moral Obligation.

Laws, which carry in themſelves their own Rewards and Puniſhments, carry their own Sanctions.

The Diſtinction between an *Obligation* and a *Sanction*.

Now, with reſpect to Mankind, that *Care of Self-happineſs* which cauſes them to *Puniſh and Reward*, (for, by *Puniſhments and Rewards*, Mankind muſt be influenced, encouraged and wrought up to an Obedience) will, in no Sort, lay the Foundation of an Obligation. Becauſe, *Obligation* wholly ariſes from the Injunction of a Law, as it is the Command of a Lawgiver: Whereas, there muſt be a Tendency, a Diſpoſition in the Subject-matter (that is, in the Frame and Structure) of the Law itſelf, ſo natural, as to carry, by its own inherent Rewards and Puniſhments, a Sanction, powerful enough to influence the Behaviour of Mankind into an Obedience: Juſt as, in the mutual Contact of Natural Bodies, it is neceſſarily required, that, a Quieſcent Body to be moved, ſhould be put into Motion, by a Body in Motion: And yet, the Power of the Moving Body, *i. e.* philoſophically ſpeaking *Motion itſelf* is the only Cauſe why *the Body moved* is impelled. But, there is one Obſervation which here deſerves ſome Notice: And it is, That, there are Perſons, who, altho' groſsly ſtupid and ſlow of Underſtanding, ſo as utterly to neglect the *Divine Will* and the *Obligation* (conſequent upon this Will) annexed to a *Law*, are yet attentive enough as to the Influences of a Sanction enforced by this very ſame Law itſelf. For, as the Care of Self-preſervation and of Self-perfection, is a Care ſo natural as inſeparably to inhere in Man: And—is, alſo, ſuch a Care as is maintained and ſtrengthened by the Motives, Aſſiſtances and Helps of Right Reaſon: It is, therefore, upon theſe Accounts, acknowledged a Care which ought to receive ſome Degree of Eſtimation amongſt [προηγμένα; *Bonarum Actionum*] *the Motives, the inducing, exciting, antecedent Cauſes of good Actions*, altho' not of *Obligation:* And, the Reaſon why ſuch a Care, or ſuch a Cauſe deſerves ſome Regard, is, Becauſe, from God as the Author of Nature, This Cauſe takes its firſt Origin: And, conſequently, The Influences, which ſuch a Cauſe carries over us, do not, in the leaſt, derogate either from the Authority and Power,

See Burlamaqui's Principles of Natural Law, Part 2. Chap. 12. and Puffendorf's Law of Nature and Nations, Book 2. Chap. 3. Sect. 21.

See Chap. 1. Sect. 26. and Chap. 5. Sect. 36.

Power, or the Honour and Glory of Almighty God—But—on the contrary, is *a Cauſe Natural*, and, as ſuch, muſt be deemed of ſome Weight, of ſome Influence, of ſome Uſe.

SECT. XXIII.

Upon a Supposition that the Natures of Things continue as they are, the Obligation of the Law of Nature is immutable.

HERE, however, at the ſame time, it muſt be allowed, that, the Self-happineſs of each Individual ſingly, is but a minutely-ſmall Particle of that *Grand End* which Man, truly-rational and wiſe, is to purſue:——And, with reſpect to the whole, entire, perfect End, (namely, *the Common Good*, which is interwoven into our inward Frame and Conſtitution, by Nature, or by Almighty God) it bears the ſame Proportion, that, one Man bears to the whole Aggregate of all Rational Beings, which is infinitely-leſs than the Proportion which one ſingle minutely-ſmall Particle of Sand bears to the whole Maſs of Univerſal Matter. For, Almighty God (between WHOM and Man no Sort of computable Proportion can exiſt) is conceived within the Denomination of Rational Beings, and to whoſe Glory and Honour, in our Searches after the *Public Good*, the beſt Satisfaction and Acknowledgment in our Power muſt always be made: And, yet—at the ſame time, we muſt not forget that full Regard due to the Agency and Happineſs of Mankind—a Regard not confined to a Generation at any one time exiſting: But, to Mankind at all times, and every where.—In a Word, leſt any one ſhould imagine, that, the Bond of this Obligation connected with the Laws of Nature, as deduced from the Will and Authority of the Firſt Cauſe, is arbitrary, changeable, and a Creature of Imagination only, it is incumbent upon me here to add, that, the Practice of *Benevolence*, (and, conſequently, of all the *Moral Virtues*) in promoting the *Private Happineſs* of all the ſingular Individuals in the Rational Syſtem, which is no other than *the Common Happineſs of All*, carries in it the Foundation, the Reaſon of a Natural Cauſe, over its own truly-natural Effects: Or, in other Words, carries in it the Efficacy of *Means neceſſary to an End*; with this one Condition only, That the Natures of Things continue as at preſent they do; ſuppoſing, even, the Dominion, the Authority of God to be left entirely out of the Queſtion. For, I do apprehend and underſtand the Argument in this Light, (as, indeed, do the Generality of all rational Men) That, the Addition of two Units to two Units, already laid down, conſtitutes the Number Four: Or, that, Geometrical and Mechanical Operations do always invariably ſolve certain Problems propoſed; ſo that, neither *the Wiſdom* nor *the Will* of Almighty God can be ſuppoſed able to conſtitute and order any thing to the contrary.—And, yet—at the ſame time, it is undoubtedly true, that, all Human Acts, with all the Effects ariſing from them, do depend entirely upon the *Will* of God, the Firſt Cauſe: And, conſequently, that, all the

Practical Operations, both in Arithmetic and Geometry with all their Effects, do proceed from, and owe their Exiſtence to, the ſame Cauſe. But, our whole Diſquiſition and Enquiry, at preſent, is, *Concerning the Exiſtence of the Laws of Nature, with their Sanction and Obligation:* And, this is to be taken and drawn entirely from the *Will* of the Firſt Cauſe. For, according to our preſent Doctrine, we require no other Cauſe, than, the Cauſe from Whom, the Faculties, Abilities, Powers, Acts and Natures of Rational Agents, draw and take their Exiſtence. And, This will appear evident in the Sequel and gradual Progreſs of our Enquiry. For which Reaſon, it is ſo far from being in my Intention to imagine, that, any Mutability, or, any, the leaſt, Shadow of Change, can be concluded, in the *Obligation of the Laws of Nature*, from our Reaſoning: That, on the contrary, I have, with all the Care and Diligence in my Power, endeavoured to prove and evince, that, ſuch a Change of Obligation in theſe Laws, cannot poſſibly happen without a manifold Contradiction. As for Inſtance, *Firſt*, That, Almighty God ſhould WILL Rational Creatures to be what they are; and yet, at the ſame time, that, theſe very Beings ſhould not be bound down to, and obliged by, *thoſe Laws of Nature*, as here ſtated and maintained: For, by this one ſingle Argument only, it can be proved, that, *ſuch*, or *ſuch a Thing cannot be done by Almighty God:* Becauſe, He is able to do all poſſible Things, which do not imply a Contradiction.

Secondly, If any one, therefore, ſhall happen to think, that, God can reconcile Contradictions, and cauſe them to co-exiſt: By the ſame Parity of Reaſoning upon Things, it can equally be proved, That, He cannot produce ſuch an Effect as this: And, conſequently, any ſuch Aſſertion is empty, trifling, vain. All rational, ingenuous Men will, therefore, in my Opinion, judge and determine, that, I have ſhewn the *Law of Nature* to be ſufficiently immutable, in caſe I demonſtrate, that, *this Law* cannot be changed without a Contradiction, whilſt the Nature of Things and their actual operative Powers (which depend upon the Divine Will) continue unchangeable. And, this Demonſtration will be ſufficiently made out, by proving, that, BOTH, the *Common Happineſs of All* can proceed and flow from the Natural Efficacy of the *Acts of Univerſal Benevolence:*—And, that, the *Happineſs of the ſingle Individuals* cannot poſſibly, upon the Principles of Reaſon and Nature, be ſeparated from that Happineſs which bleſſes and renders *All* happy. And this Reaſoning is, indeed, partly true; becauſe, the Security, the Health, the Safety of the ſingle, individual, conſtituent Parts, does not, in Reality, differ from the Security, the Health, the Safety of the Whole: And, partly alſo, Becauſe, by Vertue of Acts which render us ſerviceable to others, we, in ſome Degree, render ourſelves happy: And, by theſe Means, we influence and determine others, as much as in us lies, to remunerate and, with Gratitude pay back, in Return our Kindneſſes. By

Axiom.

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theſe Means, to be ſure, it comes to paſs, and by no other, that, Acts of a public Utility, of common Benefit, in a natural way confer and beſtow Rewards upon the Authors and Workers of ſuch *Common Good.* Where. as, Acts, at the ſame time, of a quite contrary Tendency, do not, in a leſs natural way, draw down Puniſhment and Deſtruction upon their Authors.

SECT. XXIV.

Mr. Hobbes, by confeſſing the Truth, contradicts his own favourite Doctrine.

DISMISSING, therefore, for the preſent, *That Right of All over All, and the State of War,* from thence ariſing, which Mr. *Hobbes,* as we have already ſhewn, has (but, to very little Purpoſe) endeavoured to eſtabliſh: Let us now paſs on and examine into That Poſition, which, from the evident Truth of the Caſe, Mr. *Hobbes* was forced to grant, namely, " That, Univerſal War, involving in it total Deſtruction, muſt " enſue from the Violation of ſuch Rational Dictates, as prohibit and for- " bid an arrogant Aſſumption to SELF of a Right over ALL."—— And——" Which," [*Rational Dictates*] according to his own Confeſſion, " command us to perform our Contracts, to ſtand by our Engage- " ments, *&c.*" Becauſe, " in the punctual Diſcharge of theſe Covenants " and Agreements all the Virtues are," as Mr. *Hobbes* himſelf does not deny, " employed." To which Conceſſions of His, we alſo further add and affirm, That, the Evils of War carry in them the Nature of that Puniſhment which is neceſſarily connected with theſe, and ſuch like, Violations, by the Will of that Ruler and Governor, Who fixed and eſtabliſhed this whole Univerſe in its natural Courſe, Beauty and Order. From whence, therefore, it is, that, *the Nature of Things* being our Guide (and, conſequently, the Author of Nature, Almighty God, declaring it to be ſo) the Human Mind is inſtructed, warned and cautioned before-hand, of the Puniſhment naturally connected with ſuch, or ſuch, an Act; and, the Obligation from hence is clearly diſcovered to us, That, we muſt, and ought, to refrain from every ſuch Act: Or, in other Words, That, the Human Mind is, by a ſufficiently-evident Indication, reſtrained from acting *thus:* But, much more ſo, upon this Account, That, acting after this Manner, is demonſtrated to be deſtructive of others, as well as of the Tranſgreſſor himſelf. To me, beyond all Diſpute, more agreeable, ſweeter and more eligible always, than even Life itſelf, is *The Common Good:* Under the Notion of which *Good,* we may fairly, and with Juſtice, comprehend the *Glory of God,* and the *Ultimate Happineſs of the whole Human Kind:* And, conſequently, that, ſuch Evils as either leſſen and derogate from the Glory of God: Or, which hazard and expoſe to Danger the higheſt Perfection of Human Creatures, muſt be adjudged a much greater Evil than the Loſs even of Life itſelf. Upon this Foundation, I

Evils, ariſing from Violations of the Law of Nature, are in themſelves Puniſhments.

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ground the Sanction of *Natural Puniſhments*; and, for this very Reaſon, Becauſe, the Violation of Natural Laws injures the principal Faculties and Powers of the Tranſgreſſor, introduces Folly and Abſurdity into his Underſtanding, and the corrupt vitiated Preference of Evil into his Will, under the Gloſs, the falſe Colour of Good. But, as ſuch Speculations, concerning the Things of Nature, as theſe, are chiefly formed by abſtracted Underſtandings intent upon the Operations and Powers of the Mind itſelf; ſo, ſuch abſtruſe Notions do not powerfully-enough ſtrike the Imagination, the Apprehenſions of thoſe, whoſe chief Concern it is to conſult the Eaſe, Security and Gratification of ſenſual Pleaſures. It ſeems, therefore, very proper, here, to ſatisfy the Senſes, (even to an ocular Demonſtration) That, Theſe external outward Evils are Puniſhments (which Evils Mr. *Hobbes* acknowledges to ariſe from the violated Laws of Virtue; Laws, the neceſſary eſſential Means of Peace) and to conſider theſe very Evils as Puniſhments annexed to the Laws of Nature by the Author of Nature: And, that, the Fact ſtands thus, is capable of Demonſtration, even from frequent remarkable Inſtances, clear and evident every Day to all our Senſes, without having the leaſt Recourſe to any one ſpeculative, abſtracted Demonſtration whatſoever.

With how cloſe a Connexion does the Damage retort upon thoſe who are injurious to the *Public Good?* This Fact clearly places in our View the perfect and true Definition of a Puniſhment; and may ſerve to demonſtrate, that, The Law prohibiting Public Injuries, thus puniſhed, is a Law ſanctified, ratified, eſtabliſhed and fixed by the great Contriver and Author of Nature. It appears, by the ſame cloſe evident Connexion, alſo, that, all thoſe Bleſſings, which ſpring up and flouriſh out of that Peace and Concord, which, a ſtudious Concern for the Public Welfare always eſtabliſhes, carry, in their very Nature, the Sanction, the Intention of a Reward: And may alſo, in like Manner, ſerve to demonſtrate, that, The binding Sanction and firm Obligation of a Law, is fixed by Almighty God himſelf, to the poſitive Commandments of the Virtues. And then, in the next Place, by very eaſy natural Conſequences, we are given to underſtand, by what Method, the Good and Evil of our own Minds may eaſily be foreſeen to happen, from either Commiſſions or Omiſſions, about the *Public Good:* And alſo, after what Manner, Joy and Grief, ariſing from an impreſſed Senſe, upon our own Minds, of the Happineſs or Miſery of others, may be demonſtrated: What Kinds of Acts thoſe are, what Kind of Behaviour that is, which, under all Events, muſt ſo forcibly bind theſe Obligations upon us. By ſuch an eaſy, obvious Progreſs as This, the Human Mind can, without much Trouble, ariſe to the exquiſite, inward Senſe and Reliſh of that Joy, which is felt and perceived from that perfectly-well-underſtood Harmony and Agreement of our own Minds and Conſciences, in thoſe Practical Precepts and Principles, with the Intention and Will of Almighty God

The Laws of Nature are defended both by Obligation and Sanction.

God, thus moſt diffuſively benevolent: And alſo, to form a true Eſtimate, and feel that exquiſite Torture of Heart, which ariſes from that clearly-perceived Repugnancy or Contradiction between the corrupt Suggeſtions of our own Hearts, of our evil Paſſions, and the Divine Love and Affections in the Care and Government of Mankind. The ultimate Perfection of all Human Happineſs, is eſſentially founded and laid in ſuch Joys and Enjoyments as theſe: And, on the contrary, the moſt deteſtable ſordideſt Miſery is as eſſentially laid in theſe Pains, Tortures, Anxieties and Wrecks of Mind. I therefore, upon this very Account, affirm, That, the Sanction of an Obligation is, from hence, connected and inſeparably adjoined and united to the Dictates of Reaſon.——And, conſequently, Whenever Laws exert all their Influence, all their Virtue, from the Will of God annexing Rewards to the Obſervance of them, and ſuch dreadful Puniſhments upon Diſobedience, there is no Reaſon why ſuch Laws ſhould not be called *The Laws of Nature.* But we are to begin with Obſervations evident to our outward Senſes, and which are confeſſedly allowed to be Arguments ariſing from Senſe.

SECT. XXV.

IT is evident, (to ſpeak in the Logical Language) from the very Terms themſelves of the Propoſition, when well underſtood, That, ſo common a Sewer of peſtilential Evils, pouring in Deſtruction upon All, as well from War, as from rancorous, malignant Animoſities and Quarrels of All againſt All: In order to remove, I ſay, ſuch fatal and univerſal Deſtruction, it is abſolutely neceſſary, even for the Preſervation of Individuals, that One and All ſhould earneſtly deſire and ſeek after Peace: And, therefore, the very ſame Means of Peace, which we determine neceſſary to our own Preſervation, we ought to determine equally neceſſary to the Preſervation of others. *E. G.* We muſt faithfully ſtand by our Engagements, Promiſes and Contracts. 2. We muſt render ourſelves agreeable and uſeful to others. 3. We muſt cultivate and improve all the other Moral Virtues: Which Virtues (if they be more accurately and exactly conſidered and examined into) all tend to promote the *Common Good.*

Mr. *Hobbes* himſelf acknowledges theſe Truths, as the Reader may ſee, if he conſults his Book *De Cive,* Chap. 1. Sect. 15. Chap. 2. Sect. 3. Chap. 3. Sect. 1. and the other Parts of this Treatiſe. But, Mr. *Hobbes* repeats, over and over again, the ſame Truths in his *Leviathan,* where he deduces them from the Care and Regard for Self-preſervation *only*: For, He does not acknowledge any ſuch Thing as *Common Good,* antecedent and prior to the Eſtabliſhment of Civil Society. Now, notwithſtanding all theſe Conceſſions, Mr. *Hobbes* does, with all poſſible Diligence

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and Induſtry, at the ſame time, inculcate The one favourite Principle of his, *viz. That, every one Individual muſt wage War againſt All; in which State of War, there is no room left to hope for the leaſt Safety.* From which Principle, he intends his favourite Conſequence unavoidably to follow—namely—" That, Every one muſt aſſume to himſelf a Right over " All, both Perſons and Things:" All Perſons being, as he ſuppoſes, contrary and oppoſite to all the Means apparently neceſſary towards Peace: Means, which, according to common Acceptation, are eminently diſtinguiſhed by the Name and Title of *Virtues.* It is a Maxim indiſputably true, That, all Mankind, in every State, (whether of Nature, or of Civil Society) are, from the neceſſary Principle of Self-preſervation, excited and impelled to Reſiſt, Oppoſe and Puniſh thoſe, who either attempt their Lives, altho' never ſo innocent and void of Offence: Or, who would rob them of the Means neceſſary to Self-preſervation. Upon this very Foundation it is, that, Evils inflicted, by the Command of Right Reaſon, upon thoſe who act Deſtruction againſt the Human Kind, are called *Puniſhments:* And, that, thoſe Practical Propoſitions, which teach us the Neceſſity *of doing unto all Men, as we would they ſhould do unto us,* carry in them a Puniſhment annexed to the Violation of them, by the Author of Rational Nature: And, from hence it is, that Theſe Practical Propoſitions are ſo remarkably diſtinguiſhed, as to carry in them the whole Force and Energy of Laws. And, therefore, theſe Laws are not, when conſidered in this Light, any longer to be looked upon as mere Practical Operations only, ſhewing the Conſtruction of certain Mathematical Problems (the Application and Uſe of which, any Rational Agent may ſafely neglect): But, they, with all the Juſtice and Propriety imaginable, aſſume to themſelves the Name, the Dignity of *Laws,* and claim the Obedience due to Laws. The preſent Caſe, for Inſtance, is juſt the ſame as in the poſitive inſtituted Laws of Civil Society. The Tye of every ſuch Law, is characterized by the binding Force, the Sanction of it, *i. e.* by Rewards and Puniſhments. Whereas, the Right of Sanctifying, after the Manner I have deſcribed, the *Laws of Nature* muſt be reſolved into the *Natural Authority of Almighty God:* By Vertue of which *Authority,* He governs all Things. The intrinſic Goodneſs of theſe Natural Laws, diſcovers itſelf from the neceſſary Connexion of [the *Actus Imperati,* as they are termed by the Moraliſts, *i. e.* of] all ſuch rational, voluntary Acts as ariſe from the Whole Man, with the Preſervation and Increaſe of the *Common Good:* In almoſt-exactly the ſame Manner, that, the Right of eſtabliſhing by a Sanction the Laws of Civil Society, is reſolved into that Authority of Civil Governors, Magiſtrates: And yet, the Goodneſs of theſe Laws, at the ſame time, eſſentially conſiſts in the ſuitable Fitneſs of the Acts commanded, with the Benefits, Advantages of the Society itſelf. Let us, for Example, to illuſtrate what is here ſaid, take under our Conſideration The one univerſal Propoſition, which we have laid down already,

Actus Imperati.

See Chap. 1. Sect. 4. Page 9.

already, concerning the *Obligation* and *Sanction* of *Benevolence towards All*, in order to procure the *true Happineſs of benevolent Agents:* We affirm in this Propoſition, That, Mankind is naturally obliged to practiſe *This Benevolence* towards ALL, becauſe, the ſupreme Governor of Mankind, by natural Means, cauſes Man to underſtand, that, He, as Governor, is naturally inclined to promote ſuch a *Common Happineſs:* And alſo, that, He, in the Order, the Diſpoſition of Nature, has conſtituted Cauſes, but more eſpecially rational Cauſes, ſo, that, whoſoever will ſtudiouſly undertake the Care, the Concern for *the Public Common Good*, ſhall reconcile and procure to himſelf, upon this very account, the true, effective Cauſes of his own Happineſs (in the Aſſiſtances and Helps of which Cauſes, a natural Reward is eſſentially comprehended): And, that, whoever acts in an oppoſite way, as neceſſarily alſo ſtirs up, excites and provokes Cauſes, as effectual, in producing Self-deſtruction. There are many, indeed, who do not learn the inſtituted Laws of Civil Society, either from public written Tables and Records, or from the *Viva-voce*-Evidence of living Lawgivers who enact theſe Laws: But, they learn them from Determinations of their own Reaſon, concerning proper fit Cauſes of the *Public Good*; and, from Obſervations upon Events and Things which they themſelves perceive and know are publicly rewarded, honoured, tolerated or puniſhed. By the ſame Method, likewiſe, the *Laws of Rational Nature* and of the *Divine Government* are originally taught, by diligently conſidering, what thoſe Things are which neceſſarily conſtitute the general Happineſs of all the Subjects under the Divine Polity: And, what thoſe Things are which immediately promote the Glory and Honour of Almighty God (who is the Ruler and Head of this Polity): And alſo, by obſerving, how naturally and neceſſarily Mankind are compelled to coerce and reſtrain thoſe who purſue Courſes oppoſite to, and deſtructive of, *Theſe*. Now, no poſſible Doubt can ariſe, why the Firſt Cauſe ſhould not command ſuch Puniſhments as the Right Reaſon and the Neceſſity of Things exact and demand. And, for this evident Reaſon, Becauſe, theſe Puniſhments are abſolutely ſettled in *the Laws of Nature*, which are critically poized and ballanced to anſwer this very End. And, conſequently, they are as abſolutely ſettled by Almighty God, the Author and Contriver of Univerſal Nature. According to the ſame Method of Reaſoning, alſo, we fairly conclude, That, Almighty God decrees and determines Rewards, by Acts ſimilar and analogous to thoſe, by which, Mankind decrees and determines them. And, therefore, Almighty God himſelf *wills*, that, theſe Propoſitions, employed about Acts contributing, either more or leſs, to the *Common Good*, ſhould obtain the Sanction, the Energy, the Force, the Obligation, the Vigour of Laws: And——*Which Laws*, the *Almighty Sanction* has honoured by Rewards and Puniſhments, eſtabliſhed in this Manner, preferable to all other Laws, how true and practicable ſoever. But, from an Analogy, an equal Parity of Reaſoning,

it may as evidently be collected, alſo, ſince Almighty God has taught Mankind to judge it neceſſary, both to *Public and Private Good*, that, ſuch Acts, whereby the Articles and Conditions of Peace are violated, muſt, whenever diſcovered, as far as human Power reaches, be reſtrained by Pains and Penalties, Which, Almighty God himſelf, not only Judges and Determines after the ſame Manner, and Wills that Mankind ſhould act and proceed thus; but, He alſo Judges and Determines, in like Manner, concerning Acts equally deſtructive, altho' concealed from mortal Knowledge, notwithſtanding that, in the Puniſhment of ſuch Acts, they are not furniſhed with ſufficient Penalties and Powers. Moſt demonſtratively true, therefore, it is, that, each and every Operation or Determination of the Judgment which is right, and, conſequently divine, Acts and Determines by an analogous, ſimilar Determination concerning a Point of entirely an analogous, ſimilar Nature; and, that, the cloſeſt, moſt ſecret Acts cannot be hidden and concealed from Almighty God: And, conſequently, that, no poſſible Reaſon can be aſſigned why, God ſhould withhold and ſuſpend his Determination of Judgment upon ſuch Points as theſe. Whereas, with reſpect to Mankind, ſuch a Suſpenſion of the Judgment muſt neceſſarily and moſt frequently happen, leſt, by a raſh Determination, the Innocent ſhould ſuffer.

This kind of Reaſoning, then, is intelligible and obvious to all Mankind: And, upon the Strength, the Evidence of it, they cannot but conclude, That, God has ordained Puniſhments for the flagrant Tranſgreſſions of Sinners; and, that, He will revenge the Injuries and Evils inflicted upon the Harmleſs, Oppreſſed and Innocent. For, no poſſible Doubt can ariſe in the Breaſt of any Man, why, Almighty God ſhould not readily proſecute ſuch an *End* as *This*, namely, *the Common Good:* Under which *Good* are eſſentially comprehended, both *His own Glory*, and *the Happineſs of all other rational Agents.* Becauſe a nobler, a more ſupreme *End* cannot poſſibly be imagined: Any *End* inferior to *This* cannot poſſibly be apprehended and determined, as the *Supreme End*, by that Being who judges according to the moſt perfect Truth and Right Reaſon in all Things.——And——from hence it is, that, thoſe Anxieties, nay——the whole Obligation of Conſcience takes its original Source, its firſt Riſe; *i. e.* from the Dominion, Power and Authority of Almighty God Himſelf.

SECT. XXVI.

The Reaſon of Mankind determines the Infliction of Puniſhment, whether it be in the Power of Human Laws to inflict the Puniſhment or No.

HERE, then, let us look back a little, and take into our Conſideration the Puniſhments inflicted by Mankind for the Violation of thoſe Articles and Conditions which are requiſit and neceſſary to peace. For, there are more Puniſhments, ſtill remaining to be explained concerning this Obligation, than can, as we have already ſaid, be produced and inflicted by Human Laws. We are, therefore, here to obſerve, altho' at particular

particular times (and at particular times only) it ſo happens, that, ſome Crimes may eſcape without Puniſhment: Yet, it is as true alſo, that, Mankind are (both from the Laws of Nature and of Right Reaſon) fully determined to puniſh ſuch Crimes, whenever they conveniently can, and as much as in them lies. And, conſequently, by Accident only it comes to paſs, that, Reprobate Tranſgreſſors are ſuffered to go unpuniſhed.

Now, ſuch Omiſſions, in the Execution of Puniſhment as theſe, are like other Effects which paſs unnoticed, either thro' Ignorance, Inadvertency, a preſent Incapacity, or thro' ſome other Defect.—And—as ſuch—are imputable to Caſualty or Accident, rather than to Human Nature: And, therefore, Omiſſions and Effects like theſe, are, by all conſiderate, wiſe Men, generally placed amongſt the Number of ſuch Contingencies as rarely, in the Order of Nature, happen.—But, with reſpect to ſuch Events as any one Individual might wiſh ſhould happen to himſelf; and, with reſpect to the Means which he would chuſe to purſue, for the Attainment of this *End* in order the better to ſecure his own private Happineſs, Right Reaſon, from the ſettled Rules of Morality, never yet attempted to perſuade any Man. Nay—this is, indeed, ſo far from being a true State of the Caſe, that, on the contrary, Right Reaſon will preſcribe, direct, teach, exhort and adviſe, That, *Private Happineſs* is beſt ſecured by performing Acts of *Benevolence*, *Kindneſs*, and all other good Offices: All which Offices are, upon this very Account, and upon this very Account only, agreeable to us; becauſe, they are *the only Acts* acceptable to the Nature both of God and Man. From which Method of acting, we ſhall never labour under the Dreads and Apprehenſions of ſuffering the Puniſhments eſtabliſhed by the Rational, Wiſe Appointment of Almighty God—And—which (Divine Puniſhment) neither Human Power, nor any ſecret hiding Places of Refuge can elude or keep off: Neither can thoſe Puniſhments, which Mankind threaten to inflict, be eſtimated as mere contingent Probabilities only.

Morality preſcribes no Rule for Self-preſervation merely, independent of Social Regards.

Benevolent Acts the beſt Method to ſecure Self-Happineſs.

Concerning ſuch Events as theſe (let their Degrees of Contingency be what they will) Right Reaſon determines thus much certain, That, the Sorts of *Good*, which are only contingently future, carry in them ſome ſuppoſed Quantity of Value, ſome determined Sort of *Good*. Theſe Calculations, Perſons well-verſed in this Kind of Arithmetic, from an experimental Knowledge of the Cauſes upon which they depend, know how to eſtimate at a certain preſent Value.——And, this Method of Calculation is every Day practiſed, *E. G.* In Purchaſing Reverſions of Annuities upon Lives, and of Patent-employments after the Deceaſe of Patentees for the time being. And, the ſame Method of Calculation is alſo daily practiſed in many other Purchaſes of the like Nature. The ſame Method of Calculation, upon equally-ſtrong Principles of Reaſon, ought to be practiſed, alſo, in the Computation of future Evils and Diſadvantages, as well as of future Benefits: Under which future Diſadvantages or Evils, thoſe

See De Moivre upon Chances and Annuities, and Sir Iſaac Newton's Tables.

Future Good and Evil fall within the Rules of Calculation.

thoſe Puniſhments, which, Reaſon inſtructs Mankind to inflict upon the guilty Oppreſſors and Deſtroyers of the Innocent, ought to be calculated:— And, notwithſtanding, that, ſuch Diſadvantages and Evils are contingently future, yet they admit of ſome Degrees of a preſent certain Eſtimate, let that Eſtimate be what it will, altho' never ſo ſmall.

Future Labour, Danger and Hazards of Loſs, calculated in the Eſtimates of preſent Value.

Thus, likewiſe, according to the ſame Manner of Reaſoning, the Perils and Riſques Men run, (which, in the ordinary Courſe of human Affairs ſo frequently happen, in loſing their Lives, their Health, and all their Toils and Pains) inhance, and with the ſtricteſt Juſtice imaginable, the Price, the Value of their Labour and Induſtry. And, conſequently, upon this very Account, theſe Perils and Riſques are computed at a preſent, certain Recompence or Advantage: And, according to as ſure a Method of Computation as any impending Evil now immediately to ariſe, or any preſent Emolument now immediately to ceaſe. And, therefore, upon the ſame demonſtrative Principles, the natural Light of Right Reaſon clearly diſcovers, That, the imminent Danger of a threatening Puniſhment (notwithſtanding it may poſſibly ſo happen, that a Criminal, by ſome Trick or Device, contrives to eſcape) can be reduced to a determined Eſtimate of preſent Evil in ſome Degree, more or leſs.

Objection.

But—it may be here ſaid, That, the Quantity of preſent Evil will be diminiſhed in Proportion to the Degrees of Hope which the Criminal entertains, from his thorough Inſight into all Circumſtances, of eluding the Puniſhments threatened.

Anſwer.

Let it be ſuppoſed, therefore, in Anſwer to this Objection, That, this Puniſhment, to the Infliction of which, the Invader of another's Property expoſes himſelf, to be ſomewhat leſs than what might be expected; yet, provided, that, really and in Fact, ſuch a Puniſhment may be inflicted upon him at any time after the committal of his Crime: That is, in other Words, let there be as large a Subſtraction from this whole Puniſhment, or Evil, as Reaſon can demand and allow, upon account, that, there is an Uncertainty whether the Puniſhment will be inflicted or no: Yet, notwithſtanding all this, *after ſo large a Subſtraction*, there will ſtill remain an Evil greater than can be compenſated from the Advantage made by ſuch an Invaſion upon the Right of another. The Exceſs of Evil, therefore, which remains as Difference, continues ſuperior to all the Advantage either gained or propoſed: And, conſequently, adds the Obligation, the Efficacy, the Force of a Penal Sanction to that Dictate or Law of Right Reaſon, which forbids us to invade the Property of another.

Theſe Kinds of Calculation, then, which are ſo perfectly clear and rational, will, certainly, prove of ſignal Advantage to this one End and Deſign, *viz.* That, *Natural Reaſon inſtructs all Mankind, even in a State of Nature prior to all Inſtitutions of Civil Society whatſoever, to increaſe and aggravate, in the Manner now deſcribed, the Puniſhment of iniquitous Acts, notwithſtanding all the Puniſhment or Evil which can be ſubſtracted*

ſtracted, upon the beſt probable View to eſcape the future Infliction of ſuch an Evil or Puniſhment: Becauſe, there always will remain a much larger Quantity of Evil in the juſt Calculation of future foreſeen Puniſhments, than the Lucre or Gain, to ariſe from any Injuſtice or Villainy whatſoever, can poſſibly over-ballance and outweigh.

The Truth of this Reaſoning holds ſtill ſtronger (not only in thoſe Puniſhments inflicted on both Sides according to the Rights of War for even leſſer Crimes and Affronts offered to the Members of different Civil Communities; but, more eſpecially) in all thoſe Caſes where the Laws of Civil Society leave, to the Breaſt and Diſcretion of Subjects when an Injury is committed, the Puniſhment of every ſuch notorious Tranſgreſſion. As for Example, Vengeance is denounced againſt thoſe who break open and plunder Houſes by Night. In theſe Caſes, Mankind are reduced, in ſome ſort, to that State which Mr. *Hobbes* calls *The State of Nature:* And, in ſuch a State, even lighter Crimes are puniſhed with Death, or Capital Puniſhments. And, indeed, with a great deal more Reaſon: For, upon account, frequently, that The Civil Magiſtrate cannot poſſibly take Cognizance of ſuch Crimes as theſe, they often eſcape unpuniſhed: And, conſequently, at whatſoever Time, a Puniſhment can be inflicted, the ſevereſt Puniſhment is inflicted; and, in the ſame Degree of Proportion, as an Exceſs of audacious Impudence heightens, from an Hope, an Expectation of frequent Impunity: So, exactly in the ſame Degree of Proportion, ſuch daring Villainy may be reacted upon, baffled and ſuppreſſed. And this, in my Mind, is the true ſubſtantial Reaſon why, a Vengeance, ſo much to be dreaded, becomes frequently neceſſary in times of War: And why, alſo, in Civil Societies, heavier Puniſhments are inflicted than would be neceſſary, could all the Crimes committed be brought to Trial, ſo, as to draw an immediate Puniſhment upon every one Tranſgreſſor. Theſe ſevere Puniſhments, then, clearly appear to work this one evident good Effect, *viz.* That the Danger of ſuffering a Puniſhment, but more eſpecially a Puniſhment very rigorous and ſevere, (notwithſtanding that the Execution of ſuch a Puniſhment cannot, with demonſtrative Certainty, be determined and foreknown to take full Effect): Yet, ſuch a Puniſhment, being foreknown and foreſeen by the Human Underſtanding, carries a conſtant, a laſting Influence in determining voluntary Acts undertaken upon calm, ſober Deliberations of Reaſon, againſt the Eſcape of thoſe who are thus threatened with Puniſhment. And, upon equally-rational Principles, alſo, a clear diſtinguiſhing Inſight into the *greateſt Good*, which is only, perhaps, probably future, always turns the Scale with all its Weight of Power, ſo, as to incline Mankind to thoſe Acts which, in any Degree, prove miniſterial and effectual in promoting ſo deſirable an End: Or, in other Words, (to bring our Metaphor back to its original, natural Meaning) theſe Principles of Reaſoning, ſuggeſt to the Mind one Argument, which neceſſarily

neceſſarily concludes, *viz. That an habitual Practice, conformable to the Law of Nature, is contained and comprehended as an Effect within all the Cauſes of that compleat and perfect Happineſs, which we ſo naturally deſire:* And this, moſt certainly, muſt carry a powerful Efficacy in introducing and fixing an Obligation upon us. For, The *Obligation of the Laws of Nature,* (which may truly be called an *Obligation natural to Mankind)* does not ſo abſolutely take off the voluntary Powers of a free and arbitrary Will, as to coerce and reſtrain the Parties bound by *this Obligation* from acting (altho' at their own Peril) in a contrary Manner: But, this Obligation only furniſhes us with a very fit and proper Argument: Or, in other Words, *this Obligation* furniſhes us with an impulſive Cauſe, a Motive powerful enough: "That, From a full and due Conſi-"deration of it, the Party obliged ſhould be influenced and prevailed upon "to act, or not to act, juſt as *Right Reaſon*, or *the Law of Nature* directs "and commands him."

SECT. XXVII.

WE ſhall here, in the next Place, (becauſe we would not willingly recede from the common generally-received Uſe of Words) very briefly ſhew, in what Acceptation all, that we have here ſaid, may, with full Conſiſtency, agree to the well-known Definition of an Obligation.

Juſtinian, in the third Book of his *Inſtitute*, Title 14. defines an Obligation (1) in the following Terms. "An Obligation is that Tye of "the Law, whereby we are bound down by the Neceſſity of perform-"ing ſome Duty or Thing, according to the Rights Uſages Cuſtoms "Rules Decrees Commands and Law of OUR STATE." In this Definition it is evident, that, what is ſaid concerning *Solutio, Performance, Obedience,* and of *Our State,* are particular, are ſpecial: And, conſequently, cannot be received into the general Notion of *that Obligation* which is the Subject of our Enquiry. Now, the other Parts of this Definition, which are allowed, indeed, to be general, do yet, at the ſame time, labour under that kind of Obſcurity ariſing from Metaphor. For, in a true natural and proper Senſe, the Human Mind is not tied with Bonds or Chains: There being nothing which lays the Human Mind under the Neceſſity (in conſidering any thing future) whether to act or not to act; except ſuch Thoughts or Propoſitions as determine certain Indications, Criteria or Marks of *Good* or *Evil,* to ariſe, either to others, or to ourſelves, from our own future, voluntary, free Acts. For, ſince, by a ſort

(1) *In the following Terms.*] Obligatio eſt juris vinculum, quo, neceſſitate aſtringimur alicujus rei ſolvendæ, ſecundùm noſtræ civitatis jura. The Inſtitutes of *Juſtinian* contain the Elements and Principles of the *Roman* or *Civil Law. See Appendix, under the Title* Juriſprudence, *or*, &c.

ſort of *Natural Neceſſity*, we may, and ought to, be determined in purſuing the ſeveral Degrees of future foreſeen *Good*; but, more eſpecially, the higheſt Degrees of it: And, on the contrary, to ſhun and avoid the ſeveral Sorts of *Evil*. From hence, thoſe Dictates of Right Reaſon, which cauſe a Knowledge in us, that, both *Good* and *Evil* will ariſe from certain Acts of our own: Theſe Dictates, I ſay, are ſuppoſed to lay the Neceſſity upon us, either of eliciting and executing, or of forbearing and omitting theſe Acts; and, conſequently, of fixing an Obligation upon us: Becauſe, theſe ſeveral Kinds and Degrees of *Good* are neceſſarily connected with that Happineſs which we naturally deſire: And, conſequently, ſuch *Moral Acts*, as prove the effectual Means of procuring ſuch *Good*, are neceſſary alſo.

In Conſequence of what has been already ſaid, therefore, I define a Moral Obligation in general, and with exact Propriety in my Opinion, after the following Manner. "A Moral Obligation is the Act of a Lawgiver, by which Act, he demonſtrates and ſhews, that, Actions conformable to his Law, are convenient and neceſſary to be obeyed, by thoſe Rational Agents, for whoſe Sake and Advantage ſuch a Law is introduced and enacted."—An Action, then, according to this Definition, is underſtood as neceſſary to be purſued by a Rational Agent, when it appears undoubtedly true, that, ſuch an Action is comprehended under Cauſes neceſſarily eſſential and requiſit to conſtitute *that Happineſs*, which, every ſuch Rational Agent naturally and, conſequently, neceſſarily deſires. *E. G.* We are bound down by a ſtrict Obligation to purſue the *Common Good*, when, from *the Nature of Things* expoſed to our Obſervation and Senſes, we are given to underſtand, (and more eſpecially when ſuch a Knowledge as this ariſes from Rational Cauſes) that, acting for *this End* is the Cauſe neceſſarily requiſite to conſtitute our own compleat, perfect Happineſs: And alſo, that, this Cauſe does, by an evident Conſequence, depend naturally upon a ſtudious Care and Concern for the *Common Good of all Rational Agents*: And, in the ſame Manner, that, the Health of one Limb depends upon the Health of the whole animated living Body: Or, juſt in like Manner, as the Preſervation of thoſe Powers, naturally lodged in our Hands, cannot prove effectual or of any Uſe, unleſs Regard be firſt had to that Life, and thoſe Powers in general which are diſperſed, diffuſed, and intimately blended thro' the whole Body. For, the Proper, Private, Singular Happineſs of each and every Individual does not leſs depend upon the Influx, Influence and Energy of the Firſt Cauſe; namely, *Almighty God*, and the mutual Aſſiſtance of *other Rational Agents* attainable only by a ſtudious Care and Concern for the *Common Good*, than the Hand depends upon the reſt of the Body: When, yet, at the ſame time, the Dependance of one Man upon the reſt of Mankind, is attended with fewer Circumſtances, not ſo obvious;——And, is often ſuch a Sort of Dependance as lies concealed within the Operations of diſtant Cauſes and their

A Moral Obligation defined.

their remote Effects; and, conſequently, does not, at all times, fall under ſo general and manifeſt an Obſervation. And, we may alſo further add (what has been already demonſtrated) That, the Proſecution of the *Common Good* is neceſſarily required to the *Private Happineſs* of each Individual, as being the intrinſic, inherent, radical Cauſe of it: That is to ſay, The beſt, the happieſt State and Condition of all our Faculties, Powers and Abilities eſſentially conſiſts in ſuch Acts as theſe. And—from theſe Acts we learn, That, the Preſervation, the Improvement, the Perfection of an happy State is moſt effectually and infallibly ſecured to us by the united Aſſiſtance of both God and Man. From ſuch Indications as theſe, We account for and reſolve all thoſe *happy Effects* into thoſe *voluntary Acts* of the Firſt Cauſe (Almighty God), whereby He has limited the Capacity, the Meaſure of our Abilities, Faculties and Powers, (with their ſuitable Degrees of Happineſs) to the Purſuit of *Common Good*, as the efficient Cauſe of *ſuch Happineſs*:—And, by which voluntary Acts, alſo, of the Firſt Cauſe, He has declared it his Pleaſure, to ſettle and preſerve us, in our preſent Syſtem, as neceſſarily dependant upon other Rational Cauſes.

Theſe Principles, then, being firmly eſtabliſhed, there are as neceſſarily eſtabliſhed both *the Foundation of an Obligation*, and *the natural Indication of it*: And alſo, our own evident Information of ſuch an *Obligation* as taken from *this Indication*: And, laſtly, the actual and real *Obligation itſelf*. Now, it juſt amounts to the ſame Thing, when we ſay, That, an *Obligation* is the *Act* of a Lawgiver, *i. e.* of the Firſt Cauſe: As if we ſhould ſay, *The Act of a Law*, which, in our preſent Argument, is ſaying, *The Act of the Law of Nature*. Becauſe, a Lawgiver enjoins and fixes his *Obligation* by the *Law itſelf* when *ſuch a Law* is fully and ſufficiently promulged, publiſhed and proclaimed. And, every *ſuch Law* The Lawgiver does ſufficiently and fully publiſh, when he clearly reveals and renders evident to our Underſtanding, That, *the Proſecution of the Common Good, is the Cauſe neceſſarily requiſit to that Happineſs which every one and all ſingle Individuals neceſſarily deſire*. Such an *Indication* or *Declaration* being once publicly made, all Mankind, in general and without Exception, are bound by it: Either Suppoſing, That, the *Obligation* carries little or no Influence over their Wills and Inclinations to obey the Dictates and Injunctions of it: Or, even Suppoſing, That, The Motives and Arguments, produced in favour of a contrary Opinion againſt ſuch an *Obligation*, carry a more powerful Weight and Efficacy. The Caſe holds exactly the ſame here, which holds in that of Natural Bodies. For, heavy Bodies, even heavy Bodies, I ſay, which, from ſome Fault of the Beam, are raiſed up in one Scale, by a lighter Body placed in the other, carry, notwithſtanding, a more powerful Weight, a ſtronger Propenſity downwards towards the Center of the Earth. It is obſervable here, however, that, ſuch is the Efficacy, the Power of thoſe Arguments which lay any *Obligation*, that they

they would prevail and carry their natural Cogency, did not groſs, wilful Ignorance, turbulent Paſſions, or a precipitate Raſhneſs like ſome Defect in the Beam, counteract and reſiſt the Efficacy of ſuch Arguments: Becauſe, the Arguments which demonſtrate the Puniſhments and Rewards, when once clearly manifeſted revealed and expreſſed, declare alſo, that, greater Puniſhments and Rewards poſſibly can and may be annexed, (if there appears any Occaſion or Neceſſity for it) according to the Will and Pleaſure of the Supreme Ruler, Governor and King ALMIGHTY GOD HIMSELF. Having thus fixed and ſettled the *Obligation* to purſue *the Public Common Good* as the *one only neceſſary ultimate End:* By clear conſequential Reaſoning it follows, that, an *Obligation*, univerſal and common to ALL, is known and underſtood as contained in the Dictates of Right Reaſon, concerning the *Means* neceſſary to procure and advance *the Common Happineſs of ALL.*

But, the whole Sum and Subſtance of *thoſe neceſſary Means* is comprehended in our *one grand Moral Propoſition* concerning *the Benevolence of every one and all particular Individuals towards ALL.* And, therefore, That, the Propenſity, the Inclination, the Will of committing Injuries and doing Miſchief, (which is, in other Words, waging and carrying on War againſt ALL) naturally tends to a general Calamity, to common Deſtruction: Neither can ſuch a Method poſſibly prove, upon any Foundation or Appearance of Reaſon, the *proper Means* towards ſecuring *the Common Happineſs of ALL:* Neither can ſuch a deſtructive Propenſity carry the leaſt Conſiſtency with *the Means*, which muſt produce and effect *This End.*—And—conſequently, That, ſuch a Propenſity (towards Evil and Miſchief as *this*) cannot be dictated or permitted upon any Principle of Right Reaſon.

SECT. XXVIII.

The Favour and Benevolence of Almighty God primarily neceſſary to the Well-being of Each and All.

NOTWITHSTANDING any Suppoſition hitherto made, or any Argument from thence deduced concerning that *Private ultimate Happineſs* of every one Individual, neceſſarily to be purſued and deſired by each: It is not, at the ſame time, in my Intention to imagine *this End* the *compleat* and (as the Schoolmen call it) *adequate End* of each and all ſingular individual Perſons. I do not even preſume to aſſert, What our Adverſaries themſelves will readily grant: And yet, I muſt confeſs it my Intent to carry their Thread of Reaſoning along with me, ſomewhat farther than they are willing to have it drawn. For, as, The Structure of an human Body cannot poſſibly ſubſiſt and do well, unleſs *the great univerſal Syſtem of Bodies*, with which we are converſant, contributes ſomething to ſuch an Effect: And, as no one Perſon, who rightly underſtands *the Nature of Things*, can *Will* them to be other than they

are (becauſe, He cannot but know, that, *Private Happineſs*, upon any other Suppoſition, is impoſſible) : So, the *entire abſolute Happineſs* of each and every one individual Man depends, in a natural way, upon the united Benevolence of both God and Man. Now, ſuch a Benevolence of Almighty God, towards each Individual, as *this* cannot be ſeparated from that Regard or Reſpect which ought to be paid to his Dignity and Honour : Neither can a Propenſity of Inclination, in our Fellow-creatures towards us, be ſeparated from that Regard and Care which each has to his own private Happineſs : Nay—even, we will go ſo far with our Adverſaries, as to allow, that, this Care of *Self* in Each and All neceſſarily muſt carry a Preference to that Concern which Each has for us, or for any other. And, conſequently, It cannot poſſibly happen, that, any Perſon, who rightly weighs and duly conſiders the Nature of Rational Agents, would covet and deſire theſe Agents to ſuccour and aſſiſt him, unleſs the Care of their own Preſervation be, in the firſt Place, regarded ; and, conſequently, no one Perſon can conſider and propoſe to himſelf his *own Private Happineſs*, as ſeparate and diſtinct from the Happineſs of others, in order to promote *the one grand adequate ultimate End*, viz. *The Common Good of all Rational Agents.*

We ſhall here, then, in a very diſtinct, exact Method, conſider all that we have juſt now, but very briefly, and, as it were, only by general Hints, ſuggeſted. And, *Firſt*, Nobody who acknowledges, that, Divine Providence is clearly atteſted and fully manifeſted and demonſtratively proved from *the Nature of Things*, can, with any Truth, deny the *Private Happineſs* of each and every one Individual, eſſentially and primarily to depend upon the Benevolence, the Favour, the Affection of Almighty God, as THE CAUSE neceſſary and requiſit to produce *ſuch Happineſs.* What Man, upon Principles of Reaſon rightly directed, can hope for the benevolent Influence of Almighty God upon him and his Endeavours towards his own *Private Happineſs*, unleſs that he himſelf pays to Almighty God, from the very Ground and Sincerity of his Heart, thoſe Duties and Honours which he very well knows to be moſt acceptable to Him. From hence it is, that, the ſeveral Precepts, Laws and Rules of a Country derive their Power and Force of *Obligation :* And, indeed, we may carry this Principle ſtill farther, and aſſert, That, the Rules of Juſtice, and of every Virtue capable of being mutually exerciſed between Man and Man, are demonſtrated to comprehend the *Means* neceſſary to the *Private Happineſs* of each and every one Individual : And, conſequently, become *an indiſpenſable Obligation* upon EACH and ALL : Becauſe, it is a Truth capable of the ſtricteſt Demonſtration, That, the Governor of the Univerſe [Almighty God] is in no wiſe honoured, except all his Subjects (who behave themſelves with *an Innocency*, with *a Simplicity of Manners*, exactly conformable to the *Conditions of a ſecure, laſting, general Peace : i. e.* in other Words, *according to all the Practical Precepts of Moral*

Moral Virtue) be treated with *Juſtice*, with *Propriety*, and with *Good-nature, Benevolence, Humanity.*

SECT. XXIX.

The Happineſs of Individuals ſingly, depends upon the Good-will of Mankind in general.

BUT, we have only hitherto hinted, That, each and every one Individual depends, in ſome Degree, more or leſs, upon the *Benevolence* and *Good-will of Mankind*, is, in my Mind, as true as any Truth in Nature: And yet ſuch a Truth is it, as to require ſome Attention to thoſe Arguments which we ſhall preſently offer; and, to other Arguments likewiſe, which (as is more than probable) the experience of each and every one Perſon may, with the cleareſt evidence, ſuggeſt to himſelf.

First Argument.

1. The Happineſs of every one Individual is eſſentially comprehended in the whole collective Sum of all the ſeveral Kinds of *Good:* And, that, the *private Happineſs* of Each is not ſufficiently ſecured, unleſs we carry our View into Futurity, and reconcile to ourſelves, as much as in us lies, all the Cauſes capable of contributing towards the Production of ſuch an Effect. Becauſe, ſuch a practical Inveſtigation as this makes way for and courts the Concurrence of numberleſs Cauſes; and, under ſo extenſive a Comprehenſion, that, ſcarcely any one Part or Portion of this viſible World is entirely uſeleſs; much leſs, is there any one Individual of Mankind, whether paſt preſent or to come, ſo inſignificant as not to claim a Place amongſt Cauſes, amongſt thoſe Cauſes which contribute, more or leſs, either to the Preſervation or Improvement or Perfection of our Being. And the Reaſon is, Becauſe, no one Perſon can poſſibly be imagined, (when once we ſuppoſe Mankind to have increaſed and multiplied) where the Happineſs and Comforts of Life do not immediately depend upon TWO (the ſmalleſt conceivable Number) and, that, *both of theſe Two* ſtand in need of, and neceſſarily require, the Help and Aſſiſtance of two more towards their living happy: And, in like manner, other two Perſons, alſo, are neceſſary to theſe two:—And—thus, by a very natural Progreſſion, we diſcover, that, All are of Uſe Aſſiſtance and Benefit to All.

It is not, however, here, at the ſame time, neceſſary to reduce under an exact minute Calculation, how much Benefit each and every one Individual is capable of conferring upon us; but, it is ſufficient to acknowledge, that, All ought to contribute ſomething (let that Something be what it will) to the common Stock of Advantage: Which common Advantage we are in Duty bound to acknowledge and return, by the like good Offices, which lie within the Compaſs of our Power. Such human Acts, as carry in Them this excellent Tendency towards promoting the *Common Good and Advantage*, ſeem, in my Judgment, to bear a very fit and natural Correſpondency with thoſe general Laws and Motions of

Things natural, which (Laws and Motions) at one and the ſame Time, are inſtrumental in anſwering to, and in producing, various uſeful Effects.

Second Argument.

2. But, we are, in the next Place, to conſider, that, the very Term *Benevolence*, is always underſtood, thro' this whole PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY, in a Meaning ſo extenſive as to carry, in the Idea of it, Whatſoever Duties we owe even to the ſmalleſt, the loweſt Degree of Innocence, Fidelity, Gratitude; as alſo to all the Relations and Degrees of Humanity, and Love towards all Mankind. And the Reaſon of ſo very extenſive a Meaning is evident: Becauſe, every one Perſon can, altho' at his own Peril, and to the extreme Hazard of his own Preſervation, create Uneaſineſſes and Anxieties innumerable to others: Which Uneaſineſſes and Anxieties, may diffuſe themſelves and ſpread to the remoteſt Diſtances: Suppoſing, however, ſo deſtructive an Event as this not to happen; *i. e.* Suppoſing Mankind to refrain from ſo mad, ill-natured a Malevolence as this, threatening impending War upon All; that is, threatening Infinitudes of Evil to all Mankind. Such a Coercion or Reſtraint of Temper as this, I ſay, muſt be aſcribed to ſome Sort, to ſome Degree of *Benevolence*. Whatſoever Event, then, naturally contributes in any Degree, even the ſmalleſt, towards preſerving Peace and a general Friendſhip amongſt Mankind, ſuch an Event expels and drives away the heavieſt, moſt grievous Evils from Multitudes, and, conſequently, carries in it an Advantage, a Degree of *Good* not at all inconſiderable. Any Attempt to purſue all thoſe minute Caſes, whereby all Rational Agents could prove advantageous and beneficial to all, muſt prove endleſs.

Third Argument.

It is, in the third Place, moſt remarkable alſo, that, Agents, endowed with the leaſt Degrees of Power, are able to benefit others by the Traffic and Merchandize of their Commodities (the Effects of their Induſtry, and their Labour); Or, by faithful keeping to their Promiſes and ſtanding by their Engagements; Or, by creating a Confidence in us, even without any Promiſe or Engagement at all: Or, by laying before us a Pattern, an Example, (altho' not, perhaps, the Example of great and heroic Deeds and Exploits) yet, I ſay, by ſetting an Example of either Induſtry, or Patience, or Innocency. Such obvious Remarks as theſe, even independant of, and abſtracted from, every Conſideration of Civil Society and Government, are obſervable in all Mankind, and exert an Influence over the whole Face of the Earth.

Fourth Argument.

4. The very Imperfections, Failings and Infirmities of Mankind, even for the very Reaſon that they naturally move Pity and Compaſſion, at the ſame time, demonſtrate the Neceſſity of Civil Government; and, conſequently, by the moſt powerful Motives, prevail over all to conſtitute and preſerve ſuch an Eſtabliſhment. And, from hence it neceſſarily muſt follow, that, theſe Imperfections, Infirmities and Weakneſſes prove of ſingular Service to all, in as much as they are, in ſome Degree, the Cauſes of certain

certain Advantages to Society. We muſt, indeed, allow that Aſſiſtance to be but little, which, each can receive from many, eſpecially at remote Diſtances. Upon this very Account, therefore, we have committed to the Public Stock, as into a common Repoſitory, a ſimilar, a proportional Part only of our own Pains and Labour, by way of a Depoſit, as an Acknowledgment, a Recompence. Such *Minutiæ* as theſe, altho' ſeemingly trifling, cannot with Safety be neglected: Becauſe, from the minute Offices of Humanity when amaſſed and put together by the Care and Diligence of Multitudes, the whole Happineſs of Individuals (and ſuch an Happineſs as is fully ſufficient) grows and gathers, juſt as, from the ſtated, regular Motions of Atoms and minute Particles of Matter, the moſt beautiful Structure of this our corporeal World ariſes.

But, ſince I have, in my Chapter *Concerning Human Nature*, collected and put together many demonſtrative Proofs, which directly conclude Man to be both able to help Numbers beſides himſelf, and to incline, by a natural Propenſity, to effect this End, provided always, that his own private Happineſs be ſufficiently ſecured; the few ſhort Arguments now produced, may, for this time, be ſufficient. Neither, for the ſame Reaſon, will it be neceſſary to add, That, Mankind, in the Order of created Beings, are the principal Cauſes, upon whom each Individual neceſſarily muſt acknowledge his own preſent, as well as future, Happineſs in this World to depend. By Vertue of this one Argument, it cannot, upon any Foundation of Reaſon, be expected, that, Mankind will heartily and willingly employ their Labour and Pains in rendering thoſe Perſons happy, whom they know to be in themſelves, in their Propenſities and Inclinations, malevolent, treacherous, ungrateful, inhuman. Nay—the Argument appears ſo far clear and evident to the contrary, and may be allowed as ſuch, that, All will readily conſpire unite and agree in this one Point, That, *ſuch malevolent, treacherous, ungrateful, cruel, inhuman Wretches, ſhould, and muſt, be coerced and reſtrained by adequately ſevere Penalties, by Baniſhment, a total Extirpation,* &c.

SECT. XXX.

All Rational Agents agree in puniſhing thoſe who invade another's Property, and who act againſt the Public Good.

WE are, in the next Place, to obſerve, That, there is the cloſeſt Alliance, the ſtricteſt Friendſhip imaginable, between the whole Syſtem of rational Beings: This Friendſhip, this Alliance inſtructs us thro' the whole human Life, that, He acts to no Purpoſe, and is no better than an empty Trifler, who thinks his own Happineſs ſufficiently and effectually ſecured upon the vain Suppoſition that he has at times, either to this, or t'other Perſon, performed all the Duties of Humanity and Affection; and who, at other times, as either Caprice or Humour chances to prevail, will, in his Behaviour to others, tranſgreſs and violate all

all the very ſame Duties. This Doctrine is evident, not only from what we have juſt now ſaid; namely, That, *the Private Happineſs of each and every one Individual, depends conſtantly, indeed, upon great Numbers of Agents, and in all the minute Branches of Kindneſs, nearly: And, upon the whole Syſtem of Agents, who regard the Common Good remotely:* This Doctrine, I ſay, is not only evident for theſe Reaſons, but alſo, becauſe the God and Father of ALL, the *Firſt Cauſe*, has the *ſame End* in view for ALL. And, *laſtly*, in as much as, Whatſoever any one of theſe Agents, from the Determinations of Right Reaſon, would willingly have done either to himſelf or to others; The very ſame Thing, the very ſame Acts likewiſe, All Beings truly rational would neceſſarily, and at all times, have done and be performed to themſelves, and in as high, as exalted Degrees, as they are conſcious of ſuch Acts, and of ſuch a Behaviour. For, all Rational Beings, both *God* and *Man*, who think upon the ſame Thing, agree in *Truth* and *Reaſon*. From hence, therefore, it neceſſarily muſt happen, That if any one is denied a Right properly his own *i. e.* if he be denied thoſe neceſſary Helps, without which he cannot prove ſerviceable to the *Public Good*, ſuch a Denial is contrary to the *Common Good of All*; and muſt, in the Conſequence, always prove contrary both to the Sentiments and to the Inclinations of all Beings who judge and determine rationally and with Truth. From whence it unavoidably follows, that, every ſuch Perſon hath (in that natural State of Equality which is here ſuppoſed) a Right to inflict the Puniſhments, which, the Injuſtice he ſuffers requires. And—he is furniſhed with Inducements, with Excitements ſufficient for ſuch Puniſhment, when an Opportunity offers, which rarely, if ever, is wanting to all Mankind:—Opportunity, which always, indeed, lies open to the Divine Almighty Vengeance of God;—Becauſe, againſt Omniſcience and Omnipotence, neither Secrecy nor Power, not even Death itſelf, can protect a wicked Man. The Remark here made, is with this one principal View, That, from hence we may clearly evince the Obligation, which lies upon All, to ſtudy a Care, a Concern for the *Public Good:* In *Which Good* eſſentially conſiſts, the whole Sum and Subſtance of *Laws of Nature:* And, *This Obligation* is naturally revealed by the *Puniſhments* annexed to *contrary Acts*, and by the *Rewards* conſequent upon ſuch Acts, as are congruous and well-adapted to *this one End*; namely, *The Common Good:* That, *this Obligation* is eminently good, permanent and laſting: That it remains firm and unſhaken, under all poſſible Circumſtances: And, conſequently, that, it is an Obligation powerfully-effectual, to influence and prevail over All to act with *Juſtice and Benevolence*, as well in ſecret as in public; as well towards the Weak and Helpleſs, as towards the Powerful and Mighty. From hence it may truly and clearly be demonſtrated, That all Rational Agents, as well by the neceſſary Agreement of Right Reaſon with itſelf, (whereſoever this Principle reſides) as well as by the conſtituent Cauſes of

Common

Common Happineſs, are cloſely linked and inſeparably united. And, moreover, it is from hence alſo, in a more eſpecial Manner proved, That, the Agent, who is going to execute any Act either hurtful or profitable to others, does ſo intimately depend upon all other Rational Beings, That, the whole Happineſs, which, from the Neceſſity of his Nature, he is obliged to purſue, muſt be derived upon him, either by the active Endeavours, or, at leaſt, by the voluntary Permiſſion of All, either in the way of a *Reward* for a Life ſpent in the Service of *All*; or, at leaſt, with an *Hope* highly probable, that, his future Life will be ſpent in *the Good*, and for *the Service of All*. From whence it follows, That, to no one Perſon however weak and impotent, can, according to Truth, even privately and moſt ſecretly be denied his own private proper Right: Unleſs, at the ſame time, the Care, the Concern for the *Common Good* is thrown off and rejected by ſome bold Invader of another Perſon's Right and Property. And, conſequently, *The Common Good* is, in ſome Degree, more or leſs, diminiſhed: And, for the ſame Reaſon, all Rational Agents, who have *the Common Good* ſincerely at Heart, (that is, all Agents, who are truly rational in the Practice of Morality and of the Social Virtues) will be incenſed and influenced to coerce and reſtrain, by effectual Puniſhments, ſuch Tranſgreſſions and Violations as theſe: Becauſe, *the Common Good* is *that one ſingle uniform End*, in the Proſecution of *Which*, all Rational Agents can and will unite and agree. And the Reaſon of ſo univerſal an Union or Agreement is evident: Becauſe, *this one End*, as much as poſſibly can be, comprehends in it *the Happineſs of All*. For, it is moſt demonſtratively certain, that ſuch a Practical Reaſon is *the Truth*, and *that only*, wherein the *End*, and the *Means neceſſary to ſuch an End*, are promulged and made known to All: In which *End* and *Means*, They who judge according to Truth, can agree amongſt themſelves: And, by Conſequence, All, ſo far, muſt act according to true Practical Reaſon, to whom *ſuch an End* can be pleaſing and agreeable, and to whom *the Means* neceſſary towards producing *this End*, can become practicable.

From the Principles, then, here eſtabliſhed, we may rationally and fairly conclude, That, even independant of all Civil Society, the omniſcient Reaſon of Almighty God, and the Reaſon alſo of all Mankind, ſo far as they are under the Influence of Right Reaſon, will keep a watchful Eye in detecting and bringing to Light all Invaſion upon the Rights, Privileges and Properties of others: So that, there cannot poſſibly be any Foundation of Hope to eſcape the Omniſcient Divine Knowledge of Almighty God: And——but very little Hope only, to evade, elude and baffle the Sagacity, the inquiſitive Search of Mankind. And therefore, whenever a Piece of Villainy is once diſcovered, neither *Will* nor *Power* can be wanting in both *God* and *Man*, to guard off an Injury attempted, and to revenge it, ſhould any ſuch be committed.

SECT.

SECT. XXXI.

Invaders upon the Property of others abuse their own Understandings, introduce into their Nature many Errors and disorderly Passions.

I SHALL here farther add, in few Words, That, the very Invader himself of another's Property, at the same Moment he contradicts Reason thus united and agreeing in a diligent Care for the *Common Good*, renounces Truth; and, of course, robs himself of that Perfection, hitherto pure and incorrupt, of Practical Reason: And, by admitting Practical Error, he prepares the Way for innumerable Errors of the same Kind; and, in short, delivers himself up to be led away by impetuous, blind Affections and Passions, thro' thousands of Difficulties, Dangers, Precipices and Follies. Now, all these Consequences (because they are not only *Evils*, but *direct Consequences* also, which, from the divinely-appointed Establishment of Nature, follow an immoral, oppressive Act) with great Truth and Justice claim the Title of *Punishment*. For, it is absolutely necessary, that, Mankind should, in all their Counsels, Deliberations and Cautions about their Moral Acts future, consider within themselves, what Opinion, other Rational Beings will form of them, from their future Behaviour: Because, not to mention, that, Rational Agents constitute the noblest the most perfect Work of Nature, they likewise are the principal Causes necessarily at all times requisit; and the universal Causes of that Happiness, which, all Mankind aim at and pursue in their Acts and Behaviour. The reconciling and securing to ourselves, therefore, by all the Diligence and Care in our Power, these effective Causes of our Happiness, is at all times the indispensable Concern of every Man, who will think and act for his own true Interest upon Principles of Reason. Now, these Causes, I call *Universal Causes*, which co-operate and concur in producing several other Effects; and Effects also of various, numberless Kinds, besides that one single Effect, which is the Subject-matter of our Thoughts at present.

There is not, in my Mind, the least Necessity for a long, regular Process of Reasoning to demonstrate, That, all those Things, Helps and Means are, both by the Will of God and Man, settled and disposed, which can contribute to render the Life of every one Creature the happier: And, that, either the active Assistance or voluntary Permission of *Both*, (*i. e.* God and Man) is not less necessary to the private Happiness of Individuals, than the rising of the Sun is necessary to expel the Fogs Fumes and Shades of Gloom and Darkness.

As to any Conclusions which are hereafter to follow, it will be fully sufficient now to take Notice, that, just as in the Sciences, those Propositions which explain and account for the most general Causes, or Properties and Qualities of Things (as for Instance, the Laws of Motion, or the common Properties of Triangles): Such Propositions, I say, are never, in particular Cases, stigmatized with the Name *Contradiction*; altho', in such

Cases,

Caſes, they are many ways diverſified, variouſly altered, and differently applied. The Caſe holds exactly the ſame in the Duties, in the Praxis of Morality, in the Care of Univerſal Cauſes; *i. e.* for Inſtance, in our preſent Caſe, the Care of all rational Agents conjunctively conſidered can never be neglected or laid aſide: Much leſs, can it be oppoſed by any one who, in Fact, and upon the true Principles of Reaſon, purſues *the one grand material End* or *Effect*, namely, *his own Happineſs*: But, the Caſe is ſo far otherwiſe, that, the *Care* of each and every one Individual, in reconciling and ſecuring to himſelf *Cauſes ſo eſſentially and primarily neceſſary*, prepares and makes ready the way for procuring the Aſſiſtance of all inferior Cauſes, ſo as to govern, turn and manage the Uſe and Application of them, whenever particular Occaſions and Exigences require: And, juſt in the ſame manner, as the Knowledge of the moſt general Truths aſſiſts Perſons ſkilled (Connoiſſeurs and Adepts) in the Arts and Sciences, to draw ſome Concluſion or other in all the poſſible Variety of particular Caſes which can happen, and ſo lead them, like a plain fair honeſt Guide, eaſily by the Hand into ſome Diſcoveries every Day.

Having, therefore, diſcovered this one important Truth, which is, That, extrinſic to, and independant of, any Help in ourſelves, the Aſſiſtance, the Succour, the Help of Beings truly rational, (*i. e.* of God, and of all ſuch Men as are agreed in purſuing *the Common Good)* is the ſureſt, the readieſt, the moſt general Method or Means of purſuing *our own Happineſs*.——*Means* which muſt, at all times, be primarily and principally neceſſary to *this very End*. The following Concluſion, then, immediately ſtand by direct Conſequences, ariſes from hence; namely, That, we muſt not, upon any account whatſoever, commit an Act thro' the whole Courſe of our Lives, either in public or private, againſt any Perſon, which may deprive us of neceſſary Succour and Aſſiſtance; *i. e.* in other Words, We never muſt at any time invade a Right belonging to another; but, on the contrary, at all times, and by all poſſible Means, we muſt endeavour to procure to ourſelves this laſting, never-failing, neceſſary Aſſiſtance.

Let us here add another Conſideration, which happens lucky and *apropos* enough, That, there is no Force, no Energy (within the ſphere of our own Abilities) which more eſſentially and effectually compleats our Happineſs, than the Contemplation, the Love, the Joy, boundleſs and exerciſed with the moſt perfect Freedom upon Objects and Operations acceptable to Almighty God, and to thoſe of Mankind who are truly rational: For, ſuch are, indeed, the nobleſt Objects and Operations: Or, when our Contemplation, Love and Joy are exerciſed upon ſuch Acts and Operations of our own, as can cauſe and excite the ſame happy Influences. Now, *The Univerſal Benevolence*, which we, in our Enquiry, are endeavouring to eſtabliſh, prompts, and ſpontaneouſly infuſes into the human Mind, all Acts of this Nature, with a Tendency, which *Bene-*

volence muſt and will, from the very Nature of it, from the moſt powerful Perſuaſion of all the Beneficence and kind Acts imaginable, ſue for: And which muſt obtain the Help, Aſſiſtance and Endeavours of all Rational Beings. *By which Means*, The Cauſes of Self-happineſs intrinſic, radically inherent and natural, will, with the exacteſt moſt ſuitable fitneſs, be joined to, and conſpire with, extrinſic outward Cauſes——Cauſes endowed with Freedom and Powers of their own, independant of our Volition, of our Will, of our Power:——And in this Foundation all Virtue, Religion and Society, will and muſt originally be laid. And, this is the Reaſon, the moſt general Reaſon, why, our firſt our principal Care will and muſt be for ever employed in gaining over and reconciling to our Intereſt the primary, chief, and only Cauſes of the End we moſt deſire. This Foundation of Reaſoning perfectly agrees to the Rules of Logic: Which Rules, according to the Order obſerved in the ſeveral Branches of Philoſophy, are antecedent and prior to the Rules of Morality. The Rules of Morality are not, however, upon this account, more incongruous or worſe adapted to the natural Order and Progreſs of the Operations of the human Mind: Becauſe, frequently, and with great Juſtice too, an Objection is ſtarted againſt Dialectic Subtleties, as borrowed and tranſlated from the Art of Logic, and applied to the Rules and Practical Precepts of Morality.

SECT. XXXII.

In the nine laſt Sections it is proved, that they who contrive and act againſt the Common Good muſt expect Puniſhment in a State even of Nature, independent of all Civil Society.

This Doctrine illuſtrated from Arguments grounded upon the Nature of *Oppoſites*.

THAT the whole Doctrine, hitherto inculcated, may appear in a ſtill clearer Light, we ſhall illuſtrate it by two different Kinds of Reaſoning, 1. By a Negative Proof: Or, from a Conſideration of Oppoſites. And, 2. By a Similitude of Reaſoning: Or, from what the Logicians call *Analogia Similitudinis*.

And, firſt, every wilful voluntary Neglect of the *Common Good* is always conſtrued a direct *Oppoſition* to the ſtudious Care and Concern for ſuch a *Good*; by which *ſtudious Concern* we endear to our own Intereſt, as much as in us lies, theſe general univerſal Cauſes of each (our own) private Happineſs: And, conſequently, by every ſuch Oppoſition, we careleſly leave our Happineſs, as a Matter indifferent, to the free Election both of God and Man, either to take Happineſs quite away from us, or leſſen it in ſuch Meaſures and Degrees as ſhall ſeem neceſſary to the Right Reaſon of both, (*i. e.* of God and Man) in order by an effectual Puniſhment powerful enough to deter us and others from like Neglects for the future. And, What is ſtill an heavier Aggravation: Whoſoever, by a Neglect of *Univerſal Benevolence*, neglects thoſe general Cauſes of his own private Happineſs, which, as I have mentioned, always ſubſtitutes (in the place of ſuch Cauſes) Cauſes leſs fit and much inferior: Such, for Inſtance, is private Strength, Cunning, and, perhaps, ſome other

other equally-ineffectual Aſſiſtances borrowed from a ſmall Number of wrong Heads in the ſame Oppoſition. From a Courſe of Behaviour, guided by ſuch wretched Influences, new Practical Rules gain Admittance into the Heart.—Rules—which—(becauſe they are far from rational, as carrying in them an eſſential Deformity and Unfitneſs to produce the moſt deſirable End) muſt diſpleaſe and create Uneaſineſs. And alſo—(Becauſe they are Rules of a quite oppoſite Nature to thoſe originally impreſſed upon the Mind) muſt, by force of an unchangeable Contrariety, diſconcert and ruffle all ſerene Compoſure and Tranquillity of Mind. To which we may, alſo, farther add, That, Rules thus ſubſtituted in the place of Truth Reaſon and Virtue, ſoon propagate the Seeds of Deſtruction, both to the Individuals themſelves and to all thoſe who follow ſuch Example; I mean the moſt turbulent boiſterous Paſſions and Vices, Enemies to Peace and Quiet, the bittereſt and moſt rancorous, *viz. Hatred, Envy, Fear, Terror, Fright, Melancholy, Grief,* [Μισανθρωπία, or] an Averſion againſt all Mankind, Pride, *&c.*—corroding mortifying Evils, which, as is generally believed of the Viper's Young, gnaw away and live upon their Parents Bowels. Whoſoever, therefore, perverſely and obſtinately perſiſts in ſuch pernicious Principles and Practices as theſe, infallibly draws upon himſelf ſure Deſtruction—A Deſtruction inward, and from himſelf; and alſo a Deſtruction external, cauſed by outward Agents. Now, upon the contrary Suppoſition, that, every ſuch deluded Perſon returns to his true ſound State of Mind, he will find and feel his own true Happineſs, both within and without, ſo greatly weakened and impaired, that, without the leaſt Heſitation, he muſt conclude, that it had been much better for him never to have, upon any account whatſoever, abandoned and thrown off the *ſtudious Care and Concern for the Public Good.* And—(not to mention Puniſhments more grievous, more ſevere) every ſuch Perſon muſt find, ſhould he come to himſelf, a very ſmall Portion of either Comfort or Satisfaction, upon a Remembrance of his paſt Miſactings: And—ſuppoſing him to continue in ſuch a Courſe of Oppoſition to Goodneſs and ſocial Virtue, very little can be his Hope of leading, for the future, a Life with any tolerable Share of either Proſperity or Happineſs. Whether, then, ſuch a State of Oppoſition as this, reſpects either the inward Powers and intellectual Faculties of *Individuals*, which by ſuch a State are much impaired (and which Powers and Faculties always grow in Strength and Vigour by conſtant Acts of Benevolence): Or, whether any Regard be paid to the Help Succour and Aſſiſtance of thoſe whom we have offended, and againſt whom we have ſo grievouſly treſpaſſed; Yet very ſmall Aſſiſtances, upon any footing of Reaſon, can, in ſuch a State, be expected either from God or Man. Theſe are the Evils which neceſſarily muſt happen and will follow (whether malevolent-minded Men are pleaſed to have it ſo, or no) from every voluntary Neglect of conſtantly endearing to ourſelves, and gaining over to our own Intereſt, both God and Man.

From hence, upon the whole of this firſt Argument, it clearly follows, that, we muſt not, in any Caſe whatſoever, conclude, that, any ſuch Offence againſt God and Man, ought to be committed, upon account of that Puniſhment which is naturally-inſeparable and neceſſarily-annexed to every ſuch Offence. And—This is the Truth which We undertook to demonſtrate from the Doctrine of Oppoſition. But what may, alſo, further ſtill be urged, as an Addition to this Proof, is, That, Mr. *Hobbes*, even himſelf, acknowledges (ſuppoſing us to allow God to be the Author of Nature) that ſuch Evils, as we have juſt now deſcribed, may be called *Puniſhments inflicted by the Divine Appointment*, as the Reader may find by conſulting his *Leviathan*, Chap. 28. in the ſixth Conſequence which he deduces from his Definition of a *Puniſhment*.

SECT. XXXIII.

2. The ſame Argument is illuſtrated by reaſoning from Similitude.

THE ſame Doctrine is inculcated by an *Analogia Similitudinis, i. e. The Reaſoning from Similitude.* It now remains that we conſider, in the ſecond Place, and demonſtrate, That, *theſe univerſal and principal Cauſes of Human Happineſs* muſt primarily, in the firſt Place, and at all Times, be procured, in order to obtain and enjoy *that one chief End* which we muſt deſire: And the Argument to this Purpoſe ſhall be enlivened by the Aſſiſtance and Help of an Example: Or, of the like or the ſame Point of Practice in a ſimilar Caſe, and in an Affair which nearly concerns the *Human Life* and *Health* (Two Modes, *i. e. Life* and *Health* of our preſent Exiſtence) which are, with all the Care and Caution imaginable, preſerved by thoſe who, at the ſame time, hold all Juſtice and Moral Honeſty in the moſt abject Contempt. The Reaſon, why, we introduce this Kind of Illuſtration, is, with this one ſingle Intent only, that, the full Force and entire Scope of the Reaſoning already eſtabliſhed, may ſtrike out and ſhine with a livelier Energy, with a more conſpicuous Luſtre. Neither, indeed, to ſpeak the Truth, need I make any Apology for ſuch an Illuſtration: Becauſe, no Man of a ſound rational Mind, can or ought to require the ſtricteſt Demonſtrations [in hujuſmodi ἰσχυσια] in any ſuch Analogy of Similitude, or ſimilar Reaſoning. For, it is to be obſerved, that, Similitudes are at all times uſed rather as Illuſtrations than Proofs. It is agreed, then, on all Hands, that, the Influences, both of Sun and Air, are very powerful and neceſſary towards the Preſervation of the Human Life: That is to ſay, Theſe are the univerſal Cauſes, which (beſides numberleſs other Effects produced by them, in this one Article, alſo) claim to themſelves the principal Powers and Influences of an active enlivening Efficacy. The Powers and Influences of Sun and Air, however, are not, notwithſtanding their mighty Energies, ſuch *abſolute Cauſes*, as not to demand alſo other

other Cauſes; which, in ſome reſpect or other, are ſubordinate: Such, as, for Inſtance, are a juſt equal moderate Temparament of the human Body, An apt regular Diſpoſition of the Bodily Organs, An healthy Soil, A ſufficient Supply of Food and Raiment, The mutual reciprocal Helps and Aſſiſtances of Mankind: And yet, all theſe inferior Cauſes depend upon theſe two univerſal general Cauſes of Life and Health, juſt now mentioned.——For, the Solar Rays and Heat change and vary ſo conſtantly: They ſo mellow and meliorate for all Kinds of Vegetation, Production and Increaſe, the Earth (the common Mother of all): They ſo plentifully nouriſh and enrich the Plants and Vegetables, growing out of the Earth, and the Animals nurtured by it: They ſo fit and prepare that vital Maſs of human Blood, extracted and ſecerned from the various Juices of Vegetables and Animals: All theſe Effects, I ſay, are ſo evidently produced by the Rays and Heat of the Sun, that, whoever examines with a little more Attention than ordinary into the Natural Cauſes of Things, muſt and will very readily acknowledge, that, the Sun is preferable to all other created Things: That it is the moſt general, the moſt univerſal Cauſe of all thoſe Effects which we feel and experience in ourſelves. Seeing then, upon a juſt Compariſon, that, the Dependance of human Life upon the more benign enlivening Influence of the Sun, is, in ſome Degree, analogous or ſimilar to the Dependance of human Happineſs upon the Divine Favour, the unavoidable Neceſſity, we at all times lie under, of reconciling, in the beſt way we can, Almighty God to our Intereſt by our Benevolence, or univerſal Love (which comprehends in it, the Whole of Divine Adoration and of all Juſtice); The Neceſſity, I ſay, of our beſt Care from hence appears in reconciling to our Intereſt Almighty God by our Benevolence, or Univerſal Love: Which Benevolence, or Love, comprehends the Whole of religious Adoration and of all Juſtice: And the Knowledge of it is conveyed to us in the ſame Manner of Inſtruction, by which we are taught, that it is neceſſary for us to dwell and continue in Places, where we may enjoy and feel the genial Influences of the Sun's Heat and Rays. And, upon exactly-the-ſame Parity of Reaſon, alſo, we are cautioned and forewarned not to ſubject ourſelves and become liable to the Wrath of Almighty God, by committing Acts contrary to Benevolence, That, we are cautioned and forewarned againſt thoſe Places, where we cannot feel thoſe proper Supplies of radical Heat, which we, every Day, borrow from the Rays of the Sun: Or, upon that Principle of Reaſon, whereby we are taught to withdraw from thoſe Countries and Climates, where the Sun's Heat is ſo intenſe as to evaporate entirely our pureſt Blood and vital Spirits.

SECT.

SECT. XXXIV.

The Argument taken from Similitude farther illuſtrated,

BUT diſmiſſing this Branch of ſimilar Reaſoning drawn from the Sun, (it not falling within my Province to treat too diffuſively upon Natural Religion) I ſhall now paſs on to another Branch of Similitude taken from Air, the Neceſſity whereof in Reſpiration, being ſo very ſignificant to the Life of Man, that, it cloſely reſembles the Dependance of each and every Individual upon the diffuſed univerſal Society of all Mankind: And I ſhall dwell ſomewhat longer than ordinary upon this Compariſon: Becauſe, by a very juſt Analogy are illuſtrated theſe mutual reciprocal good Offices, with the Neceſſity for them amongſt Mankind:——And, this is the Doctrine chiefly intended at preſent to inculcate and eſtabliſh. Air, then, ſo far as it is neceſſary to ſupport human Life, both, The common Herd of Mankind, as taught by Experience, freely acknowledge: And Philoſophers have, by much more diſtinct Proofs, demonſtrated from many ſatisfactory inſtructive Experiments tried and improved. Animals, preſerved and kept alive by a Circulation of Blood, prove the Truth of theſe Experiments. Theſe Animals being placed in the Receiver of the Air-pump (the ingenious Invention of the honourable and moſt-deſervedly-eminent *Robert Boyle* Eſq; (1) immediately periſhed, upon pumping out the Air. In the Anatomy of Dogs, diſſected by that wiſely-inquiſitive Dr. *Robert Hooke*, the ſame Truth is demonſtrated: Theſe Animals, the Doctor found, upon cutting out the *Aſpera Arteria*, ſituated under the *Epiglottis*, and by cutting away the [*Coſtæ* or] Ribs, the *Diaphragm* and *Pericardium*, have yet, by blowing into the Lungs with a Pair of Bellows a freſh Supply of Air, lived above an Hour. It is, therefore, univerſally allowed, that, Air muſt be numbered amongſt the neceſſary Cauſes of Life: And, as ſuch, is a Cauſe purſued and deſired in all Places as a Cauſe of Health neceſſary to all. Notwithſtanding, that, the true eſſential Nature of it, and the Manner how it operates upon all (either Human or other) Animal Bodies, is not as yet diſcovered. Let us ſuppoſe, then, upon this Similitude

See the Diſtinction between an Analogia Similitudinis and an Analogia Proportionis.

Sect. 10. Prolegomena, in the Notes.

See his Life in the Appendix.

See the Doctor's Life in the Appendix.

(1) *Invention of the honourable and moſt-deſervedly-eminent* Robert Boyle *Eſq*;] The Invention of this noble Inſtrument, to which the preſent Age is indebted for ſo many fine Diſcoveries, is aſcribed to *Otto De Guerrick*, the celebrated Conſul of *Magdebourg*; who exhibited his firſt public Experiments therewith before the Emperor and the States of *Germany*, at the breaking up of the Imperial Dyet at *Ratisbon* in the Year 1654. Dr. *Hooke* and M. *Du Hamel*, indeed, aſcribe the Invention to Mr. *Boyle*; but that ingenious Author frankly conſeſſes *De Guerrick* to have been beforehand with him. Some Attempts, he aſſures us, he had made upon the ſame Foundation, before he knew any thing of what had been done abroad: But the Information he afterwards received from *Schotus*'s *Mechanica-Hydraulico-Pneumatica*, publiſhed in 1657, wherein was an Account of *De Guerrick*'s Experiments, firſt enabled him to bring his Deſign to Maturity.—From hence, with the Aſſiſtance of Dr. *Hooke*, after two or three unſucceſsful Trials, aroſe a new *Air-pump*, more eaſy and manageable than the *German* one: And hence, or rather from the great Variety of Experiments that illuſtrious Author applied it to, the Engine came to be denominated *Machina Boyleana*. *See* Chambers's *Dictionary*, *under the Word* Air-pump.

tude of Reaſoning, that, a Multitude of Mankind lived together in a State of Nature, independant of all Civil Society; and, that, their own Powers and Abilities were, of themſelves, naturally ſufficient to aſſiſt each other, or the reverſe: Notwithſtanding that they all, in ſuch a State, might enjoy the Neceſſaries of Life, and, by Conſequence, Life itſelf (and this, to be ſure, is the moſt rational, the moſt philoſophical Branch of Mr. *Hobbes*'s Philoſophy): Yet it is certain, that, theſe very Perſons could not poſſibly live to the common natural Period of human Life, unleſs they agree that Each and All, ſhall, for the Advantage and Security of the reſt, refrain from Force: So far, at leaſt, as not to lay violent Hands upon each other; And permit to each and every one the Uſe and Enjoyment of all the neceſſary Products of Nature. Such a general Conſent or Agreement as this, therefore, pretty nearly reſembles that common Uſe of Air neceſſary to Life; and a kind of Benevolence, alſo, much greater than is included in Mr. *Hobbes*'s State of War: Becauſe, ſuch a Conſent or Agreement, both regards the true End of Benevolence itſelf, and, as ſuch, upon this very Account, regards, alſo, the Uſe of *Right Means*. For, *ſuch an End* implies the voluntary Act of the Will in the Application of *Means fitting and proper*.——But, what we may alſo further add, is, That, each and every one Individual neceſſarily judges his own Powers and Abilities neceſſarily involved in the *Means* beſt ſuited to the Security and Safety of *The Many*: And, for this very Reaſon, therefore, will uſe and apply theſe Abilities for the Benefit of others:——But, more eſpecially, when, upon rational Grounds, he is ſatisfied that he ſubſtracts no Advantage from himſelf: But, on the contrary, is fully convinced, that his own natural Powers and Abilities are improved and ſtrengthened, as well by ſo happy and excellent an Exerciſe of them, as well as from the Hope and Expectation of a Recompence, of a Reward. And, conſequently, it follows, that, under ſuch a Conſent as this *only*, not only *Innocence*, but alſo *Beneficence*, will be contained. And—Theſe two Branches, (namely, *Innocence* and *Beneficence*) conſtruct and conſtitute the whole *Moral Table of Univerſal Benevolence or the Law of Nature*.

Now, in the next Place, that, ſuch a Conſent is neceſſary for each and every one Individual, muſt, as far as we are able, be the indiſpenſable Endeavour of ALL, in order to obtain this very Conſent from the reſt of Mankind, altho' we do not underſtand the inward conſtituent Parts of Man, more than we do thoſe of Air: And—notwithſtanding, that, we cannot preciſely determine, before-hand, the Whole, whether *Good* or *even Evil*, which poſſibly may or can ariſe from ſuch an intimate Intercourſe and Communication. For, altho' we cannot poſſibly affirm what Breath of Air, we draw, brings a mortal Diſeaſe along with it; yet, we can poſitively affirm, that, without Reſpiration, we muſt inevitably dye: And, on the contrary, the Benefit of Reſpiration being freely allowed to us, that, we enjoy, in a moſt eminent Degree, a ſignal, remarkable Help towards.

wards Life. Beſides, The neceſſary Influx or Aſſiſtance of Mankind (in order to promote the Happineſs of each and every one Individual) requires thus much, that we ſhould, by our moſt diligent and aſſiduous Searches, employ our beſt Endeavours in reconciling all other rational Agents to our own Intereſt, ſo as not to neglect any one Individual entirely: Much leſs, ſhould we ſeek to provoke the Indignation of any, and in ſuch Degrees, as to ſuffer ourſelves at any time to be ſo ſeparated and divulſed from them, as to follow Ways of our own, in purſuing Happineſs, or the particular ſelfiſh Cauſes of it; ſuch, as, for Example, *Intereſt* or *Glory* or Pleaſure; notwithſtanding it muſt be allowed, that there are Times and Seaſons fit and proper for them, a decent and due Regard being always had to general Cauſes. For, who can ſay, that, theſe very ſelfiſh Motives are abſolutely neither of Uſe nor Advantage to Society—And yet, no Man, in his Senſes, will voluntarily withdraw himſelf from the neceſſary Uſe of Air; and, at the Loſs of Life, plunge himſelf into the Depth of the Ocean, in queſt of the moſt valuable Treaſures, which, perhaps, here and there, may be ſcattered thro' the Immenſities of its profound Abyſs. It is, then, the abſurdeſt Folly imaginable (and which all Mankind muſt know) to provide for, and take Care of, very few Caſualties in Life; and, at the ſame time, neglect the Sum-total of our future Happineſs, and the Cauſes requiſit and neceſſary towards the Attainment of ſuch Happineſs. For this Reaſon, therefore, the Principles which inſtruct us, that we can direct and influence the Organs of Reſpiration (the Operations of which Organs can, and may, in ſome reſpects, be either hindered or promoted, at the very Inſtant we pleaſe, upon the leaſt Volition) the very ſame Principles, alſo, which inſtruct us to breath a wholeſome Air, whenever we have it in our Power, will inſtruct us to regulate all our internal Acts, all our outward Actions, (which refer to Mankind in general) with that [Φιλανθρωπία, with that] Humanity, or univerſal Love to Mankind, that we may, in as effectual a Manner as poſſible, ſo far prevail on them, to relieve and refreſh us with the benign Influences of all the benevolent and good-natured Acts in their Power. From conſtant Experience we are fully ſenſible, how induſtriouſly we avoid infecting the Air of our Habitations and Dwelling-houſes with noxious Vapours and Stenches: And, beyond Doubt, ſuch our Caution is intended with this one particular View and Deſign alſo, leſt, our daily Food, ſo neceſſary to the Support of human Life, ſhould be corrupted and rendered poiſonous by the Effluvia, the Breathings of a Plague, or of any other Contagion: And this, indeed, is but a poor Inſtance of our Innocence, of our Freedom from Infection. Yet, ſuch a conſtant Caution demonſtrates the Neceſſity of an Innocency in all our Behaviour. We expectorate and throw off through the Lungs, the Air we draw in and breathe: But, ſhould the Portion of Air we breathe (let the Quantity be never ſo ſmall, in order to refreſh the Blood and Animal Spirits) be infected: Why, then, every ſuch Portion of Air,

by

by inſenſible Perſpiration and Reſpiration, is, with Increaſe, exhaled and evaporated again into the common Maſs of Air: And, *This*, from the reaching Motions of Nature, attended with plain Symptoms of Volition (or natural Inclination at leaſt) carries, by a Kind of *Action* and *Reaction*, a Gratitude: And, demonſtrates the Neceſſity of ſuch an Action and Reaction, in order to promote *a Public Univerſal Good.* Phyſiologiſts and Anatomiſts have alſo clearly ſhewn, that, the Blood of each Animal is, properly and truly, his own Vital Spirits, as nouriſhed by Air: And, that, the Spermatic Juice, ſecerned from the Blood and Spirits, is elaborated for Propagation by proper Organs fitted and contrived naturally for this Purpoſe. Upon this one Proof is demonſtrated, That, the Care of *Self*, and the Care of *Family*, even to many Generations, is limited within certain determined Bounds. And, laſtly, in a Word—Becauſe, the human Powers and Abilities are daily repaired and ſtrengthened by Reſpiration: Becauſe, they are naturally active and lively, in all Operations uſeful to the *Public Good:* And, that, the very Air itſelf, expectorated and thrown out from the Lungs, is evaporated again into open Air, for the common Benefit of All: We, by this ſo analogous a Similitude, in ſome ſort, picture out a very ſtriking Image of that Duty I am here eſtabliſhing, *the Duty of Humanity*, of *Univerſal Benevolence.* Now, this ſo natural an Action, that is, Reſpiration, (ſo far as it is a Phyſical Natural Animal Motion, performed by Brutes and by Human Creatures, even when aſleep) carries in it a meer Image only, of all the Virtues comprehenſively contained under *Benevolence:* Yet, it is ſo ſtriking an Image of lively Virtue and Efficacy, that it exactly refers, and particularly relates, to all and every one ſingle Member in each Animal Body; to the cloſeſt Connexions and moſt intimate Conjunctions which they bear to one another; and alſo, to all the Motions and real Effects of ſuch an Office as Reſpiration (*i. e.* Benevolence) really is.——And——indeed, the Truth of this will appear evident to all thoſe, who will take the Pleaſure of comparing what we have juſt now laid down, with thoſe Concluſions of Reaſon which we have eſtabliſhed, concerning *Acts neceſſary to the Common Good.*——And, moreover, The real Truth of this Compariſon, between Reſpiration [Common Air] and *Univerſal Benevolence*, muſt appear evident to every one, who conſiders what is the true Definition of Virtue, *viz.* " Virtue is (no- Virtue defined.
" thing elſe than) the regular, conſtant, uniform, practical Deſire, Will
" and Inclination to obey the Laws of Nature: Which Laws, preſcribe
" and enjoin the Performance of Acts neceſſary, and beſt ſuited to anſwer
" this End."

Juſt ſo far, then, as the Act of Reſpiration and other Animal Acts, which we exerciſe in common with Brute Creatures, are carried on by the Advice and Direction of Reaſon, in promoting *the nobleſt End, the Common Good of that ſocial Syſtem over which God himſelf preſides, as ſupreme Lord and Head* (in the very End, Deſign and Nature of which Society, are

eſſentially contained the Glory, the Honour of God, as Lord and Governor, and the Happineſs of all Mankind, as his Subjects) then, and then only, it is, that theſe Acts are numbered in the Catalogue of true ſubſtantial Virtues: And, juſt in the ſame manner as Feaſts and Faſts of the Chriſtian Church become Acts truly religious, when they are obſerved and ſolemnized with the View and Deſign of anſwering the real Ends and Deſigns of Religion and of a religious Life only. Laſtly, to prevent my growing too tedious, by enumerating all the Articles of this Compariſon, I ſhall only here add one Obſervation more, wherein it may appear that theſe two, namely, *Reſpiration* and *Benevolence*, farther reſemble one another, *viz.* That, altho' *Univerſal Benevolence*, be, a general, a neceſſary Cauſe of Human Happineſs, on the one Hand: And, notwithſtanding that ſuch a Plenty of Air, as we breathe and enjoy, on the other Hand, be the general and neceſſary Cauſe of human Life: Yet, in neither the one or the other Caſe, is *Benevolence*, or *Reſpiration*, the total entire Cauſe of that Effect, which depends reſpectively upon Each (or, as the Phraſe is, *The adequate Cauſe of Each*). Becauſe, there are many other concurring Circumſtances alſo, wanting to ſecure and defend both Life and Happineſs: And yet, no one Circumſtance can, as to either Caſe, exclude theſe two principal eſſential Cauſes. Neither, in the next Place, (and which indeed ſeems extraordinary) in the full adequate Power or Determination of either *Reſpiration* or *Benevolence*, is compleatly found out the ſo much deſired Effect in both, *i. e.* Life and Happineſs: And, what is, in the third Place, more remarkable, That, neither of theſe two neceſſary Cauſes is abſolutely and entirely under the Direction and in the Power of theſe Agents, who moſt ſtand in need of them.

From whence it demonſtratively follows, that, we have, as we imagine, ſecured theſe two Cauſes, by all poſſible Means in our Power: Yet, it is evident, after all our beſt Endeavours, that, we cannot be infallibly ſure of obtaining ſo deſirable an Effect, and which we ſo earneſtly purſue, in either or both Caſes: Unleſs other Cauſes, quite independant of our Power and Dominion, concur, unite and co-operate. And yet, this Conſideration ought not to deter and frighten us from exerciſing our beſt Endeavours in promoting *Virtue* (or *Univerſal Benevolence*): Becauſe we ſee, upon exactly-ſimilar Reaſoning, The ſame Argument does not prevail over any one Animal who feels Inſtinct, either totally to neglect wholeſome Air in the Article of Reſpiration, or to throw himſelf headlong into thoſe deſperate Places of Malignity and Contagion, where not one out of thouſands can live. Any Air or Climate, thus ſo plaguily infected, exactly reſembles *the War of ALL againſt ALL:* And, ſo deſtructive a State is the Conſequence, whenſoever the Baſis of Society is not eſtabliſhed upon *Common Good*, as the one only Rule of Action.—But, where, on the contrary, it is left promiſcuouſly to the arbitrary Will and Pleaſure of All to follow, Each his own particular End and Scheme of Action; and then, by this

Rule,

Rule, to meaſure the Acts and Behaviour of all the reſt of Mankind. The only one Concluſion to be collected from the Evils which muſt befal the Followers of Virtue, is, That, in all the poſſible Degrees of Happineſs, none can be ſecured by private particular Strength and Powers, even at the very Time when all Strength and Abilities and Powers are governed totally, and influenced abſolutely, by the beſt Moral Precepts.—And notwithſtanding all we have ſaid, it is yet, at the ſame time, as concluſively true, That, by a full Obedience which we owe to theſe Precepts, we muſt do all we can, That, we muſt act the beſt, in order to ſecure and lead an happy Life: And This, by the Bye, *is the one only Rule*, which Moral Philoſophy or Practical Right Reaſon lays down, for the Regulation and Conduct of all our Behaviour and Practice. And—from hence, we ſhall, at leaſt, reap the following happy Advantages,—Becauſe, in the firſt Place, we avoid thoſe numberleſs dreadful Calamities and Evils, which the whole Herd of bad Agents draw upon themſelves by their vicious Practices: And, *Secondly*, we ſhall conquer, overcome, and get the better of Evils and Calamities, (which, in this Vale of Mortality, cannot be avoided) by bearing them with Patience and a calm Compoſure of Mind. In the actual Exerciſe of ſuch Moral Virtue, we enjoy a ſound and compoſed, a reſolute and complacent State of Mind: A State of Mind which will bleſs us, and render us happy, from that moſt delicious intellectual Senſe and preſent Enjoyment of commendable worthy Acts, as well as from the pleaſing Hope, that fond Expectation of a future Reward and Recompence. On the contrary, whoſoever, by poſtponing and neglecting all Care and Concern for *the Common Good*, deſpiſes *the Favour, the Good-will, the Benevolence of both God and Man:* He knowingly and perverſely plucks up, and deſtroys radically, all thoſe vital Seeds and principal Cauſes, upon which depend eſſentially (whether we will or no) the true ſolid Foundations and Stamina of all ſubſtantial Happineſs; and, by Conſequence, turns all Good-will, all Friendſhip, both of God and Man, (which, as we muſt know, is ſo eſſential to Well-being) into Neglect, Contempt and Hatred——All——moſt-deſervedly merited. From whence it muſt inevitably happen, that, ſuch *Wilful Tranſgreſſors* cannot but dread Puniſhment; and afterwards, when they have ſorely felt Evils, and Calamities ready to ſwallow them up, they themſelves muſt acknowledge, that, *they themſelves are the Authors, the efficient Cauſes of all their own Miſeries*, and, they muſt as neceſſarily alſo upbraid themſelves with *the baſeſt the moſt abject Folly*, thus perverſely and wilfully to live only for themſelves; when, at the ſame time, they cannot but know, how little ſelf-ſufficient they were to anſwer and bring about any one rational End of Self-happineſs, when left ſingle and alone.

SECT. XXXV.

Private Happineſs and private Miſery neceſſarily involved in the general Cauſes of common Happineſs and common Miſery.

These general or univerſal Cauſes are God and Man.

NOW, the Subject-matter, concerning which we have been hitherto treating, was purſued with this View only: To demonſtrate, that, the beſt and moſt uſeful Precept laid down in treating upon Method, muſt be eſtabliſhed [Τυπὰ Τυπῶς (1) *i. e.*] concerning ſuch Univerſals as are univerſally true and hold good; and, that, this ſame beſt moſt uſeful Precept, likewiſe, claims a Place amongſt thoſe Rules of Moral Practice, in which the great Art of *Purſuing Human Happineſs* is ſtated and delivered to us. And, in the next Place, that, the univerſal Cauſes of this Happineſs (namely, God and Man, *i. e.* the Helps and Aſſiſtances of all Rational Agents) muſt be univerſally ſecured and reconciled to our Intereſt at all times invariably, and in all Places, *&c.* And, in ſuch a Manner, that, theſe Cauſes ought never totally to be neglected, much leſs, rouzed up and provoked into a Reſentment, into a War againſt us: And, ſo dreadful an Event muſt unavoidably happen, if, even with the deepeſt Secrecy, or if, even ſo ſeldom as but once only, any Act be committed againſt *the Common Good.* Whatſoever Pleaſure there be (if any Pleaſure there can be) in ſuch Corruptions of Nature as theſe, it is momentary, it is tranſitory: Whereas, the Affronts, the Inſults, offered both to God and Man, continue and laſt for ever. The Remembrances, alſo, of every ſuch Tranſgreſſor himſelf are tenacious, are indelible:—Remembrances, full of galling Reproaches, which often recur and return to his Mind whether He will or no. The Remembrances, alſo, of all thoſe Beings whom every ſuch Invader upon *Public Happineſs* has affronted, are very permanent, very mindful—And, ſuppoſing that the *Time* NOW does not always furniſh an immediate Opportunity of Revenge—yet, ſuch Remembrances will, for this very Reaſon, revive and watch every future Opportunity to vindicate the Injury, even by tranſmitting the Retaliation down to lateſt Poſterity. But,—to ſuch Tranſgreſſors the ſevereſt Curſe of all is, that, Almighty God never forgets their flagrant Offences, even at the Time when he ſuſpends the immediate Execution of his Vengeance. By Vertue, then, of theſe experienced Truths (and many more which daily occur) common Obſervation readily collects, that, Reaſon, having fairly and impartially weighed all Cauſes upon whom private Happineſs neceſſarily and eſſentially depends, never concludes, that, any one Act either can or ought to be committed againſt *the Public Univerſal Good of All.* This one eſtabliſhed

(1) Τυπὰ Τυπῶς] *i. e.* ſays Mr. *Maxwell*, That we ought to form Concluſions univerſal as well as true concerning Univerſals. Page 245.

De Faire une application genérale et ſans exception de ce qui eſt vrai en matiere de choſes univerſelle,. *Barbeyrac* Page 271. Upon our Author's Application of the two Greek Words Τυπὰ Τυπῶς, Monſ. *Barbeyrac* has this Remark, Je ne ſai, d'où nôtre Auteur a tiré ces deux mots Grecs, par où il exprime ſa régle ſuccinctement, & qui ſont apparemment de quelque ancien auteur. *Id. Ibid.*

bliſhed Maxim being, however, at the ſame time allowed, *viz.* "That, if "I, for Inſtance, by the beſt Means in my Power, have gained over to my "Intereſt the only efficient Cauſes of private Happineſs, I have moſt cer- "tainly ſecured my own Happineſs: Becauſe, all private Happineſs is inti- "mately involved in thoſe Cauſes upon whom ſuch Happineſs ſolely de- "pends."

Let us now, in the next Place, demonſtrate, upon clear full Principles, That, this Obligation (to avoid all Acts, in the general hurtful and deſtructive, by the Warnings and Admonitions of Puniſhment before-hand declared) plainly diſcovers itſelf to us: And, by an equal Parity of Reaſon alſo, from probable, well-grounded Expectation, we anticipate ſuch Returns and Retributions of Good from others, as to conclude, that, Mankind are obliged to merit and gain the Good-will of others by all Acts of *Benevolence*. From whence is fairly deduced the general Obligation to exert and practiſe *all Acts of Virtue:* Which (Acts of Virtue) are only ſo many different Modes and conſtituent Branches of *Univerſal Benevolence*. On the contrary, the Obligation is as general, as equally-ſtrong to ſhun and avoid all thoſe Vices, the malignant Nature of which cannot but be known; the ſeveral contrary Virtues being well underſtood. The Foundation of this Obligation, therefore, is firmly laid; becauſe, an Abhorrence from theſe Puniſhments and an earneſt Purſuit of theſe Rewards are comprehended under the eſſential Notion of *that Happineſs*, which, from the neceſſary Circumſtances of our Being, we deſire: And is *an Happineſs ſo extenſive* as to contain the whole Aggregate, the compleat Sum-total of *all Good, in every Degree, which we can poſſibly purſue and enjoy*. That the Inducements [the *Objecta Motiva*, as the School-men phraſe them] the Motives or Arguments, muſt be drawn from Rewards and Puniſhments Happineſs and Miſery to obſerve Laws in general, is a Doctrine confeſſedly allowed by All. Whereas, in our Syſtem of Moral Philoſophy, the Obligation of Laws is ſuppoſed no other, than that inherent, innate Energy of thoſe Arguments, which, a Lawgiver (who in our preſent Caſe is Almighty God) uſes to perſwade Rational Free Agents to the Practice of *Univerſal Benevolence*. Nay, the very Rewards, annexed by the Right Reaſon of Mankind to *Univerſal Benevolence*, lay the Inducement of an Obligation chiefly upon the Favour of Almighty God, the Supreme Rational Governor of ALL: The Puniſhments, in like manner alſo, inflicted by the ſame Right Reaſon of Mankind, are certain Portions of that Divine Vengeance, which, in this Life, muſt unavoidably be ſuffered; and are likewiſe the ſureſt Pledges and ominous Preſages of a Divine future Vengeance. Now, Right Reaſon in God cannot contradict Right Reaſon in Man. And—that, this is a Truth ſufficiently diſcoverable by the Light of Nature, *Cicero* has a remarkable Paſſage, where, ſpeaking of God, he ſays, "Whatſoever Beings have Reaſon in common, the ſame "Beings alſo have Right Reaſon in common." Neither, indeed, can I ſee

Quibus ratio eſt communis, iiſdem & rectam rationem eſſe communem. De Legibus Lib. 1. See the Notes Sect. 10. Prolegomena.

ſee any one Influence powerful enough to bind the human Mind by a Neceſſity of any kind, (and upon Neceſſity, the Definition of *Juſtinian* lays the whole Streſs or Force of *Obligation*) except ſuch Motives or Arguments as demonſtratively lay before us, either *Good* or *Evil*, as the neceſſary Conſequences of our own free Acts: Of all which Motives or Arguments, ſince the ſtrongeſt and moſt powerful are the Favour and Wrath of Almighty God, the inſeparable Connexion of theſe Motives with our own free Acts clearly-enough lays before us, *What the Divine Will is*, and, *What thoſe Acts are which the Divine Authority would enjoin and command us to perform.*—And herein, really and truly, conſiſts *the Nature of an Obligation.*

We muſt here, however, always remember, in our Computations and Accounts of Rewards and Puniſhments, to reckon all the ſeveral Sorts of Good or Evil (which, by the Divine Appointment, clearly, in the Nature of Things, cohere and agree with ſuch Moral Acts) as concern and relate either to *Common Good* or to *Common Evil.* And, This Rule we muſt carefully obſerve, either, *firſt*, Whether *This Connexion be immediate:* As, for Inſtance, When, any one Act, performed in Honour of God and for the Benefit of Mankind in general, (upon account of that inward Delight which every one from his own Experience feels) brings along with it its own Reward. As for Example. Let us reflect upon ſome of the moſt uſeful, inſtructive, beneficial Contemplations. The Exerciſe and Practice, ſuppoſe, of our Love towards God and Man: Or, on the contrary, let us try thoſe Anxieties, Diſquietudes and Vexations of Mind which wreck and torture the Envious, the Wrathful, and all the Malevolent. Or, *Secondly*, whether *this Connexion be mediate*; ſuch as, when the ſeveral Degrees, either of Good or Evil, conſequent upon our own Moral Acts, happen by the Interpoſition of a longer Series of remoter Cauſes, ſuppoſing ſuch Cauſes either neceſſary or free: As when, for Inſtance, by the Deſign and Contrivance of Rational Agents, (God and Man) ſomething is ſuperinduced upon, and added to, human Acts under the Denomination of *a Puniſhment* or *a Reward.* Now, it is by the entire Will and Conſent of Almighty God only, that *Rewards and Puniſhments after Death in a future Life* are diſtributed: And, of which *Rewards and Puniſhments*, natural Reaſon is fully ſenſible and conſcious, *The Reaſon even of thoſe who are utterly unwilling to have it ſo.*

See Sect. 12. of this Chapter, Page 316.

See Sect. 18. of this Chapter, Page 335.

One Caution more ſtill remains, which ought chiefly to be regarded, *i. e.* "That we do not meaſure and regulate the Sanction of the Law of Na-" ture by the extrinſic outward contingent uncertain Rewards and Puniſh-" ments of this Life only." Becauſe, by forming our Judgment and Practice, according to ſo precarious and foreign a Rule, in Truth and Reality, would be to neglect the ſureſt, the beſt and moſt certain Characteriſtic of an Obligation, which naturally might create a prone Tendency towards the Contempt of ſuch an Obligation. Let us carry this Point a little

little further: Suppoſe, that, we had done *ſome Good*, from the Proſpect, the View, the Expectation, the Hope of ſome temporal Advantages: Or, from the Dread, the Danger, the Apprehenſion, the Fear of ſome temporal Evils; and, upon theſe Motives only: Surely, This would prove a certain Sign of a mean abject mercenary Soul. Whereas, on the other Hand, let us ſuppoſe, that a Man ſeeks (as our Philoſophy ſuppoſes) beſides temporal Motives, that Reward, which truly ennobles the human Soul, that is, the eternal Favour of Almighty God: And, That, He cooperates with him in a ſtudious Care and Concern for *the Univerſal Public Good*, you can never, upon ſo ſolid and ſure a Foundation, want a fit Inducement, an operative Motive to act Virtue: And, you will alſo effectually baniſh all, even the leaſt, Suſpicion of a low, abject, poor, baſe, mercenary Soul. Moſt certainly, ſuch Rewards as theſe are at all times glorious and honourable, becauſe they are inſeparably annexed to the Practice of Virtue. And, the true Reaſons why ſuch Rewards as theſe are honourable, and that they at all times carry in them Praiſe and a Commendation, appear ſo, are, 1. Becauſe, a more extenſive comprehenſive Knowledge both of God and Man, (the nobleſt of all Cauſes) is the Foundation, not only of all private Happineſs, but of *the Common Happineſs of all Rational Agents*.—For, as long as you continue willing, and, with active Zeal, endeavour to ſhew yourſelf, in all the relative Duties, acceptable both to God and Man, by Vertue of that Dependance which Man has upon God; and of thoſe mutual Aſſiſtances reciprocally neceſſary, you cannot but be ſenſible that you draw your whole Efficacy of Power from the original Sources of Eſſence Preſervation and Perfection in Human Nature—Sources never to be exhauſted.

2. The ſecond Reaſon is, becauſe, the Analogy, which, our Nature bears to the Nature of God, is entirely drawn from the Divine Benignity or Munificence, which is more remarkable in his providential Care of Univerſals.

3. Becauſe, we gain the Sovereignty, the Dominion of our own Reaſon over all our Appetites, Paſſions, and corporeal or bodily Motions.

From hence, to be ſure, it demonſtrably appears, that true Religion and Juſtice, (which eſſentially conſiſt in the Virtues and Diſpoſitions juſt now mentioned) with the Improvements in both; as alſo their immediate Effects, ſuch as Joy and a peaceable Tranquillity of Mind always flowing from a pleaſing Senſe and Conſciouſneſs which they create, conſtitute the main Branch of the Reward of Virtue. Upon this Foundation, and upon no other, can be reconciled that Opinion of the *Stoics*, and of ſome others, who will have it, That, *Virtue is amiable, is deſirable upon its own Account*. I freely, indeed, acknowledge, that, this *Stoical Reward* is intimately connected with Virtue, and, that, This Connexion is ſo intimate as not to be ſeparated from it — even by Diſaſters and Misfortunes. Since, then, the Reward of Virtue (to ſay the leaſt of it) may be conſidered in

a View

a View ſeparate from Virtue: And, ſince it is a Reward which properly and peculiarly belongs to Virtue itſelf: And, ſince it is ſuch a Reward as may be known, and determined before-hand, to belong to Virtue as the Reward of it. Upon theſe Accounts, I judge it neceſſary to conſider *this Reward* under the Notion of *a Sanction* annexed to that Practical Dictate or Precept, which, as to the Subject-matter of it, ſtrictly enjoins *a vigorous Proſecution of the Common Good* (that is, *the vigorous Proſecution and full Improvement of all Virtue*): And, by a peculiar diſtinguiſhing Characteriſtic, this one Precept is perceived diſtinct and ſeparate from all other Practical Precepts, which (*i. e.* other Practical Precepts) are true, but not, at all times, ſo indiſpenſably neceſſary to be obſerved and obeyed by all and every one Individual. For, ſuch Precepts as are employed and practiſed in the Solution of Problems, both in Arithmetic and Geometry, cannot be called *Univerſal Laws*, becauſe they want *that Sanction* of which I am now ſpeaking.

The true Notion of a *Sanction* ſtated.

For, a Law, to define it truly, *is a Practical Precept, concerning the Proſecution, the Advancement, the Attainment of the Common Public Good, authorized and defended by ſuch a Sanction, as ariſes from both Rewards and Puniſhments.*

A Law in general defined.

Laſtly, The Reader may obſerve, that, I have not explained *the Cauſes of that Obligation which Laws carry in them*, by bearing the leaſt reſpect or relation to *any ſuch Sanction as this:* Becauſe, in Truth, I have aſſigned another *efficient Cauſe*, and *an End truly effectual*, and, by far, more excellent. I have explained only that one Branch of the Definition concerned about that indiſpenſible Neceſſity which intimately concerns each, every one, and all Individuals. And—from hence it is, that, Actions, enjoined by Laws, are termed *neceſſary*. (1) The Neceſſity which we

(1) *The Neceſſity which we are ſpeaking of*, &c.] The Perception, or laſt Judgment of the Underſtanding, is as diſtinct from the actual Exertion of the Self-motive Power, as *ſeeing* the Way, is from *walking* in it. Nor will it follow, becauſe the Perception of the Underſtanding is denied to be the immediate efficient neceſſary Cauſe of the Exertion of the Self-motive Power, that therefore *unintelligent Matter* may be capable of Self-motion; any more than it will follow, if a Man's *Eyes* be denied to be the immediate efficient neceſſary Cauſe of his walking, that therefore the Man may be capable of walking, tho' he has neither Legs nor Life. A Man's *Underſtanding* judges of what he is to do, as his *Eyes* diſcern the Way: But a blind or winking Man has Power to walk without ſeeing; and every living Agent has a phyſical Power to act, whether he makes any Uſe of his Judgment and Underſtanding or no. *Unintelligent Matter* can be no Agent, becauſe *Action* ſuppoſes (in the very Notion of it) Life and Conſciouſneſs; but *that Conſciouſneſs* which makes *Action* to be *Action*, is entirely a diſtinct Thing from that *Perception* or *Judgment*, by which a Man determines before-hand concerning the *Reaſonableneſs* or *Fitneſs* of what he is about to act. An *Agent over-ruled by a blind Impulſe*, is a Contradiction in Terms; for then he is not at all an Agent, but a mere Patient. But an Agent acting not according to the laſt Judgment of his Underſtanding (meaning always by the laſt Judgment of the Underſtanding, the *laſt paſſive Perception*, and not the *firſt active Volition* of the Agent; which two Things muſt by no Means be confounded); ſuch an Agent, I ſay, is like a Man ſhutting his Eyes, and walking at a Venture down a Precipice.

God

we are here ſpeaking of, cannot be ſuppoſed and underſtood as an abſolute Phyſical Neceſſity; *i. e.* Such a Neceſſity as takes place in Mechanical Powers and Motions: But, it is only a relative hypothetical conditional Neceſſity; and, ſuch a Condition is it, as relates to an Effect, which we either may or may not produce, juſt as we pleaſe. In this moſt-generally-univerſal Law, then, (the principal Concern of our preſent Enquiry) enjoining and commanding the Proſecution of *a Good moſt univerſal, (i. e. the Glory, the Honour of Almighty God, and the Happineſs of all Mankind).* It is, even to Self-evidence, true, That, the Action, or Act commanded, is not required as neceſſary towards the Production of any one Effect better or more excellent: Becauſe, ſuch a better Effect does not exiſt, neither is it poſſible for ſuch an Effect to exiſt. The Difference between a Phyſical and a Moral Neceſſity.

We may alſo, here, farther add, as a manifeſt Truth, That, if ſuch an Aim, ſuch an Endeavour is judged neceſſary towards the Production of *this one very Effect itſelf*, that then, the Propoſition becomes *identical*, and, conſequently, cannot ſubſtitute a Motive to act equally-prevailing in its Place: For which Reaſon, the Proſecution or Production of this Effect, as far as in us lies, muſt be underſtood neceſſary towards the Production of a leſſer, of a dependent Effect: And, which Effect procures, by the united Aſſiſtance of all Cauſes, that ſingle individual Happineſs [each his own] which we are, and upon ſo juſt a Foundation, ſuppoſed earneſtly to deſire and contend for. Therefore, *The Univerſal Propoſition*, being taken and underſtood in this Light, is the moſt lively Spur, the moſt effectual Motive to Action. Notwithſtanding, however, all the Force and Power of this Argument, we will, at the ſame time, moſt freely grant, That, as ſoon as the real Exiſtence of the Obligation which we demonſtrate is, once, publiſhed and known, it (*i. e.* this Obligation) acquires a powerful additional Strength of Inducement from a Conſideration of the efficient Cauſe, from whom we have deduced and inferred *this Obligation*, namely, *The Will of the Firſt Cauſe, Almighty God Himſelf.* Becauſe, from hence it moſt demonſtratively appears, that, not only the moſt per-

God always *Diſcerns* and *Approves* what is juſt and good, *neceſſarily*, and cannot do otherwiſe: But, He always *acts* or *does* what is juſt and good, *freely*; that is, having, at the ſame time, a full *natural* or *phyſical Power* of acting differently. Otherwiſe, *Juſtice* (for Example) *in God*, would be nothing different from *Juſtice in a Sword*, when it *executes a juſt Sentence*; ſuppoſing the *Sword* to *perceive* what 'tis doing, and yet *cannot help* doing it. The Conſequence whereof is, that, there could not poſſibly be in God *any Moral Perfection* at all. For every Thing that is of a *moral* Nature, implies, in the very *Notion* or *Eſſence* of it, the doing of ſomething, which, at the ſame time, was in the Agent's Power not to have done. *Moral Neceſſity*, therefore, is diſtinguiſhed from *Phyſical Neceſſity*, juſt as all other *Figures of Speech* are from *literal Expreſſions:* That is, 'tis in Truth, and philoſophically ſpeaking, *no Neceſſity* at all: And yet every one eaſily ſees, that, the Juſtice and Goodneſs of an infinitely-perfect *Free Agent*, may as *firmly and reaſonably be relied on*, as the neceſſary Effect of any neceſſary Agent is known to be phyſically unavoidable. *See Letters to Dr.* Samuel Clarke, *concerning Liberty and Neceſſity, from a Gentleman of the Univerſity of* Cambridge; *with Anſwers to them. Anſwer to the third Letter printed at* London 1717. *See* Chap. 3. Sect. 4. Page 264.

fectly-wiſe Underſtanding of Almighty God has fully confirmed theſe Laws, with the Sanction annexed to them; but alſo, that, all the eſſential inherent Perfections of the Divine Nature conſpire, unite, and agree in promoting *this one very ſame Effect*. And the Reaſon, why, ſuch an Harmony, in the preſent Caſe, is evident: Becauſe, there cannot poſſibly, it implying an Imperfection, be any Diſagreement between the Will of God and his other Perfections.——For which Reaſon, all theſe Motives and Inducements, when unitedly conſidered, will inſpire a Man with the ſanguine lively Hopes of *ampler nobler Rewards*, and ſtrike into him ſure and certain Expectations and Preſages of *ſeverer Puniſhments*, by which, *the Sanction of theſe Laws of Nature*, with the indiſpenſable Neceſſity of *an exact Obedience to them*, muſt be confirmed and eſtabliſhed.

The whole Source and Original, both of *an Ignorance in the Laws of Nature*, and of *a careleſs Negligence as to the Obſervance of thoſe Laws*, ſeems to ariſe from hence, That, the Generality of Mankind, either do not ſufficiently weigh and conſider what are the true eſſential conſtituent Branches and Parts, either of *their own Happineſs*, or of *the Happineſs of others*; and, what Proportion, Connexion, Relation and Intimacy they bear to each other, ſo as to underſtand which Part carries a greater, and which, a leſſer, Degree of *Good* in it: Or becauſe, perhaps, they will not weigh and conſider the true Cauſes of *theſe ſeveral Kinds of Good*: Which of them contributes more, and which, leſs, in producing *this one End or Effect*. Upon both theſe Accounts, Mr. *Hobbes*'s Principles become very juſtly liable to Cenſure, in their Settlement and Direction of a *State of Nature*: Becauſe theſe his Principles, *Firſt*, lay down too poor, too limited an End, namely, *The Preſervation of the human Life and Limbs*, without the leaſt Regard and Notice had to *the intellectual Perfections of the Rational Soul, and to the Hope and Expectation of an Eternity, an Immortality to come*: And, *Secondly*, Becauſe, upon theſe his Principles, he ſtrenuouſly maintains, That, *in a State independant of Civil Society, the Power of Rational Cauſes* (*i. e.* of God and Man) *in reſtraining all Acts of Violence and Invaſion upon the Rights of others, is inſignificant, trifling, and of no Conſequence*.—Now—altho' I muſt ingenuouſly own, that, in this Vale of Mortality, theſe Cauſes receive a conſiderable additional Sanction from Civil Society; yet I, on the contrary, in Oppoſition to Mr. *Hobbes* and his Principles, as ſtrenuouſly maintain, That, there is not the leaſt Neceſſity (in order to ſecure Happineſs) to anticipate others either publicly or treacherouſly, by running headlong into a State of War (the State of Civil Society, by the *Hypotheſis*, being quite baniſhed and removed): But, on the contrary, That, the Natures of both God and Man carry Weight and Power enough, (as effectual efficient Cauſes, Reaſons and Motives) why, we ſhould chuſe to court and ſolicit all Beings, by *Univerſal Benevolence*, and by *all Kinds of Virtue*, which neceſſarily and conſequentially promote

Peace,

Peace, Benevolence; and ſo, at length, arrive at the happy State of a Civil Religious Well-governed Society.

SECT. XXXVI.

Two Objections ſtated and anſwered.

HAVING laid before my Readers, as briefly as I well could to be intelligible, my whole Opinion *concerning the true eſſential Subſtance and original Source of a Natural Obligation*, I judge it neceſſary, in the next Place, to remove and take off two Scruples or Doubts, which, ſeeming of more Importance than ordinary, poſſibly may perplex and diſquiet, confound and diſturb the Underſtandings of Mankind.

First Objection.

" 1. That the Puniſhments of Vice ſeem to be precarious and uncer-
" tain: That the Rewards of Virtue are not, with an Evidence ſuffici-
" ent, with a Certainty conſpicuous and ſatisfactory-enough, underſtood,
" ſo, as to exhibit clear Indications of a Natural Obligation, and of the
" Will of the Firſt Cauſe."

Second Objection.

" 2. That, the Doctrine here aſcertained ſeems to imply, that, the
" Common Public Univerſal Good is poſtponed and made ſubordinate to
" the Private Happineſs of each Individual."

Now, that, neither of theſe two Objections can, with either Truth or Reaſon, be laid againſt the Doctrine we have eſtabliſhed, we ſhall here demonſtrate. As to what concerns the firſt Objection, in which it is ſuggeſted, that, the Connexion of Puniſhments and Rewards, with Acts relating to the *Public Good*, (whether ſerviceable and beneficial, or hurtful and deſtructive) is entirely precarious and uncertain, we have the following Arguments to produce, which ſeem to carry a full Anſwer and ſatisfactory Reply.

Let us here, then, begin diſtinctly with that Connexion of Puniſhments cloſely attending upon Vice itſelf: And, upon this one Point we ſhall ſpeak more at large, becauſe this ſeems a Point of the greater Difficulty; and, becauſe, from hence, a clear Eſtimate may be made of the Reward conſequent upon Acts morally and rationally performed.

An Anſwer to the firſt Objection.

1. Notwithſtanding, that, ſome Kinds of Puniſhments, *E. G.* Human Revenge, may, by accidental Cauſes, be ſeparated from ſome iniquitous abominable Actions, yet, ſuch Crimes (notwithſtanding ſome few accidental Caſes) do not abſolutely eſcape all Puniſhment; and, conſequently, the Obligation we are now endeavouring to maintain, is not different from the Conſideration of a Puniſhment by neceſſary Conſequence to follow. For, the Diſorders of a diſturbed Mind cannot (more or leſs) be ſeparated from Iniquity, Guilt, Immorality: Such Diſorders ariſing and flowing from a Conflict, *a Contraſte*, an Oppoſition between the ſounder, more ſubſtantial Dictates of Right Reaſon, (which perſuade us to our Duty) and

thoſe raſh unwarrantable Sallies of Appetite and Paſſion (which hurry Mankind into Vice and Immorality).

2. To theſe Evils may alſo be added, the dreadful Apprehenſions of impending Vengeance, of Revenge, both of God and Man:—Apprehenſions, which are always attended with preſent Uneaſineſs and Pain.

3. Another pernicious Conſequence, which alſo deſerves Conſideration, is the Propenſity, the Inclination (contracted by vicious Habits) pronely tending towards a Perpetration of the ſame Crimes, and, many times, of Crimes much more malignant. Such an ill-inclined Propenſity as this, (becauſe it is ſtill ſure to diſturb and enervate the Faculties and Powers of the Mind) muſt, in my Opinion, be numbered amongſt the *Puniſhments of Vice and irregular Paſſions*. And, what we may yet ſtill further add, is, That, Malice and Envy, the inſeparable Companions of Invaſion upon the Property and Rights of others, muſt neceſſarily, and from the Nature of ſuch diſorderly Motions, wreck and torture every ſuch malevolent Mind; and, conſequently, the Mind of every Man ſo egregiouſly wrecked, is deeply ſtained and poiſoned with large repeated Draughts of ſo much malignant Infection.

4. As to thoſe Puniſhments, hinted at in the Objection, which do not certainly, but only contingently, follow *Immoral Acts*; the Rate, the Eſtimate, the Weight, the Importance of them, has a neceſſary Coherence with the wiſe, the prudent Conſideration of thoſe Acts, which any one individual perpetrates, or has already perpetrated, to the Loſs Damage and Hurt of others. For, ſince (as we have already demonſtrated) the Expectation of any Evil contingently-future, carries in it the Value, in a Degree more or leſs, of ſome certain preſent Evil; It demonſtrably follows, that, every ſuch Evil, is an Argument or a Motive offered and given by the Supreme Governor of All to his Subjects, whereby he would perſuade them, not to throw themſelves raſhly into ſo hazardous, ſo imminent a Danger. Now, ſo far as ſuch an Evil, ſuch an Hazard is capable of being deduced and inferred, (ſo far, at leaſt, as it concerns and relates to the Approbation and Conſent of the Supreme Governor, Almighty God) it muſt fall within the Eſtimate, the Calculation of a Puniſhment. And, conſequently, ſuch a future Evil, ſuch an extreme Hazard as this, carries a fixed determined Force and Obligation over all thoſe who rightly weigh and conſider, according to Reaſon, all Events and Conſequences which oppoſe and contradict their own Happineſs. The natural Concluſion, then, which follows from thoſe Principles juſt now eſtabliſhed, is evident enough. The one Point we are here to demonſtrate, in few Words, is, That, the Conſideration of ſuch human Acts as are pernicious to other Rational Beings, by a Neceſſity of Reaſoning, brings the Mind of Man to ſerious Thoughts of hazardous impending Danger:——Thoughts ſo much to be dreaded upon account of that Puniſhment: Againſt which, Cauſes the moſt weighty and conſiderable adviſe admoniſh and warn us; notwithſtanding, that,

we

we cannot from hence, with a peremptory Certainty, declare and foretel, What the ſure Event will be. This, then, is the Point, which, to a Demonſtration, is clear and evident from the following Reaſoning.——For, in the firſt Place, Human Acts of a noxious deſtructive Nature (merely becauſe they are ſuch) carry in them the Force, the Energy of (1) *a meritorious Cauſe: Which Cauſe is ſufficient and powerful enough to influence any Rational Agents,* but more eſpecially ſuch as ſuffer any Evil from hence, to reſtrain, as much as they poſſibly can, by proper coercive Puniſhments, Tranſgreſſors, who would thus bring Deſtruction upon the *Innocent*. This *Impulſive Force* is not *a Force fictitious* and *imaginary*, but a Force actual ſubſtantial and real; and is as truly ſo, as any one Motion, which ſtrikes and works upon our Senſes from outward Objects. We, however, at the ſame time, allow, that this Force is not, of itſelf, ſufficient to inflict *Puniſhments* upon the *Guilty:* But, we only, upon this account merely, judge, that, ſuch an Energy or Force as This deſerves ſome Notice; becauſe it is, in the very Nature of the Thing, neceſſary, that,

The firſt Argument why malevolent Acts carry in them their own Puniſhments.

(1) *A meritorious Cauſe, which Cauſe is ſufficient and powerful enough to influence any Rational Agents,* &c.] *A meritorious Cauſe,* or *Meritum,* is deſcribed by the logical and metaphyſical Writers, That Cauſe which excites and influences an Agent to pay Like for Like, or Meaſure for Meaſure: And theſe Kinds of *Retaliation* take place, as they ſay, in Caſes both of *Good* and *Evil*. They tell us, that, this *Meritum*, or *Cauſa Meritoria*, falls under an inferior Sub-diviſion of the *Cauſa Efficiens*, or *Efficient Cauſe*. The *Efficient Cauſe*, according to their Definition, is an external Cauſe producing an outward ſenſible Effect: A Cauſe, wherein, the Eſſences and inward Natures of Things are not concerned: A Cauſe which reaches no farther than the *Effect produced* and the *End deſigned:* That, the *Effect* and *End* are both *external:* And laſtly, that, it is a Cauſe which carries in it a *real* and not a *metaphorical Cauſality* or *Efficiency*. They then run into many Diviſions, Sub-diviſions, and inferior Sub-diviſions: Amongſt many others, (and which ſerve at preſent to explain our Author beſt), they diſtinguiſh the *Efficient Cauſe* into a *Principal* and a *Leſs-principal Cauſe*. The *Principal Cauſe* is that Cauſe which, by its own inherent Energy, produceth an Effect: A *Leſs-principal Cauſe* is that Cauſe which acts miniſterial and ſubſervient to the principal Cauſe, in producing an Effect. A *Leſs-principal Cauſe*, they further ſplit into *Procatarctica*, *Proegumena*, and *Inſtrumentum*. The *Procatarctic Cauſe* is that *Influence* which irritates and excites a *Leſs-principal Cauſe* by the Powers and Operations of external Cauſes (extrinſically and independant even of the *Principal Cauſe* itſelf). The *Proegumenic Cauſe* is that Cauſe, which, by an intrinſic inward Agency, diſpoſes inclines and even puſhes on a *Principal Cauſe* to act. The *Inſtrumentum* or *Inſtrumental Cauſe*, is *that Power*, (whether *mechanical*, *artificial* or *natural*) uſeful neceſſary and miniſterial to the *Principal Cauſe* in effecting the Work to be produced. The Difference between *Cauſa Procatarctica* and *Cauſa Proegumena* is, that, the firſt operates by *an External Efficiency:* The ſecond, by *an Inward Agency*. Theſe ſame ſubtle Hair-ſplitting Diſtinguiſhers place the four following Requiſites in a Subordination cloſely-relative to both the *Procatarctic* and *Proegumenic Cauſes*, viz. 1. *Objectum*, 2. *Occaſio*, 3. *Autor*, 4. *Meritum*. An *Object* may ſo far be called a Cauſe, as it actuates and puts into Motion the *Principal Cauſe*. An *Occaſion* is the convenient well-circumſtanced Opportunity, both as to *Time* and *Place*, of acting as the Agent himſelf pleaſes. By *the Author* we are to underſtand here, *That Adviſer, Counſellor* or *Moral Cauſe*, who, by laying before the Principal Cauſe Rational Motives and Arguments, endeavours, either, to perſuade him to act, or, to diſſuade him from acting. The *Meritum* or *Meritorious Cauſe* is that Cauſe which excites an Agent to pay Like for Like, or Meaſure for Meaſure. And theſe Kinds of Retaliation take place in Caſes both of *Good* and *Evil*. *See* Chap. 1. Sect. 26.

that, they, who are willing to act agreeable to Right Reason, ſhould fully weigh and conſider the whole Powers of their free moral Acts, and all the poſſible Effects and Conſequences which are to ariſe from them; and amongſt other Effects and Conſequences, one principal Concern and Thought ſhould be, to know how far theſe Acts are capable of influencing other Rational Agents; and to foreſee, Whether theſe Agents probably will, or will not, inflict a Puniſhment in Defence of a Common Cauſe, *the Univerſal Public Good.*

The Impreſſion, the Influence of *a Meritorious Cauſe* muſt be computed amongſt the *ſocial and aſſiſting Cauſes:* And, *ſuch an Energy, ſuch a Force, ſuch an Influence,* is rationally connected and joined with the Powers and Influences of 1. an inducing exciting *Object,* of 2. a fit *Occaſion* or *Opportunity,* and 3. *an Authority* or *Adviſer*; And, for this very Reaſon, we are not, upon any account, to neglect ſuch an Influence, ſuch a Perſuaſion, ſuch a Cauſe as this. Becauſe, the Mind is, by natural Inferences, led to conſider, that, the Force, the Influence of our own Moral Acts can be conſociated and mixed with the Forces, the Influences of numberleſs other Cauſes: And, conſequently, that the Influence, the Efficacy of ſuch Acts of our own, is capable of a Concurrence, a Co-operation, in the Production of noble extenſive general Effects, which could not poſſibly, from the Natures and Reaſons of Things, be expected from ſuch private Acts of our own, when ſingly and alone conſidered. And, for this very Reaſon, beyond all Contradiction, the Paradox is true which I juſt now aſſerted: That, *The View, the Conſideration, the Thought of Puniſhments, is neceſſarily connected with the Conſideration, the Thought of our own Moral Acts: Which Puniſhments, upon account of the Concurrence and Co-operation of external Cauſes, are, not by an evident Neceſſity, but, contingently only, altho', very probably, future.* The following Truth, however, at the ſame time, is undoubtedly certain, That, if we refrain from, and keep ourſelves clear of malevolent pernicious Acts, we ſhall not draw any Evil, any Deſtruction upon ourſelves: Whereas, if we, on the contrary, wilfully and perverſely commit ſuch Acts, it is as undoubtedly true, that, we ourſelves are the firſt Authors, the Workers and Provokers, the Exciters of The One, and indeed the Only One Firſt Cauſe, (or, as the Schoolmen call it, the Αἰτιατροκαταρκτικὴ *ſive* Προκαταρκτικὴ, *i. e. Cauſa incipiens aut inchoans,* the Procatarctic Cauſe) the Cauſe which, with all poſſible Eaſe, can concur and co-operate with other Cauſes to draw down upon us Ruin and Deſtruction. The undeniable Probability, therefore, there is, that other Cauſes, alſo, will unite and join in producing *this Effect,* we may fairly conclude, from the following cloſe Chain of Reaſoning.—But, before we enter farther into this Argument, we ſhall, by way of a Preliminary Introduction, adjoin ſome Conſiderations concerning *ſuch other Effects of evil immoral Acts* as contribute, not a little, to render the Execution of theſe *Puniſhments* more ſure and certain.

See Chap. 1. Sect. 26.

SECT.

SECT. XXXVII.

The ſecond Argument why malevolent Acts carry in them their own Puniſhments.

IT is undoubtedly true, That, every Act flowing from Malevolence and Ill-will towards others, carries, in its own Nature, a Tendency towards the Production of Acts equally malevolent, endleſs, and, in an infinite Series, repugnant to, and contradictory of, *Common Happineſs*: All ſuch Acts, conſequently, leſſen and diminiſh the Happineſs of every malevolent Agent himſelf: The Happineſs of Each, by ſo many Links of Connexion, eſſentially depending upon *the Happineſs of the Whole*. Becauſe, *Firſt*, Every ſuch malevolent Act ſtrengthens a bad Habit and immoral Practices: And, *Secondly*, Becauſe, every bad Agent will find it neceſſary to ſecure and defend one bad Act by another: For, whatſoever Attempt is undertaken treacherouſly by Deceit, or in ſecret, muſt, if Occaſion requires, be carried into full Execution by public and open Violence: And alſo, becauſe, in the *third* Place, the curſed Infection, communicated by bad Example, far and near ſpreads its peſtilential Influence thro' Multitudes. It is alſo, to a Demonſtration, true, That, the wider any Malevolence diffuſes its Influence, the more publicly and univerſally do all Things run into a State of War and Confuſion: Which State, to an Exceſs beyond meaſure, abounds with the ſevereſt Puniſhments: And threatens, in no leſs a Degree, Deſtruction to the Author himſelf of ſuch malevolent Acts, than it threatens a Deſtruction to be dreaded and feared by All. For, altho' the Apprehenſion of a War perfectly juſt, undertaken by All againſt All, is entirely groundleſs and vain, (becauſe ſuch a War cannot poſſibly exiſt, as we have already proved) yet, every one muſt, and, upon the moſt ſubſtantial Foundation of Reaſon, ought, when in a State quite independant of Civil Society, to apprehend and dread, leſt, by his own bad Practices, he bring a War upon himſelf; the united Powers of Multitudes being aſſociated, in order either to protect themſelves and their own Rights, or to inflict juſtly-deſerved Puniſhment. Every ſuch malignant Tranſgreſſor muſt, and ought to, labour under dreadful Apprehenſions, ſuppoſing him capable of drawing over Aſſociates to his Protection and Defence, leſt he plunges his Allies and Confederates headlong together with himſelf into the Diſtreſſes and Miſeries of an unjuſt War: Nay—even upon an Expectation beyond the Merit of his Cauſe, ſhould he happen to eſcape victorious, yet he has no leſs than Reaſon (notwithſtanding ſuch accidental Succeſs) to dread, leſt the Succeſs of his Villainy might kindle the ſame Spirit in others to invade his Rights in the very ſame way he invaded the Rights of others; and, with an equal Confidence, with as firm a Reliance upon the ſame victorious Succeſs. By ſuch Ways and Means, then, as theſe, may, upon the cleareſt Evidences, be diſcovered, how Contentions and War ariſe, not only, from a Survey of human Nature, but alſo, from common Obſervations made upon Tranſactions, which

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paſs between neighbouring States and Kingdoms. It is alſo equally-evident, that, ſuch Commotions and Contentions as little befriend the Security, the Preſervation of Individuals, as if ſuch Diſorders and Convulſions had taken their Riſe from that fictitious imaginary Right (invented by Mr. *Hobbes*) of All over All. And therefore, at the time Mr. *Hobbes* contends, that the Calamities, attending his State of War, lay a ſufficient, nay—even a neceſſary Foundation to compel all Mankind, every where, to lay down thoſe Inſtruments of War, which, they have hitherto exerciſed, and to ſubmit themſelves peaceably to a deſpotic abſolute Power and to all the arbitrary Laws of ſuch a Tyranny: Yet, at the ſame time, he cannot poſſibly avoid a Self-contradiction, unleſs, upon an equal Parity of Reaſon, he allows alſo, that, the Proſpect of as hazardous a War poſſibly may ariſe from invading the Rights and Properties of others, or from any other wicked Motive, powerful-enough to compel theſe ſame Invaders to refrain from all Injuries and Wrongs, *i. e.* from all ſuch Acts as contradict and oppoſe the *Common Good:* And as effectually, likewiſe, at the very firſt Inſtitution and Commencement of Civil Authority, to cultivate and promote all the mutual Duties and Offices of *Peace*, *Benevolence* and *Good-will amongſt themſelves:* And, in the next Place, (which alſo follows as a neceſſary Conſequence) that, they never ſhould, upon any account whatſoever, either directly or indirectly, enter into, or even attempt, a War againſt ALL—That Dream, that fond Dream of Mr. *Hobbes*'s own Delirium.

For, Right Reaſon, by the cleareſt Marks of Demonſtration, dictates this one Truth, *viz.* That, *The Calamities of a War, clearly and certainly foreſeen, which are ſufficiently-powerful to determine and deter Mankind, from raſhly engaging in War, are as powerful to make them decline and withdraw from a War actually undertaken.* Now, if the calamitous diſmal Effects of ſuch unjuſt iniquitous Acts, which ſo vigorouſly recoil upon the Agent guilty of ſuch Iniquity, may be fairly interpreted to ſtick faſt and adhere to the Crime, the Iniquity itſelf; and by Vertue of that regular Order in all Things, as conſtituted and ſettled by the Firſt Cauſe The Supreme Lord and Ruler of ALL: Such Effects, then, claim to themſelves the Nature of a *Puniſhment* by Divine Inſtitution eſtabliſhed and confirmed. And, That Propoſition, (formed from the Tendencies of Nature, and, conſequently, by the Determination of the Lord of Nature, declaring That ſuch, or ſuch, an Act is not good, *i. e.* ought not to be elicited and reduced to Practice, which proves both deſtructive of others, and greatly injurious to ourſelves) muſt be *the Law of Nature* ſufficiently manifeſting itſelf by ſuch Indications as theſe, namely, *Pronouncing* and *Determining* upon Acts of public Injury, or of public Advantage; and this is properly the Subject-matter of all Laws: And, which Propoſition or Law alſo carries in it a *Puniſhment*, a *Puniſhment inſeparably annexed to it*, by the Supreme Ruler, Governor and Lord of ALL: And, which ſupreme Authority

thority adds and ſuperinduces to this Propoſition or Law, the operative effectual effective Energy and Force of *Sanction*, We here entirely agree with Mr. *Hobbes*, That, Dread of Evils, ariſing from War, carries great Perſuaſion, effectual Prevalence over Mankind, by obliging them, from the Practice and Exerciſe of all Virtues, to perform mutual good Offices of Peace and calm Society. But, we here conſider War, ſo far only as it is capable of being juſt on the one Side of the Queſtion, and unjuſt on the other; abſolutely denying, at the ſame time, any Right, to Each and All, of waging and entering into an actual War againſt All, in order, that, Each and All may promiſcuouſly arrogate and aſſume *All* to *Self*——A Doctrine vigorouſly aſſerted and ſtrenuouſly maintained by Mr. *Hobbes* in his Book *De Cive*, Chap. 1. Sect. 10. The principal Concern of this our Enquiry is to diſtinguiſh ſeparate Rights from *the Neceſſity of Things*, as deſtined and ſettled to anſwer *neceſſary Ends*. We acknowledge, indeed, That, the neceſſary Things of Life are, from the very Natures of Things, unchangeably determined—And yet, at the ſame time, we do not limit this Neceſſity to ſuch Things as are neceſſary to Individuals only—ſingly and ſeparately conſidered—But—we conclude, That, Things neceſſary to *The Many*, nay, *To ALL*, taken conjunctively and in the *Aggregate Whole*, are THE THINGS neceſſarily and invariably ſettled in the eſtabliſhed Order of Nature.—Theſe Propoſitions are the *Truths* we have hitherto demonſtrated—Propoſitions ſtrictly conformable to the immutable Regularity of Nature: That, they are *Truths* which fully declare What Human Acts are neceſſary to produce *the Common Good of Mankind*, and What Human Acts oppoſe and prove deſtructive of *this End*. Theſe are *the Truths* which we hitherto, in a curſory Way, have eſtabliſhed as *the Laws of Nature*. The Sum and Subſtance of *theſe Laws* we have collected into *one general Propoſition*, and have reduced the Whole within the Compaſs of ſome few Chapters. What the *private Duties* and *Obligations* are, which, in an eſpecial manner, *theſe general Truths command and enforce*, we proceed next to ſtate and define, before we preſume to aſcertain the Right we carry over our own free Acts: But—more particularly, before we venture to ſay any Thing concerning *The Right of engaging and entering into War*. In a Word, Mr. *Hobbes*'s Sentiments and mine differ as widely as Contradictions can poſſibly make them. Whenſoever, therefore, we treat upon *Obligation*, which is the *Effect* proper and peculiar to *Laws*: (An Effect, which intrudes itſelf upon our Senſes by ſuch *Rewards and Puniſhments* as are natural Conſequences of *Obedience and Diſobedience*: And are, for this very Reaſon, fit characteriſtic Marks whereby to know *theſe Laws*.) We may, then, fairly allow and take for granted, ſuch Poſitions as Mr. *Hobbes*, upon Principles of Reaſon, has allowed and taken for granted: Provided always, that, we do not imbibe thoſe many dangerous Errors, which, he has blended into the very Eſſence of his Philoſophy and Politics. And, here we have, indeed, been moſt particularly-

cularly-cautious, not only for the Reaſon juſt now mentioned—but alſo, becauſe, a *juſt War* (the Subject of our Enquiry) is, as we maintain and aſſert, the Effect of *the Law of Nature* and of *Rational Beings*, who are endowed (as it were by Natural Inſtinct) with the Knowledge and Notices of *theſe Laws:* Becauſe, this Natural Knowledge inſtructs us, that, for Self-preſervation, and in Defence of juſt Rights againſt lawleſs Invaders, we ſhould have Recourſe to Arms and Weapons of Defence: This Method of Proceeding, in theſe Caſes, is lawful, right and juſtifiable. Becauſe, they are the *neceſſary Means*, the *only neceſſary Means*, of promoting and ſecuring the *Common Good*. In flat Contradiction to this whole Doctrine, Mr. *Hobbes* poſitively maintains and aſſerts, That, *a War on both and on all Sides, offenſive and defenſive, both of the Invader and of the Invaded, is all alike equally juſt: Nay, even, before, that, any Laws of Nature (which are the original fundamental Rules, and which lay the firſt Injunctions of all Juſtice) were framed and inſtituted.* And, what is ſtill more unaccountable, Mr. *Hobbes*, with an equal Confidence, inſiſts upon it, That, *theſe Laws regulate the neceſſary Means of avoiding ſuch a War.*—Such a War! O happy Contradiction! which, at one and the ſame time, is on all Sides, as he ſays, *juſt*; and yet is, at the ſame time, *pernicious to, and deſtructive of, ALL. See his Book* De Cive, Chap. 1. Sect. 12, 13, 15, *&c. and towards the End of his third Chapter.* But we ſhall treat more at large upon this in another Part of this Work.

SECT. XXXVIII.

The Conſequences, which follow from perſonal Injuries and Violations of Property, are Puniſhments.

IT fully anſwers the Scope and Deſign of our preſent Argument, to allow and grant juſt ſo much, as every Man in his Senſes will readily allow and grant, namely, That, *the Violation of Rights* greatly contributes, in the very Nature of the Thing, to foment Diſputes, Contentions, Civil Commotions and open Wars: For which Reaſon, common Senſe muſt perſuade every Man of common Senſe, that, from ſo fermented a Sewer and Reſervoir of all Evils, much more Damage muſt be feared, than the Hope of any Gain, to follow from the Injury committed, can poſſibly compenſate and make Amends for: But, more eſpecially in ſuch a State (according to Mr. *Hobbes*'s Suppoſition) in which there is no Government, no Rule, no Authority, to coerce, reſtrain and keep Anger and Revenge within any Bounds and Limits at all;——And, Where, one Conteſt produces Conteſts numberleſs and without End. Univerſal Experience alſo evinces, that, Strife in general expoſes the Life of Man to imminent apparent Danger. Here, then, let us ſuppoſe a Caſe, which, upon the ſtricteſt Rules of Calculation, is allowed to hold true. Suppoſe, there are two Perſons to engage in ſingle Combat; all Circumſtances on each Side being well weighed and adjuſted, they both are, in all Reſpects, equal; from

See the Doctrine of Chances, at Page 393.

ſo

ſo exact an Equality, Life or Death may as eaſily happen to the one as to the other. Now, from the Moment they enter the Liſts and Engage, the Expectancy or Chance of Life to each is leſſened the one half of its Value. According to Rules of Calculation, it happens after the ſame manner in another Caſe. I hold, for Inſtance, cloſe in one Hand twenty Shillings, and, in the other, (which is equally cloſed) nothing. Upon this Suppoſition, I allow to a Perſon (quite ignorant whether my Hands contain ſomething or nothing) a Liberty of chuſing what is incloſed in either the one or the other of them, but not in both, juſt as he likes: According to the Doctrine of Chances, my Gift to him, and his Expectancy before he makes his Choice, are worth ten Shillings, *i. e.* it is worth half of the whole Sum, thus expoſed to an Hazard, hanging in the ſame Suſpence as the Beam of Scales in æquilibrio. Upon the very ſame Foundation of Reaſoning, it holds as equally true, that, no right Determination will ſuffer a Perſon to venture his Life at ſuch an Hazard as this (ſuppoſing us to have as full a Dominion over Life, as we have over Money, Property and worldly Poſſeſſions) unleſs it be, with this neceſſary Condition, that, the preſent Gain and the doubtful future Expectancy riſe as high in our Eſteem as half the Price of Life is worth: Or, in other Words, which exactly amounts to the ſame Thing, unleſs the Chance we run be, upon Account of the Advantage, equal to the Acquiſition of a future Poſſeſſion; *i. e.* be worth purchaſing at the Expence, and with the certain Loſs, of Life. In Recompence, therefore, for ſo nice, ſo dangerous an Experiment, and for an Hazard of ſuch Importance, the Invader of another Man's Property gains, moſt certainly, little or nothing; becauſe, the Life, of a Perſon conquered, is deſtroyed, vaniſhes, and, conſequently, is quite inſignificant and uſeleſs to the Conqueror. And, as to Poſſeſſions, they are, becauſe really and truly, neceſſary to the Well-being of the Poſſeſſor, called his own; and conſequently are not, for this very Reaſon, Poſſeſſions as equally neceſſary to the invading Conqueror; and therefore, under theſe Circumſtances, cannot be his Property. For, with the higheſt Juſtice imaginable, in that State or Community where all Things are common, we ſuppoſe and conclude, that, Nature has afforded to all Individuals ſo much, at leaſt, as the Neceſſities of Life require: At the ſame time, however, ſuppoſing, that, the Induſtry, the Labour of Mankind is no ways deficient: And, if ſo, the ſame good Things of Life which really and truly are neceſſary to the Well-being and Happineſs of one, cannot equally, and at the ſame time, be as really and truly neceſſary to the Well-being and Happineſs of any other. The laſt of theſe two Propoſitions is clearly proved by the firſt. For, ſuch Things as, before the Death of the Conquered were not neceſſary to the Conqueror, by his Death are not made neceſſary; and therefore, the certain Acquiſition of theſe Poſſeſſions, is not ſo valuable as to equal the Purchaſe of them at the Hazard of Life:——Nay——and even, after a compleat Victory, in

that State of Community which Mr. *Hobbes* ſuppoſes, will all Things continue in common. So that (excluſive of an impending Revenge threatened by the whole Community) no new Acquiſitions, in Truth and Reality, accrues to the Conqueror. Becauſe, the whole Security (which, as Mr. *Hobbes* has inſtructed us, can be had in ſuch a State) is Anticipation, or taking by a prior Occupancy, either openly or treacherouſly. And, This he tells us, in his Book *De Cive*, Chap. 5. Sect. 1. Such a Security as this, then, certainly is not of any Value at all; or, at leaſt, not very conſiderable. For, when we come ſeriouſly to conſider, whether an Invaſion upon the Rights and Privileges of others is to be attempted: And, whether we ſhall provoke others to declare War againſt us, or no, it is neceſſarily ſuppoſed, that, all Parties are innocent; that, they have not actually committed any Violence upon others; and, who, upon the Suppoſition, either would not take up Arms, or, at leaſt, that, they have not already taken up Arms, were they not compelled to it by ſome violent Attack made upon Things neceſſary to their Preſervation: For, where there are no Grounds for Suſpicion, a Security is not to be purchaſed by expoſing Life to apparent Danger.—Much leſs, can any reaſonable Man, with all his Senſes about him, expect to raiſe a Security to himſelf, from a War entered into againſt All. But—we have aſſerted in this our *Philoſophical Diſquiſition*, concerning *the Obligation of Natural Laws*, that, from the Dread of future Puniſhments, by violating theſe Laws, *i. e.* by invading the Rights of others, Mankind are neceſſarily ſuppoſed innocent: And, the Ground of this our Aſſertion is eſtabliſhed upon theſe Arguments: *Firſt*, Becauſe, we allow it lawful to deprive the Guilty of *Lands*, *Goods* and *Chattels*, nay—even of *Life itſelf*, for the Sake of Puniſhment: And, *Secondly*, Becauſe, it is the infallible Mark of raſh wild Folly to prejudge, that, there is in Mankind (who never as yet, by the Suppoſition, have diſcovered any Signs of Malevolence towards us) A Will, an Inclination to do us an Injury. To commit Violence, therefore, either upon the Rights and Properties, or upon the Perſons and Lives of others, whether publicly or treacherouſly in order to ſecure ourſelves from their Violence, is moſt certainly a Folly equally raſh and wild: And yet—by the Bye, this wild Hypotheſis is the whole Sum and Subſtance of all Mr. *Hobbes*'s Rights and Laws of Nature. Compare his Book *De Cive*, Chap. 1. with Sect. 1. of Chap. 5. Thus far ſeems eaſily deducible from Mr. *Hobbes*'s own Scheme, notwithſtanding any thing to the contrary, which he may, and often does, ſay in flat Contradiction, both to his own Hypotheſis and to himſelf. But Mr. *Hobbes*, in his State of Nature, ſuppoſes Mankind born and grown up to adult Age. *See his Book* De Cive, Chap. 8. Sect. 1.—If ſo—why then one Queſtion, and indeed a material Queſtion, here ariſes, Whether, Right Reaſon dictates to theſe Adults immediately, upon the firſt ſight of each other, that, they ought rather to cultivate and improve the reciprocal Duties of Peace and Good-will, *i. e.* practiſe the

Duties

Duties of Benevolence, Fidelity and Gratitude to each other: Or, to ruſh at once precipitately into a War of All againſt All?—And—the next Queſtion is, Whether, The State of theſe grown up adult Perſons, (ſince, as yet, by the Suppoſition, they have not done reciprocal Good or Hurt to each other; or have even determined to do either: The next Queſtion, I ſay, upon this Suppoſition, is, Whether) ſuch a State be a State of War or a State of Peace?

To this ſecond Queſtion I anſwer, That, ſuch a State is a State of Peace: And, if ſo, all the Perſons, thus entirely free and diſengaged both from Good and Hurt, muſt be conſidered and looked upon as *innocent*: And, conſequently, it is the Voice, the Command of Right Reaſon, that, they muſt preſerve and eſtabliſh ſuch a Peace, by entering into the ſtrongeſt Securities of Fidelity, by keeping whole and inviolable theſe Engagements: And, that, Obligations, ſo ſolemn and binding, may beſt be performed, they muſt render themſelves pleaſing and acceptable to one another: And, that, the Sincerity, the Integrity of ſuch a Diſpoſition, of ſuch a Behaviour, may demonſtrate itſelf and produce its genuine Effects, they muſt exerciſe well-choſen intelligible Signs and all the external Acts of Duty and Obligation. The Reaſons, why, ſuch a State as this is moſt deſirable, moſt eligible, are, *Firſt*, Becauſe, all theſe Acts of Behaviour are, in their own Nature, moſt amiable and delightful: Whereas, Acts contrary, as they neceſſarily do, and from the very Nature of them, muſt betray Malevolence, Ill-will, Hatred and Envy; ſo, they cannot poſſibly be ſeparated from that Anxiety, from that Pain, which is ſo eſſentially connected and mixed with ſuch Tendencies and Diſpoſitions of Mind as theſe. And This is my firſt Argument for a State of peaceable Society. But, ſuch a State muſt be moſt eligible, moſt deſirable, becauſe, *Secondly*, Whoſoever bears a Malevolence, an Ill-will, an Hatred towards others, and denies to them ſuch neceſſary Helps as, according to Truth and Reaſon, they require and have a Right to demand, plunges himſelf into the extreme Danger of a War, wherein, I imagine, are, and muſt be, contained the heavieſt, the ſevereſt Puniſhments:—This is my ſecond Reaſon, and the very Argument which we at preſent diſcuſs:—And—moreover, ſince Mr. *Hobbes* acknowledges, that, in a State of Nature, the firſt Law of Nature is the Purſuit and Endeavour after Peace; and, ſince he inculcates, and inſtructs us in this very Point alſo. (*See his Book* De Cive, Chap. 14. Sect. 3. where he defines *Right to be a Natural Liberty admitted and left to us by the Laws.*) It from hence neceſſarily follows, that, no Man can have a Right, by acting contrary to the Laws of Nature, to run himſelf headlong into War, ſince it does not, as yet, appear, that, Peace cannot poſſibly be had, without arrogating and aſſuming ALL to SELF. And, ſince the *Law of Nature* abſolutely prohibits any ſuch Right, notwithſtanding, at ſome time or other, that, a Man might be ſuppoſed to have been in the Poſſeſſion of it: The both of which Poſitions Mr. *Hobbes* has maintained

ed in his Book *De Cive*, Chap. 2. Sect. 23. That poor evaſive Shift of His, where he inſinuates, that, theſe Laws cannot, as yet, oblige to external outward Acts, becauſe they want Security and full Defence, we have examined into and confuted in another Part of this ENQUIRY. What I have to offer here is only this, That, no Laws can carry in them the Power of Obligation, (and, conſequently, *ſuch Laws* have not any thing at all to ſay to *the Laws of Nature*) unleſs they ſtrictly regard external outward Acts. Becauſe, in the very Nature of Things, it is impoſſible to purſue and ſettle Peace with others, or to recede from, and give up, Right by any Act merely internal. For, ſuch Acts as regard Mankind are extrinſic to us, *i. e.* they are no Part of our own Identity, and therefore Acts, in the very Nature of them, tranſient: Or, ſuch Acts as, produce Effects in other Beings, are extrinſic to the Agent himſelf. But—ſuppoſing Mr. *Hobbes* ſhould reply upon me, in Anſwer to this, and ſay, That, *ſuch Acts as theſe are very improperly called Laws*, (as he broadly hints in his Book *De Cive*, Chap. 3. Sect. 33.) I retort upon him, That, what we have hitherto ſaid, and what we hereafter have to ſay, plainly evince and demonſtrate, That, theſe Propoſitions of Nature do carry in them the true and proper Eſſence of Laws. But, (to wave every other Argument which does not immediately concern Mr. *Hobbes*) this one Concluſion muſt neceſſarily follow—namely—That, if there be no Laws, properly ſo called, in a State of Nature, there cannot poſſibly be any Rights or Privileges properly ſo called: From whence it muſt follow, That, this Right (a Creature of his own) over all, muſt be Right improperly ſo called, and muſt prove, alſo, a Foundation as improper and ridiculous to build all Morality and Politics upon. For, Rights and Privileges cannot, truly and properly, be greater or more, than what are allowed granted and permitted by Laws properly ſo called: But, there are not, in this natural State of Mr. *Hobbes*, any other Laws than the Laws of Nature. For which Reaſon, if the Laws of Nature be not, truly and properly ſpeaking, *Laws*, why, then it follows, that, the Rights and Privileges of Nature are not, truly and properly, Rights and Privileges: And if ſo, it of Conſequence follows, that Mr. *Hobbes* (at the very time he is delivering ſuch Principles as theſe for the true genuine Principles of Moral Philoſophy, Politics and Civil Diſcipline) will be, but without any Truth or Propriety, a *Philoſopher*, a *Politician*, *&c.* And therefore, by a neceſſary Conſequence, it muſt follow, that, all thoſe much-boaſted mighty Concluſions, publiſhed by Mr. *Hobbes*, and taken by him for Demonſtrations, (and which depend upon no better Principles, upon no better an Authority) are, but without any Senſe, Meaning or Propriety, any Demonſtrations at all.

See Chap. 27. Book 2. of Identity and Diverſity, in Mr. Locke's Eſſay concerning Human Underſtanding.

SECT.

SECT. XXXIX.

I REALLY am, to confeſs the Truth, tired of ſuch Contradictions as theſe. Let us, therefore, paſs on to the third Argument, which ought, and with the higheſt Juſtice imaginable, to ſtrike the Terror of Puniſhment into the Minds of all who violate the Laws of Nature.—— And, This Argument is taken from that Analogy, that Similitude, that Community of a rational Nature between God and Man: And, this Community of a rational Nature is the near immediate Cauſe of inflicting theſe Puniſhments. For, from this Similitude, from this Community, it is, that, we trace and mark out thoſe Diſcoveries, by which, the Mind of every thinking reaſonable Man, cannot but preſage and foretel what will be the Event. It is demonſtrably true, that, Right Reaſon (and conſequently the Divine Reaſon of Almighty God) dictates to us, and informs us, that, the Means, neceſſary towards ſecuring and preſerving the *Common Good*, are the Determinations, the Appointments, the Decrees of proper Puniſhments againſt human Acts oppoſite and contrary to *this Good:* That ſo, by the wholeſome Severity, and, reaſonable, probable—nay—certain Expectation of theſe Puniſhments, the Malevolent and Ill-natured may be deterred and reſtrained from any ſuch Acts. From hence, it evidently appears, how lawful it is, according to the Principles of Right Reaſon, to inflict theſe Puniſhments upon theſe Tranſgreſſors; and, that, ſuch Tranſgreſſors, conſequently, are liable to the Puniſhment allotted, whenſoever other Rational Agents are willing and able to inflict and lay it upon them. It is as evident and certain, alſo, that, all they, who have the *Common Good* ſincerely at Heart, (under which Denomination, God and all other good Agents are comprehended) and, that, other Agents, moreover, whoſe Intereſt and Advantage it is to prevent Commiſſions of Violence upon the Rights of others; (under which ſecond Denomination, Mankind in general, even the Bad, are comprehended) All, I ſay, All are ready and willing to inflict Puniſhments upon thoſe, whom they ſhall, at any time, diſcover to have either actually already perpetrated theſe Violations: Or, who have even betrayed a Diſpoſition an Inclination to perpetrate them in any future Time. To which we may alſo add, That, altho' the Will, both of God and Man, may, upon particular Occaſions (but, very ſeldom indeed) leave ſome room for the Indulgence of Pardon; yet, however, it is, at the ſame time, notwithſtanding, as demonſtratively true, That, Reaſon always, with reſpect to the *Common Good*, carries in it ſuch powerful Efficacy, (it being for the ſubſtantial Advantage and real Benefit of All, to defend and ſecure *this Good)* that no full Aſſurance can, at any time, be given to hope for Pardon, which may not, at the ſame time, demonſtrate, that, it had been much better not to have tranſgreſſed at all; and, by Conſequence, not to ſtand in need of Pardon.

A third Argument to prove, why, malevolent Acts carry in them their own Puniſhments, drawn from the Similitude between God and Man. See the Notes in Section 10. of the Prolegomena.

Becauſe,

Becauſe, the Reaſon in common of all Rational Beings invariably requires, *viz.* " That, Attempts which contradict and oppoſe *the Common* " *Good*, ſhould be repelled and coerced by Puniſhments, full and power- " ful enough to defend and guard *ſuch a Good:* And if ſo, that, no Pu- " niſhment can be effectual and powerful enough to anſwer *this great* " *End*, if the Encouragement to hope for Pardon be greater than the Ex- " pectation, the Dread, the Apprehenſion of Retaliation, Revenge, Puniſh- " ment."

Upon this Foundation, then, Reaſon itſelf dictates and demonſtrates the Neceſſity, why, the whole Hope of eſcaping Puniſhment is quite over-ballanced, partly, *Firſt*, by the many Executions of Puniſhments frequently exerted; and partly, *Secondly*, by the Severity, the Rigour of Them:—And—as to any Difference between the Cauſes of Hope and the Cauſes of Fear, it is ſo ſmall, as to be ſcarcely perceivable. That the Hope of Impunity, therefore, may be removed, it ſeems neceſſary to inſiſt rather upon the Frequency than the Severity of Puniſhments: Becauſe, from the Frequency, a more exact Rule of Proportion is better obſerved, which may contribute to ſilence the loud Clamours of Objection ſo iniquitouſly raiſed, *viz.* That, Puniſhments upon ſome are inflicted with heavier Severity; That, others equally, if not more, guilty, may eſcape unpuniſhed: And, laſtly, in a Word, becauſe, Puniſhments, merely human, cannot extend and reach beyond the Grave. Now, altho' Death be certain, yet, in my Opinion, by Death, the enormous Crimes of thoſe oppreſſive Tyrants are not adequately puniſhed, who have, by the moſt horrible Wrecks and Tortures, deprived Mankind of many, and thoſe, the moſt valuable, public Bleſſings. Common Reaſon would, moſt certainly, deſert her Office, *i. e.* act contrary to true Reaſon, ſhould ſhe overlook and neglect ſuch flagitious Crimes as theſe.——And Mankind, in caſe they do not puniſh ſuch Enormities by a juſt Revenge, by a proper Puniſhment, ſeem to court and ſolicit the Bribery and Corruption of malevolent Agents, from the Hopes, Expectations and Emoluments of their unpuniſhed Villainies. Suppoſing, then, at ſome times, a Difficulty to happen, where certain Agents will not; or, rather, why, they cannot, coerce and puniſh thoſe who tranſgreſs and ſin againſt the *Common Good*; yet, this one Conſideration occurs naturally, " That nothing " can abſolutely elude and evade the Omniſcience and Omnipotence of " Almighty God: Neither can any poſſible Doubt ariſe, why, the Di- " vine Will ſhould not incline to act in ſuch a manner as Right Reaſon " (and conſequently the Divine Reaſon) ſhall judge and determine neceſ- " ſary to *this one ſupreme End.*" Now, as to Mankind conſidered in a State of exact Equality, and independant of Civil Society, it can, according to Mr. *Hobbes*'s Hypotheſis, eaſily be proved: Since, Each Individual may claim to himſelf the mere Neceſſaries of Life as his Right, That, *an Open* is left but for very few Crimes, and even thoſe ſuch, as can be

eaſily

eaſily detected and, without much Difficulty, puniſhed: But, more eſpecially, if Numbers unite and are agreed to coerce and reſtrain every ſuch malevolent Agent, whoſe Villainy will and muſt, upon this Suppoſition, be deemed equally dangerous to All. Since, therefore, it is the Care and Concern of All, that they, ſhould be puniſhed, from a Violation of Natural Laws, who oppoſe *the Common Good*: And, ſince Nature, moreover, has endowed Man with a Sagacity peculiar to him, above all other Animals, of examining into, and diſcovering the ſecret Devices of treacherous Villainy: And, ſince Nature has alſo inflamed him with the Thirſt after Glory, (a Senſation unfelt by every other Animal) with a quick, a lively, an active Senſe to coerce and reſtrain the common Enemies of ſocial Happineſs.——All theſe Cauſes, therefore, are powerful Motives, why, the common Enemies to Mankind muſt, and ought to, dread Puniſhments of every Kind; and, conſequently, demonſtrate, upon how ſlender a Security ſuch Wretches can expect or hope to eſcape the Wrath, the Vengeance of both God and Man.

SECT. XL.

Certain Degrees of Poſitive Good neceſſarily do follow from a ſtudious Concern for Public or Common Happineſs.

I HERE, again, am forced to repeat, how fatigued I am with ſo tedious an Inveſtigation, drawn from the Indications, the clear Marks of an Obligation, as taken or drawn from Puniſhment; or, from the extreme Danger of ſuffering it: And more particularly ſo, becauſe, *Thoſe Bleſſings of Life*, or the *Rewards* intimately blended with, and cloſely joined to, *the ſtudious Concern for, the earneſt Endeavour after, the Common Felicity*, (notwithſtanding that ſuch Bleſſings are not placed, by the Generality of Mankind, amongſt the Characteriſtic Marks of a Law, and the ſure Indications of an Obligation) are, however, ſuch Bleſſings, or Kinds of Good, as ſeem to me Marks of the Divine Will, clearer and more excellent than the Puniſhments which are moſt undoubtedly conſequent upon Acts oppoſite to, and deſtructive of, ſuch a ſtudious Concern: And theſe are the Points which we are now, according to our Method, to examine into and diſcuſs.

We are then, by way of a previous Poſtulatum, to ſuppoſe, That, the whole Chain or Connexion between all Antecedents and Conſequents, laid and framed in the Natures of Things, ariſes from the Will of the Firſt Cauſe, *i. e.* Almighty God the Creator of All. Becauſe, the very ſame Principle of Reaſon, which proves Things themſelves to have been created by the Firſt Cauſe, demonſtrates alſo, the whole Order or natural Connexion of them to ariſe from the ſame Cauſe. For theſe very Reaſons, therefore, we may ſafely, here, take this one Point for granted, even at a time when the Queſtion in debate is, Whether the Firſt Cauſe does, or does not, will to govern the World by Practical Precepts, *i. e.* by

Laws of Nature reducible to Practice? Even upon this Suppoſition, I ſay, the Conſequences of human Acts, whether good or evil, always proceed and follow from ſuch Acts themſelves reſpectively, by the Will of the Firſt Cauſe. The only two particular Articles of Enquiry, at preſent to be briefly handled and explained, are theſe, *viz. Firſt*, To demonſtrate, from the Order of Nature well underſtood and obſerved upon common univerſal Experience, that, good Effects follow ſome Acts: And Effects, indeed, they are, of ſuch Moment and Conſideration, that, we cannot poſſibly expect them upon any Foundation of Reaſon, from the Vices oppoſite and contrary to ſuch Acts. *Secondly*, That, the actual Attainment, the Acquiſition of ſuch good Things and bleſſed Effects as theſe, is a ſufficient Indication, upon natural Principles, that the Divine Will commands and enjoins the Practice of theſe Acts. Neither is there, indeed, in our preſent Diſquiſition, the leaſt Occaſion to collect and heap many Arguments together: Becauſe, the Whole of what is oppoſite to our preſent Purpoſe may eaſily be gathered from thoſe Arguments already introduced, in treating upon *the Puniſhments annexed to the Laws of Nature*; which muſt be conſidered as parallel Caſes, drawn from oppoſite Sides of the Queſtion.

Now, in the firſt Place, amongſt theſe ſeveral *Bleſſings* and *good Effects*, we are to compute and eſtimate *that Security from impending Evils:* And, *Which Evils*, we have already ſhewn, do very frequently torment and deſtroy the Wicked. To enumerate all which Evils over again here, (as being entirely needleſs) I think proper to decline. What I ſhall at preſent ſubjoin, is only this, That, the Dread, the Apprehenſion, the Fear of Evil, expreſſes, after the ſame Manner exactly, the Attainment, the Proſecution, the Acquiſition of *the Enjoyment of Good*, in which an Affirmative Propoſition is formed out of two Negatives. Becauſe, in the next Place, Evil, moſt certainly, denotes and implies the want of ſuch good Things, or Rewards, or Bleſſings, as Nature requires and ſtands in need of: And, conſequently, the Avoidance of ſuch Evil, really and truly, is the Proſecution, the Attainment, the Acquiſition of *Good:* And, therefore, ſuch an Avoidance is only expreſſed by the Antipathy, the Averſion againſt *Evil* in general: Becauſe, *The Many*, altho' they do not with a ſufficient Care and Diligence ſecure and preſerve the Bleſſings which they actually enjoy, do, however, as ſoon as they apprehend the Abſence, the Want of them to approach, begin to dread the impending Danger, and are moſt feelingly rouzed up either to purſue cloſely, or to defend vigorouſly, ſuch Bleſſings. Now, notwithſtanding, that, ſuch negative Conceptions, and the Words or Terms which expreſs them, are always in common Uſe; yet, according to Nature, that Motive which operates is a poſitive ſubſtantial *Good*, the Acquiſition or Security of which is expected and hoped for: And, on the contrary, the Dread of wanting *ſuch a Good* is an Alarm of Deſtruction. For, in the firſt Place, *Privations* and *Negations*, merely

See Notes in the Prolegomena, at Page 41.

as

as ſuch, do not influence the Human Will. Neither, indeed, in the ſecond Place, does the bare Averſion from Evil, for any other Reaſon, become an Object of the Will, (as to acting) than as it implies and expreſſes the Preſervation of ſome *Good poſitive*. Whatſoever effectual Efficacies can be attributed to Puniſhments, or to natural Evils, in ſtimulating and ſpurring Mankind up to the Avoidance of them, muſt, in the Whole, be reſolved into that impulſive Force, into that attractive Influence of thoſe Bleſſings and good Things, whereof, either from Evils or Puniſhments, they might be deprived.——All Effects, which are commonly ſaid to ariſe from Dreads and Apprehenſions of Want Poverty and Death, may, much more naturally, much more philoſophically, be ſaid to ariſe from the Love of Plenty and Life. There would not, certainly, be any Apprehenſion of Death, was not Life, (which cauſes the Diſſolution) the Foundation of ſuch a Dread, of ſuch an Apprehenſion: Neither could the Fear of Death poſſibly exiſt, had not the Love of Life a prior Exiſtence. The ſame Reaſoning holds good in all Kinds of Evil. The Concluſion, and by as neceſſary a Conſequence, follows: That, in all voluntary Acts whatſoever, our Deſire, our earneſt Purſuit after a *poſitive Good*, takes place of any Dread or Apprehenſion of Evil.——(1) All Motion, taken in the general, muſt

(1) All Motion, *taken in the general, muſt be allowed to carry what the Logicians call at one time*, Terminus a quo, *at another time*, Terminus ad quem, *&c.*] The *Terminus a quo*, and the *Terminus ad quem* are logical Phraſes: They are comprehended under (*Action* and *Paſſion*, or *Agency*, or *Patiency*) the fifth Category of *Ariſtotle*. Agency carries in it very different Ideas. Moral Agency is the elicited Energy of a rational free Being in producing an Effect. Phyſical Agency is the Operation of a natural Body acting according to the Laws of Matter and Motion. Theſe Two kinds of Agency carry, in the very Idea of them, a real Exiſtence. But, there is a third Kind, which is rather *the Mode* than *the Reality* of Exiſtence; and, as ſuch, is placed by logical Writers under the Categories. In this Categoric Agency there is ſuppoſed *an Agent*, which implies the *Terminus a quo* and the *Terminus ad quem*. If the *Terminus ad quem* cannot ſubſiſt by itſelf, then there is required a Subject or a Patient wherein the Effect of Agency muſt ſubſiſt. If the *Terminus ad quem* can ſubſiſt by itſelf, the Agency exiſts without a Patient. A trite Illuſtration may help a little to clear this Creature of *Ariſtotle*'s own Imagination. *E. G.* In Heat and Warmth (or, as logical People phraſe it, in Calefaction) the Agent is *Fire*: The *Patient* or *Subject* is the Perſon warmed and heated: The *Terminus a quo* is *Cold*: The *Terminus ad quem* is *Heat*. Now, the Perſon warmed and heated is He, who from *cold* becomes *hot*. The *Terminus ad quem* is always ſomething of a real Exiſtence. The *Terminus a quo* has not always a real Exiſtence, but is negative, *privative* of, and *contrary* to, the *Terminus ad quem*. Laſtly, In the very Idea of *Agency* and *Patiency*, of the *Terminus a quo* and the *Terminus ad quem*, *Motion* is always underſtood. I do not know how to render the Paſſage of our Author plainer: And yet, to ſay the Truth, this Explanation is pedantic and obſcure. Let us, however, apply it as well as we can. *Omnis ſanè motus*, ſays Dr. *Cumberland*, *promiſcuè denominationem habet nunc a termino a quo nunc a termino ad quem: Sed ſpeciem (uti vocant) ſeu perfectiſſimam naturæ ſuæ limitationem accipit a termino ad quem. In motibus autem voluntariis peculiaris eſt ratio cur a bono potiùs demonſtrantur quoniam non illuc ſolùm tendunt, ſed etiam ab ejus vi primum excitantur.* In all Agency whatſoever (whether Moral Phyſical or Logical) there is a Motion, of ſome Kind or other, which is determined, at ſome times by the *Terminus a quo*, at other times by the *Terminus ad quem*. *All Good whatſoever* implies,

muſt be allowed to carry, what the Logicians call, at one time *Terminus a quo*, at another time *Terminus ad quem*: But, concerning the Species of it (as their Phraſe is) *i. e.* according to the moſt perfect Extent of the Mode or Manner in which it exiſts, It takes its Denomination from the *Terminus ad quem*. As to *Voluntary Motions*, there is a ſpecial peculiar Reaſon why the Propoſition, under our preſent Enquiry, ſhould rather be demonſtrated from *Good* than *Evil*: Becauſe, *ſuch Voluntary Motions* have not only, in the very Frame and Conſtitution of them, a natural Impulſe, an innate Tendency this way: But, alſo, becauſe, their very firſt Emotions are excited by the Energy, by the Influence of *Good*, of ſome *Good poſitive*. This Remark, by way of Introduction, appears neceſſary, in order to confute that eſtabliſhed Opinion of *Epicurus*, who places his higheſt Pleaſure (which, *viz.* according to the *Epicurean* Philoſophy, is *the Chief Good* and *Ultimate End*) in the Abſence, in the Removal of Pain. There is a cloſe Affinity between this Philoſophy and the Sentiments of Mr. *Hobbes*, who has inſtructed Mankind to ſeek, and enter into, Society, from the Dread, the Apprehenſion of Evil: Notwithſtanding, that, He could not, at the ſame time, but perceive eaſily ſome Hope, ſome Expectation at leaſt of Good, to ariſe from ſuch a State: Neither can there, in Truth and Reality, be, from the preſent State and Condition of human Affairs, any *greater Good* than that which Society produces. For, to be ſure, That Domination, That abſolute tyrannical Power of All over All, from whence, he aſſerts, *greater Good is drawn, than can be drawn from all Society whatſoever*, is a manifeſt Impoſſibility. (*See his Book De Cive*, Chap. 1. Sect. 2.) And, in the next Place, The principal Reaſon, why, we make theſe Remarks, is, to evince more clearly, that, the Criteria, the Marks of Obligation (as drawn from the ſeveral Degrees of *Good*, and the Rewards which are the neceſſary Conſequences of *a ſtudious Concern and diligent Care for the Common Good*) carry, to the full, as operative, as effectual a Force in them, as uſually can be had from Puniſhments: Notwithſtanding, at the ſame time, that, the Marks of Obligation, annexed to Puniſhment and Evil, are more generally allowed, altho' under more indiſtinct obſcurer Notions and Apprehenſions.

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plies, in the very Nature of it, the Idea of ſomething *poſitive*: And, on the contrary, all *Evil*, the Idea of a *Negative*, of a *Privation*. Life is a poſitive Good. Death is an Evil, becauſe it is a *Negative*, a Privation of Life. Happineſs is a *poſitive Good*; Miſery is a *Negative*, is an *Evil*, becauſe it is the *Privation* of Happineſs. The *Terminus ad quem* is *poſitive*, and always carries in it ſomething of a *real Exiſtence*. The *Terminus a quo* has not always a real Exiſtence, but is *negative*, *privative* of, and *contrary* to, the *Terminus ad quem*. When, therefore, we ſay, that, in all Agency whatſoever, there is a *Motion* determined, at one time by the *Terminus a quo*, at another time by the *Terminus ad quem*, we are to underſtand, the Avoidance of Evil at one time for the Sake of Good, and the Purſuit of Good at another time, for the Sake of itſelf. Evil, as Evil, is not, cannot be, the Object of Deſire: Neither can Privations and Negations, merely as ſuch, influence the Will.

The Truth of this Aſſertion is ſtill capable of an exacter Enquiry. For, if any one clearly and diſtinctly conſiders and underſtands the Power, the Efficacy, the Energy of Puniſhments, he muſt be ſatisfied, in my Opinion, that, this whole Efficacy, even of Puniſhments, is capable of a Deſire, of a Concern natural to ſecure and improve private Happineſs. For, in like manner, as Theoretic Speculative Concluſions, proved by *Apagogic Demonſtrations*, drawn from Suppoſitions contrary, tend directly to Abſurdity or Impoſſibility, may, in a far better and more natural way, be deduced from Definitions or Properties, which directly flow from Oppoſition and Contrariety; ſo, in like manner, *Practical Concluſions*, which are to determine certain Acts, (ſince Evils follow from contrary Acts) are much better proved from *Good*, but more eſpecially from the *Good* moſt nearly relative to theſe Acts. And therefore, the very beſt Compendium of Ethics, the very beſt Syſtem of Morality is the Idea of the *true Happineſs*, poſſible for each and every one to purſue, connected with all the true Cauſes of ſuch Happineſs, as Cauſes lie ſettled and digeſted in their natural proper Order. For, upon this Foundation, not only the whole Efficacy and genuine Fruits of human Acts become obvious; But, from hence, alſo, the fitteſt and beſt Opportunities when to elicit and execute theſe Acts, immediately, at once appear and are perceived. So that, upon a Foundation ſo plain and evident, it is, that, no Motive can be wanting to direct and influence the Will. For, altho' the Compilers of Laws, enacted by the Authority of Civil Society, do not ſeem to uſe this Method, becauſe rarely, if ever, *Rewards* are mentioned, whereas *Puniſhments* very frequently are: Yet, if we examine a little more narrowly into the Cauſe, we ſhall find from the *End deſigned*, namely, *Happineſs*, (ſo far as it is capable of being promoted in Civil Society) that, all the Laws of Civil Authority are contrived, enforced, and ſometimes altered, relaxed, or even abrogated and rendered void, in order the better to anſwer *this one principal End*, namely, *Happineſs*.——And, the Truth of this Aſſertion might eaſily be proved by numberleſs Inſtances, drawn both from the Civil Law, as well as from the Laws of our own Country as they ſtand at preſent. Nay, and even *Equity* itſelf, from which, Laws poſitive borrow a Conſtruction, and at ſome times a Correction, an Amendment, reſpects and regards *the Common Utility and Advantage*. I ſhall produce one Example, only, taken from the Civil Law, *Digeſt*, Lib. 1. Tit. 3. Leg. 25. " No Foundation " of Law, no Indulgence of Equity allows, that, any Eſtabliſhment, ori- " ginally introduced and ſettled for the Good, the Advantage of Mankind, " ſhould, by a forced Interpretation, be ſtrained to a Severity, a Rigour, " againſt ſuch a general Advantage, ſuch a Common Good." This is the Authority of *Modeſtinus*, as taken from himſelf. In this plain Inſtance we are to underſtand, that, not only *poſitive Laws*, but *Equity itſelf*, chiefly and principally regards *the Advantages of Mankind in general*: Under which Term *(viz. Advantages)* are eſſentially contained all thoſe Aids and

Απαγωγὴ Reductio ad Impoſſibile ad Abſurdum.

and Aſſiſtances of *Happineſs*, which can poſſibly be acquired and obtained by the *Sanction of Laws*. Such *Advantages* and *Helps as theſe*, then, moſt certainly, are the largeſt nobleſt Rewards of that Obedience which is due, and ought to be paid to *Laws*. For, ſince a Protection from Injuries, and the *Security which from hence ariſes*, as alſo *the other Advantages of well-eſtabliſhed Civil Societies*, are free and in common to all Subjects, and naturally flow from that Obedience which is due, and ought to be paid, to all Laws without Exception: It therefore follows, That, theſe noble ſignificant Advantages ſhould not be premiſed as comprehended under *any one ſingle Law only*: But, that, all ſingle particular Laws (ſuppoſing the *End* and *Deſign* of them well weighed and maturely conſidered) ſhould, each reſpectively, carry in them its own particular proper Reward. And, conſequently, the Obedience paid to all theſe Laws conjunctively, has, for its Reward, the Aggregate Sum-total of all thoſe Advantages which, *by the Sanctions of Government*, are acquired, procured, preſerved and ſupported in every Civil Society. The Abhorrence from, the Dread of, any Miſery, which can poſſibly be avoided, (in caſe ſuch a Fear does, at any time, proceed from clear Ideas and a diſtinct Knowledge) carries, in the very Nature of it, a freſher, a more recent Exiſtence of a poſſible Happineſs: And, therefore, ſuch an Apprehenſion muſt be built upon ſome *Happineſs poſitive*. For which Reaſon, (even upon this account, were there no other) that Method is, by far, more excellent, purſued by the ancient Philoſophers, who taught, That, *the Virtues, and the Rules employed about them*, i. e. *the Laws of Nature muſt be cultivated, improved and obſerved, as the neceſſary Means towards Happineſs; this being (i. e. Happineſs) the ultimate immutable Object and End of All*. The ancient Philoſophers Method, I ſay, is better than that laid down by Mr. *Hobbes*, who would make *the Laws of Nature* the only Conditions of either ſettling Peace, or, of ending that ſtrangely-invented War of *All* againſt *All*: A kind of War, indeed, which no Man in his Wits ever did, as yet, enter into:—Nay—the Caſe, in fact, is ſo far otherwiſe, that, every Man, with his Wits about him, would chuſe to preſerve Peace; becauſe he can always, by fair Calculation, compute Peace amongſt the *conſtituent Means* of preſerving and purſuing *Happineſs*. For, *Peace* cannot, according to any *true Definition*, be ſuppoſed *the neceſſary Conſequence of War only*: Neither does *the Ceſſation of Arms* enter, by any Means, into the Definition of Peace; and yet Mr. *Hobbes*, in his Book *De Cive*, Chap. 1. Sect. 12. has defined Peace thus, in order the better to anſwer that Hypotheſis of his, which he afterwards was very fond to eſtabliſh. Whereas, *Peace*, according to the *true Definition of it*, is that State in which Rational Agents mutually enjoy, amongſt each other, the Benefits and Advantages of reciprocal good Offices. And, on the contrary, *War* muſt be defined, *the Extirpation the Privation of Peace*; juſt as Health (and the Similitude is very lively) is not *the Abſence of Diſeaſes*, but every Diſeaſe, in the very

Nature

Nature of it, is the Oppoſite, the Negative, the Contrary of Health. Nature, beyond all queſtion, holds always the firſt Place: The *preſerving Cauſes*, the *pure Effects*, and the *genuine Offices of Nature*, are, in the next Place, intimately connected with Nature itſelf. And then, in the third Place, by juſtly comparing *Diſeaſes* with theſe *preſerving Cauſes* and *good Offices*, the clear Knowledge of Oppoſites, Contrarieties and Negatives is acquired. We cannot covet and deſire Health purely to avoid the Pains and Evils of Diſeaſes; but, we deſire Health, for its own Sake, as it is *a poſitive real Good:* Thus, in like manner, we deſire and covet Peace, for its own Sake, as it is *a poſitive real Good*, and not purely upon account that we ſhould avoid the Miſery and Deſtruction of War. This is not, however, the proper Place for a deeper Penetration into theſe Matters; it being fully ſufficient to my preſent Deſign, that, amongſt thoſe good and valuable Effects which are the Conſequences of Virtue, we may alſo rationally compute, not only a Security from inward Evils, (ſuch as *turbulent Affections* and *a troubled Conſcience*, &c.) but alſo, a Security from *external Puniſhments*, Evils which, in Mr. *Hobbes*'s State of Nature, are called *Commotions* and *Wars:* And, which *Puniſhments* or *Evils*, the Profligate and Wicked draw down upon their own Heads. The Good and Virtuous do not load themſelves with the heavy Taxes of ſuch Puniſhments and Evils; altho' Experience ſhews, that, the Good and Virtuous, at ſome times, ſuffer grievous Calamities from other Cauſes;—but—yet, they are ſuch Calamities as equally threaten all the reſt of Mankind.

SECT. XLI.

Higher Rewards annexed to the Practice of the Public Good than thoſe already mentioned.

THE Order of our Enquiry leads us, in the next Place, to conſider thoſe nobler more extenſive Rewards which Nature expoſes to our View: And, *Which Rewards* are, beyond all Peradventure, punctually conferred upon thoſe, who carefully and practically ſtudy and regard *the Common Good*; for, theſe Rewards are intimately blended into Nature. Theſe Rewards are, to be ſure, the inward Perfections of the Mind together with all the Moral Virtues, the whole Fruits, Benefits and Advantages of Natural Religion, an uniform regular Tenor of Life, (whereby every conſiderate Man acts always conſiſtent with himſelf), a calm compoſure of Soul and a Joy ſpringing from the moſt exquiſit delightful moral Senſe of all theſe Bleſſings: A Joy which is permanent and laſting—Joy, in a Word, which very nearly and intimately affects and fills the Heart, as immediately flowing from our very ſelves, from our own free voluntary wiſe Choice, Behaviour and Actions. With an earneſt Deſire of appearing, therefore, as conciſe and ſhort as poſſible, I have cloſely connected all theſe Rewards together. The Heathens even themſelves, and their Philoſophers alſo, who, altho' they differed widely, and diſputed with Warmth and Animoſity enough amongſt themſelves; yet, they all, however,

however, ſo far agree as to maintain, that, in theſe Enjoyments or Rewards, the higheſt Degrees of Delight and Pleaſure are perceived and felt. And, that, ſuch Enjoyments and Rewards are intimately mixed with Human Happineſs. It would not be a difficult Matter to ſhew here, the wonderful Conſent and Agreement which appear, as to this Point, between the *Peripatetics*, the *Old* and *New Academics*, and even the *Epicureans* themſelves; notwithſtanding, that, ſome of them contended and maintained, that, *Virtue* is the *One Only Good:* Others, that, it is a *Principal a Chief Good* which carries a Preference to all the other Sorts and Degrees of Good: Again, others maintain, that, *Virtue is the one only chief and ultimate End:* Others, again, laſtly, maintain, that, *Virtue is the Means beſt fitted and adapted, and, of all others, the moſt neceſſary, in order to purſue and obtain this End.* And, which is the very Point *Epicurus* himſelf frequently inſiſts upon, as well in his Marks and Characters *(De Sapiente)* of the wiſe Man, as well as in his Κυριαι Δοξαι, his *Ratæ Sententiæ ſive Opiniones*, his *Maxims and Sentences.*—Nay—what appears more extraordinary, he has ſtrengthened and confirmed his Opinion, as to this Point, by his own Example, if any Credit can be given to his laſt Words, which, in my Mind, ſeem to carry very much the Air of an *Hyperbole*, of an incredible Falſhood. For he ſays, (ſpeaking of himſelf) that he ſuffers Tortures, from a Stone in his Bladder and from an Ulcer in his Inteſtines, ſo exquiſit that they could not receive any additional Pain: And—yet altho', under ſuch Agonies, that, the Day of his Sufferings was happy to him, from that Joy and Pleaſure of Mind occaſioned by Remembrances of his Reaſonings and Inventions. The Reader may, if he pleaſes, read *Epicurus*'s own Words, in his Letter to *Idomeneus* as quoted by *Diogenes Laertius*, Lib. 10. Segment 22. Page 613. Quarto. Amſtel. 1692.

Now, altho' there unqueſtionably appears a deal of Boaſt in theſe Words, yet, at leaſt, they prove thus much, *viz.* That, *Epicurus* acknowledged a very remarkable Pleaſure of Soul to ariſe from the true Pleaſure of Nature, and from a Life ſpent and regulated by the Dictates and Counſels of Reaſon: A Pleaſure even ſo very remarkably powerful, as to relieve the Man wrecked with the moſt tormenting Tortures: And, as it were, by the Inducement of a Reward, actively excite the Mind of Man to Virtue. *Epicurus* is the only one Philoſopher who maintains, That, *Virtue alone is inſeparable from Pleaſure*; and, that, *Pleaſure*, according to his Syſtem, *is the Title, the Appellation of the Supreme Happineſs.* Now—if theſe are the avowed Maxims of that Philoſopher, who, of all the other Sects, was the moſt ſcandalouſly faulty, (becauſe, he denied any, even the leaſt, Traces of either Wiſdom or Goodneſs in divine Providence) notwithſtanding ſo excellent a Diſpoſition, Order and Uſefulneſs in all Things; what Delights, infinitely ſuperior and more excellent, muſt they feel in *Virtue* and in *the ſtudious Concern for the Common Good*, who (from a nearer, a cloſer Inſpection into that extenſive, beſt-contrived, regular Series of natural Cauſes,

Cauſes, all uniting, conſpiring, co-operating to produce Effects the moſt beautiful and moſt completely perfect) can, with Eaſe, demonſtrate how impoſſible it is, that, this whole univerſal Frame could ſtart up out of nothing into Being, upon the *Epicurean* Principles; and who can, with as great Eaſe, demonſtrate, how abſolutely neceſſary it is, that the divine Energy and Contrivance ſhould intimately interpoſe, in the Courſe and Order of natural Things, but more eſpecially in the Conduct and Management of human Affairs? From hence, I ſay, Perſons affected by ſo noble a Senſe, will at once acknowledge, that, Almighty God himſelf carries on, by his all-wiſe Contrivance, the Preſervation of the Univerſe, which is no other than the *Common Good:* And, that, Almighty God commands Mankind, as we have already demonſtrated, to act with all their Powers, in purſuance of this ſame principal End; by which Means, ſuch Enquirers will very ſoon perceive the Agreement of their own Acts with thoſe of Almighty God. Now, from this Harmony, from this Agreement with the Divine Will, it neceſſarily follows, that, thoſe moſt pleaſing Perceptions, Senſations, Joys, and tranquil Compoſures of Mind are, (as it were, under the Divine Security and Protection) transfuſed into us: And, from the ſame Harmony and Agreement, alſo, that ſure and certain Hope of a bleſſed Immortality, is, from the Divine Benignity and Goodneſs, derived upon us.

The *Epicurean* Sect, of all the other Sects of Philoſophers, altho' ſo numerous, denied, that, God had any Care or Concern for *the Good of the Univerſe*: And conſequently, that, God had the leaſt Regard and Favour to mutual Juſtice amongſt Mankind—a Virtue which, in the very Nature and Practice of it, produces *this very ſame Good.* The Reaſon—or—rather the Pretence, why, *Epicurus* and his Followers denied *Divine Providence*, ſeems to me to be what *Cicero*, in his Book *De Naturâ Deorum*, oftentimes urges in his Argument with *Poſſidonius*, *viz.* That, *Epicurus* is willing, in his outward Expreſſions, to acknowledge the Divine Nature; but, in Fact, to baniſh ſuch a Nature out of the World: And, conſequently, That, what, *Epicurus* has urged concerning the Gods was principally upon account of avoiding an invidious World, as well as of avoiding the Danger and Hazard of his own Life. Amongſt thoſe ſeveral Cauſes which drew *Epicurus* into this execrable Error, This one does not, in my Opinion, appear the leaſt, That, his Knowledge of Nature (and upon which, *i. e.* Nature, depending, he ſo impudently rejected Divine Providence) was very airy, ſhallow and ſuperficial. Now, altho' I am not at all ignorant, how many are the Things ſpoken in *Epicurus*'s Vindication by *Gaſſendus*; yet, notwithſtanding the whole of *Gaſſendus*'s Defence, it is ſtill, notwithſtanding all he has ſaid, a clear Caſe, that, the *Epicurean* Philoſophy muſt be reſolved (in order to render it any ways tolerable) into ſome Principles demanding and requiring certain Poſtulata, which, upon rational Principles, are not at all allowable; and yet these Principles,

theſe Poſtulata, ſuppoſing them taken for granted, would ſtill be quite ineffectual, totally inſufficient, to conſtitute and frame this moſt beautiful Syſtem of natural Things which we daily behold. As for Inſtance, (1) *Epicurus* ſuppoſes the whole Frame of Nature to be compoſed of Atoms, endowed with a double, a compound natural Motion, roving and flying thro' the infinite Void: One of theſe Motions is perpendicular, the other with a ſort of Declination: And, that, theſe Atoms receive theſe ſeveral Impreſſes of Motion from their own natural innate Gravity. Now——if Gravity itſelf be any one Principle diſtinct from Motion, or from a natural Tendency downwards: Or, ſuppoſing that Gravity be the Cauſe of Motion, then we are not at a Loſs in ſeeking for the Cauſe of it. But, I ſhall not dwell upon the Confutation of ſuch clear Points as theſe, becauſe, the bare Repetition of them, in ſo learned and wiſe an Age, (an Age inſtructed in a much more excellent Philoſophy) is an ample, an abundant Confutation of them. *Epicurus*, to be ſure, underſtood nothing about the Laws of Motion: Neither did he, even with an ordinary Attention, obſerve, that exquiſitly-beautiful Diſpoſition, Chain and Dependency, ſo remarkably conſpicuous thro' all theſe complicated compound Motions from whence ariſe the conſtant Viciſſitudes of all the Generations and Alterations, Varieties and Succeſſions in the whole univerſal Syſtem of Nature. For, upon this Diſpoſition and Order of Parts, as well as, upon the Proportions, the Ratios of Figures and Motions from hence ariſing, the whole Beauty of corporeal phyſical Nature almoſt entirely depends: And, in ſuch Inveſtigations and Searches as theſe, it is, that, the whole Operations, Energies and Powers of that more exalted ſublimer Science, called *Natural Philoſophy*, as well as Mathematics, are principally employed.

Epicurus's Account of the Creation by Atoms.

Vid. Phil. Nat. Prin. Math. If. Newton, Pag. 530. Edit. Lond. 1726. Quarto.

(1) Epicurus *ſuppoſes the whole Frame*, &c.] *Leucippus*, the Place of whoſe Birth is unknown, was the firſt Inventor of the Atomical Hypotheſis, and perhaps the firſt, who from premeditated Impiety and deliberate Malice to the Gods, ſet in cool Blood to form ſuch a Syſtem of natural Science, as might effectually exterminate the Divine Being from the World, and diſcharge him from all Concern and Care about the Government of the Univerſe and the Adminiſtration of human Affairs. And tho' this Philoſopher was well inſtructed in the ſounder Diſcipline and Notions of the ancient Schools, he relinquiſhed their Doctrines, and reſolved to inſtitute ſuch a Scheme as might extirpate all Religion out of the Minds of Men. His Principles were, that, Matter in the minuteſt Particles, endowed with great Variety of Figures, did eternally exiſt, roaming about with great Velocity in an immenſe Void; by whoſe fortuitous Hits and Concuſſions, Diſengagements and Coalitions, all Things in Nature were produced, without Counſel and Contrivance, and without the Direction of an eternal ſuperintendent Mind. Thus, it is evident, that, *Leucippus* was a real Atheiſt, according to the Notions of an Atheiſt before ſettled.

It was from this Philoſopher that *Epicurus*, who has not in his whole Syſtem one Invention of his own, but what is a manifeſt Blemiſh and Diſhonour to the Author, has borrowed all his Philoſophical Materials, his boundleſs Void, his Atoms and their Figures, Motions, Rencounters, Repercuſſions, Diſunions and Combinations, tho' he is not pleaſed to make the leaſt mention of him, or to do him the Juſtice to own, that ſuch a Perſon did ever exiſt, leſt he ſhould not receive the Applauſe of a vaſt Imagination and independant Genius, and not be eſteemed the entire Compiler of his own vain and ill-imagined Philoſophy. *See* Blackmore's *Eſſay upon Atheiſm*, Pages 17, 18.

employed. For, the Knowledge of theſe two exalted Sciences, *Natural Philoſophy* and *Mathematics*, is cloſely connected. Now, it cannot be denied, that, *Epicurus*'s Ignorance in the Mathematical Science was groſs, nay, ſo palpably obſcure as to maintain, that, the Surface of the Earth was not a ſpherical Figure, but a Plane: An Abſurdity eaſily confuted by the very firſt Elements of Geometry. Can any one reaſonably expect, from a Perſon ſo groſly ignorant, any ſound Philoſophy in his Account of the Mundane Syſtem, and in his Reaſonings upon that moſt beautiful Order of the Parts, and more remarkable Motions of this Syſtem. In which Diſpoſition, Order and Motions eſſentially is demonſtrated the Being of a Firſt Mover and of his Providence in the wiſe Direction and Government of all Things.

Epicurus, to confeſs the Truth, ſeems to betray the thickeſt Stupidity of Soul, in maintaining, That, ſo curious a Structure of Plants and Animals flows from the fortuitous blind Concourſe of Atoms, quite independant of any Power, Energy, Force or Operation of Reaſon.—I can eaſier believe, that, Cities will at once ſtart into regular Buildings, by the diurnal Motion of the Earth from confuſed Concuſſions of Stones: Or, that, Houſes and Temples in Cities, raiſed upon the moſt beautiful Piazzas, Porticos, Pillars and Columns, ſhould repreſent to our View and excel all the Contrivances, all the Ornaments of Architecture deviſed by the great *Vitruvius*.

But the ridiculous Abſurdities of *Epicurus*'s Phyſiology do not ſtop here; for, he proceeds even to outdo his own Outdoings—He even ſtill exceeds himſelf in Madneſs, when he delivers it as Philoſophy, That, *the Human Soul, and, conſequently, Human Reaſon itſelf, Human Wiſdom, all the Arts and Sciences, do ſpring from a fortuitous blind Coalition of thoſe ſame Atoms, without the leaſt Deſign, Operation or Contrivance of Reaſon.* Now, ſuch Poſtulata as theſe muſt neceſſarily be taken for granted and allowed, before it is poſſible for us to diſcern, from this *Epicurean* Phyſiology, that, the Precepts of Religion, Morality, and of all the Cardinal Virtues, are not ſuggeſted to our Minds from the Nature of Things, as influenced and directed by the Will of God: Or, even before it is poſſible for us to free the Human Mind from that extenſive boundleſs Hope of Rewards, upon our Obedience paid to theſe Precepts: And, on the contrary alſo, before it is poſſible for us to diſengage the Mind from that Dread, from that Apprehenſion and Fear of Revenge which always threaten the Tranſgreſſors of thoſe Precepts. But—now, let us for the preſent diſmiſs, with this Section, *Epicurus* and his Herd, notwithſtanding that, of late Years, his Admirers are ſo mightily increaſed. There is one Poſition which *Epicurus* moſt avowedly and openly maintains, in his *Ratæ Sententiæ*, his *Maxims*, *viz.* "That, a juſt Man, by the Efficacy "and Effect of his Virtue, arrives at one Branch of Happineſs, prefera-"ble to all the reſt of Mankind: That, he is free from any Perturbations

The indolent Deity of Epicurus an Absurdity.

" or diſorderly Commotions of Mind." And, indeed, we ought not at all to wonder at *Epicurus* for diſallowing the Divine Reaſon and the other Divine Perfections to concern themſelves about Human Actions, ſince he has denied any Marks and Traces of ſuch Perfections obſervable in the Creation and Preſervation of the whole Univerſe. For, in Fact, at the very time he deemed it neceſſary to deprive Mankind of all Expectations (both Hopes and Fears) from Almighty God, upon account of their Actions, he ſufficiently diſcovers his Sentiments, that, the Hope of an ampler Recompence, as *the Reward of Juſtice*; and, that, the Apprehenſion, the Fear of Revenge, as *the Puniſhment of Injuſtice*; That, ſuch Hopes and Fears as theſe, I ſay, *Epicurus* acknowledges, to be no leſs rational and certain, than it is, that, the whole Frame of Nature is created and preſerved by the perfect Divine Reaſon of Almighty God.——But——ſince This is a Point which has been clearly handled and demonſtrated by other Authors, we ſhall, at preſent, content ourſelves with what has been already ſaid, and not purſue this Controverſy any farther. For, beyond all Contradiction, That Propoſition is ſufficiently proved to be *the Law of Nature*, which is ſanctified, ratified and eſtabliſhed by *Rewards and Puniſhments* upon the Will and Authority of that Cauſe, who, in the general univerſal Structure of the World, ſettled the Series, Order, Diſpoſition, Method and Subordination between all Cauſes and Effects, Antecedents and Conſequents, *Priora* and *Poſteriora*, Relations, Circumſtances, Fitneſſes and Unfitneſſes, Agreements and Diſagreements, *&c.*

SECT. XLII.

THRO' the whole Thread of my Reaſoning, an attentive Reader will obſerve, That, I have placed *all the Virtues* and *that Perfection of Mind, which, theſe Virtues carry in them*, amongſt the happy Conſequences, or the natural Rewards, of *Univerſal Benevolence*. There are, however, ſome Rewards, hereafter to be demonſtrated, which follow as Conſequences from that Practical Dictate which commands *ſuch an Univerſal Benevolence*; juſt after the ſame Manner as the Skill, in demonſtrating and conſtructing various Caſes reducible under ſome one general Geometrical Problem, follows from the Method purſued in ſolving every ſuch Problem: Yet, it is well known, that, in the Application of every ſuch Problem, ſo immediate an Attention is requiſit, as can diligently and carefully apply itſelf to all thoſe many Circumſtances wherein ſuch various Caſes differ; becauſe, otherwiſe the Mind would fall into Error and Miſtake. Now, ſince each and every one of all the particular Virtues, are only Parts and Branches of *this one moſt diffuſive benevolent Love*, and the various Modes only of exerting it; and conſequently, that, they all, in real Fact (when collectively conſidered) conſtitute, compound and make

make up this *univerſal benevolent Love:* Or, in the Schoolmens Phraſe, are identically the ſame. We, therefore, acknowledge, at the ſame time, notwithſtanding any thing which may appear to the contrary, that, *Virtue is a very conſiderable Part of this Reward, and of its own Reward:* And, we likewiſe deliver it as our Opinion, that, *the chief of that Happineſs which we ſeek after is comprehended under it.* However, what we here aſſert, we underſtand in no other Meaning than when we ſay, that, *Health is a very conſiderable Share of that Happineſs which Animals purſue, endeavour and ſeek after:* That is, *a State of Virtue is as fit and proper for the Execution and Diſcharge of all the Functions and Operations of the Mind, as a State of Health is neceſſary for the regular Performance, Execution and Diſcharge of all the Animal Powers.* The Analogy in both carries an exact Similitude, and is a State of both Soul and Body that impreſſes upon the Mind an agreeable pleaſing Senſation, reſpectively belonging to each; and creates not only a calm Compoſure, but, indeed, a laſting Pleaſure, even at times when the other Affairs and Circumſtances of Life do not flow on with an equal Proſperity. It is, however, neither proper or neceſſary, upon this Subject, to diſtinguiſh between this Health of the Mind, and the Senſe of it impreſſed upon the Soul, *i. e.* the Fruition, the Enjoyment of it; ſince Nature has ſo intimately joined theſe two Senſations together, that, the free voluntary Acts of all the Virtues, and the Perception or Conſciouſneſs of theſe Virtues cannot be ſeparated from each other: And yet, at the ſame time, I will not quarrel with them who define and call *Virtue the near efficient Cauſe, the eſſential Form of Happineſs:* Provided, that, they will agree with me in the main Point, and conſent to endow Virtue and the preſent Condition of human Nature, with ſome eſſential, with ſome noble Branch of Happineſs: That they will agree to defend the true Road to Happineſs: And laſtly, provided, that, they will raiſe the Expectations, the ſure and certain Hope of Mankind, in their Purſuits after a larger more ſolid Happineſs hereafter: For, there cannot poſſibly be any real Cauſe or Impediment, why, the ſelf-ſame individual Thing may not be the Part of a Whole which has a flowing ſucceſſive Exiſtence (and ſuch an Aggregate or Whole is human Happineſs); and yet, at the ſame time, why, this very ſelf-ſame individual Part ſhould not be an efficient Cauſe of other Parts of the ſame Aggregate or Whole, in future times to exiſt. *E. G.* The ſame Man may be, both a Member of the *Roman* Republic and alſo the Father of a Son, not yet born, who will likewiſe be a Member of the ſame Civil Community. There are, indeed, numberleſs Sects of Philoſophers, (but more particularly the *Stoics* and *Academics*) who, with clear Perſpicuity and Strength of Argument, demonſtrate and evince, That, the Virtues neceſſarily carry Happineſs in the very Nature and Practice of them: And, that, the Virtues are eſſentially and inſeparably connected and joined to ſuch Happineſs itſelf. All that the Philoſophers have ſaid upon this one Topic, muſt,

muſt, in my Judgment, appear needleſs to repeat; ſince the Writings and Opinions of the ancient Philoſophers employ ſo much time in this learned Age. It will be abundantly ſufficient, here, to ſay, (and, to which Truth I ſhall give my ſincereſt my moſt hearty Conſent) That, *the Moral Virtues* are the ſublimeſt moſt exalted Branches of human Happineſs; nay, Branches of Happineſs ſo eſſential, that, without them, *i. e.* without *the Virtues*, no Man (altho' the moſt plentifully ſupplied with all other Advantages and Bleſſings) can poſſibly be happy: Neither, on the other Hand, can any man, ſurrounded by the Bleſſings of Virtue, be miſerable, altho', in all other Reſpects, he is extremely unfortunate. The Moral Virtues are, therefore, for their own Sakes, as containing a Self-perfection, worthy of our Love, our Deſire, our Eſteem, our Practice; even, ſuppoſing, that, there was not any Law of Nature to lay the Obligation of an Obedience to them.—And—This is a Propoſition, which I would, with all the Accuracy of Reaſoning in my Power, demonſtrate, were it not a Propoſition already taken for granted, and which I find copiouſly and diffuſively proved by *Torquatus* in *Cicero*'s firſt Book *De Finibus*, at the Time when *Torquatus* takes upon himſelf the Defence of *Epicurus*.

From theſe Proofs and Conceſſions of Philoſophers, we maintain, That, a natural Indication is laid before the Mind, which is annexed as a Reward, by the Will of the Firſt Cauſe——as a Reward to Acts of Virtue. And, conſequently, the Firſt Cauſe Wills, that, Mankind, whom He has, from Nature, inſtructed to foreſee and prejudge the conſequent Rewards of Virtue, ſhould act ſo, as to purſue the Happineſs which beforehand is placed in their View. In the Diſcovery of ſuch a Will in the Firſt Cauſe as this, entirely conſiſts a Promulgation of this Natural Law; and, upon this Promulgation immediately depends and follows an Obligation both natural and moral. This Point, however, the Philoſophers do not ſeem ſufficiently to have regarded, when they propoſed Virtue as *the ultimate chief Happineſs*. It adds, to be ſure, a very conſiderable Weight to Arguments drawn from the moſt delicious Fruits and exquiſit Enjoyments of Virtue; That, theſe Fruits and Enjoyments muſt be conſidered as Rewards annexed to Virtue by the Will of the Firſt Cauſe; And, that, The Divine Will and Pleaſure is revealed to Mankind, purely with this one Deſign and Intent only, that, we ſhould chuſe to perform rather all Acts which the Firſt Cauſe has been pleaſed to honour with Rewards natural and eaſily obtained; than, by committing Acts contrary, and which, from the very Nature of them as ſettled and ordered in the univerſal Syſtem of Things, are well known to lead Mankind into Deſtruction. It is impoſſible, by any natural Signs whatſoever, more clearly and effectually to perſuade Mankind what they are to do, and how they are to act: And to demonſtrate with Authority, that ſuch, or ſuch, Acts are commanded by the Supreme Governor; than, that, they are ſanctified, ratified and honoured with natural Rewards by the Author of Nature. No

one

one Man with his Reaſon and Senſes about him, expects from Almighty God, in the ordinary Courſe of Things, Declarations, either expreſſed by Words or delivered in Writing, to convey and communicate his Laws to us: Nay—and even ſuppoſing any ſuch Declarations to have been made; yet, the Interpretation or Meaning of them could not, with ſo ſure a Certainty, be underſtood, as the powerful Efficacy of a Reward diſcovered to actuate and influence the Human Mind to perform ſuch Acts as are thus ſo highly honoured by him.—From Conjectures and Gueſſes which we make, when Children, and which are not altogether demonſtrative, we collect and conclude, what Mankind mean by ſuch, and ſuch, Words and Expreſſions.—And yet, ſuch conjectural Interpretations ſerve very well to inform us, what is the Intent and Signification of Political Laws. And, I have alſo further obſerved, that, Mankind in general are diſpoſed heartily to renounce and give up all that Information which they receive from the ſuperior Abilities and Perfections of their Minds; and would be very well ſatisfied to want all this intellectual Happineſs, provided they lawfully might Indulge themſelves in the Gratifications of their Appetites: And yet, theſe very Perſons, when once they are convinced by ſome clear Token, that, the Will of God has ſanctified The Law which reſtrains theſe Appetites, and which calls their Study and Attention another way, will revere and obey ſuch a Law: And, from hence determine, that, greater Degrees of Good, or greater Degrees of Evil, can follow from their own voluntary Acts, by Interpoſitions of Divine Providence, than can be foreſeen, apprehended or foreknown, without ſuch Interpoſitions. For, any Indication, even the ſmalleſt, provided it be certain, which declares the Divine Will of the Supreme Lord, carries important Weight and Conſequence with all Beings truly rational: Becauſe, all the greateſt Bleſſings flow from his Favour; and, conſequently may, upon the beſt Foundation of Reaſon, be hoped for and expected from it.

Under theſe Kinds of Rewards, is comprehended that bleſſed Immortality, which, natural Reaſon informs us, await the Souls of the Righteous, when ſeparated from the Body. Becauſe, Natural Reaſon knows and is conſcious, that, the Human Soul is a Subſtance entirely diſtinct and different from that of the Body; inſomuch, as it is the Foundation, the Subſtance of nobler and more exalted Operations: And—*Secondly*, Becauſe, Reaſon perceives the Soul fortified with a ſteady Purpoſe, a firm Reſolution to exert, exerciſe and practiſe *Univerſal Benevolence*; and, conſequently, *all Sorts of Virtue*, the conſtituent Branches of *this Benevolence*. It is therefore manifeſt, that, ſuch a Subſtance as the Human Soul is, will, and may, enjoy a bleſſed Immortality: Which Subſtance, becauſe it is of an entirely different Nature, is not hurt or injured by Death and Diſſolution, as the Body is; and which, alſo, (that is, the Human Soul) conſequently leads a Life pleaſed and ſatisfied, filled with the moſt delightful Remembrances of its former Virtue: A Life fitted for all Occaſions and Opportunities

tunities of exerciſing Virtue, which, even Eternity itſelf can afford. For the Reaſons, therefore, juſt now mentioned, (and which Reaſons the univerſal Experience of all Mankind evinces and ſhews to be true) the bleſſed State and Condition of good Men cannot be ſeparated from the Remembrance, the Exerciſe and the Practice of Virtue itſelf. To treat in a ſummary way, in this Place, is fully ſufficient, upon a Subject which has been ſo very diffuſively and at large handled by ſo many other Writers.

SECT. XLIII.

All Civil Societies are eſtabliſhed upon the Care of the Common Good.

WE come now, at length, in the third Place, to prove, That, all the ſeveral Benefits and Advantages, ariſing from Civil Society, fairly come within an Eſtimate, a Computation amongſt thoſe Rewards which are naturally conſequent upon a ſtudious Care and a practical Concern for *the Common Good*. Becauſe, all Civil Societies are, not only originally framed and conſtituted, but alſo ſupported and continued, by a Care, by a Concern for *the Common Public Good*. Each particular Civil Society has, to be ſure, a peculiar Regard and Reſpect to its own Members: And yet, the Government of each and all of them is ſo managed, that, the moſt cautious Care is taken, leſt there be an Injury offered to the Members of any other Society: Leſt, there be a Violation of Faith: Or, leſt, any Office, either of Gratitude or Humanity, be denied. Becauſe, upon theſe Articles of Obſervance, principally depend the Rights and Laws of War and Peace: And, which Duties, by the Help and Mediation of the ruling Powers, are obſerved and practiſed by all the worthy Members of each Society towards all the reſt of Mankind. From this one Principle, then, muſt be deduced the True Grounds and Reaſons of entering into and eſtabliſhing Civil Society at firſt: And, which I ſhall, as Occaſion offers itſelf, more diffuſively explain in ſome other Part of this ENQUIRY.

Let all other Relations and Circumſtances be, however, what they will; it muſt be allowed, that, the Benefits and Advantages of Society are very conſiderable. Nay—that, no Society could either, at firſt, be inſtituted, or afterwards preſerved, unleſs the Precepts and Rules of Virtue were taken in as eſſential Branches and under the Sanctions of Political Laws, is confeſſedly allowed, over and over again, in many Parts of Mr. *Hobbes*'s Writings; ſo that, to ſay any thing here upon this Point, muſt appear entirely needleſs. The one only Obſervation, which, I ſhall here make, is, That, all the ſeveral Sorts of Good to be found in Society, I have referred to this one Eſtimate, and, under the ſame Calculation: Notwithſtanding, that, ſome particular Members of Society may, at ſome times, want theſe ſeveral Kinds of Good; and, for this Reaſon conſequently, may be

be called *Advantages*, or, *Good contingent only:* But yet, however, they are ſuch Advantages and Kinds of Good as can be expected and hoped for, upon the Grounds of Rational Probability. Becauſe, *Contingent Good* carries a Value, an Eſtimate, which, in our preſent Argument ought not, by any Means to be overlooked and neglected. Such Kinds of *Good* are, for Example, *Plenty of Neceſſaries, The probable Security of Life, Honour, Riches, a more liberal Education of our Children, more extenſive Learning*, &c.——Such Advantages do not, to be ſure, by any Benefit ariſing from Society, fall to the Lot of All, or, at leaſt, not in an equal Degree.—— And yet, notwithſtanding theſe Inequalities and Uncertainties, I am firmly perſuaded, That, all Mankind do, from ſocial Advantages, enjoy many, many more, even of theſe Benefits, than could poſſibly fall to their Share, did no ſuch Principle as *a ſtudious Concern for the Common Good* carry an Influence over Mankind; upon the Suppoſition, that, there was no ſuch Thing as Civil Society, but, that, the whole human Race were to live and herd together like wild Beaſts:——A ſavage State, into which, as Mr. *Hobbes* ſtrenuouſly argues, the Right Reaſon of every one Individual would lead and compel All, before any Civil Societies were ever formed and entered into at all. Upon this very account, therefore, it is neceſſary to regulate, by a Computation, the Value of ſuch contingent Advantages as theſe, in deliberating and determining how we are to behave ourſelves and act towards Mankind. And—The Reaſon, why, we ought to calculate and compute, according to ſome Method, is evident: Becauſe, all the Effects (whether Good or Evil) which we can expect from free Agents, like ourſelves, by Acts of our own towards them, are, in their very Nature, ſubject to ſuch Contingencies: So that, either the one, or the other, of theſe Conſequences muſt unavoidably happen. Either, *Firſt*, That, we muſt give up abſolutely all Hopes and Expectations of any Good from Mankind (which is quite repugnant to conſtant univerſal Experience): Or, *Secondly*, That, the Good which redounds to us from Civil Society, altho' attended with Chance, Hazard and Uncertainty, muſt, notwithſtanding, be computed at ſome certain Value. I eſtimate, it is true, the Advantages mentioned, not only from Civil Society more immediately, but alſo, from an Obſervation upon that Natural Law, which takes its Riſe originally and principally from *a ſtudious Care and Concern for the Common Good:* And, this Eſtimate I take at ſo high a Value, that, ſincerely, and in my Conſcience, I believe, the Loſs of Life (which in the Cauſe of our Country the Laws of Nature at ſome times commands us to ſuffer) will be abundantly recompenced and over-rated by theſe ſuperior Advantages. For, *A liberal Education, The private Security ariſing from Civil Society, The Delights of Intercourſe, Commerce and Converſation with our Fellow-creatures, and thoſe Ornaments and Embelliſhments of Nature which we enjoy from the mutual Aſſiſtances and Helps of each other*, are ſuch Bleſſings as give a Reliſh to Life, and make it worth enjoying.—When we, therefore, have, for a

Series of Years, received and enjoyed all theſe Advantages of Life, by the Beneficence of our Fellow-citizens and Companions in Civil Society, (who act as Agents miniſterial to the *Public Common Good*) theſe our beneficent Fellow-members in Civil Society, do neither make an odd Requeſt, nor act unreaſonably, ſhould they require and command us to reſtore to them, or even to lay down for their Advantage, that Life, which, we have received at their Hand, and which they have ſo often preſerved and ſecured to us. —Nay—we may carry this our Gratitude ſtill farther—even ſo far, as to aſſert, That, we are Debtors to our Country and to our Fellow citizens, ſuppoſing that we ſhould, at their Command, (a Caſe which ſeldom, or never, happens, except where the Civil Conſtitution of our Country is in the laſt Extremity of Diſtreſs and Neceſſity) give back Life to that Society, which conſtantly, every Day, and always confers Life upon us. Small, I am afraid, is the Number who will refrain from offering an Injury to others, purely from the Motive of Obedience to the Precepts of the Laws of Nature: And, therefore, in order *that theſe Laws may receive a more enforcing Sanction*, either lower Rewards, or the obſcure darker Diſcovery of Rewards nobler and more extenſive, will be ſufficient to a firmer Ratification of them. It may, then, be objected, That, *manifold Perſecutions are apt to obſtruct the Influence and Efficacy of the Rewards ſo peculiarly annexed and promiſed to the Chriſtian Faith, Diſcipline and Doctrine:* In order, therefore, to confirm and ſtrengthen true Chriſtians in their orthodox Faith and Practice, it was neceſſary, that, *the Reſurrection of the Body*, and *the Revelation of Life and Immortality, thro' the Goſpel*, ſhould be manifeſted: And, that, *the Glory of the Heavenly Kingdom ſhould be revealed*, leſt, Chriſtians, under a State of Perſecution, might appear more wretched and miſerable than the reſt of Mankind: And ſo, lay a Stumbling-block againſt *Natural Religion* and *Chriſtianity*, which, without *a future State*, and *the Rewards of it*, might not, perhaps, be ſo eaſily removed.

Objection.

Anſwer.

SECT. XLIV.

From the Arguments hitherto urged and proved, we conclude, that God willed Mankind to be obliged and bound to act for the Common Good.

HAVING demonſtrated the firſt Point propoſed, namely, "That, "the moſt ſubſtantial Advantages, and higheſt Degrees of Good, "do follow as the Reward of Human Acts which regard and promote "the Public Good." I come now to clear up the Truth of my ſecond Point, which is, "That, the Compariſon of theſe Advantages and Kinds "of Good (or Rewards,) being formed and made by the Will, Counſel "and Deſign of the Firſt Cauſe, affords to us a natural Mark, ſpecific and diſtinct enough, whereby to underſtand, "That, it is the Will and "Command of God, that Mankind ſhould conſtantly proſecute and pro-"mote the Public Good in all their Acts, Motions, Habits, Dealings and "Behaviour."

"Behaviour."——However, ſince I have already, and to my own Satisfaction, ſufficiently demonſtrated this ſecond Propoſition, where I have treated upon *Puniſhments*, and where I have treated upon *the Happineſs of the Human Mind as connected with Virtue*; I ſhall here only connect the Force of that Proof into the one following Syllogiſm. This whole Reaſoning reduced into the Form of a Syllogiſm.

The Governor, or Firſt Rational Cauſe, (by whoſe Will and Pleaſure Things are ſo ſettled and diſpoſed, as clearly to ſhew and convince Mankind, that, ſome certain Acts of their own are the *neceſſary Means to an End neceſſary for them to purſue*,) wills, that Mankind ſhould perform ſuch Acts (*i. e.* in other Words, God commands ſuch Acts). Major Propoſition.

But, by the Will of God, Things are ſo ordered and diſpoſed, as fully and ſufficiently to lay before Mankind, That, *a ſtudious Care and Concern for the Common Good*, are *Means neceſſary to The End which they evidently are to purſue*, i. e. *their own private Happineſs*, as neceſſarily interwoven into, and mixed with, *the Common Good*, (and, which *Private Happineſs*, from hence only, can be rationally expected. Minor Propoſition.

And, therefore, it is the Will of Almighty God, that Mankind ſhould be obliged to *a ſtudious Concern for the Performance of Acts neceſſarily from hence ariſing*. That is, in other Words, *Almighty God orders and commands Univerſal Benevolence as the whole Sum and Subſtance of the Laws of Nature*. Concluſion.

The major Propoſition of this Syllogiſm is taken from *the Definition of an Obligation*, which we have already enquired into, and traced up to its Original. The minor Propoſition, alſo, of this Syllogiſm was alſo proved a little while ago, therefore the Concluſion is true. See Sect. 11. of this Chapter, Page 315, and Sect. 22. Page 346.

We are here, however, to admoniſh the Reader, that, an entire integral Happineſs is the Point at preſent in view—An Happineſs ſo extenſive, as to comprehend *all Perfections of Soul and Body within our Power*——An Happineſs boundleſs, not confined to this preſent Life, but fitted to a future Life of Immortality, ſo far as ſuch a future Life is diſcovered to us by the Light of Nature. In like Manner, alſo, under the Denomination of *Acts taken and ſuppoſed as Means of this Happineſs*, we are to underſtand principally, and in the firſt Place, the whole Series of Acts, thro' the whole human Life, as elicited and fully drawn forth into Practice, to anſwer *This One Grand End and Purpoſe:* Notwithſtanding, that, each ſingle Act neceſſary to procure every Branch of this Happineſs, is, by this very Argument, proved to be *the Command of Almighty God the Author of Nature*. It is therefore neceſſary, to the laſting ſubſtantial Happineſs of Individuals, (which is the Happineſs we are now enquiring into) that, each, every one and all individual Rational Agents, ſhould come to *ſome determined Reſolution* concerning a conſtant regular Tenor of Behaviour, in order to promote *This One Grand End*. Becauſe, ſuch is the natural Conſtitution of all thoſe Cauſes, in procuring the Concurrence and Co-operation of which Cauſes this whole Happineſs eſſentially conſiſts, that, the Right Rea-

ſon of Man (*i. e.* ſuch a Reaſon as is conformable to his mortal and immortal Nature, and which promiſes no other Effect as deſirable, than ſuch as Cauſes really and in Fact are deſigned to produce): That this Right Reaſon of Man, I ſay, cannot poſſibly diſcover to us any one Method in our Power ſo operative and effectual to ſecure *this ſo deſirable an End*, as the one here laid down, *viz.* "That we reconcile and bring over to our "Intereſt, as much as in us lies, by our *Univerſal Benevolence*, both *God* "*and Man:* Or which, in other Words, amounts to the ſame Thing, "That, the Nature both of *God and Man*, upon proper Enquiry, declares "this one important Truth, namely, That, *every one Rational Creature*, "*by ſubſerving and conſtantly miniſtring to the Common Good, is able to* "*procure to himſelf, and by the beſt Means in his Power, his own Pri-*"*vate Happineſs, ſo eſſentially connected with that of the Whole:* And, "conſequently, *it is neceſſary for him to effect this, if he is inclined and* "*willing to be as happy as it is in his Power to be.*" In this one material Point, all who determine judiciouſly concerning Nature, both *the Divine and Human*, (under which are comprehended the Cauſes of Private Happineſs in each and every one Individual) can ſoon agree; and, with the beſt Security of Self-preſervation and Self-happineſs: And—by ſufficient clear Indications, both from *the Nature of Things*, and, conſequently, from *the Author of Nature*, they are alſo prompted and ſolicited to agree in their Practice, that, this Propoſition is *a true perpetual Rule, an immutable Law of Action.* For, it may happen, as ſometimes, indeed, it does in ſome few Inſtances (altho' but very rarely) that, greater Advantages, for a ſhort Continuance, fall to the Lot of this, or t'other particular Man, than ſeem conſiſtent with the *Public Good:* Yet ſince, upon a ſtrict Examination into the whole Period of Duration, a fuller compleater Happineſs will be procured by neglecting ſuch Advantages, than by purſuing them, all the poſſible Enjoyment, therefore, which ſuch Advantages carry in them, cannot be reckoned amongſt the conſtituent Parts and Branches of the ſupreme, of the higheſt Felicity. Becauſe, in the one Maxim, moſt comprehenſive and univerſal, juſt now mentioned, is contained, not only the Whole of Philoſophy Moral Political and Oeconomic; but, alſo, the Whole of all *true Wiſdom, Prudence* and *Virtue.* If we proceed and act upon *this ſolid ſubſtantial rational Foundation*, we ſhall ſhew the beſt Regards in our Power to all other Rational Beings, as well as to ourſelves.——And we ſhall, not, (at the ſame time we act upon this Principle) diſturb and confound that Beauty and Regularity, which, we find eſtabliſhed thro' all Nature, in order to ſubdue and bring all Things under the Subjection of an abſolute Self-will. This is the ſecond Objection laid down by Mr. *Hobbes*, and which I promiſed to anſwer.

SECT.

SECT. XLV.

LET us, in the next Place, according to Order, paſs on to ſolve (1) that " Objection, wherein is ſuggeſted, That, the Method which " we purſue, in inveſtigating and tracing out the Obligation of Natural " Laws, concludes, That, *the Common Good*, or, in other Words, That, " *the Glory the Honour of Almighty God*, That, *the Happineſs of all Man-* " *kind*, (SELF excepted) muſt ſubmit to the Happineſs of Individuals, " and is made ſubſervient to *Private Happineſs* as *the ſupreme ultimate* " *End.*" Objection. See Sect. 36. of this Chapter.

Now, this Doctrine is, to be ſure, as far as poſſible from my Thoughts: Nay, ſo far, that, the Reaſoning eſtabliſhed upon my Principles fundamentally deſtroys the whole Objection: For, I have, over and over again, inculcated it as an unalterable Maxim, That, no Man has a Right either to Life, or to the Neceſſaries of it, unleſs, in ſome Degree, more or leſs, the Life of each Individual be a Part or a Cauſe of *ſuch a Common Public Good:* Or, at leaſt, that it does not carry a Contradiction, an Oppoſition to *ſuch a Good*, but is perfectly conſiſtent with it. Here, then, my Buſineſs ſhall be to demonſtrate, and upon rational diſtinct Principles, after what Manner, and by what Connexion, theſe two, *viz. The Private Happineſs of Each* and *the Common Good of All*, unite cohere and agree. Anſwer.

We are, then, in the firſt Place, principally and more eſpecially to obſerve, That, a Natural Obligation is not *inveſtigated, traced out and diſcovered by each Individual, according to that Order wherein ſuch an Obligation is eſtabliſhed and conſtituted by its Author in the Nature of Things.* Becauſe, we find it always neceſſary to make uſe of the Analytic Order or Method, by beginning firſt with Effects which moſt immediately ſtrike and affect us; and then, by gradual Steps, riſing to various *complex compounded ſecond Cauſes*, till, at length, from ſuch a Progreſs, we aſcend and arrive at the Firſt Cauſe. By this Method of Inveſtigation, we do not offer the leaſt Affront to the Firſt Cauſe, ALMIGHTY GOD. Provided always, that we, in the Courſe of our Enquiry, acknowledge all thoſe neceſſary Effects (which I all along ſtrictly obſerve) to have drawn their original Source and Creation from his Divine Will: And, that, we aſcribe to his tranſcendant Nature all that Perfection and Excellency which we have traced out See Prolegomena, Page 10.

(1) *That Objection wherein it is ſuggeſted that the Method*, &c.] At the thirty-ſixth Section of this Chapter our Author ſtates two Objections.

1. " That, the Puniſhments of Vice ſeem " to be precarious and uncertain: That, the " Rewards of Virtue are not, with an Evi- " dence ſufficient, with a Certainty conſpicu- " ous and ſatisfactory enough, underſtood, ſo " as to exhibit clear Indications of a Natural " Obligation, and of the Will of the Firſt " Cauſe."

2. " That, the Doctrine here aſcertained " ſeems to imply, That the Common Public " Univerſal Goyd is propoſed and made ſub- " ſervient to the Private Happineſs of each In- " dividual."

The firſt of theſe two Objections he has anſwered at large and in full. He comes now to the ſecond Objection, &c.

out and marked in theſe Effects. Thus, for Inſtance, in the Caſe at preſent before us, we, as the firſt Step of Inveſtigation, acknowledge, in ſome way or other, our own Nature: And, that, ſome Things are neceſſary, convenient and uſeful to the Happineſs of it: As alſo, that, ſome Endeavours of our own are evidently natural towards the Attainment of ſuch convenient uſeful Supplies. We moreover obſerve, from the Nature of thoſe Perſons, (whom we familiarly know, and with whom we carry on an intimate Correſpondence) that, ſome certain voluntary Acts of our own, whether we will or no, meet with Oppoſition from them; and we find, that, ſuch Acts, as far as in the Power of ſuch Perſons lie, are coerced, reſtrained and rendered ineffectual: Whereas, other voluntary Acts of our own, (ſuch, I mean, as are benevolent and beneficial to others) are moſt heartily and liberally recompenſed and rewarded with reciprocal Affection and Kindneſs: And, we alſo cannot but perceive, and find ourſelves ſo conſtituted and framed by Nature, as ſtrongly to incline by an inherent Propenſity, (previous even to any Act of Thought, Judgment, Reflection or Deliberation) *to repel Force by Force*, and *to render Like for Like*. And, indeed, to confeſs the Truth, the moſt deliberate Reaſon and cooleſt Reflection, do not dictate to us any Contrariety to theſe Propenſities and Inſtincts, from numberleſs Obſervations of this Kind, which conſtantly hold good. And, from other Arguments already ſuggeſted, the Human Mind is demonſtratively convinced and reſts fully ſatisfied, that, the Benevolence of ſome towards others, and towards All, ſecures the Road to thoſe Rewards, and to that Happineſs ſo neceſſary to our Well-being, and always in a Proportion as large and extenſive, as this Benevolence extends itſelf and is diffuſed. And, therefore, when once the Human Mind fully conſiders, that, this whole Effect is cauſed by the all-wiſe provident Author of Nature, no poſſible Doubt can remain, why, the Author of Nature ſhould not will and be pleaſed with this ſo glorious an Effect when produced by Mankind, as being, in Truth and Reality, an Argument, a Motive well adapted and fitted by the ſupreme Governor of All, to elicit the Practice of *Univerſal Benevolence*: That is, in other Words, (and which is our very Demonſtration) that, we ſhould regard this Argument, this Motive, as the ſure Characteriſtic of an Obligation, the moſt infallible Criterion or Mark of a Law commanding ſuch an Obligation, ſuch a Benevolence.

Now, altho' this Concluſion be the laſt Truth diſcovered in the Courſe of this Inveſtigation; yet, *the Obligation of the Laws of Nature* takes, however, its firſt Riſe from the *known declared Will of God*, whom, we, from the Works of Creation, have learned, and fully proved, to be the moſt perfect Being, to be the Original Cauſe and Creator of All; and, upon whoſe Will, Pleaſure and Countenance, abſolutely depends the whole Happineſs of all Beings, and, conſequently, the Happineſs of ourſelves, concerning which [Happineſs] we naturally, and, as it were, by Inſtinct, are

ſo

ſo anxious, ſolicitous and earneſt. Now, by no other Method whatſoever, does the Obligation ariſe from a Love of our own Happineſs, than as the Truth of Natural Propoſitions, formed upon the real Exiſtence of Things, ariſes from the Fidelity of our Senſes, eſtabliſhed upon ſure Proofs and Teſtimony: As alſo, upon the Veracity of the Firſt Cauſe demonſtrated by the very ſame Principles, *i. e.* the Effects produced, the Works of Creation. No Man, however, will, with his Reaſon about him, ſay, That, we prefer our Senſes, and the Evidences of them, to the whole univerſal Creation—much leſs to Almighty God himſelf, the Creator, Maker and Preſerver of ALL: Since we confeſs and acknowledge, That, the whole Exiſtence, the whole Application, and the whole Uſe of all created Beings and Things, primarily depend upon Almighty God as the Firſt Cauſe, and, then, in the next Place, upon the whole Syſtem of Nature as Secondary Cauſes under the abſolute Dominion and Guidance of the Firſt Cauſe, the Creator, Almighty God himſelf. In this Inveſtigation, therefore, we obſerve, THAT [*i. e.* THAT CAUSE or BEING] to be the firſt in Nature, which, in this backward Method and retrograde Order, we laſt arrive at the Knowledge of. And, conſequently, altho' ſuch a Series or Order of Knowledge as this, is evidently natural, and, in the general, moſt uſed: And, moreover, altho' our Affections, our ſeveral Appetites and Deſires, are employed and exerciſed ſo, as to furniſh us with a Knowledge of both Good and Evil in their ſeveral Degrees; yet, notwithſtanding all this, we are not, from hence, to pronounce, declare, determine what Object it is, which either is moſt worthy to be known, or which, above all others, ought moſt to be beloved. For, juſt as, by the Help and Mediation of our Senſes, our intellectual Faculties learn and underſtand ſome certain Principles, which are very general: As for Inſtance, by the Help and Mediation of our Senſes, our intellectual Faculties learn and underſtand the moſt univerſal Theorems both in Arithmetic and Geometry, upon the Force and Evidence of which, [Theorems] thoſe Errors are happily corrected which the Generality of Mankind imbibe, by the very Senſes themſelves (when not rightly underſtood and practically managed): So upon exactly the ſame Foundation of Reaſoning, from that naturally well-governed Love, which we cheriſh for our own Happineſs, Human Creatures, truly rational, arrive at ſuch a Knowledge both of Things natural and of God himſelf; and attain to ſuch exalted Degrees of Love, of Affection *for the Honour of God, and for the Common Good of all other Rational Agents*, as, not only to guard againſt all perverſe abſurd φιλαυτία, or *Self-love*; but alſo, radically to root out and baniſh every ſuch ſelfiſh inordinate Motion. The Appetites of Self-preſervation and of Self-happineſs, in themſelves (originally ſo natural and neceſſary, which, we ſuppoſe in Man) are evidently circumſcribed within very narrow Bounds, are very innocent, and free from any Imputation of Guilt: Or, at leaſt, ſome of them are ſo very innocent, that, Reports of Senſe, ſimple and uncompounded,

pounded, are (when employed upon Objects properly ſuited to theſe Appetites within regular Limitations) free from all Error, free from all Miſtake. For, *Theſe Truths* being once denied, there cannot poſſibly be the leaſt Room, the leaſt Hope, the leaſt Expectation left, either to underſtand Nature, or to regulate adjuſt and ſettle our own moral free Acts, according to *the Laws and Rules of Nature.* But—on the contrary, a vain, empty, endleſs Sceptciſm muſt neceſſarily ſucceed and come into the Place of Science: And——a ſelf-willed Obſtinacy of Behaviour and Manners quite groundleſs, accidental, precarious, muſt come in and take place of Prudence, and of the ſettled regular Government of our Appetites and Paſſions. From whence it cannot but happen, That, all Difference, all Diſtinction, between a Man truly wiſe, and the moſt egregious Fool alive, is undoubtedly, to all Intents and Purpoſes, ſwallowed up and loſt. For, ſince, from the Knowledge and Love of Effects which moſt nearly concern us, the Mind naturally acquires a Knowledge, a Love of all Cauſes upon which we depend; but eſpecially of Rational Cauſes (as Cauſes which, not only by Virtue and Efficacy of their Cauſality, are the moſt powerful effective Cauſes): And, ſince, from an Analogy, a Similitude of Nature, theſe Cauſes do moſt powerfully inſinuate and work themſelves into our Underſtanding and Affections, it manifeſtly appears, that, theſe firſt Notices of ourſelves, and of thoſe ſtrong Tendencies which we naturally carry in us towards our own Happineſs, are only the Steps and Introductions to ſeveral Degrees of *ſublimer Knowledge*—and, to *Affections more enlarged, more diffuſive and more intenſe*, which the ſeveral Degrees of Goodneſs and Perfections (conſpicuous and eminent in theſe Objects) require from us. It is, moreover, a Truth too ſelf-evident to ſtand in need of Proof, That, the Degrees and Rules of our Love do not depend upon that Order (as to ſooner or later) of Time wherein the Object or Thing is known by us, either known or believed by us; but it depends upon the Judgment we form concerning the Meaſure or Degree of Goodneſs diſcovered and diſcoverable in Beings and Things. The Propoſition, then, which we demonſtrate is, That, *no Good whatſoever is to be determined by the Relation it bears to SELF only*, (and which, by the Bye, is the *one Good alone*, which Mr. *Hobbes* allows in a State of Nature); *but, purely upon account of that Efficacy, of that Energy which every ſuch Good carries in it, to preſerve, compleat and render more perfect any other Being or Beings; but, moſt eſpecially, the whole of Rational Beings ſocially united into one Syſtem of affectionate benevolent Agency.* And, the Demonſtration of this Propoſition our Reader will find in our Third Chapter, *(De bono Naturali*, i. e.) *Concerning Natural Good.* Now, *ſuch a Goodneſs* or *Perfection* as this, will, without any Difficulty or Scruple, I believe, be acknowledged much larger and more extenſive in the whole Human Kind, than in any one Individual: And, conſequently, *ſuch a Goodneſs* or *Perfection* is tranſcendantly the higheſt in Almighty God. And, therefore, that, Almighty God

God, upon this very Account, is the moſt perfect Object of all our firſt, all our beſt Love.

The main Point, then, of this whole Argument turns here.—" We are " powerfully moved, actuated and ſway'd by a ſtudious Care and Concern " for our own Happineſs, (which we always eſteem and look upon as a " *good poſſible*) to conſider and regard thoſe Cauſes, upon whom this our " *Happineſs* depends, and thoſe Cauſes more eſpecially who act the prin- " cipal Parts in effecting and bringing about this ſo neceſſary, ſo deſireable " an End: Cauſes capable of being influenced either to encreaſe or dimi- " niſh ſuch an *Happineſs* or *Good*; and, which principal Cauſes really and " truly are both GOD and *Man*." At the very Time we are, with circumſpect Care and an accurate Scrutiny, examining into the Nature of theſe Cauſes, we muſt unavoidably diſcover a Perfection, a Goodneſs, that is, an Aptitude, a Fitneſs in theſe Cauſes to preſerve and render better the whole State of Nature; and it is ſuch an Aptitude, ſuch a Fitneſs, as exactly reſembles that Diſpoſition in our own Nature which always renders us agreeable to our ſelves, and amiable in our own Eyes.—Such an Aptitude, ſuch a Diſpoſition as this is tranſcendently and infinitely greater in ALMIGHTY GOD, than it is in any other, nay—even than it is in all other Beings whatſoever. To which we may alſo further add, *that we find ſingle Individual Cauſes reſpectively not leſs determined by their Reaſon to ſeek and procure Effects ſuited to the Happineſs of* SELF, *than we ourſelves are.* From whence we conclude, *That no poſſible Reaſon can be aſſigned why we ſhould deſire or expect, that* ALL *muſt conſpire as united Cauſes acting for our* Good, *in Preference to the* Good *of all other Beings—— Nay——even in Preference to the* Good, *each reſpectively of himſelf.*

SECT. XLVI.

THERE is but one Method, which Reaſon ſuggeſts to us, and this Method is drawn from a Knowledge of the total Sum or aggregate Whole, by the Addition of Individuals or of Unity often repeated:——(1) *A Knowledge ſo very peculiar to rational Beings only.*

(1) *A Knowledge ſo very peculiar to Rational Beings only.*] Amongſt all the Ideas we have, as there is none ſuggeſted to the Mind by more Ways, ſo there is none more ſimple, than that of *Unity*, or *One*. It has no Shadow of Variety or Compoſition in it; Every Object our Senſes are employed about, every Idea in our Underſtandings, every Thought of our Minds, brings this Idea along with it. And therefore it is the moſt intimate to our Thoughts, as well as it is, in its Agreement to all other Things, the moſt univerſal Idea we have. For, Number applies itſelf to Men, Angels, Actions, Thoughts, every Thing that either doth Exiſt, or can be Imagined.

2. By repeating this Idea in our Minds, and adding the Repetitions together, we come by the *complex* Ideas of the *Modes* of it. Thus by adding one to one, We have the complex Idea of a Couple: by putting twelve Unites together,

By this Method, all may be reconciled to all, and conſequently to the Individuals or Units reſpectively ſo far as the Nature of the whole will allow:

together, we have the complex *Idea* of a Dozen; and of a Score, or a Million, or any other Number.

3. *The ſimple Modes of Number are of all other the moſt Diſtinct*; every the leaſt Variation, which is an Unite, making each Combination as clearly different from that which approacheth neareſt to it, as the moſt remote: two being as diſtinct from one, as two hundred; and the Ideas of two, as diſtinct from the Idea of three, as the Magnitude of the whole Earth, is from that of a Mite. This is not ſo in other ſimple Modes, in which it is not ſo eaſy, nor, perhaps, poſſible for us to diſtinguiſh betwixt two approaching Ideas, which yet are really different. For who will undertake to find a Difference between the White of this Paper, and that of the next Degree to it? Or can form diſtinct Ideas of every the leaſt Exceſs in Extenſion?

4. The Clearneſs and *Diſtinctneſs of each Mode of Number* from all others, even thoſe that approach neareſt, makes me apt to think, that Demonſtrations in Numbers, if they are not more evident and exact than in Extenſion, yet they are more general in their Uſe, and more determinate in their Application. Becauſe the Ideas of Numbers are more preciſe, and diſtinguiſhable than in Extenſion; where every Equality and Exceſs are not ſo eaſy to be obſerved, or meaſured; becauſe our Thoughts cannot in Space arrive at any determined Smallneſs, beyond which it cannot go, as an Unite; and therefore the Quantity or Proportion of any the leaſt Exceſs cannot be diſcovered: which is clear otherwiſe in Number, where, as has been ſaid, 91 is as diſtinguiſhable from 90 as from 9000, though 91 be the next immediate Exceſs to 90. But it is not ſo in Extenſion, where whatſoever is more than juſt a Foot, or an Inch, is not diſtinguiſhable from the Standard of a Foot, or an Inch; and in Lines which appear of an equal Length, one may be longer than the other by innumerable Parts: Nor can any one aſſign an Angle, which ſhall be the next biggeſt to a right one.

5. By the repeating, as has been ſaid, of the Idea of an Unite, and joining it to another Unite, We make thereof one collective Idea, marked by the Name two. And whoſoever can do this, and proceed on, ſtill adding one more to the laſt collective Idea, which he had of any Number, and give a Name to it, may count, or have Ideas, for ſeveral Collections of Unites diſtinguiſhed one from another, as far as he hath a Series of Names for following Numbers, and a Memory to retain that Series, with their ſeveral Names: All Numeration being but ſtill the adding of one Unite more, and giving to the whole together, as comprehended in one Idea, a new or diſtinct Name or Sign, whereby to know it, from thoſe before and after, and diſtinguiſh it from every ſmaller or greater Multitude of Unites. So that he that can add one to one, and ſo to two, and ſo go on with his Tale, taking ſtill with him the diſtinct Names belonging to every Progreſſion; and ſo again, by ſubſtracting an Unite from each Collection, retreat and leſſen them, is capable of all the Ideas of Numbers, within the Compaſs of his Language, or for which he hath Names, though not, perhaps, of more. For the ſeveral ſimple Modes of Numbers, being in our Minds, but ſo many Combinations of Unites, which have no Variety, nor are capable of any other Difference but more or leſs, Names or Marks for each diſtinct Combination, ſeem more neceſſary than in any Sort of Ideas. For without ſuch Names or Numbers we can hardly well make uſe of Numbers in Reckoning, eſpecially where the Combination is made up of any great Multitude of Unites; which put together without a Name or Marks to diſtinguiſh that preciſe Collection, will hardly be kept from being a heap in Confuſion.

6. This I think to be the Reaſon, why ſome *Americans*, I have ſpoken with, (who were otherwiſe of quick and rational Parts enough) could not, as we do, by any means, count to 1000; nor had any diſtinct Idea of that Number, though they could reckon very well to 20. Becauſe their Language being ſcanty, and accommodated only to the few Neceſſaries of a needy ſimple Life, unacquainted either with Trade or Mathematicks, had no Words in it to ſtand for 1000; ſo that when they were diſcourſed with of thoſe greater Numbers, they would ſhew the Hairs of their Head, to expreſs a great Multitude, which they could not number; which Inability,

allow: Which, in other Words, is, that all ſhould agree and unite in one End to be purſued by all; namely, THE COMMON GOOD.

Inability, I ſuppoſe, proceeded from their want of Names. The *Tououpinambos* had no Names for Numbers above 5; any Number beyond that, they made out, by ſhewing their Fingers, and the Fingers of others who were preſent: And I doubt not, but we our ſelves might diſtinctly number in Words, a great deal farther than we uſually do, would we find out but ſome fit Denominations to ſignify them by; whereas in the Way we take now to name them by Millions of Millions of Millions, *&c.* it is hard to go beyond Eighteen, or at moſt four and twenty Decimal Progreſſions, without Confuſion. But to ſhew how much *diſtinct Names conduce to our well Reckoning*, or having uſeful Ideas of Numbers, let us ſet all theſe following Figures, as the Marks of one Number: *v. g.*

Nonilions.	*Octilions.*	*Septilions.*	*Sextilions.*
857324.	162486.	345896.	437916.
Quintrilions.	*Quatrilions.*	*Trilions.*	*Bilions.*
423147.	248106.	235421.	261734
Millions.	*Unites.*		
368149.	623137		

The ordinary Way of naming this Number in *Engliſh*, will be the often repeating of Millions, of Millions, of Millions, of Millions, of Millions, of Millions, of Millions, of Millions, (which is the Denomination of the ſecond ſix Figures,) in which Way it will be very hard to have any diſtinguiſhing Notions of this Number: but whether, by giving every ſix Figures a new and orderly Denomination, theſe, and perhaps a great many more Figures, in Progreſſion, might not eaſily be counted diſtinctly, and Ideas of them both got more eaſily to our ſelves, and more plainly ſignified to others, I leave it to be conſidered. This I mention only to ſhew how neceſſary diſtinct Names are to numbering, without pretending to introduce new one's of my Invention.

7. Thus Children, either for want of Names to mark the ſeveral Progreſſions of Number, or not having yet the Faculty to collect ſcatter'd Ideas into complex ones, and range them in a regular Order, and ſo retain them in their Memories, as is neceſſary to Reckoning; do not begin to number very early, nor proceed in it, very far or ſteadily, till a good while after they are well furniſhed with good Store of other Ideas: and one may often obſerve them diſcourſe and reaſon pretty well, and have very clear Conceptions of ſeveral other Things before they can tell 20. And ſome, thro' the Default of their Memories, who cannot retain the ſeveral Combinations of Numbers, with their Names annexed in their diſtinct Orders, and the Dependance of ſo long a Train of Numeral Progreſſions, and their Relation one to another, are not able all their Life-time to reckon, or regularly go over any moderate Series of Numbers. For he that will count Twenty, or have an Idea of that Number, muſt know, that Nineteen went before, with the diſtinct Names or Sign of every one of them, as they ſtand marked in their Order; for wherever this fails, a Gap is made, the Chain breaks, and the Progreſs in Numbering can go no farther: So that to reckon right, it is required. 1. That the Mind diſtinguiſh carefully two Ideas, which are different one from another, only by the Addition or Subtraction of one Unite. 2. That it retain in Memory the Names or Marks of the ſeveral Combinations from an Unite to that Number; and that not confuſedly, and at Random, but in that exact Order, that the Numbers follow one another: In either of which, if it trips, the whole Buſineſs of Numbering will be diſturbed, and there will remain only the confuſed Idea of Multitude; but the Ideas neceſſary to diſtinct Numerations will not be attained to.

8. This farther is obſervable in *Number*, that it is that which the Mind makes uſe of in *meaſuring all Things*, that by us are meaſurable, which principally are *Expanſion* and *Duration*; and our Idea of Infinity, even when applied to thoſe, ſeems to be nothing, but the Infinity of Number. For what elſe are our Ideas of Eternity and Immenſity, but the repeated Additions of certain Ideas of imagined Parts of Duration, and Expanſion, with the Infinity of Number, in which we can come to no End of Addition? For ſuch an inexhauſtible Stock, Number, of all other our Ideas, moſt clearly furniſhes us with, as is obvious to every one. For let a Man collect into one Sum as great a Number as he pleaſes, this Multitude, how great ſoever, leſſens not one jot the Power of adding to it, or brings him any nearer the End of the inexhauſtible Stock of Number, where ſtill there remains

Now this one general End, all can eaſily effect, becauſe the Nature of every one rational Being is endowed both with an *Underſtanding* (more or leſs capable of ſuch an End) and with a Will fit to proſecute and effect it.

For, upon this Foundation the Happineſs of Individuals is as effectually ſecured as the Nature of the whole can allow.

Becauſe Singulars are a Part of the Community: And, therefore, ſuch an Happineſs, as any one Individual may raſhly hope to enjoy, inconſiſtent with the Happineſs of that Community made up and compounded of all Rationals, is really and truly impoſſible, as being utterly repugnant to that determined Efficacy of Cauſes by far more weighty and powerful than the Inclination, the Will of the Individual who wiſhes ſuch an Happineſs, and conſequently, ſuch an Happineſs cannot be deſired upon the Principles of Reaſon.

Now my principal Obſervation here is, that, altho' the Care and Concern for our own private Happineſs does not lead us to conſider the Nature of rational Cauſes; yet *the Reaſon* ſo eſſentially inherent, and *the Will* ſo natural and prone in them ALL to purſue all Happineſs poſſible: As alſo, all that Perfection and Goodneſs (ſo relative to, and cloſely connected with, the State of the Univerſe) which we acknowledge to inhere in it, *i.e.* the Univerſe, muſt prove ſubſtantial Reaſons why all Individuals can propoſe to themſelves this common End, and why it is neceſſary that, in Fact, they ſhould determine to proſecute this one End: Provided always that they are willing to regulate their Practice and Behaviour according to the Principles of right Reaſon. For, as there is but *one* End only in the Proſecution of which, all can agree, ſo it is demonſtratively true, that, there is not any one End, according to right Reaſon poſſible to reſolve upon, in which all rational Beings cannot unite and agree.—And, conſequently, from this common rational Nature ariſes the Neceſſity why each and every one Individual ſhould ſeek, by Acts and Habits of univerſal Benevolence, the common Good, and his own private Good, as a ſmall Portion only of ſuch a Good, as a particular *Good* ſubordinate to the common Good:——And, this is the whole Subſtance of the Law of Nature.

Since then, in this Syſtem of Rationals, there *is one Creator Preſerver and Lord of all*, at whoſe Will and Pleaſure the Means neceſſary to the Happineſs of all are eſſentially influenced: And ſince from his Will, as He has been pleaſed to declare it to us, the Neceſſity ariſes of proſecuting this End, and of exerting and eliciting Acts ſuitable to it, (as the aſſiſting Means contributing to advance this End) the Obligation to perform all ſuch Acts as theſe, is, conſequently with the higheſt Juſtice and Propriety aſcribed to the Will of Him

as much to be added, as if none were taken out: And this endleſs Addition or Addibility (if any one like the Word better) of Numbers, ſo apparent to the Mind, is that, I think, which gives us the cleareſt and moſt diſtinct Idea of Infinity. Mr. *Locke*'s Eſſay concerning *Human Underſtanding*. Book 2. Chap. 16.

Him who directs and governs all Things. For, altho' the Nature of all other rational Beings, in which Number every one of us may include his own Nature, may characterize and point out what is neceſſary, (the Reaſons and Natures of Things being framed and conſtituted to proſecute and arrive at, an End greater and nobler than our own private Happineſs:) Yet this End always eſſentially contains private Happineſs, ſo far at leaſt as ſuch an Happineſs is poſſibly attainable, and, is ſuch an End as will alſo afford us the compleateſt fulleſt Enjoyment of private Happineſs.

In the Analyſis or Solution then of that Queſtion which we ſtate and lay down concerning the manner how, the Happineſs of each and every one Individual muſt, under any given Circumſtances be procured, a Conſequence ariſes (which to the Generality of Mankind may, perhaps, appear ſomewhat ſurprizing: And yet, it is a Conſequence) which happens very frequently in (1) a *Geometrical Analyſis or Solution*, viz.

" That, in the ultimate Concluſion of ſuch an Inveſtigation, not only " the main the principal Truth, which originally was the Inquiry, comes " out right; But alſo, other Truths, equally pertinent and well-ſuited " to the Subject in Hand, as clearly and directly follow, nay, and very " often they appear to be Truths, about (2) which the rational Enquirer " gave himſelf no Trouble."

For, in the firſt Place, an univerſal Anſwer or a general Solution is diſcovered, and applicable, not only to the Circumſtances of one Individual, but to the Circumſtances alſo of every Individual whatſoever, who as equally each and all depend upon God and the whole human Species: Nay,—even whole Nations in general are, by the ſame Method, directed to their own Happineſs.——The ſame Solution, *i. e.* univerſal Benevolence, and all the Precepts comprehended under the Care and Concern for *common Good*,

(1) *A Geometrical Analyſis or Solution.*] A Geometrical Analyſis or Solution conſiſts more in the Judgment and Readineſs of Apprehenſion than in any particular Rules where pure Geometry is made uſe of, as it was amongſt the Ancients: But, at preſent, Algebra, is principally uſed on this Occaſion, which furniſhes certain Rules to perform or arrive at the End propoſed.

This Method, under it's preſent Improvements, muſt be allow'd the Apex or Height of all human Learning, being the great Inſtrument or Means whereby ſo many ſurpriſing Diſcoveries have been of late Years made both in Mathematics and Philoſophy. It furniſhes the moſt perfect Inſtances and Examples of the Art of Reaſoning; it gives the Mind a ſurpriſing Readineſs at deducing and diſcovering Things unknown from a few Data. *See* Chap. 4. Sect. 4. Pages 277, 278, and Chap. 5. Sect. 4. Pages 297, 298.

(2) *About which the Rational Enquirer gave himſelf no Trouble.*] When *Pythagoras* invented that famous *Theorem*, upon which ſo many ingenious Problems and uſeful Concluſions are eſtabliſhed, he did not carry his Thought and Penetration into all thoſe particular Caſes and Conſequences ſince diſcover'd, and which are ſo intimately involved in this one *Theorem*: (*That, in every Right-angled Triangle, the Square of the Side which is oppoſite to the Right Angle is equal to the two Squares together of the two other Sides. Euclid*'s Elements of Geometry, Book 1. Propoſition 47.) and yet, every particular Caſe or Conſequence holds as true, and is as equally demonſtrative as the general Theorem or Propoſition itſelf: only with this remarkable Difference. That each particular Caſe or Conſequence neceſſarily implies it's own Limitation; whereas the Theorem or Propoſition itſelf is general, is unlimited.

Good, oblige, and, upon the ſame Foundation, not only each and all Individuals, but alſo each and all Nations: Upon the Force of which Solution or Benevolence, proper Obſervances and Duties muſt be paid by each Individual: Concluſions which evidently follow from a full Conſideration of this *Univerſal Law*.

Secondly. In this ſame Analyſis there is alſo a Demonſtration laid, declaring within what Bounds the Queſtion under Conſideration muſt be limited, which proves that the Anſwer or Solution may with more clear Evidence appear not only poſſibly but practically true. Such a Limitation as this, in the Courſe of Inveſtigation, is neceſſary; becauſe, the Queſtion is propoſed in general Terms without any Limitation at all.

To be the more intelligible, then, upon ſo abſtruſe a Point, it is expreſsly required, that the Happineſs propoſed to the Conſideration of any one rational Being be ſuch as may perfectly conſiſt with the Nature and with the Determinations, Counſels and Deſigns of other rational Cauſes: The Power Efficacy and Influence of which Cauſes being infinitely ſuperior to the Powers and Intentions of any *one* rational Creature: That is, in other Words, it muſt be an Happineſs not only perfectly conſiſtent with the Glory, the Honour of ALMIGHTY GOD, and with the common Good of Mankind;—But, muſt prove, alſo, an Happineſs miniſterial and ſubſervient to both, (*i.e.* to the Glory of GOD and to the Good of Mankind). Suppoſing then, that, any one human Creature preſumes to expect a private Happineſs peculiar to himſelf independant of GOD and Man, he is fully cautioned by the Analyſis or Solution of this Queſtion, that his Expectation muſt be a Problem impoſſible, and conſequently as ſuch, muſt be utterly rejected.

I ſhall not here meddle with Geometrical Examples employed about ſuch Solutions as theſe: Becauſe Examples of this Kind are familiar and obvious to Mathematicians well-ſkilled in the analytic Art: And, to other Perſons, theſe Analytico-Geometrical Queſtions appear not only very diſagreeable, but alſo at too remote a Diſtance from my preſent Deſign.——Let, therefore, what has been ſaid ſerve as a firſt Part of our Anſwer to the Objection laid down at Sections 36 and 45.

SECT. XLVII.

Second Part of an Anſwer to the ſecond Objection, &c.

WE come now, in the ſecond Place, to ſhew that the End, the View, the Deſign not only of the Lawgiver, but alſo of the Perſons bound to fulfil the Law of Nature, is nobler, ſublimer, and more excellent, than either the bare Eſcape of Puniſhment, or the bare Attainment of a Reward: By both which Sanctions, the Law of Nature is obligatory: And, theſe Sanctions intimately concern, touch and affect every one Subject:

Subject: Notwithſtanding, at the ſame Time, that, by theſe Sanctions, the Obligation upon each and every one Perſon, ſubject to act in Obedience to this Law, may more immediately be diſcover'd. For, the End, *i. e.* the Effect directly intended by both the Will of the Law-giver as well as by the Reward and the Puniſhment, is *the Common Good* (i. e. the Honour of the Governour, and the Security, the Safety and Proſperity of all his Subjects).——And, this End, to be ſure, is much nobler and greater than the private Happineſs of one obedient Subject only.——Now no body either is, or can be, truly obedient to this Law, who does not heartily regard, and in earneſt co-operate with the ſupreme Ruler and Governour in the Proſecution of this very ſame End. If, then, each and every one rational Creature would with Sincerity and Conſtancy aim the whole Scope and Deſign of his Views directly to this one End, there cou'd not be any Subſtraction or Diminution from the Sincerity of his Obedience: But, on the contrary, it in Fact muſt prove an additional Motive: Becauſe, upon the earlieſt Notices of Happineſs, he wou'd find out and underſtand that his Governour and Ruler had commanded him to extend and enlarge his Views towards the Proſecution of a farther, a nobler, a ſublimer End.

The Sanctions of Laws by Rewards and Puniſhments muſt prove abſolutely trifling and vain, did not the Conſideration of them directly tend to bring over all the particular Subjects, (whoſe Happineſs is either to be increaſed or diminiſhed by ſuch Sanctions,) to a ſincere, to a perfect Obedience. Becauſe Sanctions of ſuch a Kind are annexed to any Law with the Deſign and Intent of influencing Subjects to purſue a nobler, a ſublimer, a better End than the poor narrow private Happineſs each of himſelf. And, conſequently, whenſoever the moral Writers talk concerning the eſſential Happineſs of an Individual, as the ultimate End for each reſpectively to follow; I, without ſcruple, interpret their Meaning in this one uniform Senſe: *viz.* That, ſuch an End ultimate is the chief End of all thoſe other Ends which regard ſuch an individual Agent himſelf merely and only: at the ſame Time, however, not doubting but, that, every good Man propoſes and lays down to himſelf the ſame one End, *i. e.* he intends a much nobler Effect than his own private Happineſs only—an Effect which promotes the Honour, the Glory of GOD, and the happy State and Condition of all Mankind. For, in our own Happineſs and in the Happineſs of all other rational Beings (which complex Happineſs as Opportunity offers we contrive and endeavour to produce) I apprehend, that, this ultimate End, or beſt Effect, is eſſentially conſtituted. The Queſtion then at preſent is not what Good, amongſt many and different Sorts, is greater and ought to be preferred (A kind of Enquiry frequently followed by the ancient Philoſophers): But the Queſtion is, how human Happineſs can be wrought up, conſtituted and cemented by the Confluence Co-operation and Union of many different Sorts of Good; and how ſuch an Happineſs is capable of a ſucceſſive enjoyment thro' the whole Series of Duration natural to Man;

and

and yet, at the ſame Time, we muſt ſeek and purſue a laſting Succeſſion of theſe ſeveral Kinds of Good: Nay——even Kinds of Good much greater. Wherefore the Queſtion under our preſent Enquiry is, whether or no rational Cauſes, upon whom depend the whole Expectancy of that Happineſs we at preſent contend for, oblige us to reconcile and procure theſe Cauſes by preferring the common Good to private Happineſs reſpectively independant of the general whole? And whether, upon a fair Calculation, private Happineſs be a conſtituent Branch of that common Good, which cannot poſſibly ſubſiſt, unleſs the whole be ſecured?

Or whether, on the contrary, the true Nature of rational Cauſes rather adviſes that I, *i.e.* every one Individual reſpectively ſhould ſeek Security, either by public Anticipation and Occupancy: or, by Fraud, Treachery, Deceit, (Principles truly ſelfiſh) conſult Self-Happineſs only: and conſequently, that, all Mankind are public Enemies, *i.e. All to Each*, and *Each to All?*——A Doctrine openly enough, and, without the leaſt Reſerve, maintained by Mr. *Hobbes*. *See his Book*, De Cive, Chap. 5. Section 1.

Whereas, according to my Scheme of Morality, this Benignity of Nature creates a ſtrong Propenſity in rational Agents to help and aſſiſt all their Fellow-Creatures, provided there be a Conſent and Agreement in the vigorous Proſecution of the common Good. The natural Concluſion, therefore, which from hence follows, is, that, in Proportion as Agents are endowed with Reaſon, they, in the ſame Proportion, are more inclined to promote this one chief End, preferable to all other Ends whatſoever: Namely, that the true Self-Happineſs of each will be moſt compleat and perfect by this one ſingle Method only.

The next natural Queſtion is, Whether each Agent of this rational Syſtem will, pronely incline, both by Precept and Example, to lay down and enforce this End, for the Practice and Imitation of others, whenever Opportunities of Company and Converſation happen? Can any one Perſon, conſiſtent with right Reaſon, deny his full Aſſent and Approbation to ſuch rational practical Queſtions as theſe? What juſt Grounds are there to preſume that any one rational Creature will not readily agree to and join in ſuch an End: unleſs ſufficient Evidence be firſt produced, that, every ſuch Creature has diveſted himſelf of right Reaſon. All other human Creatures (excluſive of ſuch notorious Idiots and Madmen) muſt be treated, as if they actually, expreſly and in Fact joined and agreed in the Promotion and Advancement of this one grand End. When any Perſon determines within himſelf to purſue the common Good, preferable to the particular Advantages of SELF at that very Time, I ſay, every ſuch Perſon propoſes and lays down to himſelf an End compounded and made up of his own private Happineſs, and the Happineſs of all other Agents whatſoever: And

he

he alſo, in Conſequence of this, effects a Part of this general End, as often as he procures either to others or to himſelf, any Advantage, (be it never ſo ſmall) without any Diſhonour, Damage or Loſs to any Being whatſoever.

In Order the more effectually to bring about this great Deſign. It is a Matter of ſome Importance to obſerve, that, this End is not that particular Object only, which, any one ſingle Perſon enjoys; as for Inſtance, "the "private Happineſs peculiar to any one *Man*; But, the whole entire Effect "alſo, which, any and every rational Agent knowingly, willingly, and "with a fix'd determined Purpoſe, either actually produces, or endeavours "to produce." And——from hence it is, that, all the deliberate ſober Acts which we perform, either for the Good or for the Pleaſure of others, are not conſidered as Ends leſs properly our own, than that intrinſic inherent Happineſs reſpectively belonging to each, whereby we ourſelves are eſſentially and truly bleſſed and delighted.——The very inward eſſential Happineſs itſelf of any one Being does not ſeem to me to be termed the End of every Being, upon any other Foundation than as ſuch conſtituent Branches or Parts of private Happineſs are certains Effects, towards which (as towards determined Limits of certain Motions,) our Acts and Affections are directed and influenced by our Reaſon: Neither can there a Cauſe poſſibly be aſſigned, why Acts and Affections, directed by our Reaſon towards other Effects (as towards certain Limits placed out of our own Power,) ſhould not, for the very ſame Reaſon, *be* called *determined Ends alſo*. Now—— Amongſt Ends of this Kind, that *one* is deſervedly *Chief*, when, upon mature Deliberation concerning it, we voluntarily limit and reſtrain, by the neceſſary Dictates of right Reaſon, the Operations and Acts of our own Mind, in the Purſuit of any other Ends whatſoever, nay even of ſuch Ends as regard our own private Happineſs.

Syllogiſm. Major Propoſition.

But, from the Conſideration of the public common Good, as one compleat integral and adæquate End; and from the Conſideration of private Happineſs reſpectively, (as being a ſmall minute Portion of ſo extended a Whole) We regulate and determine all thoſe Operations and Acts which reſpectively regard SELF only.

Minor Propoſition.

And, therefore, we conſtitute and appoint the common Good as the principal End, in the Method we lay down for the Conduct and Regulation of human Actions.

Concluſion.

The minor Propoſition of this Argument is demonſtratively proved from the Principles eſtabliſhed in the firſt Chapter of this our *Philoſophical Enquiry*. In this Chapter we demonſtrate, that, the Portion of *Good*, properly ſuited and allotted to each and every one reſpectively, cannot otherwiſe be ſettled and determined than according to that Degree of Proportion, which, each of us reſpectively bears to the whole Syſtem of all rational Agents, *i. e.* to the univerſal aggregate whole natural City or Society of GOD.

The ſame Analogy of Reaſon holds exactly the ſame here that it does in a ſound animal Body.

The Increaſe of all the individual ſingle Members is rated and determined in the ſame *Ratio* or Proportion, which, ſuch an Increaſe bears to the beſt and moſt perfect State and Condition of the whole animal Body.

SECT. XLVIII.

The private Happineſs of Individuals (limited, and circumſcribed,) requires the united Aſſiſtance of all rational Cauſes.

THE Principles hitherto eſtabliſhed have clearly proved, that, GOD and all Mankind (Beings independant of us) are the voluntary agreeing Cauſes of our Happineſs. Theſe Principles, alſo, in the next Place, neceſſarily lead us to ſome circumſcribed Limitation of that Happineſs which we are to expect and deſire: From whence it is, that, we lie under an indiſpenſable Neceſſity (the Nature of theſe Cauſes requiring it) to procure and reconcile to ourſelves the Favour and Aſſiſtance of both GOD and *Man*, which Favour and Aſſiſtance muſt be acquired by granting and allowing to theſe Cauſes all the Honours and Advantages moſt pleaſing to them, as being, by far, the largeſt moſt eſſential Parts of the univerſal natural Community: And we are, by the beſt moſt effectual Means in our Power, to make theſe full Allowances, before we can, upon any Foundation of Reaſon, expect, that, theſe Cauſes will contribute their Aſſiſtance (by the cleareſt Evidence ſo eſſentially neceſſary, in all Concerns, to our Proſperity and Happineſs). Now, in all Operations directed to certain Ends, it is a full Abſurdity, a glaring Contradiction, either to expect or deſign any other Effect than ſuch an one as can rationally be determined from the Nature of all thoſe Cauſes (but more eſpecially of all thoſe principal Cauſes) who are to concur and co-operate in producing ſuch an Effect. And, conſequently, ſince the principal Cauſes of our Happineſs are rational Agents diſtinct from and independent of ourſelves, that, therefore ſuch a Meaſure or Portion of Happineſs only can be expected as the Will and Reaſon of theſe Cauſes ſo natural and neceſſary to produce it [*i. e.* Happineſs] will allow. As for Example, altho', in the Inveſtigation of Cauſes as in the Solution of Problems, we begin our Enquiry, and proceed from the Effects: (of which Effects we have, generally ſpeaking, very confuſed Ideas: and, for which Effects perhaps we have but a bare Wiſh: of ſome ſuch Nature is the peculiar poſſible Happineſs of every Individual; ſuch an Happineſs however it is, as the human Mind comprehends under a very general Notion:) Yet, in the Courſe of Operation, the Analytic Inveſtigation being once finiſhed: And, the Cauſes ſought after with their neareſt Effects being once diſcovered and regularly digeſted, we then proceed in the ſynthetic Method of Enquiry. For, our firſt Thoughts and Concern, in this ſecond Method, being employ'd about ſeparate diſtinct ſingle Cauſes, namely, GOD and *Man*; Theſe Cauſes are in Nature prior to the good Effects relative to public Happineſs. And, therefore, theſe good Effects muſt be obtained by the Endeavours and determined Purpoſes of theſe Cauſes in Conjunction

The Obligations from Self-preſervation and Self-Happineſs which lie upon Individuals, &c.

The Analytic and Synthetic Method of Reaſoning purſued in this Argument, and compared with *Propoſition* 13. *Book* 6. *Euclids Elements of Geometry.*

junction with our own rational Endeavours. The Caſe holding exactly the ſame here, that, it does in the Conſtruction of *Geometrical Problems*, where we uſe a regular ſettled Syntheſis, for the Diſcovery of which [Syntheſis] we are indebted to an analytic Inveſtigation. From this Syntheſis (framed either by the Poſition and flowing of Mathematical Points, or by drawing the ſimpleſt moſt uncompounded Lines, with the greateſt Caution and Accuracy in the firſt Place laid down or even ſuppoſed: and, by the well-known Properties ariſing from theſe Lines as Cauſes,) a perfectly true Determination may be made, or a certain Concluſion drawn concerning the Effect deſired and ſought after. Any one that pleaſes may image out and delineate the Truth of this Doctrine by an eaſy Repreſentation [*facili ἰκασία*] taken from Geometry. Any one may, for inſtance, obſerve how neceſſary, in anſwering to it's own particular Uſes, it is, to draw a mean Proportional between two given Lines. Immediately, upon an analytical Enquiry, it appears, from what Cauſes, the mean Proportional can be known and determined. The beſt Method of performing this Operation (*i. e.* of finding out this mean Proportional) is, by the Circumference of a Circle, whoſe Diameter is the Sum Total of the two Lines, or of the two Extremes given. *See Euclid's Elements of Geometry. Book* 6. *Prop.* 13.

Having ſo far proceeded by an Analyſis, we muſt obſerve in the further Progreſs to uſe another Method of Operation, and it is, a much nobler Operation than the drawing of one ſingle right Line: It is drawing the mean Proportion required, which is now propoſed to the Mathematician's Enquiry and Invention. The two Lines, or *Extremes given*, muſt be joined together, ſo as to make one right Line, and the *mean Point* is to be found in the *Line compounded of the two extreme Proportionals thus joined together.*

In the middle exactly of the *whole compounded Line*, fix the Central Point, upon which, at the Diſtance of either equal Extremity, let a Circle be deſcribed, from the Circumference of which Circle by letting a perpendicular drop upon that *Point* which connects *the two extreme Proportionals*, the mean Proportional is found. In this Conſtruction, the ſynthetic Method of Reaſoning (as is evident) may be introduced: And, the Operations of a true Geometrician are not governed by any one certain Length of the right Line required: But, by conſidering the Nature of a Center, of a Diameter, of a Circle, and of a Perpendicular dropt upon a Point given.

Now, from the Nature (*i. e.* from the Definitions and mutual Relations) of theſe Properties, the whole Efficacy of practical Geometry, in order to arrive at the Concluſion required, is demonſtrated: Nay——a farther Concluſion, from theſe Principles demonſtrated, is, that, this very ſame Conſtruction ſufficiently ſettles and determines numberleſs other ſuch right Lines alſo as are equally applicable to Uſe and Practice in all their different Kinds; and are, perhaps, as equally applicable to many and various other Uſes alſo.

For, this ſame Diameter is capable of being divided, in any one Point of it, into two other right Lines: And, conſequently, this very ſelf-ſame Circle alſo lays before us a mean Proportional between any two ſuch given Lines or Extremes, —— *A mean Proportional*, which, may, upon other Occaſions, prove uſeful, either to ſome different Caſe, or to ſome Caſe ſimilar. In Truth and Reality, and, upon a Foundation of Reaſoning exactly parallel all the Individuals reſpectively of Mankind, provided, that, in a true natural Way, they conſult their own Happineſs, diſcover ſome one certain Meaſure or Rule or mean Proportion of Good, fit to be followed and purſued as correſponding to their Neceſſities, a *Proportion of Good* more clear and more diſtinct, than the Idea of that particular Good reſpectively itſelf, which, each Individual purſues. When once we have with exact Care traced out the Cauſes from whom theſe ſeveral Kinds of Good ariſe, and muſt be expected: And when we have once fixed our Analyſis upon ſome certain near Cauſes, who in the Syſtem of Things exiſt at very remote Diſtances from us; Mankind, by the Guidance and Direction of Nature, come to underſtand, that, all rational Agents, operating thro' the whole Infinitude of Space (as Cauſes upon whom we more or leſs depend) muſt be taken into our Conſideration, and muſt be reconciled to our Intereſt by our general Benevolence exerted towards all. And, therefore, whenever this Analyſis demonſtrates to us an End to be purſued, much nobler than what at firſt appeared:——An End, in which our higheſt poſſible Happineſs is intimately involved (we being conſtituent Parts and Members of the ſame univerſal Whole:) Upon this very Account I ſay, it muſt conſequently follow, that, either the private Happineſs of each reſpectively muſt be purſued in neceſſary Conjunction with this nobler End, *viz. the public Good* [i. e. *the Glory of God, and the Happineſs of human Nature*] or, that, all rational Hope of *Self-Happineſs*, ſo far as ſuch an Happineſs is founded in the Nature of Things, muſt be quite laid aſide. From this Analyſis, *i. e. from the Nature of Cauſes*, theſe Obſervations and Concluſions being clearly underſtood, the human Mind, as the next Step, applies itſelf and it's Enquiries to purſue this nobler End, under *which*, the Happineſs of each and every one reſpectively is moſt compleatly and fully comprehended: And, if, in a farther Progreſs, the Mind eſtimates the Degrees, the Dignity, the Significancy of all Cauſes, as uniting and co-operating according to their ſeveral Meaſures of Capacity in producing this End, it muſt follow, that, both GOD and *Man* are moſt powerfully able and willing to ſecure this End, and conſequently, that their Powers and Capacities are the Cauſes or Means beſt fitted to procure this End, as well as the common Good, which is the *principal End itſelf*.

And conſequently, that, the Underſtanding of every reaſonable Being joins itſelf to theſe Cauſes, and employs them as Agents in a Way ſuitable to the rational Nature and Dignity of them reſpectively: Namely, by either propoſing

poſing to practice Acts moſt productive of this End: or, by concurring with theſe Cauſes in ſuch Acts as, They perſuade and convince us, are neceſſary or, which, at leaſt, they demonſtrate, are allowable and to be permitted without any Detriment Injury or Loſs to this principal End.

Now, ſince all theſe Events and Conſequences are produced purely upon Account of this one ſingle End only, it neceſſarily follows, that, we ſhould, (thro' the whole Series of all our Operations or Acts, and conſequently, thro' the whole Courſe of our Lives regulated by ſuch Principles of Reaſon as theſe,) cloſely unite with thoſe Cauſes whom we certainly know are powerfully able and willing, fully and effectually to produce this End, (that is to ſay, with ALMIGHTY GOD, and with the moſt perfect, moſt rational Part of Mankind). And, conſequently, that, the nobler Parts of ſuch a public Good or End muſt be preferred to the leſſer Parts of it, *V. G. Public Advantages* muſt be preferred to *Private Advantages*, and the Advantages of *Particulars* to the Advantages of an *Individual*.

To bring our Argument then ſtill cloſer as well as to carry on the Thread of Compariſon between the Mathematical Propoſition juſt now laid down and our moral Propoſition. At whatſoever Times we apply ourſelves to act, our firſt, our principal Care muſt be the Diſcovery of a central Point (or firſt Principle) of that nobleſt Effect which we ſeek and purſue: And the next Care is, ſtrictly to obſerve the true Diſtance from this Center or Principle: That is, we, in the firſt Place, are to inveſtigate or find out GOD and ſuch Indications of his divine Will as clearly are diſcoverble in the Effects or Works of his Hands. And then, to conſider all Individuals of the human Race, who ſurround us, as infinite Points of the Circumference: Obſerving, at the ſame Time, their Order, Poſition, Regularity as ſettled and adjuſted inviolably by the firſt Cauſe: And then, by the Aſſiſtance of ſome certain reciprocal Motion (*i. e.* of *Benefits and good Offices* mutually and reciprocally performed) we at length obſerve a ſecure innocent Station. Suppoſe for inſtance, we call this Station, or Place, the Point of Conjunction in the two given Lines, which Point or Station, as much as is ſufficient, we are allowed to hold, without the leaſt Injury or Loſs brought upon others: And, conſequently, is the Point or Place determined and allotted for us by all the ſurrounding Agents, as ſuited (*in as much as it is proportioned*) and ſuitable to our Nature and Condition, in order the better and more conveniently to miniſter and ſerve the whole public rational Syſtem, juſt in like Manner, as the Length of the mean Proportional required, is determined by the Circumference of the Circle.

At the ſame Time, however, from this moſt glorious Motion of reciprocal mutual Beneficence, all Agents may reap the ſame or like Benefits, and often indeed, as Opportunity offers, greater Benefits than thoſe which we ſought after and purſued for ourſelves.

Juſt in like Manner, as by the Deſcription or Drawing of the ſelf-ſame Circle, we, not only diſcover a mean Proportional between the two Lines

given,

given, But, we, alſo, diſcover ſimilar mean proportional Lines, between the other infinite Lines, into which, the ſame Diameter is capable of being divided: Nay, and, as what moſt frequently happens, theſe many mean Proportionals greatly exceed any Number, which, our own Occaſions require; and yet, at the ſame Time, they really and truly are ſuitable and convenient to the Uſes of others. In a Word then, it is not from one ſingle Effect which the Deſcription of a Circle produces, that the ſkilful Geometrician eſtimates the Energy, Perfection and Order of Precedence amongſt mathematical Figures, but from all its uſeful Effects in Conjunction: *i. e.* in other Words, from the Conſtructions of all thoſe uſeful Problems, which in any Way depend upon, and are deducible from a Circle. Upon the ſame evident Method of reaſoning, no one rational Being will rate the Perfection and radical Virtue of the firſt Cauſe and of the whole human Race, by that Efficacy only, which, he diſcovers in theſe Cauſes, as influencing his own private Happineſs merely; but, by that wonderful amazing Variety, and by that magnificent Grandeur of Effects iſſuing from theſe Cauſes either now more immediately, or in any future Time: Every rational Agent will, more particularly and eſpecially, however, take his Eſtimate from the univerſal Good of all rational Beings, as ſuch a Good is daily preſerved and promoted by the Powers, Operations and Influences of theſe concurring Cauſes. Becauſe, every one Power or Influence whatſoever can only be meaſured and determined by the aggregate Sum of all thoſe good Effects which flow from it: And, conſequently, the Power of doing Good muſt be rated and eſtimated by the Sum Total of all thoſe Benefits and good Offices which flow from ſuch a Power.

And therefore the natural Order of Precedence and Dignity, amongſt beneficent Cauſes, is the Meaſure or Quantity of which, the Beneficence itſelf ſettles and circumſcribes.——Agents leſs beneficent may be called inferior to Agents more diffuſively beneficent, *i. e.* They are ſubordinate, with reſpect to this Attribute of Beneficence, juſt as, in the increaſing or aſcending Series of Numbers, the leſſer Numbers are called inferior.

SECT. XLIX.

UPON the foregoing Foundation of Reaſoning, therefore, it clearly follows, that, the Natures and inward Capacities of Things are, with an Evidence and Demonſtration fully ſufficient, impreſs'd and laid in the human Mind: from whence the Judgments we form, the Determinations and Eſtimates we take, concerning the Goodneſs, the Order, the Dignity of Beings and Things, will receive their proper Tendencies and Directions: Theſe Tendencies, theſe Directions muſt not, however, receive their Eſtimate, their Value, from the Regards paid to our own little inſignificant mortal ſelves only: But, as ſtrictly relative to the whole of all rational Beings,

Beings, to that integral comprehenſive Society over which ALMIGHTY GOD preſides the ſupreme Lord and Head; when, at the ſame Time, it muſt be confeſs'd, that, the Concern, which, the Individual exerts, for his own Happineſs, may principally, and in the firſt Place, direct each to a more diligent Search into the Natures and Conſtitutions of all Things. Upon the ſame Foundation it is alſo as evidently clear, (ſo far as we may be allowed or are able to compare the ſeveral Parts of this moſt glorious End together, and to contemplate upon the Order and Connection which theſe ſeveral Parts bear to each other), That, ſuch a Part of this End, as is beſt ſuited and moſt anſwerable to a more exalted inward Perfection, is a ſuperior Part of it. As for Inſtance, let the beſt Part of this End, *be the Glory, the Honour of ALMIGHTY GOD:* Let, *Secondly*, Amongſt the Members of rational Creatures, the Happineſs of the greater and beſt and moſt numerous ſucceed as the ſecond Branch: And then, *thirdly*, let the private Happineſs of Individuals reſpectively come in as another Branch of this End ſubordinate and inferior to both. Now——as to the Means or Cauſes which produce this End or Effect, each, and every one of them reſpectively, muſt, upon all Occaſions, be allowed a Degree of Eſteem Love and Regard, in Proportion as each reſpectively is more or leſs capable of anſwering *to this grand univerſal End or Effect beſt.* And, conſequently, the *ſupreme Dignity the firſt Precedence muſt be ſubmitted to ALMIGHTY GOD:* The next Degree of Dignity and Precedence muſt be allowed to the united moſt effectual Aſſiſtances of the moſt and the beſt of Men: And ——in the third Place, that each individual (and conſequently, whoſoever deliberates upon his own private Affairs and Happineſs) muſt be contented and take up with a ſtill lower Place, with an inferior Degree of his own Care and Concern, in caſe he impartially attends to the Reaſons of Things and to the Dictates of Nature. Fair, impartial Determinations upon Means and Ends, and the Degrees of each, are, indeed, in my Judgment, Arguments powerfully able to baniſh all Surmiſes againſt our Method of Inveſtigation: or, that, any Concluſion can be drawn tending to prefer the ſingle Happineſs of an Individual, before either the Honour the Glory of ALMIGHTY GOD, or the *public Good.*——Now, no Man can take Offence, that, the firſt Cauſe, and the whole Aggregate of Mankind be conſidered as Means truly and beſt effective of this nobleſt End: of which End the Happineſs of each Individual is a very minute Portion only. We judge it proper to declare openly and expreſly what we have hitherto hinted at only *viz.* That, the Terms *End* and *Means* are no other than Denominations or Expreſſions, which, in the Definitions of them, are attributed and applicable to Effects and Cauſes outward and viſible, ſo far as they proceed and ariſe from the Deſign and Purpoſe of rational Agents. Every Effect, deſigned and purpoſed by theſe Agents, is called the *End.* And every Cauſe (the Energy, or Efficiency of which contributes any Thing to this End) is called *Means.* Terms defined and apply'd after this Manner do not

not fully and adequately contain in them thoſe appoſite fit Bounds and Meaſures intrinſic to and inſeparable from Things themſelves, or the Degrees of Value and Eſteem, which, they carry, in the Opinion and Judgment of others. It is the cleareſt ſelf-evident Truth, that, neither GOD nor *Man* (conſidered as one collective aggregate Whole) will give up one Jot or Tittle of their reſpective Dignity, Conſequence or Honour: And, the Reaſon is, becauſe, from hence, they contribute to the Happineſs of each and every one inferiour Being.——An Effect, produced for the Sake of any one particular Creature only, is an inferior Effect; and, is generally ſo reputed: (1) The particular End, at which a rational Agent aims and directs his Ability of acting, may be inferior to the Agent himſelf who acts: and yet, it is fully ſufficient, if the End of his acting be adequate compleat, and ſuitable to the Dignity of the Agent: Proper Regards, however, at the ſame Time muſt be paid to the Honour due to ſuperior Cauſes, even when the loweſt Condeſcenſions are made by them to provide for, and take care of, the minuteſt Ends, the ſmalleſt Effects: Becauſe, in the firſt Place, theſe ſuperior Cauſes act thus, for the good of Inferiors, with a premeditated Intent, with a deliberate Choice: And, becauſe, in the ſecond Place, there is no other Method whereby each of us can, aſſuredly and with any Certainty procure to himſelf the neceſſary Helps and Aſſiſtances of all theſe Cauſes, than, by an hearty, a willing Conſent to miniſter all poſſible Aſſiſtance to their Service and Benefit, even by denying to SELF the neareſt and deareſt Bleſſings, if at any Time the neceſſary Good of the Public ſhould require ſuch a Behaviour from us. And what is ſtill above all; the higheſt Joy poſſible, (and in which the moſt ſubſtantial Happineſs of every Man living eſſentially conſiſts) is grounded upon the Perception, the Conſciouſneſs, that, thro' the Courſe of Life paſt, we have acted, ſo as to pleaſe both GOD and *Man*; that, we are always willing to act the ſame Part again: That, we are, with a Sincerity of Intention ready, as much as in us lies, to render all around us happy, and *to rejoice with them that do rejoice in the Enjoyment of their own Happineſs.* From whence it is impoſſible that any one, who acts ſuch a Self-happineſs as this, can incur the Guilt of a perverſe, ill-grounded [φιλαυτία or] Self-Love; becauſe, from this pure Source, from this never-failing

(1) *The particular End at which a rational Agent*, &c.] An Effect produced may not be equal to the Extent of Capacity in the Agent who produces it: And yet, in the Schoolmen's Phraſe, *Secundum Quid*, it is a complete adequate Effect, becauſe it beſt anſwers to the preſent Condition, Circumſtances and Happineſs of an inferior Agent who feels the genial Influence of it: and conſequently, ſuch an Effect does not derogate from the Dignity and Honour of the Agent who cauſes this Effect. If I, for inſtance, by the Power and Energy of ſuperior Cauſes, am made as happy as my preſent Nature can bear, the Effect wrought upon me is compleat and adequate. Any higher Degree of Happineſs cou'd not be Happineſs to me, becauſe my preſent Nature is not qualified to receive it. Herein conſiſts that beautiful Correſpondency between Faculties and Objects: Herein conſiſts the Perfection of rational Agency to anſwer and fit this Correſpondency.

ing Spring of Happineſs, each and every one employs and returns that Happineſs, which he has received from others, back upon themſelves, and employ it upon them juſt, as Rivulets pour into the Ocean thoſe Streams, which from the Ocean were exhaled and evaporated to nouriſh and ſupply each of them.

Anſwer to the Second Objection ends with this Section.

SECT. L.

HAving by a long Chain of elaborate Reaſoning removed (I hope) all thoſe Difficulties, which ſeemed to cloud and obſtruct ſome Part of the Method, we purſued, in inveſtigating and tracing out the Laws of Nature and their Obligation: It is now full Time to examine into thoſe Principles of Mr. *Hobbes*, upon which he ſo earneſtly endeavours radically to extirpate and root out all that Obligation, which, the Laws of Nature carry over external Acts: by which Means, of Courſe, he leaves to theſe Laws nothing but the bear Name of *Laws*; and, of Laws, which, according to him, are very improperly ſo called: For, he allows a full Liberty to every one to tranſgreſs theſe Laws at his own arbitrary Will and Pleaſure in a State of Nature, that is, in ſhort, as often as the Authority of the civil Magiſtrate either ſleeps or may be evaded. And, that, this is his Doctrine any one may ſee, who pleaſes to peruſe his Book *De Cive. Chap. 3. Section 33. 27. and Chap. 5. Sect. 1, 2, 3.*

The two Objections laid down being anſwer'd, I ſhall now examine into the Foundations of Mr. *Hobbes*'s Reaſoning, when he aſſerts that the Laws of Nature carry no Obligation over outward Acts.

Here then, we are to obſerve that Mr. *Hobbes* aſſigns one particular favourite Reaſon, why, in a State of Nature, he denies the Obligation of external Acts from theſe Laws in the above cited Places, namely, becauſe we cannot be ſecure that others will obſerve thoſe Laws in all ſuch Articles as regard our own Preſervation. And, from hence he infers that the whole Hope of Security left to every one, is eſtabliſhed upon this one ſingle Point, that each is to anticipate and ſeize before-hand, by his own Force and Contrivance, his next Neighbour, either openly or treacherouſly. This then to be ſure is (and pray take ſtrict Notice of him) that impregnable Argument which appears in Mr. *Hobbes*'s Judgment ſo powerfully able as to rend aſunder and blaſt into nothing, all the Force of natural Laws in a State independent of Civil Society.

Now, altho' Mr. *Hobbes* condeſcends to leave ſeemingly ſome little minute inſignificant binding Force to theſe Laws of Nature, whereby, in (that Petit internal Court called) *Conſcience*, theſe Laws may, perhaps, enjoin the Propenſity towards, and the actual Security of Peace: Yet this all, is only mere Grimace to divert the Attention and to throw duſt in the Eyes of careleſs Enquirers.

For, ſince, almoſt all the Laws of Nature in general, ſpeak only concerning outward Acts, and lay an Injunction as to theſe only: So that, upon the Principles enjoined by theſe Laws, no one ought to arrogate and aſſume

to himſelf all Things, but to abſtain from all Attempts to injure and hurt the Innocent, inviolably to execute Contracts and Engagements to return all Sorts of good Offices for Benefits received, *&c.*——He is, to be ſure, abſolutely deprived of Sight who does not ſee that the Energy, the Sanction, the Force of all theſe Laws is entirely baniſhed; when it is obſtinately by that Doctrine maintain'd, that, as to outward Acts, Tranſgreſſions and Violations of theſe Ties and Obligations may lawfully be committed: A Doctrine avowedly maintained by Mr. *Hobbes* in the Paſſages juſt now quoted, as alſo in *Chapter* 14. *Section* 9. in his Book *De Cive*, and in other Parts of his Writings.

Our Confutation of Mr. *Hobbes*, as to the Point before us, ſhall conſiſt of two Parts. And *Firſt*, We reply, That we have no Occaſion for a Security from Mankind of their Obedience to the Laws of Nature (but more eſpecially of a Security quite diſengaged from all Cauſe of Fear), when we ourſelves are bound by as ſtrong a Tie of Obligation to perform external Acts conformable to theſe ſame Laws. Becauſe the Will of the firſt Cauſe being fully revealed, which gives a Sanction to Laws commanding theſe external Acts, is the compleat Foundation of Obligation to perform theſe Acts: And, therefore, as long as the Divine Will carries the ſame binding Force, ſuch an Obligation as this cannot be abrogated. The Will of GOD in this *Point* may be eaſily diſcovered by the Methods of Inveſtigation and Enquiry hitherto eſtabliſhed and explained, notwithſtanding that the Morals of many Men are ſo corrupt and debauched as very often to requite, by Acts of Injury, juſt and righteous Dealings. What we here aſſert, will, ſtill, appear in a clearer Light, by comparing them with the Obligation enjoined by Laws of Civil Society; which bind all Subjects under Civil Government to an external outward Obedience, and this is a Sort of Obligation, which even Mr. *Hobbes* himſelf will not diſown. For, all Mankind, let the different Forms of Civil Government be what they will, live, however, in that comprehenſive Society, called *the City and Kingdom of GOD*. It is alſo as notoriouſly true, that they, who live under the ſame Civil Eſtabliſhment, cannot live perfectly ſecure from all Apprehenſions either. *Firſt*, That their Fellow-Subjects will obſerve the Laws eſtabliſhed, by keeping themſelves free from Rebellion, from all Invaſions upon the Property of their Neighbours: or, *Secondly*, That the ſupreme Civil Governor both can puniſh Tranſgreſſors of the Law, but more eſpecially where Factions run high: and, that, he will watchfully guard and protect the *public Good* as much as in him lies. To Men of the ſtricteſt Prudence and Caution, who have diveſted themſelves of Religion, it appears a Security ſufficient to the Obligation of inſtituted Laws, if there appears a ſtronger Probability that the Civil Magiſtrate can and will attend to the Authority of Laws, by protecting the Obedient, and by puniſhing the Tranſgreſſor.

First Reply.

And

And as to Men who exerciſe themſelves in the Duties of Piety and Virtue (and, who, by the by, are alway the beſt Subjects) the Obligation enjoined by the Laws of Civil Society appears to them Binding and Valid, notwithſtanding, that, there ſhould happen ſome Defect of Power in the Civil Magiſtrate,——or——notwithſtanding that, there ſhould happen ſome Depravity in his Will, as to the Exerciſe of his Office, in many Particulars.——But, provided always that, ſuch good Men enjoy a Compoſure, a Tranquility of Mind from this their Obedience, and are bleſſed and ſupported by a ſure and humble Confidence rationally grounded of the Favour and Acceptance of ALMIGHTY GOD: or, to expreſs the whole in one Word, as long as the natural Marks, Tokens and Characters of Obligation (which, ſuch Men find they lie under to ſtudy and purſue the *Common Good*) remain clear, firm and immoveable. From the Compariſon here drawn, it appears evident, in Caſe Mr. *Hobbes*'s reaſoning proves concluſive and valid, that, of Conſequence, by a neceſſary Connexion of Argument, the whole Obligation of all inſtituted Laws in Civil Society muſt at once fall into Ruin: Neither, indeed, can it poſſibly happen otherwiſe, but, that, the whole Power of arbitrary Laws muſt fall to the Ground, from all thoſe falſe Principles, pretended Reaſonings and ſophiſtical Arguments, which deſtroy or even leſſen the Obligation of Laws natural. And the Reaſon is evident; becauſe the Authority and Security of Civil Government, the whole Energy, the true binding Force of Laws enacted by human Power, is grounded and eſtabliſhed upon the Laws of Nature. To which I alſo here add, that, to require, whether in a State of Nature, or of Civil Society, an abſolute perfect Security, as to future human Acts, is a poſtulatum abſurd, and in its own Nature impoſſible: Becauſe all Mankind do, and muſt, from their very Nature, act contingently.

SECT. LI.

The Second Reply.

IF under the Term *Security*, Mr. *Hobbes* is pleaſed to underſtand a State more free and diſengaged from the Apprehenſion, the Danger of Miſery: We aſſert, that, ALMIGHTY GOD has made a manifeſt Revelation of this to all Mankind by thoſe Indications which are laid in the Characteriſtic Marks of an Obligation: And, that, each Perſon (even prior to and independent of all Civil Society) is more free and much better ſecured from Evils of all Sorts collectively viewed and conſidered in the whole, who, with Reſolution and Conſtancy, obſerves the Laws of Nature in all outward Acts of Behaviour, than he, who, upon Mr. *Hobbes*'s Principles, by either *open Violence* or *ſecret Fraud*, anticipating and aſſuming ALL to SELF, purſues a Security for himſelf. And, conſequently, ſuch a Security as this, comparatively ſpeaking, is granted by ALMIGHTY GOD to all Mankind when conſidered even in a State of Nature. But, here we

muſt obſerve, that, ſuch Perſons only, can be deemed juſt, who obſerve the Laws of Nature in their outward Actions. It is, therefore, neceſſary that, whenever we compare the ſeveral Dangers and Degrees of Security between the *juſt* and the *unjuſt* together, in Order to determine which of the two have enjoy'd the beſt Security, we muſt bring into our Calculation, not only all thoſe Evils which attend and await *both*, thro' the whole human Race: But, we muſt calculate alſo Evils, all thoſe Evils which the Unjuſt and Wicked draw upon themſelves, by an inconſiſtent, ſelf-contradictory Method of living by irregular boiſterous Appetites and Paſſions, ſuch as *Envy*, *Wrath*, *Anger*, *Intemperance*, &c. And, to which Evils we may alſo add all thoſe Evils rationally to be dreaded and apprehended from ALMIGHTY GOD. We muſt alſo compare all thoſe Degrees of *Good* and *Evil*, which happen not in one particular Caſe only; or, as to ſome few particular Circumſtances; but, in all Caſes and Circumſtances, which happen thro' the whole Period of Duration: becauſe, otherwiſe, it is impoſſible to determine clearly and with Truth, whether an uniform regular Life of Juſtice and Virtue, or an irregular Courſe of complicated Iniquity be attended with leaſt Danger, with moſt Security. But, that, their Condition is by far the happieſt, who in a regular Tenor of Action always purſue the Law of Nature, we have already demonſtrated. A Repetition of the ſame Arguments I ſhall paſs over, they not being at preſent neceſſary. The only Remark, which I ſhall here add, is: That, altho' Mr. *Hobbes*, whenever he treats upon the Security requiſite to that Obedience due to the Laws of Nature, ought to have turn'd the whole Force of his Argument againſt any Security to be expected from an Invaſion upon the Rights of others; Yet he has maintained (becauſe ſuch a Security is not to be had) that no Perſon is bound to perform external Acts of Juſtice, but, on the contrary, that, each has a Right to *all Things*, and of Conſequence, has a Right to wage War againſt all. *See his Book* De Cive, *Chap.* 5. *Section* 1. Notwithſtanding, however, theſe bold Aſſertions, he, in ſome other Parts of his Writings, ſeems to allow, (with a ſlight ſuperficial Air, as if forgetting himſelf) ſome Indications which ſeemingly acknowledge an Obligation ſufficient to enforce the Conformity of outward Acts with the Law of Nature, in order to prevent the falling into other Evils, beſides thoſe to be dreaded from Invaſion and Violence offered to the Right and Perſons of all Mankind. Whenever, he, for Inſtance, endeavours to demonſtrate that a faithful Performance of all Engagements muſt be obſerved, as in his Book *De Cive*, *Chap.* 3. *Section* 2, 3. He from hence picks up an Argument to prove that *he who violates an Agreement falls into a Contradiction.*——For, according to him, a *Contradiction is an Abſurdity in human Converſation.*——Since therefore in this one Caſe, he allows it better *not to violate* than *to violate* an Agreement, leaſt we fall into a Contradiction: What can be the Reaſon, why we ſhould not infer the Concluſion general concerning the whole Law of Nature, and extend it even to the

Obligation

Obligation which this Law carries over all external Behaviour, all outward Acts? And conclude, that, it is better *not to violate this Obligation* by any outward Act, even in a State of Nature, than *to violate it*. And the Reason is, becauſe the Violation of that Obligation, which the whole Law of Nature lays upon us, neceſſarily carries in it a Contradiction, an Abſurdity in Converſation. For, whatſoever Being, but more eſpecially whatſoever rational Being examines into his own Nature, muſt acknowledge, that, all the poſſible Happineſs, which, each reſpectively can enjoy, naturally depends upon the univerſal *Common Good* as upon a compleat full adequate Cauſe; and, for this plain Reaſon, becauſe each rational Agent will ſeek and purſue them both in Conjunction; and, therefore, cannot but know, that as often as he violate any Law of Nature, he wilfully and perverſly plucks away all his own private Advantages from thoſe of the Public: By which Means he acts two ſuch Contradictions as muſt inevitably raiſe an inteſtine Commotion in the Mind of Man, and miſerably defeat his whole Tranquility. The Puniſhment, inflicted as the natural Conſequence of Sin, is a portion of Miſery, not at all inconſiderable, a Miſery which deſtroys the whole Security of all private Happineſs.

This Strain of thinking is much of a Piece with what Mr. *Hobbes* ſays in the laſt Section but one of his *Leviathan*, Chap. 31, where he owns that *Natural Puniſhments* are inflicted; by which, in an ordinary Courſe of Things, the Tranſgreſſions of Natural Laws are puniſhed: And, that, theſe Puniſhments do ariſe, as he expreſsly declares himſelf in the *Engliſh* Edition of his *Leviathan*, from the Will and Power of ALMIGHTY GOD.

Thus, for Inſtance, he ſays, *That, the Violence which we feel from others is the Puniſhment inflicted upon us, for the Violence which we ourſelves offer*, Sickneſs and Diſeaſe are the Puniſhments of Intemperance, *&c.*

In the *Latin* Edition of his *Leviathan*, theſe Paſſages are curtailed and ſomewhat molified: Theſe Puniſhments are, however, even here, acknowledged to be Natural. Now, if theſe Puniſhments follow from the Violations of Natural Laws as to external Acts, in the indiſſoluble Chain of Things by divine Appointment linked together, then, it neceſſarily muſt follow, that, theſe Laws will oblige Mankind to perform outward Acts, conformable to theſe Laws. Becauſe, no Puniſhment can, according to Reaſon, be inflicted for an Act, where there is not an Obligation of Obedience firſt enjoyned: And, therefore, any Security from a forceable Anticipation or Pre-occupancy of another's Right, is a vain Attempt, in Caſe ALMIGHTY GOD, has, by his own Appointment, annexed a Puniſhment as the Bar, againſt the Oppoſition to every ſuch Invaſion. In a Word, altho' from this one Conſideration only of the Dangers which daily await every individual Independant of the Reſt of Mankind, we would allow, that, the Security of Good Men is to be rated, (which, however is a moſt glaring Falſhood) yet I clearly am of Opinion, that all good Men, even thro' the whole Period of their Being, enjoy much more Security than all

bad

bad Men, who, upon Mr. *Hobbes*'s Advice, are to ſeek Security by anticipating others, either by open Violence, or by ſecret Treachery; *Cæteris Paribus*, even ſuppoſing all other Circumſtances equal.——Neither does it prove any Thing, that, ſome few Examples, may, now and then, altho' very rarely, be produced againſt this general Rule. For, the Caſe holds as certainly true here as upon a Pair of Dice, there are 35 Chances to one, that you do not throw two Sixes at the firſt Caſt, altho' it may be as evidently true, that ſuch a Caſt often happens.

See Chap. 2. Section 20.

SECT. LII.

Laws of Civil Inſtitution. Suppoſe every Member of Society Good till the contrary be proved.

SINCE then we have already produced many Arguments which clearly prove the Truth of this Doctrine, I ſhall, therefore, at preſent only offer two Arguments which bear much harder againſt Mr. *Hobbes* than any other of our Adverſaries.

First Argument.

And firſt a Preſumption of inſtituted Laws, as well in our own Conſtitution of Civil Government, as in that of moſt others, ſuggeſts to us the very Doctrine I am now contending for, which Preſumption or Suppoſition diſcovers to us what Judgment, Rulers, Kings, Governors, Form of human Nature, viz. *Every Member in each Civil Community is ſuppoſed to be Good, till the contrary appears by ſome Act evidently proved upon full Evidence.*

Now ſince Mr. *Hobbes*, thro' all his Writings, maintains, that, the Will of the Civil State, or of the Civil Magiſtrate, is the only Rule to go by; he is therefore under a Neceſſity of acknowledging that no Perſons ſhould be concluded and treated as flagrantly wicked, and in ſo high a Degree, (for the Sake of Security) as to puniſh them with Death, notwithſtanding, any Thing, as yet, appearing to the contrary, that, they are innocent.

Such Perſons, to be ſure, are rather to be looked upon as Good, in order, with Safety, to enter into Leagues, Covenants and Compacts with them; and, conſequently, there is more Security in this Kind of Confidence than there can be in running Headlong at once into a War againſt All. Such a Preſumption as this concludes very ſtrong againſt Mr. *Hobbes*: Becauſe the Security, which he acknowledges ſufficiently teſtified in civil Communication, he reſolves into thoſe Puniſhments by which all civil Magiſtrates coerce and reſtrain the Invaders of other Mens Rights and Properties. But it is beyond all Contradiction true, that no Puniſhment can be inflicted in civil Society, unleſs the Puniſhments be ratified and confirmed

firmed by the Determination and Sentence of Courts and Judges; who always pronounce and decree upon ſuch a *Preſumption* as we now maintain and are contending for.——And, therefore, ſuch a *Preſumption* is either true, well-grounded, and, conſequently, a juſt Rule to go by, in a State of Nature: or, a ſufficient Security cannot be had in civil Society, by the Sanction of *Puniſhments* inflicted upon this Footing of *Preſumption* only.——And,——if ſo, by a neceſſary Conſequence it follows: That, the inſtituted Laws, even of civil Societies themſelves, do not lay any Obligation upon outward Acts: By which Means, the Conſequence is neceſſary, that, civil Society muſt at once fall to Pieces.——For, ſince we know, from our own Experience, that, Courts of public Judicature pronounce Sentence, and decree upon *Preſumption*, in order to render the Life of Man as ſecure as poſſible, we muſt certainly conclude, that the human Life is rendered much ſecurer upon this *Preſumption*, than it poſſibly can be, upon a *Preſumption* that all are public Enemies; and, which, conſequently, by the Acts and Hoſtilities of an *Hobbian* Anticipation and Pre-occupancy, condemns and aſſigns over, as far as in human Power lies, all Mankind to Death and Deſtruction.

And,——it alſo, from hence farther follows, that, the private Determinations of Individuals, even themſelves, concerning the reſt of Mankind (made upon the *General Preſumption* we have laid down) contribute much more to a Security of the whole, than that raſh, hot-headed *Preſumption* vindicated by Mr. *Hobbes*:——A *Preſumption* of ſo depraved diſingenuous a Nature, as muſt prevail over and influence each individual to ſeize, in the Way of Prevention, either by clandeſtine Treachery or public Violence all the reſt of Mankind, (that is, the whole human Species, SELF excepted.)

SECT. LIII.

Second Argument. Mr. *Hobbes* deſtroys all the Securities of Society and Civil Government as well as of Nature.

THE Second Argument, which I now produce to prove that a Violation of the Laws of Nature, in ſuch our outward Acts as anticipate and ſeize before-hand, by Way of Pre-occupancy, the Rights of others, carries in it leſs Security, than a punctual juſt Obſervance of theſe Laws: And the Force of this Argument is drawn from Mr. *Hobbes*'s own Confeſſion, *that* there muſt, (upon his Suppoſition,) ariſe neceſſarily, the War of All againſt All. And,——this Conſequence is moſt demonſtrably true. For, ſuppoſing all to follow his Advice, ſuch a War becomes inevitable, altho' never ſo unjuſt. The War then of *All* againſt *All* being eſtabliſhed as his neceſſary Foundation: The next immediate Concluſion is to infer

infer that all muſt at once periſh in the Depths of Miſery and Woe. From whence I infer, that the Purſuit of Security, by this Method, is a vain, is a fruitleſs Attempt: Neither can it carry any Proſpect, any Probability, any Hope of Succeſs: And—yet—this is the Method Mr. *Hobbes* propoſes in his Book *De Cive*, Chap 5. Section 1. and in his *Leviathan*, Chap. 13. *In Mutuo Hominum metu; Securitatis Viam meliorem habet Nemo Anticipatione*, i. e. "In that State where Mankind live in the mutual reciprocal "Dread and Apprehenſion of each other, no better Method can be deviſed "than for each to ſecure himſelf by Anticipation," His own Words at Page 61 of his *Leviathan* in the *Engliſh* Edition run as follows: "*And, from "this Diffidence of one another, there is no Way for any Man to ſecure him-"ſelf ſo reaſonable as Anticipation, that is, by Force or Wiles to maſter the "Perſons of all Men he can, ſo long till he ſees no other Perſon great enough "to endanger him: And, this, is no more than his own Conſervation re-"quireth, and is generally allowed.*"

Now, all this, in other Words, is only ſaying, that, every Man ſhould endeavour to bring all the reſt of Mankind under Subjection; And, for ſo long a Time, as he finds others, againſt whom he muſt guard and protect himſelf: which in plain *Engliſh*, is only, for ſo miſerable a length of Time, as till he himſelf is left the only one Survivor; and, this, conſequently, in Fact is, till the whole Earth becomes one common Sepulchre for all the Reſt of Mankind. From the Nature of Things it is impoſſible, that, any one individual can procure to himſelf Help and Aſſiſtance from ſuch a State as this; becauſe, all the Engagements of mutual Faith and Fidelity, Truſt and Confidence (by which Ties and Securities only, every Perſon can link himſelf and others into mutual Society) cannot, in ſuch a State as this, oblige and bind any Man to external Acts. *See his Book* De Cive, *Chap.* 2. *Section* 11. And, conſequently, there cannot poſſibly ariſe any Security from ſuch an Anticipation as he here vainly imagines. And, therefore, ſuppoſing there to be ever ſo little, even the leaſt Security in the Nature, the Reaſon or Conſcience of Mankind: Suppoſing, I ſay, ſome few, even the ſmalleſt Number, in the leaſt, inclineable to purſue the Common Good (*under which Common Good, the private Happineſs of the Individuals reſpectively, each of himſelf is comprehended*) they will certainly ſpare the Innocent, the Benevolent Man, who ſtudiouſly endeavours, by his outward Behaviour, to deſerve well at their Hands. And, conſequently, the Security of each Perſon, who behaves himſelf *thus*, is much better eſtabliſh'd than poſſibly can be expected from *Anticipation*: Becauſe any *Security*, ariſing from *Anticipation*, is in Truth and Reality *No Security at all*. But, beſides all this,——Mr. *Hobbes*, even in that State of Nature which he ſuppoſes, acknowledges, that, there poſſibly may be ſome one Perſon at leaſt, who, upon the Terms of a natural Equality, will allow to others all thoſe ſame Privileges which he aſſumes to himſelf: *See his Book* De Cive, *Chap.* 1. *Section* 4. Now, ſuppoſing ſome few ſuch Men, even as theſe, to aſſociate and

and join themſelves together by mutual Compacts and Agreements: And, which they avowedly enter into for the common Good: And, that, they, in order the moſt effectually to anſwer this End and Deſign, earneſtly endeavour to render ſuch Compacts and Agreements as binding and obligatory as poſſible. Such a Society, even ſo ſmall as this, will, I ſay, be eaſily able to defend itſelf from all the reſt of Mankind, who, (upon the *Hobbian* Hypotheſis) are inteſtinely raging and burning, ravaging and deſtroying each other with reciprocal Hatred, Animoſity, Malice, War and Deſtruction.——It is, indeed, Matter of Aſtoniſhment to me, how Mr. *Hobbes* could all this while avoid perceiving, that, the innumerable Evils, ariſing from that State of *Univerſal War of All againſt All*, are Motives powerfully ſufficient to deter and frighten all Mankind, when in a State of Nature, from that outragious, ambitious, wild Luſt of, immediately, (by Way of Anticipation,) ſeizing and falling foul upon all the reſt of Mankind. For, he has not brought any other Motives under his Deliberation here, except thoſe Evils of War, which, in a State of civil Society, deter and frighten Mankind from Treaſon, *(the Crimen Læſæ Majeſtatis)* civil Commotions, Rebellions, Seditions, *&c.* Evils which never fail to unhinge all civil Government, and to looſe the Bands and Obligations of all inſtituted Laws whaſoever. *See his Book* De Cive, *Chap.* 14. *Sections* 21, 22. For, here, he ſtrenuouſly argues, that, *that very Tranſgreſſion or Sin*, which, according to the Law of Nature, *is Crimen Læſæ Majeſtatis*, i. e. *Treaſon againſt the ſupreme civil Power. Legis Naturalis, Trangreſſionem eſſe, non Civilis*, i. e. is trangreſſing againſt the Law of Nature only, and not againſt any Law of civil Society.—And, conſequently, that, Rebels and Traitors are not puniſhed as bad Members of Civil Society; but, as the public Enemies of Civil Society: And, as ſuch, are not puniſhed by the Laws of Civil Government, but, by the Laws of War.—I ſhall only obſerve here, by the by, that theſe two Laws: Namely, thoſe of *Civil Society* and *of Nature*, are with too *indigeſted* as well as *raſh a Contradiction*, placed in Oppoſition to each other.—Nay,—it is, even to the ſtricteſt Demonſtration imaginable, plain, that, it is extremely dangerous as well as ſeditious, to affirm that *the Crimen Læſæ Majeſtatis*, or *High-Treaſon* is not a Tranſgreſſion againſt any Law of Civil Society: And, that Rebels are not puniſhed, as bad Subjects, by any Law of Civil Government. I ſhall not, however, dwell any longer here upon ſo glaring an Abſurdity. But,—there is one Queſtion which I have now to aſk Mr. *Hobbes*:—And, it is, Whether the Puniſhment to be inflicted by the Right of War; As, for Inſtance, Death (or the Danger of Death ſuppoſe) be a Characteriſtic Mark plain and evident enough to ſhew, that, the Law of Nature, which he here mentions, about keeping Faith, and, conſequently, of abſtaining and refraining from High Treaſon, can lay any Obligation ſo far as may extend even to outward Acts? If Mr. *Hobbes* anſwers in the Negative, and ſays *it is not*, why then he allows a Right to commit High-Treaſon: And,

conſequently, he leaves no natural Characteriſtic Mark, whereby to diſcover, that, this Law obliges the Subjects under Civil Government *not to engage in, and act Rebellion.* If he anſwers in the Affirmative, and ſays, *That, ſuch Puniſhment is a ſufficient Characteriſtic Mark of Obligation upon the Members of Civil Society to pay faithful and true Allegiance, in all their outward Acts, to Civil Governours:* Let him, then, aſſign a Reaſon why this very ſame Puniſhment (which ought, upon an equal Right of War, to be inflicted in a State of Nature) is not a ſufficiently-clear Characteriſtic Mark of equal Obligation alſo, to act with Fidelity and Truth in our outward Behaviour by all Mankind, even in a State quite Independant of all Civil Society whatſoever?——And——the ſame Reaſoning holds as ſtrongly concluſive in all the other Laws of Nature. Upon this Point Mr. *Hobbes* appears very perplexed and confuſed: For, in the Twenty-eighth Chapter of his *Leviathan*, (when he comes to the laſt Conſequence deducible from his own Definition of Puniſhment) he expreſſeth himſelf thus,

Malum inflictum Hoſti manifeſto, Nomine Pœnæ non comprehenditur; quià Hoſtes Cives non ſunt. Quanquam, autem Cives ante fuerint, ſi ſe Hoſtes, tamen, poſt, declaraverint, non ut Cives, ſed ut Hoſtes patiuntur. Sequitur hinc, ſi Civis Facto aut Verbo Sciens & Deliberatè, Perſonæ Civitatis Authoritatem negaverit (quæcunque Pœna Crimini Læſæ Majeſtatis Lege præſcripta fuerit) puniri tamen, cum ſe jam Hoſtem Civitatis eſſe declaraverit Pœnâ arbitrariâ, jure poteſt, tanquàm Hoſtis.—— And, in his *Engliſh Leviathan*, he expreſſeth himſelf thus, *Laſtly*, "*Harm* "inflicted upon one that is a declared Enemy, falls not under the Name "of *Puniſhment:* Becauſe, ſeeing, they were either never ſubject to the "Law; and, therefore cannot tranſgreſs it: or, having been ſubject to it, "and, profeſſing to be no longer ſo, they, by conſequence deny, that they "can trangreſs it: All the Harm which can be done to them, muſt be taken as "Acts of Hoſtility. But, in declared Hoſtility, all Infliction of Evil is lawful. From whence it followeth, that, if a Subject ſhall, by Fact or Word "wittingly and deliberately deny the Authority of the Repreſentative of "the Common-wealth, (whatſoever Penalty hath been formerly ordained "for Treaſon) he may lawfully be made to ſuffer whatſoever the Repreſentative wills. For, in denying Subjection, he denies ſuch Puniſhments as, by the Law, hath been ordained: And, therefore, ſuffers as "an Enemy of the Common-wealth: That is, according to the Will of "the Repreſentative. For, the Puniſhments, ſet down in the Law are "to Subjects not to Enemies: Such as are they, that having been, by "their own Act, Subjects, deliberately revolting deny the Sovereign "Power. *Page* 163, *Leviathan* in *Engliſh*, *Lond Edit.* 1651. *Fol.* There are many Particulars in both the *Latin* and *Engliſh* Words very blameable: And yet, they all follow, as Conſequences, from the Doctrines eſtabliſhed in his Book *De Cive*, juſt now quoted. I muſt animadvert a little

little upon Mr. *Hobbes*. And, *First*, Mr. *Hobbes* contradicts himself: Because he did not, in his first Entrance upon these Topicks, comprehend under the Term, *Punishment*, the Evil inflicted upon a public Enemy. But, on the contrary, in the very last Conclusion, he terms him a *Rebel* who once has declared himself a public Enemy, and ought to be punished as an *Enemy* by an arbitrary Punishment. For, *An Arbitrary Punishment*, says he, *is comprehended under the Definition of a Punishment*.

Secondly, This Position of his is highly faulty, because he will not allow that the Evil, openly inflicted upon an Enemy, ought to be called a Punishment.

Punishment defined.

From his Reasoning, therefore, it follows, that the Evil inflicted upon a Rebel, for Treason, (in that, he once declared himself an Enemy to the Civil Community) is not a Punishment. Now, it is undeniably true, that, *Punishment is* nothing else than *Evil inflicted for the Transgression of some Law:* And, whosoever denies the Evil inflicted to be a Punishment, denies that it is inflicted by Reason of some Crime: Or, for the Transgression of some Law. And—by this Means, insinuates that an Enemy, and consequently a Rebel even, who is now become an Enemy, does not suffer upon Account of some Crime: Or, because that, he either has, or has not violated some law: Or, because, that, by any such Violation, he has not incurr'd a Penalty, a Punishment.—For since, in an *Hobbian* State of Nature, all Mankind are Enemies; Mr. *Hobbes* talks consistent enough with himself and his Principles, whenever he asserts, that, such Enemies are not conscious of a Crime, of a Transgression. And the Reason is, because they have a Right to act just as they themselves please. Are not *Rebels* upon his Doctrine Enemies? Is no Crime imputeable to them?—May not they be put to Death at the arbitrary Will and Pleasure of some one Person? Yes, says he, *they may*; And yet must they not be coerced and restrain'd by Punishment? Yes certainly, unless, in Imitation of Mr. *Hobbes*, you will contradict yourself, and what you said before. Mr. *Hobbes*, therefore, by consequences evident and necessary, absolves and clears Rebels and Traytors to their Country from the Guilt and Punishment of their flagrant Crimes. Because, he gives *to Enemies of all Kinds, a Right over all Persons and Things:* As also, because he denies, that, the Laws of Nature carry any Obligation over outward Acts: And yet, he says, at the same Time, *That Treason is one Violation of these Laws*. He does not, consequently, allow any Punishment, properly so called, for the Act of High-Treason against either the Prince or State; insomuch, as he has denied, that, the Evils of War (into which any one has plung'd himself by violating the Laws of Nature) are Punishments: And, insomuch also, as he has strenuously maintained, that, an hostile Anticipation by Violence and Treachery (and, which, necessarily must give Rise to such a War as this) is the best Method of Security. Notwithstanding all those much-boasted Arguments to the contrary, I cannot perceive how the Force of my Demonstration is invalidated, where I prove that

Innocency, Fidelity, and Gratitude (as clearly expreſs'd in all our outward Acts, and all the Aids and Aſſiſtances attainable by ſuch a Courſe of Behaviour) muſt create to each and every Individual, even in a State of Nature independant of all Civil Society, a much firmer Security:——And, therefore, upon this very Account, it is much better, even in a State of Nature, for all Mankind to refrain from Invaſion upon the Rights of others, than to attempt ſuch an Anticipation and Pre-occupancy, as Mr. *Hobbes* is ſo deſirous to eſtabliſh. I alſo farther add, that this ſame Mr. *Hobbes* acknowledges ſuch a Security, comparatively ſpeaking, ſufficient to lay an Obligation upon thoſe outward Acts of Obedience due, not only to Laws natural, but to Laws likewiſe of Civil Eſtabliſhment. For, in all thoſe Paſſages where, with any Care and Caution, he deſcribes this Security (as in his Book *De Cive, Chap.* 5. *Section* 3). He expreſſeth himſelf in this Manner. *Ad hanc rem (Securitatem, ſcilicet, Idoneam) excogitari aliud non poteſt, quam, ut unuſquiſque Auxilia Idonea ſibi comparet, quibus Invaſio alterius in alterum adeò Periculoſa reddatur, ut ſatius ſibi uterque putet Manus cohibere quam conſerere.*——i. e. " In order to effect this, (namely, a proper Security) " no other Expedient can be deviſed than, " that, each Perſon ſhould ſecure for himſelf proper Aids and Aſſiſtances, " whereby the Invaſion, of one upon another, ſhould be rendered ſo dan- " gerous, that, both ſhall judge it more adviſeable to refrain from Violence, " than to enter the liſts and engage in War. This Security, however, is not with a clear Evidence, in all Reſpects, compleat: For, the whole Force of it lies here, that, if the two impending Dangers (*to refrain from Violence*, and to *engage in War*) be compared together; there is leſs Danger *in Refraining* than *in engaging*.——Without any Difficulty, conſidering the Helps ariſing from Civil Society, upon Account of that Allegiance paid by Subjects to Civil Governours, I ſhall grant, that, the mutual Violence and Invaſion of Fellow-Subjects upon each other, muſt, in the general, be attended with imminent Danger——And, yet, if we reject all the Helps and Aſſiſtances of Civil Society, there are full Grounds and Reaſons to conclude, that, each Perſon muſt determine it for his own private Advantage to refrain from Violence, rather than precipitately to hurry himſelf into War—into a War againſt All: But more eſpecially—when *the Neceſſaries of Life* do not immediately require ſo raſh a Determination. Mr. *Hobbes*, then, is under the Neceſſity of acknowledging, that, the Danger, reſulting from ſuch a War, is greater than all other Dangers whatſoever: And, conſequently, this is a Motive powerful enough to deter every Man from any, even the leaſt Invaſion upon the Rights of others. And, the Reaſon, upon Mr. *Hobbes*'s own Principles, is evident: Becauſe the Dread of Evils pouring in upon all, from ſuch a War, is the only Cauſe why all ought to be frighten'd, when once they become Members of Civil Society, leſt the Laws of every ſuch Society, as well as of Nature, fall under a general Contempt. And, leſt, in

in the ſecond Place, by abſolving all Subjects from their Allegiance, upon a general Rebellion, that, they relapſe into a State of Nature.

SECT. LIV.

I Cannot ſee what Mr. *Hobbes* has to reply in Anſwer to the Argument here offer'd: Unleſs he is pleas'd to fly for Protection, and ſkreen himſelf under *that old Noſtrum of his own Brain*, which we have long ſince entirely expoſed to View and confuted, namely,

"*That, in ſuch a State each Perſon is to judge and determine concerning* "*his own Acts whether they be juſt or unjuſt.*"—And— his Determination, to be ſure, concerning any Violations of the Laws of Nature, is, That they are produced for Self-Preſervation, and, to procure Peace of Mind. And, therefore, that ſuch Violations happen, *De Cive*, *Chap.* 1. *Section* 10. in the *Annotations*. And from hence is deduced that odd Doctrine of his ſubjoined to the 27th *Section* and 3d *Chapter* of his Book *De Cive*, by Way of *Annotation*, *Juſtum & Injuſtum in Statu Naturæ, non ex Actionibus, ſed e Conſilio & Conſcientiâ Agentium æſtimandum eſſe. Quod neceſſariò, quod Studio Pacis, quod ſui conſervandi Cauſâ ſit, recte ſit.*——i. e. *That, Juſt and Unjuſt in a State of Nature, muſt not be determined from Actions; but, from the deliberate Deſign and Conſcience of the Agents themſelves. Whatſoever is done by Neceſſity, whatſoever is done with a ſtudious Care and Concern to promote Peace, whatſoever is done for the Sake of Self-Preſervation, is done Right.*

Taking it for granted, that, Mr. *Hobbes*, is inclined to ſtand by this his Opinion, I anſwer, that there was not the leaſt Occaſion for any Diſtinction between *the Obligation of internal Acts only*; and *the Propenſity to obſerve the Law of Nature*: Since, Mr. *Hobbes* does not think fit to obſerve a Propenſity to obey this Law in outward Acts; cou'd we even ſuppoſe ſuch a Subterfuge as this to be ſafe. For, ſince the Perſon, moſt intereſted in the Determination, may be the Judge himſelf, he can with no leſs a Security allow, that, the Law of Nature lays an Obligation upon external Acts, when he decrees concerning the Fact immediately relative to himſelf, *viz.* that he either had not committed ſuch a Fact, or, in Caſe he had, that the Fact committed did not violate or break in upon any one Law of Nature. For, it is a clear and evident Caſe, that the Sentence of a Judge, concerning a *Fact*, is not leſs valid, than it is or can be, when concerned about a Privilege, a Right, a Law, already proved to be ſo. That is, To be more explicite and clear in what we here affirm: The Sentence of a Judge can, with the ſame binding Force, make *wrong right*; or, deny a *Fact* to be a *Fact*, by which he can take upon him to eſtabliſh a Sentence that, each Perſon has a Right to do what he himſelf ſhall think fit againſt all Mankind. First Anſwer.

And,—truly—the only Foundation of Mr. *Hobbes*'s Reaſoning here is, becauſe

becauſe, whenever any Perſon ſits as an Arbitrator, a Judge upon his own ſuppoſed Right, and concerning the Uſe of Things neceſſary to himſelf and his own Preſervation, he is pleas'd to determine and decree the Care to be ſo. And, conſequently, an exact, a careful Inveſtigation of the Laws of Nature is nugatory and trifling, ſo long as Man, upon this laudable Scheme, does not depart from an *Hobbian* State of Nature. For, (pray obſerve the Conſequence) every Sentence of every ſuch Judge, concerning Things neceſſary to the Security of his own Life, is a Law. But he allows to himſelf a Power of doing whatſoever he himſelf pleaſes, nothwithſtanding at the ſame Time, that, ſuch a Sentence contradicts a thouſand other Sentences, which, even he himſelf has already pronounced.

Second Anſwer.

We ſuppoſe, in the ſecond Place, even at the Time this Queſtion is debated, what, Mr. *Hobbes* ſuppoſes, that, Man has not arbitrarily and raſhly determined, but only as yet, doubts, and inclines to diſcuſs, with exact Caution, whether it be better, when clear of all Violence, to engage in War, the Right of each and all being ſuppoſed equal? Or, (which is much the ſame Thing,) whether according to the Laws of Probability, before any Civil Eſtabliſhment of Society, it will contribute more to private Happineſs, to cultivate Peace with others, by permitting them to enjoy thoſe natural Advantages, which the Earth produces, equal with himſelf; nay—even aſſiſting them with his own Labour and Pains, whenſoever it can be done, without a private Damage or Loſs, by acting, in ſhort, according to the Laws of Nature? Or, whether it be better to fall foul upon all without Diſtinction, and, even obſtinately, to perſevere in a War already waged, as means beſt fitted, to arrogate and aſſume the arbitrary Domination over all to SELF, (the Right of each, and the ſuppoſed Right of each and every one being equal)? If my Opinion carries the leaſt Weight, this Queſtion is ſo far from being intricate, that, any Man, even of a moderate Capacity, muſt perceive, that, there cannot poſſibly be any Security in ſo unequal a War, where one engages againſt all; Allowing, even, at the ſame Time, that, the Hazard, computed upon Dictates of Reaſon, be doubtful: Upon Dictates of that Reaſon, I ſay, which inſtructs us, how much it contributes to common Happineſs, and conſequently to the private Happineſs of *All* and *Each*, that, every one reſpectively ſhould propoſe to himſelf the *Common Good* of *All* as an *ultimate End*——*An End* which nearly concerns all Individuals reſpectively to purſue and follow.—And the Truth of this Doctrine gains an additional Strength from daily Experience. We have full Proof of this in bordering States and Empires. For, between them Peace is not only poſſible, but for the Intereſt of them all.—And, very often, it is for their Intereſt, that, Peace ſhould laſt for ever, altho' they live under very different Forms of Civil Government: And, over whom no one rules as ſupreme and in Common beſides ALMIGHTY GOD. Mr. *Hobbes*, according to his own Scheme, is compell'd to deny the Laws of Nature;

Nature, nay—he is even under the Neceſſity of denying *that Law* of reciprocal Fidelity, which obliges Princes and Potentates of different Nations to direct and execute external Acts, agreeable to their ſeveral conditional Contracts: His Words are plain, as delivered in his Book, *De Cive, Chap.* 13. *Section* 7. *Status Civitatum inter ſe Naturalis, id eſt, Hoſtilis eſt, neque ſi pugnare ceſſent, idcircò Pax dicenda eſt, ſed Reſpiratio: In qua Hoſtis alter, alterius Motum Vultumque Obſervans Securitatem ſuam non ex Pactis, ſed ex Viribus & Conſiliis Adverſarii æſtimat*, i. e.

" The State of different Civil Societies, in regard to each one other, is " natural, *i. e.* a State of War.—Neither, if ſo happen, that they decline " the Battle, is it for that Reaſon Peace, but rather a breathing Space: " During which Interval, one Party obſerving the Motions and Looks of " the other, calculates its own Security, not from any Leagues and Cove- " nants, but from the Forces and Stratagems of the Enemy."

And, what he ſays in his Book *De Cive, Chap.* 10. *Section* 17. expreſſes much the ſame Sentiments. " *Quid autem aliud ſunt plures reipublicæ,* " *quàm totidem Caſtra Præſidiis & Armis contra ſe Invicem Munita; quo-* " *rum ſtatus (quia nullâ communi Potentiâ coercentur, utcunque incerta* " *Pax, velut breves Induciæ, intercedat,) pro Statu naturali, hoc eſt, pro* " *Statu Belli habendus eſt.*

And he has expreſſed the ſame Sentiments with the moſt bare-faced Aſſurance in that ſame Book, *Chap.* 2. *Section* 11.

Pacta Mutuæ Fidei, in Statu Naturæ fruſtra eſſe et invalida; nempe cum utrinque aliquid ex contractu præſtandum eſt, ſi alter uter metuat, ne alter non ſit præſtiturus quod pollicitus eſt, non tenetur præſtare quod ipſe prius facere Pacto ſuſcepiſſet.

Now the Party, which, with Juſtice, fears, that, the other Party will not perform his Engagement, is moſt certainly a timorous Judge. Mr. *Hobbes* from hence, according to his uſual Method of Concluſion, would have us infer, that, at whatſoever Time, the timorous Man fears, he fears upon juſt Grounds. This Reaſoning is general, and in caſe it carries any Argument, muſt infer, that, Leagues and Covenants are invalid, not only thoſe in the which no one Article is performed by either Party: but thoſe alſo, in the which ſomething of Conſequence may be left, for the preſent, unperformed on both Sides.

For, he, who will not perſevere to perform his plighted Word, from an Apprehenſion that another will poſſibly fail his Expectations, may, and upon juſt Grounds, fear (the Party himſelf being the Judge). But the Reaſon, (always right,) of this Judge, will not command him to perform any ſuch Engagement: And, therefore, no ſuch Engagement can carry any binding Force or Obligation.

What Mr. *Hobbes* inſiſts upon (concerning a new Cauſe of Fear in his Annotation ſubjoined, *that theſe Engagements are invalid*) is not the leaſt Objection, if the Reaſon be true which he has aſſigned in his 11th *Section:*

tion: "For, any Fear or Apprehenſion concerning the Veracity, the Fi-"delity, the Faith of another ariſes either from the Remembrance of a "bad Diſpoſition in human Nature, which before any compact, he, who "fears had not ſufficiently conſidered, or, 2. That he interprets every "Act, altho' the moſt innocent, as a ſufficient Indication of an Intention "not intended to be performed."——Now, no one Motive, at leaſt, in the State of Nature, can ſatisfy a Coward of another's Fidelity ſo fully, as ſhall oblige him to perform his Contract, which Performance is, moſt certainly, an outward Act. And, ſo far, even Mr. *Hobbes* himſelf declares to be ſo, *De Cive*, *Chap.* 5. *Sect.* 1 *and* 2. *and Chap.* 7. *Sect.* 27.

All the Hope, All the Expectation of Security, ſays he, *ariſes from the Power, the Ability, either openly or by Treachery, to get a prior Poſſeſſion.* And this really and truly is that moſt noble Invention in the *Hobbian* Hypotheſis of Morality, where Mr. *Hobbes* ſo greatly excels his Maſter *Epicurus*.

Epicurus indeed, imagined that he had quite rended aſunder all the Bonds of Juſtice, when he aſſerted in (his Κυριαι Δοξαι *his Ratæ Sententiæ*) his eſtabliſhed Maxims, that, no ſuch Thing as *Juſtice* cou'd ſubſiſt between Nations, when they neither were able nor willing mutually to agree in Leagues defenſive and offenſive. In this Caſe, then, we ſee, that *Epicurus* left the Force and Obligation of Compacts and Agreements firm and unſhaken; even, ſuppoſing there never had been any Superior to controul and reſtrain the contracting Parties. Whereas, Mr. *Hobbes* has attributed to this his darling Paſſion *Fear*, a Right, a Power in a State of Nature, (which is the State, he ſays, of each and all ſeparate Civil Communities) to tranſgreſs and violate, even upon the Principles of *Juſtice*, the Leagues and Covenants of mutual Fidelity reciprocally ratified by each and all of them.

SECT. LV.

ANY Man then, let his Degree of Capacity be what it will, may eaſily infer from theſe Principles of Mr. *Hobbes*, that the heavieſt Calamities muſt await all Mankind.

1. For, in the firſt Place, the Security of all Leagues and Embaſſies, altho' the moſt innocent and harmleſs, at once becomes nothing.

2. The whole Obligation of Engagements and Alliances between *Potentates*, States and Communities, is quite diſſolved.

3. All Truſt and Confidence between Merchants, Traders, and Dealers, (and conſequently, all Traffick, Trade and Commerce) alter into Diffidence, Diſtruſt and Uncertainty.

4. All

4. All the Laws of Hoſpitality (ſo very neceſſary and comfortable to Ambaſſadors, Strangers and Foreigners) are fundamentally deſtroyed.

5. And *Laſtly*, Leſſer States, ſuch as Colonies, depending Provinces, Corporations, and all other ſmaller Societies, cannot, from the Nature of Human Paſſions, ſhake off the Dread and Apprehenſion of Deſtruction threaten'd by the Inſults of ſuperior Power and Domination. Whereas the Fact is quite otherwiſe, as daily Experience evidently demonſtrates: ——Becauſe we obſerve every Day that Leagues and Covenants are entered into, and ratified: The faithful Execution, the punctual Performance of them, after ſome Time, is reciprocally, as expected, anſwered by the contracting Parties: And, conſequently, that, theſe are Compacts, Agreements, Leagues and Covenants of mutual Truſt, Fidelity and Veracity :——And, which, Mr. *Hobbes* has allowed to be ſuch.—— Ambaſſadors alſo, Merchants and other Strangers in Foreign Countries, are ſafe and ſecure enough, altho' they be, according to his Opinion, Enemies: And—even ſuch Enemies as actually live under the Juriſdiction and Power of Foreigners.

Now, the *Hobbian* Hypotheſis has taught us, that Foreigners, *(utpote fortiores, hos infirmiores ad præſtandam Cautionem futuræ Obedientiæ, (ni velint potius mori) Jure cogere poſſe, et nihil abſurdius cogitari poſſe quàm, ut, quem debilem in poteſtate Tenes, eum amittendo, fortem, ſimul et Hoſtem facias. De Cive Cap. 1. Sect. 14.)* "As being the ſtronger, can "lawfully compel the weaker (unleſs they chooſe to die) to give Security of "their future Obedience: And, nothing can be imagined more abſurd, "than, for any Man to keep a weak Perſon under his Power, and "then, by letting him eſcape, to render him both powerful and an Enemy "more powerful than he was before."

Now, the Hint, underſtood by the Terms *Cautio futuræ Obedientiæ*, i.e. The Security of a future Obedience, is fully explained by what he ſays afterwards more openly and at large.——For, (*nulla Cautio*), no Security is, according to Mr. *Hobbes*'s Doctrine, ſufficient, unleſs it be that very Tie or Unity, whereby Mankind yield and ſubmit to the ſame Civil Community, and whereby they are made ſubject, in all Things, to the ſame Civil Eſtabliſhment of Government: And how awkardly all this agrees with the Rights and Privileges of Envoys Ambaſſadors and Commerce is obvious to all Mankind. – If, then, Ambaſſadors and all other Strangers, reſiding in Foreign Countries, lawfully can, and may become the Subjects of Foreign States: Why then, no Law of Nature (according to Mr. *Hobbes*'s Opinion) can oblige Strangers to any outward Acts of Benevolence at all: But, on the contrary, it is entirely left to their own free Choice, whether (by any external Sign, which always demands ſome outward Act) they will or will not comply with ſuch a Submiſſion: Or, whether they would chooſe rather to feaſt their Eyes with the Blood of the Innocent.

Theſe Conſiderations will not, I am afraid, move either Mr. *Hobbes*, or thoſe of his Diſciples, who are more deeply initiated into the hidden myſte-

rious *Arcana* of the *Hobbian* Philoſophy. Becauſe theſe and numberleſs other ſuch Concluſions have been ſearched out, diſcovered, and greedily embraced by theſe Gentlemen.

I ſhall, however, notwithſtanding all the unanſwerable Force and Power of theſe mighty Objections, briefly touch upon the Concluſions and Conſequences of them, and endeavour to place them in a clear open View, that theſe Gentlemen may try and examine them, by their own Underſtandings, which, perhaps, are not yet ſo totally corrupt, as not to perceive, that, the Diſpoſitions and Tendencies, radically implanted in human Nature, muſt recoil and ſtart back at Doctrines, Poſitions and Principles, ſo deteſtable, ſhocking and monſtrous.

The whole Scope or Deſign of what I am now going to offer is only this: Namely to evince and prove by the Acts of Mankind, as Effects perfectly well known, both from Obſervation and Experience; That, nobler and by far more excellent Advantages (even laying aſide all the additional Helps of Civil Society) accrue, not only to Individuals reſpectively, but, alſo, to different States and Communities, from Innocence, Gratitude, Fidelity, Humanity, and all the other Virtues enjoyned by the Law of Nature; than from Ingratitude, Violence, Perfidy, and all the other Vices prohibited by this Law. For, as the Exerciſe of theſe Virtues, on the one Hand, is the natural Reward of them: And, as the Practice of the contrary Vices, on the other Hand, is the natural Puniſhment of them: So, they are ſuch a Reward and ſuch a Puniſhment as are annexed, by the general Conſent of Mankind, to theſe ſeveral Acts reſpectively, and which are conducive to that eſſential Happineſs, intrinſically comprehended under and contained in Virtue. From theſe natural Conſequences, reſpectively, of Virtue, will, I ſay, more manifeſtly appear the natural Obligation of paying an Obedience in all our outward Acts to the Laws of Nature. It is frequent to obſerve numberleſs Perſons, whoſe Intereſt, as to all outward Appearance, is no Ways concerned, run together and unite in extinguiſhing a common Flame; and, even, without any poſitive Command or Injunction of human Laws. We, every Day, likewiſe obſerve, that, Falſhoods, Frauds, Acts of Violence offer'd to the weak and defenceleſs (notwithſtanding that, ſuch Crimes are, ſo far from being puniſhed by, that, they very often eſcape the Notice of Courts of Civil Judicature; yet they) appear ſo odious and abominable, as to draw Contempt and Miſery upon the Tranſgreſſors, and involve them in ſo much Diſtreſs, as to leave them quite helpleſs and deſtitute of Friends.—And, ſurely, ſo wretched a State as this may, with full Juſtice, be ranged in the Catalogue of Puniſhments. As frequently alſo it happens, that, they, whoſe Crimes have moſt deſervedly rendered them odious, have preferr'd Death to an infamous Life: And, that, others (who as to ſecret Sins and Corruptions are deſperately wicked) have refrained from many flagrant open Crimes, to avoid Contempt and Infamy.——We may alſo, upon the ſame Foundation of Reaſoning, obſerve, that a Deference, a Reſpect, an Obedience

dience is paid to the Laws of Nature, by what is termed *Honour*, a Principle thus generally obſerved, not from any poſitive Laws of Civil Society. What we now call *Honour*, was term'd by the ancient *Romans*, *Honeſtum*. As for Inſtance, Inſtruments and Contracts of Truſt, of Commiſſion and Deputation, of Loan, of Arbitration of Covenants and public Alliances: The Adminiſtrations of laſt Wills and Teſtaments, the Diſcharges of Legacies bequeathed by Perſons deceas'd, *&c.* Inſtances of this Kind, which are practis'd daily, evince to a Demonſtration, how well inclined Mankind are to Reward and Honour, Probity, Candour and Virtue. As to what concerns different Communities (which are always in their higheſt State of Perfection when they follow the true State of Nature): It is manifeſt, that altho', ſometimes, by Accident, they engage in War, yet Mr. *Hobbes*'s Concluſion is not true, that ſuch Wars are juſt on both Sides. *See Grotius De Jure Belli & Pacis, Book* 2. *Chap.* 1. Nay——even the contending Parties will honeſtly acknowledge thus much; Becauſe, they Both allow, that, one Side only can wage War upon juſt Grounds. And this Truth, *ſecondly*, in the preſent Controverſy, is a Truth of the firſt Notice, of the higheſt Importance.

For, it never yet happened, either in the preſent, or in any former Age, that, all Civil Societies have waged War againſt all. And yet, this is a pretended Fact which Mr. *Hobbes* has the Impudence to boaſt as a Fact, and to have demonſtratively proved. *See his Book De Cive, Chap.* 1. *Section* 12. When, at the ſame Time, no Hiſtories, no Antiquities, (even of the earlieſt Ages,) mention the leaſt Tittle of ſo univerſal a Barbarity.

Thirdly, We obſerve (and which, indeed, is ſtill much more remarkable) that, many Civil Societies have moſt punctually and religiouſly obſerved Leagues of mutual Fidelity and Alliance, and, for many Years together. From which ſolemn Engagements they all have carried on large Dealings in Trade and Commerce (the moſt beneficial and ſignal Advantages ariſing from Times of Peace). They have alſo behaved themſelves as brave Auxiliaries, as Opportunity offered in Times of War, notwithſtanding, that they have by ſuch ſteddy reſolute Fidelity expoſed themſelves to extreme Dangers. Theſe Truths are ſo notorious, that, Quotations from Hiſtory would be endleſs; ſince there hardly ever yet was a War of any Importance, where there were not Allies on both Sides, (or at leaſt, on one Side or the other,) ſent from other States and Kingdom, and who have bravely expoſed themſelves to ſhare the Danger.

SECT. LVI.

Objection. IF then, by Way of Objection, any one is pleaſed to ſay, that the Forces of different Civil Communities are preſerved and poiſed in an equal Ballance, by a down-right Principle of Fear, leſt, by an Overballance, the Communities themſelves be quite ſunk and depreſſed.

Anſwer. I anſwer, that, our preſent Enquiry is concerning a mere Matter of Fact only, namely, whether or no, Mankind, in a State of Nature, do not uſually relieve, help and ſuccour one another? Whether or no, they do not execute, perform and diſcharge Compacts of Truſt, Fidelity, and mutual Dependance, nay, even, in Caſes attended with apparent Hazard and Danger.—And, from hence I deduce, that, the like Performances muſt, upon a rational Probability, be expected from all Mankind (*Cæteris Paribus*) in like Circumſtances. And, conſequently, Compacts of mutual Fidelity (even in the very State of Nature itſelf) are not altogether nugatory and inſignificant. Neither can it be ſaid, that, he acts an Abſurdity who is firſt in performing (even in a State of Nature) thoſe Compacts which he himſelf had entered into and engaged to perform. And, this, at leaſt, to ſay no better of it, is a preſumptive Argument which ſuppoſes, or rather proves, that, there are good Reaſons why, any one Man, altho' of a different Civil Community from any other Man, ſhould and ought to be firſt in doing Acts of Kindneſs: And——that, there is not the leaſt Neceſſity, why, any one Man ſhould, like a wild Beaſt of the Foreſt, threaten another with the Weapons of Violence and of immediate Deſtruction.

Mr. *Hobbes*, indeed, to ſay nothing but the Truth of him, ſtrenuouſly aſſerts, that, Man is to Man, what, one Wolf is to another; unleſs they live under the ſame Civil Government. And, his Aſſertion carries a ſtricter, more literal Meaning, than is commonly uſed in Adagies and proverbial Sayings. And——All this only to ſhew the Neceſſity upon all Mankind of having immediate Recourſe to a wild Savage Rapine.

The Reader may, if he pleaſes, examine into, and peruſe Mr. *Hobbes*'s own Words in the Epiſtle Dedicatory prefixed to his Book *De Cive*. His Words, indeed, are here politely expreſſed, and with much Delicacy, according to the Stile and Manner of Epiſtolary Writings and Dedications.—But, afterwards, in his Book *De Homine*, *Chap.* 10. *Section* 3. where he talks more with the auſtere rigid Severity of a Philoſopher, he poſitively affirms. *Homines, Lupos Urſos Serpentes (qui ultra Famem) Rapaces non ſunt, (nec, niſi laceſſiti) Rapacitate & Sævitiâ ſuperare.*——i. e. "That, Mankind exceed Wolves, Bears, Scorpions in their ravaging and "Cruelty. For, ſays he, they (*i. e.* Wolves, Bears and Scorpions) are "not rapacious, except they are hungry and greedy of Prey, neither are "they cruel, unleſs rouzed by ſome Provocation.

Theſe

Theſe are Expreſſions in my Mind, ſo indignant and reproachful, as to ſink ſordidly beneath the Dignity of human Nature, and, whether they are or no, I ſhall leave to the Judgment of every ingenuous Reader:—But, what ſtill renders theſe Expreſſions the more abominable, is, that, they flatly contradict daily and univerſal Experience. Upon ſuch Poſitions and Aſſertions as theſe, however, as bad as they are, Mr. *Hobbes* has laid the whole Foundation and Baſis of all his Politics: Suppoſing then ſuch Poſitions and Aſſertions to be in Fact true; all Attempts to reclaim and humanize into Society theſe rapacious Animals, (who always thirſt after the Blood of their own Species) muſt be an evident Impoſſibility. The Method, therefore, which Mr. *Hobbes* has deviſed for the Eſtabliſhment of Civil Society, will, in no ſort, anſwer: His Method is built upon Compacts and Agreements, whereby the Individuals reſpectively are ſaid to transfer, and make over each his own Right of Reſiſtance to the Civil Magiſtrate. Such a Method as this, I ſay, ſignifies nothing, for, Animals of the Nature he ſuppoſes cannot poſſibly be kept to their Duty by any *Moral Senſe*, by any conſcientious Awe, either of Compacts or Promiſes, ſo as to prevent their recalling and reaſſuming immediately the Authority given to the Prince or the Magiſtrate——But, ſuppoſing, that the Majority of the Society think fit to diſannul and make void thoſe Compacts, whereby they have conſtituted their Civil Governours: Why then, of Courſe, all that Authority, in coercing and reſtraining by Penalties and Puniſhments the Violation of their plighted Fidelity, at once vaniſhes: And, upon this one only Account it is, that, Compacts in a Civil State are binding and valid, which did not lay any Obligation in a State of Nature upon human external Acts. Now, if all Mankind are Beings of ſuch notorious Perfidy as he repreſents them, they have it not, by Conſequence, in their Power to contribute and beſtow upon the Prince any Powers or Authorities (or to the Magiſtrate they have choſen, any Powers or Authorities) whereby he can puniſh Treaſons againſt his own Perſon, or Injuries offered to his Subjects: And ſo conſequently, the Civil Society, according to his Principles, muſt, for want of Security, be diſſolved almoſt as ſoon as eſtabliſhed, and then, of courſe, muſt relapſe and fall back into that State of War, which, according to *his Chimæra*, is *the State natural*. Compacts and Agreements, therefore, muſt, and ought to lay an Obligation upon thoſe external Acts, whereby the Civil Magiſtrate is impowered and commanded to puniſh the Tranſgreſſors of eſtabliſhed Laws, and whereby this very ſame Power is preſerved and kept alive.—— But, theſe Compacts and Agreements cannot receive their Sanction, their binding Force, from the Prince or Magiſtrate already conſtituted and eſtabliſhed. Becauſe Cauſes are, in their natural Order, Energies prior to the Energies of any Effect cauſed and conſtituted by them: And, therefore, it is a neceſſary Conſequence, that, the Energy, the Force of Compacts, (upon which Civil Society is eſtabliſhed,) ſhould be fixed, naturally prior and earlier than thoſe Capacities of puniſhing, which, Civil Societies receive

See Sect. 5. Chap. 1. Page 14.

receive, when once conſtituted and eſtabliſhed. What Foundation, then, can be conceived ſo fit and rational, ſo ſolid and firm, as the Nature of Man, his Will and genuine Propenſity, together with the Nature and Will of the firſt Cauſe from hence in any Manner diſcoverable.

If ſuch Foundations as theſe are not ſufficient to create and raiſe in us the Knowledge of Natural Laws: To raiſe in us that Awe, that Reverence which ought to work in the Breaſt of every Man;——As alſo, to regulate all external Acts of Behaviour in Conformity to Innocence, Fidelity and Gratitude; it is then, ſure, an airy Imagination to expect, that, a bad, a wicked Man will become a good Member of Civil Society. Becauſe, the Foundation being once convulſed, the Superſtructure (notwithſtanding the moſt delicate Taſte of Art and Contrivance) muſt tumble down to the Ground, even with the Duſt. And, it is well-known, that, corrupted Chyle never can, by all the Contrivances of Sanguification, change and become wholeſome Blood.—What has been hitherto offer'd is abundantly ſufficient to clear up the Definition and Obligation of the Laws of Nature generally ſo term'd.

SECT. LVII.

See the Definition of the Law of Nature at Page 284.

THE Sum and Subſtance of all that has hitherto been ſaid upon that Propoſition (which at the Beginning of this Chapter, we have defined to be the Law of Nature;) the judicious Reader may eaſily underſtand, and perceive alſo, after what Manner, we have formed this our Propoſition, in Imitation of the *Data*, laid down in *Euclid*'s *Elements of Geometry*: *Data* capable of the cloſeſt moſt commodious Application to Practice.—The *Data* in this my *one grand moral Propoſition*, are thoſe manifeſt Indications, diſcoverable in the Nature of Things, by the determined Will, Purpoſe and Deſign of the firſt Cauſe: Namely, *That the Common Good of all rational Beings is the greateſt and moſt noble Good poſſible, of all Kinds of Good within the Power of Man to purſue: And, that, the moſt diligent Purſuit of this one Good is abundantly recompenſed (and according to Nature) with the ſublimeſt Happineſs, to which, each and all can attain: Whereas, the neglect of this ſupreme Good will certainly be attended and puniſhed with as conſummate a Degree of Miſery.*

From which clear Indications we are given to underſtand, that, *the firſt Cauſe* will'd and deſigned to lay an indiſpenſable Obligation upon Mankind to execute and bring to effect, with all Diligence imaginable, this one grand End: Or, to ſpeak in other Terms, which carry the ſame full Meaning; From hence we diſcover a full Promulgation, a clear Publication of this one moſt general natural Law.

We

We ſhall endeavour to expreſs what we would inculcate in ſtill clearer and ſhorter Terms under this one Propoſition.

The Knowledge, the Notice of that neceſſary Dependance, which the Happineſs of each and every one Individual bears to the Common Good, being given, there is given alſo the Knowledge, the Notice of that Obligation which lies upon all indiſpenſably to proſecute this ſupreme Good. Propoſition.

This *Propoſition* is, with the moſt demonſtrable Evidence, proved in thoſe very Definitions themſelves, *concerning the Law of Nature and its Obligations*, which we have already delivered.—*That, all theſe* Data *are* clearly ſuppoſed in the Subject-Matter of this Propoſition, we, in the plaineſt, moſt diffuſive Manner, have evinced from thoſe *Phænomena*, thoſe Appearances in the Nature of all Things, but more particularly in the Nature of Man.—The Sum of all is collected under this one fundamental *Lemma*.

Whoſoever, to the beſt of his Skill, Sagacity and Application, conſults practically the whole Aggregate Society of rational Beings, does at the ſame Time equally conſult, and after the beſt Manner, the eſſential intrinſic Parts neceſſary, conſtituting ſuch an Whole.——Parts, which, by a radical ſubſiſting Influence, derive their All *from the* Whole: *And, of Conſequence, each Individual particularly receives its All from the ſame Common General Source.* Lemma.

And, for this plain Reaſon; becauſe, generally Speaking, it lies in the Power of every one human Creature to contribute more to the beſt State and Condition of his own Mind and Body, (without the leaſt Hurt or Damage to others), than it is in the Power of any other human Creature whatſoever to produce the ſame Effect, And, conſequently, this one Principle of Action, when rightly exerted, increaſes and adds to the Perfection, the Energy, the Happineſs of the whole.—For, it is a notorious Truth, even to SELF-Evidence, that, the private Happineſs of each and all Mankind reſpectively, but more particularly, the *external* Happineſs of each, depends upon the actual Aſſiſtance (or, at leaſt, upon the Permiſſion, the Acquieſcence) of almoſt—all other rational Beings, and in ſome Degree, even remotely, depends upon them all.

Thus, for Inſtance, by Experience we know, from the original Deſign of the firſt Cauſe, that, all the Parts of the Phyſical or Natural World, together with their ſeveral Operations, Powers and Influences, are cloſely compounded into one complex Motion: And,—after ſo wiſe a Contrivance, That, there is not any one natural Body, which cannot add either Advantage or Hurt, Gain or Loſs to any other Natural Body: And, altho', perhaps, not ſo *immediately NOW:* Yet, to be ſure, in ſome *Time future.*

This

See Chap. 2. Sect. 23. Page 213.

This ſame Truth holds ſtill ſtronger in human Capacities, Powers, and Influences: And why? becauſe, theſe Faculties and Powers diffuſe an ampler, a more extenſive Influence, upon Account of Capacities in a rational Soul ſuperadded to the animal Natural Body.

This Argument cannot in more lively Colours be illuſtrated than by a Compariſon taken from the *Ballance*. For, it is obvious to our Senſes, that, the minuteſt *Momenta of Weight*, placed in one Scale, contribute, either more or leſs, (to preſerve an Equilibrium, an Equality of Gravity, that is) to counterpoiſe a Weight, how large and heavy ſoever, laid in the oppoſite Scale; by which means, two plain Effects are produced. *Firſt*, Such a minute Force adds *a Momentum to its own Side*, and of Courſe, *Secondly*, it proves an Impediment againſt, it takes off a Preſſure from, the oppoſite Scale. Another Compariſon, in Conjunction with the former, may ſtrike more effectually. *E. G.* In our Globe of Earth (if we reaſon from the Hypotheſis of *Ariſtotle* and the Peripatetics) every Particle of Matter contributes, in ſome Degree, towards poiſing this Globe upon its own proper Center: Or, ſuppoſing, according to *Carteſius*, (the prevailing Philoſopher of theſe Times,) that, every Particle of this Vortex, in which we are moved and turned round by a centri-fugal Force (like the oppoſite Scale in the Ballance) *in a Ratio compounded of the Solidity and Motion*, adds ſomething towards that Equilibrium or Poize between all the Parts of the whole Globe collectively taken, and by which the whole Syſtem or Frame of it is preſerved. Skilful Politicians in this Manner (to apply theſe two Illuſtrations to our preſent Argument) do uſually reaſon, when they conſider the Powers of different Civil States, as counterpoiſed and ballanced; from which Equality of Weight or Power, it is impoſſible that one ſhould overturn and deſtroy the other.—Suppoſe then, upon an equal Parity of Reaſoning, all Individuals, without any one common Head or Governour, to whom they are ſubject (and, which in Fact is the Caſe, as to different Political States, reſpectively); all theſe Individuals have ſtill, however, a proportional Share of Natural Power to defend themſelves, and have likewiſe (each his own) Degrees of Wants, Infirmities and Evils always ſolicitous, uneaſy, and craving; And, the very ſame Motives and Cauſes, conſequently, which influence different Civil Societies to carry on a mutual Trade and Commerce with each other, and to enter into Leagues of Alliance, offenſive and defenſive againſt Common Enemies, and, to provide, that, no one of theſe different Civil Societies ſhall ſwallow up and devour the reſt; the very ſame Motives and Cauſes muſt, upon an equally ſtrong Foundation of Reaſon, influence Individuals to enter into Leagues, Covenants and Agreements, whereby the reciprocal Privileges of each and all reſpectively may be the better ſecured, increaſed and improved to the beſt Advantage. A Similitude—A ſameneſs— A Parity of Circumſtances and Conditions is evidently natural, and runs thro' all Mankind: And, therefore the Neceſſity, which all Mankind lie under, to reaſon from Dangers and Degrees of Evil, as well as from

Ariſtotle the Head of the Peripatetic Sect. A. D. 1670.

See Note at Page 172, Chap. 2 Sect. 15.

from Advantages and Degrees of Good (which are obſerved to happen in like Caſes,) is as equally natural, when applied to like Events, which can and will, as probably, attend and await ourſelves. By this ſympathetic Cauſe, All are moved and influenced, either from Hope or Fear. Becauſe, by ſuch Events as uſually happen, we neceſſarily judge that any Perſon, whom we obſerve violently to attack the Innocent, threatens ſome Evil immediately to befal ourſelves, and we at once imagine that the whole Foundation of our own Security is entirely ſhock'd by the Man, who violates his Promiſes and Engagements, or who breaks thro' all the Ties and Obligations of Gratitude and Humanity. For, it is not leſs natural, leſs neceſſary in any Man to be influenc'd by a Motive, from a Similitude of Caſes; than it is for natural Bodies, to receive an Impulſe by a Force impreſſed: Or by a Centripetal Direction. For the Analogy in both Caſes is equal: Neither, indeed, is it difficult to lay open that whole Reaſoning which looks into Futurity, (and upon which entirely are govern'd all human Acts, elicited and drawn into outward View) from that Analogy, that Similitude and Sameneſs of Events between Cauſes and their Effects, as well paſt as future. *All Individuals* reſpectively (I mean human Creatures) from their natural Frame and Conſtitution, are powerfully, nay neceſſarily preſſed to protect Innocence, to diſcharge faithfully their Promiſes and Engagements, and to exerciſe Gratitude. For, upon theſe ſolid Principles, the Powers and overbearing Influences of ſome are ballanced and equalled by oppoſite Powers: And the Amities or Alliances of Friendſhip, in which are laid the laſting Settlements of all Societies already eſtabliſhed.—Theſe Ties, theſe Obligations, may, however, be ſhaken off and neglected by the few, and for a Time, under certain particular Circumſtances; yet, it is as true, that ſuch important Obligations are not totally neglected by ſuch Perſons oftner than Reaſon itſelf is neglected: or even oftner: than the moſt eligible delightful Part of human Nature. Theſe Principles, therefore, do not oftner recoil upon the Perſons themſelves, and with no leſs a Certainty, than the Re-actions of Nature (that is to ſay the Recoveries of Reaſon for a Time clouded:) or in other Words, no oftner, than Perſons revive and come to themſelves.

Natural Reaſon, therefore, as directed from the genuine Similitude between Man and Man, commonly influences Mankind to the mutual Aſſiſtance and Support of each other. Becauſe, generally ſpeaking, the genuine Principles of Reaſon carry their full Influence over human Nature.—And, upon a cloſer Examination, we ſhall find, that, Individuals reſpectively return and repay, in the general, according to the Ability of each, Obligations in as particular a Manner to thoſe who have ſerved and benefited them.

SECT. LVIII.

THE Series of Reaſoning, hitherto laid down, is only to ſhew, that, Mankind muſt be treated as a Whole, whoſe conſtituent Parts are, in ſome Sort connected by the ſame characteriſtic Mark of Nature; and by a Similitude, a Likeneſs, a Sameneſs of Neceſſities, Wants and Infirmities. From whence ariſes *a Probability* of eſtabliſhing and ſettling Friendſhip. This *Probability* riſes into higher Degrees of *Certainty*, whenever an Individual begins to deſerve well by his Benevolence and Good-Will.

Now, altho', the *Lemma*, mentioned in our laſt Section, (as to *Helps external* of human Happineſs) may receive convincing Proofs from theſe Motives, as well as from other Arguments already produced; Yet, the Truth of this *Lemma* will appear with a ſtill clearer Evidence in thoſe ſeveral Branches of *Happineſs intrinſic*, placed reſpectively within the Power of each, *i. e.* (to expreſs my ſelf with a clearer Separation of Ideas). *Firſt*, In the Complacency, the Compoſure of an uniform regular Mind: *Secondly*, In the government of our Appetites and Paſſions: *Thirdly*, In that joyful Senſe, that pleaſing Remembrance of upright commendable Acts (and this to be ſure, is a never-failing Source of Joy —— A Source, which, with reſiſtleſs Influence, directs and points out the Path to the very beſt End, and by the fitteſt, the very beſt means). And, *laſtly*, in thoſe ſolid well-grounded Preſages of the Divine Favour. And——here we muſt obſerve, That all Kinds of Good, to which we cannot attain by benefitting and pleaſing other Beings; *becauſe, not within our Power*, are not mentioned in the Terms of our *Lemma*, and, conſequently, theſe other Kinds of Good cannot render the Truth of it precarious and uncertain, notwithſtanding, that we cannot determine preciſely what theſe Kinds of Good are. It cannot then, by any Rule of Reaſon, be expected, that Acts, impoſſible for Man to perform, ſuppoſing ſuch Acts, even to contribute ſomething towards the Common Good, are, or can be natural Rewards. It is fully ſufficient to render our Demonſtration compleat, that, the firſt univerſal Cauſe (*i. e.* ALMIGHTY GOD) is pleaſed to lay the Obligation upon us of proſecuting and purſuing the Common Good, that he has eſtabliſhed thoſe Rewards which we have eſtabliſhed as Principles in this our *Enquiry*, ſure and certain: And, that he has moreover diſcover'd to us a firmer Certainty to procure, by this Method of Acting, the Benevolence and Aſſiſtance of Mankind, than by any Method of SELF-Security, which can poſſibly ariſe, from either treacherouſly or openly falling foul upon and attacking All. Effects, cauſed by all other human Acts, are naturally contingent, and, conſequently, human Reaſon faithfully diſcharges its Office, in caſe it directs us to chooſe the Event, which, in the general, muſt frequently happen. For, a certain fix'd eſtimate of Value is put upon ſuch a Con-

Velut ἐυκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν

a Contingency as moſt frequently happens. Now, the Reality of this Value is not only evident in all Games upon Dice, and in all other Games of the like Nature, but alſo in Agriculture and Huſbandry, in Commerce and Trade, Merchandize, Traffick, and in almoſt all Employments, where human Induſtry is concern'd and Buſied. Such a Certainty of Value is the natural Reward of every Election, of every Choice, the wiſeſt and moſt prudent. And, therefore, altho', at ſome Times rarely, it may poſſibly ſo happen, that, the Man, who endeavours to ſecure himſelf by the *Hobbian* Devices of Force and Treachery, eſcapes Dangers, which, according to human Foreſight, and a rational Probability, carry in them, generally ſpeaking, ſure Deſtruction: Or, altho', perhaps, it may ſo happen, that, ſuch a raſh ill-judging Man procures to himſelf Advantages, which, the Man, who acts upon more deliberate Wiſdom, cannot procure: Yet, Events happening thus, do not, however, render the Argumentations and Paralogiſms of theſe Logicians from Contingency firmer and more concluſive: Neither can they prove that Nature has, in general, annex'd Rewards to ſuch Acts as theſe. The Man, for Inſtance, who wagers, that, at the firſt Caſt upon a Pair of Dice, he will throw two Sixes, wins from him who lays an even Wager, that, two Sixes do not come up firſt: Yet, notwithſtanding this lucky Caſt, demonſtratively true, (from the Nature, *i. e.* from the Cubic Figure of a Die,) it is, that the Odds, advantage againſt ſuch a firſt Caſt, are 35 to 1. And, conſequently, the Chance of him, who takes up the Wager, is to the Chance of him who lays the Wager, as 35 to 1, which are call'd the Odds. This Difference between the Values of the Chances can and may, with great Propriety, be eſtimated and rated as the Chance, the Gain, *i. e.* The natural Reward of a wiſer, of a more prudent Choice. And, we are to determine, in like Manner, concerning Damage or Loſs, that, it is the natural Puniſhment of a fooliſh, of an imprudent Choice.

See Chap. 2. Sect. 20. Page 193 and 194.

But, in caſe, the curious Reader may be better pleaſed with an Illuſtration taken from the Phyſiology of an Human Body (altho', in this Caſe, the Point is not, from any Diſcoveries hitherto made, capable of the ſame critical exact Calculation) the following Inſtance naturally, and at once, occurs to my Mind.—The *Stomach* and the *Inteſtines* by preparing the Aliments, the *Liver* by ſecerning and ſeperating the Bile, and the *Heart* by performing it's (Syſtole and Diaſtole it's Contraction and Dilatation, it's) Action and Re-action, ALL directly and immediately conſpire to promote the Health of the whole Animal-œconomy, and, at the ſame Time, alſo, promote, after the beſt manner in their own Power reſpectively, the *Health, each, of itſelf*.—But—by ſome Fault or Diſorder of Parts inferior in the Animal-Body, it may poſſibly happen, that, theſe very ſound Parts (*viz.*) *the Stomach, the Inteſtines, the Liver* and *the whole Heart* are (without any Fault or Defect in themſelves) deprived of their proper Supplies of Nouriſhment: A Defect or Diſtemper, I ſay, in any of the inferior Parts, muſt threaten Deſtruction to the Whole: And, yet the Deſtruction is neither ſo

quick nor ſo ſure, as when theſe nobler Parts are deficient in their Duties reſpectively to the whole animal-Oeconomy. Theſe nobler Parts, therefore, upon this very Account, (becauſe they generally are preſerved longer by the Diſcharge of their own proper Offices) convey to our Minds a lively Image of that natural Reward which I here mean: And, conſequently, this is a juſt Illuſtration of the Point before us.

Since therefore the Knowledge of this *Lemma* is a Truth demonſtrative, and, which, like the Knowledge of all other Truths employed about *Effects* and their *Cauſes*, is ſtamped and impreſſed upon the human Mind from the Nature of Things by the Will of the firſt Cauſe determined to effect this very End; it is, therefore, evident, that, the *firſt Cauſe* is *the original efficient Source* from whom we know that this *Lemma* is true.—And, it is as demonſtratively true alſo, that, whenever we give our Aſſent to this *Lemma*, it naturally perſuades and prompts us to a ſtudious Concern about the public Good: For which Reaſon, and with no leſs Propriety, we conclude, that the firſt Cauſe directs and guides us to the Knowledge of this very END itſelf.——Now, we do not run the leaſt Hazard of making the *firſt Cauſe* the *Author of Evil*, provided, we attribute to him, as *Firſt Cauſe*, ſuch Effects only as are natural and neceſſary.—For, as to all moral Evils, they happen by the Means and Intervention of Ignorance or Inadvertency or Raſhneſs, owing to ſome Abuſe of Liberty.——The *firſt Cauſe*, directs us to the very ſame Ends which the Determination of Right (that is, of true) Reaſon points out to us, concerning the Requiſites neceſſary towards obtaining this one *principal End*, by the fitteſt and beſt Means poſſible.——But—whoſoever perſuades us by Arguments drawn from the higheſt Rewards and Puniſhments, which, he himſelf, who is ſuperior to all Beings in *Wiſdom Goodneſs* and *Power*, has inſeparably annexed to our own moral Acts, and to his own Commands, ſuch a Being's Perſuaſion, ſuch a Being's Command, is, beyond all Queſtion, a *Law:* and, therefore, (by Virtue of that very Authority, which lays ſo powerful a Motive, ſo convincing an Argument, ſo binding a Law upon us) this *ſame Being* is our *Law-giver*.

Syllogiſm, Major Propoſition.

Minor Propoſition.

Concluſion

Whatſoever, under any given Circumſtances, the Senate of *Rome* had determined *beſt to be done*, (altho' from the Want of Senators ſufficient in Number preſent; or, from ſome Circumſtances either of Time or Place: Or, upon Account of ſome interpoſing Authority in the Tribune himſelf), did not paſs into an eſtabliſhed Law, yet every ſuch Determination became a Decree, and had the Name and Sanction of Authority, as *Dion Caſſius* tells us in his 55th *Book*.——In a much more exalted Degree, muſt that End (according to a rational Determination) be ſecured and defended by Authority, which, the *firſt Cauſe* has declared an End for the *Common Good* beſt and fitteſt to be purſued: And, where there is not the leaſt poſſible Defect, either as to Authority or any other Requiſite neceſſary: And which (*principal End*) the ſame *firſt Cauſe* has ſanctified and ſtrengthen'd by Rewards

and

and Puniſhments: Notwithſtanding, that, theſe Rewards and Puniſhments are produced by the Means and Interpoſitions of *ſecond Cauſes* ordered and ſettled, guided and directed by the *firſt Cauſe himſelf*. The Will of the *firſt Cauſe* (as *firſt Cauſe*) is ſupreme, is the wiſeſt, the beſt and the moſt powerful: Becauſe no other Cauſes can poſſibly have any Power, Ability or *Being*, not derived from the *firſt Cauſe himſelf*: And, by Reaſon of that infinite Perfection inſeparable from the *firſt Cauſe*, his Will never diſſents from the Dictates and Concluſions of his own perfect Underſtanding.

Having laid down, eſtabliſhed, and at laſt finiſhed all fundamental Principles; it is no difficult Matter to demonſtrate after what Manner the Laws of Nature, thus ſettled and defined, carry in them the full Authority of *Commanding*, *Forbidding*, *Permitting*, &c. And from hence, as little Difficulty will be found in reconciling our *Definition of the Law of Nature* with thoſe *Definitions* delivered by the beſt-eſteemed and moſt approved Authors: Provided, always, that, we make proper Allowances for that Ambiguity of Senſe to which Words are naturally liable if not faithfully compared and particularly applied to the Intent and Meaning of the ſeveral Authors who uſe them, ſo, as to reconcile an Uniformity of Senſe in each and every one of them. But——ſuch Cautions as theſe, we ſhall leave to the Judgment and Diſcretion of our prudent Readers.

See Sect. 3. of this Chapter at Page 291.

End of the Second Part.

A

PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY

INTO THE

LAWS of NATURE;

With a CONFUTATION of Mr. *HOBBES*'s Philoſophical Principles, &c.

PART III.

CHAP. VI.

Concerning the Duties and Virtues in General contain'd under the Univerſal Law of Nature.

SECT. I.

HAVING in the foregoing Chapter eſtabliſhed one General Precept about promoting the *Common Good*, it ſeems neceſſary to explain in what is to come,

I. What thoſe Things are which we apprehend to lie within the Limits and Bounds of the *Common Good*. What contained in the Common Good.

II. What is the Nature of Acts, which in any Reſpect concern the Attainment of this *Good*, and, conſequently, Acts relative to the Common Good.

III. How far ſuch Acts are capable of being directed by ſuch a Law: (namely, the *Common Good*:) Concerning the firſt of theſe, very little need be added to what we have already ſaid in our third Chapter *concerning Natural Good*. How the Common Good can direct theſe Acts.

For, ſince Beings conſtituting that Syſtem, of which [Syſtem] we here principally regard *GOD and Man*, all thoſe Duties and Virtues conſequently muſt be referred to the GOOD which comprehends the *Honour*

or *Glory* of *ALMIGHTY GOD*, and *the perfect Happineſs of Man*: As alſo, whatſoever *Means tend to the Perfection* of both the *Human Soul* and *the Human Body*.

The General Diviſions and Subdiviſions of Mankind.

But, beſides this: Since the whole collective Sum of all Mankind (juſt in the ſame Manner that many other Things are compounded of *Numbers*, of *many*) may moſt fitly and commodiouſly be ſeparated, *firſt into large Diviſions*, and, again *Secondly*, thoſe large Diviſions into *Subdiviſions*: And, again, *Thirdly*, Thoſe Sub-diviſions into ſtill *lower Sub-diviſions*. As, for Inſtance, ſince Mankind in general may firſt be divided into various *larger Societies* or *Countries* or *Nations of People*; next, into Families: And *laſtly*, into particular Perſons or Individuals: Upon the ſame Foundation of Reaſon, whatſoever Things are for the Good of Men conſidered, as particular Individuals ſeparately, the ſame Things benefit whole Nations, or at leaſt, the Parts in General: And theſe are the Objects, or Subject-Matter, upon which, the Rules of moral Philoſophy and the Laws of Nations are employed.

Moral Laws and the Laws of Nations cloſely connected.

For, the Rules of Morality and the Law of Nations, nearly relate to each other: Other Kinds of Good concern one Civil Society, *i. e.* prove advantageous to the Subjects under one Civil Government, and, for which Kinds of Good, the Laws of that particular Civil Society or Polity provide.

There are other Kinds of Good, which conſider the Advantages of ſingle Families, and theſe are directed by the Rules of OEconomy, and, *laſtly*, there are other Kinds of Good appropriated to Singulars, and which prove of Advantage to *Individuals*.

The Art of Logic, and the wholeſome Rules of Regimen in Diet, as well as all the Arts and Sciences before-mention'd are deſigned to adjuſt and regulate theſe material Concerns.

1. The Office of Ethics.

1. Ethics, or Morality, ſo far limits ſuch Acts of Individuals, as regard *SELF* and *one's own Advantages*, by the Obligation due to the Good of all rational Agents, *i. e. The Glory or Honour of GOD, and the Rights and Privileges of all Mankind.*

2. The Office of Politics.

2. The Political Laws, *i. e.* The Laws of Civil Society limit human Acts by the Obligation due to the Safety and Welfare of the Civil State.

3. The Office of Oeconomics.

3. The Oeconomical Laws, *i. e.* Rules of Oeconomy limit human Acts by the Obligations due from every Man to his own Family.——But, here, however, we muſt obſerve, that, the one general Law of *Nature* completely takes in, at one comprehenſive View, the whole Syſtem of rational Agents, and all the ſeveral Parts of it, according to that Degree of Relation and Proportion which theſe ſeveral Parts bear to the whole.

SECT.

SECT. II.

THE Opinion of ſome, who have falſely imagined, that, the chief Deſign of all Morality is to inſtitute and form Man into a ſolitary unſocial Creature regardleſs of others, has, beyond all Queſtion, proved the Occaſion of many Errors and Miſtakes: Whereas the Truth is, that, univerſal Juſtice, which comprehends the Sum, Subſtance and Eſſence of all moral Virtues, is (no other than Ἀλλότριον Ἀγαθὸν, *i. e.*) the good of others, and is employ'd intirely in their Service, and for their Advantage. ——Nay——if this Point be more accurately and nicely examined into, we ſhall find, that, all true Morality models Mankind into Society, into a Society the moſt truly extenſive and noble, a Society begun, eſtabliſhed, and continued between GOD and all Mankind. The Patrons of this ſolitary, unſocial Scheme exſcin'd the ſeveral Precepts of Morality, and cut them off, as Precepts diſtinct and foreign to both Civil and Sacred Society; that, theſe Precepts are not limited and ty'd down to either Sort of Society reſpectively: And yet, truly, they acknowledge that theſe Precepts or Laws relate, in the general, to all theſe ſeveral Sorts and Forms of Society: And, moreover, that, theſe Precepts caſt the moſt exalted Virtue, the brighteſt Glory and moſt amiable Decorum or Comelineſs upon them all. Whereas, the Truth is (and, a Truth very worthy of Notice it is,) that, all leſſer Societies with their ſeveral Powers, Authorities and Acts, are confined and limited by thoſe Relations and Reſpects which they all bear to the Good of Society univerſal and more exalted than them all. As for Inſtance, particular Civil Societies ſtrictly are bound down not to enforce any Obligations contrary to the Law of Nations. We are here to underſtand by Laws of Nature, ſuch Laws as are to direct the Behaviour of all Civil inſtituted Societies, and of all Individuals towards all, let theſe Civil Societies be modelled into any and what Form ſoever: Or, even ſuppoſing that theſe Forms are not as yet reduced into any Eſtabliſhments. Yet, the Laws of Nature are ſuch as command an Innocence of Behaviour towards the innocent, together with the Duties and Obligations of Fidelity and Gratitude; and are ſuch Laws as lay an unequal Tie of Obedience upon all. In this ſame Foundation of Reaſon exactly it is, that, the Laws of Civil Society, upon which the Safety of a Community depends, muſt not be violated and tranſgreſſed, to promote the Advantage of any one *Family*, much leſs of any one private *Perſon*.

Morality never deſigned Man for Solitude.

SECT. III.

The Analytical Method of Reaſoning well explained. See Prolegomena, Sect. 1. Page 10.

THE Operations and Acts of the Underſtanding truly affected by, and thoroughly employ'd upon ſuch Objects of Thought as theſe, are all intirely drawn from *the Analytical Method of Reaſoning*, i. e. The Procedure of the Underſtanding operates, judges and infers, from Objects more compounded, to thoſe of a more ſimple Kind. Becauſe, the Proportion or Quantity of *Good in the whole* is firſt to take Place, as being of a more excellent Nature: and, afterwards, when the *whole* is fully ſecured, then, in the Order of Things, the Happineſs of the particular conſtituent Parts, may and ought to take Place; and, yet, at, the ſame Time, upon this Method of reaſoning no one Part of *Happineſs* or *Virtue* in the *Individual* is leſſened: but, on the contrary, all the ſingle Parts take ſeparately and reſpectively, each to itſelf, its own Share and Portion of Happineſs. This Method certainly is very rational: Becauſe, every Whole differs nothing from, but is exactly the ſame with, all the Parts taken together in Conjunction; they are, therefore, here conſidered in their natural and in their ſeveral mutual Relations to each other; and by Conſequence the Good of the Whole is no other than the very ſame Good diffuſed and portioned out, thro' all the Parts, according to thoſe mutual Relations and ſeveral Agreements which they all naturally and reſpectively bear to each other. Whenſoever, therefore, we are required to pay our firſt Regards to the Whole, no other Injunction is laid upon us, than (as our principal Concern) not to violate and break thro' Fidelity, Gratitude and thoſe other Bonds and Ties of mutual Support and Aſſiſtance, whereby all are linked together: And, whereby, the Order and Degrees of all to one another are eſtabliſhed and preſerved.—For, by theſe Links (juſt like Blood-Veſſels and Nerves transfuſed thro' the whole Animal-Body) all Individuals of the human Species, as Members of the ſame Animal-Body, are aſſociated and united together; and, hereby they perform mutual good Offices: The Difference being very little, whether they be, or be not, Members of the ſame Civil Community. Becauſe, by theſe Links and Ties, we frequently grow wiſer from the Counſels, the Experience, and the Wiſdom of others; we become better Men by their Virtues, and we gather Strength by their Energies and Powers in the Attainment and Security of ſuch Advantages and Benefits as are materially uſeful to ourſelves; and——in a Word——we grow rich by their Wealth.

Why this Method in moral Philoſophy is the beſt,

For, ſince it is a noted Maxim, that thoſe Perfections of the Mind, which diſcover themſelves to us under the Definitions and the Terms of intellectual and moral Virtues; as alſo the very Animal Powers themſelves, and Riches even, are ſuch Bleſſings or Kinds of Good, by whoſe Bounty, Opulency, and Plenty, the Happineſs of Individuals is generally eſtimated. From hence, therefore, I ſay, it follows, that, all theſe Advantages, when collected

collected into a common Stock of Happineſs, by the faithful Diſcharge of Compacts and Agreements, by Gratitude, Humanity, *&c.* become common Bleſſings, eſſentially conſtituting a common Felicity. That Perſon, I muſt confeſs, augments the Fund of common Happineſs, who benefits even one Individual only, without any Loſs or Detriment to all the other ſocial Parts ——And, even ſuch a private Benefit as this cannot be conferred without ſome Prudence, ſome Caution, leſt an Injury be offered to the Rights of others: neither can ſuch a Prudence, ſuch a Caution, be exerted without a diffuſed extenſive Benevolence exerted towards All: Which Benevolence comprehends the Rights and Privileges of ALMIGHTY GOD, thoſe of all Nations in general, thoſe of our own Country, and thoſe of Kindred and Family: Under all which ſeveral Relations of Duty, is comprehended that moſt diffuſive Good, common and general, even to all. And, conſequently, this is the one grand Point, which ſo neceſſarily demands the Care, the Attention, the Practice of all: Namely, That, in caſe, we are willing to benefit even any one Individual, the Benefit be conferr'd without a Crime: Becauſe ſo wiſe, ſo prudent a Foreſight leads us, by a fair Induction of Conſequences, into a Thought, a Concern, a Regard, an Obſervance of all Laws, not only natural, but alſo poſitive, both Eccleſiaſtical and Civil. All Good Laws—All Wiſe Admonitions of Parents—All the Sage Maxims of Philoſophers ultimately regard this one End only. And, conſequently, in Proportion, as theſe Laws, Admonitions and Maxims prove more or leſs neceſſary to this one End; and in Proportion, as they are more or leſs diſcoverable from the Nature of Things, in the ſame Proportion do they either ſtrengthen or enervate the Energy, the Operation, the Power, the Influence of Natural Laws.

SECT. IV.

IF any one, to ſum up this Argument, is pleas'd to find Fault, that, I did not, in my Syſtem of Morality, account for the Origin of Mankind from a rude indigeſted Chaos of Animals, rather than from a Sum Total of rational Agents comprehending Nations, Communities and Families, diſtinct and ſeparate from each other: I anſwer, *Firſt*, ſo confuſed a State of the human Kind is not neceſſary to account for the firſt Riſe and Origin of Families and Communities. Such a Suppoſition (ſo far from being, upon the Determination of mere natural Reaſon, neceſſary) implies in it an higher Probability, that, the Human-kind, and, by conſequence, all Societies and Families ſprang from the matrimonial Union of one *Man* with one *Woman*. And, conſequently, *all Civil Government* is originally laid in *a natural Parental Authority*. But, let us, in the ſecond Place, ſuppoſe, that, all Mankind are not cemented by any natural Conſanguinity: Our Method, however, is ſufficient to prove the Origin of the largeſt as well as

Objection.

Anſwer.

of

of the ſmalleſt Civil Societies. Becauſe, from the very Nature of the Thing, it is evident, that, the neceſſary, the principal Means to produce the Common Good muſt be the Collective Body (even without any formal Conſent) of *all* originally conſtituted into one General Society diſtinguiſh'd, and in after-times, ſeparated into different Political Bodies; *All* and *Each* ſubordinate and ſubject to *ALMIGHTY GOD*, as the one *Supreme Lord and Head.*—And, that each of theſe Political Bodies, ſhould be ſubdivided into leſſer Societies, Corporations and Families. From whence, in future Times, the Property, the Poſſeſſions, the Advantages belonging to Individuals, were transferred and made over by the Parties themſelves reſpectively, and became the Treaſures, the Poſſeſſion and Advantages of the Public, according to ſome Rules and Laws which I ſhall, in the Sequel of this Enquiry, deliver and ſtate. Juſt as, in an impregnated Egg genially warmed and brooded upon, the State, the Condition of the Matter and Motion of thoſe Particles, from whence the future young is to be formed, greatly contribute to the common Perfection of them:——And, that, the Particles ſhould be prepared and ſeparated into ſeveral diſtinct Parts: Becauſe theſe ſeveral diſtinct Parts muſt contribute their Functions, Offices and Operations miniſterially to promote the common Health and Strength of the Whole. The Caſe holds exactly the ſame in Morality, as it does in Phyſick: For, the Phyſician, in his Practice, always ſuppoſes all the Parts of an Animal-Body conſtituted and formed: The Moraliſt always ſuppoſes Societies entered into, formed, ſettled and eſtabliſhed. Conſidering, therefore, all the Arguments already offered concerning the Origin of a Dominion over, and a Right in, Things neceſſary, (even, laying aſide all the Information from ſacred Hiſtory, to this Purpoſe,) they as fully explain the Origin of Authority and Dominion over Perſons, not only of a Father over his own Family and Houſe, but of the Magiſtrate alſo over the Civil Society: And they explain, as fully alſo, the Foundations of Rights and Powers neceſſary in all Society. And—the whole Force of this Doctrine, Natural Reaſon itſelf alone is able to demonſtrate.

SECT. V.

2. What the Nature of ſuch Acts is, which in any Reſpect concern the Attainment of Common Good.

WE now proceed to the ſecond Point propoſed in the Beginning of this Chapter.

The Solution of this ſecond Queſtion we give under the following general Terms. *That all Human Acts, ſo far as they are capable of being governed, influenced and regulated by Reaſon, Prudence, Deſign, or, by any habitual Practice ſuper-induced upon human Nature, may be underſtood as* Means *leading to the Common-Good,* Means *which conduce to the effectual Attainment*

Attainment of This Good. (1) Now theſe Acts are either *Elicit* or *Imperate Acts*.

1. *Acts Elicit* belong to the Underſtanding, to the Will, and to the Affections. 1. Actus Eliciti. Intellectus, Voluntatis & Affectuum.

2. *Acts imperate*, are Motions of the Human Body directed, influenced and acted upon by Volitions or Powers of the Will. 2. Actus Imperati, i. e. Actus Corporis Determinati, a Voluntate Humanâ.

It is therefore, firſt, the principal Precept commanded in the Law of Nature (which Law commands us with all our poſſible Endeavours to proſecute the Common Good) that we exert the Natural Capacities of our Underſtanding, *i.e. Our whole Strength of Mind upon all Things and Perſons, ſo far as they are in any Reſpect capable of being directed by us towards this End*; in order to ſettle, acquire and eſtabliſh that Habit of Mind (which of all others moſt contributes to this great End: And *this Habit* is) called *Prudence*. This *Habit* or *Virtue* is fundamentally laid in a true Knowledge of Nature; of univerſal Nature, but, more eſpecially, in the true Knowledge of rational Nature. The chief Branches of this *Habit* or *Virtue* are the practical Knowledge of Experience in *ultimate Ends* (the Supreme of all which [Ends] is *the End* we are now purſuing) and of *the Means* eſſential and neceſſary to theſe Ends. This whole Knowledge entirely conſiſts in the Aſſent given to practical Precepts. For the better Attainment of a full Knowledge in both theſe (that is, *Ends*, and *Means*) the Powers and Operations of the human Mind are ſignally ſerviceable.

1. *Invention* which is entirely formed upon the Obſervations taken from Objects immediately repreſented to our View: And, from a faithful Remembrance of ſuch as have, in Times paſt, been laid before us. 1. Invention. 2. Judgment, *Judicium Noëticum & Dianoëticum.*

2. *Judgment (Noëtic* and *Dianoëtic, ſimple* and *compounded, merely-intelligent* as well as *Reaſoning)* which conſiſts in, and is made up of, *Ratiocination* and the *Methodical Diſpoſition of Truths*.

From

(1) *Now theſe Acts are either* Elicit *or* Imperate] Celebris eſt Humanarum Actionum Partitio in *Elicitas* & *Imperatas*. Elicita, Voluntatis Actio dicitur, cujus, Voluntas eſt immediatum Principium; vel, quam, Voluntas ex ſeipſâ & in ſeipſâ elicit: *Imperata* verò, Quæ ab aliâ Facultate quàm à Voluntate, non tamen ſine Voluntatis Imperio, elicitur: Elicita Voluntatis Actio duplex in genere admitti poteſt: Altera *circa Bonum ut ſic*, quæ generali Nomine *Volitio* dici poteſt; altera *circa malum ut ſic* quæ poteſt dici *Nolitio*. Rurſus, elicita Voluntatis Actio circa bonum, aut eſt circa Finem aliquorum Mediorum, aut circa Media ipſa: Actio Elicita circa Finem eſt Triplex; Nempè Volitio, Fruitio, Intentio: Circa Media quoque Triplex; nempè Electio, Conſenſus, Uſus. *Imperata* verò alia interna eſt nempe Actiones intellectivæ & Senſitivarum Facultatum ſive Cognoſcitivarum ut Phantaſiæ, Æſtimativæ; ſive Appetitivarum, ut utriuſque Appetitûs Senſitivi: Alia verò externa, nempè Operationes Membrorum externorum. Actiones *Elicitæ* & *Imperatæ* in hoc conveniunt quòd ſint in Poteſtate Voluntatis, quoad Exercitium Actûs; ideòque ſolæ ſunt Liberæ, Humanæ, ſeu Morales: In hoc tamen diſcrepant, quòd *Elicitæ* ab ipſâ Voluntate eliciantur; *Imperatæ* verò ab aliâ Facultate, idque juxta Imperium Voluntatis: Deinde, *Elicitæ* ſunt ſemper Appetitivæ; *Imperatæ* verò poſſunt eſſe cognoſcitivæ: Illæ ſunt ſemper Internæ & Occultæ: Hæ verò nonnunquam Externæ eſſe poſſunt & Senſibus Obviæ. Vid. *Euſtachii Ethic. De Actionibus Humanis Speciatim, Quæſtio: Prim. Poſterior. Diſputat. inter Opera, Pag.* 45, 46. *Edit. Cantab.* 1640. *Octavo.*

From whence we juſtly infer, that, Nature recommends to our Practice the Uſe of true Logic: And, by which, we are alſo given to underſtand in what Senſe and Meaning thoſe Acts and Habits fall naturally under Command, which lie in that Power of the Mind called *Invention*, and which are diſtinguiſhed by the Terms Εὐβουλία (1) a cautious Attention, that we apprehend Right; and, that we are not miſled by fictitious Appearances inſtead of real Impreſſions. 2. By an Ἀγχίνοια an acute Readineſs of Mind, a Quickneſs of Perception: Or, 3. By a Δεινότης, a Sagacity, a Penetration to ſearch into, and find out, upon every Occaſion, the proper *Means* ſuitable, and fitted to proper *Ends*: Now, theſe three intellectual Perfections (in caſe they are capable of a threefold Diſtinction) properly belong to what we term *Invention*. *Secondly*, In that Operation of the Mind termed *Judgment* (ſo far as this Operation is employ'd in the artificial Rules of Logic and the Art of Reaſoning). There is 1. what is call'd Σύνεσις, the Power of Intelligence or ſimple Apprehenſion. And 2. Γνώμη, i. e. The Opinion and Determination (as to affirmative and negative Propoſitions) by which the Mind affirms and denies, either upon *Probability* or *better Certainty*. But, in all Caſes, where the Judgment is determined by *moral Evidence* and *the Teſtimony* (whether Divine or Human) *of other Beings*, then, the Term alters and becomes, what is call'd *Fides*, Faith.

All theſe Powers, however, of both *Invention* and *Judgment* (ſo far as they lie within the Capacity of each and every Human Agent) prove neceſſary in attaining to the *one ultimate End*: And, conſequently, as ſuch, they are commanded by the *Law of Nature*.

SECT. VI.

The Effects of Prudence. 1. A Conſtancy of Mind.

THE immediate and moſt General Effects then of Prudence, and ſuch Effects as are indeed genuine and inherent in us, are,

1. *A Conſtancy of Mind*, or that Reſolution, by which we firmly and invariably adhere to the Dictates of *Prudence* as Dictates of unchangeable Truth, ſuited and applicable to all Circumſtances. Now, this Kind of *Prudence* is a firm, ſteddy, reſolute Unchangeableneſs of the practical Judgment concerning ſome *one* determined End and the beſt Means of attaining to it: And of the *Will* naturally conſequent upon ſuch a Judgment. This reſolute and firm Determination immediately ariſes from a rightly-conceived unchangeable Veracity in the practical Propoſitions themſelves, from which, we pronounce and determine upon the *End* and *Means neceſſary*. Prudence bears the ſame Relation to Inconſtancy, that Science

(1) See Monſ. Barbeyrac's Notes in *Locum*, *Pages* 338, 339, 340. And the Reverend Mr. *Maxwell's* Notes in *Locum*, *Page* 308.

Science or true Knowledge does to the Aſſent given to ſuch Propoſitions as are, at one and the ſame Time, contradictory: Whereas Conſtancy, in firmly purſuing this one very beſt End, when Dangers impend and threaten, and when intricate Difficulties oppoſe themſelves and lie in the Way, is *Fortitude*. Fortitude.

This ſame firm Permanency, in bearing up againſt Diſtreſſes, Misfortunes and Evils, is truly called *Patience*. And, *Secondly*, it is, with equal Truth, call'd *Moderation*. For, *Moderation* is one Effect of the *Prudence* which preſerves and keeps our Paſſions, Appetites and Deſires, our Endeavours and Purſuits within ſuch a Rule or Meaſure, as is moſt ſuitable to the Goodneſs, the Perfection of the End, and to the Neceſſity and Expediency of the Means. Patience. Moderation.

Now, becauſe *Prudence* always directs the Mind to the *integral, moſt perfect End:* That is, to an End, which, when all the conſtituent Parts of it are well conſidered, ought to be ſought after and purſued, as alſo to the Uſe and Application of all Means neceſſary: For this Reaſon, and upon this very Account, I ſay, *Moderation* cannot be ſeparated from *Integrity* or *Moral Honeſty*, neither can it be ſeparated from *Diligence* and *Induſtry*. See Page 311.

Here, then, we ſuppoſe it (in the Deſcription of *Moderation*, which we have laid down) a Truth well-known, and readily taken for granted; that, the intenſeſt, warmeſt Affections, and the moſt earneſt Endeavours of Mankind, in Purſuit of this one ſupreme End, and the Means chiefly neceſſary thereto, are enjoyned and commanded in this one moſt general Law of Nature. This one *Poſtulatum*, then, being allowed and taken for granted, it is evident, that, if the true Analogy, the rational Proportion, between the ultimate principal End and any other End whatſoever, be once found out and diſcovered: And, in like Manner, if the true Analogy, the rational Proportion between the Uſe and Neceſſity of the principal chief Means and of any other Means whatſoever, be once found out and diſcovered; that, therefore, the ſame true Analogy, the ſame rational Proportion between the ſeveral Degrees of our well-governed Affections and the juſt regular Quantities of our Diligence, Induſtry and Endeavours, in all Caſes which happen, equally holds good, and can be diſcovered alſo.

SECT. VII.

UPON a rational well-eſtabliſhed Scheme of Virtues, from that Moderation perfectly reconcileable with an earneſt concern about Ends and Means, it appears evident, in my Opinion, that *Mediocrity* does not differ from *Moderation:* That *Mediocrity*, I mean, which the *Peripatetics* extol, as the Eſſence, the Subſtance of all Virtues, provided always, that a fair, candid Interpretation, be put upon this Virtue. We acknowledge at the ſame Time, that the Virtue called *Moderation* is moſt eminent in Acts of the *Will* and *Affections*: And yet, ſince the regular Moderation. Mediocrity. Moderation how to be underſtood.

Adjuſtment or Determination of Meaſure, Quantity and Proportion (naturally inherent in this Virtue) is a certain Energy or Strength peculiar to the *Underſtanding*: And ſince ſome certain Bounds muſt limit the Searches and Enquiries of the human Underſtanding, leſt Doubt and Caution might lead the Mind into endleſs Scepticiſm, and leſt an over-eager Deſire in our Searches after Cauſes might degenerate into trifling impertinent Curioſity. For theſe Reaſons, it is proper here to ſhew that Virtue call'd *Moderatio imperata:* That is, a Moderation under Command, preſerved within proper Limits: That, from hence we may diſtinguiſh and deduce Acts of the *Will* enjoyned by this Virtue. Theſe voluntary Acts are comprehended under (that one moſt univerſal Appellation, moſt diffuſive, and, at the ſame Time, moſt operative) *Benevolence*. This one Viriue (*i. e.* Benevolence) operates, and exerts itſelf in all Affections and Attempts to procure and obtain Things pleaſing both to GOD and Man; As, alſo in all thoſe Affections and Attempts to remove and baniſh all ſuch Objects as are diſagreeable to every rational Nature. For, ſince it is the proper Office of Benevolence to provide and take Care that nothing ſhall happen contrary to the Common Good; or, in Caſe, by any Accident, it ſhould ſo happen that the Common Good is oppoſed, in order therefore to remove and correct, as ſoon as poſſible, every ſuch Oppoſition, there ariſes that radical eſſential Branch of this Virtue called *Equity:* or, that *particular Virtue* which fully marks out and diſtinguiſhes ſuch a Propenſity or Will as is inured and habituated, by Rules of Prudence, to correct and amend all Errors and Miſtakes in Decrees, Sentences and Judgments, determined either by the Law itſelf, or eſtabliſhed by Courts of Civil Judicature, other than what the Nature of Common Good, under given Circumſtances, requires. It frequently happens, either thro' a vague, indeterminate Signification of Words, or thro' ſome Incapacity in Law-givers and Judges to provide againſt all poſſible Caſes which can happen, that, Rulers and Governors may wander and deviate from that very End itſelf, which, with Sincerity and Honeſty, they determined originally to inculcate and eſtabliſh. A true Love, therefore, for the public Good demands from Rulers and Legiſlators (upon an impartial full Enquiry into the Circumſtances of a particular Caſe at any Time before them, and which perhaps cou'd not poſſibly be foreſeen at a remoter Diſtance) to correct and amend all Miſtakes—That ſo, from clearer, cloſer and more perfect Enquiries, Points of Right, Law and Juſtice, which in the original Conſtitution of Civil Societies were not ſo happily and advantagiouſly contrived, may receive proper Correction and Amendment. Every Sentence, Decree or Judgment, with Equity and good Conſcience, derives its whole Authority from this *one General Natural Law*. And, conſequently, this *one Law* is the true original Source and Fountain-Head of all *Equity*. And, indeed, in my Opinion, the Mention of Equity here is not at all unſeaſonable. For, altho' we freely allow that the Uſe of Equity is ſignally remarkable in correcting and amending

Laws

Moderatio Imperata. See Page 477.

Equity defined. A cloſe Affinity between Equity and Moderation.

The Neceſſity of Equity.

Laws of Civil Inſtitution, and altho' we cannot, in this Place, ſo clearly and diſtinctly explain the Nature of this Virtue, ſince we have not hitherto fully explained the original Make and Frame of inſtituted Laws in Civil Society:——Yet, becauſe this *Virtue, Equity*, contains in it many excellent Uſes and Applications, not only where the inſtituted Laws of Civil Society are ſilent, but alſo in the original Frame and Make of theſe Laws: This Virtue *Equity* therefore could not well, in my Opinion, be paſſed over, without ſome Notice.

SECT. VIII.

THE whole Sum and Subſtance of what has been already ſaid turns upon this one Point: That, a prudent well regulated Benevolence, exerted towards all rational Beings, ſeverally and reſpectively, fulfils the one moſt univerſal Law of Nature. *Benevolence* will, at all Times, propoſe to our View the beſt End, and oblige us to apply ourſelves, with all our Affections and by all poſſible Endeavours, to the Practice of it. *Benevolence* will likewiſe fix juſt Limits to theſe Affections and Endeavours, which muſt anſwer the full Attainment of the *beſt End:*——And ſuch Bounds or Limits as theſe are, upon this very Account, the beſt. *i. e.* Becauſe, they beſt ſubſerve and miniſter *to this* one *very beſt End itſelf.*

There is no Occaſion here, as ſome vainly imagine, to aſſign and ſpecify particular diſtinct Virtues to govern and regulate our various different Affections:—And for this plain Reaſon, becauſe the ſame Care or Concern, which we employ in effecting and bringing about any End, will alſo raiſe in us a *Love* to thoſe Means which are favourable and kind to it; will raiſe Love. in us a *Deſire* for the immediate Preſence of theſe Means when abſent from Deſire. us; will raiſe in us the *Hope* of enjoying them, if the future Expectation Hope. appears probable, and will raiſe in us *Joy*, when in the actual Poſſeſſion Joy. of them. And—on the contrary, upon an equal Foundation of Reaſoning, the ſame Care and Concern, which we employ towards the Attainment of any End, will, as effectually, create and raiſe in us *Hatred* againſt ſuch Hatred. Means as prove deſtructive of an End; will raiſe in us an *Averſion* an *Hor-* Averſion. *ror*, an *Avoidance*, a *Fear* of them when abſent; and will affect us with Fear. *Grief*, when preſent: And, conſequently, for the very ſame Reaſon, if the Grief. End, which we ſeek and purſue, be ſuch as is commanded and laid down by the Law of Nature: and, if, likewiſe, the ſtudious Care or Concern about attaining to this End be conformable to this ſame *Law*, the Motions and Operations of all our Appetites and, Paſſions (at leaſt ſo far as, from any ſuch Cauſe, theſe our Affections our Appetites and Paſſions depend upon the State and Condition of human Nature) will proportionably be either *raiſed higher* or *ſunk lower*: Unleſs, perhaps, it might ſo happen, that, the Underſtanding be ſtupidly blind in perceiving and diſtinguiſhing the Objects of

them, *i. e.* the particular exiſting Cauſes of theſe our Affections. But againſt this Kind of Stupidity (upon Account of that fit Proportion of Love which we ſuppoſe due to the End it ſelf) every one will, be ſure and beyond all peradventure to guard and defend himſelf before-hand. This very ſame univerſal Benevolence, ſo far forth as it either coerces and keeps down in us all voluntary Motions, which oppoſe and contradict the Common Good, or as it corrects and amends them; But more eſpecially, thoſe Motions wherein the private Advantages of SELF are generally preferred to thoſe of the Public; ſuch a Benevolence as this, I ſay comprehends in it *Innocence*, *Lenity* or *Mildneſs*, *Repentance*, *Reſtitution* or *Satisfaction*, and *Self-Denial*. So far as *Benevolence* comprehends in it an uniform, effectual, open Intention of conferring Favours Benefits and Kindneſſes, it muſt raiſe in us benign human Sentiments concerning others: And this falls under the Notion of that Term, which we call *Candour*. Whenever we engage in Promiſes and punctually perform ſuch Promiſes, then, this Virtue is term'd *Fidelity*.

Innocence, Lenity, Repentance, Reſtitution, Self-denial.

Candour,

Fidelity,

Gratitude.

Again, this very Self-ſame univerſal Benevolence, as it will, in proportional higher Degrees, love and regard the bright diſtinguiſhing eminent Cauſes of the common Good, ſo it will proportionably impreſs upon the human Mind a deep Senſe of Gratitude, and render Mankind grateful and full of Acknowledgments for Favours received.

Gratitude defined.

Becauſe, Gratitude, to define it, is nothing elſe than an exalted Benevolence exerted towards them, who were benevolent to us firſt. Neither does this Virtue, *Gratitude* indeed, properly ſo called, lay any Obligation upon us, except there be ſome Benefit firſt conferred and beſtowed upon us, and without the leaſt Injury or Prejudice to any other. It is that particular Virtue which obliges us to make all Returns in our Power for Favours received: but——always under this Reſtriction, that, no one public Advantage is either injured or diminiſhed by it. Now notwithſtanding, That, *univerſal Love*, ſincerely endeavours to render all Objects and Things acceptable to the whole, or Parts collectively taken, of the rational Syſtem: Yet it is ſuch a Love as pays the Principal the firſt Regards to thoſe Agents, who both can and will beſt benefit the whole univerſal Community; ſuch Agents, for Inſtance, are, in the firſt Place, GOD and they, who, by divine and rational Appointment, are placed in Authority, whether Eccleſiaſtical or Civil, over us: Or, in the ſecond Place, *They*, who, from the State and Condition of human Nature, can prove in a proportionable Degree of Benefit and Advantage, as for Inſtance, alſo, in the third Place, every Man who can ſerve beſt, and prove moſt advantagious to *himſelf*, *to his own Family*, to his own Poſterity, his Relations and Kindred.

How the ſpecial Laws are deduced from the General Law.

For, in theſe few Reſpects, Degrees, and Relations, are comprehended the *ſpecial Laws of Nature*, and of all *Virtues* both *particular*, or perſonal. As alſo, the ſocial, ſacred, divine Virtues: And, likewiſe the Virtues of Civil Society; and *laſtly*, Thoſe Virtues of *Oeconomy* or Family.

And

And, under theſe few Relations or Reſpects of Duty alſo, we ſhew after what Manner this one ſingle Affection, or ſtrong Propenſity [*Benevolence*] towards the Common Good is fully, from the very Nature of it, ſufficient to promote all theſe relative Duties and Offices. And the Reaſon is, Becauſe univerſal Love or Benevolence naturally oppoſes and contradicts all Motions of a contrary Tendency; as alſo, it promotes the effective Cauſes, and all the particular ſeveral Branches of ſuch an Affection, which ſo radically inhere in it. From hence it manifeſtly appears, that, the very ſame Law which lays the Obligation of ſuch an Affection, lays the Obligation at the ſame Time alſo, of Coercion, of Reſtraint, upon all Motions and Attempts oppoſite to, and deſtructive of ſuch an Affection. And from hence it as manifeſtly follows, that Cauſes, co-operating with this Affection, muſt and ought to be encouraged, helped, promoted: And, for the ſame Reaſon alſo, all the conſtituent Branches of every Object, which properly belongs to this ſo noble an Affection, muſt be eſteem'd and regarded, but more eſpecially thoſe *Branches* (i. e. thoſe *Duties*, *Offices* and *Virtues*) which I have hitherto mentioned.

SECT. IX.

Laſtly, I judge it proper here to mention only, that, the Diſtinction, between *Acts neceſſary*, *and Acts indifferent*, takes it's Riſe from the Relation or Reſpect which Acts naturally bear to an Effect intended, an End propoſed and laid down by and in the Univerſal Law of Nature.—— Acts, I mean, without the Practice of which, we cannot by any Means poſſible promote and execute the propoſed End juſt now mentioned, are Acts neceſſary, and they only. Whereas, Acts of equal Efficacy and Effect with other Acts, *i. e.* Acts which Logicians call *Æquipollent*, in producing this ſame End, we call *Acts indifferent*; they being ſuch Acts concerning which the Law of Nature has not expreſsly and poſitively determined, whether we ought to act in one Manner preferable to another. The Law of Nature determines and commands thoſe Acts only which contribute ſuch or ſuch a Quantity of Efficacy or Virtue towards the Common Good in any how or Manner, where Means are equally indifferent.

By neceſſary Acts our Author here underſtands moral Duties which always carry in them an indiſpenſible neceſſary Obligation. Here we are to obſerve, that the Neceſſity which a moral Agent lies under to act ſuitable to certain ſtated rational Rules differs widely from that Neceſſity which is termed *Phyſical* or Natural *See Page* 385.

Now in ſuch Acts as theſe there is a Latitude allowed to the moſt extenſive Liberty or Freedom: And, alſo, in all ſuch poſitive Laws, as circumſcribe this Liberty within narrower Bounds. To convey more clearly into my own Mind the Diſtinction between Acts *neceſſary* and *indifferent*, I frequently take my Illuſtration from the Praxes generally uſed in conſtructing Geometrical Problems. Some of theſe Praxes are ſo neceſſary, that the Geometrical Problems cannot be conſtructed without them. Whereas in many other Queſtions, there are many Methods which offer and preſent themſelves

ſelves in conſtructing the Problem given; and, which are equally applicable, without any Geometrical Error: So that, in the Conſtruction of ſuch Problems, the Geometrician is left at free Liberty to uſe, at one Time, one Conſtruction, and, at another Time, another Conſtruction: And, at one Time, to apply one Method, and, at another Time, to apply a different Method, juſt as he himſelf pleaſes. And, yet, in every Method poſſible, he is fixed and ty'd down to ſome certain Geometrical Rules, by which ultimately, at the Concluſion of his practical Operation, the Solution muſt be intirely uniform and the ſame with his Queſtion ſought. There is likewiſe another Compariſon equally applicable to our preſent Caſe. *E. G.* It is now, and has been ever ſince the World grew ſo populous, left to the Diſcretion of Man to lead either a ſingle or a married Life.—And yet—in both Conditions of Life, Man is bound down, by certain Laws, not to commit any Act againſt the *Common Good*; but, in both Conditions, to ſtudy and promote equally ſuch a *Good*.

SECT. X.

I Have not, however, all this while, determined, how neceſſary it is to reduce all theſe Duties under the Form of Laws natural. For, under ſuch a Form, the Reader views all thoſe Duties diſtinctly and ſeparately, which, as I have demonſtrated, are comprehended, within the one univerſal Law of Nature. By a natural Sagacity, every one can diſcover the Law directing to the Knowledge and Practice of *Prudence*, *Conſtancy*, *Perſeverance*, *Reſolution*, *Moderation*, *Equity*, *a General Good-Will*, *Love*, &c. *Which Virtues*, always, and without Exception, muſt be acquired and exerciſed, in order to promote and effect *the Common Good of All*, provided that we remember, and well obſerve, that the Eſſence, the ſubſtantial Form of theſe Laws, is clearly manifeſted (as drawn and deduced from the Phænomena and Appearances of Nature) to be either really thus, or at leaſt, an Eſſence and ſubſtantial Form extremely like unto it. The firſt Cauſe, Creator and Author of Nature has clearly reveal'd to Mankind, how neceſſary it is to the common Happineſs of all, and to the private Happineſs of each (which private Happineſs can only be expected, from proſecuting and promoting the Common Happineſs) that, each and all Individuals ſingly and conjunctively ſhould purſue with *Prudence*, *Perſeverance* and *Conſtancy* the public *Common Good:* Or, in other Words, a Law, once clearly laid down, commanding the Proſecution of *Common Good*, according to the beſt of our Abilities: That there is at the ſame Time a Law as clearly laid down, commanding the Duty and Practice of *Prudence*, *Conſtancy*, *Perſeverance*, *Fidelity*, (i. e. The faithful Performance of Contracts, Promiſes, Engagements, *&c.*) Laws natural are equally ſound and rational,

rational, commanding the Obligation of entering into *Contracts*, *Promiſes*, *Bargains*, and ſuch like, and of faithfully executing and obſerving the ſame. ——And of habitually exerciſing ourſelves in the Duties and Practices of Gratitude. And the Reaſon is, becauſe all theſe Duties ſtand upon an equal Footing with all Acts and Behaviour towards Beings intirely rational. Whereas, there are many other human Acts, which, altho' they prove uſeful and ſubſervient to the Good and Happineſs of the whole rational Community, are not, however, more immediately, and in a more particular peculiar Manner applicable to certain Parts or Members only, of ſuch an univerſal Community.—And, Conſequently, the true Origin of Property and Dominion muſt, in the next Place, be examined and enquired into: Where we are to take Notice that, in Writings of moral Philoſophy, the *Terms*, *Property* and *Dominion* are taken in a more extended Acceptation than what is generally underſtood by Civilians in their Writings upon theſe Subjects.

CHAP. VII.

Concerning the Origin *of* Dominion *and the* Moral Virtues.

SECT. I.

A Compariſon between the Laws of Nature in general, and the particular Laws comprehended under it, taken from the Animal Body in General, and the Conſtituent Parts and Members of ſuch a Body.

1. AS the animal-Oeconomy is indeed truly, but not ſufficiently, explained, by informing us that the whole Syſtem of an Animal Body is ſupported by a conſtant Circulation of Blood: So, in like Manner, is the Society of all rational Agents, and with equal Truth, ſaid to be preſerved by thoſe reciprocal Duties and mutual Offices, which, with united Force, operate for the public Advantage: And yet, this Doctrine is not, to any Satisfaction, explained, unleſs we firſt prove what theſe Acts, in their Conſequences, are: that, they are Acts ſeverally diſtributed to all the various Members of the ſocial Syſtem as neceſſary to this End, in what Manner ſuch Acts are deſigned, and how applicable to the particular Uſes of each Part reſpectively. In order to arrive at a clearer and more compleat Knowledge of Animals, it is requiſite to ſhew, what is the Share or Proportion in the whole Maſs of Blood which ought to circulate thro' the Brain and upper Regions of the Body; and, how much ought to ſupply the Lower, as for Inſtance, the Liver and Spleen: As alſo, in what Proportions the alimentary nutritious Juices ought to ſupply and be diſtributed thro' the nobler vital Parts of the Body at leaſt.

2. It is, moreover neceſſary here to obſerve, that, thoſe Ducts and Veſſels which convey animal Spirits and vital Nouriſhment to any one Part, do not only miniſter to the private Advantage of that ſingle Part, but alſo, by the ſame Conveyance and Operation, ſubſerve and anſwer to the Health and Well-

Well-Being of the Whole. ſince each Part is more or leſs ſerviceable to the Whole. The Caſe holds the ſame in all Particulars which properly belong to the individual Members of the Body ſocial, *i e.* All ſuch Particulars with the ſame Fitneſs, Propriety and Advantage, as conſtantly miniſter Service to the whole Society.

SECT. II.

Univerſal Happineſs eſtabliſhed upon the Dominion and Property of Individuals reſpectively.

See Chap. 1. Sect. 22. Page 65.

WE ſee then, that the whole original Right over *Perſons* and *Things* (uſually and with a juſt Propriety, diſtinguiſhed by the Terms, *Dominion* and *Property*) is, from what has been already ſaid, built upon the Foundation here eſtabliſhed. For, ſince, under the Notion, *univerſal Happineſs* the conſummate Glory of *ALMIGHTY GOD and the Perfections in Man, both of Mind and Body* are comprehended: And, ſince, we clearly diſcover from the Nature of Things, how neceſſary to theſe two great Ends, it is, that, we, not only, employ many Acts of Mankind in General; but alſo, the various and many Uſes diſcoverable in Things, (which Acts and Uſes cannot prove ſerviceable to different Ends and Purpoſes at one and the ſame Time: It therefore follows, that, Mankind, who are obliged to promote and purſue the Common Good, ſhould be obliged to conſent and agree, that the Uſes diſcoverable in Things and the Acts or Endeavours of free rational Agents, ſo far as they become neceſſary to Individuals in order to ſerve the Public Good, ſhould in ſuch Degrees be granted to the Individuals themſelves, that, ſo long, as this Neceſſity continues, the Individuals cannot with Juſtice be deprived of the Benefits ariſing from ſuch *Uſes* and *Acts:* Which, in other Words, is ſaying, that, theſe Advantages and Rights, for ſome certain Time at leaſt, become the Property ſpecifically of Individuals; and, by Conſequence, ſo far are their *own*. But, becauſe Times and Occaſions, Neceſſities and Wants are of ſuch a Nature, as by a continual Series and perpetual Succeſſion to await all and every one Individual, ſome certain Continuance of Property or Right to an Uſe in ſuch Things, and to the Aſſiſtance of Perſons neceſſary, will follow of Courſe, for ſo long a Time, I mean, as during the natural Life of the Individual reſpectively.

See Pages 69, 70, 71.

But to argue upon this Point with a ſtill cloſer Attention. If a private Property in ſome Things, as for Inſtance, in Lands or Gardens, proves ſufficient to anſwer this End for ſo many Days or Years: The ſame Foundation of Reaſon which gave the original Right at firſt over ſuch Poſſeſſions for one Day, will give an equal Right the Day following, and ſo on with a Continuance, provided always that other Circumſtances, *Cæteris Paribus*, continue the ſame, and by theſe Gradations and Steps, by this Series of Conſequences, in Truth and Reality it is, that, Reaſon leads, perſuades

and

and directs Mankind into a Conſent proper for the Settlement, Determination and Eſtabliſhment of a private Right in, and a Dominion over, a Property in Things: And, by as natural a Progreſs alſo, in a Dominion over Perſons; that is, ſuch perſonal Helps and Aſſiſtances as are neceſſary to *Common Happineſs*.

For, Reaſon directly concludes, that, the Obligation which we lie under to purſue that one grand End, which we have already evinced and proved, introduces the Obligation alſo upon us to purſue the Means only and above all, moſt neceſſary: Namely, the Conſent of all Individuals to ſome certain Diviſion of Things, Poſſeſſions, human Labours, Endeavours and Aſſiſtances: It being impoſſible, as Nature is now circumſtanced, that, the ſame Thing or Object; or, that the ſame Induſtry of the one ſame individual Man can ſerve and obey the diſcording, jarring Will and Pleaſure of Multitudes.——And the Foundation of ſuch a Contradiction as this is evident; Becauſe the Things which we ourſelves uſe and apply to our own Purpoſes: And the Limbs of Mankind, by the Exerciſe of which, their viſible outward Effects are performed, (both the one and the other, I ſay,) are corporeal; and, for this Reaſon, conſequently, at any given Point of Time, are circumſcribed within ſome one certain Place: So that, the Motion of both, whereby they can prove ſerviceable to any one, is directed to one ſingle Point or aim at the Time given: And, from hence, of Conſequence, it muſt happen, that the ſame Food and Raiment, neceſſary to preſerve Life in one Individual, cannot, at the ſame Time, effectually perform the ſame Preſervation in another Individual: And yet, remotely, according to Truth, ſuch Food and Raiment (by the Mediation of the Individual thus nouriſhed) can and may prove of Uſe and Service to many. From hence, therefore, by a ſtrict Concluſion of Reaſoning, it clearly follows, that, the Nature of Things fully declares how neceſſary it is to the Happineſs, Life and Health of Individuals (upon which all other human Advantages eſſentially depend) that, the Uſes of Things ſhould be limited, at leaſt, for ſome certain Time, to Individuals reſpectively, and to their reſpective Uſes only, excluſive of all others whatſoever. And, from hence it is as manifeſt alſo, that, ſo general a Conſent, limiting private Property to one at once, is, and upon an equal Footing of Reaſon, as neceſſary alſo to promote the Common Happineſs of all: And this Truth is eſtabliſhed upon Self-evidence, upon this Maxim, *That the Whole differs nothing from, but is intirely the ſame with, all it's Parts taken together.* Upon a ſtrict Analogy of Reaſoning it is therefore evident, that, in all ſucceeding Times, ſuch a Limitation, thus for a Time ſettled, ſhould in the ſame Manner be continued, for the ſame End or Purpoſe, whether as to the ſame Things, or as to other Things capable of producing the ſame Effect, and anſwering to the ſame End—— Now——in this continued Limitation of Things and of human Labours neceſſary to the Life and Health and integral Happineſs of Individuals, is eſſentially contain'd the whole Eſſence, Energy and Virtue of a Property

See Note at Chap. 1. Sect. 22. Page 65.

in, and Dominion over, Things neceſſary: We muſt here, however, allow at the ſame Time, that, ſuch a Limitation is capable of receiving ſome additional Obligation from the inſtituted Laws of Civil Society.——Nature therefore clearly informs us, that, a Right in, and Dominion over, Things and Perſons for the Common Good of All, muſt, from down-right Neceſſity, be inſtituted, ſettled and eſtabliſhed, ſuppoſing it poſſible that no ſuch Inſtitution, had originally, at the firſt Moment of Time, been made: Or, rather, ſince ſuch Dominion and Property are actually, at preſent, ſettled and eſtabliſhed, that they muſt have been delivered down, and are preſerved to us by the *original firſt Cauſe himſelf* ALMIGHTY GOD.

See the Note at Chap. 8. Sect. 2.

SECT. III.

The Right of Individuals to Dominion and Property, as derived from the Law of Nature, reduced into the Form of a moral Propoſition.

WHAT we here offer concerning *Dominion* and *Property*, as of Right belonging to Individuals ſingly and reſpectively, may be ſettled into the Term of a Law of Nature by the following Method or Proceſs. "The Nature of Things created by the firſt Cauſe *ALMIGHTY* "*GOD* openly declares it his Divine Will, that, the voluntary Acts of ra"tional Creatures (neceſſary to preſerve and conſtitute a Property in In"dividuals reſpectively, as to ſome particular Things and Perſons) are "abſolutely neceſſary towards an effective, effectual Execution of the "Common Good. And, conſequently, that, all-rational Creatures are "obliged, by the ſame Law, by the ſame Rewards and Puniſhments, to "eſtabliſh, *i.e.* to acknowledge and preſerve ſome certain Dominion, "whereby they are obliged to purſue the Public Good as much as in them "lies." Or, to expreſs the ſame Meaning otherwiſe in ſhorter Terms:

A Law, having been once enacted and publiſhed, about procuring and aſcertaining the Common Happineſs of all, a Natural Law is, at the very ſame Time, enacted and publiſhed, about conſtituting and maintaining the Rights reſpectively belonging and proper to Individuals ſingly and apart in all ſuch Things as are apparently neceſſary to the Happineſs of each, (both as to Perſons and their Endeavours) which are requiſite to a mutual Aſſiſtance, as well as a Right to other Things alſo.——Now, under this Law there are two principal Branches or Heads comprehended.

1. "That there be rendered unto GOD the Things that are GOD's."

2. "That there be rendered unto Man, the Things that are Man's."

And, that, both theſe Dues and Rights ſhould be preſerved inviolable, it is neceſſary, *Firſt*, That the Honour and Glory, which inherently and inſeparably belong to ALMIGHTY GOD, ſhould be effectually ſecured. And, *Secondly*, That all ſuch Benefits, Helps and Aſſiſtances, Advantages and Emoluments, by which Man can either preſerve and perfect each himſelf reſpectively or prove uſeful to others, ſhould be effectually ſecured

to Mankind. Theſe two material Concerns are contained in the End propoſed and deſigned, *namely*, the *Common Good*. I determined it then for the beſt to uſe the indefinite Terms *Proprietatis vel Dominii cujuſdam*, becauſe Nature, I muſt freely confeſs, does not always diſcover, that, a Property of this Kind (ſo cloſely annex'd to a full and equal Diviſion of Things) is ſo very Material and Neceſſary: Becauſe it fully conſtitutes the eſſential Nature of true Property or Dominion, that, every one ſhould hold a Right defended by Law, either to poſſeſs or make over ſome certain Advantages which he enjoys, in a Thing or a Poſſeſſion, (in an undivided Farm, for inſtance) which he uſes and enjoys in Common with others, and, from which, it is not by any Means lawful for another to exclude and turn him out.

If any one is pleaſed to contend with me, and ſay, that the Term, for Inſtance, *Property* or *Dominion*, is not ſo well adapted in the preſent Caſe, I ſhall not fall out with him about a Word. What I am wholely concerned about is the Thing itſelf. *Grotius* (*Book* 2. *Chap.* 2. *Section* 2. *De Jure Belli & Pacis*) acknowledges that the Uſe, the Enjoyment, the Poſſeſſion of ſuch a general Right as this, ſupplies the Place of *private Property*. (1)

(1) *By private Property* I mean, ſuch a Right to any Thing as to make it my own, excluſive of all others Right or Claim to it: And, that there cou'd be no ſuch Thing as this in a State of Purity, except in our firſt Parents themſelves, ſeems to me, I muſt confeſs, little leſs, than demonſtratively certain. For, a State of Purity is a State, where all Things are govern'd by right Reaſon; and, as Reaſon is then only right, when it agrees with the Natures and Reaſons of Things, ſo no Man could have any natural Right to any Thing any farther, or any longer, than as Reaſon ſhould judge, he had a natural Want of it; And, had Mankind continued in this State of Purity, as all their Wants would have been regulated by Reaſon, ſo (it were eaſy to prove, if there were Occaſion) all Things would have continued common, as I ſaid before. But, when this State of Purity was loſt, and inſtead of all their Operations being govern'd by Reaſon, the Fleſh began to luſt againſt the Spirit, and the Members to wage War againſt the Mind, when Mens Luſts and Appetites grew heady and extravagant, as their Wants would naturally increaſe by the Increaſe of their Luſts, ſo from the Increaſe of their Wants, there would ariſe a Neceſſity of larger Supplies, and theſe larger Supplies would naturally beget Monopolies and Incloſures, and thoſe Incloſures would as naturally beget Contention, and Contention as naturally beget Confuſion. Now, whether out of an obvious Senſe of this, Mankind might not of themſelves agree upon a certain Diviſion of ſuch Portions of Lands, as they thought convenient for their Families: Or, whether our firſt Parents, who were the only Perſons, who could have any Pretence to any Property in any Thing, might not make a Diſtribution to their Children, and allot them their reſpective Portions for the Prevention of Diſpute: Or, whether they might not leave their Children at Liberty to take what they pleas'd, and give them ſome general Rule of Property, *That whatever any one ſhould poſſeſs: he ſhould enjoy as his own*, which we call the Law of Occupancy: And ſo, as Families increas'd, they might tranſplant themſelves, and whilſt they had the Range of the World before them, they might take to themſelves, without Injury to any one, what they ſhould find their Occaſion requir'd. Whether it might be this, or any other Way, it is not poſſible to determine at this Diſtance, nor is it indeed very material to be inquir'd into, were it not to gratify our Curioſity: Which Way ſoever the Diviſion came, 'tis certain that one Time or other there was ſome Diviſion or Appropriation

I could not, indeed, deviſe a Word which more expreſsly declares *how* and *in what Manner*, the Proſecution of the Common Good requires, that, a Property of ſome Kind ſhould ſo belong to Individuals reſpectively and ſingly, that, it can't be lawful for another, either to deny ſuch a Property to the Individual, or to deprive him of it: And, by this Method of Inveſtigation, alſo, it is, as demonſtratively proved, that ſuch an *Hobbian* War, as muſt neceſſarily ariſe from that, (Mr. *Hobbes*'s fictitious imaginary) *Right of all over all*, is abſolutely illegal and abſurd. In the beſt conſtituted Civil States it is manifeſt, that, many Things are held and occupied by many in common, without a diſtinct ſeparate Diviſion: And, that, ſome of theſe Many have a Right to a larger Share of the whole Profit and Produce than other ſome: And, that, even in ſuch compound Property, there is a quiet, a peaceable Enjoyment: Neither indeed can it be doubted (without any critical Niceties of abſtracted Reaſoning) but, that, the ſame quiet Enjoyment in a common compound Property can be effected and ſecured, even by a Civil Authority. A *Right*, then, to uſe, and diſpoſe of Things, and a *Right* to certain Helps and Aſſiſtances from Mankind: (and ſuch Rights are they as cannot be violated without breaking thro' the Law of Nature, and the Divine Authority of ALMIGHTY GOD, who has vouchſafed his full Sanction to guard ſuch a diſtinct Poſſeſſion of Things and Perſons: Such Rights as theſe, I ſay,) come under our Notion and Appellation of *Proprietatis aut Dominii cujuſdam)* ſome certain *Property* or *Dominion*.

SECT. IV.

Juſtinian's Definition of univerſal Juſtice conſider'd.

HAving, thus, with ſome Pains and Labour, explained theſe ſeveral material Articles of Enquiry, I ſhall now (as being a Time proper) ſubjoin, that, the Law which I have already eſtabliſhed, is, that very natural Law, wherein *univerſal Juſtice* is enjoyned and commanded. And, the Reaſon is, becauſe this Law (*i. e.* of Nature) lays no other Command upon us, than is comprehended in *Juſtinian*'s Definition of *Juſtice* properly cleared and explained.——And, which is expreſſed in the following Words: *Juſtitia eſt conſtans & perpetua Voluntas, Jus ſuum cuique tribuendi.* "Juſtice is a conſtant Propenſity or Deſire of allowing and giving "to every one what really and truly is his Right."

See the Appendix N°. 3. Page 63.

Whereas we aſſert that all *voluntary Acts* are enjoined and commanded by the ſame Law which enjoyns and commands the beſt Prudence, And, conſequently,

propriation made, and from this Diviſion there aroſe a Property.

And now the great Queſtion comes in Place, how Mankind happen'd to fall into this Method of ſecuring their Properties, which we call Government, whether by the Appointment of GOD, or by the Agreement and Contrivance of Men. *See the Rev. Mr.* Thomas Burnet's *Eſſay upon Government*, Pages 17, 18, 19, 20. *See* Chap. 1. Sections 22, 23, 28.

conſequently, a *Conſtancy*, a *Reſolution*, a *Moderation*, and even *Benevolence* itſelf, *&c.* Upon this very Account, therefore, we have provided, that the Inclination, the Deſire or Will, employed upon ſuch laſting valuable Virtues, ſhould be conſtant, reſolute, permanent.—Now, *That Right*, which *Juſtinian*, in his Definition of *Juſtice*, has attributed to any and every one, we aſſert and maintain, reſpects and belongs to all rational Beings: And conſequently, to *ALMIGHTY GOD himſelf.*——And from hence ariſes that natural and juſt Diſtinction between 1. Things *Divine*. 2. Things *Human*. 3. Things *Sacred*, and 4. Things *Profane* or *Common*. In a Word we underſtand *Right* under ſo univerſal an Attribute, that, whatſoever Quality or Property is peculiar to any *one*, (and which Right has, in Times paſt, been eſtabliſhed either by *ALMIGHTY GOD* himſelf, or by Mankind, to have been a Right Proper and Peculiar) ſhould be preſerved to each reſpectively inviolable: And moreover, as to thoſe Things or Poſſeſſions, which have not as yet become the Property of any one Individual or Individuals, we muſt agree upon that Kind of Diſtribution amongſt all as may moſt effectually ſecure Peace; and, as effectually preſerve and eſtabliſh an univerſal Laſting Happineſs. The Terms are, with a Propriety clear and intelligible enough, explained after this Manner:—And, beyond all Diſpute, the Definition carries in it the ſame eſſential Efficacy and Intent to diſtribute Things, Poſſeſſions and human Labours, ſo, as to become a Publick Good, and to preſerve them, when once thus divided or diſtributed, for the ſame End and Purpoſe.——And——for this very Reaſon, therefore, the ſame univerſal general Law of Nature commands both Kinds of Conſent, *i. e.* to make ſuch a Diſtribution, if none be already made, or to preſerve ſuch a Diſtribution, if one (*i. e.* a Diſtribution) be already made, as is beſt fitted and moſt ſuitable to the State and Condition of Things for the Time being, in order beſt to anſwer that one End which originally and principally ought to be purſued and regarded.

We may, alſo here farther add, that, this very ſame Law of Nature clearly and expreſsly commands Mankind to act that eſſential Duty called *Repentance*, and to make Reſtitution as much as in us lies, for all Injuries and Wrongs, whenſoever, at any Time we have committed any Tranſgreſſions which call upon us to act theſe Duties. For, in the Laws of Nature, Accuracies and Niceties of Expreſſion are not ſo much regarded (which is generally the Caſe in expreſſing and wording the written poſitive Laws of human Inſtitution:) No,——far from it,——Becauſe, in the Laws of Nature, the principal Concern is an effectual Attainment of *the one Grand End deſired*. As for Inſtance, *Firſt*, *The Common Good of All* is beſt obtained by *an unerring conſtant never-failing Juſtice*. And, *Secondly*, If any Violation of this ſupreme Cardinal Virtue at any Time happens (which alaſs! thro' the Weakneſs, Infirmity and Corruption of human Nature, is too too frequently the Caſe) then the Common Good is to be obtained and reſtored by *Repentance* and *Reſtitution*.

SECT.

SECT. V.

The Diſtinction between Things and Perſons ſacred, and between Things and Perſons of common Uſe.

THERE is here laid before us the openeſt View, the moſt extenſive Proſpect of Enquiry: *Firſt*, Into the Right, Dominion and Authority of ALMIGHTY GOD over Things and Perſons: And into the Manner how Mankind are taught this Divine Dominion, Right and Authority. And, *Secondly*, Into the Dominion of Man, whether ſuch a Dominion be exerciſed over ſuch Things as are of private Concern and mutual Dealings between Man and Man: Or, over ſuch Things as of common Right belong to All; or over the ſingle Individual himſelf.——Theſe are the Articles of Precept laid down in the *Decalogue or Ten Commandments*. Theſe are the Duties ſo fully handled by *H. Grotius in his Rights of War and Peace*. Book 2. Chap. 2. and by many other Writers ſince his Time. But, I here paſs over the firſt of theſe, leſt I chance to entangle myſelf in a Theological Controverſy, and the ſecond I likewiſe paſs by, leſt I ſwell this Volume to too large a Size. I judge it neceſſary, however, here to give my Reader one Caution. *Namely*, That, this general Law of Nature fixes one very material Diſtinction between ſuch Things and Perſons as are dedicated and conſecrated to ALMIGHTY GOD: And ſuch as are allowed to the Uſe and Service of *Man*.

Now—This diſtinct Diſtribution of *Right* and *Dominion* neceſſarily implies in it the *Divine Univerſal Dominion* over all Things, ſo juſtly aſcribed to ALMIGHTY GOD:—*A Dominion* perfectly-conſiſtent with the ſubordinate Rights, Privileges and Properties of Mankind in the ſame Things.—And—it implies in it, as neceſſarily alſo, *a Divine Right*, *a Dominion* peculiar to ALMIGHTY GOD HIMSELF—Not only in *Perſons* (ſuch as *Kings* and *Prieſts*,)—but alſo,—in Things, Times and Places ſet a-part and dedicated to him, to his worſhip and Service.

From the ſame original Fountain flow all thoſe good Laws circumſcribing and directing Mankind in *Things conſecrated* to ALMIGHTY GOD: Such, for Inſtance, are the Laws granting Privileges and Immunities to *Perſons* and *Things ſacred*:——And——on the contrary, All Laws, limiting the Powers of alienating Poſſeſſions, Goods, Chattels, *&c.* capable, formerly, of being granted, deviſed and made over to (what the Lawyers call) *a Mortua Manus*, *a Mortmain*, a *Dead Hand*.——I content myſelf with a bare Mention only, and as it were by the by, of theſe Points. Becauſe my principal Deſign, in this *Philoſophical Enquiry*, is, only to ſhew, that, all the Right, which we are capable of acquiring, is either over ourſelves, which is termed *Liberty*: Or, over Things, either by taking the Poſſeſſion of them, *i. e. Occupancy*, or by *Diſtribution*: Or, ſuch a Right as is granted to us, over Perſons either by Birth, Conſent or Forfeiture upon ſome notorious Crime; by the Will of the firſt Cauſe ALMIGHTY GOD confirming,

See *Chambers's* Dictionary under the Word *Mortmain*.

Occupatio, Occupancy. the taking Poſſeſſion of what is vacant: Or, a Poſſeſſion of

firming, ſanctifying and ratifying that one primary Law concerning the Proſecution and Attainment of *the one univerſal Common Good.* From hence, by a clear Deduction of Conſequences it is proved, that, the whole Right of Mankind is deduced from ſome Law, and, by the ſame Law, that, the Rights of each and all ſingle Perſons or Individuals are ſo limited, that, no Body can have a Right to break in upon, and violate, Public Advantages, or to deprive any Man, who has not injured the Community, of either Life, or the Neceſſaries of Life, under a Pretence of enabling himſelf to ſerve *the common Public Good.*

those Things that belong to no private Perſon, but are capable of being made by it. *Wood*, Page 101. The Word *Delictum*, here ſignifies ſome Fault or Failure, which occaſions a Forfeiture.

SECT. VI.

NOW, altho' we have fitted and adapted (becauſe the Nature of Laws properly, ſo called, requires it,) all our Expreſſions to the State and Condition of rational Creatures, yet, we have uſed our beſt Caution to qualify theſe Expreſſions and render them applicable to ALMIGHTY GOD, ſo far as an Obſervance of the Laws of Nature is attributed to GOD *Analogically.* For, GOD is univerſally acknowledged *Juſt, Beneficent, pitiful or merciful,* &c. No Man of Common Underſtanding can imagine that the firſt Cauſe ALMIGHTY GOD is ſubject to any Laws, (ſuppoſing Laws to be apprehended as practical Precepts or Rules of Action injoined and ſanctified by the Will, *i.e. the Reward or Puniſhment of ſome Superior*) and, conſequently, no Man can imagine, that, his Dominion, *i.e. the Divine Dominion of the firſt Cauſe*, is, or can be either eſtabliſhed or regulated by any Law taken in any ſuch Senſe or Meaning.

Origin of the Divine Dominion.

See the Notes at large upon Analogy in the Prolegomena, Chap. 10, Pages 27, 28, 29, &c.

Whereas, the Caſe is ſo far othewiſe, that, no one can, with Reſpect and Honour think of *GOD's Supreme Dominion over his Creatures*, who does not acknowledge *his Divine Wiſdom*:—And, that, he always propoſes to Himſelf the very beſt End: namely (*his own Honour*, and the *Happineſs of all other rational Agents:* Provided always that theſe Agents exerciſe and apply properly the Underſtanding and Will natural to them; And, that, this ſame *Wiſdom in GOD, as the firſt Cauſe*, requires alſo, that, the Neceſſaries of Life, convenient for Individuals reſpectively, be allowed to them, at leaſt ſo far, as to prevent any Violation of them under the Colour and Pretext of promoting *this one grand neceſſary End.* viz. *The Public Good.*——For, herein eſſentially conſiſts the Conſtitution, the Settlement of diſtinct Rights, Property and Dominion belonging to Individuals reſpectively.——And, in the Perfection of the Divine Nature, as eſſentially alſo is included that Propenſity or Will ſo perfectly conſiſtent with infinite Prudence or Wiſdom towards proſecuting and compleating the Supreme Good by Means beſt and fitteſt: Becauſe, in ſuch

ſuch a Conſent or Agreement, the moſt glorious Benevolence is comprehended. For, ſince, it redounds neceſſarily to the moſt tranſcendent Glory and Honour of ALMIGHTY GOD, as well as to the Preſervation and Perfection of the whole Syſtem; that, *ALMIGHTY GOD ſhould regulate and govern all Things according to the Purpoſes and Deſigns of his own Divine Intellect*; His own Divine Wiſdom, from the Perfection of it, always dictating thus much to him. Neither can there poſſibly be imagined, without ſuppoſing an Imperfection in the Divine Nature, any Will, any Propenſity, averſe and oppoſite to this Dictate of Divine Wiſdom. It is, moreover, clearly manifeſt, that, ſuch a Dictate of the Divine Intellect as this, (which is always thus exerciſed upon the End, and upon the Means naturally leading to this End,) is, at leaſt, analogous to, if not exactly the ſame with, that Propoſition which we have defined to be *the Law of Nature:* And it is as clearly manifeſt alſo, that the *Neceſſity moral* of perſevering in the Perfection of this his determined Will or Reſolution, *i.e.* his full Conſent (and Concurrence with this his own tranſcendently-perfect Underſtanding,) infinitely, and in the real Effect, ſurpaſſes all Sanction of any Law, as enforced by Rewards and Puniſhments. From whence it is, that, all the Acts of ALMIGHTY GOD will be uniform and conformable to the Dictates of his own pure Intellect, in proſecuting *the beſt End*, i. e. *The Common Good.* And, conſequently, they will be called true and juſt upon the ſame rational Foundation that ſuch Dictates themſelves are acknowledged to carry the Force and Obligation of Laws. And by the ſame Proceſs of Reaſoning, the Power of regulating and diſpoſing, (*as ſeemeth beſt to his own Divine Wiſdom*) all Things in a manner conſiſtent with this End and the Means neceſſary thereto, may be called *the Right or the Dominion of ALMIGHTY GOD over Things and Perſons eternally flowing from the Divine Inherent Perfection of his Nature*, as we have demonſtrated: So far, at leaſt, as herein is included all the Force or Obligation of a Law natural.

See Chap. 5. Sect. 1 Page 284, 285.

See the Difference between a Phyſical and a moral Neceſſity at Page 385.

I cannot indeed, after the matureſt Deliberation, ſee any Objection why the following Propoſition ſhould not be a Dictate of the Divine Intellect, *viz. It is neceſſary to the Common Good of all, that, the moſt fully compleat and the Supreme Authority and Power over all Creatures ſhould be aſſumed by ALMIGHTY GOD and reſerved to himſelf.*

Objection.

Anſwer.

Neither, indeed, can I ſee any Reaſon, why ſuch a Propoſition as this ſhould not carry in it the full Force and Authority of a Law: And, conſequently, become the ſolid Foundation of the Divine Dominion: Unleſs, perhaps, it may appear to ſome an Objection, that, ſuch a Dictate is not laid down and enforced by the Sanction of a Superior. Any ſuch Objection, however, cannot carry any Weight: becauſe, it is fully ſufficient to conſtitute the eſſential Force or Obligation of any Law, that, ſuch a Law be preſcribed and dictated by the ſupreme and moſt perfect Being: And that, this Law lay down the beſt End, as alſo the means neceſſary to this End:

Altho'

Altho', at the ſame Time, it is not pronounced or enacted by a Superior, which in the preſent Caſe is impoſſible. The outward viſible Recommendation of ſuch a Dictate by any Author, but ALMIGHTY GOD, cannot be neceſſary: becauſe, the intrinſic Perfection of his Divine Nature only (*i. e.* the nobleſt ſubſtantial Form and Eſſence of it, which is *pure Truth*) is abſolutely free from all Imperfection; and alſo, becauſe the very Author himſelf of this Propoſition or Dictate is infinitely and tranſcendantly more perfect than all other Beings who can poſſibly exiſt. Neither will ſuch a Propoſition, or Dictate as this, ſtand in need of any Sanction from Puniſhments to be inflicted by any other Cauſe: Becauſe, The Sanction here eſtabliſhed (upon Account of that inward inherent Propenſity in the Divine Will to promote the GREATEST GOOD,) cannot be violated by him.—For, ſhou'd we ſuppoſe the Divine Will to depart from the beſt End and from the Means neceſſary thereto, we muſt ſuppoſe, at the ſame Time, ALMIGHTY GOD, to have fallen off from his infinite Perfection, (becauſe, moſt certainly he would have been more perfect, had he not fallen off,) that is, in other Words, it is, ſuppoſing, ALMIGHTY GOD to have diveſted himſelf of his Divine Nature, which neceſſarily carries in it a manifeſt Contradiction. Upon the ſame Sanction, therefore, are eſtabliſhed the Dictates of the Divine Intellect over Laws, which always take Place in the Nature of GOD, from the *Immutability of his Perfections:* As when we uſually ſay, That the Oath of ALMIGHTY GOD, is confirmed and ratified, when he ſwears by himſelf and his own Life, *i. e.* when he ſwears by his own unchangeable Perfection to laſt for ever and ever, and World without End. Here, at the ſame Time, however, this Reſervation of the Supreme Dominion over all, which we attribute to ALMIGHTY GOD, is quite free, upon this very Account, from all Imputation of an Injury to any, becauſe no Law Prior can be tranſgreſſed, by aſcribing ſuch an Authority to ALMIGHTY GOD himſelf; neither can there poſſibly be produced any Foundation for Competition with him on his Creatures Part: Whoſe Exiſtence in the Beginning was only and barely poſſible, and by Conſequence, that, all the future Exiſtence of them and all their future Right to a Dominion of any Sort, all depended intirely upon the Bounty of the Divine Will.——But,——Beſides all this, the End, in Order to which, we affirm it neceſſary that ALMIGHTY GOD ſhou'd aſſume this Dominion to himſelf, (*namely*, the Common Good,) ſo fully regards the Happineſs of his Creatures, that no one Creature (if it be not his own Fault) can be injured or hurt either by theſe or any other Means neceſſary towards the Attainment of, each his own, Happineſs. In a Word——this Solution of the *Divine Right* or Authority into ſuch a Dictate of the Divine Intellect, and into the other Perfections ſo peculiarly belonging to the Divine Nature, muſt be allowed as a ſolid Solution, and upon this very Argument, becauſe no one Creature ever could from an Opinion of his own Wiſdom or Goodneſs, much leſs of his own Power, by laying this In-

ſtance as a Pattern before him for Imitation, arrogate and aſſume to himſelf the Right of Dominion over other Creatures. Whereas, on the contrary, the *Hobbian* Solution of Divine Dominion into the irreſiſtable Power of ALMIGHTY GOD leads (and with ſo much bare-faced Impudence,) Mankind, to attempt the Dominion over all others, by Force or Trick, Right or Wrong, that, in my firm Opinion, this Fiction of his own Brain was attributed to ALMIGHTY GOD with this one only View and Deſign, that, with the better Grace or Appearance, he might patronize and Countenance this *his favourite Right of All over All.*

We are here, however, in the laſt Place to add, that the Law of Nature, ſtrictly ſo called, which is innately fitted to the human Mind, (and which Law upon Account of the Will of GOD, whom, in the Manner juſt now explained, we acknowledge to be the *Governour and Lord of all*; this Law of Nature, I ſay,) obliges Mankind to pay Honour and Worſhip to ALMIGHTY GOD HIMSELF, *and to him only*: And may, with great Truth and Juſtice, be ſaid to attribute his own *Divine Dominion* to Himſelf, in ſo much as it obliges us to acknowledge that this *Dominion* is in him, and that we readily and willingly aſcribe unto him, as moſt juſtly due, *this his Divine Dominion and Authority.*

Becauſe it is manifeſt, that if we propoſe to ourſelves, (as in Truth and Reaſon, we ought,) this one moſt noble End, we cannot purſue it, by wiſer more prudent Means than by attributing the Glory of *Empire* to GOD HIMSELF, and, by reſerving to ourſelves the Praiſe, the Commendation of Submiſſion of Obedience only. And, conſequently, that, the Right over Things and Perſons is ſubordinate to ALMIGHTY GOD and *the Common Good.* For ſuch a Right as this is acknowledged by All to be a Right ſubordinate and miniſterial to the Uſe of various Things and of human Endeavours: As alſo, evidently neceſſary to ſupport the Life, Health, and Strength of Mankind, and, conſequently, as evidently neceſſary in performing all that Worſhip and Adoration, Duty and Honour, which Mankind can in this Life pay to *ALMIGHTY GOD.* We are then, however, here cautiouſly to avoid the Notion that GOD ſtands in the leaſt need of any of theſe Things; and, conſequently, that ALMIGHTY GOD does not demand theſe Things with any other View or Deſign, than as the natural Means which he himſelf has created, of ſupplying with a more liberal Hand thoſe of his Servants, who in a more eminent Degree above others are miniſterial to him in his Power and Dominion here upon Earth, and act as his Vicegerents: As for Example, Civil Magiſtrates and Perſons more immediately ſet a Part to miniſter about holy Things.

SECT.

SECT. VII.

The Origin of Divine Dominion not owing to the Creation.

I Uſually did, to confeſs the Truth, (as well as many others, before I had taken the Riſe and Origin of *Dominion* and *Right* under an univerſal and diſtinct Conſideration I uſually, did, I ſay,) reſolve the whole Dominion of ALMIGHTY GOD, into the *Creation*, as into the adequate full compleat *Origin* of it.—For I imagined it a Self-evident Truth, that, every one is Lord and Maſter of his own Abilities, as differing little or nothing from the Nature and Eſſence of that Being in whom theſe Abilities inhere: And, conſequently, I imagined, alſo, the Effect to be his, from whoſe Powers and Abilities, ſuch an Effect derived it's whole Eſſence, but more eſpecially in the Act of Creation, by which Act the whole Subſtance, the whole Eſſence of a Thing is produced out of Nothing. Whereas, on the contrary, ſince all *Dominion* is ſome certain Sort of Right, and whereas all Right is either granted or permitted, by ſome Law, (at leaſt, *analogically ſpeaking*,) conſequently the Law, either granting or permitting ſuch an Authority, muſt be firſt acknowledged.—Now—no Law whatſoever is antecedent to the Law of Nature, or to that Dictate of *Divine Wiſdom* concerning the beſt *End*, and *Means moſt conducive* to produce it: And this intirely agrees with the Law of Nature, *a Dictate* which, analogically ſpeaking, may be called the Law of *Divine Acts in ALMIGHTY GOD:* And, conſequently, I at length, after much Study, cloſed with the following Opinion, *viz. That the Dominion of ALMIGHTY GOD is* that Right *or* Power *accruing and ariſing to him from his own inherent intrinſic Wiſdom and Goodneſs, as from a Law:—A Dominion diſpenſed for the Regulation and Government of all thoſe Beings and Things, which ever were, are, or ſhall be created.*—As for Inſtance, (to render this very intricate Point clearer and more intelligible;) in the *Divine Wiſdom* there is neceſſarily contained that Dictate calculated to proſecute the beſt End and to apply the neceſſary Means: And, in the Goodneſs of God, or, in the Perfection of the *Divine Will*, is included by as ſtrong a Neceſſity the freeſt Approbation, and fulleſt Conſent towards the Proſecution of this End:—And theſe two *Divine Attributes*, by a very proper and juſt Analogy, correſpond and anſwer to the Eſtabliſhment, to the Ratification of this one eternal Law, from whence we are to learn the true Origin of the *Divine Dominion.*—Now—no one can, with the leaſt Propriety, complain, that, from this Account, *the Dominion of ALMIGHTY GOD* is coerced and reſtrained, is confined and limited within two narrow Bounds: In which Explication or Account, what is aſſerted, amounts only to this, *viz.* That no one Branch or Part of this *Divine Dominion* conſiſts in the Power of doing any Thing contrary to *the beſt End*, (the *Common Good:*) that is, contrary to his own Divine Honour and Glory, or againſt that Happineſs of all other rational Beings which the Nature of Things, as created and

See Prolegomena, Sect 10. Page 27.

The Dominion of ALMIGHTY GOD is an eternal Dominion flowing from his own Perfections.

eſtabliſhed by Himſelf, allows: Becauſe, to purſue this *Happineſs*, their Powers and Faculties, contrived by the Author of Nature, are exactly fitted and applicable. For, it is a clear Caſe, that, infinite Power and infinite Wiſdom can always ſettle and diſpoſe all Things and all Men by Methods and Ways ſo infinitely diverſified, that, in each and all theſe Methods or Ways, the Common Good of the whole Syſtem, can, at one and the ſame Time be equally and effectually procured.——And, it is as clear a Caſe alſo, that, perfect Liberty or Freedom does not conſiſt in the Ability or Power of Acting either better or worſe:—No,—But perfect Liberty or Freedom conſiſts in the Power of acting equally at all Times, for the beſt. And, the Perfection of this Liberty, or Freedom is equally conſpicuous, whether or no, that ALMIGHTY GOD *is pleaſed to beſtow his Bleſſings and Favours*, (all Acts of his own free Bounty and Grace) upon ſome in larger Abundance than upon others; in Caſe there be at all Times a full Care taken of *the beſt End*. One Caution here, however, is ſtrictly neceſſary, that we do not imagine a Thing inconſiſtent with this *beſt End*, becauſe our Underſtanding cannot comprehend the Manner how it is ſerviceable. And the Reaſon is, becauſe we cannot but know, (if we know ourſelves at all) the Weakneſs of human Capacities to be ſuch, that we cannot underſtand ſo extenſive unlimited an End; that we cannot trace out nor purſue that infinite Variety of Means, which, to effect ſuch an End, are applicable by ALMIGHTY GOD: Neither can we anticipate that additional Light of future Knowledge, which ſhall be reveal'd to us concerning Things now hidden from our Eyes. Thus, for Inſtance, we are well convinced, and upon a general Knowledge, that all the Members of an Animal act miniſterially, and are ſerviceable to the Individual, altho', perhaps, we do not minutely, and to a critical Exactneſs (from Obſervations hitherto made, upon all the ſeparate conſtituent Members and Parts) underſtand their ſeparate diſtinct Offices, as the *Liver*, the *Spleen*, the *Brain*, &c. Since then the Perfection of the *Divine Intellect*, and the Perfection of the *Divine Will*, (conſenting to ſuch a Determination of the Intellect,) are intrinſic to ALMIGHTY GOD HIMSELF: It therefore demonſtrably appears true, that, his *Divine Dominion* (accounted for, and explained, after this Manner) muſt not be underſtood in any other Acceptation nor leſs eternal than the Divine Perfections themſelves: Becauſe, from theſe very Perfections, we learn and demonſtrate this very Dominion itſelf. Now, this *Dominion of ALMIGHTY GOD* is more firmly laid in the *Divine Perfections*, than it poſſibly can be in any *derivative Right*, properly ſo called whatever. And, therefore, in this Senſe and Meaning only, and in no other muſt we underſtand and interpret any Queſtion concerning the Origin of *Divine Dominion*, becauſe no Man in his right Senſes ever yet enquired into the Cauſe, the Original, the Foundation, truly and properly ſo called, of an eternal Right, of a Right *from all*, and *to all Eternity*.

The

The Reader here, I hope, will pardon ſuch a Digreſſion as this, which from the Reaſon of the Thing has appeared ſo well grounded: Since ſome ſhort Hint was neceſſary to ſhew, how compatible and well-fitted the Right belongs to ALMIGHTY GOD of obliging Mankind to obey thoſe Laws which we have traced out and proved in the Courſe of this *Enquiry*: And that, the Scheme of Morality here eſtabliſhed is much ſounder Philoſophy than the Maxims Mr. *Hobbes* has fiction'd for us: In which he ſtrenuouſly maintains, that the irreſiſtible Power of ALMIGHTY GOD, and of every other Being, whoſe Power is uncontroulable, gives to him, and in like Manner to any one elſe, a Right of doing whatſoever he himſelf pleaſes, without any Regard or Reſpect being firſt had to the *Common Good*.—But —our Philoſophy carries in it a quite contrary Tendency, becauſe we demonſtrate that there is in the Perfection of the Divine Nature, (ſo far as it is a rational Nature) neceſſarily included, a Care for this ſupreme ultimate End, by means naturally ſufficient and neceſſary to produce it; and this we have proved to be the true original Source, from whence is fully and clearly demonſtrated, that univerſal Juſtice, and by Conſequence, all that moral Virtue ſo requiſite in a Governour, moſt conſpicuouſly to ſhine forth and diſplay itſelf in ALMIGHTY GOD, and this, I have demonſtrated in the ſame clear Method, by which we ſhall prove, in what is to come, that Mankind are under the indiſpenſible Obligation of cultivating and improving the ſame Virtues.

And this is the ſubject Matter of what we have undertaken to explain and prove in this our Treatiſe of Moral Philoſophy: And, for this Reaſon, we are determined not to dwell any longer upon controverſial Points which poſſibly may, (becauſe Diſputes are endleſs) be further agitated upon the *Right, the Dominion of ALMIGHTY GOD.*

SECT. VIII.

WE now return from whence we have digreſſed, and purſue the Conſideration of that *Law*, not long ſince inveſtigated, and diſcovered: By which *Law*, it is poſitively commanded, that, the Neceſſaries of Life at leaſt, be allowed and granted to every one Individual; and, that, each and all be protected, defended and guarded from Violence and Oppreſſion: That is, in other Words, that, Things ſhall become the reſpective Property of each and for ſo long a Time as they are neceſſary: From whence, by Conſequence, ſuch Things are called, and in Fact, are the ſingle proper Right of each reſpectively. I thought it therefore a Duty incumbent upon me to expreſs this Law, under the general Terms, we commonly uſe to ſhew that this Law can and does equally oblige and direct Mankind both in a State ſuppoſed Antecedent to any ſeparate Diviſion of Property and of mutual

See Chap. 1. Sect. 23. Pages 69, 70, 71.

tual reciprocal Good Offices, upon an eſtabliſhed Conſent, (1) And in a State, conſequent of ſuch a ſeparate Diviſion. In the firſt of theſe two States, this Law of Nature lays upon each the Obligation of a limited Occupancy only, in Things and in human Aſſiſtances, ſuch an Occupancy, I mean, as can be and is conſiſtent with the Conveniency and Advantages of others; Such a State as this can eaſily be ſuppoſed the Condition of the firſt created Pair *Adam* and *Eve*: Suppoſing there to have been no divine Revelation expreſſed to them concerning the Authority of the Man over the Woman. Now——in ſuch a State as this, there may be ſuppoſed many Events to happen, which might render it clear and evident to every Underſtanding, That, from a general Mixture of Property, Mankind muſt, in Times future, conſent and agree to the Eſtabliſhment of diſtinct and ſeparate Uſes in Things and Labour: For, without ſuch diſtinct and ſeparate Uſes, Strife, Contention, Quarrels, Violence and Evils of every Kind, and common to all, are the natural Conſequences, where the *Neceſſaries* of *Each* reſpectively are not aſcertained and diſtinguiſh'd: And, where no regular Examination and Enquiry can be made into the Sloth and Idleneſs of thoſe who neglect to till and cultivate Lands held in common, with many more Wills of the like Kind, under any ſuch Circumſtances, Laws (concerning the *End* and *Means neceſſary*, applied, from Time to Time to the preſent Circumſtances of Perſons and Things) muſt and ought to lay the Obligation of ſettling and eſtabliſhing a clear diſtinct Diviſion of *Rights*, *Property*, *Dominion*, &c.—And the ſame Laws cou'd not avoid to lay Obligations as firm and binding, not only upon Generations for the Time being, but upon Poſterity in ſucceſſive Generations after them, to preſerve ſuch a Diſtribution or ſeparate diſtinct Diviſion, calculated and fitted ſo well to anſwer the principal, the ultimate End. Upon ſo rational and ſolid an Eſtabliſhment as this, diſtinct Rights will be allotted, portion'd out, and fixed for private Perſons in particular and reſpectively, for Families, Kindreds, Towns, Cities, Corporations, Kingdoms, Nations, *&c.* And theſe Rights will be eſtabliſhed, not only over Things, but alſo over the Perſonal Induſtry and Labours of the Members reſpectively in the whole Body ſocial: From hence, conſequently, will ariſe the Rights and Laws of Commerce and Trade, of Amity and Friendſhip: From hence will ariſe the Rules alſo of Regimen and Oeconomy in private Families, and in all Societies:—And, ſuch a wholeſome wiſe Diſcipline, ſuch a regular diſtinct Juriſdiction or Right will be ſtrictly obſerved in all *Concerns as well Sacred as Civil.*

All theſe Rights are eſtabliſh'd upon the ſecondary Laws of Nature. See Chap. 5. Sect. 1. and Chap. 8. Sect. 1. See *Burnet* upon Government, Page 17.

SECT.

(1) *And in a State conſequent of ſuch a ſeparate Diviſion.*] The Determinations of Property muſt neceſſarily have been before the Settlement of Government; this being only a Means for the Security of Property, and by Conſequence Government cou'd not be founded in any *Primary* Law of Nature, if Property itſelf was not. *See* Thomas Burnet's *Eſſay upon Government*, *Page* 16. *See Chap.* 5. *Sect.* 1. *Page* 288.

SECT. IX.

NOW, as to the Riſe and firſt portioning out of this Diviſion, I ſhall not ſay much: Becauſe we all, at preſent, find the Partition or Diſtribution into ſeparate Parts already made to our Hand; and indeed, the Diſtribution or Diviſion is ſo dealt and portioned out, as fully to anſwer the one principal ultimate End, *viz.* The *Glory*, the *Honour*, ſo juſtly due, and which ought conſequently to be paid to ALMIGHTY GOD: and, *Secondly*, the Happineſs of all Mankind, if it be not their own Fault. I ſhall here then only obſerve in few Words, that, as a farther Diviſion may from Time to Time appear neceſſary: And, as Diſputes may, perhaps, (which uſually happens in Caſes of *meum* and *tuum*, or of private Property) ariſe between the Parties, whoſe Intereſt and Concern it is, that the Diviſion be made: So, it manifeſtly conduces more to the mutual common Happineſs of the Parties, to ſubmit the Settlement of their reſpective diſtinct Rights to the Arbitration and Judgment of ſome one candid, honeſt, knowing Referee (who has no Intereſt of his own at Heart, by favouring one in Preference of another) than it is or can be for them to try Titles either by open War and Violence, or by Craft, Cunning and Treachery; and ſo wait for the Event or Reſult of ſo much Peril and Danger. It is, according to all Rules of Probability, more likely, that, the Reaſon of any Man will lay before him, as his Guide, that Method which moſt conveniently agrees with the Attainment of a well-known determined certain End: (Namely, the Common Good,) than, that, either Party, from the blind Impetuoſity and uncertain Turns of War, ſhould fall into ſo large a Field, where neither of the Parties can carry a ſure Aim, or Direction towards any one determined certain End whatſoever. Let us ſuppoſe with Mr. *Hobbes*, that, in ſuch an Engagement as this, both Parties place their whole Safety upon Victory.—Now, if it ſhould ſo happen that the contending Parties cannot agree upon an Arbitrator, in the Variety of Mankind, Reaſon ſeems more powerful in perſuading them to ſubmit the Diviſion (or even a Right over the whole, in Caſe the Property in Diſpute cannot admit of a Diviſion) to chance, by the Caſts of Dice, or by drawing Lots, or by ſome ſuch Method; rather than to the Danger and Hazard of War: And the Reaſon is plain, becauſe in War both Parties poſſibly may fall in the Engagement: And conſequently loſe all Expectation of the End intended, which is an Event impoſſible to happen, ſuppoſing a Determination to be put upon the Doctrine of Chances.

Thus much I thought proper to obſerve in a curſory Way, and as it were by the by, that we may perceive the true Reaſon why we muſt, and ought to acquieſce and agree upon certain determined Rules for the Diſtribution of Things, Poſſeſſions, Offices, Duties, Labours, Induſtry, *&c.* which Rules uſually favour much more of Chance, than of a rational free Election

Election and Choice. Such, for Inſtance, (Beſides a *Sortitio*, or Diſtribution) *are the Priority of Birth*, and *a firſt Occupancy*. Now, the very ſame ſolid Foundation of Reaſon, the very ſame Law of Nature, which (in order to promote and ſettle the Common Happineſs of all,) injoyns and commands us to conſtitute and eſtabliſh ſeparate diſtinct Rights over Things and Perſons or perſonal Labours, enjoins and commands us alſo (and if poſſible, with a ſtill clearer Evidence) to preſerve inviolable ſuch ſeparate diſtinct Rights when once eſtabliſhed, and which, from Experience, are fully proved ſufficient to anſwer the great End deſigned. It is to a Demonſtration evident, that, ſuch a Diviſion of *Property*, *Dominion* and *Rights*, as we find agreed upon and tranſmitted down to us by our Anceſtors, and upon the general Conſent or Permiſſion of all Nations and of all Civil Societies ſufficiently anſwers, not only the Procreation and Preſervation of all the Singulars and Individuals who now exiſt, but as fully tends alſo towards the effectual Attainment of as much Happineſs as the whole human Species is at all Times in this Vale of Mortality capable of poſſeſſing: For, by Virtue of a *Diſtribution* or *Diviſion* thus ſettled, there naturally ariſe to Mankind mutual Dealings, Trade, Commerce and Traffick, and all thoſe Advantages likewiſe of mutual Help and Aſſiſtance, by Means of which, all are placed in a Capacity of riſing to higher and ſtill more exalted Degrees of Happineſs both in this World and the next.——To which we may alſo, upon the ſame demonſtrative Evidence add, that, the Happineſs which we at preſent enjoy, from ſuch a Diſtribution or Diviſion, and Happineſs future (which upon a rational Hope we expect and deſire to enjoy) are by far, better and greater than any prudent wiſe conſiderable Man can hope to arrive at, from Violence, Rapine and the utter Confuſion, Deſtruction and Subverſion of all Rights, both Divine and Human, which we now find ſo happily eſtabliſhed; or, from any Overtures of introducing a new Settlement of diſtinct ſeparate Rights at an arbitrary Will, Pleaſure and Determination juſt as each and every one likes beſt. For, it is moſt notoriouſly true, that any ſo new and ſo extenſive an Undertaking is immenſely larger than can be conceived poſſible for any one Man, or, for any ſmall Aſſembly of Men to execute: And, it is alſo as eaſy to foreſee, that, upon any ſuch firſt Settlement of Things, the Sentiments and Opinions of Mankind will be as infinitely various and different as the very Perſons and Numbers of Men themſelves: So that, the immediate Conſequences, in ſuch a State of Affairs as is here ſuppoſed, muſt be Miſery and Deſtruction ravaging and preying upon all far and near, over the Face of the whole Earth. For, it being quite abhorrent from and deſtructive of the *Law* eſſentially blended with the *Public Good* to attempt Innovation and Diſturbance in Things relating to *Property*, *Dominion* and *Rights*, every ſuch Attempt muſt be, upon all theſe Accounts, to the laſt Degree, *unjuſt*. And therefore I not

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very neceſſary to this Purpoſe,) will, in like Manner, oblige their Generations ſucceſſively to approve of and confirm the ſame.—We cannot—however—deny, that the many Changes and Chances of Life, and of human Affairs, muſt neceſſarily cauſe many Conveyances, Transferences and Changes of Rights and Properties (altho' ſo early and ſo long ago eſtabliſhed) to happen: And, that, many new Laws and Rules concerning ſuch Changes muſt ariſe: But, yet, ſince all Conveyances of Rights, and, ſince Laws and Rules newly conſtituted, are confirmed by the voluntary Conſent of thoſe to whom theſe Rights, at leaſt *mediately*, were at firſt granted, the ancient Diſtinction or Separation of Rights is therefore ſtill ſtrictly followed: Becauſe, in Fact, their *voluntary Conſent* is obſerved.—And the Reaſon is, becauſe the firſt Authors and Promoters of ſuch diſtinct Dominion or Property are always underſtood to conſent, in tranſmitting down the Power of transferring and conveying over theſe Rights, and of conſtituting many new Rules, not only relating to the firſt Poſſeſſors, but to their Heirs and Succeſſors alſo.—For, in the very eſſential Notion of *Dominium* or Property there is underſtood a Power to diſpoſe of it, and the Fruits of Labour:—(1) Whereas a *Pactum*, or Contract, or Bargain conſiſts in a mutual Conſent of Parties concerning the Diſpoſition: And, conſequently, a Bargain is rendered valid by the very ſame Law, whereby the Power is confirmed and ratified to diſpoſe of and make over his Property, his Induſtry and the Fruits of it.—But—ſince this Power, or, in other Words, this very Dominion granted to any one, is granted only in order to ſubſerve and prove miniſterial to the *Common Good*: It therefore follows, that no Agreement, no Bargain (becauſe every Bargain, every Compact, every Agreement, is eſſentially and totally eſtabliſhed upon the Common Good) can grant and make over a Right a Dominion to perform any Thing which apparently contradicts and defeats this one End, *i. e.* the Common Good: Or, in other Words, can authorize and give a Sanction to Acts declared illegal and unjuſt by the Law of Nature: And, conſequently, the whole Force, Obligation and Limits of Compacts, Agreements and Bargains take their true and immediate Source from the ſame Original.

A Conſent Mediate.

Their voluntary Conſent, that is, becauſe, from the very Nature of Man and from the Nature of Things, theſe were the original Conditions.

The Difference between *Dominium* and *Pactum*.

SECT.

(1) *Whereas Pactum or Contract or Bargain*, &c.] In all *Contracts*, ſays *Grotius*, Nature demands an *Equality*: Inſomuch, that the aggrieved Perſon has an *Action* againſt the other for over reaching him. This Equality conſiſts partly in the *Acts* and *Circumſtances*, and partly in the Subject itſelf of the Contract: And this Equality, or *Dealing* upon the *Square*, muſt be obſerved as well in thoſe Circumſtances that are previous to the *Bargain* as to thoſe that are *Principal* and Eſſential to it. *De Jure Belli & Pacis Lib.* 2. *Cap.* 12. *Sect.* 8.

SECT. X.

HAving, by a long Chain of demonſtrative Reaſoning, eſtabliſhed and proved the true Dominion over *Things* and *Perſons:* From the Law of Nature moſt extenſive it plainly now appears, that, a Power is allowed to Individuals reſpectively, whereby each is enabled to transfer and make over ſome Part of what he can call his own, either by abſolute Promiſe or by Compact—But, with this Reſtriction, that, the other Party is obliged to perform his Condition of the Contract: Theſe two Suppoſitions muſt be granted before any Foundation for the faithful Diſcharge of all or any Engagements can be laid. For, upon the ſame right Reaſon, that, any Donation or Gift is *free*, upon the ſame Right it is alſo *valid*; and, upon the ſame Foundation of Right, a Dominion is conſtituted and eſtabliſhed, in the which, a Power of *Donation* or *Gift* is laid, namely, in the Common Good of all rational Beings. But, more eſpecially, of them, to whom this Power is in any particular Caſe granted.—From whence it is manifeſt, that, ALMIGHTY GOD (and all the Promoters or Authors of Dominion in Subordination to him) always will'd Mankind to conſent and agree, for this very one End and Purpoſe, in the reciprocal giving and receiving all free Gifts and Donations, without which, no Opportunity could have been provided by the Law of Nature for any ſuch Acts at all as theſe: For, whoſoever receives a Gift is underſtood to have in Fact conſented to the very Act itſelf done, *i.e.* he himſelf will'd the Donation valid, from whence he receives the Benefit, with Proviſo and Condition, that it may benefit the Community, but, more particularly, *HIM*, from whoſe Power the Benefit ariſes and accrues.—Becauſe this Conſent naturally contains a tacit Compact or Agreement to return the Benefit, as Opportunity offers.—And herein eſſentially all the Operations and Virtues of Gratitude fully exert themſelves: And moreover, ſuch a Conſent is only a full Approbation of that moſt univerſal Law concerning the Proſecution and Attainment of the Common Good, and of the original Eſtabliſhment and Conſtitution of Dominion, Property and Rights, for this very ſelf-ſame End.—And,—conſequently, upon this Foundation evidently is demonſtrated, that, *Gratitude* is injoined and commanded.—Whoſoever therefore beſtows a Gift to another, out of *what* is truly *his own*, lays the Foundation of a Gratitude due to himſelf. And from hence alſo it is, that, we can and ought to acknowledge the Benevolence of them who have conferred upon us ſome Right, ſome Advantage more than what in Juſtice was our own. But in the next Place, from the Regulation of *ſuch Things* as are *our own* (a Regulation calculated and determined by the Relation which ſuch Things bear to the Publick Good) are taken the Bounds and Limits of a truly generous honourable *Self-Love*, or, a right, well-grounded Care and Regard for *Self.*—

In this Section we demonſtrate that Benevolence, Gratitude, Self-Love, and the Affection for our Children are limited by and derived from this ſame Law.

Gratitude.

For, at all Times, whenever we truly conſult our own real Intereſt and Happineſs, we muſt be ſure to keep ourſelves clear of all Invaſion upon others: And we muſt to the full be as careful alſo, that, we miniſter to and ſerve the Public Good. This [φιλαυτία, or] Self-Love, regulated within juſt Limits and Bounds, ſhines moſt conſpicuous in *Temperance*, *Frugality* and *Modeſty*. In a Word, the ſame Law of Nature, which diſtributes *Dominion*, *Property* and *Rights* into diſtinct ſeparate Portions: And, the ſame Juſtice alſo, or Will of maintaining and preſerving the Rights thus granted to each and every one reſpectively (which always carries a Reſpect to *others* as well as to *ourſelves*, as we have already demonſtrated,) this very ſame Law of Nature, this very ſame Cardinal Virtue *Juſtice*, does moreover direct and limit that Love or Affection of Parents towards their Children.——A Love ſo pathetically expreſſed by the Term [στοργη] *Storgé*, and which eminently above all other our Affections, is ſo uſeful and Beneficial to the Common Good. For, our Children are the Mixture, they are ſome conſtituent Parts of ourſelves, they are ſomething (which carries a bold Idea) *ourſelves* and *not ourſelves* at the ſame Time: (*alter & idem*, as the Poet expreſſes it). And, conſequently, it is neceſſary, that, the Virtue, by which we are influenced and determined to regard ourſelves and others; for a more peculiar, a more extraordinary Reaſon, regards thoſe (*i. e.* our Children) who are the Conjunction, the Link, the Tie, the Cement between ourſelves and other rational Beings——And, in a natural Way, the two Branches which conſtitute this Virtue are joined and cemented together.—From this one Principle there ariſes a ſtudious, a diligent Concern in every well-regulated Common-Wealth for the Good, the Welfare, the Happineſs of Poſterity in their Laws concerning the Succeſſion of Property; and very often concerning a Succeſſion into Places, Offices and Employments of Perſons deceas'd.——It is, upon this one Conſideration, *an eaſy Truth*, that, a Beneficence towards others, that the whole Energy, Obligation, that the whole Fidelity and punctual Performance of Compacts, Bargains and Agreements, that Gratitude, Temperance, Frugality, Modeſty, and [the στοργη the *Storgé* or] Parental Affection cannot admit of a clear diſtinct Explication, unleſs at firſt there be allowed, or, at leaſt, ſuppoſed, the Diviſion of Rights; whereby diſtinct Properties, Dominions, Juriſdictions and Rights are previouſly ſettled and ſeparately occupied: And, beſides all this, it is as Apparant as Noon-day, that, this ſame univerſal Law of Nature, (whereby the ſeparate Diviſion of Rights, Properties and Dominion is diſtributed and made) obliges all Mankind to the Exerciſe and Practice of all theſe Virtues, as alſo, of all other Virtues, which are either eſſentially contained in them, or naturally ſpring and riſe out of them.

Temperance, Frugality and Modeſty.

The Love of SELF, and of our Young how to be limited

SECT.

SECT. XI.

IN a Word, all the ſpecial Rules or Laws of moral Behaviour, as well thoſe whereby the Rights of different Nations are protected, guarded, and defended from the Invaſion of others, as well thoſe whereby the Power, the Authority of Sovereignties and Empires is eſtabliſhed and preſerved from the civil Commotions of Rebels, who are contriving Novelty and Revolution; and whereby, alſo, the Rights of Subjects are ſecured and preſerved from the Oppreſſion and Violence of the mighty and powerful: All theſe Rules and Laws, I ſay, are derived from that ſame ſingle Precept of *Property, Dominion and Rights in Diſtribution reſpectively amongſt Individuals*, as ſubſervient and relative to the *Common Good*. I have affirm'd, it is true, that in this one Precept is grounded *Civil Authority*: And—the Reaſon is, becauſe the Eſtabliſhment of Civil Government is a much more effectual Means towards defending and ſecuring the common Happineſs and Proſperity of the whole human Race, than an equal Diſtribution of Property amongſt all, which is an abſolute Contradiction in Civil Government.—— Mr. *Hobbes* inſiſts upon it, however, and maintains, that, an exact Equality of all Property Rights and Privileges is preſcribed and commanded by the Law of Nature, and, upon this Equality, he wou'd feign place and eſtabliſh *natural Equity*.——He being miſled——to be ſure,——by a Quibble, a Similitude of Sounds: But, however, to make the beſt Apology we can—this well becomes him, who over and over again would feign perſuade his Readers, that, all Argumentation Ratiocination or Reaſoning depends intirely upon *Words*.——And this Doctrine concerning the equal Diſtribution of Rights, he gently, and by Degrees, inſtils into his Readers, in his Book *De Cive*, from *Sect.* 13 to *Sect.* 19.

In the diſtinct Diviſion of Dominion and Property is conſtituted Civil Power—A Power greater than that of Subjects.

See Section 8 of this Chapter, Pages 499, 500.

Naturalis Equitas.

It it not worth while, however, here to dwell any longer in confuting ſuch trifling Cavils as theſe: Becauſe they do not carry any Thing, even as to Appearance, of Weight and Conſequence enough to miſlead and impoſe upon any Man of common Underſtanding: And, beſides this, that very Point, (upon which all the reſt of Mr. *Hobbes*'s Argumentation is eſtabliſhed: Namely, *It is neceſſary, in order to ſecure Peace, that all Mankind ſhould ſtand upon an exact Equality*. Art. 13.) does not ſeem, in Mr. *Hobbes*'s own Opinion, the fit Means of anſwering this very End: Namely, *the Attainment of Peace and Security*; but, he, on the contrary, demands, as his mean Foundation, a coercive Power, which, in one Moment, is to ſwallow up and devour all ſuch Equality——And this is evident from his 5th Chapter *De Cive*.

Let Mr. *Hobbes* and all other Adverſaries to the Law of Nature *contend*, or *not contend*, juſt as they pleaſe: Yet, however, it is deſtructive of Mankind to argue, That, ſuch an equal Diſtribution of Property and Right as this, either

ther is, or can be injoyned by the Laws of Nature: Becauſe, theſe Laws, even according to Mr. *Hobbes*'s own Confeſſion, are abſolutely immutable, *Chap.* 3. *Section* 29. *De Cive.* And, conſequently, upon his own Principles, the unequal Diſtribution of Dominion and Rights, altho' it may appear abſolutely neceſſary in the Eſtabliſhment of Monarchy, yet, ſuch a Diſtribution never can become lawful: becauſe, it will and muſt be contrary to the Law of Nature.

SECT. XII.

In the Conſtitution and Preſervation of Civil Society the Law of Nature, commanding the Obligation to perform external Acts, is preſuppoſed, even before any Civil Society can exiſt.

THE Doctrine, which, I here maintain, is, that, the Diſtribution of all Dominion, Property and Rights, is deduced from that Law which does not ſuppoſe any Eſtabliſhment of Civil Society at all: And, conſequently, that, ſuch a Diſtribution does not depend upon the Will and Pleaſure of the Civil Magiſtrate: From whence it muſt appear, that, this is a Law properly ſuited and fitted to direct the Acts and Behaviour of different Civil Societies, as well as to aſſign and circumſcribe Bounds and Limits, ſo, as to inviolably preſerve and ſupport Civil Societies againſt Invaſions and Violences of the mighty and powerful, whether *Emperors*, *Kings*, *Princes*, *Potentates*, &c. For ſince, by this Law only it is, that, the Neceſſaries, requiſite to the Happineſs of Singulars and Individuals, are defended againſt the Invaſions of all Mankind, *even all*: It follows, that, by this Law, Peace can be eſtabliſhed and ſecured amongſt all. And that, ſuch a Peace, moreover, will be ſecured as much as poſſibly can be, by Vertue of this one Law, and by Vertue of that Power or Authority or Right derived upon and granted to Mankind from this Law; neither can any Thing more, according to Reaſon, be required.——Whereas, on the contrary, if the Bounds and Limits of Dominion, Property and Rights are, at the ſole Will of the Chief Governour in every Civil Society, to *be fixed* and *unfixed*, determined and undetermined, ſettled and unſettled at an arbitrary Will and Pleaſure: And, whereas, if there be no Rule or Law ſettled and determined from the Nature of the beſt End (*i. e.* the Common Good of all naturally tending to produce this End): And to obey which Rule and Law, the Wills of all Civil Governours and Magiſtrates are bound in their outward Acts and Behaviour; if there be no ſuch Rule, I ſay as this, (which Mr. *Hobbes* upon all Occaſions maintains, *there is not*) then it follows of Courſe, that, there cannot poſſibly be an effectual operative Energy in any Law to reſtrain Civil Societies from mutual Wars, Invaſions and Incroachments upon one another. It follows alſo, of Courſe, if this be the Caſe, that, no Law can lay the leaſt Obligation upon the Rulers of Civil States to purſue the Public Good of their reſpective Subjects, and to maintain, *in all public outward Acts*, the Rights and Privileges of each Subject reſpectively; ſeeing

Fixit Leges Pretio atq; refixit, Virg. Æn. 6. V. 622.

ing that, the arbitrary uncontrouled Wills of Magiſtrates themſelves (which Mr. *Hobbes* eſtabliſhes as the only abſolute Law) can be influenced and carried very oppoſite and contrary Ways. There could not poſſible be, moreover, if this were the Caſe, any Law able to prevent and reſtrain a Faction (powerful enough to overturn the Civil Eſtabliſhment,) from committing *High-Treaſon*. For, in Fact, the very Moment any Faction is formed ſtronger than the Civil Power, there no longer remains any Power in the Civil State, coercive and operative enough, either to guard faithful Subjects, or to puniſh Rebels; and, conſequently, upon Mr. *Hobbes*'s Principles, there cannot poſſibly be given any Security neceſſarily requiſite, that, the Laws of Nature (*v. g.* concerning the faithful Diſcharge of our Engagements or keeping Faith) ſhould lay any Obligation at all: But, on the contrary, it will be lawful to overturn the State thus ſettled and eſtabliſhed upon civil Compact and Agreement: So that, every Civil Society may be divided and ſubdivided minutely and for ever into ſmaller and ſtill ſmaller Societies;—And—ſuch a Practice as this may be followed lawfully from Mr. *Hobbes*'s Doctrine: For, there is no Law in this Caſe which enforces an Obligation that is tranſgreſſed and violated. Becauſe, for Inſtance, firſt, a Law of Nature, for Want of Security, cannot in this Caſe oblige to external Acts according to what Mr. *Hobbes* ſays, *Chap.* 3. *Sect.* 27.—Neither, *Secondly*, can any Law of Civil Society lay an Obligation, becauſe theſe Laws are not violated either by Rebellion or High-Treaſon, according to what he ſays, *Chap.* 14. *Section* 21. *De Cive*.

SECT. XIII.

In this laſt Section are deduced ſeveral Corollaries of important Moment in Things ſacred and Civil.

THAT *univerſal Law*, therefore, of Juſtice, which we have eſtabliſhed, in Truth and Reality ſo far as it regards *Common Good* lays the General Foundation of *Dominion* both *Divine* and *Human* over Things and Perſons. And, It Inſtructs us alſo to acknowledge, allow and defend all Government and Power fixed in and eſtabliſhed upon Nature, ſuch, for Inſtance, as the Dominion of ALMIGHTY GOD over all his Creatures, and that of Parents over their own Children.—By Means of this Dominion we are, in the firſt Place, inſtructed to ſuccour, help and ſupply the Neceſſities and Wants of human Nature: And, in the next Place, from theſe two Plans of original natural Government, we are informed, how to model and ſettle the moſt commodious Forms of Civil Polity, wherever any ſuch are wanting: And, *Thirdly*, we are from hence admoniſhed to cultivate Peace and good Neighbourhood with all thoſe, who do not live under the ſame Civil Community; and, conſequently, from hence it comes to paſs, that, not only, the Authority of the Divine Laws may be allowed and permitted as Dictates and Precepts of right Reaſon clearly commanding many Things,

in general concerning the Good of the Whole, that is, as they ariſe from the declared Will of the firſt Cauſe ALMIGHTY GOD in the Nature and Conſtitution of Things originally. The Authority, I ſay, of the Divine Laws may not only be in this Manner allowed, but there is alſo a moſt extenſive Scope left for poſitive Laws (as they are termed, to which poſitive Laws in their Aim and Tendency, but, more eſpecially under ſome given Circumſtances) either Divine Revelation or human Authority ſuperadds and introduces ſomething for the ſame one End: Namely, *the Common Good of all.* Theſe general Laws of Nature (concerning a full Care and Protection of the Public Good, as well as concerning the Eſtabliſhment and Security of Dominion) require, moreover, the Aſſiſtances of both GOD and *Man* to provide, that, at whatſoever Time they enact any poſitive Laws, they promulge by clear Marks and Tokens their Will and Pleaſure, as to the Sanction of every ſuch new Law: Becauſe, ſuch Indications as theſe are neceſſary to the Promulgation of it. For, without ſuch a Promulgation or Publication as this, no one can, according to Reaſon, be laid under an Obligation of Obedience to any ſuch new Law. From hence the Neceſſity appears, that, if ALMIGHTY GOD is pleaſed, by a Revelation of himſelf, to lay any Command upon us, *i. e.* This Revelation ought, firſt, to carry ſuch a Command as is clearly in all Points conſiſtent with thoſe eternal immutable Laws of *His* traced out and diſcovered in Nature. Becauſe, it is an eſtabliſhed Maxim, that, *the Divine Nature cannot contradict itſelf:* And it is moreover as neceſſary alſo, whenever any new Command or Law is thus added, that, *the Divine Will and Pleaſure be declared to thoſe who are to introduce it by endowing his choſen Meſſengers and Servants either with the Gift of unerring infallible Prophecy:* Or, *with the extraordinary ſupernatural Power of working true Miracles.* And, from hence it is, that they, of Mankind, who hold the Supreme Authority, whenever they enact Laws, muſt ſignify principally and in the firſt Place, by Way of Preamble, that, they are Laws of public Advantage; and, by Conſequence, that, they conſpire in the ſame End and Deſign with the Laws of Nature: And, they likewiſe ought to add ſeveral other Evidences and Credentials whereby they publickly declare theſe Laws to have been really and truly promulged by their own full and proper Authority.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

Concerning the Moral Virtues *in particular.*

SECT. I.

HAVING, in the laſt Chapter, explained the true Origin of Dominion over both Perſons and Things and the ſubordinate Diſtribution of this Dominion thro' all the ſeveral Branches of Society, both Sacred and Civil: And having alſo given a tranſitory View what Kind of Dominion that is, which evidently ſubſiſts between different Civil Societies and the different Branches of a Family: *We may, now, very properly, lay before our Readers a particular Deſcription of the moral Virtues more confined, and which generally are leſs underſtood.* In what has been already ſaid, we have, indeed, offer'd ſome Sentiments, upon theſe Points, where we have demonſtrated, that, theſe particular moral Virtues are eſſential conſtituent Parts of that univerſal Benevolence ſo ſtrictly injoyned by the Law of Nature. But—becauſe Acts, properly converſant about theſe Virtues, have, evidently and only for their Subject Matter, what naturally and of lawful Right is in our Power.——And, becauſe the Subject-Matter of theſe ſeveral particular Virtues is diſtinguiſhed into *Acts of Debt* and *Acts of Favour*, into Acts exerciſed towards *Superiors* and *Inferiors*: Towards Members of different *Civil Societies* and thoſe of the ſame *Civil Society*: As alſo, towards the different conſtituent Parts of the Polity Eccleſiaſtic; and of a *Private Family*.—It was therefore neceſſary to ſay ſomething in general concerning the Eſſence and Conſtitution of that *Dominion* over *Perſons* and *Things* from whence thoſe various Differences ariſe, *and* from whence this Deduction of Reaſoning muſt be drawn—By Vertue of Principles which do not ſuppoſe any Obligation to the ſpecial Acts of theſe Virtues. We are in the firſt Place moſt diligently to obſerve, that, as univerſal Juſtice is, upon this very Account, the ſtrict Rule or Meaſure of Perfection in Morality, becauſe, ſuch an Inclination or Propenſity is poſitively injoyned by that univerſal Law itſelf which ſettles and reſpectively diſtributes to all, his own proper, juſt, private Rights and Properties, ſo we ought, for this very Reaſon, to be endow'd with all particular Virtues: Or, We are, for this very Reaſon, obliged to perform theſe Duties:—— Becauſe they are plainly commanded by that particular Law of Nature, which is contained under that general Law, concerning which (*i. e.* General Law) we have been hitherto ſpeaking.——Now, upon the very Suppoſition, that, there had been no Law at all, ſuch Virtues as theſe muſt always have been, in their own inherent Nature, Good: Becauſe, they

The particular moral Virtues are deduced from the Laws of Dominion and Property.

Leſs underſtood, becauſe laid in the Secondary Laws of Nature. See Page 288.

greatly contribute towards the regular State and Well-being of the univerſal Syſtem. Becauſe, a moral Obligation and ſuch a natural State, as ought to ariſe from it, cannot poſſibly be conceived without a Regard being firſt had to ſome Law—at leaſt *Natural*. To which we may alſo farther add, that, *Honour it ſelf*, from whence Acts in their own Nature *good*, are mark'd with the diſtinguiſhing Character of (*Honeſty:* Or, are Acts called) *Honeſt:* From——hence it appears, that the whole of what we call *Honour*, ariſes from all ſuch Acts as carry their own Commendation and Praiſe in that general Law of the ſupreme Governour revealed in Nature, and which receive the Sanctions of *Honeſt* and *Commendable* by the higheſt Rewards: Amongſt which Rewards, the concurring Approbation of good Men muſt be computed as no inſignificant Part. Theſe Acts, however, according to Nature, are term'd Lawful and Commendable; becauſe, the Law, whereby theſe Acts become ſuch, does not depend upon the arbitrary precarious changeable Will of Civil Authority: But,—ariſes neceſſarily from the Nature of Things in the Manner hitherto explained: And, becomes a Law as abſolutely unchangeable as Nature itſelf, which admits of no Alteration.

There can be no moral Obligation if there be no Law

The *Honeſtum*.

Honour.

SECT. II.

(1) NOW, the ſpecial Laws of the moral Virtues may upon this Foundation be deduced from the General Law of Univerſal Juſtice.

That

(1) *Now, the Special Laws of the moral Virtues may*, &c.] That Paſſage, which is the moſt intricate and involved in this whole *Philoſophical Enquiry*, may here properly enough admit of a farther clearing. I ſhall ſet down this Paſſage in the learned Author's own Words, *Chap.* 5. *Sect.* 1. *Page* 186, 187. *London Edition* 1672 in Quarto. *Certum autem eſt ſolas veras Propoſitiones, ſive Theoreticas, ſive Practicas à Naturâ Rerum Menti noſtræ imprimi; quoniam Actio Naturalis id ſolum indicat, quod exiſtit, ejuſque Cauſa eſt in quo nihil unquam eſt Falſi: Id enim totum provenit à Voluntariâ Temeritate Notiones conjungente, aut ſeparante quas Natura non conjunxit aut ſeparavit. Si itaque Naturâ cohæreant Termini, verâ de iis affirmata fiat Propoſitio. Termini autem cohærent cùm ab eâdem Re diverſimodè conſideratâ, aut cum Rebus diverſis Comparatâ, ſive ſi ejus Conceptus (plerumque inadæquati) Menti ingeruntur. De Negativis autem veris ex his facile eſt pronunciare. Interim juſtè admodùm hæ Leges, ſeu Propoſitiones Naturæ aſcribuntur, cùm ea & ipſarum Terminos & Terminorum cohærentiam Menti exporat obſervandam. Ita inſuper Agentia rationalia comparata ſunt ut dum in hoc Statu morantur, ex Neceſſitate quadam ſuæ Naturæ earum Terminos percipiant, ſeu apprehendant, ſed ex intrinſecâ Propenſione feruntur ad eos inter ſe conferendos, ut Propoſitiones efficiant affirmatas de Conſentaneis, negativas de Diſſentaneis, immò & ad binas Propoſitiones ita inter ſe diſponendas, ut ex iis Præmiſſis tertiam ſeu Concluſionem deducant. Scilicet hæc flagitat ipſa Natura rationalitatis ut et Propoſitiones (præcipuè de Actuum noſtrorum Effectibus circa noſtram, aliorumque Fœlicitatem) fiant per ſe evidentes, quales ſunt* Primæ *Leges Naturæ; et ex iis deducantur aliæ, ſeu Concluſiones, quæ* ſecundariæ *ſeu minùs Notæ ejus Leges dicantur.* Our Author ſpeaks concerning the *Primary* and *Secondary* Laws of Nature, as ſo many

That Law being ſuppoſed which eſtabliſhes the Rights ſeverally of Individuals, and preſerves ſuch Rights with this one View or Intent only: Namely,

Two Special Laws of the Moral Virtues.

many Propoſitions in the *Syllogiſtical* and *Mathematical* Way. Every one of theſe *Propoſitions* has its own *Terms*, a *Subject*, a *Prædicate* and a *verbal Copulative* either *Conjunctive* or *Diſjunctive*. The Terms of each *Moral Propoſition*, if they be true, are either *nearly* or *remotely* laid in Nature: *Nearly*, in the *Primary Laws*: *Remotely*, in the *Secondary Laws*. *Ex Primis Naturæ Legibus*, ſays our Author, *Deducantur aliæ ſeu Concluſiones, quæ ſecundariæ ſeu Naturæ Leges Minùs Notæ.* Theſe Terms, with all their innate Truth, are impreſs'd upon the Mind.—And then—by connecting the Terms of each Propoſition, the Propoſitions themſelves are form'd by the Mind, and treaſured up in it as ſo many Truths. The Reader is to obſerve that we talk here concerning *affirmative Propoſitions* only: Becauſe, Propoſitions *negatively true* are readily underſtood. *De negativis autem veris ex his facile eſt pronunciare.* The Terms of theſe Propoſitions are therefore laid in Nature (*See Supplemental Notes by Way of Recapitulation at the End of* Sect. 10. Chap. 1. Page 31.) And the Human Kind is conſtituted and framed, both by *a natural and moral Neceſſity*, to *connect*, and to *perceive* the *Connection* of, theſe Terms. *Ita inſuper Agentia Rationalia comparata ſunt, ut, dùm in hoc Statu morantur, ex Neceſſitate quâdam ſuæ Naturæ, earum Terminos percipiant, ſeu apprehendant, ſed ex intrinſecâ Propenſione feruntur ad eos inter ſe conferendos, ut Propoſitiones efficiant affirmatas de Conſentaneis, Negativas de Diſſentaneis.* When two of theſe Propoſitions are naturally, and according to the Legitimate Rules of Logic, diſpoſed. The next Progreſs, which the human Mind takes, is, from theſe two Propoſitions, as from Premiſſes, to infer a third Propoſition or Concluſion. Each of theſe Concluſions, thus fairly inferr'd and deduced, is a *Primary Law* of Nature. *Immò & ad Binas inter ſe diſponendas, ut ex iis Præmiſſis tertiam ſeu Concluſionem deducant. Scilicet hæc flagitat ipſa Natura Rationalitatis ut et Propoſitiones (præcipuè de Actuum noſtrorum Effectibus circa noſtram aliorumque Felicitatem) fiant per ſe evidentes quales ſunt Primæ Leges Naturæ*, &c. Our Author ſeems to have conducted his Reader hitherto in the Logical Way. When theſe *Primary Laws* or firſt Concluſions are drawn, Further Concluſions, that is, *Corollaries* or *Secondary Laws* are deduced from the *Primary*: They are, truly ſpeaking, *Corollaries*, ariſing from the *Primary Laws*, and are (*mutatis mutandis*) equally true, but ſomewhat more difficult: They are remoter Inferences; or, in the Mathematical Term, *Corollaries*, and muſt be conſider'd as farther Propoſitions applicable to particular Times and Circumſtances, according to the different Forms of Civil Inſtitution over the Face of the whole Earth. *Et ex iis deducantur aliæ, ſeu Concluſiones quæ ſecundariæ ſeu minùs Notæ Leges Naturæ dicantur.* Upon this one Diſtinction only, is grounded the Neceſſity of an Ἐπιείκεια, an *Equity*, a *Moderation* in the Application of *Primary* to *Secondary* Laws of Nature. This Diſtinction between *Primary* and *Secondary Laws* demands a cloſer Enquiry: Nay, the Primary Laws themſelves determine, as to Mankind, differently at different Times. Had Mankind continued in a State of Purity, all their Wants wou'd have been regulated by Reaſon. But, when this State of Purity was loſt, and inſtead of all their Operations being govern'd by Reaſon, the Fleſh began to luſt againſt the Spirit, and the Members to wage War againſt the Mind, when Men's Luſts and Appetites grew heady and extravagant, as their Wants wou'd naturally increaſe by the Increaſe of their Luſts, ſo, from the Increaſe of their Wants, there wou'd ariſe a Neceſſity of larger Supplies, and theſe larger Supplies wou'd naturally beget Monopolies and Incloſures, and thoſe Incloſures wou'd as naturally beget Contention, and Contention as naturally beget Confuſion. From theſe two States of Man, the Primary Laws of Nature themſelves demanded a different Application, a different Obedience, even before any inſtituted Laws. *Termini autem Propoſitionum cohærent Quùm Termini imprimuntur ab eâdem Re diverſimodè Conſideratâ.* As ſoon as States, Empires, Kingdoms, and the ſeveral Forms of Civil Government were inſtituted, then theſe remoter Concluſions, Corollaries or *Secondary Laws* of Nature took Place and began to operate.——And ſince theſe *Secondary Laws* took their Origin from the *Primary*; and as equally concern us now as the *Primary Laws* did our firſt Parents in a State of Purity: Their Obligation at this Day carries an equal

See *Burnet* upon Government, Page 18.

Namely, to promote the Common Good of All: Each and every individual Agent, in order to anſwer this one ultimate End, being bound down to two Sorts of Obligations.

The firſt Special Law of the Moral Virtues.

1. *Every one Individual is obliged to allow and grant to all other rational Beings ſuch a Proportion or Share of the Bleſſings with which each is intruſted, as ſhall not break in upon, leſſen or deſtroy, that neceſſary Share or Proportion which is reſpectively by GOD and Nature allotted to each, and with the very ſame View End and Deſign.*

The ſecond Special Law of the Moral Virtues. See Sections 4th and 7th of his Chapter.

2. *That each ought to reſerve to himſelf ſuch an Uſe or Application of his own private good Things or Bleſſings, whereby* (i.e. *by ſuch an Uſe or Application*) *others may alſo be greatly benefited at the ſame Time: Or, at leaſt, that, ſuch a particular Uſe or Application prove perfectly conſiſtent with the Good of others.*

In order to arrive at the clear Interpretation, Meaning and Obſervance of theſe Laws or Obligations, we are to conſider.

1. "That all rational Agents (as being in a ſtrict neceſſary Conjunction "with ourſelves) are the Terms or conſtituent Parts into which, the "whole Syſtem of rational Agency is to be diſtinguiſhed:" ——And,——

2. "That theſe Terms are indifferently and equally applicable both to GOD and Man."

From whence, in the firſt Place it follows, that the Glory, the Honour of GOD muſt be ſtrictly regarded by all Mankind in their Determinations concerning the Common Good, and *Secondly*, That ALMIGHTY GOD (as from the moſt regular ſtrict Analogy may moſt eaſily be collected) acts by all other rational Beings, according to the ſtricteſt Rules of the moral Virtues.—Now, the firſt of theſe two Laws which commands us to regard others, from a Regard to the Common Good, preſcribes and lays the Injunction of that Virtue, called *Liberality*, and of all thoſe Virtues, which, in a ſtrict Senſe, are called *Homiletic*. We are here, however, to obſerve that, in a large extended Meaning, all the ſeveral Branches of univerſal Juſtice tend to the Preſervation of others in Conjunction with ourſelves. And, by Conſequence, that, all the ſeveral Branches of Juſtice may be called *Homiletic Virtues*.

See Biſhop *Butler*'s Analogy, Chap. 3. Part 1. of the moral Government of GOD.

Ὁμιλητικὸς Qui benè & cum Dexteritate quâdam ſcit converſari: vel qui Dexteritate quâdam in Converſatione utitur. Rob. Stephan. Theſaur. Græc.

The ſecond Law or Obligation commands ſuch a *Temperance* and *Modeſty* in the Uſe of good Things appropriated to *SELF*, as may prove miniſterial in all the ſeveral Offices of Public Good, ſuch as, 1. The Service of *GOD*. 2. The Service of *Human Nature*. 3. The Service of *our Country*. And, 4. The Service of *Family* in Particular. Now, in theſe two

binding Force. *Aut Quùm Termini Propoſitionum impremuntur ab eâdem Re cum Rebus diverſis comparatâ, diverſi ejus conceptus (plerumque inadæquati) Menti ingeruntur.* That theſe different Kinds of Conceptions concerning the ſame Thing are, generally ſpeaking, inadequate, and far from compleat, muſt inevitably happen, both from the preſent Imperfections of Human Nature as well as from the arbitrary changeable Uſe of Words. *See the Note at* Sect. 3. Chap. 7. Page 489.

two Special Laws or Obligations, both Sides of the Diviſion, (*i. e.* The Sum Total of that Whole, wherein we ourſelves and others are the eſſential conſtituent Parts) muſt be taken into the Queſtion: And, by Conſequence, the ſingle particular private Virtues reſpect the Publick Good preferable to the Advantage of any one ſingle Individual whatſoever.——But —becauſe, ſome of theſe Virtues may be ſaid to regard one particular Part of the Whole more immediately than the reſt; theſe Parts or Branches of Juſtice, and, by Conſequence, all the ſpecial Virtues may, perhaps, ſeem rather mix'd and confounded together, than ſeparated and diſtinguiſhed from each other: Yet, whoſoever has, with any Degree of Attention, compared the natural Connection of theſe ſpecial Virtues, with the reciprocal Aſſiſtance which they afford to one another and to the Common Happineſs, will find that they can ſcarcely, in any other Terms, be expreſſed to more Advantage: And, conſequently, That, theſe Virtues cannot, even in the Expreſſion, be confounded by any Man, unleſs by ſome ſuch diſorderly Wretch, who is the very Quinteſſence of Confuſion itſelf: Becauſe, the ſame Circulation of Blood thro' the ſame Arteries and Veins, which preſerves the Health and Vigour of the whole Body preſerves alſo particularly the Health and Vigour of any one Part. *E. G.*

The Animal Oeconomy, upon a Secretion of the Blood by the Veſſels of the Liver, executes two diſtinct Employments. 1. *Firſt*, it prepares and renders the Blood fit for all its other Offices thro' the other Veſſels of the Body (for, without ſuch a Secretion of the Blood thro' the Liver, a Jaundice muſt follow) and by this Secretion, the Liver alſo itſelf at the ſame Time is preſerved and nouriſhed.

2. And, *Secondly*, (*vice verſâ*) the animal Oeconomy nouriſhes and preſerves the Liver by this Secretion; regarding, at the ſame Time, all the other Parts of the Body. So that the Office of the Liver is naturally complex, both *public* and *private:* And yet no Confuſion ariſes in the Diſcharge of both. Theſe two Offices are capable of a ſeparate diſtinct Conſideration: And yet this Conſideration includes in it ſomething peculiar to the Liver itſelf. And thus much is fully ſufficient to anſwer the whole Objection about Confuſion. Theſe two Offices, however, cannot, in Fact, be ſeparated from each other in a State of Health, *i. e.* whilſt Nature continues free and undiſturbed. In like manner, Juſtice in general and the Public Good being preſerved, all the ſubordinate Virtues, implied in the general, cannot in reality be ſeparated; and yet, no Confuſion happens, if each and every one of them is ſeparately conſidered by that Regard for the Parts which theſe Virtues immediately concern: Notwithſtanding that they ultimately prove miniſterial to the Happineſs of the Whole, *the chief End*; The principal Effect of both Laws, and conſequently, of all the Virtues injoined, being the ſame.——But, the very Ends, which they reſpect, and the various Effects which follow, don't vary or differ leſs than the various Parts of the Syſtem of rational Agents:—All which muſt be conſulted, in order to produce the beſt, moſt perfect State of he Whole.

SECT.

SECT. III.

FROM hence we underſtand the Reaſon (altho' not ſo very explicitly) why the Common Good is always familiar to the Mind of Man at the Time he acts according to the Rules of Virtue. We immediately, to be ſure, purſue ſome Part of this General Good, but it is ſuch a Part, as, from different Reaſons we well know, agrees happily with the other Parts of it, and, is requiſite in conſtituting the Whole. Many Circumſtances concur to prove, that, in every Act agreeable to Virtue, a Regard for the Common Good muſt never be laid aſide. For, amongſt theſe Conſiderations, Care is always taken, that, every one ſhall keep within the Bounds and Limits of his own Rights and Juriſdictions, as alſo, that no one ſhall invade thoſe of others.——Now——Theſe Diſtinctions and Limitations cannot be obſerved, if Reſpect be not had to the Rights of others, and conſequently, to the general Good. Becauſe, for this very Reaſon it is, that the particular Rights, Juriſdictions and Privileges of Individuals reſpectively were limited. All Civil Societies and the firſt Founders of them explicitly and expreſsly acknowledge the general Diviſion of Rights, (Dominion and Property,) into the ſeveral diſtinct Branches and Portions of them. Under this Diviſion, ſome Portions (as being ſacred) are, in a more eſpecial Manner appropriated to ALMIGHTY GOD: Other Portions of theſe Rights and Sovereignties are within ſtated Bounds aſſigned to Nations, and to Countries reſpectively, under their Juriſdictions: And with this Deſign only, that they all may acknowledge the Bounds and Limits each reſpectively of its own Dominion and Sovereignty; that they may practiſe Religion, enter into ſolemn Leagues and Covenants, and carry on Trade, Commerce, and mutual Dealings. And private Perſons, who are the Members of ſome one particular Civil Society, do, in Fact, at the Time they obey the Laws of their own Community and keep themſelves within the regular Bounds of their own Society, exerciſe and practiſe the moral Virtues; And thus far do they, by a neceſſary Conſequence, agree with their own Society, and with all other Societies, in that diſtinct Diviſion, in that general ſeparate Diſtribution of Rights, Privileges, Properties, Dominions and Sovereignties ſo abſolutely neceſſary to the Good of the univerſal All.

Since then, to ſum up all, the Mind is ready, in all the practic Virtues to allow ſuch Rights as belong both to GOD and to all *Mankind*, as well thoſe of different Communities, as thoſe of our own Fellow-Citizens, and of them united in the ſame Houſe and Family: Therefore, for the Security and Preſervation of ſo diſtinct an Order, of ſo regular a Subordination:

1. "The Rights, Juriſdiction and Dominion of ALMIGHTY GOD, "muſt be principally regarded.

2. Such

2. " Such Rights, Privileges and Dominions, as belong to Nations in " general, muſt maintain the ſecond Place.

3. " The Rights, Privileges and Powers of particular Kingdoms reſpec- " tively muſt hold the third Place.

" And ſo on ſubordinately come in thoſe Ties and Obligations, which " link together ſmaller Societies, ſuch, for Inſtance, as *Franchiſed Towns*, " *Corporations*, *Colleges*, *Families*, &c."

From hence the Concluſion is eaſy and natural: That, the principal and chief End of them all is the Common Good of the whole Syſtem of rational Beings, and, which, in Reality, differs nothing from the Good of the ſeveral Parts conſidered in their true regular Order to each other, and united to each, by the Ties and Bonds of Society. We are to take the Rule and Meaſure of all our Acts, Affections and Paſſions from this one ultimate End, and from all the conſtituent Branches of it view'd in their ſeveral Subordinations: So that, they may truly be ſaid to err, on one extreme, or the other, who, at any Time, allow to any one Part, either *more* or *leſs* than the Good of the Whole (to be preſerved in this Order and Form of Relation,) requires. Upon this Foundation (conformable to Rules and Laws well underſtood and known to regulate and eſtabliſh the Dominion and Right of ALMIGHTY GOD of Nations and of every particular Society, as well as of all the Parts and Members of each and all leſſer Societies) certain Modes and Forms of Behaviour may eaſily be diſcovered, proper to regulate all theſe ſeveral Acts and Duties within the true Bounds of *Mediocrity*: And with ſuch an Accuracy as not to tranſgreſs, on either extreme, any one of theſe Laws: For, it is undoubtedly true, that, every Act deviates into ſome one extreme, or is faulty, which breaks in upon any of theſe Laws.——Let us ſuppoſe then theſe Laws ſo to correſpond, that, the Rights of leſſer Societies in all Points agree with the Rights of the larger. 1. " As for Inſtance, nothing in the firſt Place, can or ought to " be commanded in any Family contrary to the Laws of that Civil Society " in which ſuch a Family is a Part. 2. Neither ought any Thing, *Se-* " *condly* to be commanded in any Civil Society, contrary to the Laws of " Nations in General, ſuch as the Diviſions, Diſtributions and Alienations " of thoſe Dominions Rights and Properties as are and ought to be pre- " ſerved inviolable, the Obligations of mutual Fidelity, and the punctual " Performances of Engagements.——3. Neither *laſtly*, ought any Thing " to be commanded or permitted injurious to the Right and Dominion of " ALMIGHTY GOD over his Creatures.

Becauſe, the whole *Force of Obligation*, which *inferior Laws* carry in them, is derived from the *Force of Obligation* which Laws of a *Superior Nature* contain: And, conſequently, whatſoever oppoſes and contradicts theſe prior *ſuperior Laws* abſolutely wants the *Aſſiſtance*, the *Force*, the *Obligation* of them. For, an inferior Power cannot abrogate and diſannul the Law of a ſuperior Power, notwithſtanding, that, an inferior Authority

rity can and may, in many Ways, limit the Liberty allowed by the Law of a Superior. And the Reaſon is, becauſe the Power of *a ſtricter Limitation* (in Caſes not determined by the ſuperior) perfectly conſiſts with the Subordination of the leſſer Power to the greater: Nay, and the Fact is ſo ſtrictly true, that this is the principal Reaſon, why, ſubordinate Governors and Vice-Rulers are conſtituted and appointed.

SECT. IV.

The Virtues in Particular, how deduced and explain'd.

HAving explained the Meaſure or Rule of Mediocrity, or that Medium lying between two Extremes, which is generally required in all the moral Virtues, it will now be no difficult Matter to deſcribe and define each and every one of theſe Virtues ſeparately and diſtinctly: Becauſe the true Subſtance of them all eſſentially conſiſts in a Propenſity, *or Readineſs of Will*, to pay due Obedience to all the Laws inferr'd and deduced from the General Law of *Juſtice*.

See Sections 2d and 7th of this Chapter.

Let us therefore, for the Purpoſe, examine into thoſe two Laws which we have, not long ſince, ſhewn to take their Riſe from the Law, conſtituting and appointing ſeparate Dominions, Rights and Properties, in order, the better to promote *Common Good*.

The firſt of theſe two Laws, in order the better to anſwer this great End, *commands us to communicate what is our own to others, we reſerving, at the ſame Time, ſo much to ourſelves, as may enable us to purſue and attain to our own Happineſs.*

We are ſufficiently given to underſtand that this Law is commanded, it being evidently neceſſary to the Common Happineſs: Becauſe, without this Common Happineſs, it muſt be the moſt trifling Abſurdity imaginable to hope for and expect our own private Happineſs, as I have already diffuſively and at large demonſtrated.

1. Under this Law is comprehended, *firſt*, the Precept about *Donations*, *Gifts* and *Benefits* whether freely beſtowed and for which little or no Return is ever expected: Or, whether the whole Gratitude be entirely left to the free Choice, as to Times and Seaſons, of him who receives the Benefit.
2. Under this Law, *Secondly*, is alſo contained the Exhortation to that Benevolence, which indeed is leſſer, but of a moſt uſeful Kind, and employ'd about *Agreements*, *Bargains*, *Compacts*, *Commerce*, *Traffick*, *Trade*, &c. In which we either promiſe, or perform a Promiſe made, to others, under ſome certain Condition or Conditions to be performed on their Part. We, therefore, can communicate to others either our *Property* or our *Labour* (and Induſtry) or both. The Propenſity of our Will to obey this Law is diſcovered, either in Acts of Beneficence, and in Effects naturally conſequent upon this Virtue: And which, therefore either become themſelves

the

the *natural Signs* of ſuch a Propenſity to *this Virtue*: Or *Secondly*, are the voluntary Marks and Tokens of it. *Firſt*, To the Effects or natural Signs themſelves of this Virtue belongs Liberality, or the Bounty in beſtowing. To the voluntary Marks and Tokens of this Virtue belong, *Secondly*, The *Homiletie* Virtues as they are called.

Concerning theſe Virtues we ſhall treat in the 6th Section of this Chapter.

SECT. V.

Liberality, to define it, *is that Branch of Juſtice, evident from external Acts*, freely *giving and beſtowing to others, whatever is truly our own.* In this Definition I place *Juſtice* as the *Genus*, to avoid the Neceſſity of expreſſing in many Words a *Will* to obey the Law of Nature:——And, that, I might, alſo, under the *ſame Term* or *Genus*, ſhew, that the Neceſſity and true Meaſure of this Virtue muſt be derived from ſome certain Law. For, every Part or Branch of Juſtice is reducible to a Law, nay—even every Law injoined, as the Meaſure or Rule of Moral Agency, muſt be conſidered, not only the *Natural* but *the poſitive Law* of ALMIGHTY GOD; as muſt alſo all Laws of Nations in general, all the Laws of each Civil Society, all municipal Laws, the Laws of leſſer Societies, of Cities, Towns, Corporations, *&c.* Before we can determine a moral free Act *juſt or agreeable to the Nature of Virtue.* For, in all theſe Laws the beſt End and all the ſeparate ſingle Branches of it reſpectively are conſidered and regarded. Namely, the Glory and Honour of ALMIGHTY GOD; the Peace of different Civil Societies, their Trade and Commerce with each other; the Civil Polity proper to each Society; the Opulency and Security of ſmaller Societies and Families. All Superfluity and Deficiency, all Extravagance and Avarice in our free Gifts and Donations (whereby any of theſe Laws is in Danger of being tranſgreſſed) are ſtrictly forbidden.—There is alſo poſitively and ſtrictly commanded a free Conſumption of theſe our Poſſeſſions and Labours, ſo far as can be ſerviceable to this End, both in eſtabliſhing and enlarging all the ſingular Parts in their own natural Order.—But,—ſince it is impoſſible to ſupport a liberal, generous Expence without ſome juſt and honourable Method of acquiring Property: And, unleſs we exert ſome Prudence in preſerving ſuch Property when acquired, we are alſo taught and commanded theſe Duties, *i. e.* the Duties of an honeſt Induſtry and Prudence, in the Precepts and Admonitions deduced from the Conſideration of this one ſame great End: And of every and all its ſeveral conſtituent Parts as viewed in their regular Order. And therefore, of Conſequence, that ſame Principle of *Liberality* which primarily directs the

Liberality defined.

Liberality a Branch of Juſtice.

An honeſt Diligence in acquiring Property.
A Prudence in the Care and Management of it.
Rapacity.
Improvidence.
Frugality.
Avarice.
Extravagance.

Will to a juſt regular Expence, does, in a ſecondary Way at leaſt, denote the Deſire of obeying the honeſt Laws of Acquiſition and Prudence, expreſſed by the Term *Providence, or a providential Care in acquiring and applying Property.* The oppoſite Extremes of this Virtue are, on the one Hand, a rapacious Seizing of all we can lay our Hands upon; on the other, a careleſs improvident Neglect: And the Virtue itſelf between the Extremes is term'd *Frugality* or Parſimony in preſerving and keeping what we have: To this Virtue, on the one Extreme, is oppoſed (1) *The ſordid Avarice of Miſers*, and on the other, an Ἀσωτία a laviſh *unthrifty Extravagance.*

The ſeveral Branches of Liberality.
Generoſity.
Compaſſion.
Almsgiving.
Hoſpitality.

After this Manner, for Inſtance, the Definitions of ſuch a Providence, and of ſuch a Frugality are only the Definitions of a Juſtice in acquiring or procuring, and in carefully preſerving and managing our Income, and theſe two Kinds of Juſtice, as to our Expences, are exactly analogous to the Virtues, *Providence* and *Frugality*. Now, according to the various Objects, upon which Expence is injoined and commanded, the Virtue *Liberality* aſſumes to itſelf different Appellations: For, if this Virtue exerts itſelf upon ſuch Objects, and to ſuch Purpoſes, as are ſignally, and remarkably uſeful to the public Good, it is called *Generoſity:* To which Virtue is oppoſed, on the one Hand, the extravagant Profuſion of the Proud and Ambitious: And on the other, the mean Spirit of minute low Mortals. When this Virtue is exerciſed upon the wretched and miſerable it is term'd *Pity*, and more particularly, when it diffuſes Beneficence upon the poor and needy, it is term'd *Alms-giving.* In Caſe this Virtue diffuſes itſelf and ſheds Comfort and Support upon Strangers, it is term'd *Hoſpitality*: Which muſt be underſtood in ſtill a ſtricter Meaning, if we entertain them in our own Families. In all theſe Virtues the Rule of Beneficence is regulated by this one Maxim, *viz. Whatſoever conduces moſt to all the ſeveral Branches of this one ſupreme ultimate End.* As for Inſtance, *Firſt*, to that Piety, which is the Cement, the Tie, the Link of that ſocial Correſpondence between GOD and *Man.*

2. To thoſe mutual reciprocal Aſſiſtances, Helps, and Succours: The Fidelity and Truth, the Trade and Commerce which are carried on and promoted between different Civil Societies.

3. To that Peace, Harmony, Agreement, Concord, and all the other Duties and good Offices which are obſerved and cultivated by the ſeveral Members of the ſame Civil Society, and,

4. To that moſt flouriſhing State and Condition of leſſer Societies and Families, which may be eaſily obtained, preſerved and maintained: The three former Relations juſt now mentioned, being firſt well-ſecured and preſerved

(1) *The ſordid Avarice of Miſers*] Sordida Parcitas Euclionum. Euclio, Avari Senis apud Plaut. Aul. Nomen quod ad omnes ejuſmodi Homunciones vulgò transfertur. *vid.* Stephan. Rob. Theſaur. Lat.

preſerved inviolable. Theſe ſeveral Relations of Duty, I thought proper to expreſs and inculcate in a Manner more diſtinct and clearer than ordinary, by circumſcribing and determining the exact *Moderation, Mediocrity* and *Golden Mean* of this one Cardinal ſpecial eminent Virtue; that, by the Help of ſo particular an Analyſis or Solution of this Virtue into all its Branches, there may be no Occaſion to add any Thing farther, in fixing the Rule of Proportion we are to purſue in inveſtigating, by a Method moſt infallible, the true Meaſure of the following Virtues, *i. e. the Homiletic Virtues*; which are to fall under our Conſideration in the next Section.

SECT. VI.

LET us now paſs on to the Virtues particularly diſtinguiſhed, by the Epithet *Homiletie: Virtues* grounded and eſtabliſhed upon a due Obedience *to that Juſtice, to that very ſame general Law of Nature, in this* Enquiry *ſo firmly ſettled.*

The Homiletic Virtues, See the Second Section of this Chapter, Page 514.

An Homiletic Virtue in the General is a Juſtice Beneficial to others, expreſs'd by Arbitrary or Voluntary Signs, or by viſible free Motions, Geſtures, Attitudes, Words, and Marks, (diſtinguiſhing Characteriſtics) fit, convenient, and anſwerable to the Common Good.

Homiletic Virtue defined.

In this Definition of *Homiletic Virtue*, I have ſo particularly ſpecified the *End*, viz. *the Common Good:* Since, under the General Notion of *Juſtice*, already defined, this whole compleat *End* is comprehended, becauſe the whole Virtue *Juſtice* has a direct Tendency to this very End:——My chief Deſign here is to avoid Miſtakes by the cleareſt Perſpicuity of Expreſſion. By voluntary or arbitrary Signs, I underſtand Principally, and in the firſt Place. 1. *Articulate Sounds or Speech.* 2. *The ſeveral Geſtures and Attitudes of the Body.* 3. *The ſeveral Looks and Turns of Countenance which betray and lay open the natural Tendencies and Inclinations of an inward Diſpoſition.*—In all theſe true arbitrary Signs, *Gravity* and *Courteſy* preſerve the true middle Way, free from an Extreme on either Side. As to our Speech or Converſation; Taciturnity or *Silence* and *Truth*, in a moſt eſpecial Manner keep and preſerve us, within regular Bounds, beſt and ſecureſt from both Extremes: This Medium, as to Promiſes, aſſumes the Titles, *Fidelity* and *Urbanity* or *Civility*. Concerning each of theſe, we ſhall now ſpeak ſomewhat more particularly. I cannot explain theſe two moſt agreeable Signs of Virtue more expreſſively, than, by conſidering, that, in all Sorts of Acts (where Juſtice is concerned towards others) there are required the Prudence and the moſt extenſive Benevolence of free rational Agents, as we have before demonſtrated. That Kind of Converſation, then, wherein are diſcovered all the ſeveral Marks of a juſt wiſe Prudence, determines the Character of a *Man* we call *Grave.*

Grave.

That Kind of Converſation, on the contrary, wherein ſhine forth and appear conſpicuous all the outward Marks of an exalted eminent Benevolence, determines the Character of him we call *Courteous*. For which Reaſon, I define *Gravity* that *Homiletic Virtue* ſo remarkably diſtinguiſhed by the Fit well-choſen Signs of *Prudence*. Whereas, I call *Courteſy* that *Homiletic* Virtue ſo eminently diſtinguiſh'd by an exalted Benignity and Benevolence. Theſe two *Homiletic* Virtues are eaſily reconciled, becauſe in them Prudence and true Benignity or Benevolence (as ſpecific diſtinguiſhing Marks) appear and ſhew themſelves. From hence, the Oppoſites of theſe two Virtues are eaſily apprehended: On the one Extreme, a certain affected Auſterity or rigid Behaviour, as for Inſtance, when any Perſon uſes more outward Forms than the true Nature of the End deſigned requires: Or ſuch Signs, as are not commodiouſly fitted and adapted to anſwer the *Glory of God* and the *Happineſs of Man* (the true conſtituent Parts and Branches of each Virtue): or *thirdly*, ſuch Tokens as betray too rigorous and ſtrict an Adherence to outward Shadows and Appearances, letting go the true Subſtance. Whereas, on the other Extreme, a Levity, a trifling Behaviour is as equally repugnant to the very ſame Virtue: And *this*, the judicious Enquirer may eaſily diſcover from a Deſcription of the oppoſite Virtue and Vice. Upon the ſame Foundation, to *Courteſy* and a good-natured Politeneſs of *Behaviour*, on the one Extreme, is oppoſed *Flattery* or all the fulſome Arts of a *Gnatho*; on the other extreme, a rough peeviſh Behaviour called the *Moroſe* or *Moroſity*.

Courteous.

Gravity defined.

Auſterity.

Levity.

Flattery.

Moroſity.

Now, ſince Speech is the principal Interpreter of the Mind, and the Characteriſtic which chiefly diſtinguiſhes Man from Brute, the Law of Nature, conſequently, in a more eſpecial and ſignificant Manner lays before us the Rule concerning ſuch a wiſe prudent good natured Benevolence, as ought to be expreſſed and ſhewn to others: And this Rule, the ſeveral Virtues religiouſly and ſtrictly obſerve. 1. For, in the firſt Place, the Law of Nature at ſometimes commands Silence. As for Inſtance, whenever our Duty either towards GOD, or any other of our Superiours require it.

Silence.

2. *Secondly*, Silence, is by the Law of Nature injoined in all ſuch Caſes, where (the *Arcana*) Secrets, (whilſt they continue Secrets) of Civil Society, or of Friends, or of Families, or of ourſelves, ought not to be divulged: Provided always, That ſuch Secrets can be concealed, for the better Security of Happineſs in general, and that the Common Good of all be preſerved. This Taciturnity or Secrecy is ſtrictly obedient to all theſe Laws, *i. e.* To the Laws of our Duty to GOD and all other Superiours, to the Laws of Civil Society, of Friendſhip, of Family, and to the Laws which more immediately concern ourſelves.

Taciturnity.

Taciturnity or *Secrecy*, to define it, is that *Homiletic Virtue*, which keeps a ſtrict Silence ſuitable and well-fitted to anſwer the Common Good.

The

The one Extreme, which is oppoſite to, and deſtructive of this Virtue, is an unſeaſonable ill-timed Parſimony of our Words: A Silence, a Darkneſs, when it is a Prudence a Duty to be open, and to ſpeak. Such a Defect as this is wonderfully injurious to a free Communication of Arts and Sciences, and to the principal Advantages and Benefits of Society. Whereas, on the other Hand, it is a Duty incumbent upon us, and enjoined by the Law of Nature, that we at fit Times and Seaſons converſe with our Fellow-Creatures for the Publick Good: Now I do not remember to have met with a Term, which expreſſively enough, in one ſingle Word, conveys to our Minds the Duty and Obedience which ought to be paid to this one ſingle Virtue. This Virtue may, and not improperly, be called a (παῤῥησία attended with Prudence, Wiſdom, and Diſcretion, or, a) juſt and becoming Freedom of Speech: This Virtue eſſentially conſiſts in a Propenſity, a Readineſs to expreſs, under intelligible Words, whatſoever, Reaſon dictates to be in any Reſpect advantageous and for the Happineſs of the whole rational Community. The Expreſſions, then, about which the Law of Nature, in this Caſe, is concerned, regard either Things paſt or Things preſent; and concerning theſe two, this Law commands us; (in order the better to anſwer this one grand End,) ſo to declare and expreſs the Thing (let it be what it will) juſt as it is in itſelf, and as it has appeared in Truth to us, and ſuch an Obedience to this Law is called *Veracity*: Or, ſuppoſe our Expreſſions employ'd about Things *future*, (or to be performed) concerning theſe Modes and Forms, the Law of Nature commands that whatſoever Promiſes we make to others ſhall be ſuch as may redound to a common Utility, to a public Advantage: And, every ſuch *Promiſe* is to be either *abſolute* or *conditional*, juſt as the Nature of the beſt End, in the Caſes before us, requires. Now, of *Promiſes*, wherein *the many* are concerned and agreed, the *Promiſe* is called a *Conventio*, an *Agreement*, a *Contract* or *Bargain*, and upon this depend almoſt all mutual Commerce and Dealings carried on between Rational Beings.

An ill timed Parſimony of Words.

Παῤῥησία, or a prudent diſcreet Freedom of Speech.

Veracity.

I do not here, however, by the by, recollect ever to have met with any one ſpecific Name diſtinguiſhing that Virtue which determines and lays the Obligation upon rational Agents to enter into and engage in ſuch Kinds of Promiſes and Contracts, ſo eminently Beneficial to the public Utility and Advantage. Whereas the Virtue itſelf, which religiouſly keeps and punctually obſerves ſuch Promiſes and Contracts when made, is honoured by the Title *Faith* or *Fidelity*. Here it is to be obſerved, that a Propenſity, a willing Deſire to enter into ſuch Compacts or Agreements, and to perform and execute them punctually when once engaged in, do both carry in them the ſame eſſential Spirit, Energy and Virtue; neither, indeed, is it by any Means lawful to obſerve Compacts and Agreements unleſs they are ſuch as may and can, according to the Laws of Nature, (with a full ſaving to, and Preſervation of, the Common Good,) be done and performed. All Kinds of Juſtice, (eſſentially and properly conſiſting in the

the due Obſervance of Laws) cannot be reſolved into that Faith or Fidelity which depends entirely upon, and is to be diſcharged by, poſitive Contracts only: The Caſe is ſo far otherwiſe, that, before it poſſibly can be known whether an Agreement is or ought to be fulfilled, the Agreement ought in the firſt Place to be well proved, that it is an Agreement either commanded, or, at leaſt, allowed by the Laws of Nature. In a Word, the higheſt Benevolence in our Converſation is not expreſſed unleſs ſomething be properly ſuited and adapted to the ſeveral Stations, Capacities and Ranks of all and each reſpectively with whom we converſe. This Behaviour is, with Propriety enough, expreſſed by the Term *Politeneſs:* And therefore, the Limits and Bounds which ſecure this Virtue from its Extremes are juſt the ſame with thoſe of the other Virtues. Here one Caution is univerſally, and without Exception, to be ſtrictly obſerved, that no one Expreſſion (not even in *jeſt*) be uttered which tends to leſſen the Glory, the Honour of ALMIGHTY GOD, or the Happineſs of *Mankind*. This Rule will be cautiouſly obſerved, provided that neither the Laws of Religion nor the Rights of Nations, nor the Civil Rights of a Country, nor thoſe of ſmaller Societies, nor thoſe of private Perſons, be ridiculed in a low, mean, ſawcy Drollery, ſo odious and abominable in all. Whoſoever, therefore, indulges himſelf in theſe Jeſts tranſgreſſes againſt the true Laws of Nature, and deſervedly incurs the Cenſure of that Vice called *Scurrility*. Whereas, on the contrary, Perſons utterly averſe againſt all the innocent Pleaſantry of Converſation, or, who never trouble their Heads about it in all they ſay, or, who condemn it in others fall under the Cenſure of a clowniſh Ruſticity, a churliſh Bluntneſs. What we here offer, is fully ſufficient in treating upon *the firſt Special Law*, which takes it's Riſe and Source from the univerſal Law of Juſtice; as do alſo all the minuter Branches of this Special Law, together with all the ſeveral Virtues, both general and particular. conformable to it.

Scurrility
A Clowniſh Ruſticity.

SECT. VII.

The Second Special Law of the moral Virtues. See Sections 2d and 4th of this Chapter at Pages 514 and 518.

THE ſecond Special Law then of the Moral Virtues which we now come to conſider is deduced by the following Inveſtigatiom, from the Law of Univerſal Juſtice. *That Law* (i. e. The Law of Univerſal Juſtice being proved, and,) *which conſtitutes and eſtabliſhes the Rights of Individuals, conſtitutes and eſtabliſhes them with this one View only, that, the common general Good of all muſt be promoted by each and every one Individual.* From whence it appears evident " That Individuals are laid under an in-
" diſpenſable Obligation to conſult themſelves and their own Happineſs
" reſpectively, in ſuch an Uſe of the good Things of Life, (which pro-
" perly belong to each in particular,) as may beſt and moſt effectually an-
" ſwer

" ſwer the Good of all rational Beings: Or, at leaſt to diminiſh nothing " from the general Good of them." Theſe Expreſſions carry the ſame Senſe and Meaning in them with thoſe not long ſince delivered, (in the ſecond Section of this Chapter,) where we deduce the two Special Laws of the moral Virtues from the general Law of *Juſtice*. " That, the limited " well-regulated Love, which we bear to ourſelves, muſt pay a ſtrict Obedi- " ence to this general Law of Univerſal Juſtice: A Love, keeping and pre- " ſerving itſelf within thoſe Bounds of univerſal Juſtice, which, that equal Law " (allowing both to GOD and *Man* all their juſt Rights and Privileges,) " preſcribes."—If then a limited [φιλαυτία, or] Self-Love be commanded by this general Law: And that—in order to the nobleſt beſt End, ſuch a Self-Love as this cannot prove otherwiſe than juſt, honeſt, commendable; and—to carry this Point ſomewhat farther, ſince we have already demonſtrated, that, ſome certain Rights and Privileges (*i. e.* becauſe the Good of the Whole cannot be maintained without ſuch particular Rights reſpectively,) neceſſarily muſt be allowed to Individuals reſpectively, in order to the Well-being of all: Upon an equal ſtrong Foundation of Reaſoning, therefore, we conclude, the Neceſſity why each and all Individuals reſpectively ſhould have a free Uſe in, and Power over, his own Rights and Poſſeſſions, to anſwer the Ends of Happineſs in each Individual, but, at the ſame Time, miniſterial and ſtrictly ſubordinate to the Happineſs of the whole rational Community. And the Truth of this Reaſoning is eſtabliſhed upon a Self-evident Truth, an Axiom. *That, the Happineſs of the Whole is eſſentially conſtituted and made up of the Happineſs of all its conſtituent Parts.* For which Reaſon, a Concern as to one, being commanded, a Concern for the other is as virtually, as neceſſarily commanded alſo. And conſequently, the Happineſs of Individuals cannot be produced by others, in Caſe the Individuals themſelves *reſpectively* and *ſingly* intirely neglect themſelves and their own private Happineſs. And, ſince the eſſential conſtituent Parts of each and every one individual Man, are *Soul* and *Body*, the proper Care and Improvement of both are neceſſary towards an Advancement of the *Common Good.* It is not however, here, in ſo very eſpecial a Manner, neceſſary to inculcate Rules for the Improvement of the *Soul* or *Mind:* Becauſe the Whole of Moral Philoſophy, in all its Branches, is to cultivate and improve the Mind, *this* being the adequate Object of all Morality. For the Care of Body, as miniſterial to this End, is injoyned by that Precept in Morality ſpecifically diſtinguiſh'd by the Term *Temperance*—But,—here we are to obſerve, that, the Precepts of moral Philoſophy, employed about *Meat*, *Drink*, *Sleep*, *Exerciſe* and *Venery*, muſt, upon moral Principles, be diſtinguiſhed from thoſe Rules of Regimen delivered and preſcribed by Phyſicians: Becauſe, in Morality, theſe Precepts are directed and aimed at a nobler, a much more exalted End. For, Phyſicians contenting themſelves with Rules and Preſcriptions, purely to reſtore and confirm Bodily Health (this being the near the immediate End of Phyſick and Medicine.)

No one Being can make me happy if I entirely neglect to make myſelf ſo.

The Improvement of Mind and Body in each Individual neceſſary to the Common Good.

Beyond

Beyond all, peradventure, I ſhall not look upon their Patient endow'd with the Cardinal Virtue Temperance, who, with his moſt diligent Care and Caution, has followed all the Rules of Diet: In caſe he has not, at the ſame Time, paid an Obedience to thoſe Laws and Rules which guard and protect the Common Good: and, by Conſequence, has not paid any Regard to that ultimate ſupreme End, for which, ſuch Laws were originally eſtabliſhed.—And yet we acknowledge it fully ſufficient to conſtitute the Character of Virtue, if, in the Mind of a moral Agent, there be a ſettled Propenſity, an Habit of acting in general what is pleaſing and acceptable in the Sight of GOD and *Man.* For, ſuch a Propenſity or Habit moſt certainly ariſes from a perſevering Intention of Proſecuting and purſuing the ultimate End, and, conſequently, ſuch a Propenſity flows from a full Aſſent very *early* approved of and given to ſuch Kinds of practical Propoſitions, Laws, Precepts and Rules as theſe. For, the whole Operation of Habits, eſtabliſhed by long Practice, ariſes from that Aſſent of the Underſtanding long ſince given to Practical Propoſitions: Which Aſſent muſt lie deep, and continue laſting in the Memory.

By *Early*, I underſtand the Time when a rational Creature at firſt becomes capable of giving his Aſſent when Habits are formed and ſetled.

SECT. VIII.

Temperance defined.

WE may venture, upon the Principles laid down, to deſcribe the Cardinal Virtue *Temperance* under the following Definition. *Temperance is the Juſtice due to ourſelves, employed in the Care of the Body or rational Animal, miniſterial Serviceable and ſubordinate to the Common Good.*—One Caution comes in here very ſeaſonable, which is, that, if any Man takes Care of, and indulges his Body ſo, as to neglect entirely his Underſtanding, by either deſtroying or leſſening the Faculties and Powers of it; and, in ſo remarkable a Degree, as to become leſs and leſs fit for Duties and Offices, Religious or Human, Civil or Domeſtic: Every ſuch Man muſt be deemed intemperate, notwithſtanding it may at ſome Times ſo happen with a Saving to his own Health: And, conſequently, with a ſaving to thoſe Rules of Regimen or Diet preſcribed by Phyſicians. As for Inſtance, ſuppoſe a Perſon to break a Faſt enjoyn'd by Religion, which Faſt, with an equal Saving to his Health, he might either keep or neglect: Or, Suppoſe, without indangering his Health, he ſhould fare ſumptuouſly every Day, ruin his Fortune, and by theſe Means become unable to pay the Taxes lawfully impoſed and laid on for public Uſe and Benefit. Every ſuch Man muſt beyond all Diſpute be accuſed to all Intents and Purpoſes guilty of Intemperance, and in the full Acceptation of this Vice.—We alſo farther add, that they, who, by purſuing their Pleaſures, impair their Health, do not only prove injurious to themſelves, but to their Friends alſo, and to Civil Society in ſome Meaſure likewiſe, that is, they become

The Abſurdity of that Saying, *I hurt nobody but myſelf.*

leſs

leſs qualified, from the Want of Health to oblige and ſerve all, or, indeed, any of Mankind.

We very rationally may, in the preſent Caſe, form our Eſtimate, and take our Calculation, from that certain Proportion which Health bears to Life.—For, it muſt be obſerved, that the inſtituted Laws of Civil Society (which employ the Care and Attention of Mankind moſt in their neareſt and weightieſt Concerns) uſually determine that the Man, who lays *violent Hands* upon himſelf, does not only injure himſelf, but alſo the Community; becauſe he deprives Society of a Member, and conſequently, this Crime is numbered in the Catalogue of Crimes the moſt enormous. Now, very nearly towards ſo flagrant and outrageous a Crime as this committed againſt the Public Good, does the voluntary Diminution of Health approach, and at no remoter a Diſtance than the true Eſtimate of Health approaches towards the true Eſtimate of Life: Which Eſtimate is taken from the ſeveral Sorts of Employments, from the Diſcharge and Induſtry of them neceſſary to the Public Good: The faithful Diſcharge of which Employments and Induſtry is, in ſome Shape or other, demanded and expected from all Mankind without Exception. The Evidence of this Reaſoning will appear in a clearer light, if we particularly, and with a more exact Enquiry, take into Conſideration, that, the Care of our animal Bodies conſiſts in the Moderation and regular Management of thoſe natural Deſires implanted in us, chiefly for *the Preſervation* of the Individual and *the Propagation* of the Species.

The Sin of a voluntary Diminution of Health taken from the Doctrine of SELF.

Firſt, To preſerve the *Individual* belongs a ſtrong Appetite in general, exerting itſelf more or leſs, five ſeveral Ways.

1. The Appetite for *Food or ſolid Meat*, to which Appetite, from the ultimate principal End laid down, and to all the ſeveral Branches of it, Abſtinence limits the Bounds: To this Virtue *Abſtinence*, the one Extreme, is too rigorous and emaciating a Self-Denial, on the other Extreme *Gluttony*.

2. The Appetite for *Drinks or Liquors:* To this Appetite, *Sobriety* lays down Bounds; the one Extreme oppoſed to Sobriety is called *Drunkenneſs*.

3. The Appetite of *Sleep*: *Watchfulneſs* holds the Dominion over, and regulates this Appetite: A Dominion, which ſhakes off Drowſineſs, that ſluggiſh Indolence ſo oppoſite.

4. The Fourth Appetite, the Deſire of *Exerciſe and Recreation*. The Virtue which meaſures and regulates this Deſire, has not, that I remember, a peculiar Name: Neither has it any Vices, ſo far as I can learn, an Extreme, either in Defect or Exceſs.

5. The Fifth Appetite relating to Self, is the Deſire of *Dreſs*, *Apparel*, *Furniture*, *Equipage*, and all ſuch other Ornaments as belong to an outward Decorum, in Utenſils, Conveniencies, Buildings, &c.

As to all the Articles under this 5th Head, a cleanly Simplicity and Elegance porportioned and adapted to the Condition of Individuals reſpec-

tively, preſerves the *Golden Mean* between two Extremes: When the human Mind in any of theſe Articles exceeds and is over nice, it is called *Delicacy*: When the Mind is deficient in the Article of Cleanlineſs, turns to the other Extreme, and is deficient in the Article of Cleanlineſs, it is called a *Squalor*, a *Filth*, a *Naſtineſs*.

SECT. IX.

Secondly, The Appetite of Venery or Propagation and Continuance of the Species.

Chaſtity.

Incontinency or unbridled Luſt.

The Evils of Incontinency.

LAſtly, to a Propagation and Continuance of the *Species*, that Appetite call'd *Venery* properly belongs. To this Appetite, *Chaſtity*, according to the ſame Laws and Rules juſt now mentioned, fixes the true Bounds: Whereas *Incontinency* breaks thro' them all. The various Sorts of this Vice, being too well, too practically known in this vitious Age, there is no need of waſting Time in reckoning them up. From whence it is eaſy to diſcern in what Reſpects, and how many Ways, we may become injurious to others from too free an Indulgence of this Appetite. For, whoſoever hurts himſelf, gives a Wound to the Member of a Family, to a Member of Civil Society, to a Member of the whole human Kind. Whereas had he, who ſtands in all theſe Relations, kept himſelf Whole, Chaſte and Sound, he wou'd, by numberleſs ſocial Offices and good Acts, prove of Advantage and Uſe to others. From whence it alſo follows, that, there muſt be ſome Neglect, either more or leſs, of Piety; and of a cloſe Application to Studies, and of uſeful Employments, of all which Offices and Duties, a Man, quite debauched and intemperate, is utterly incapable; by which Means, the whole Syſtem of Rational Nature ſuffers Damage: Inſtead of which Damage the whole ſocial Syſtem has always a full Right to demand an Uſe, a Profit, an Advantage from every ſuch debauched Member.—Not to mention here, that, from Intemperance, the Mind of every Debauchee is provoked to Ravage and Plunder the Property of others; in order to gratify his vitious Luſts and Appetites: from hence the Prices of neceſſary Proviſions are enhanced and inflamed, to the heavy inſupportable Oppreſſion of the Poor.

Drunkenneſs. Incontinency.

As to Drunkenneſs (*Quid non Ebrietas deſignat?*) What Miſchiefs does it not contrive and produce? As to Incontinency or an unbridled Luſt, the Calamities ariſing from it are of a very public National Concern: They are of too filthy obſcene a Nature to bear Expreſſion with any Modeſty: And they are too ſhamefully notorious to require any Proof. Here it may, therefore, be fully ſufficient to mention, that, in the Perpetration and Committal of ſuch villainous Crimes as theſe, there neceſſarily muſt be ſome Companion to act in Conjunction: From whence of Courſe the Vice cannot lie concealed within the Confinement and Secrecy of one Boſom only:

But, it diffuſes Corruption and Poiſon into many Breaſts: From hence it is, that, the neareſt Ties of Blood and Kindred in Families, Eſtates, Poſſeſſions and Hereditary Rights are diſſolved, ſwallowed up and confounded: From this one Peſtilential Vice, a curſed Snake lies hid, lurks, and creeps in the Graſs, and cruſhes all, who dare preſume to expect any Satisfaction, Reparation, any Share of their natural Right for their vitally-injured Families and Inheritances; And ſo, by Conſequence, from hence it is, that whole Civil States and Kingdoms are reduced and brought under the extremeſt Difficulties, Calamities and Diſtreſſes: And, from all which it as neceſſarily muſt happen, that, the Condition of the whole human Kind degenerates and becomes worſe. It is a Point alſo, as equally clear and evident, that the well-known public Laws of Civil Society (as well in a ſingle State, as in that of Marriage) principally take Care, that, not only the Souls and Bodies of the Chaſte and Virtuous be cheriſhed, aſſiſted, improved; but alſo, Foundations and Settlements be made and eſtabliſhed for new Families in a Succeſſion of Generations: and that, the old Families be alſo preſerved: Becauſe, by theſe wiſe Proviſions, ſuch Alliances and Friendſhips as ariſe in the married State, from Blood and Affinity, may more extenſively and largely be diffuſed: From whence proceeds a Friendſhip,—a Society ſtill more ſtrictly unavoidable between the Parts of the ſame Civil Polity, as alſo between the Members of different States and Kingdoms: And conſequently, a Society, an Alliance, between the conſtituent Individuals of the whole Human Race. Upon this Foundation of Reaſoning, in my Opinion, natural Reaſon has in the General inſtructed all Nations, (that as ſoon as the human Kind multiplied by a large Supply of numerous Families: And, as ſoon as the Remembrance of the antient Conſanguinity, by an Original drawn from the ſame univerſal common Parent of us all *Adam* and *Eve*, became almoſt quite obliterated) to prohibit Marriages between Perſons of the neareſt Blood, of the cloſeſt Conſanguinity: That, new Alliances and Friendſhips, ſtricter Ties of Relation and Kindred, ſhould be contracted and united between Families ſeparated by a very wide Diſtance from each other, And, where, a Kindred by Blood did not carry the leaſt Force or Obligation in reconciling and uniting ſuch Families to each other. As for Example, Intermarriages between Brothers and Siſters are now prohibited, by Reaſon of that more diffuſive Influence of Friendſhip which muſt naturally flow from *Affinity*. Whereas, ſuch Marriages in the Beginning were lawful, becauſe abſolutely neceſſary to propagate and increaſe the ſame one human Species: And as neceſſary alſo, to the firſt Riſe of all thoſe Families, which Reaſon now endeavours to preſerve, keep up and continue, by forbidding then, (in the Beginning,) ſuch Marriages to ſpread their Influences of Friendſhip more at large and extenſively. Thus, we ſee that, the ſupreme Excellency of, and the chief Good propoſed by, the very ſame End renders it lawful both to allow at firſt a Liberty, and, in

after Times, to deny the very ſame Liberty: The State and Condition of Human Affairs being altered and changed.

Laſtly, Since the natural Appetite implanted in us of propagating and preſerving our Species, called Στοργὴ, is only a Continuation of that Appetite, whereby Animals are prompted and carried as it were, by inſtinct, to produce the firſt Exiſtence of their Young. It is, therefore, manifeſt, that, this radical inherent Affection, called Στοργὴ, from the Reſpect which it bears to the ſame one ſupreme End, and all the ſeveral Parts of it, ought to be excited, put into Motion, limited and reſtrained. That is to ſay, we ought to cheriſh, nurture, and love our Children, juſt ſo far as, and no farther than, it may contribute to preſerve the Glory and Honour of ALMIGHTY GOD upon Earth, as well as the Happineſs of all Nations, Particular Societies and Families. It is, however, at the ſame Time, a clear Caſe, that, the Happineſs of all Mankind, who are to ſucceed and come in Place of the preſent Generation, depends upon the Care and Education of the preſent Young. And ſince, our Children are ſomewhat mixed in their original Nature with us, and made up of ourſelves and others, it is manifeſtly true, that the Care of our Children ought to produce and lay before the World a Specimen of ſuch Virtues as concern and relate to, not only ourſelves, but to others alſo.

SECT. X.

The Care of Means, neceſſary to anſwer the Public Good, enjoin'd by the Law of Nature.

NOW, that, each and every Individual ſhould rightly and truly take care of and preſerve himſelf, in order the more effectually, to promote the Common or Public Good: We are here, not only, to regard the two conſtituent Parts, namely, *Soul* and *Body*, of each Individual, concerning each of which we have treated already: But, we are, moreover, to take under our Conſideration, alſo, thoſe Means, by whoſe Aſſiſtance the two conſtituent Parts, juſt now mentioned, may be much helped and benefited.

The Foundations of Riches and Honours in Individuals.

Theſe Means are called, under the general Titles by the Lawyers, (*Bona Noſtra*) *our Goods*, the good Things of Life and (*Jura*) or *our Rights and Privileges over Things and Perſons*. Becauſe, from the Plenty and Abundance of theſe, eſſentially ariſe the *Riches* and *Honours* of each and all Individuals. The ſame Law of Nature, therefore, which limits and regulates the human Will and all the Affections employ'd upon SELF, from a due Regard had to the beſt End, by an equal Strength of Reaſoning will limit and regulate (when the ſeveral Conſtituent Parts of this ſame beſt End are well conſider'd) all our Affections in acquiring and preſerving *Riches* and *Honours*: Theſe Advantages are by all Mankind purſued, as Means of Happineſs to their Poſſeſſors; the Meaſure of which Happineſs cannot,

By what Rule our Deſires after Riches and Honours are to be regulated.

cannot, as we here demonſtrate, be either adjuſted or expected upon any other Foundation than as an Happineſs Subordinate and Miniſterial to the Common Happineſs of all, or, at leaſt, as it is actually conſiſtent with it.

Concerning this limited providential Care in acquiring and preſerving Riches, (as the Supplies of *Liberality*, *Bounty* and *Generoſity* to others) we have already hinted: And the ſame may prove ſufficient to limit our Deſires after ſuch Objects, as Means of our own Happineſs. What at preſent remains is, only to remind the Reader in few Words, that, by Vertue of this one Law of Nature, the Command, the Obligation is laid upon all to ſeek and procure Honours to themſelves, by this one Rule or Meaſure, and by this Rule or Meaſure only: A Rule not only perfectly conſiſtent with the Health both of Body and Mind, and of Individuals reſpectively, but alſo a Rule as perfectly conſiſtent with the Oeconomy and Care of *Families:* That is, we are ſtrictly prohibited to ruin our Families, by graſping too greedily at Honours. It is a Rule or Meaſure likewiſe, which as perfectly conſiſts with the Tranquility and Peace of Civil Society, that is to ſay, no one ought to form Conſpiracies, and move Seditions, in order to raiſe and exalt himſelf into Dignity and Honour: It is a Rule as conſiſtent likewiſe with the Peace and Tranquility of other Nations, that is to ſay, we are not to violate the Laws, the Rights of Nations, in order the more amply to raiſe, aggrandize and extend our own Titles, Honours and Dignities.

And *Laſtly*, which is above all, it is ſuch a Meaſure or Rule, which muſt as perfectly conſiſt alſo with religious Duties, with our Piety towards ALMIGHTY GOD: That is to ſay, no one ought, upon any Pretence whatſoever, ſacrilegiouſly and atheiſtically to offer the leaſt Violence to the Divine Majeſty, or to make any ſacrilegious Attempts upon either Things, Offices, or Perſons ſet apart and dedicated to the Worſhip and Service of *the Great Lord JEHOVAH*, upon the poor inſolent Motive of raiſing the Vain-Glory of an empty Name. A Will, an Inclination, a Propenſity conformable to all the ſeveral Laws, has arrived at the true golden Mean, the true Mediocrity in regulating our Deſires after Honours, and our Averſions againſt Infamy and Diſgrace. The Virtue which moderates theſe Extremes, is *Modeſty:* A *Virtue*, which, to define, *is a Juſtice to ourſelves perfectly conſiſtent with the Concern for Honour, Dignity and Reputation, as miniſterial and ſubſervient to the Common Good.* Now, this ſame genuine *Modeſty*, upon which we are now diſcourſing, ſo far as it reſtrains the *Will* from ſeeking and aſpiring after higher Attempts and Deſigns than are conſiſtent with this Virtue, (*with this one End*) is term'd *Humility.*——And, yet——ſo far as, and no farther than, this Deſire raiſes and inflames the Mind with an Ardour, with an Emulation, with an Ambition after the higheſt Sublimities of Glory and Honour which fall in our Way; and yet a Deſire, which, at the ſame Time, perfectly agrees with the Attainment of the ſupreme End, is true *Magnanimity*, is a real Greatneſs

The Extravagancies of our Deſires after Riches and Honours is regulated by Modeſty.

Modeſty defined.

Humility.

Magnanimity.

neſs of Soul. I ſuppoſe it however well-known that this ſame Magnanimity or Greatneſs of Soul ſecures and preſerves Honours, and at the ſame Time ſecures itſelf from, and utterly Baniſhes all Infamy, Contempt. Ignomy, Diſgrace. Upon the Whole, here ſaid, therefore, we may eaſily compute and determine the Nature of Oppoſites.

Pride. *Pride* then which exults and exerciſes itſelf in Ambition, Arrogance, Boaſting and Vain-Glory, is the direct Oppoſite of *Humility*. And,—in like manner, *Puſillanimity*, or a groveling daſtardly Spirit carries the ſame Contrariety, the ſame Contradiction in it to *Magnanimity*, *a true Greatneſs of Soul*.

Puſillanimity.

SECT. XI.

A natural Method how to inveſtigate thoſe Dictates of Reaſon, whereby the Acts and Operations of free Agency muſt be govern'd and directed thro' all the ſeveral diſtinct particular moral Virtues. See the 4th Chapter concerning Practical Precepts. See Prolegomena, Sect. 1. Page 10.

WE have, with ſome Accuracy, taken, under a ſhort tranſient View, the moral Virtues ſingly and in particular: And in all and each of them, we cannot but obſerve, that there is a Regard, more or leſs, had to the Good of the whole Syſtem of rational Beings; whether theſe Virtues be view'd as relative to other Beings, or whether they be view'd as relative to ourſelves: And yet, in both Caſes, the one chief Point always, ultimately is, *That the Good of the Whole be principally, and in the firſt Place conſulted.*

This Syſtem of all rational Beings may, in a large extenſive Meaning, and with an allowable Propriety, be call'd *the City, the Society, the Kingdom of GOD.* Now—The Mind of Man, indeed, according to the intellectual Vertue or Capacity of each moral Agent reſpectively, inveſtigates and traces out this Common Good of all, both in a (*Genetic*, i. e. a) *Synthetic* and an *Analytic Order.*

Each Individual reſpectively, as to himſelf, imitates and follows the *firſt* (*i.e.* the *Genetic* or *Synthetic*) *Method:* For, beginning with his own private Concerns, as the Concerns of one Individual, he thinks, takes care of, and provides for his own Affairs and Concerns, juſt as the Model, the Circumſtances, the Preſervation, the Security and the Decency (or Decorum) of his own private Family *demand* from him, or at leaſt *allow*:—And, yet, in the ſecond Place, under all this Care, he does not, at the ſame Time, conſider this his Famiiy in any Light ſtronger than conſiſts with the larger Civil Society, of which, this his Family is a conſtituent Part; and, ſuch as the Civil Society will permit or allow. His next Care or Concern is for his own Civil Society, which always bears an exact Proportion to the pure undiſturbed Happineſs of all other Nations or Civil Societies whatſoever.——Nay, there are many Caſes, wherein the Happineſs of Foreign States and Kingdoms muſt be advanced and promoted. And *laſtly*, he takes no farther Care of the whole human Kind, than as ſuch a Care is perfectly conſiſtent with the Glory, the Honour, the Dignity of *ALMIGHTY*

MIGHTY GOD: But always with this View, that, the Rights, Authorities and Privileges of the Kingdom of GOD may be preſerved ſacred and inviolable;——Under which ſacred Rights and Privileges, all Things, both Human and Divine, are eſſentially and totally comprehended. Here at laſt he ends and ſuppoſes now that the Rights and Privileges of all are previouſly conſtituted, ſettled and fairly divided, with all the Juſtice of Diſtribution reſpectively, which can poſſibly be imagined.

Whereas, they who preſide over Inferiours, and are inveſted with a Power of making and ſettling the Diſtribution of Rights, begin their Computations with the Regard and Reſpect had to the whole Syſtem in general, and conſequently they chooſe rather to purſue the *Analytic Method.* They who are impower'd to reaſon in the ſecond or analytic Method, declare and determine, that, the City or Kingdom of GOD is effectually ſecured: Provided firſt, that Duties of the higheſt Eſteem, Honour, Obedience and Reverence be paid to ALMIGHTY GOD, as *Supreme Lord, Head and King of ALL:* And provided in the 2d Place, that the true Rights, Privileges, and Authorities of all Nations over both Things and Perſons be aſcribed, attributed and allowed to them (*i. e.* to all Nations in general) as *Subjects* of the *Divine Kingdom.* Now, in the Rights of Individuals ſeverally and reſpectively, the Rights and Privileges of all leſſer Societies muſt be preſerved and maintained; but more eſpecially thoſe of Families: Becauſe, in Families are particularly and eſſentially contained the Property, Subſtance, Goods, Rights, *&c.* of each ſingle Individual. It therefore was the eaſieſt Thing imaginable, and evidently neceſſary to uſe this ſecond Method in the firſt Diſtribution of Dominion and Power over both Things and Perſons, *i. e.* in an original Eſtabliſhment of private Rights, at the Time when our firſt Parents *Adam* and *Eve* divided and diſtinguiſhed all other Rights, Privileges, Donations, Properties, Poſſeſſions, except ſuch as of original, unalienable Reſervation belonged to ALMIGHTY GOD HIMSELF.——And the Reaſon why this ſecond Method was followed in the Beginning is clear and evident: Becauſe the Happineſs of the whole Syſtem of all rational Beings, is, that one ſingle uniform End, which, in its own Nature, is the beſt and higheſt; ſince it is the whole Sum, Subſtance, Eſſence of all Kinds of Good whatſoever; and conſequently, ſince it is larger and better than any Part of itſelf; or than any other Good poſſible. Now, they, who rightly and truly underſtand this one *Supreme End,* cannot but proſecute and eagerly deſire it: And then, *the moral Neceſſity,* which every ſuch intelligent Agent is under of Proſecuting this End, creates as equal a Neceſſity for diſtributing and limiting within due Bounds reſpectively the Dominion over Things and Perſons, *i. e.* in other Words, this very ſame *Neceſſity* gives Origin, not only to General Laws, but alſo, to all the Rights and Privileges of Singulars and Individuals, which ariſe from, and are eſtabliſhed upon theſe general Laws. From the Care and Regard due to the Whole, when we proceed to the Conſideration

Analytic Method.

See the Note at Pages 384, 385.

of

of its ſeveral Parts, it is notoriouſly well-known that this ſecond or *Analytic Method* of Reaſoning takes Place.

I have now ſettled thoſe Laws of ſocial Unity, which ſubſiſt between ALMIGHTY GOD (as the Univerſal Head) and all other Rational Beings: Between divers Nations in general, between the Members of each civil Community in particular, and between the Individuals of each Family ſingly: From all theſe Relations there are diſcovered ſuch clear, certain, unalterable Laws and Rules of Piety, Religion, and of all the Virtues, that, no Name, falſely impoſed upon them, (by Acts ſubverſive and deſtructive of Rights either religious or ſacred, either National, Civil or Oeconomic) can poſſibly, in Time to come, after all we have ſaid in Confutation of Mr. *Hobbes*, miſlead and deceive any Man of common Underſtanding. Becauſe, (as to a Demonſtration appears) all the conſtituent Branches of univerſal Juſtice, which we have briefly enumerated, and all the ſeveral diſtinct Acts of the Virtues ſingly defined and ſtated, are injoyned and commanded by theſe very Laws of Nature, and with no other View or Deſign than *as the Common Public Good:* And for this very further Reaſon alſo: Becauſe, from daily never-failing Experience, it is clearly manifeſt, that, all theſe human Acts carry in their own Nature a Virtue, an Energy, an Efficacy, either of declaring *Glory* and *Honour* to ALMIGHTY GOD, or of promoting the Peace and Happineſs of *divers ſundry*,——Nay, *of all Nations*: *i.e.* of heaping Bleſſings, Advantages, and good Things upon ſome larger Society, or upon ſome leſſer Society, or upon ſome one Individual in particular.——And——of all theſe contituent Parts, Members and Branches (adjudged and ſettled in their natural ſubordinate Degrees and Orders,) the Common Good is compounded, conſtituted and cemented into one integral Whole.

SECT. XII.

The Golden Rule of Human Agency.

FROM hence alſo, in the cleareſt moſt evident Manner, may be explained, what that right Reaſon of the wiſe Man is, who with true Propriety and Merit, fixes and limits the juſt Mediocrity, the golden Mean to human Acts——For,——the whole of this wiſe rational Prudence conſiſts in thoſe *practical Propoſitions*, which lay before us the *beſt End* to purſue, and which point out to us the *fit Means* within our own Power. The Means laid down in theſe practical Propoſitions are ſuch human

1. Acts as, *Firſt*, The Laws of Divine Worſhip injoin and command.
2. *In the ſecond Place*, come in all the Laws of Nations (beſides thoſe relating
3. to the Divine Worſhip) which preſerve and maintain mutual Commerce, Traffick and Dealings amongſt Mankind. And, *in the next Place* follow the Laws of Civil Society, the Laws of Family and Oeconomy:
4. And then *laſtly*, the Dictates and Suggeſtions of each ſingle Perſon conformable

able to his own Knowledge and Experience concerning the natural Efficacy and Effects of human Acts ſucceed next.

Firſt, We ſee, in the ultimate Reſult of all, that, the laſt Determination is formed upon the natural Energies and Forces of Acts, as they benefit or hurt Mankind, whether in the particular or in general conſidered, whether in a private Family or in one particular Society; or, in many Societies and Nations collectively taken. Firſt, From the Energy of human Actions.

Whereas, *Secondly*, by the Help of an Analogy drawn from Acts tending to revere Honour and reſpect Mankind, we form our Judgment and Determination of ſuch Acts as relate to the Glory and Honour of ALMIGHTY GOD. Secondly, From the Doctrine of Analogy.

Experience *in the third Place*, does, not with leſs Evidence and Certainty aſſure us, what Sorts of human Acts prove beneficial or hurtful to all in general without almoſt any Exception: And, ſuch a Knowledge or Experience as this is no leſs certain than that which demonſtrates what Sorts of Aliment nouriſh and repleniſh *the moſt*, *the Generality:* And, on the contrary —what Sorts they are which breed Diſeaſes moſt, and haſten Death ſooneſt. Thirdly, from Experience.

SECT. XIII.

All the Laws of Nature and all the moral Virtues flow from two Propoſitions.

NEither do we, with leſs Difficulty, learn, from Experience, the Truth of the following Propoſitions.

Prop. 1. *It is neceſſary to the Common Good that there ſhould be a Diviſion, a Diſtribution of Things and mutual Aſſiſtances.* Propoſition 1.

Prop. 2. *Such a Diviſion or Diſtribution muſt be maintained inviolable, by acting both towards others, and towards ourſelves, according to ſuch a Meaſure as the Preſervation of Nations, of Civil Societies, of Families, (in all which Relations we ourſelves ſtand) requires from us.* Propoſition 2. From theſe two Propoſitions, all the Laws of Nature, and all the moral Virtues flow: And, this *Connection* we learn to be as neceſſary in Morality as we find it neceſſary to the Life and Health of an animated Body, *viz.* That, Nouriſhment muſt be diſtributed thro' all the ſeveral Parts and Members of it: And, that, a Diſtribution, thus laid and eſtabliſhed in Nature, muſt be preſerved by the Offices, Duties and Employments of all the Members mutually relative both to one and all: That, by ſuch united Influences, the principal Parts, in the firſt Place, and the leſs-principal Parts, in the ſecond Place, may be eaſed of Obſtructions and alſo repaired, (whenever, at any Time, there happens a Conſumption, a Loſs,) in order to ſtrengthen and increaſe the Energies, Powers, Operations and Meaſures of them, as ſettled and preſcribed by Nature. The Truth then of the whole, viewed in every Light, is reſolved into theſe and ſuch like Propoſitions as theſe: Namely,

Propoſition 1. 1. *That whatſoever Means of Preſervation preſerve the Whole, preſerve all its Parts.*

Propoſition 2. 2. *That the Preſervation of Parts inferior, leſs-principal and ſubordinate flows from the Preſervation of the principal ſuperior Parts.*

Theſe two Propoſitions, becauſe they appear evident from the Definitions of theſe their Cauſes, may, with a juſt Propriety, be ſaid clearly to manifeſt themſelves to our Experience from the Nature of Things. For, it is a well-known Maxim, that, Definitions are taught in the Nature of Things, and known from Experience.

SECT. XIV.

The Common Good being the greateſt Good poſſible, is a Rule of free Agency, which always determines itſelf.

The Common Good is a Rule whichbranches itſelf into many and ſeveral diſtinct Parts and Duties.

WE may alſo here add, That, as the whole Certainty of that Phyſiology, or Diet natural to an animated Body, flows from the unchangeable Efficacy of ſome certain corporeal or phyſical Cauſes very ſimilar in producing their Effects: So, in like manner, from the unchangeable Influence of human Acts, in either preſerving or deſtroying Individuals Families Societies and whole Nations in general, ariſes all that Certainty of thoſe Practical Propoſitions (*the Laws of Nature*) which conſtitute moral Philoſophy and determine the Nature of all Virtues. We may proceed even ſtill farther, and affirm, that, the Variety of Duties and Acts commanded in the various Relations, Circumſtances and Conditions of Mankind (as to Individuals, Families, Societies, and ſeveral other Circumſtances) ſuch a Variety of Acts and Duties as this, I ſay, is not a fuller Contradiction to the neceſſary and conſtant Care of maintaining and perfecting all thoſe Parts and Branches (ſo often mentioned) of the beſt End; than a Diverſity of Diet in different Climates, Ages, Temperament and Conſtitutions of Mankind, is a Contradiction to the conſtant Care of preſerving in all Places their own ſeveral Members, and of ſatisfying, in all Places, all their natural and neceſſary Wants, by gratifying (for inſtance) Hunger and Thirſt, of taking Sleep and Reſt; by regulating and adjuſting the Meaſures, the Bounds, and the Proportions of Exerciſe, Venery, and the Affections, according to the Exigencies and Cravings of each individual Nature. Becauſe, in all theſe Caſes, as much as in Affairs of a public Concern and of Common Good, we cannot attain to the true End deſigned, by acting arbitrarily juſt as we pleaſe: The Truth of the Fact, from daily Experience, is, that, the very Nature of the End deſigned fixes and determines certain, regular, uniform Bounds and Limits: Notwithſtanding, that, the human Underſtanding may not (——Nay,——perhaps cannot) arrive at a Mathematical accurate Exactneſs, in aſcertaining theſe Bounds and Limits. We certainly may take a Care of Life and Health fully ſufficient *without meaſuring and weighing by Scruples and Drachms every Ounce of Solids and Liquids*

we

we eat and drink: And, after the ſame manner, we ſincerely and truly, to the beſt of our Capacities, miniſter to, and anſwer the Common Good, altho' we cannot, to a critical Nicety (in all the ſingular particular Caſes of Duty) purſue what is ſtrictly the beſt; provided, that, we endeavour, as much as in us lies, to purſue what is beſt.

Here then, moreover, I judge it neceſſary to ſubjoin this one Obſervation, that, the Common Good of all Rationals (in as much as it is the whole comprehenſive collective Sum of all Sorts of natural Good, and, by conſequence, *The greateſt Good)* is the Meaſure or Rule determined, as by Nature beſt adapted, fairly to conclude, That, upon a Compariſon of other Kinds of Good with this comprehenſive one, whether or no theſe ſeveral Kinds of Goods reſpectively, be great or ſmall, and conſequently, whether they chiefly are to be deſired, or whether there be not other Sorts preferable and more to be deſired. For, the ſame Meaſure, whereby we rate and eſtimate the ſeveral *Ratio*'s and *Proportions* of Good, lays before us an equally exact Meaſure how to rate and eſtimate the ſeveral Sorts and Degrees of Evil: And, conſequently, diſcovers to us, what Evils more and what Evils leſs are to be ſhunned and regretted. Upon this ſo regular a Foundation, we ſhall eaſily learn which of our Affections ought to bear Rule over the Reſt, and, which of them ought to ſubmit to Government and ſubſide. For, ſince it is undoubtedly true, that, the Meaſure, whereby to regulate all our Affections, is the only Meaſure fitted to anſwer a rational Nature, and the Nature of the Univerſe; That, therefore this is the Meaſure or Rule which exactly correſponds alſo with the true Eſtimate of Good and Evil in all Degrees and Kinds, by whoſe Energy and Power theſe our Affections, our Appetites and Paſſions are excited, ſtirred up, and put into Motion.

Sine Ponderatione Leſſianâ. Alimentorum. Leonard Leſſius, the Jeſuit, who lived in the Beginning of the laſt Century, writ a Treatiſe, call'd *Hygiaſticon ſeu vera Ratio Valetudinis Conſervandæ. Vid. Opera Edit. Plantin. Antverp.* 1626, in Folio, Pag. 901.

SECT. XV.

SINCE then, as we have already demonſtrated, the Regulation and Government of our Appetites and Paſſions is of the weightieſt Conſequence: Becauſe, from a due Management of them, all Virtue and all Happineſs ariſe, ſo far as they, after any Manner, are in our own free Power: And ſince (as we have before remarked and obſerved) that, the whole of ſuch a Regulation depends upon a Knowledge of the true Rule Meaſure or Medium in the ſeveral Degrees or Sorts of Good and Evil, according to which Rule or Meaſure, Things great or ſmall are to be rated and eſtimated. Since then, I ſay, we have already proceeded thus far, I think it now Time to explain, ſomewhat more at large, what I have juſt now only affirmed, namely, " That, *the Common Good* is this Rule or Meaſure, as

" ſettled and determined in the Nature of Things themſelves." The Truth of this Aſſertion or Propoſition is evident to a Demonſtration upon the Principles hitherto eſtabliſhed: Becauſe, " The Common Good of all " rational Beings is the one grand End, towards the Proſecution and At- " tainment of which, all are, from their own Natures and the Natures " of Things, laid under an indiſpenſable Obligation."——For, ſince the End is more obvious and more evidently-known than the Means: And, ſince, from the State or Condition of a rational Nature, the End alſo is the neceſſary Meaſure or Rule by which the Fitneſs, the Excellency, the Suitableneſs, the Goodneſs of all Means whatſoever (as to better or worſe) muſt be rated and eſtimated: That, therefore, the Common Good, being fixed and ſettled as the principal ultimate End; the Good of each and every one Individual will bear ſome *Ratio*, ſome *Proportion* in the Means neceſſary towards the Good of the whole Syſtem of rational Beings; juſt, in like Manner, as the Health, the Soundneſs of every one Limb or Part in an animal Body is the Means neceſſary to the Health and Soundneſs of the whole Animal. It is not, indeed, an unuſual Practice to inveſtigate and ſearch out the Quantities of Things, by the Help and Aſſiſtance of ſuch a Meaſure or Rule as exceeds the Quantities of the Things to be meaſured: But always, under this one Limitation, that, this one Meaſure or Rule be divided into Parts minutely-ſmall, each of which bearing ſome well-known *Ratio* or *Proportion* to the Whole. *E. G.* We commonly uſe a two-Foot or three-Foot Rule divided into Feet, the Feet divided again into Inches or twelfth Parts; or ſuppoſe into Hundredth Parts, or into Thouſandth Parts, in order to find out the Length of a Line, perhaps, leſs than the tenth Part of a Foot: Now, altho' the *Common Rule of all* is infinitely the largeſt, yet, the ſame evident Method is here alſo equally purſued: For, notwithanding, that, the known Parts of ſuch a Good are comprehenſively-large, as well as minutely-ſmall, the *Ratio* or *Proportion* of them All to the Whole is ſo well underſtood, that, we are able to find out and determine, even to the moſt ſatisfactory Uſes and Advantages, not only, the Quantity of every one Good, but, alſo, upon comparing ſeveral Degrees of Good together, to determine *which Good* is *Greater*, and *which Good leſs*.

SECT.

SECT. XVI.

All the Parts of Relative Particular Duties regulated by Common Good.

FROM hence we learn, that, the Conſtituent Parts, into which the *Common Good* (conſidered as a *Rule*) is capable of being divided, are the ſeveral Sorts of Good reſpectively relative to *All*, and compre hended under the Happieſt State of the whole Syſtem of Rational Agents: In this Diviſion, we are ſtrictly to obſerve, at the ſame time, that, theſe Conſtituent Parts and Branches of Good muſt be ſettled in their Natural Order, in their Regular Subordination. As for Inſtance, ſuch Parts and Branches of this *Good*, as more immediately relate to the Worſhip and Service of ALMIGHTY GOD (or to True Religion,) muſt principally, and in the firſt Place, be regarded. *Secondly*, ſuch Parts, as concern the Tranquility, the Peace, the Neceſſary Supplies, and Mutual Subſidies of whole Nations, take the Second Place. *Thirdly*, Such Parts, as prove ſerviceable to the happieſt Condition of each Civil Society reſpectively, claim a Third Place. *Fourthly*, Such Parts, as prove moſt beneficial to each Family, and the prudent Oeconomy of it, demand a Fourth Place. *Fifthly*, and *Laſtly*, Such Parts and Branches of the *Common Good*, as promote beſt the Happineſs of each Individual, follow next. For, this Natural Order, this Regular Subordination, being mutually and carefully purſued by All, the happieſt State or Condition of *the Whole*, muſt, according to the beſt Capacities and Abilities of Mankind, in this Vale of Mortality, be ſecured and preſerved. We may, by Way of Illuſtration here, make the ſame Compariſon, which was apply'd in the laſt Section:——A Compariſon taken from a Two-foot or a Three-foot Rule, divided into Feet: Each Foot into Tenth, or Twelfth, or, into any other given Number of Parts required: And, of theſe Parts, again into Hundredths, Thouſandths, *&c.* Here, the Ratio, or Proportion of the minuteſt Particle to the Whole is diſcovered. In like Manner, from the well known, eſtabliſhed Order, and Proportion, of ſundry, divers Kinds of Good; and, of them *All* to the one *Common Good*, we eaſily inveſtigate, and trace out the *Ratio*, the *Proportion* of each, and every one Good given, to the Supremeſt, Higheſt *Good* thus aggregated and compounded of *All*. As, for Inſtance, to make what is here ſaid ſtill plainer and more evident. From the well known Relation and Proportion, which any one true Propoſition bears to a whole Science, from the Relation and Proportion which ſuch a Science bear to a Tranquility of Mind, and to the Management of Appetites and Paſſions; from the Relation and Proportion which, ſuch a Science bears to the Happineſs of the Individual, to the Happineſs of a Family, to the Happineſs of a particular Society, to the Happineſs of a particular Country or Kingdoms, to the Happineſs of Kingdoms and Nations

Nations in General, and laſtly, to the Happineſs of the whole Rational Syſtem. From ſuch a Syntheſis, or Inveſtigation as this, we at laſt come to underſtand, in what Share or Degree, the Knowlege of any one given Truth may contribute to the Univerſal Whole in General.

The like Rule of Proportion equally holds true in rateing and eſtimateing the Goods, as they are called, of Body; as for Inſtance, in the firm ſound Health of each Bodily Member and Limb, even the leaſt: Or in the Efficacy of Cloathing and Apparel, or in the Vertue of Food, towards preſerving and ſtrengthening the whole Animal Body. We may alſo, by the ſame juſt Rule, find out and diſcover what Proportion the Human Body bears to the Integral Man: Of the Integral Man to a Family, of a Family to a Society, and of a Society to the whole Univerſe.

The moſt accurate Maſters of Rule and Meaſure, (I mean the Geometricians) uſually follow the Method here purſued in determining the Ratio's and Proportions of Quantities, by comparing them with the higheſt Quantity, to which, the ſeveral Proportions of theſe Quantities, can, in any Reſpect, be referr'd.

Now, the Rational Likeneſs, which this their Method carries to the the Point, under our preſent Enquiry, may, with great Eaſe, be applied by the Intelligent Reader.

Thus, ſince infinitely-ſmall Quantities eſcape our Senſes and our Underſtanding, all the middle Quantities, which lie between the greateſt Quantities and the leaſt, are infinite: And, no Reaſon can be aſſigned, why any one, of theſe intervening Middle Quantities, ſhould be a Rule or a Meaſure rather than any other: —— And, we alſo farther add, that, the very ſame Quantity, when relative to leſſer Quantities, we may term Great; and, when compared with larger Quantities, we may term Small. Whatſoever Quantity, therefore, is abſolutely the *Greateſt*, is Regular, Uniform, and abſolute Unity or *One*. And conſquently, is that Quantity, which of all others, is more obvious, and, lies more open to the Underſtanding. And therefore, *Such a Rule, or Meaſure is the beſt and fitteſt, which, from the Nature and Neceſſity of it, is determined, fixed, and moſt obvious to the Mind.* Becauſe, according to this Maxim, Mathematicians inveſtigate and trace out the Magnitude of *Lines*, inſcribed in *a Circle*, by comparing them with the *Diameter*, which, of all *Inſcribed Lines*, is the *Greateſt*. The ſame Method is alſo purſued in *Trigonometrical Tables* calculated to fix and determine *Sines*, *Tangents*, and *Secants*: As for Inſtance, We determine *Sines*, by comparing them with *Radius*: According to that truly-wonderful Canon, *viz. A Sine is Half the Inſcribed Subtenſe or Chord of double the Arc: And* Radius *is Half the Diameter.* It is alſo an Axiom: *That the Ratio, or Proportion which the Half bears to the Half, is as that of the Whole to the Whole.* Thus, likewiſe, *The Regular Solid Bodies* are meaſured Mathematically Exact, by comparing them with the Sphere, (the largeſt of all Bodies) in which

See firſt Section of this Chapter, page 511.

which the five Regular Solid Bodies can be inſcribed. But,—upon ſuch abſtruſe Examples of Illuſtration as theſe, I will not dwell too long. With this Deſign and Intent only, have I ſaid thus much, concerning the Rule or Meaſure of *Good* in its ſeveral Degrees and Kinds, that, we may be the better able to Eſtimate and Compute either Good or Evil (not according to thoſe Meaſures and Proportions in which Individuals ſingly and ſolely are affected with either Pleaſure or Pain: But, proportionably) as the Common Happineſs of All is either increaſed or diminiſhed. And, that, upon comparing ſeveral *Goods* together, we may always conclude ſuch a Good, greater, which carries in it the larger Quantity of public Happineſs, and ſuch a Good, leſs in Proportion to the leſſer Good it adds to Public *Uſes* and *Benefit*.

SECT. XVII.

Self-Happineſs and Private Virtue, involved in the Common Good.

THE one Concluſion, contained in the three preceeding Sections, is, that, an Univerſal Remedy againſt Inordinate Affections, Appetites, and Paſſions, is fairly from theſe Sections deducible. For, as all Exceſſes of Deſire are kindled, generally ſpeaking, by too-warm a Love for *Self*: So they either bring Injuries or Evils upon others; or, they baniſh all *Self-Tranquility*, all *Self-Happineſs*. And, therefore, that Man, who never will perverſely and obſtinately place, amongſt the ſeveral Kind of Good, any Object as Noble and Grand, which does not in an eſpecial Manner promote the Common Good; ſuch a Man, I ſay, never will, in ſo remarkable a Degree, tranſgreſs againſt this Good, as to feel the Conſcientious Remorſe and Guilt of a Crime.——Nay,—— Even ſuppoſing Human Affairs to ſuffer Damage, either from the wicked Purpoſes and Practices of others; Or, from Cauſes ſuperior to Human Power: Yet, the Event will not ruffle his Peace and Tranquility of Mind:——And——for theſe Reaſons,——Becauſe, *Firſt*, He knows, that, every ſuch Event is placed beyond his Reach, either to prevent or to remove. *Secondly*, Becauſe he is, from Reflection and Experience, fully convinced, that, ſuch Events as theſe daily do and muſt happen. And——*Thirdly*, above all,——Becauſe, from the uninterrupted Experience of all Ages, demonſtratively true it is, that, the innumerable Chances and Changes of Human Affairs have left the State and Condition of the whole Univerſe to us, *better* rather than *worſe*. And, from hence, conſequently, a probable Rational Hope ariſes, that, the common Courſe of Human Affairs will not fare worſe with Poſterity.

See Section 33. Chap. 1. Pages 116, 117, &c.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

Conſectaria or *Corollaries.*

SECT. I.

1. The General Precepts of Morality may be reduced into Precepts of private Concern, and practical Uſes, by each ſingle Individual, reſpectively.

HAving, with no ſmall Pains and Diligence, deduced from Nature the *Moſt General Precepts* concerning *Moral Behaviour*: And, from thence, having defined and explained each particular Moral Virtue: I judge it very proper here to diſcover, in few Words, how thoſe General Precepts may be farther extended to other Precepts of more particular Concern and private Uſe. Becauſe, from hence we may prove, that, even the Special Commands of ALMIGHTY GOD, are, by Natural Signs, Marks and Tokens, both impreſſed upon the Mind, and, carry in them the Sanctions of Rewards and Puniſhments.

Precepts of Private Concern, as Commands of Almighty God, carry their ownSanctions.

Our preſent Demonſtration is chiefly taken from the Decalogue, and from the Laws of Civil Inſtitution. The Decalogue, or the Ten Commandments, are uſually placed under two Heads or Tables.

The firſt of theſe two Tables contains the Laws of our Duty towards GOD.

The ſecond of theſe two Tables contains the Laws of our Duty towards our Neighbour or Mankind in General.

The Demonſtration of this Propoſition, taken from the Decalogue.

The whole of both Tables is compleatly fulfilled in our ſincere Love to GOD and *Man.*———Now, it appears evident to a Demonſtration, that, the General Precept of Univerſal Benevolence; or, of a ſtudious active Concern about the Common Good, which we have by clear Conſequences inferr'd from Nature (ſo far as this Precept relates to GOD, as the Lord and Head of the Intellectual Syſtem, and to Mankind as his Subjects) comprehends under it the two ſeveral Sorts of Duty as reſpectively relative both GOD and *Man.* For, In the firſt Table of the Ten Commandments, is peculiarly and in an eſpecial Manner comprehended the Branch of that Law, called *Univerſal Juſtice*, in which we prove the following Doctrine taught. Namely, *It is neceſſary to the Common Good, (and by Conſequence, to the Happineſs of each of us, who all, taken together, are the Individuals conſtituting the Whole; and, from which* Common Good, *the Happineſs of each can only be drawn) that, we aſcribe unto* GOD, *what, of Natural Right is his Due, that is to ſay, all thoſe neceſſary Duties, as far as in each of us lies, as may, with the moſt tranſcendant Splendour, advance the Divince Glory, and Honour: Or, to be more particular, that, the Acknowledgment of* GOD's *Supreme Dominion over all Perſons and Things is the neareſt, and moſt important Concernment of Each and All: That, the Exerciſe of*

of this his Supreme Authority or Dominion, is clear and obvious to every one of us, and upon this very Argument, that, GOD is the primary original Cauſe of all, a Cauſe quite free, and abſolutely independent. And, that the Rights or Neceſſity of ſuch a Supreme Dominion, in ALMIGHTY GOD, moſt effectually to promote the Common Good, is in the third Place from hence clearly diſcovered. Becauſe, ALMIGHTY GOD is moſt able and moſt willing to ſecure this *one principal End:* And by *Means* the moſt effectual, and at all Times the beſt and fitteſt. ——And, this Truth plainly appears, from theſe three Divine Attributes.

I. His Wiſdom.

II. His Will or Propenſity to do Good.

III. His Power.

1. The Truth of this Aſſertion is clear, from the Divine Wiſdom: Becauſe ALMIGHTY GOD is indued with ſuch a Wiſdom, as can moſt perfectly underſtand all the Eſſential Conſtituent Parts of, and the fitteſt moſt Neceſſary Means towards, ſuch an End.

2. The Truth of this Aſſertion is clear, from the Divine Will or Propenſity to do Good. Becauſe, ALMIGHTY GOD is always inclined to effect the beſt and happieſt *End,* and to *Means* beſt fitted and moſt ſuitable: Such a Propenſity or Inclination for ever Acting in the moſt perfect Harmony and Agreement with his Tranſcendant Wiſdom.

3. And, in the laſt Place, the Truth of this Aſſertion, is clear from his Power. Becauſe, the *Power* of *ALMIGHTY GOD* is always ready to execute all ſuch Operations as the Perfections of his Will and Wiſdom prefer, and chooſe.

SECT. II.

1. THE Neceſſity, therefore, of this Dominion and Authority, in ALMIGHTY GOD, being fully diſcovered, and clearly traced by theſe Natural, and conſequently Eternal, Attributes inſeparable from him in Order the moſt effectually to ſecure the Common Univerſal Good: We from hence deduce that Law of Nature, which aſcribes to GOD ſuch a Dominion as perfectly agrees to the Principles we have hitherto enlarged upon and explained. Becauſe it is evident, that, the *Divine right Reaſon* (which is *a Law natural to GOD*) did, from all Eternity, aſſume to itſelf ſuch a Dominion or Authority as is truly anſwerable to this very End: And, conſequently, Human right Reaſon always, even from the firſt Moment of its Exiſtence, is not only conſcious of this Divine Dominion, but alſo muſt, by a moral Neceſſity, Conſent, See the Note at Pages 384, 385.

Conſent, Agree and Submit to ſuch a Dominion. For, as long as ever *Reaſon* continues *Right*, it cannot poſſibly *diſſent from the Divine Right Reaſon.*

2. The Law, therefore, being eſtabliſhed, which confirms the Divine Authority of ALMIGHTY GOD; thoſe Laws likewiſe are eſtabliſhed, which command the Love of GOD above all Beings and Things, our *Confidence*, our *Truſt*, our *Hope in him*, our *Gratitude*, our *Humility*, our *Fear*, our *Obedience to Him*; as alſo whatſoever Duties are, either expreſſed or underſtood, by invoking and calling upon his Holy Name; our *Thankſgivings*, and diligent Heed and *Attendance to his Holy Word* howſoever revealed: And, laſtly, by *dedicating*, *devoting*, and *conſecrating Certain Things*, *ſtated Periods of Time*, particular *Places*, and ſelect *Perſons* to his, and only his Glory, Honour, Worſhip and Service.

SECT. III.

The firſt Commandment.

1. UPON theſe Natural and Rational Principles, We are ſtrictly forbidden to pay equal or the like Worſhip to any other GOD, beſides *the One Only True GOD the LORD JEHOVAH.* And this is the Prohibition contained under the *Firſt Commandment.*

The Second Commandment.

Neither are we, *ſecondly* to image out *The ALMIGHTY LORD GOD*, by any Bodily Repreſentation, like to the Figure of a Man, or of any other Animal: Or, that, his Omnipreſent Eſſential Preſence can be limited or confined within any Bounds of Figure, Place and Space. And this is the Prohibition of the *Second Commandment.*

Third Commandment.

Neither are we, *thirdly* to provoke *ALMIGHTY GOD*'s Wrath and Indignation againſt us, by *Perjury*, taking his Name in vain, forbidden by the *Third Commandment.*

The fourth Commandment.

Fourthly, We are to deſtine and ſet apart, ſome certain Reaſonable Portion of our Time to his Worſhip and Service, both public and private; and this is expreſly injoyned in the *Fourth Commandment*, as exemplified by the *Sabbath*, or *Day of Reſt.*

The ſecond Table.

Upon an equally ſtrong, and concluſive Foundation of Reaſoning, the Second Table of the Decalogue may be inferr'd from that Branch of Natural Law which concerns Univerſal Juſtice: (Under which Natural Law of Univerſal Juſtice) We have obſerved the ſecond Table of the Decalogue to be contained.

For, ſince it is neceſſary to the Common Good, that, diſtinct ſeparate Dominions and Properties in and over Perſons and Things, ſhould, by Conſent, be eſtabliſhed and preſerved inviolable, and by Conſequence over ſuch Operations, as they either conjunctly or ſeverally, (namely, Perſons

Perſons and Things) produce. Since, I ſay, to expreſs my Meaning more clearly, it is neceſſary, that, there ſhould be a Diſtribution wiſely contrived and fitted to anſwer the beſt End: As alſo, ſince a Diſtribution or diſtinct Diviſion ſhould be preſerved inviolable, as we find it originally conſtituted: That, therefore, each Individual ſhould reſerve to himſelf, not only ſuch a Share of his own private Property as is neceſſary to his own Self-preſervation and Happineſs; but alſo, the reaſonable Uſes of ſeveral other Agents, each and both of which greatly contribute to the public Good. But,——Such a Diſtribution of *Things*, *Actions*, *Operations*, *Duties*, and Human Endeavours amongſt Individuals is neceſſary to this End. Becauſe, no one can poſſibly live, (much leſs be happy) without both the uſe of Many Things, and alſo, without the active Aſſiſtance and voluntary paſſive Acquieſcence of many Agents. ——And alſo, becauſe the Security, the Preſervation of the whole Human Kind, (which more manifeſtly, and nearly concern the Common Good) is eſſentially compounded and made up of the Safety, the Security, the Preſervation of Individuals.

Now, if we examine ſomewhat more ſtrictly into ſuch Things as muſt neceſſarily be granted, allowed, and permitted to each, that, it may go well with all, we ſhall find them ſuch as here follow, namely,

Firſt, We muſt neceſſarily allow, to each Perſon, the Right and Power of preſerving his own Being and Life, the Health and Strength of all his Limbs and Members, provided always, that, the Public Good receives no greater Injury, Loſs, Detriment, Damage than the Loſs of one ſingle Life. The fifth and ſixth Commandments.

The *Sixth Commandment* lays the Obligations of ſuch a Preſervation as this: And by Conſequence, allows,———Nay, and what is more, even injoins and protects a limitted well regulated φιλαυτία or *Self-Love*. The ſixth Commandment.

Secondly, It is neceſſary that we confirm and bind the Obligation and punctual Performance of all ſuch Compacts and Agreements, as are uſeful and ſerviceable to the Public Good.

Amongſt which kind of Covenants or Agreements that of Marriage, in the firſt Place, and above all others, is Uſeful and Salutary, to the Happineſs and Well-Being of all Mankind. Becauſe, Upon this depends all the Hope of future Generations, all the Succour of an approaching Old Age. The fifth Commandment.

In this Foundation is laid the *Seventh Commandment*, which injoins, that, the Marriage Bed be kept pure and undefiled; and conſequently ſecures the Supplies, the Streams of that eminent Love, Mutual Affection, derived upon our Young, and which Commandment, for this very Reaſon, affords us a more ſure and certain Knowledge, that, our Young, really are our own, and not a ſpurious Off-ſpring. The ſeventh Commandment.

Thirdly, That a Certain Portion of the other good Things of Life, and other Kind of Human Endeavours is alſo neceſſary to Individuals: By Means of which, Man may be enabled to ſupport himſelf and his own Family in the firſt Place, as being his principal firſt Duties, and in the next Place, that he be enabled to miniſter to the Conveniency and Advantage of Others: It is therefore requiſite, to the Public Good, that ſuch ſeveral Good Things of Life as theſe be, in the firſt Diviſions, of Property, aſſigned over to each Individual: And alſo, when ſuch Good Things of Life are conveyed over, that, they be preſerved inviolable and ſecure: And this is the very Sum and Subſtance of the *Eighth* Commandment.

The eighth Commandment,

The ninth and tenth Commandments.

It, moreover, greatly contributes to the Public Good, that each and all Individuals, in all thoſe Bleſſings of Life, which, as we have hitherto obſerved, ſhould be preſerved Secure and Harmleſs, not only from all injurious Acts of others, whether in Thought, Word, or Deed, but alſo from hurtful opprobrious Expreſſions, and inordinate Deſires, and theſe are the practical Doctrines, expreſsly injoined in the *Ninth* and *Tenth* Commandments. By a perfect Obedience, by a Performance ſteady and uniform to all the Negative Precepts, we form the Notion of an innocent Life and Behaviour.

SECT. IV.

Not only Negative Goodneſs, or a bare Abſtinence from Evil, but alſo Poſitive Goodneſs is injoined by the Law of Nature.

1. IT greatly contributes to the Public Good, that, we not only hurt Nobody, by Thought, or Word, or Deed, *i. e.* that we refrain and abſtain from all Sorts of Injury towards others, but alſo, that we aſſiſt, by beneficent Influences in our Words and Deeds, as Opportunity offers, other Perſons, in all ſuch thoſe good Offices, which, as the Commandments themſelves give us to underſtand, are neceſſary to the Mean End, whereby the moſt diffuſive Humanity may be exerted and diſcovered. And it is, indeed, by ſuch Means as theſe, that, *the Public Good* is ſecured by removing all Obſtacles and Impediments, which lie in the Way of ſuch a Good, and by eſtabliſhing Human Benevolent Affections, diffuſing a Genial Influence thro' all the ſeveral Parts of the whole Rational Syſtem, and affording neceſſary Supplies to all the Conſtituent Parts of ſuch a Whole.

Poſitive Goodneſs deſcribed.

The Compound Motion of Sir *Iſaac Newton*, ariſing from Gravity and Attraction,

2. For, as the Natural Syſtem of the Univerſe, upon Mechanical Principles, is actually preſerved, by a Motion communicated thro' all the ſeveral Parts; ſo it, alſo, required, that, ſuch a Motion ſhould return, continued and impelled in a Diagonal Line. And, the Revolution or Return of this Compound Motion into itſelf, as taken from the Carteſian Hypotheſis, is, with ſome ſmall Variety eaſily applicable to the preſent Caſe.

and

and revolve into itſelf, in order to continue and keep up a laſting Motion.

Juſt ſo, when Univerſal Benevolence, is once put into Action, it is conſtantly repaired and ſupplied by the Reciprocal Actions, and Reactions of Gratitude, (both by conſtant immediate Aſſiſtances, which Gratitude affords, and by Proſpects to come, and Hopes of Advantages). By which Means, this Univerſal Benevolence gains new Vigour, and flouriſhes with Bloom to all Eternity.

3. It is a Self-evident Truth, that, the Benevolence of Individuals or of ſingle Perſons, properly directed towards thoſe who firſt ſhewed themſelves Benevolent and Beneficent, (and, which is the true Definition of Gratitude) greatly contributes to the laſting Security of the Common Good.

What a proper Direction in Acts of Gratitude is.

Now the Term *Proper Direction*, or, *Proper Exerciſes of Benevolence* is eaſily learned from what has been ſaid, in the preceding Chapter, *i. e.* when ſuch an Advantage or Good is conferred upon a Benefactor, as in no one Reſpect invade the Right of any other Individual Perſons, Family, Commonwealth, or even of whole Nations themſelves: And, for this Reaſon, I ſhall chooſe to ſpeak of this Virtue Gratitude, when I have Demonſtrated, from the other Natural Precepts, that the Rights and Properties of others, are, upon no Account whatſoever, to be invaded, violated, or broke in upon.

Gratitude injoined by the fifth Commandment.

4. This Virtue of Gratitude, however, is appointed in the *Fifth Commandment* of the Decalogue, where Gratitude to Parents is, in a more expreſs Manner, commanded, as to our beſt firſt Benefactors, next to ALMIGHTY GOD (who is the Common Parent, and beſt Benefactor of all). From this one Inſtance, and upon an equal Strength of Reaſoning, we are inſtructed to repay Obligations to all who have, in any Reſpect, approved themſelves advantageons and ſerviceable to us. Under theſe few Heads, are, in my Opinion, comprehended all thoſe Natural Laws which concern and bind Individuals or particular Perſons. And upon the Foundation of theſe very Laws, likewiſe (as applicable to the Behaviour and Manners of different Countries or People, when compared) we may fix, limit, and ſettle all the Laws of Nations.

SECT. V.

The Law of Nature the only ſolid Foundation of all inſtituted Laws in Civil Societies.

FROM this Short Compendium of the more general Laws of Nature, we may now, by an Eaſy Convenient Tranſition, paſs on to conſider ſuch Dictates of Reaſon as muſt direct all Mankind in the Original Eſtabliſhment, and Regular Preſervation of all Civil Societies, where the Supreme Command is adjudged conſiſtent with *Reſtraint* or *Coercive Power*. For, the Laws of Nature more General, are for this Reaſon,

Reaſon abſolutely neceſſary in this Conſideration: That, the inſtituted Laws of every particular Civil Society may be the more effectually maintained and preſerved, both for the *Glory of God*, and for the *Happineſs of all Mankind in general*; becauſe the ſeveral and many Members of ſuch ſeveral particular inſtituted Civil Societies reſpectively are no other, independent of ſuch an arbitrary Diviſion, than the Members, in a more eminent ſpecial Degree, of all, *i. e.* of the whole rational Syſtem, including both *GOD and Man*; and, conſequently, the natural Law being once eſtabliſhed, which commands the Proſecution of ſuch an End as this (namely, *the Glory of GOD and the Happineſs of Mankind)*, that Law is likewiſe eſtabliſhed, which lays down the Origin and Preſervation of thoſe Means, which are ſo materially neceſſary to this End: Or, in other Words, that, each particular Civil Society ſhould act ſeverally, as the Inſtruments promoting and advancing this original Supreme Natural Government.

Common Experience ſhews the Reaſon, the Neceſſity why ſome are to command and ſome to obey.

Now the Neceſſity of ſuch Means as promote this End, may be eaſily learned from the common Experience of all Mankind: As for Inſtance, *Firſt*, From the Rules and Oeconomy of *Families*; or, *Secondly*, from the Skill and Art purſued in *Architecture* and *Buildings*: or, *Thirdly*, From any other viſible Effect, wherein different Kinds of Operations and Employments are required. We obſerve in theſe and all other Kinds of compound Labour, that, the ſeveral Sorts of Induſtry muſt prove quite fruitleſs and vain, did not *ſome command* and *ſome obey*. For, it is an evident Point, that, the full effectual Attainment of the greateſt poſſible Good, which the whole rational Community can produce, is effected and brought about by ſuch Agents and Means, which muſt, as I have obſerved, cauſe ſomething very complex, compounded, mix'd, and, *which* (*ſomething, or Effect*) muſt of Neceſſity depend upon the concurring united Aſſiſtances of ſingle individual Agents, carried on by a Variety of Employment and Labour, widely different; and, conſequently, it muſt happen, that, the deſigned Effect cannot but fail, unleſs ſome Agents, in a continued progreſſive Series, be ſubordinately employ'd under other ſuperiour Agents, and, that, all conſequently muſt act in Obedience to the one ſupreme Almighty Deity, [GOD, *Numini*] as the principal moſt perfectly rational Being. By obſerving thoſe Laws which we have proved *natural* and *common* to all Countries People and Nations in general.

The Neceſſity of a Subordination in every well governed Society, illuſtrated from the compound Motion in natural Bodies.

This Manner of Reaſoning, grounded upon a Variety of manifeſt Experience, muſt, in the Judgment of all Men, who are not blinded by Prejudice, evince the Neceſſity of a ſubordinate regular Order.——But—— becauſe our Adverſaries are apt, with ſuch proud Boaſting, to triumph and plead Demonſtration againſt us; I ſhall endeavour to lay my Finger upon, and ſingle out, ſome certain Mathematical Principles, in which is generally demonſtrated the Neceſſity of a well-known Subordination between certain corporeal Cauſes co-operating in the Production of an Effect ſurely eſtabliſhed and determined:—— And, ſuch an *Effect* is the

Common

Common Good with all thoſe who are reſolved to obey the moſt univerſal Law of Nature.

Now, we do not contend for any other Neceſſity towards conſtituting ſuch a ſubordinate Order than ſuch as flows from the very Neceſſity of the very End itſelf, As for Example, we find, in *Carteſius*'s *Geometry*, *Book* 2. that the moſt ſimple Effects ariſing from Motions complicated and interwoven with each other (namely the Geometrical Drawings and Properties of Curve Lines) can accurately be known and certainly produced, provided, that, the ſeveral Motions, from whence theſe Effects flow, hang together with ſo cloſe a Connection, that, the ſubſequent Motions depend upon thoſe which immediately went before: And yet, that, theſe Effects cou'd not poſſibly ſubſiſt, were there no ſuch Subordination and Dependance.

An Example taken from *Carteſius* 2d Book of *Geometry*.

It is a Point alſo of equal Certainty, that, the unalterable certain Determination of all Surfaces in general, which can poſſibly flow from Lines, neceſſarily require the ſame Determinations of Motion. From theſe Determinations, therefore, the ſame uniform Generations of all Figures, which terminate and bound Mathematical Bodies, ariſe. This Doctrine is alſo capable of a cloſer Application. For, Phyſiology or Philoſophy (that genuine true Philoſophy I mean, which is eſtabliſhed upon Mathematical Principles) inſtructs us that all natural Effects are produced by compound Motions, and by the Figures of natural Bodies limited down to ſome certain Subordinations of this Kind.——And, for the ſame Reaſon, this ſame Philoſophy will alſo teach us, that, thoſe natural Effects, whereby common public Advantages can certainly be promoted and advanced by Mankind, muſt be, and are produced by the like Subordinations of Motion flowing from human Bodies. It is beyond all Queſtion clear and evident, that, certain Bodily Motions of Mankind are neceſſarily required for the mutual Benefit and Aſſiſtance of each other, but, particularly and eminently are ſuch bodily Motions of Mankind required, in acquiring, occupying, uſing and transferring the Right, the Dominion over Things and Perſons: Under which Heads the whole Sum of Juſtice is comprehended. And therefore, it is neceſſary, that certain Subordinations of ſuch Motions as theſe muſt be conſtituted and ſettled: And, by conſequence, that, certain Subordinations muſt be conſtituted and ſettled amongſt Mankind themſelves. In order, the better, and with a more exact Regularity, to unite and co-operate, in the procuring and obtaining this very ſame Effect, namely, the *Common Good*. In a Word, upon conſidering with cloſer Attention this Chain of Reaſoning (which is, indeed, ſomewhat too long) I find it capable of being made much ſhorter: Thus, for Example, ſince we find, that, no one Effect, even the minuteſt, as for Inſtance, the Deſcription of a Geometrical Curve, can to any Purpoſe be drawn, without a Subordination of compound Motions, therefore a *fortiori*, (from the ſtronger Reaſoning) no Complex effect flowing from many Cauſes, ſuch as the Common Good is, can

Corpus Phyſico-Mathematicum.

Effects whereby the public Good is promoted, flow from a Subordination of Motions in Human Bodies.

Certain Corporeal Motions in Human Bodies.

This Doctrine illuſtrated, by drawing a Geometrical Curve.

can be brought to any Truth and Certainty, without ſuch a Subordination as this.

The Connection between mix'd Mathematics and Moral Philoſophy, a very pleaſing Contemplation.

I would not, however, reject the firſt Method of deducing the Conſequences here laid down: Becauſe it, perhaps, may prove a very pleaſing Amuſement to the curious, who will find that there is ſome real true Connection between the Mathematical Principles of Natural Philoſophy and thoſe of Morality and Civil Society. Now, notwithſtanding, that, the Neceſſity of a regular ſubordinate Order to aſſociate and happily unite ſeveral Forces, Energies and Powers, in producing any conſiderable Effect, be capable (upon theſe and ſuch like Principles) of Demonſtration; yet, this Neceſſity is not the firſt Knowledge impreſſed upon the Mind, but, Mankind, on the contrary, learn it daily, and by Degrees, from clear, obvious experimental Knowledge, ſuch as I have ſuggeſted, and fully proved in the foregoing Chapters of this Enquiry.

Having deduced and, by proper Conſequences, traced out the Neceſſity there is for Diſcipline or Government in General, from the very End and Deſign of it: The ſame Principles are capable of an eaſy Application to *Domeſtic Diſcipline*, *Family-Government*, or Oeconomics: And, *Secondly*, to CIVIL SOCIETY: Theſe two Branches of Government being the conſtituent eſſential Parts of the very beſt End poſſibly-attainable. For, according to natural Order, the Happineſs of private Families is in the firſt Place, then that of Societies in the ſecond Place: And then in the third and laſt Place, the Happineſs of the whole Univerſe.

SECT. VI.

In Geometry one Quantity is ſubordinate to another, as in the Caſe of two Motions.

TO what has been already ſaid, I ſhall only here add: That, as in *Geometry*, the firſt Inſtance or Example of a Subordination, a Dependance of one Quantity upon another, is, between two Motions, whereof the one is ruled by the other: So, this regular Order lies ſtill more open and more remarkable, when the Subordination between ſome few more Cauſes is repreſented: As this plainly is the Caſe in Geometry; ſo, in like manner, when we treat upon the Nature of Mankind, the firſt true Inſtance of this ſubordinate Order, is between Man and Wife: In which Union; Man, according to Nature, is ſuperiour, is *the Head*, as having, generally ſpeaking, ſtronger Capacities of Intellect or Underſtanding, and a more athletic bodily Strength: And, by conſequence, can contribute much more largely to the Effect deſigned and ſought after, from the Union or Society between them. And, this Effect is the Common Good of both, in Matters as well *ſacred* as *human*.

Man and Wife.

Father and Son

Now, notwithſtanding this firſt Order of Subordination: Yet, the Power, the Government of a Father (as ſoon as Children iſſue from the Marriage Society)

Society) is ſtill more conſpicuous and manifeſt. And, conſequently, upon this ſecond Relation, (*i. e.* the Relation between Father and Son) we are to form our Plan: And, according to it, draw the true Origin of Power and Authority both Civil and Eccleſiaſtical. For, originally, and at firſt, it was neceſſary, that, ſuch a double compound Authority ſhould be in the Father, for the neceſſary Ends and Purpoſes merely, which I have mentioned already. The firſt Family, conſequently, was an orderly regular Society under Diſcipline and Government: *i. e.* It was the firſt Civil as well as the firſt Eccleſiaſtical Society. In a Courſe of Time, as Families increas'd and multiplied, ſo likewiſe did Societies both Civil and Eccleſiaſtical. And, in this Point, really and truly do the Accounts of Hiſtory perfectly coincide with Nature: And, conſequently, with right Reaſon, which is derived from Nature. Thus likewiſe, but in more eminent Degrees of authentic Truth, do, perfectly and in all Reſpects, correſpond the ancienteſt, moſt infallible Hiſtories: I mean, thoſe of *Moſes* divinely inſpired.

We are, moreover, here to remark, that, from the very ſame End and Deſign (for which Government or the Civil Authority is eſtabliſhed) Government is, upon as equally a natural Neceſſity, limited alſo. Becauſe, all Means whatſoever muſt be exactly fitted and adapted to their own reſpective proper End, ſo, as to keep free from Extremes on both Sides. And, therefore, by the cleareſt Conſequence imaginable, it follows, that, in order to promote the *Glory, the Honour of ALMIGHTY GOD, and the Happineſs of all Nations,* no Kind of Government can be eſtabliſhed, which either has, or can have, any Right to overturn and defeat theſe two great Ends.—There are, indeed, very few Conditions abſolutely neceſſary to promote theſe two great Ends: And, ſince theſe Conditions are plain and obvious: And, ſince theſe Conditions are laid before us in a fair open View, as we have demonſtrated in the Decalogue or the two Tables of the Ten Commandments, We from hence conclude (and fairly we may) that, the Bounds and Extents of Civil Power are, according to Reaſon, as large and extenſive as poſſible.——The firſt Prohibition laid upon Civil Magiſtrates, is, that, they don't mix, confound and deſtroy the ſeperate Rights of diſtinct Dominion and Property.——For, by ſuch ſeperate diſtinct Rights, there are aſſigned and given unto God, *the Things that are God's,* and unto Man, *the Things that are Man's.* Civil Magiſtrates are prohibited, in the ſecond Place, from overturning and aboliſhing all the other Laws of Nature. To the Binding Force and Obligation of theſe natural Laws the whole Security and Happineſs of all Governours whatſoever is intirely owing.—So that—no Commands are laid upon Civil Magiſtrates, by the Author of Nature, more ſevere than theſe, that, they do not extirpate the only Foundations and Securities of their own Happineſs and Authority, that they do not involve themſelves and Mankind in Ruin by attacking and deſtroying the neceſſary Means of *Common Good,* of *Common Happineſs.* And yet

The true ſolid Foundations of all Civil Government.

The Limits and Extents of Civil Power.

1. The Diſtinct Rights of Dominion and Property not to be confounded and deſtroy'd by Civil Magiſtrates.

2. The Laws of Nature cannot be aboliſhed by Civil Magiſtrates. Becauſe Civil Magiſtrates are not to weaken the Securities of their Authority and Happineſs.

yet——at the ſame Time, it muſt be allowed, that, ſince *the Dictate of Reaſon*, (wherein the original Conſtitution and true Preſervation of Government are commanded,) is *the Law of Nature*, as clearly appears from what has been ſaid: It demonſtrably follows, that *this Dictate of Reaſon* tooks its firſt Riſe and Origin from ALMIGHTY GOD: And, that, ſuch Limits and Bounds were aſſigned to it as we have deſcribed; which, remarkably and in a very eminent Degree, redounds to *the Glory and Honour of Government in general.*

SECT. VII.

The Privilege of ſupreme ruling Powers.

(1) NOW one eminent Privilege, peculiar to Supreme Rulers and Governors in Civil Society, is, That ALMIGHTY GOD, never delegated any coercive reſtraining Powers to Subjects and Inferiors by Vertue of

(1) *Now, one eminent Privilege peculiar to ſupreme Rulers*, &c.] The ſupreme executive Power and Authority in every Civil Government cannot, according to Law, be puniſhed by the Subjects or Parties governed: For, if it be true, as we have ſuppoſed, That GOD made Mankind for Happineſs; and, that, they ſhould live together in Society: And if it be likewiſe true, as we have inferr'd, that GOD thereby authoriſes every Society to put themſelves under ſuch Forms, and to make and execute ſuch Laws and Rules as they ſhall find neceſſary for their Happineſs; It will hence follow by an obvious Conſequence, that tho' it be left to the Society to judge what *is neceſſary*, yet the Power of making *That* into a Law, and obliging others to ſubmit to it, is entirely derived from GOD. And as this Power muſt neceſſarily be intruſted by every Society in ſome particular Hands, and ought to be executed according to ſome certain Rules, ſo whatſoever thoſe Perſons ſo intruſted ſhall think neceſſary to be done, the Society ought to be determined by, and whatever Laws they ſhall make, according to thoſe Rules, are by Conſequence to be eſteemed the Will and Command of GOD: Unleſs he has in Time paſt, and till he ſhall in Time to come, ſignify his Will that it ſhall be otherwiſe.

And as the Adminiſtration of theſe Laws muſt neceſſarily be intruſted in one or more Hands whom we call Governours; ſo, whatever theſe Governours ſhall do, according to thoſe Laws, is ſo far done by the Authority of GOD.

And, as thoſe Laws cannot be diſobeyed without Sin, ſo neither can thoſe Governours be reſiſted or oppoſed in the Execution of thoſe Laws without Rebellion, and that, not only againſt them, but alſo againſt GOD, by whoſe Authority they act. *Secondly*, if Government be neceſſary to the Welfare of Society, and if it be true, that thoſe Notions are falſe, and therefore ought to be avoided, that tend to Diſorder and Confuſion; from hence it will follow, that every Society ought to provide, and every Member of that Society ſubmit to ſuch Methods as they think neceſſary for Unity and Order.

And, ſince the Authority of GOD, is the only Foundation, and the only ſure Support of Government, and, by Conſequence, of Unity and Order; and ſince it is evident to every Underſtanding, that without a due Senſe of this Authority of God, which I call Religion, there can be no certain Baſis for Truth or Juſtice, or Confidence amongſt Men, which are the Bonds and Ligaments of Society, the Joints, by which its Members are united: But, on the contrary, all Falſehood and Deceit, Avarice and Ambition, Rapine and Violence, Murther and Oppreſſion, Malice and Revenge will be lawful, ſo far as they can be ſecret, and without the Reach of human Laws: it will follow, that it ought to be the Care of every Society, that Religion be eſtabliſhed and maintained amongſt them.

This is ſo neceſſary, that even Atheiſtical Politicians adviſe its Preſervation, and Encouragement,

which, they lawfully may puniſh their Superiors, ſuppoſing them even to violate their Subject's Rights by tranſgreſſing againſt the Laws of Nature. For, if any Caſe cou'd be ſo circumſtanced that, Subjects are authorized to call Supreme Civil Power to an Account: Other Powers may, upon the ſame Foundation of Right, be conſtituted and appointed over theſe queſtioning Powers, in order to puniſh them, ſuppoſing theſe queſtioning Powers to have iniquitouſly puniſhed the firſt ſupreme Powers here ſuppoſed.——And, upon ſame Foundation of Right alſo, Superiours may for ever (to an endleſs Infinity) be conſtituted and appointed over Supreme Powers and Authorities. ——Than which Nothing in Nature can be ſuppoſed more abſurd. For they, who endeavour to make theſe their Superiours the Objects of Puniſhment, deſtroy the very Eſſence, the Vitals, (as much as in them lies,) of Civil Government: And the Reaſon is, becauſe they reduce theſe their ſupreme Governours in Civil Society to the State of Subjects. It is likewiſe, no leſs repugnant to the Nature of Government, that all ſhould be Subjects; than, that in it, all ſhould be Supreme. The very Deſign of Order ſo eſſential to Government, neceſſarily requires, that, ſomething ſhould be *firſt* and *ſupreme*, and, conſequently, that, nothing is *prior* or *ſuperiour*. And, upon this very Account, therefore, in our preſent Caſe, it is neceſſary, that, amongſt Mankind who live in the ſame Civil Society, there ſhould be ſome, in whom eſſentially inheres a coercive reſtraining Power: And, from whom all the reſt, (or inferior Magiſtrates) are to receive their Power: Now, moſt undoubtedly true it is, that, they who receive their *whole Power from the one Supreme Power* are not authoriſed by it to puniſh itſelf, in as much as it is *the Author and Giver of all the Powers they can lawfully exert.*

Unity and Order to be preſerved.

In Civil Society a coercive Power muſt be lodged ſomewhere.

ragement, merely out of a Principle of worldly Policy, as being ſo ſerviceable to the Ends and Purpoſes of Government, as if it had been only the Invention of Men.

And therefore they, who are Enemies to Religion, are ſo far Enemies to Society, and Traitors to the Government they live under.

But then, as religion ought to be the Care of every Society, as Neceſſary to Unity and Order, ſo it ought to be equally their Care, that Unity and Order in Religion be maintained.

And as Religion cannot be maintained without ſome Form of Worſhip, and ſome Rules of Order, ſo it will follow, that in every Society there ought not only to be ſome ſuch Form and Rules eſtabliſhed, but alſo, that *that Form*, and thoſe Rules be ſo contrived, as far as poſſible, that, every Member of the Society may unite in them, and conform to them.

And ſince we have already ſhewn, that the Laws of a Society are to be obeyed, as the Laws of GOD, ſo far as they are agreeable to his Will; it will follow, that every Member of a Society ought to comply with that Form of Worſhip, and ſubmit to thoſe Rules of Order eſtabliſhed amongſt them, ſo far as they are not contrary to GOD's Will.

And therefore, ſo far as any one oppoſes theſe Things, ſo far he is an Enemy to the Unity and Order of the Society, and diſobedient to GOD, by whoſe Authority they are injoined. The Rev. Mr. *Thomas Burnet*'s Eſſay upon Government, *Page* 30, &c.

There is not any Thing here, however, which to the Contrary whereof, can, notwithſtanding, in any Reſpect, be aſſerted as a ſufficient Cauſe or Impediment why, theſe ſupreme Rulers and Governors of Mankind, ſhould not be puniſhed by ALMIGHTY GOD, if they commit any Violence upon, or Tranſgreſſion againſt the Laws of Nature;——Becauſe, in the City and Kingdom of GOD, (*i. e.* in the one Univerſal Society) thoſe very Perſons are Subjects, who, in Human Societies, hold the Supreme Authority. And, conſequently, it cannot rationally be affirmed, that, theſe Supreme Rulers have a juſt Right to commit ſeveral Acts, which they actually do commit, (and with Impunity too) amongſt Mankind. And, the Reaſon is becauſe *Right is the Power* granted and allowed by every one Law whatſoever, to which we are ſubject and ought to pay Obedience. And, therefore, Acts, committed upon the Sanction of ſuch a Right, cannot be puniſhed by any Law-Giver, by any Governour: When yet, at the ſame Time, the Crimes and Miſdemeanors, of even Emperors themſelves, perpetrated in Violation of the Laws of Nature, may, and with the ſtricteſt Juſtice, be puniſhed by the Author of Nature.

Here then, upon this Foundation, by diſtinguiſhing between *an Impunity according to inſtituted Laws*, and *that plenary full Right*, which muſt be eſtimated both from the Laws of Nature, as well as from the particular End, and Deſign of Civil Laws, there are, in fact, according to my Opinion, given unto *Cæſar* the Things which are *Cæſar's*: And yet there is reſerved at the ſame Time to ALMIGHTY GOD, and to all GOD's Subjects, the Right both of God and his Kingdom.

SECT. VIII.

HOW ample and extenſive an Authority then is granted to Empire, and Supreme Civil Government, without any Encroachments upon the Laws of Nature, Any one will eaſily determine, who perceives, that the Laws of Nature, as eſtabliſhed in this Philoſophical Enquiry, extend themſelves Univerſally to Divine and Human Things, to Foreign Nations, as well as to the ſame Civil Society, and to the Rights of making War and Peace. Upon this ſo ample an Authority, the Civil Magiſtrate may, by purſuing the Common Good, become the Guardian, the Protector of the Decalogue, or, two Tables of the Ten Commandments, he may maintain his Right of making War and Peace with Foreign States, and, at the ſame Time, preſerve his Right of enacting wholeſome Laws for his own People, his Right of Judging, Condemning, Puniſhing, Baniſhing, *&c.* of conferring and beſtowing Honours, Public Rewards, Immunities, Dignities, Privileges, and many other Advantages, *&c.*

Now

Now, ſince the Public Happineſs, as well of the whole Human Race, as of each particular Civil Society, muſt be procured, as far as lies within the Reach of Human Prudence, by Inſtitutes, Cuſtoms, and Laws, varying, and differing from each other: And, ſince ſeveral Honours, Dignities, Advantages, *&c.* are, with equal Safety to the Civil State, beſtowed, now upon ſome, then upon others:——And ſince, (Crimes as it very often happens,) are either too partially indulged, too eaſily pardoned, or too ſeverely puniſhed; in all which Caſes, *the true Merits* are very little, if at all, conſidered: Manifeſt it is, that, many Things ſafely may, and uſually are, left to the arbitrary Will and Pleaſure of Governours, who, at the ſame Time, are under the indiſpenſable Obligation of guarding and protecting one unchangeable principal End, and all the ſeveral Means naturally leading to it.——And——Indeed,——Every one muſt know, from his own Obſervation and Experience of that Civil Community in which he lives, that, theſe Inconveniencies do actually and in fact happen: And yet,——without any very remarkable Detriment or Loſs to the General Social Good. For, whoſoever compares the different Eſtabliſhment and Conſtitutions of the ſeveral Kingdoms and States through Europe muſt obſerve (from thoſe ſeveral Changes and Chances, which daily await both the Lives and Fortunes of Subjects, as well as the Decrees and Councils, Acts and Laws of Princes;) that, in each Community, the Wiſe and Prudent may enjoy Life happily enough: And, that, all theſe ſeveral States and Kingdoms are ſo equally ballanced in Times of Peace, by the ſeveral Branches of Trade; and in Times of War, by ſolemn Leagues, by Reciprocal Succours and Covenants, and by Alliances, that from each and all of them, many Public Benefits contribute towards, and increaſe that Proſperity, which, at preſent, flouriſhes over all Europe. For, altho' ſeveral Advantages may ſtill be wanting, and altho' many Evils are complained of; Yet, the preſent State of Europe is ſtill, however, extremely Happy if we compute and rightly eſtimate the Bleſſings which we all enjoy, both from our own Civil Society in particular, as well as from many Foreign Nations and Countries in general.

But,——in a more eſpecial Manner, muſt this our Eſtimate riſe in its Value, if we compare theſe manifold Bleſſings with thoſe many Miſeries and Calamities, which inevitably follow upon the *Hobbian* Scheme; "That, *SELF* is the only one Conſideration to be regarded: That, each "Individual has from hence, a Right to Arrogate and aſſume all to "*SELF*: And, that, each, and every one ſhould wage War at once and "immediately againſt *All.*

We ought, therefore, as a neceſſary Concluſion, to reckon all theſe Bleſſings Natural Effects ariſing from Principles of Peace and Concord, of ſuch Natural Affections and Propenſities as promote the Common Good. Now——All theſe ineſtimable Bleſſings muſt be deſtroyed, if the Principles only of Diſcord, and of a Rapacious, Unlimited

limited *Self-love* are univerſally to reign in the Breaſts of all Mankind. And, theſe are the Principles and theſe only, which Mr. *Hobbes* has inculcated as the Dictates of Right Reaſon in a State of Nature.——Theſe Principles and Doctrines having then been in the General conſidered, it will not fall within our preſent Deſign to explain minutely and particularly all the ſeperate ſingle Rights and Privileges reſpectively, of Supreme Dominions and Empires: And it, alſo, will be as little neceſſary to lay down the ſeveral Forms of Civil Government, and the Cauſes upon which their Riſe and Encreaſe, their Grandeur, their Declenſion, and Ruin, depend: Theſe Enquiries coming more immediately within the Province of Politicians, and Writers upon Government.

It will be fully ſufficient then, in my preſent Deſign, to evince the Neceſſity there is for theſe our Moral Principles in the Political Rules and and Doctrine of Civil Government, if, to a Demonſtration in few Words, it appears, that, Mr. *Hobbes*'s Doctrine, deſtructive of theſe Moral Principles, is as flat a Contradiction againſt the Eſtabliſhment and Security of all Civil Society. Becauſe, no Civil Government can, upon this HOBBIAN DOCTRINE, be form'd: Or, ſuppoſing it cou'd, that, it muſt immediately, the firſt Moment of its Inſtitution, drop into Ruin and Deſtruction.

SECT. IX.

The many fatal Conſequences to Civil Society which follow from Mr. *Hobbes*'s State of Nature.

ALL thoſe Invectives, with which Mr. *Hobbes* has ſo ſcurrilouſly abuſed Mankind, carry in them this ſo very deſtructive a Tendency: That, they bear as hard againſt all Supreme Power, all Crowned Heads: And, of Courſe, againſt our own Dread Sovereign Lord King *Charles* the Second: And, the Conſequences here drawn for Mr. *Hobbes*, are concluſively true from his own Principles. Becauſe, even Kings themſelves, with all their Pomp and Splendour, do not diveſt themſelves of Human Nature, when once they put on the Crown and Robes.——Nay——and to carry this Aſſertion ſtill farther, the Nature of Kings remains juſt the ſame, had not any Civil Society or Government been conſtituted and formed upon thoſe imaginary ſandy Compacts, with which Mr. *Hobbes* has amuſed Mankind: So far are ſuch Compacts from altering the Minds of Princes for the better, that, Mr. *Hobbes*, with bare-faced Impudence, aſſures us, that, the Prince cannot be bound down to the Obligation of any Civil Compact or Agreement whatſoever. And then truely, his next Concluſion is, that Princes cannot offer any Injury to their Subjects, notwithſtanding that, they injure and oppreſs them with the moſt grievous Calamities. See Sect. 14. of Chap. 7. in his Book *De Cive*; From whence Mr. *Hobbes* goes ſtill farther; that, ſuch Poſitions, as he has univerſally

See his Book De Cive, Chap. 7. Sect. 12.

verſally laid down as true, naturally and neceſſarily hold true againſt all Mankind:——And, which Poſitions he has eſtabliſhed as the Fundamental Maxims of all his Politics; namely, "That, Mankind are by far more "Savage, Rapacious, and Cruel than Wolves, Bears, and Serpents, becauſe, "they are [*i. e.* Brutes] no farther Rapacious, than as Hunger prompts them, "and no farther Cruel than as they are rouſed up by ſome Provocation. See his Book *De Homine*, Chap. 10. And, that, "Nature has entirely "diſſociated or ſeparated them, *i. e.* rendered them [Mankind] quite unfit "for Society, and produced them with ſtrong Propenſities, and Inclinati-"ons towards mutual Slaughter and Deſtruction." See his *Leviathan* Chap. 13. with many other as odd Poſitions, of equally Monſtrous Abſurdity, and Contradiction.

See Chap. 1. Sect. 25. Page 76. and Chap. 2. Sect. 20. Page 194.

Now, all theſe Doctrines I peremptorily declare, are directly levelled againſt our Dread Sovereign Lord the King.

Who, in the Name of God, can poſſibly love a Prince whom he takes for ſo monſtrous a *Leviathan* as this? Who in his Senſes, would place his Life, his Property and all his Hopes upon that Prince whom *Hobbes* paints out as ſuch a Monſter? Muſt not dreadful Apprehenſions ariſe, in the Breaſt of every Man, leſt, this *Leviathan* devour him and all Mankind. There are Motives equally prevailing, if not much more ſo, why Subjects ought to fly from ſuch a Prince, and ſhun him as a more public, a more malignant Enemy than all the reſt of Mankind taken together. For, the Prince has, according to Mr. *Hobbes*, a natural Propenſity of doing Hurt implanted in him, equally ſtrong to the ſame Propenſity inherent in every other Human Creature.——A Propenſity much ſuperior and more powerful,——Becauſe the whole Power of a Civil Society is collected and lodged in the Prince.

SECT. X.

The Abſurdity of Mr. *Hobbes* in affirming that Human Reaſon is an abſurd ſilly Rule, &c.

UPON this ſo wretched a Scheme, do all thoſe Principles totally demoliſh the Royal Authority of Monarchs, and the whole Syſtem of Political Government, by Virtue of which, Mr. *Hobbes*, with ſuch mighty Endeavours, ſtrives to perſuade Mankind, that, human Reaſon is a Rule, abſolutely abſurd and nugatory for the Conduct and Regulation of Moral Duties: And his Argument is, Becauſe, ſays he, "Human Reaſon can-"not diſcern between *Good* and *Evil* any farther than as we deſire the "Good to happen to ourſelves: Whereas, the *Evil* we naturally dread "and ſhun." See his Book *De Cive*, Chap. 14. Sect. 17. "We all, Self-(diveſted of all Social Regards,) Mr. *Hobbes*'s Governing Moral Principles. "ſays he, take our Eſtimate of Good and Evil from that Delight or Un-"eaſineſs, which we ourſelves (each ſingly, and individually for him-"ſelf) perceive and feel." As for Inſtance, "No Man living, no not, "even

" even *the King himſelf*, either could or would conſider what might prove " of Benefit and Advantage to others, ſuppoſing Mr. *Hobbes*'s Doctrine " to hold true.

There could not poſſibly be any Foundation left for ſettling and preſerving the Common Good, " Since the Nature of Man, (even " the King, or his Council, to whom the whole Adminiſtration " of all great State Affairs is intruſted," according to Mr. *Hobbes*, as in our Chapter *De Bono*, concerning Good, we have demonſtrated) " has " no Knowledge of either Good or Evil, independant of all Relation to " *Mere Self*, i. e. to the Individual Perſon himſelf who applies, and uſes " the Terms *Good* and *Evil*: And conſequently, whatſoever Command " the King injoins, and lays down as *Good*, muſt always be underſtood " as the individual particular Good of the King himſelf, or of the " Perſon, whoſoever he is, governing and repreſenting the Civil So- " ciety. See *Leviathan*, Chap. 6." Mr. *Hobbes*, then, by no Means will allow any *Good*, the *Good of Civil Society*, much leſs, *of the whole Univerſe*, according to the Opinion of much ſounder Philoſophers and Politicians, who maintain, that, all Acts, aſcribing unto ALMIGHTY GOD the Glory, and Honour ſo juſtly due to *His Divine Majeſty*, are Acts of *Natural Good*, and *Common Happineſs* to the *whole Human Kind*.

No Knowledge of Good and Evil, independant of a narrow Selfiſh Regard, an abſurd Notion.

Mr. *Hobbes* beyond all Controverſy, upon this Foundation of his, renders and repreſents Government of every Kind, a State abſolutely unequal to the End, for which Government is, and ought to be, ſo deſireable. And, conſequently, He inſinuates, and, in Terms too plain to be miſunderſtood, that, Civil Government is ſuch a State as muſt and ought to be quite aboliſhed.

Neither, indeed, can ſuch a vital Wound as this, given to Empires and Monarchies, be healed by the whole Art and Contrivance of all thoſe ſoothing Flatteries, with which, in ſome ſubſequent Parts of his Writings, He ſo thickly dawbs Kings and Governors, by telling them, that, *Good and Evil*, *Juſt and Unjuſt*, are nothing elſe than what they themſelves are pleaſed to make and declare ſo: And, that, all Things become *Juſt* by their Command, and *Unjuſt* by their Prohibition. See his Book *De Cive*, Chap. 12. Sect. 1.

From this Doctrine it follows, that, theſe High and Mighty Perſonages, in theſe their Decrees and Determinations, cannot err; That, they become abſolutely infallible, and of Conſequence, that, they have not the leaſt Occaſion, either to conſult Lawyers, or to hold Councils with the learned and experienced in Politics and Civil Government; in order to receive Information before they Act *What* will turn to the Advantage, and Happineſs of the States, they govern, and *What* muſt prove injurious and detrimental to them. Neither will Mr. *Hobbes*'s Definition of an Offence or a Crime, ſignify any Thing to the Purpoſe, by ſaying, that, an Offence or a Crime is neither more or leſs, than ſuch a Commiſſioner or Omiſſion,

ſuch

ſuch a Word, or Will, as is contrary to the Reaſon of the Civil State, which he aſſerts in his Book *De Cive*, Chap. 14. Sect. 17. Or, contrary to the Reaſon of him who repreſents and perſonates the State: As he explains himſelf in ſome other Paſſages of his Writings. And, that, ſuch a *Reaſon* "As this, let it be what it will, either of the Civil Society, or "of its Repreſentative, muſt be always held and eſteemed as *Right Rea-* "*ſon* by the People governed," Mr. *Hobbes* has avowedly maintained in his Book *De Cive*, in his Annotations to Sect. 2. Chap. 2. Notwithſtanding this, Mr. *Hobbes* has poſitively declared, that, "the Injunctions "and Commands of Civil Societies and States can be contrary to Right "Reaſon, in Matters of Religion, (As in his Book *De Cive*, Chap. "15. Sect. 18.) and, contrary to the Laws of Nature in Temporal "Concerns; and yet, at the ſame Time, all theſe Injunctions and Com- "mands are, according to him, altho' ſo Contradictory, the Dictates "of Right Reaſon." See his Book *De Cive*, Chap. 6. Sect. 13. and Chap, 7. Sect. 14. And,——What is ſtill, yet more extraordinary, Mr. *Hobbes* has baniſhed, from his moral and Politic Scheme, any ſuch Rule as is capable of being deduced and drawn from the Nature of Things, (according to which Natural Rule, Civil Societies are capacitated to execute their own Commands lawful and right), ſince he has expreſsly declared in his *Leviathan* Chap. 6. "That, there is not any Common Rule "of *Good*, *Evil* and *Baſe*, or *Contemptible* and *Vile*, derived and taken "from the Nature of the objects themſelves." And——yet,——in other Paſſages, he frankly and ingenuouſly enough acknowleges, that, he does not believe "The Reaſon of Civil Society, really and truely to be right "Reaſon: But, that, in order to put a Definitive Concluſion to Contro- "verſies, the contending Parties ought voluntarily, inſtead of Right Rea- "ſon, to conſtitute and ſet up the Reaſon of ſuch a Judge as this; by "whoſe Determinations the contending Parties are bound and tied "down to abide. Becauſe, otherwiſe, ſays he, the Controverſy could "never be brought to any Concluſion at all; or, muſt be decided by "Force of Arms, from the Deficiency of a Right Reaſon ſettled and "eſtabliſhed in Nature." See his *Leviathan* Chap. 5. Where, ſome few "Lines lower down in this Chapter, he compares Right Reaſon to the "*Trump* turned up at *Cards*, to which *principal Card or Trump*, in the "Courſe of the Game, the chief Parts are ſettled and adjuſted, partly by the Conſent of the Players or Gameſters, and partly by Chance alſo."

SECT. XI.

Determinations of *Right* by Arbitration in many Caſes unavoidable.

WHAT Mr. *Hobbes* here aſſerts is, beyond Queſtion, ſound Reaſon in all Caſes of Controverſy where a Deciſive Determination is neceſſary: Becauſe, it nearly concerns *the Public Good*, that, all contending Parties ſhould readily leave the deciſive Iſſue of their Conteſts to the Arbitration of Civil Society; and then, quietly acquieſce under and abide by ſuch an *Arbitration*. This Method of deciding and ending Differences, *the moſt perfect Right Reaſon* dictates: Becauſe, in Truth, this Determination is either right: Or, at leaſt, is uſed as ſuch where better Determination cannot be had, ſuppoſing *the Common Good ſecured*. *This Reaſoning* is evident, and, conſequently, preferable to Mr. *Hobbes*'s *Right Reaſon*; Becauſe, it ſuppoſes ſomewhere a *Practical Right Reaſon* amongſt Mankind, which is to direct them; or, (to expreſs the ſame Thing in fewer Words) *a Right Reaſon* which fully anſwers all the Ends of Human Happineſs, and of our Duty. Mr. *Hobbes* however, as we here obſerve by the by, does not ſuppoſe *a Right Reaſon founded in Nature*: And, therefore, he commands us *to ſtand and abide by the Reaſon of Civil Society, as THE RIGHT REASON*; than which Poſition, nothing in Nature can be imagined more monſtrouſly ridiculous, or more deſtructive of all Happineſs. For, in the firſt Place, one of his Premiſſes flatly contradicts his Concluſion: Becauſe, it may, with much more Truth, be inferr'd, (allowing no Right Reaſon as founded in Nature to exiſt) that, we muſt not ſtand by the Reaſon of Civil Society.

The material Point of Difference here in this Argument between Mr. *Hobbes* and Biſhop *Cumberland*, lies in ſuppoſing and not ſuppoſing the Common Good, to be fully and effectually ſecured.

This odd Reaſoning advanced by Mr. *Hobbes*, muſt prove very dangerous to Perſons not ſufficiently upon their guard: For, one of the Premiſſes being falſe (and which perhaps is of no ſmall Conſequence in Mr. *Hobbes*'s Argument) muſt at leaſt render the whole Concluſion ſuſpicious, if not notoriouſly falſe:——Notwithſtanding all his mighty Boaſt of Truth.

See Chap. 1. Sect. 11. Pages 32, 33.

No one Affront or Reproach, by the by, can be offered to Rulers and Governors, more groſs or provoking than to tell them, that *their Supreme Commands* are not the Dictates of Right Reaſon, but, that, they become ſuch, purely becauſe, by the ſuperior lucky Chance of an Arbitrary Conſent, they have arrived at the Supreme Authority. For, ſuppoſing the Arbitrary Wills of Princes, independent of Rational Dictates, to take place: Why then, Laws, evidently contradictory and repugnant to all theſe Dictates, may and will be as equally conducive to Common Happineſs, and may as juſtly aſſume to themſelves, and demand an equal Awe, Reſpect, and Obſervance; if by Chance of War, or by the proſperous Succeſs of Raſh, Hot-headed Councils, a Mad-man becomes Supreme, and introduces *Laws* incouraging *Cruelty*, *Perfidy*, *Treachery*, *Ingratitude*,

tude, or even that unbounded Luſt of *Domination* over all, both *Perſons* and *Things*. In a Word,——this inſolent Spirit inflames the moſt profligate Wretches with the hotteſt Ambition to ſow Seditions, to form Conſpiracies, and to engage in Rebellion againſt Principalities and Powers: That, ſo, by arrogating to themſelves, and uſurping the Reins of Government, their own wild Conceits and corrupt baſe Appeties may arrive at the high and mighty Honours of *Right Reaſon*, and of *Worthy*, *Juſt*, *Commendable Acts*.

SECT. XII.

IN my firſt Chapter, I have explained and confuted that Doctrine concerning *the Right of All over All*. Mr. *Hobbes* has not, (and which, is very remarkable) proved, that, Mankind, tinctured with this Doctrine, will *in a State of Nature*, conſent to enter into Society. Neither, has he, *ſecondly*, proved, that, *the Members of a Civil State*, governed by this Doctrine, will be diſpoſed to ſhake off all Obedience to Laws of inſtituted Poſitive Compact: *i. e.* (according to his own Comment) he has not proved, *That this Doctrine will incline Mankind to commit High Treaſon againſt the Sacred Perſon of their Prince.*

The Right of *All* to *All* will not permit Man in a State of Nature to enter into Society.

The firſt of theſe two Charges, laid againſt Mr. *Hobbes*, we prove thus: "That, the whole Right of all Perſons to all Things is proved (even to "Demonſtration by Mr. *Hobbes* himſelf) to ariſe from that Right or Power, "which Right Reaſon has given to each Individual of preſerving and "defending himſelf," if we give any Credit to his own Principles, as delivered, Chap. 1. Sect. 7, 8, 9, 10. in his Book *De Cive*———And what is ſtill more ſtrange——this ſame Mr. *Hobbes* has aſſerted, "that, "any or every Right is, by this one Method only, to be transferred and "made over to another; when the Poſſeſſor declares, by proper ſignificant "Tokens, that, it is not any longer his Pleaſure to hold it lawful for him "to reſiſt another Perſon, who is willing to accept this Right: Which "Reſiſtance, he lawfully could have made, before he ſubmitted to ſuch a "Reſignation, *De Cive*, Chap. 2. Sect. 4. But, no Man can be laid "under the Obligation of any Campacts or Agreements not to "reſiſt the Perſon who offers Death, Wounds or any other Bodily "Injury to his Perſon, *De Cive* Chap. 2. Sect. 18." and then he ſays, "that every Perſon reſerves the Right of defending and preſerving "himſelf againſt Violence, and that, he cannot transfer this Right "over to Civil Society, even at the Time he conſents to that Aſſo-"ciation which links together and cements all Civil Societies, *De Cive*, "Chap. 5. Sect. 7."

And, therefore, from all theſe Poſitions and Premiſſes of his, I affirm as a Concluſion, that, Mr. *Hobbes*, or any other Man ſtill retains his Right over all (if ever he had any), and this his Right extends ſo far, that, he lawfully may wage War againſt all, even againſt the Civil Society itſelf, of which he is a Member: Provided only, that, this exorbitant Right can be proved a Right deducible from the Right of preſerving and defending *SELF.* And then, the natural and neceſſary Conſequence is, that, no one human Creature can agree to enter into Civil Society.

It is as eaſy alſo to demonſtrate, that, every one Individual, according to Mr. *Hobbes*'s Principles, is a competent Judge, whether the Civil Society ought or ought not to inflict Death, or any other Puniſhment upon him, and conſequently, that, every individual Perſon alſo is as competent a Judge, whether Rebellion be neceſſary to his own Self-Defence or not: And it is equally eaſy to prove likewiſe, as the neceſſary Means of Self-Preſervation and Self-Defence of one and all, that, each Individual himſelf, as being the beſt Judge, ſhould pronounce theſe to be the Means: And, that the very ſame right Reaſon, which not, long before, he had maintained, as principally, and above all Things, neceſſary to Self-Preſervation, cannot poſſibly contradict itſelf, by affirming afterwards *fewer Means* and *Helps* ſufficient.——But, what need I dwell longer upon this Branch of Controverſy. Becauſe, every Reader, tolerably well-acquainted with Mr. *Hobbes*'s Doctrine, may ſtart to himſelf many ſuch Objections as theſe. Neither do I ſee what Mr. *Hobbes* can ſay in Anſwer to them. I chooſe rather to proceed immediately to conſider the ſecond Branch of my Aſſertion: Which, I am afraid will draw upon me ſomewhat more of Mr. *Hobbes*'s Reſentment.

SECT. XIII.

The Right of *All* over *All* furniſhes Subjects with the Arms of Rebellion.

THIS ſecond Part of our Aſſertion, advanced againſt Mr. *Hobbes*, can be proved by the very ſame Argument, which proves, that, the Right of arrogating and aſſuming All to SELF, in a State of War, cannot be transferr'd: Becauſe, even from hence, alſo, it follows, that, every one, according to Mr. *Hobbes*'s Doctrine, reſerves to himſelf a Right over every Man: And, conſequently, a Right of entring into a War againſt that very Civil Society, of which he himſelf is a Member: Unleſs the Civil Society itſelf grants to each and every one *a Right over all:* And, ſuch a Grant as this, manifeſtly cannot be allowed in any one Civil Society upon Earth. Now, that, we may not proceed too far againſt Mr. *Hobbes*, without his own Authority, let us, here remark what he has to ſay for himſelf. In Terms as clear and expreſs as poſſible, Mr. *Hobbes* allows to Subjects the Liberty of preſerving and defending themſelves againſt the

the Supreme Authority of the Civil Government: And this Liberty he eſtabliſhes, upon that abſolute unbounded Right, which, each Perſon has of protecting and defending himſelf: And, that, ſuch *a Liberty in itſelf*, in Oppoſition to the Supreme Civil Authority, may be aided and ſtrengthened by an united armed Force.

In his *Latin Leviathan*, printed at *Amſterdam*, *Johan. Blaw* 1670. He ſtates his Queſtion in the following Words, and then ſubjoins his Anſwer, *cap.* 21. *Page* 109. *Quarto Edit. Quid autem, ſi multi ſimul, contra Civitatis Poteſtatem ſummam, Crimen aliquod commiſerint capitale, propter quod, niſi ſe defendant, expectant Mortem, quæret aliquis, utrum Libertatem illi, conjunctis Viribus, ſe mutuo defendendi habeant? habent apertè. Nam Vitas ſuas defendunt tantùm; id quod et innocenti & nocenti Æquè licet, Injuſtitia quidem erat Violatio prima; ſed quod Arma poſtea ad ſe defendendos ſumpſerint, Crimen novum non eſt.* In his *Engliſh Leviathan*, Folio, printed at *London* 1651, Chap. 21. Part 2. Page 112, 113. "He expreſſes his Senſe to the very ſame Purpoſe; but yet, in Terms however, "ſomewhat bolder and more rebellious: For, inſtead of the laſt Sentence, "*viz. Sed quod Arma poſtea ad ſe defendendos, ſumpſerint Crimen novum "non eſt.*" He ſubſtitutes the two following Sentences.—*Their bearing of Arms ſubſequent to it, tho' it be to maintain what they have done, is no new unjuſt Act.* And, *if it be only to defend their Perſons it is not unjuſt at all.*— I cannot help commending Mr. *Hobbes* for taking off, in his *Leviathan*, ſomewhat of that Harſhneſs, which ſo curſed and perverſe a Doctrine as this carries in it: And yet, notwithſtanding *ſuch a mollifying*, theſe his corrected ſecond Thoughts are pernicious to the laſt Degree, and breath nothing but Death, and Deſtuction, Murther and High-Treaſon. Let us here imagine the capital Crime, which, he ſuppoſes, committed by the many, to be a Crime, where Numbers had entered into a Conſpiracy to murder the King, and that, the Crime is diſcovered to the King by one of the Conſpirators. Theſe Conſpirators are under dreadful Apprehenſions (which is no leſs than natural) what kind of Death they have deſerved. "It is, "therefore," ſays our ſagacious Diſtinguiſhing *Hobbes*, "Lawful for theſe "Conſpirators to join together, to defend and aſſiſt one another: And, to "act thus, ſays he, is no new Crime."

Now, according to my Judgment, theſe Conſpirators, by taking up Arms againſt their King, in order to drive off a Puniſhment which they have juſtly incurred, do wage and carry on an unjuſt iniquitous War, and, are, conſequently, to all Intents and Purpoſes guilty of High-Treaſon. And, therefore, by ſuch a deſperate Proceeding as this, they add a new Crime to their rebellious Conſpiracy; notwithſtanding that, in ſome Sort, both Crimes equally fall under the ſame general Denomination of High-Treaſon againſt the Life and Perſon of their Sovereign. Yet, this ſecond Attempt is moſt certainly a new Crime, that is, they add a freſh Act of Tranſgreſ-

ſion

ſion to the former: And, conſequently, in each ſingle Act, by which they carry on ſuch a War, they exaggerate their flagrant Crimes, and add Sin to Sin. For, taking up Arms is the ready Introduction to a Civil War againſt that Supreme Civil Authority, which, with ſo juſt an Indignation, endeavours to bring theſe abandoned Villains to a Puniſhment highly merited. Nay——And to carry this Argument ſtill farther, ſuppoſing ſo rebellious a Faction allowable, How can ſuch Rebels, under any Colour of Law, be reſtrained and prohibited from killing the King himſelf, whenever he draws the Sword of Juſtice againſt any one of them? But——how pernicious and deſtructive a Doctrine this is, I leave to the Judgment and Determination of others.

SECT. XIV.

Mr. *Hobbes*'s Doctrine of Compacts, Covenants, Agreements, Contracts, *&c*, is highly dangerous to the Supreme Civil Authority whereſoever lodged.

BUT——there are ſome Poſitions, alſo in the third Place, delivered by Mr. *Hobbes* which threaten immediate Ruin and Deſtruction to all Civil Government. And theſe Poſitions, or Aſſertions of his, particularly concern the Obligation of Oaths and Compacts. For, in the firſt Place, he peremptorily affirms, "that, Civil Societies are ſettled and eſta- "by the effectual Efficacy of Compacts only:" And then truly, he, with as little Reſerve, aſſerts, "That, no Compacts whatſoever can carry "any Obligation, any binding Force, except we give Credit to, and have "a Confidence in, the Perſon who promiſes, and engages in, theſe Com- "pacts." And, this Inſinuation of his, is clearly implied in the Definition of a Compact, which he himſelf has delivered in his Book *de Cive*, Chap. 2. Section 9. which Definition he firſt explains, and then tells the Uſe, to which this Definition is applicable. *De Cive*, Chap. 8. Sections 3 and 9, where he diſcourſes upon the Obligation of Slaves.——*Obligatio (ſervorum ſcilicet) ex pacto oritur; pactum autem, niſi Fide habitâ, nullum eſt, ut patet*, i. e. "The Obligation of Slaves ariſes from Compact: "Now a Compact is nothing, unleſs there be a previous Confidence, an "antecedent Truſt ſuppoſed," and, that, this is his Opinion, appears from his Book *De Cive*, Chap. 2. Sect. 9, where he has defined *(pactum eſſe promiſſum ejus cui creditur)* "a Compact to be the Promiſe of him, in whom the "Confidence the Truſt is placed." *Cum Beneficio, ergo, Vitæ condonatæ, Conjuncta eſt Fiducia, qua Dominus eum in corporali Libertate relinquit, ita ut niſi interveniſſent Obligatio & Vincula practica, non modo aufugere, ſed etiam Dominum Conſervatorem Vitæ, ejus Vitâ ſpoliare poſſit*, i. e. "with the "Obligation or Benefit therefore of a Life beſtowed, given, pardoned, "there is mixed a Confidence, a Truſt; by which Confidence or Truſt, "the Tyrant leaves his Slave to the Freedom of his bodily Liberty, ſo that, "unleſs Obligation and practical Chains Bonds Links Compulſions do not

not interpoſe; this "Villain of a Slave may, not only run away, but alſo, "murder the Lord and Preſerver of his *Liberty*, *Life*, &c." Of the ſame black Stamp, is, what, Mr. *Hobbes* ſubjoins, in the 9th Sect. of this ſame Chapter; where, explaining the Methods purſued in procuring to Slaves their Freedom from Bondage, He, at the Cloſe of all, couragiouſly inſiſts upon it.——*Servum, qui in Vinculum Conjicitur, vel quoquo modo, Libertate corporali privatur, alterâ illâ Obligatione practicâ liberari.* i. e. "That, the "Slave who is loaded with Irons, or who, after any other Manner, is de"prived of his Corporal Liberty, is diſengaged from his Condition of the "practical Obligation."——And then he goes manfully on, "Becauſe, no "Compact ſubſiſts, unleſs Credit be given to the Compactor, the Con"tractor, the Engager; neither can there be any Violation of the Condi"tion, where ſuch a Credit, ſuch a Confidence, ſuch a Fidelity is not firſt "ſecured." *Non enim (inquit) exiſtit pactum niſi ubi paſciſcenti creditur, nec violari poteſt Fides quæ non ſit habita.* Nay——And——who could imagine it? Mr. *Hobbes*, ſtill with a more bare-fac'd impudent Arrogance, tells us in the 4th Section of this very Chap. "That (*Servos, ſi Carceribus aut Vinculis cohibentur, nihil facere contra Leges naturales, ſi Dominum Jum interfecerint*, i. e.) "Slaves, ſuppoſing them to be chained and impri"ſoned, act nothing againſt the Laws of Nature if they murther their Lord, Tyrant, Maſter, Baſhaw, *&c.*"

Now, all theſe bold, daring Aſſertions are introduced by Mr. *Hobbes* with this one ſingle View only, to explain the Rights of Empire, or of that natural Government acquired by main Force, by natural Strength: "Which "Government is," as he affirms, "effectually at laſt eſtabliſhed, when either "Priſoners of War, or, the conquered, or in the third Place, Perſons, diffi"dent of their own Strength, engage themſelves to the Conqueror, *i. e.* to the "ſtronger; that, then they will become his Slaves." And this is evident from the firſt Section of this very ſame Chapter *De Cive*. "And it is notori"ouſly well-known," continues our ſagacious Politician and Caſuiſt Mr. *Hobbes*), "from the moſt authentic hiſtorical Records, that, the moſt "flouriſhing Kingdoms and Empires, which now ſubſiſt, were eſtabliſh"ed upon Force and Violence." Now, in Anſwer to this Concluſion, allowing the Premiſſes true, Mr. *Hobbes*'s Principles are abſolutely deſtructive of every ſuch Government. For, ſuppoſing a Prince openly to *declare his Belief*, that ſome of his Subjects, who have ſworn to be true and faithful to him, do not appear to him ſo: Can Subjects, upon this bare Declaration, be abſolved from their Allegiance, notwithſtanding all Compacts to the contrary? Can they lawfully, and upon this Account merely, take up Arms, murther their Prince, and, not violate any one Law of Nature whatſoever? Suppoſe then, upon this *Hobbian* Scheme, a Subject impriſoned; and, that, he has either broken looſe, or, by bribing his Keepers, made an Eſcape: Is he therefore abſolved from his plighted, compacted, ſworn Allegiance? May he therefore enter into a Conſpiracy, have recourſe to armed Force, and engage in Rebellion againſt his lawful Prince—And

——all

—All this—without the leaſt Imputation of a Crime?—Now—Theſe Principles of his are ſtill, if poſſible, more pernicious and dangerous; becauſe, the Marks, whereby to know whether Princes obſerve their Compacts, are very often doubtful: Whereas, the Preſervation of their ſacred Perſons demands the beſt Security, leſt, ſuſpicious Men, who place no Confidence in Princes nor in any Child of Man, may, upon Mr. *Hobbes*'s Hypotheſis, think themſelves abſolved from their Allegiance. Let us then here, for Argument's Sake only, take *mere Confinement* or *a Privation of bodily Liberty*, as a ſufficient Mark of Diffidence, that, the Prince has not kept Faith with his Subjects (a Point, by the by, which Mr. *Hobbes* has no where proved). It frequently, indeed, happens, (and unavoidable it is) that, Witneſſes to be examined, and who are entirely innocent, muſt be kept under cloſe Confinement: And, that, other Perſons, for petty Crimes and Miſdemeanours, are laid under Bodily Reſtraints.—And yet—no ſuch Confinement can, by any Means, prove a ſure Mark of the Prince's Will to abſolve Subjects from their Allegiance ratified and confirm'd by Promiſes, Engagements, Contracts, Oaths, *&c.*

SECT. XV.

Objection. TO all the unaccountable Doctrines, hitherto advanced by Mr. *Hobbes*, he adds another which ſaps and undermines the fundamental Settlement of all Civil Societies, by informing us in his Book *De Cive*, Chap. 2. Sect. 11. (*Pacta, in quibus, paciſcentes utrinque ſibi invicem credunt, neutro quicquam ſtatim præſtante, ſi juſtus ex utrâvis Parte Metus oriatur, ne Pars altera, non ſit præſtitura quod promiſit, eſſe invalida, ſeu non obligare.* i. e.) "That, Compacts, wherein, the contracting Parties, on both Sides, credit "and believe each other, but yet, where no Performance, on either Side, is "immediately executed; that, then, there ariſes, on one Side, a juſt well-"grounded Fear, that, the other contracting Party will not perform his "Condition of the Obligation promiſed, and, therefore, that ſuch Com-"pacts are null and void, and don't oblige."

Anſwer. Now, in Anſwer, it is beyond all Diſpute true, that, theſe Compacts, upon which, Civil Society neceſſarily muſt be, according even to Mr. *Hobbes*, eſtabliſh'd, actually take Place in a State of Nature: And, that, both the contracting Parties, as well the one, who is to aſſume the Authority, and of conſequence, promiſes Protection; as the other, who promiſes Obedience, cannot, immediately at once perform their Engagements: And, it is as true alſo, that, ſome new Fear may, every now and then, ariſe in the Breaſts of the Contractors, leſt the mutual Confidence in each (and upon which they both depend) be diſappointed: And, therefore, they will imagine their Fear well grounded. And conſequently, according to Mr. *Hobbes*, their Fear is really and truly well-grounded, ſince the contracting Parties themſelves

ſelves are Judges. No Body, it is true, can compel both Parties. And, therefore, (obſerve Mr. *Hobbes*'s Concluſions) theſe Contracts are not binding; and, if ſo, the Civil Society, which, in their Opinion, ſeemed to be eſtabliſhed; (like an Houſe built upon a Sandy Foundation) drops into Ruin at once.

The ſhort Anſwer here delivered is ſufficient, becauſe, we already have, in its own proper Place, treated at large concerning the Obligation of the Laws of Nature; but, more particularly, concerning that Branch of the Obligation which regards and relates to Compacts.

SECT. XVI.

LET us then, in the next Place, proceed, to conſider Mr. *Hobbes*'s Sentiments about Oaths; which, if true, undoubtedly render the ſecureſt Settlement of Civil Society uſeleſs, of none Effect: and conſequently, in fact deſtroy all Society. Mr. *Hobbes*'s Account of Oaths conſidered.

Pray now obſerve him in his Book *De Cive*, Chap. 2. Sect. 22. where, in the Margin he has theſe Words.

(*Jusjurandum nihil Superaddit Obligationi quæ, eſt ex pacto. i. e.*)

"An Oath adds no additional Force to an Obligation grounded upon "Compact."

But,——in the next Place, pray take particular Notice, that, in the Text, in the Body of the Book, he ſpeaks ambiguouſly, and is guilty of an Equivocation. His Words, are theſe, (*Pactum Nudum non Minus Obligare, quam id, in quod Juravimus, i. e.*) "That, a bare Compact is "not leſs obligatory than the very Article which we are bound by an "Oath to perform."

Here we freely acknowledge, that, a Compact, without the Additional Obligation of any Oath as yet taken, is Binding. But——to this Conceſſion, what we likewiſe farther in the next place ſubjoin is as an undoubted a Truth; that, ALMIGHTY GOD, according to the Prayer or Wiſh of him who Swears a lawful Oath, will certainly puniſh the Violation, the Breach of our plighted Faith: And, the Reaſon is, becauſe ſuch a Violation is the Tranſgreſſion of a Natural Law, to which ALMIGHTY GOD has given this Divine Sanction for the Public Good: ——Now, this Obligation, to perform the Oath thus lawfully taken, is fully underſtood from the very Nature of Things themſelves; ſo that, there is no need for any Divine Revelation particularly, *i. e.* for any extraordinary Meſſenger, ſent on Purpoſe from ALMIGHTY GOD, to declare that any ſuch Vow as this is received and accepted by him: And yet, Juramentum eſt actus Religioſus, in quo ad Confirmandam rem dubiam, Deus, Teſtis Invocatur. *Sanderſon.*

this is what Mr. *Hobbes* would feign inſinuate. *De Cive*, Chap. 2. Sect. 12. and 13.

There ariſes however, a new additional Obligation as ſoon as the Oath is taken, becauſe then immediately an Obedience becomes due to another Divine Law: By which Law we are ſtrictly forbidden, under a new Penalty (and that the heavieſt Penalty imaginable;) to invoke raſhly in Confirmation of Falſehood the ſacred Name of ALMIGHTY GOD. ——Neither, indeed, in Contradiction to what is here ſaid, does Mr. *Hobbes*'s Exception ſignify any thing. Where he aſſerts, "that, the Man, "who in his Oath renounces the Divine Mercy, unleſs he performs "his Engagement, does not however render himſelf liable to the Pe-"nalty, becauſe he, at any Time lawfully may deprecate ſuch Pe-"nalty, let the Provocation for inflicting a Penalty be what it will, and "ſo, by this Means, if his Prayer be granted, he may receive and "enjoy forgiveneſs at God's Hands:" Whereas, the Obligation, which lies upon Mankind, is, in both Caſes, equally binding and ſtrong, as well firſt, in exerting their cloſeſt Caution, not to incur and deſerve the Puniſhment, as well as, *ſecondly*, in bearing patiently, the Puniſhment inflicted: And, this Obligation, of bearing the Puniſhment, is as equally Binding, even upon them who are left to their Liberty to deprecate ſuch a Puniſhment, whether they will deprecate ſuch a Puniſhment or no.

Theſe Preliminaries and Premiſſes, then, being well weighed, and fully conſidered, I muſt, now beſeech my Readers, to think with Attention, and, then, to determine, what one ſettled Principle of Security, has Mr. *Hobbes* left in Civil Society: Since, ſo ſtrenuouſly and with ſo much ſtudied Art, he maintains and inſiſts upon it, that, no one Tye, no one
1. Obligation is either acquired or becomes binding from Oaths.——Kings are quite deceived, are entirely impoſed upon: Laws which they enact, and which lay the Injunction upon all their Subjects to perform and keep their Oath of Fidelity and True Allegiance: All theſe Laws, I ſay, be-
2. come likewiſe, Vain, Fruitleſs and carry no Effect.——All Oaths of Secrecy adminiſtered to Privy-Counſellors, are empty and vain:—So like-
3. wiſe are the Oaths taken by the Servants of the King's Houſhold.——
4. So likewiſe are the Oaths taken by the Guards of his Majeſty's Perſon.
5. ——In ſhort, no Obligation can ariſe from Oaths, in Courts of public Juſtice, either as to Judges, Juries, Witneſſes, Evidence, Civil Officers, *&c.*

Here then obſerve, what a Miracle of a Man Mr. *Hobbes* is!——Pray, how is he ſuch a Prodigy? Why, by this his Cobb-web-thread of Reaſoning, he has freed and abſolved all Mankind, from this and all other Obligations, and at the ſame Time, by the ſame mighty Rope of Reaſoning he has utterly expelled, and quite baniſhed all Civil Government.

SECT.

SECT. XVII.

MR. *Hobbes*'s Doctrine, concerning the Origin of Civil Power, contains certain Principles (if ſuch Notions can be called Principles) evidently repugnant to, and deſtructive of the firm Stability of all Civil Government. The principal Foundation, in which Mr. *Hobbes* lays all Civil Society, is, what he terms *Societas Inſtitutiva, i. e.* a Society of poſitive Inſtitution, or Compact. As for Example, Many Perſons, frightened at each other, transfer and make all their Rights over to one (*in Unam perſonam Civilem*) Civil Perſon: As, for Inſtance, into the Hands of ſome one Man, (or Council of Men) by a Compact made and ratified with each and every one of their Fellow Citizens or Subjects, not only now exiſting, but, in future Times alſo, to exiſt. Let us look cloſer into his Scheme: "I, for Inſtance, transfer and make over all my Right to this "Perſon, upon Condition, that, you make over and transfer your Right, "to the ſame Perſon. See his Book *De Cive*, Chap. 6. Sect. 20, and "alſo his *Leviathan*, Chap. 17." When once this happy Perſon is devoted to Supreme Command and has received his Commiſſion, the Civil Society is then immediately formed.

4 Mr. *Hobbes*'s Origin of all Civil Power and Authority, is very abſurd, becauſe inconſiſtent with the firſt laſting Eſtabliſhment of it.

Mr. *Hobbes*'s Generation of a Common-Wealth, *Leviathan*, Chap. 17. Page 87.

There are two Kinds of Civil Societies; Namely,

Firſt, a Deſpotic Government, that is the Government or Authority of the Conqueror over the Conquered, whoſe Lives have been ſpared, and are termed Slaves. Secondly, a Paternal Government or the Authority of Fathers over their own Children, whom they have begotten and educated, and conſequently preſerved from that Death, which the Parent has a Right to bring upon them. Now, theſe two Kinds of Government Mr. *Hobbes* inſinuates are eſtabliſhed and conſtituted upon the very ſame Compacts. He does not mean, to be ſure, Contracts outwardly expreſſed and committed to Writing; but only, ſuch Contracts, as are tacitly implied and underſtood. And, the Foundation of this Diſtinction, is, "That Rea-"ſon does not inſtruct Conquerors, and Parents to ſpare Lives placed "under their abſolute Dominion, upon any other Conditions or Terms "than ſuch Tacit Contracts as theſe: And——the ſame Foundation of "Reaſon, commands conquered Slaves and Children gladly to embrace "their Lives, from Conquerors and Parents under theſe ſame Conditions.

Theſe, and ſuch-like Concluſions, as theſe are eaſily drawn from all that Mr. *Hobbes* advances in his Book *De Cive*, Chap. 1. Sect. 14. and Chap. 8. Sect. 1. *&c.* and Chap. 9. Sect. 2.

This whole Point, then, turns upon the Transference or Reſignation of Rights by Virtue of Compacts. Now, if we enquire into the Manner how, according to Mr. *Hobbes*, theſe Perſons originally transfer and make over their Rights, he tells us, in his Book *De Cive*, Chap. 2. Sect. 4. "That

" That the Right is then transferred, and made over, when any Perſon " declares openly, that it is not his Pleaſure to hold it any longer lawful for " him to reſiſt another, in doing any one Thing which before he had " by Right a Power to reſiſt." And, conſequently, upon theſe Principles, the Members of Mr. *Hobbes*'s Civil Society, in their Compacts and Agreements with the Perſon who is to bear the Supreme Authority, lay themſelves under this one Obligation only: That, they will not reſiſt him, let him do, or command juſt what he himſelf pleaſes, provided always that it be conſiſtent with Self-preſervation. And then from this one Principle Mr. *Hobbes* infers a very right Concluſion, *De Cive*, Chap. 6. Sect. 13. (*Obligationem ad Preſtandam Obedientiam ſimplicem, non immediate naſci e pacto quo jus omne noſtrum in Civitatem tranſtulimus. Illud ſcilicet pactum obligat, tantum ad non-reſiſtendum, non ad obediendum Imperanti*, i. e.) " That the Obligation to perform a ſimple Obedience does not ſpring " out of that Compact immediately, by Virtue of which, we transfer " all our Right over to Civil Society. Becauſe, that Compact lays the " Obligation of Non-Reſiſtance only: But not of an Active Obedience " to the Governor." Surely then, this is, a very poor Civil Authority, if, upon a bare Compact only, (which is the integral conſtituent Cauſe of it,) *No one is bound to obey but only not to obſtruct him:* Which for Inſtance, is no more, than, that, the King, ſhall not do, ſuch Things as he is able to do, and with his own Hands, or Bodily Strength. Here ſteps in Mr. *Hobbes*, and ſays, (*Ex hoc pacto, mediate naſcitur Obligatio, ad Obedientiam, Nempe, ex eo, quod, ſine Obedientiâ jus Imperii fruſtra eſſet, & per conſequens omninò Conſtituta Civitas non fuiſſet*, i. e.) " From " this Compact *Mediately*, tho' not *Immediately*, the Obligation of Obe- " dience ſprings: —— From this one Principle, namely, that, without " Obedience, the Right of Government would be an empty, vain Sha- " dow, and conſequently, not any one Inſtitution of Civil Society had " been, or ever would be, to the End of Time, eſtabliſhed.

The Concluſion, which, I think, ought rather here to be drawn, is, that, Mr. *Hobbes*'s Compact or Agreement concerning the transference of Right, (which is neither more or leſs, than the Promiſe of Non-reſiſtance;) does not ſufficiently account for, the Generation, the firſt Origin of Civil Government: Becauſe, ſuch a Right of Empire may be made over to no End or Purpoſe: So that (according even to Mr. *Hobbes*'s own Confeſſion) the Right being ſurrender'd conferred and made over, the Common-wealth or Civil Society is not eſtabliſhed. Becauſe, upon this Foundation, no Body, from hence, would be obliged and bound down to pay any Obedience to the Governor. And, therefore, upon Mr. *Hobbes*'s own Principles, the Transference of Right cannot poſſible be upon any other Terms. Becauſe the Perſon, whoſoever he is, upon whom any Right becomes transferable; is previouſly ſuppoſed capable, and endowed with a Right to accept ſuch a Transference: But every ſuch Perſon, has a Right over

all

all Perſons and Things; which Right, however he could not uſe, becauſe the other had a Right of reſiſting him: And therefore, this Obſtacle or ſtumbling Block, could be removed by Compacts only, that, ſo the Right of ruling over All, (which is a Right compatible, and coæval with every Nature) may exert its full Force and Sway, all Obſtacles being now removed, *De Cive*, Chap. 15. Sect. 5.

Let us, then, paſs by this Difficulty, and take it for granted, that, the Members of Mr. *Hobbes*'s Civil Society have firmly blended and united that Compact or Agreement, concerning the Performance of ſuch an Obedience, which is ſufficient to render the Right of Government, not intirely uſeleſs. Let us, I ſay, ſuppoſe the ſecond Compact, firmly united to their firſt Compact concerned about the Tranſlation, the Transference and Making over their Right.—Taking then the whole for granted; yet, that Civil Government is too poorly-limited and confined, which is barely *not-inſignificaut* or *nothing*. To which we alſo add, that, ſince Mr. *Hobbes* does not oblige his Subjects to any certain Meaſure or Degree of Submiſſion or Obedience to be paid to the Supreme Ruling Powers, but, ſo far only, as that, the Right of Government is not granted *entirely to no Purpoſe*; and, that, this very Right, ſuch as it is, by a Chain of neceſſary Conſequences, to be deduced from the very Compacts themſelves entered into about the transferring of theſe their Rights; The whole Determination therefore of the Queſtion is intirely left to the Compactors and Covenanters themſelves, *viz.* "What is that Obedience which neceſſarily muſt be performed, in "order, that the Right of Empire be not made over, and given up by "them for no End or Purpoſe at all." Becauſe they can beſt underſtand the End or Deſign which, they themſelves had in View, by entering into in ſuch a Covenant: Neither indeed can it be known, whether any Act be trifling and inſignificant or no, unleſs it be alſo fully underſtood what End, the Man, who deſigned it, had in View. How dangerous ſuch a Suppoſition as this is, to every well conſtituted Eſtabliſhment of Civil Government, every Man muſt unavoidably ſee. Becauſe, Subjects will moſt certainly fix Limits only to their own Arbitrary Pleaſure of Obedience, ſince (as we have before demonſtrated,) the governing Powers can only be limited and reſtrained by Laws derived from ALMIGHTY GOD: And, which cannot be altered and changed at the precarious Will and Pleaſure of Man: And, by the ſame Natural Laws alſo, Subjects muſt have been bound down to the ſtricteſt Obligation of Obedience, in all Things not prohibited or forbidden by a manifeſt clear natural Law,——From hence, the judicious Reader will obſerve, that, the direct immediate Cauſe of the Supreme Authority in every Civil Society, according to Mr. *Hobbes*, is, *that Imaginary Right over all Things*, which he ſuppoſes to have been beſtowed upon all by Nature originally, and (conſequently amongſt the reſt) upon him, to whoſe Adminiſtration, the Civil Authority is committed.

For,

For, as to the Compacts of all the Society beſides, concerning a Transference of their own Right, it is only removing ſuch an Impediment or Reſiſtance of others, whereby is reſtrained the Exerciſe of that Right commanded by Nature coeval with the firſt Exiſtence of all: For which Reaſon *Fear* is, in no other Reſpect, the Cauſe of conſtituting Civil Society than as it has forcibly obliged Mankind to the Removal of this Impediment: And, that, the Nature which Mr. *Hobbes* has aſſigned to Man (*much more ſavage than that of Brutes*) is no otherwiſe neceſſary to the Conſtitution of an *Hobbian* Common-wealth, than as it proves the Cauſe of ſuch a Fear: That is, than as it is the remote Cauſe neceſſary to remove, by Compacts and Agreements, that Reſiſtance of all the reſt, whereby the Right of Command, committed to one over all, is reſtrained and coerced.

Mr. *Hobbes* is clear and expreſs enough as to this Point; where he treats upon the original Right of puniſhing a Member of Civil Society in his *Leviathan*, Chap. 28. Page 148. *Latin* 4to. *Amſtelodami* 1670. *Jus Puniendi; quod habet Civitas, (id eſt, is qui Perſonam gerit Civitatis) fundatum non eſſe in Conceſſione, ſive gratiâ Civium. Sed, ante Civitatis Conſtitutionem, unicuique quidlibet Agendi, quod ad Conſervationem ſui videretur ipſi neceſſarium, Jus erat naturale. Atque hoc Juris, quod habet Civitas Civem puniendi, Fundamentum verum eſt.* And a little after at the ſame Page, he ſays,——*Itaque Jus illud illi non datum, ſed relictum eſt; & illi ſoli, nec Minùs integrum, quàm fuit ante Civitatis Inſtitutionem.*

Definition of Puniſhment.

I ſhall here give at large his own Words in *Engliſh Leviathan*, Page 161. Chap. 28. Of *Puniſhments* and *Rewards. A Puniſhment is an Evil inflicted by public Authority on him that hath done, or omitted that, which is judged by the ſame Authority to be a Tranſgreſſion of the Law; to the End, that the Will of Men may thereby the better be diſpoſed to Obedience.*— "Before," Says Mr. *Hobbes*, "I infer any Thing from this Definition, "there is a Queſtion to be anſwered of much Importance; which is, by "what Door, the Right or Authority of puniſhing, in any Caſe, came "in. For by that which has been ſaid before, no Man is ſuppoſed bound "by Covenant not to reſiſt Violence; and, conſequently, it cannot be in-"tended that he gave any Right to another, to lay violent Hands upon his "Perſon in the making of a common Wealth, every Man giveth away the "Right of defending another; but not of defending himſelf." Alſo he "obligeth himſelf to aſſiſt him that hath the Sovereignty in the puniſhing of "another, but of himſelf not. But to covenant, to aſſiſt the Sovereign in "doing hurt to another, unleſs he that ſo covenanteth, have a Right to do "it himſelf, is not to give him a Right to puniſh. It is manifeſt there-"fore, that the Right which the Common-Wealth (that is, he or they that "repreſent it) hath to puniſh, is not granted on any Conceſſion or Gift of "the Subjects.——But, I have alſo ſhewed formerly, before the Inſtitu-"tion of a Common-Wealth, every Man had a Right to every Thing, and

"to

" to do whatſoever he thought neceſſary to his own Preſervation; ſubduing, " hurting or killing any Man, in order thereunto. And this is the Foun- " dation of that Right of puniſhing, which is exerciſed in every Common- " Wealth. For the Subjects did not give the Sovereign that Right; but " only, in laying down theirs, ſtrengthned him to uſe his own, as he " ſhould think fit, for the Preſervation of them all: So that it was not " given but left to him, and to him only; and (excepting the Limits ſet " him by natural Laws) as intire, as in the Condition of meer Nature; and " of War of every one againſt his Neighbour."

Here then it is evident to a Demonſtration, that, in this Authority, there is both a Power of annexing Sanctions to a Law, and alſo of putting theſe Sanctions into Execution, as alſo of declaring and waging War, and conſequently, that there are comprehended under this Authority, all the Nerves, Sinews, and Energies of Empire and Government.

Now, pray what other is all this, than ſaying that the Rights of every Government may be overturned by all thoſe Arguments, which overturn the Right of All over All? And this one Aſſertion, without any more, involves Mr. *Hobbes* in infinite Contradictions. And, what is all this more than what we have already demonſtrated, to be an Aſſertion grounded upon no Reaſon or Foundation at all, in our firſt Chapter? What, I ſhall only farther add here, is that,——according to Mr. *Hobbes*'s Principles, every Enemy or Invader of another's Dominion, Rights and Properties, has an equal Right to murder, kill, deſtroy lawful Princes; and, by ſuch a Power as Mr. *Hobbes* gives to Princes, whereby, they lawfully may puniſh their rebellious Subjects; which is the very Article, the very Point, which makes Subjects more careleſs in defending, protecting and guarding their own Princes from the Violence, the Invaſion of Enemies: Which, in plain *Engliſh*, is this, *viz. An Enemy by Right is an Invader, becauſe he has a Right to all Things. And alſo a King has a Right to puniſh a Rebel,* becauſe *in a State of Nature he has a Right to all Things,* and becauſe that *this Right ſtill remains with him.*——Nay——even, upon Mr. *Hobbes*'s own Confeſſion; becauſe, a Subject by Rebellion becomes a public Enemy; becauſe, every public Enemy has an original natural Right of puniſhing, according to his own arbitrary Will and Pleaſure, every Perſon, equal to the Right of any Prince: From hence, therefore, it follows, that, every Rebellious Subject, even from his very Rebellion, has the very ſame Right of puniſhing, according to his own arbitrary Will and Pleaſure, his Prince; which, the Prince has of puniſhing any of his Subjects, let the Enormity of the Crimes committed be what it will.

SECT.

SECT. XVIII.

ALL thoſe Privileges which Mr. *Hobbes*, under the Title of Rights, aſcribes to ſupreme Power and Authority, (much beyond what the other Writers upon Civil Government have done) neceſſarily weaken and diminiſh the Strength and Stability of Civil Societies; ſuppoſing theſe Privileges exerciſed and reduced into Practice: And they are only ſuch Privileges, as he, in ſome other Parts of his Writings, has flatly, and in plain Words, denied to belong to Princes: Whence we ſuſpect, and with no leſs than Reaſon, that, no other Motive than that of mere Flattery put him upon writing at firſt ſuch fulſome Stuff.——I will produce here two Inſtances, and very ſignificant Inſtances they are, to my preſent Purpoſe.

1. The firſt is, the Right or Privilege which he aſcribes to Princes of determining by their own arbitrary Will and Pleaſure (and that according to the Laws of Civil Society) what belongs to *SELF*, and what to *others*, i.e. *meum* and *tuum*; or *Property*; as alſo, of determining, as they pleaſe, what is *Juſtice* and *Injuſtice*, *Honeſt* or *Decorum* and *Diſhoneſt* or *Indecorum*; and *laſtly*, what is Good and Evil.——And,

2. The ſecond is, that he leaves Princes abſolutely free from all the Obligation which, Compacts and Agreements can poſſibly lay upon them. To make out the firſt of theſe two Inſtances obſerve what he ſays in his Book *De Cive*, Chap. 12. Sect. 1. *Quod Legiſlator præceperit id pro bono, quod vetuerit, id pro Malo habendum: Is Autem Legiſlator eſt qui in Civitate, ſummum habet imperium*, i. e. "whatſoever a Law-giver commands "muſt be eſteemed, looked upon, and received as Good: Whatſoever he "prohibits or forbids, muſt be looked upon and avoided as Evil.——And a little after, he ſays (*Ante—imperia, Juſtum & Injuſtum non extitere, ut quorum Natura ad Mandatum eſt Relativa; Actioque omnis ſuâ Naturâ eſt Adiaphora*, i. e.)—"Before the firſt Inſtitution of any Civil Government, "Juſt and Unjuſt, had not any Exiſtence, that the Nature of both carries "a neceſſary Relation to, and is in inſeparably connected with, a poſitive "Command: And, that, every human Act is, in its own Nature indif-"ferent as to Virtue and Vice, Good and Evil." In his Book *de Homine*, Chap. 13. Sect. 9. He ſays, *Niſi in Vitâ Civili Virtutum & Vitiorum communis Menſura non invenitur, quæ alia eſſe non poteſt præter unius cujuſque Civitatis Leges. Nam, Leges (inquit) Naturalis conſtitutâ Civitate, Legum Civilium fiunt Pars.* From hence, in the next Place, he defines that to be a *Peccatum quod quis fecerit, omiſerit, dixerit vel voluerit contra Rationem Civitatis*, i. e. *contra Leges Civiles*, *De Cive*, Chap. 14. Sect. 17. *i. e.* "Excluſive of Civil Society, the common Meaſure whereby to regu-"late Virtue and Vice is not to be found. Which Meaſure or Rule can-"not be any other than the poſitive inſtituted Laws of every one particu-

lar

" lar Civil Community: For, the Laws of Nature, ſays he, in an eſta-
" bliſhed Civil Society, become Part of the poſitive inſtituted Laws." He proceeds in the next Place to his Definition of an Offence. " An *Of-*
" *fence* is, Whatſoever any Perſon has committed or omitted by Word or
" Will, ſaid or willed againſt the Reaſon, the Senſe of the Civil So-
" ciety: That is, againſt the poſitive inſtituted Laws of the Com-
" munity. *De Cive*, Chap. 14. Sect. 17.

There are numberleſs other Paſſages likewiſe, in Mr. *Hobbes*'s Writings, which inculcate the ſame Doctrines and Opinions, particularly where, in his Book *De Cive*, at the End of *Chap.* 6. *Sect.* 9. He ſubjoins, *Leges Civiles eſſe ejus, qui, in Civitate, ſummâ præditus eſt Poteſtate, de Civium futuris Actionibus, Mandatâ*, i. e. " That, the Laws in Civil Society, of
" Right belong to him, and to him only, who, in the Common-wealth is
" endowed and intruſted with the ſupreme Authority, as this Authority is
" employed and exerciſed in commanding the future Acts of the Subjects," under ſo ſupreme and abſolute a Governour.——All he ſays only amounts to thus much.——" Whatſoever this ſo ſupreme a Magiſtrate commands,
" notwithſtanding his Command be the immediate Effect of ſome ſudden
" Guſt of Paſſion: And, notwithſtanding, that ſuch a Command makes
" the Act commanded a practical Contradiction againſt the ſober delibe-
" rate written Laws of the very ſame ſupreme Commander: Yet, that, ſo
" ſudden a Command as this becomes an immediate Law, and the only
" diſtinguiſhing Characteriſtic of *Honeſt*." For, he inſiſts upon it, that,
" *Laws publiſhed* ariſe from him only, who holds the Supreme Command
" or Civil Authority." And he likewiſe inſiſts upon it farther, that,
" theſe Laws publiſhed, cannot, with any Degree of Accuracy and Phi-
" loſophical Exactneſs, be underſtood and known, unleſs they are taught
" by thoſe very Perſons who had them from the very Mouth of ſupreme
" *Leviathan* himſelf. *See his Book* De Cive, Chap 24. Sect. 13."

Let us then apply thoſe Laws to particular Caſes, that is, let us apply them to arbitrary Commands, becauſe, hereby, in a clearer Form of Expreſſion, we may judge and determine according to Laws (as at the End of the ſame Section he informs us) whether any ſuch arbitrary Command be enjoined by the mighty *Leviathan* himſelf: Or, by any other Perſon deriving under his ſupreme Authority, to whom is delegated this Power of either publiſhing or interpreting theſe Laws. Such a Privilege then of Supreme Civil Governours is (may I, be allowed to uſe ſo much Freedom of Expreſſion) very extraordinary, which, Mr. *Hobbes* from hence endeavours to deduce: A Privilege indeed, I ſay, *very extraordinary*: That, Princes cannot poſſibly err, and, conſequently, that, they never are with any Juſtice blameable. And, pray, from whence does this Infallibility proceed? Why, truly, Princes are not ſubject to the poſitive Laws of Civil Society. For, no one can be bound down by any one Obligation to himſelf. *See De Cive*, Chap. 12. Sect. 4. And, conſequently, Princes cannot invade the

Right of any other; ſince from their own arbitrary Will, (which is the one only Law of Civil Society) it comes to paſs, that, whatſoever they have willed to be their own, is their own: Neither can they tranſgreſs any Rule of *Honeſty* or *Decorum*: Becauſe, whatſoever they are pleaſed to determine *Diſhoneſt*, or *Indecorum* is ſo, and nothing elſe; and therefore they prohibit and forbid it: But, they cannot lay any Prohibition upon themſelves: For, this would be as abſurd, as to ſay, that any Perſon can be tied down by any Obligation to himſelf. Mr. *Hobbes* here, with no ſmall Art and Subtilty, maintains, that, Governours are not bound by the Laws of Civil Society: Becauſe there are (as indeed there are) many Laws enacted in Civil Society, which are enacted purely for the Obedience of Subjects, and, therefore, ſuch Laws can oblige Subjects only. And he goes on to ſtretch this Point farther, and inſinuates ſomething ſtill more myſterious. "That, Princes are not laid under any Obligation of Duty; "either by the Laws of Nature or of Divine Revelation." For, without Reſerve, he tells us more than once, that, *the Laws of Nature, properly ſpeaking, are not Laws*: And, therefore cannot, as ſuch, truly lay an Obligation further than as they are conſidered conſtituent Parts of the Laws of Civil Society, (as we have already ſhewn).

Syllogiſm Major Propoſition.

Minor Propoſition.

But it is impoſſible that any Law of Civil Society can oppoſe the Laws of Nature. *See his Book De Cive*, Chap. 14. Sect. 10.——And pray obſerve what is moſt extraordinary: Mr. *Hobbes* lays the two Premiſſes of his Syllogiſm, but leaves the Concluſion at the Pleaſure of him who will collect it: *The ſupreme Civil Authority, therefore, is not bound by the Laws of Civil Society.*——Again, *the Precepts of the ſecond Table of the Decalogue are the Laws of Civil Society.* (*See his Book De Cive*, Chap. 14. Sect. 9. Chap. 6. Sect. 16. Chap. 17. Sect. 10.) *The ſupreme Civil Authority, therefore, is not obliged to obey the Precepts of the Decalogue:* And——which Precepts [of the Decalogue] really and truly are the Laws of Nature. In other Places of his Writings Mr. *Hobbes* tells us, over and over again: "That all holy Scriptures, from Beginning to Ending, are "no otherwiſe Laws, than as they are aſſumed and taken into an inſtituted "Law, which may be altered and changed at Pleaſure." And, conſequently, that, the ſupreme Civil Authority cannot be bound down to any Obligation by the Laws and Precepts of Scripture. *See his Leviathan*, Chap. 33. Upon theſe Grounds and Reaſons then to be ſure, from his profound Veneration for Governours, Mr. *Hobbes* has been, miraculouſly careful to render them entirely inculpable, quite incapable of receiving the leaſt juſt Imputation of Blame: Notwithſtanding that, ſuch blameleſs innocent Princes, are in the Opinion of Mankind, enormouſly-wicked Monſters.——Nay——his Caution and Complaiſance are ſo wonderful, that theſe his *Leviathans* are made moſt perfect and compleat in Juſtice and Piety!——And——pray—why? why, becauſe the Acts of theſe high and mighty Perſonages will be always conformable to their own Arbitrary Will: And, conſequently

See Chap. 1. Sect. 2. Page 32.

Conſequent.

Concluſion.

Enthymem. Antecedent.

quently, all their Acts and Behaviour conſiſt and agree with this one infallible Rule only *their own Royal Will and Pleaſure.*

Now, in my Opinion, a fouler more abominable Reproach cannot be thrown at Princes: Nothing can render them more odious to all Mankind, to all their own Subjects, to all Foreigners: And by a neceſſary Conſequence nothing more radically plucks up all the Seeds of univerſal Benevolence:——The firmeſt moſt laſting Security of all Princes, Governours and Crown'd Heads.——We muſt own indeed, that this noble frank open Apology, which Mr. *Hobbes* makes for Crown'd Heads, fully admits all thoſe Crimes and Enormities which the bittereſt Enemies of Civil Government and Monarchy can lay to their Charge, and Object againſt them.——As for Inſtance.——That the Actions of theſe mighty ſpotleſs Men, are, in no wiſe, governed by certain ſteddy Laws, drawn from the Nature of the beſt End, or, of Means naturally ſuited, adapted and fitted to promote this End: And, conſequently, that they are the moſt monſtrous and enormous Creatures imagineable.——In all theſe Conceſſions, Mr. *Hobbes* openly and plain enough tell us, that he cannot better vindicate them from the Crimes laid to their Charge, than by endeavouring to ſhew, that their Actions muſt not be tried according to any Law, either of Nature or of Scripture, in the ſame Senſe and Meaning, whereby others are ſuppoſed under the Obligation of obeying both (*i.e.* Nature and Scripture): But, on the contrary, that, all theſe Laws, both of natural and revealed Religion, muſt, with a ſweet complaiſant Compliance, ſtoop, bend and bow down to the Will and Pleaſure of Princes, ſo as to mean nothing but juſt what they themſelves pleaſe: And upon this ſandy Foundation only, it is, that, Princes are proved innocent and clear of all thoſe enormous Crimes, which Men of a ſeditious rebellious Spirit are apt frequently, and without Truth, to object againſt them. We muſt therefore, with certainty, conclude, That, all worthy Princes will, with Scorn and Indignation, ſpurn at ſuch a Patronage, ſuch a Protection, ſuch a Vindication, in which it is hard to ſay, whether palpable Falſehood, or bare-fac'd Inſult, againſt their ſacred Perſons, is moſt predominant. Nay——our Argument is ſtill capable of Extenſion to good Princes. For,————even, amongſt bad Princes themſelves, there is not one ſo conſummately profligate in his Mind and Manners, as not to ſubmit, as not deſire, that, certain of his Acts ſhould be examined into and tried by ſome Rule different from that of his own arbitrary Will and Pleaſure. And, therefore, upon the whole, not only all Princes, but, even, all Mankind, muſt with Scorn and Diſdain ſneer at ſo poor a Shift of an Apology as this produced by Mr. *Hobbes.*

SECT. XIX.

WE have in this Section to add, that, at the very Time, and upon the ſame Foundation of Reaſon, Mr. *Hobbes* ſo ſtrenuouſly endeavours to baniſh every Fault from Princes, he is with the moſt malicious Wickedneſs injurious to them. For, by this compleat Piece of Craft, he robs them of all Praiſe, of all Commendation due to Prudence, Wiſdom and Juſtice. Becauſe theſe Virtues, and conſequently all Virtues neceſſarily dependant upon them, are diſcerned only in ſuch Works and Operations, as are influenced by certain Laws, derived from the Nature of that Subject-Matter about which theſe Virtues are concerned. As for Inſtance, Practical Wiſdom conſiſts in that Skill and Knowledge of an End moſt worthy, from its own Nature and Dignity, of our Labour and Pains: And, in the Skill, the Sagacity of finding out and applying Means determined and ſettled by Reaſon, as Means fitteſt and moſt effectual to produce the Effect or *End* deſign'd. Univerſal Juſtice itſelf is nothing elſe than a conſtant regular Will, perfectly correſponding with the Wiſdom already deſcribed, which fully purſues an End, an Effect better and preferable to all other Ends whatſoever, *the Common Good*, as we have already demonſtrated at large.

Now, there cannot poſſibly be the leaſt Room left for any Praiſe or Commendation of Virtue as due to Princes; if, according to the *Hobbian* Doctrine, they not only act themſelves, but alſo command Acts to be performed by others, without the leaſt Regard being firſt had to the Nature of *Ends* and *Means*. No one Prince ſurely is, or can be, eſteemed either *wiſe* or *juſt*, merely becauſe he is pleaſed to do whatſoever firſt comes into his Head or Heart, and without the leaſt Regard to the Nature of GOD and *Man*, and of Things naturally created and fitted to anſwer the *Glory of one*, and *Uſe of the other*. Shou'd we conclude, that, every Act is wiſely reſolved upon as juſt and good, for no other Reaſon than the Will of a Prince, why then farewel to all Diſtinction, to all Difference, between a *Nero*, who by a Decree of the Senate was ſentenced the Enemy of all Mankind, and a *Titus*, whom the Senate decreed the Delight, the Joy, the Happineſs of Human Nature. Cou'd ſo indiſcriminate ſo jarring a Confuſion as this be ſuppoſed, all poſſible Marks of Diſtinction, as to Praiſe and Diſpraiſe, between a *Tiberius*, a *Caligula*, and the two *Antonini* (namely *Antoninus Pius*, and *Antoninus* the Philoſopher) muſt be totally eraſed. Upon an equal Footing of Reaſon, all would elicit and draw forth acts agreeable to their own Inclinations, as well as thoſe of their Prince: And, with equal Truth and Certainty, muſt, therefore, be as equally Juſt, Good and Honeſt. Human Nature is not, to be ſure, ſo ſtupidly blind as not to ſee, that, the well-being of every Common-Wealth (and, conſequently, the well-being of all Nations) is ſuch a natural Effect as cannot be produced by all the promiſcuous, indiſcriminate Acts of either Prince or People: But, that, it neceſſarily muſt be procured by ſearching out and applying (from Laws, eſtabliſhed Decrees, and the whole Adminiſtration of Political

tical Affairs) Natural Cauſes which are ſo well adapted to preſerve the Lives, Fortunes and Underſtandings of Mankind in a perfect Sound State. All theſe Cauſes are no other than Acts (as we have before demonſtrated) injoined and commanded by the Laws of Nature. As for Example: A ready, a willing Diviſion of Things, and of mutual Aſſiſtances, whereby the Neceſſaries of Life, (at leaſt of Life,) Health, and Sound Mind be made over and diſtributed to Individuals reſpectively: And, that, theſe Bleſſings be preſerved and ſecured to each inviolably: The Exerciſe of Virtue in every Kind and Degree: The Eſtabliſhment of Civil Diſcipline and Order whereſoever it is wanting: And, The Preſervation of ſuch Order and good Government as we find already eſtabliſhed. And, conſequently, from theſe eſſential Cauſes of Social Happineſs, it muſt happen, unleſs Princes and Governours ſo conſtitute their Laws, and ſo regulate all pubblic Affairs, as to make it demonſtrably appear, that they have this one End in View; And, that, they apply likewiſe the Means, in ſome Degree, either more or leſs, ſuited to, and fit for theſe neceſſary Requiſites juſt now mentioned, That, ſuch an Awe, ſuch a Reſpect as is due to Laws muſt neceſſarily be diminiſhed. For, from the Nature of Mankind, as they are Rational Beings, and endowed, more or leſs, with the Knowledge of Truth, they neceſſarily eſteem and value that one Thing only, as truely great, which appears, to be, and which really and truely in its own Nature *is Great:* And conſequently ſuch an Adminiſtration of Civil Government, as they perceive and know to be for the Public Good, (which Good, of all Effects in Human Power, is by far the greateſt. Such an Adminiſtration as this) they moſt highly eſteem and revere as of Divine Appointment. (1)

But, ſince, it is even to a Maxim true, that, theſe Perſons, on the Contrary, ſink beneath the Dignity of Vulgar Minds, who act in their more trifling Affairs without any Regard to ſome one End: Or, who, in Caſe they propoſe an End, apply Means unfit and no ways ſuitable to their Deſign, if this happens always to be the Caſe, we therefore (*a Fortiori*, from a ſtronger Force of Reaſoning) neceſſarily conclude, that, it is infinitely beneath the Dignity of Lawgivers and Princes, and, in the moſt important weighty Concerns where the whole Community is ſo cloſely intereſted, to act with an Impetuoſity abſolutely blind and headlong, quite regardleſs of the Common Safety, and of Means naturally fitted to this End. And, conſequently, Mankind cannot highly eſteem the Laws of ſuch Princes, in which they clearly perceive ſomething contrary and repugnant to the Means neceſſarily ſuited to ſuch an End. And—which Means are eſſentially comprehended in the Laws of Nature, hitherto diſcuſſed. We muſt however, at the ſame Time acknowledge, that, in thoſe

(1) *Eſteem and revere as of divine Appointment.*] See Lord *Bolingbroke*'s Letters on the Spirit of Patriotiſm. The Idea of a Patriot King. Pages 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80. *Dublin* Edition 1749. 12mo.

thoſe Caſes, where, by Acts of different Kinds, the ſame one, Good End may be obtained (which Acts are called ἀδιάφορα *adiaphori*, or indifferent,) it cannot be expected that any ſolid Reaſon muſt be aſſigned, why, one indifferent Kind ſhould be commanded rather than another, it being fully ſufficient, that, by the Method preſcribed and commanded, the End ſought may be obtained. Becauſe any ſuch Command is truly Rational: Neither is an Obedience paid to ſuch a Command leſs Rational in Matters, whether Rational or Civil. We muſt, in the next Place, moreover, acknowledge, that, it is not neceſſary to lay, before every particular Member of Civil Society, all the Grounds and Reaſons of every Law, becauſe it is fully ſufficient if the Law be not repugnant to the principal End, and to the Means neceſſarily leading to this End; or, that, in ſome way or other, either more or leſs it may conduce to them.

And, for this very Reaſon therefore, Lawgivers and Governors, generally ſpeaking, in the Preamble of each Law, recite, in few Words, the Reaſons why ſuch or ſuch a Law is enacted, purely to advance ſome one End of Public Good, and to correct the Rigour of ſome one eſtabliſhed Law, by the well known Maxims of Rational Equity (1). The ſeveral Conſtitutions

(1) *The ſeveral Conſtitutions of* Juſtinian *and* Leo, *&c.*] *Leo* V. is allowed on all Hands to have been a Prince of great Prudence and uncommon Penetration in the Management of Public Affairs. He is highly extolled by the Eccleſiaſtic Writers, on Account of his Zeal of the Purity of the *Catholic Faith*, and by them compared to the moſt Zealous and Vigilant among their Biſhops. As he was a Man of great Learning, he left ſeveral Books behind him, *viz.* A Letter to *Omarus* King of the *Saracens*, concerning the Myſteries and Truth of the Chriſtian Religion, and the Hereſies and Blaſpemies of the *Saracens:* A Book of Military Diſcipline, which has been tranſlated into *Latin*: Another on Hunting: Several Theological and Hiſtorical Tracts, ſtill to be ſeen (though ſtrangely maimed and corrupted) in the *Vatican* Library: A Circular Letter, which, in imitation of the Biſhops, he wrote to all his Subjects, encouraging them to the Practice of every Chriſtian Virtue: But, as he applied himſelf above all to the Study of the Law, he new-modelled the *Roman Juriſprudence.* His Father *Baſilius* had, in the Year 870, with the Aſſiſtance of his two Sons *Conſtantine* and *Leo*, publiſh'd an Epitome of *Juſtinian*'s *Code*, which he called *Procheiron.* This Work, which conſiſted of forty Titles, is ſtill to be found among the Manuſcripts in the *Vatican* Library. It is by ſome aſcribed to *Baſilius*, *Conſtantine*, and *Leo*, by others only to *Leo* and *Conſtantine*, and by ſome to *Leo* alone; whence *Cujacius* and other Civilians conclude it to have been reviſed by *Leo*, and brought into a better Form. *Leo*, not ſatisfied with that, publiſhed, about the Year 886, his *Baſilicæ*, divided into ſixty Books and ſix Volumes. In this great Work, the Emperor followed the Order which *Juſtinian* had obſerved in his Laws; for it was compiled from his *Code*, *Edicts*, *Novellæ*, and from the Conſtitutions of the ſucceeding Emperors down *to Baſilius*, whatever was ſuperfluous, or had been abrogated by the Cuſtom of after-times, being retrenched. The *Baſilicæ* were no ſooner publiſhed, than the Books of *Juſtinian* were quite laid aſide, both in the Schools and Courts of Juſtice. *Leo* dying, his Son *Conſtantine* reviſed and corrected the *Baſilicæ*, which had been publiſhed by his Father, and ordered them, thus corrected, to be made uſe of both at the Bar, and in the Schools. The *Baſilicæ* of *Leo* were called *Priores*, and thoſe of *Conſtantine Poſteriores*; but the latter alone were in Force, and continued to be the Foundation of the *Greek Juriſprudence* to the End of the Empire.

Univerſal Hiſtory, Vol. 6. Book 3. Chap. 34. Page 577. *Dublin* Edition 1745 in Folio. See Archdeacon *Echard*'s *Roman Hiſtory*, Volume 5. Chap. 1. Page 63. *London* Edition 1707. in Octavo. See the Appendix, No. 3. Pages 59, 60.

Conſtitutions of *Juſtinian* and *Leo* are clear Proofs of this Doctrine, as any one may obſerve, in the *Corpus Juris Civilis*,——And——which is no leſs obſerveable in almoſt all Acts of Parliament, enacted in theſe Realms. Now, whoſoever the Man is, who, in flat denial of all theſe well-known Truths, avowedly over and over aſſerts, (which Mr. *Hobbes* with no ſmall Aſſurance has done) that, every Act becomes either *Good* or *Evil*, merely becauſe it is ſo commanded by the Civil Magiſtrate, or by ſome inſtituted Law, neceſſarily involves himſelf in many Contradictions: Such as, 1. That, Acts, which, from the very Nature of them, are moſt beneficial to Mankind, contribute nothing to Public Social Advantage. And, 2. That the Good Effects naturally conſequent upon ſuch Acts, cannot, from any previous Knowledge, be comprehended, even by Law-Givers themſelves: And therefore, all this Kind of *Hobbian* Politics, not only renders the Government of Princes abſolutely Wild and Brutal, but, the Obedience of Subjects as Wild and Brutal alſo. Each of theſe Doctrines is an equal Reproach reſpectively to both Prince and People, and threatens the ſure Deſtruction of all Civil Society. Becauſe, if every Thing that is Good aſſumes the Nature of Good from the mere Will and Pleaſure of the Prince only, why then all Advice, of the wiſeſt Politicians, of the ableſt Stateſmen for the Security and Preſervation of Civil Society, becomes abſolute vain and inſignificant; ſince *all Means*, neceſſary to this *Great End*, depend merely upon the Will, the Pleaſure,—the Command of the Prince only.——And, from hence alſo theſe farther Abſurdities follow, that, the very ſame Authority which can communicate the Nature of Good to Human Acts, can alſo communicate to them, any and all Degrees of Good: From whence follows ſtill a groſſer Abſurdity: That, this ſame *Leviathan*-Will of a Prince renders, upon his bare Word of Command, all Acts whatſoever, beſt and moſt prefective of Good to the Commonwealth. The Prince, who can vainly imagine his own Command ſo powerfully-operative as to create every Social Good and every Social Evil, muſt diſdain to conſult with the Wiſe and Experienced, as being of no Moment. Becauſe, he certainly will determine each Command of his own the beſt, altho' it be in itſelf as hot, raſh and giddy as poſſible. Whereas, every Prince, by an Experience too too dearly purchaſed, will ſurely find, that, Mr. *Hobbes*'s Political Maxims muſt whenever he draws them into Execution, bring final Ruin both upon himſelf and his People.

SECT.

SECT. XX.

The Powers and Prerogatives, which Mr. *Hobbes* aſcribes to Princes renounced by themſelves

BUT, there is alſo a very particular Reaſon, why, this *Hobbian* Doctrine is ſo very pernicious to Princes: Becauſe the ſame Motive which provokes them to Raſhneſs, takes away from them at the ſame Time all Expectation of correcting any Error; if ſo it ſhould happen, that any Thing be enacted in theſe Laws, which, perhaps, thro' Human Frailty, is not ſo perfectly right. For, Mr. *Hobbes* utterly baniſhes any Rule, any common Meaſure of Good, except that only of an arbitrary Will in Governours themſelves, and conſequently he has left nothing to correct *this Will*, in Caſe it happens to deviate and go aſtray. Now, in flat Contradiction to all theſe Doctrines of Mr. *Hobbes*, we muſt obſerve, if we look abroad at all, that, Civil Societies and Princes every where do, in their *Subſequent Laws* ingenuouſly acknowledge, that, they obſerve many Things, not ſufficiently provided againſt and remedied in their Laws of a *prior Date and Eſtabliſhment:* And alſo, that, there are many Things, as they learn from Experience, of little or no Uſe to the Public, which, perhaps, in Time paſt, they imagined extremely beneficial to Society, and conſequently they, with Candour and Openeſs, declare, that, they find, from the very natural Effects of human Acts themſelves, what Acts prove publickly Uſeful or Good; and, that, they cannot, with all their Power and Authority, make all Acts which they think proper to authorize and command *Good*.

To this one Origin we owe, all that Amendment of Laws inſtituted by Civil Society, and of judiciary Decrees eſtabliſhed upon them, by Maxims of Equity, Good Conſcience and the well-known Rules of the Laws of Nature. Now, there could not poſſibly be the leaſt Room left for any ſuch wholeſome Amendments, for any ſuch wiſe Corrections, if either the Law of Civil Society only, or the Will of a Prince (ſignified publicly by Marks and Tokens of Law) was the Rule of all Morality and of all moral Acts: Becauſe, it is an undoubted Truth, that, no Civil Society, *no not one*, can poſſibly ſubſiſt long, wherein there is not a diſcretionary Power left, and Rational Allowances made, for ſuch equitable Amendments and Alterations in arbitrary inſtituted Laws. And, conſequently, in all Civil Societies, of which I have hitherto heard, many Points are left to the Determinations and Deciſions of Equity and Good Conſcience.—— And, concerning which there is not the leaſt tittle mentioned in the expreſs Letter of the Laws poſitive and written. And, therefore, for this very Reaſon, the Privilege which Mr. *Hobbes* allows to Princes, is every where rejected and renounced even by Kings themſelves.

Laſtly,

Laſtly, Mr. *Hobbes*, even the great Mr. *Hobbes*, contradicts himſelf in this very Point, becauſe he, in ſome other Paſſages of his Writings, baniſhes al thoſe Privileges from Civil Societies, in which, not long before, he had ſo amply indulged them. Thus for Inſtance, in his Book *De Cive*, Chap. 6. Sect. 13. after having produced one particular Example concerning iniquitous wicked Commands, in which, he denies that, the Subject is obliged and tied down to pay any Obedience to the Civil Community: (as if a Perſon ſhould, for Inſtance, be commanded to kill either himſelf or his Governour, or his Parent) he then adds as follows. (*Multi alii ſunt caſus, in quibus (cum Mandata aliis quidem factu inhoneſta, aliis autem non ſunt,) Obedientia ab his præſtari, ab illis Negari jure poteſt: atque id, Salvo jure, quod imperanti Conceſſum eſt abſolutum. Nam illi, in nullo caſu, jus adimitur eos interficiendi qui obedientiam Negabunt. Cæterum, qui ſic interficiunt, et ſi jure conceſſo ab eo qui habet, tamen eo jure, aliter atque recta ratio poſtulat, utentes, peccant contra leges Naturales; id eſt, contra Deum*, i. e.) " There are many other Caſes, in which (when the Things " commanded become indeed baſe and diſhonourable as performed by " ſome, but are yet quite contrary Acts, as performed by others) " in theſe Caſes, I ſay, an Obedience to Commands may juſtly be " paid by ſome, and as juſtly may be refuſed by others, and all " this perfectly conſiſts with that Right, which, in the Supreme Ci- " vil Magiſtrate or Commander, is allowed to be abſolute: For, from " him, in no Caſe whatſoever, can be taken away his Right of killing " and deſtroying thoſe who will refuſe an Obedience to him. But—— " they, who at their Pleaſure kill and ſlaughter, altho' the Right ſo to " do be derived upon them by him who has ſuch a Right, yet, if they " uſe this their Authority, in a Manner different from the Laws of Right " Reaſon, they ſin againſt the Laws of Nature, that is, they ſin againſt " GOD." In theſe Words I obſerve, Firſt, That, according to Mr. *Hobbes*'s own Confeſſion, there are ſome Things, which, with reſpect to ſome Perſons, are unjuſt and diſhoneſt, and yet, are Things commanded by the Will of a Supreme Authority, *i. e.* by ſome Law of Civil Society, and if ſo, from hence it muſt follow, that, the poſitive Law of a Civil Society is not the only one Meaſure or Rule of *Unjuſt* and *Diſhoneſt*: And yet, this is a Doctrine inculcated by Mr. *Hobbes*, in ſome other Parts of his Writings. I obſerve, Secondly, That, Mr. *Hobbes* ſometimes allows, that, Civil Governours, when they puniſh Subjects diſobedient to their Laws, may ſin againſt Right Reaſon, againſt the Laws of Nature, and againſt GOD: And, yet, in other Parts of his Writings, he teaches us, that, their Commands cannot poſſibly contradict the Laws of Nature, by Virtue of ſuch Compacts, touching Obedience, which Subjects enter into, as are guarantied, ratified, and which, they confirm and ratify by the moſt ſolemn Engagement. *De Cive*, Chap. 4. Sect. 10.

Thirdly, Mr. *Hobbes* involves himſelf in a Contradiction, by ſaying, that Governours can exert an Authority contrary to what right Reaſon directs.

For, no one Perſon has a Right of acting contrary to Right Reaſon, Becauſe, *Right*, according to Mr. *Hobbes* own Definition, is, *That Liberty which every Perſon has of uſing his own Natural Faculties, Powers and Abilities, according to Right Reaſon.* See his Book *De Cive*, Chap. 1. Sect. 7. And yet, in other Parts of his Writings, as for Inſtance, *De Cive*, Chap. 7. Sect. 14. he tells us, that, *Supreme Civil Authority err's in many Reſpects againſt the other Laws of Nature, as in Cruelty, Iniquity,* (i. e. *Wrong and Oppreſſion) contumely,* (i. e. *Diſdain, Contempt, Arrogance*) *and in ſeveral other Vices, which do not fall ſo immediately under the Interpretation of an Injury in a ſtrict Acceptation of the Term,* i. e. *are not Violations of, or Encroachments upon, Agreements and Compacts.*

But, concerning this laſt mentioned Crime, we ſhall enquire more particularly hereafter. My only Remark here, is, that, Mr. *Hobbes* acknowledges the Will of thoſe, inveſted with a Power of enacting Laws, capable of being corrupted: From whence it follows, that, Mr. *Hobbes* even himſelf preſcribes ſome certain Rule of Acting, even to Governours themſelves, and conſequently that, he does not looſely leave all Things to their own abſolute Will and Pleaſure.

From hence then we juſtly and fairly conclude, that, Subjects of Civil Society are bound down by an equally-ſtrong Obligation to the Laws of Nature: And, conſequently, that, all their Acts and Modes of Behaviour are not arbitrarily left to the Will and Pleaſure of Civil Magiſtrates; unleſs that, ſuch Subjects voluntarily ſin againſt GOD in order to obey Man.

Now, beyond all Queſtion, Mr. *Hobbes* has acknowledged thus much, when he comes to treat upon the Duties due to Man: And, the Conceſſions he makes are much of the ſame Nature, in thoſe Duties which natural Reaſon preſcribes and commands, when he talks upon the Worſhip and Obedience due to ALMIGHTY GOD. For, in his Book *De Cive*, Chap. 15. Sect. 18. after he has informed us, that, we are to pay Obedience to a Civil Authority commanding the Worſhip of GOD, under a Repreſentation or Image, (which, in plain Words, is commanding Idolatry) and many other the groſſeſt Abſurdities; he then freely owns that ſuch Commands as theſe may and can be againſt right Reaſon, and, conſequently, are Sins and Impieties in thoſe who command them: And *De Cive*, Chap. 14, Sect. 10. he acknowledges, that, Civil Societies, with reſpect to GOD, are not (*ſui Juris*, i. e.) left to their own Arbitrary Will, neither can they be ſaid to enact Laws to the Diſhonour and Indignity of ALMIGHTY GOD.

From whence I conclude, that the Reaſon of a Civil Society is not always *Right Reaſon*, and, conſequently, that, it cannot always be the Rule and Meaſure of *Good, Honeſt and Juſt.* But, that, this *Civil Reaſon* (if I may venture

venture ſo to call it) is then, and only then, *Right, when it is conformable to the Nature of Things*, i. e. to the true Nature of *Acts, upon which, this Civil Reaſon declares or pronounces.* And, for this very Reaſon, therefore, it neceſſarily follows, that, Mr. *Hobbes* contradicts himſelf, when, in ſome other Paſſages, as for Inſtance, *De Cive*, Chap. 14. Sect. 17. He defines, *A Crime to be nothing elſe than, whatſoever is contrary to the Reaſon of Civil Society.*

SECT. XXI.

Mr. *Hobbes*'s Aſſertion that Kings and Rulers are not bound by Compacts confuted.

BUT——there ſtill remains a ſecond Inſtance of a monſtrous *Leviathan Power*, which Mr. *Hobbes* allows and gives to Civil Societies, —Power leſs extenſive than the former, and yet, comprehended under it: However, ſince Mr. *Hobbes* has taken the Conſideration of *this ſo extraordinary an Authority* under a ſeparate View: And, becauſe this Doctrine of his ſeems to labour under very ſingular Abſurdities, I ſhall therefore take a diſtinct View of it. His Poſition is, "That thoſe Ma-"giſtrates who hold the Supreme Authority, in every Civil Society, are not "accountable to any, from Obligation, Contract, or Agreement." Our Buſineſs therefore in Confutation of this Doctrine here ſhall be to demonſtrate, that, the Authority allowed under the Notion and Definition of Right to theſe mighty Rulers and Governours, in Fact both leſſens and deſtroys their very Power and Authority: And, that, Mr. *Hobbes*, even in this material Point, upon which ſo much of, if not all, his Syſtem depends, is quite inconſiſtent with himſelf. This Doctrine Mr. *Hobbes* aſſerts under general Terms in his Book *De Cive*, Chap. 7. Sect. 14. And this general Poſition of his is deduced from what he ſays, *De Cive*, Sections 7, 9, 12 of the ſame Chapter, in which Paſſages he ſpeaks concerning ſuch Compacts, Covenants and Agreements only, as Civil Governours enter into with their own Citizens or Subjects, to which Compacts, Covenants and Agreements he abſolutely denies, that, the ruling Powers can be laid under the leaſt Obligation: And from hence he concludes, that, they cannot poſſibly commit the leaſt Injury againſt their Subjects. This favourite Maxim is, beyond all peradventure, a Creature of his own Invention. *Epicurus*, from whom Mr. *Hobbes* extracted almoſt all his other Opinions, altho' he has to the beſt of his Skill much enervated and weakened the other Branches of Juſtice, and robb'd them of any other Force or Sanction, than ſuch as is derived from a Fidelity to, and to an Obſervance of, poſitive Compacts, is, however, willing to leave this one Branch of Juſtice firm and unſhaken.

Let us here then examine the Foundation upon which Mr. *Hobbes* builds his new *Paradox*; and which, we are to take from his Book, *De Cive*, Chap. 7. Sect. 7. Where, he has advanced it as a Doctrine that the People cannot

be tied by an Obligation to any one Perſon of the whole Civil Community.

For, the ſeveral Kinds of Supreme Power, *i. e.* The whole Court of Nobility, even Monarchy itſelf, according to the *Hobbian* Doctrine, derive all their Rights from the People: And, conſequently, both Nobles and Monarchs are abſolved from the Obligation of Compacts, and——if ſo——the People is abſolved and ſet at Liberty. This Doctrine is ſo very extraordinary that I ſhall ſet it down in Mr. *Hobbes*'s own Words. *Poſtquam Civitas conſtituitur, ſi Civis cum Populo paciſcitur fruſtra eſt, quia Populus Voluntate ſuâ Voluntatem Civis illius (cui ſupponitur obligari) complectitur, ideoque liberare ſe poteſt Arbitrio ſuo, & per Conſequens, jam Actu eſt Liber*, i. e. "As ſoon as the Civil Society is once form'd ſettled and "eſtabliſhed, if one Member, of the Civil Society thus entered into and "conſtituted, agrees and bargains with the People, ſuch an Agreement is "null and void, becauſe the People comprehends and contains in their "own Will the Will of any ſuch Civil Perſon or Member, to whom the "People is ſuppoſed to be bound under to an Obligation; and, therefore, "the People can free and ſet themſelves at Liberty from any ſuch Obliga-"tion at their own arbitrary Will and Pleaſure: And, conſequently, are "actually free the very inſtant they enter into any ſuch Engagement." The whole Strength then of all this Reaſoning is eſtabliſhed upon this one Point, namely, that, becauſe any Member of Civil Society has a Power of diſengaging whomſoever he will from the Performance, from the Obligation of ſuch Compacts as are entered into with himſelf, by renouncing and diſclaiming his own Right, he transfers and gives up all his own Rights to the People: And, if ſo, the People can free and diſengage themſelves from their Compacts and Agreements, and, conſequently, what, they can do, they certainly will do.

1. Now in Anſwer to all this ſpecious Reaſoning, We ſay, In the firſt Place, That it cannot, upon any Foundation of Reaſon, poſſibly be proved from the Nature and Conſtitution of Civil Society, that, the future Members ſhall and will conſent and give up even as much as this to the People, ſo as to render the People capable of freeing and diſcharging themſelves from a future Obligation of all ſuch Compacts and Engagements as they muſt enter into. Becauſe ſuch a Condition is not neceſſary towards the Conſtitution and Eſtabliſhment of Civil Government.——Nay, ſo far is the Condition otherwiſe, that, it entirely contradicts and is quite deſtructive of the fundamental End and principal Deſign of Society in General: Namely, the common Security and Happineſs of all. And yet, we acknowledge, at the ſame Time, that, the future Members of every ſuch Civil Society, can, may, and ought to renounce all right of Compulſion and Force againſt thoſe who hold the ſupreme Command. Another Obligation, however, remains in full Virtue and Force, whereby Mankind are bound down are held to keep and obſerve Compacts and Agreements entered into with the Members of Civil Society, *i. e.* The Obligation of a

Natural

Natural Law, as eſſentially flowing and ſpringing from the Divine Authority and Sanction. The Members of Civil Society can, with a ſafe Dependance, reſerve the Benefit of this Law to themſelves, and it is always to be preſumed, that they will reſerve ſuch a Benefit, becauſe it is neceſſary to the Common End deſired and to be purſued by all. It is not, indeed, in my Opinion, lawful for the Members of Civil Society to grant any Licence or Liberty to Rulers of violating any ſolemn Engagement they have entered into: Neither it is lawful for Rulers and Governors to embrace ſuch a Licence or Liberty, if offered to them, by Virtue of that indiſpenſible Obligation, which the Law of Nature carries in it, which Law being as comprehenſive as the Common Good, and authorized by ALMIGHTY GOD himſelf, the Obligation, as much as in them lies on both Sides, is, to Secure and Maintain inviolably the faithful diſcharge of Compacts and Agreements reciprocally made and entered into.

2. By Way of Reply to Mr. *Hobbes*'s Argument. In the Second Place, I Anſwer, that the Conſequence is Falſe from which infers immediately his Concluſion, *i. e.* The People can free and diſengage themſelves from all ſuch Agreements at their own arbitrary Will and Pleaſure. And therefore the People actually are free, and at Liberty. Now, that this is a falſe Concluſion is evident from hence: Becauſe, by a Conſequence as equally evident, a Propoſition, contradictory to Mr. *Hobbes*'s Concluſion, can be drawn and inferred. *E. G.* Thus, from the Obligation of Compacts and Agreements, the People cannot free and diſengage themſelves at their own arbitrary Will and Pleaſure. And, therefore, they are not actually and in Fact free.

Take this Argument then on both Sides of the Queſtion, and the Conſequence (*a poſſe ad Velle*, i. e.) from a mere Poſſibility to an active operative Will in free Agents, is by no Means concluſive.

The whole Foundation, then, upon which, according to Mr. *Hobbes*'s Principles, is firmer and more ſolid, as to the Firſt, than, as to the Second Conſequence. And it is this, Mr. *Hobbes* may preſume and take it for granted, that, the whole Race of Mankind, and conſequently Rulers and Governors themſelves, are always by a Neceſſity of Nature willing and determined to do Hurt, and bring evil upon others, provided, that, an Acceſſion an Increaſe of Power, altho' never ſo ſmall, ſhall from hence accrue to the Perſons thus willed and inclined.

But here—— let me pauſe a little,———and beſeech my Reader ſeriouſly to obſerve in how exceſſive and monſtrous a Degree does this render Governors odious and abominable to their own Subjects, and in Fact render weak and impotent all Authority over them. Why may we not alſo conclude equally, that the People will readily neglect the neceſſary Security of Civil Society, and the Members of it? becauſe they can be thus negligent: And, from hence, therefore, every Civil Society muſt in one Inſtant be

diſſolved.

diſſolved. Becauſe, " no Body " (according to Mr. *Hobbes*'s Scheme *De Cive* chap. 6. Sect. 3 & 4.) " is underſtood to have ſubmitted to Civil Govern-" ment, or to have paſſed from a State of War againſt all, ſuppoſing a ſuffi-" cient Proviſion not to have been as yet made for Self-ſecurity, ſuch heavy " Puniſhments, I mean as apparently ſhew, that, it is a greater Evil to have " Hurt, than not to have Hurt, a Member of Civil Society." A Civil Eſtabliſhment, it is true, can, at ſome times, diſpence with the Infliction of Puniſhments even upon the guilty Criminal, and yet, it is a very pernicious Doctrine from hence to conclude, that any or every Civil Society is free and diſengaged from all Obligation to inflict Puniſhments upon Tranſgreſſors.

From the two Anſwers here produced againſt Mr. *Hobbes*, it is, in my Opinion, a manifeſt Truth, that, Mr. *Hobbes* has not ſufficiently proved this Doctrine of his, ſo ſurpriſingly new, which peremptorily tells us, that, Governours are abſolutely free and diſengaged from the Obligation of Compacts and Covenants entered into and ratified with their Subjects. And, in theſe two Anſwers alſo, we have ſuggeſted ſome Points which clearly evince, how pernicious to, and deſtructive of, all Civil Society, this Doctrine advanced by Mr. *Hobbes* is. One Obſervation more, I think proper here to add: That, Empires, Monarchies and Supreme Governments can neither be conſtituted, eſtabliſhed or preſerved by Mankind, with their Reaſon and Senſes about them, without a View to ſome one End, uſeful and Common to them all: *i.e.* unleſs it be made evident, that, the Political Adminiſtration of their Affairs is undertaken as the Means of Publick Security and Happineſs: But, in a more eſpecial Manner, unleſs it proves the Safety of thoſe who are to conſtitute and ſupport ſuch an Eſtabliſhment. Every ſuch Eſtabliſhment, in as much as it is future and dependant upon the will of Governours, cannot be made conſiſtent with it ſelf by any other ways, than by the Promiſes, Compacts, Engagements, and to which we may alſo add Oaths, of the adminiſtring ruling Powers: As alſo, by a diligent watchful Care, that, all Promiſes, Engagements, Compacts and Oaths be with the ſtricteſt Truth and Fidelity executed and diſcharged. If the Obligation of Conditions be once deſtroyed by Mr. *Hobbes*, the whole Foundation of Hope is alſo quite deſtroyed, upon which, Subjects are to expect, that, Rulers will faithfully execute their Part of the Obligation: The whole Foundation likewiſe is as radically torn up, why Rulers ought to be anxious and ſolicitous about the Fidelity and Allegiance of Subjects. And, therefore, by a neceſſary Conſequence, it follows, that, the whole Reaſon is entirely deſtroyed, why Civil Government in general ſhould either be conſtituted, eſtabliſhed or preſerved: And, therefore, upon this very Account, all Civil Societies muſt neceſſarily ſink and relapſe into Nothing. And——what is ſtill more——that, Subjects may not place the leaſt Security in or Dependance upon the Words of their Governours; Mr. *Hobbes* ſubjoins, that, an Oath adds no Force to the Obligation of Compacts and

and Agreements. *See his Book De Cive*, Chap. 2. Sect. 22. And therefore, in all theſe Caſes, the Obligation of Compacts and Agreements is nothing. As for Inſtance, where Princes guarantee and promiſe, according to Mr. *Hobbes*'s commendable Scheme, the Obligation of Oaths, (as an additional Confirmation of Promiſes and Compacts at their Coronation) and their other Leagues Covenants will be nothing. Such precarious looſe Contracts as theſe render not only the Condition of Subjects to the laſt Degree miſerable, but alſo that of Princes likewiſe: And, ſuppoſing this bold Aſſertion of Mr. *Hobbes*'s own Invention true, Subjects never would think themſelves bound to their Governours by any Fidelity, any Allegiance, any Duty, any Obedience at all: Neither could Princes and Governours, by any poſſible Security, aſſure thoſe who deſerve well, that, they ſhall enjoy ſuch Rewards of their Merits as are promiſed to them.——Such Securities and Foundations as theſe, therefore, being once aboliſhed, the whole Power, the whole Authority of Princes becomes diſſolved: All the Nerves and Sinews of Civil Government are laxed and enfeebled in their Powers and Operations, by the Force and Energy of which, Governours and Governments are enabled to encourage and ſpirit up the Members of Civil Society, their Subjects, to act with the leaſt Fidelity or Courage either in War or Peace.

SECT. XXII.

Leagues and Compacts according to Mr. *Hobbes*, of different Civil Societies conſider'd.

LET us, now, in the next Place, examine into Mr. *Hobbes*'s Opinion concerning thoſe Compacts and Agreements which different Civil Societies reciprocally enter into with each other. It is eaſy to determine, from all that has been ſaid, what his Opinion concerning a State of Nature is: In which State, Mr. *Hobbes* ſtrenuouſly maintains, that, the Laws of Nature do not lay the leaſt Obligation, as to external, outward Acts. Whereas, we affirm and maintain, that, to keep Faith, or to perform Compacts and Agreements, is a Command of the Law of Nature, and, that, an external or outward Act, of ſome Kind or other, is always here neceſſarily required. Thus, for Inſtance, in his Book *De Cive*, Chap. 5. Sect. 2. He affirms, that, *in the Midſt of Arms: or, in the State of War, (i. e. in the War of every one againſt all) the Laws of Nature are abſolutely ſilent, if we attempt to make the leaſt Application of theſe Laws to external or outward Acts: And, that, ſuch a Meaſure or Rule, which is uſually obſerved in a War of Nation againſt Nation, is not to be ſo underſtood, as that they can be bound down and obliged to any Thing by the Law of Nature.*

But, here, we are to obſerve, that, in another Paſſage of his Writings, Mr. *Hobbes*, in a more open undiſguiſed Way, anſwers our Queſtion, namely, *De Cive*, Chap. 13. Sect. 7. where he ſays, *Status Civitatum inter ſe naturalis*,

turalis, id eſt, hoſtilis eſt; nequè ſi pugnare ceſſent, idcircò Pax dicenda eſt ſed Reſpiratio, in quâ Hoſtis alter, alterius Motum Vultumque obſervans, Securitatem ſuam non ex Pactis, ſed ex Viribus & Conſiliis adverſam æſtimat, atque id, Jure naturali ut Cap. 2. Art. 11. *De Cive. Oſtenſum eſt ex eo, quod Pacta, in Statu Naturæ, quoties juſtus Metus intercedit, ſunt invalida; oſtenſum eſt et in* Leviath. *Cap.* 13. *Reges inquit & Perſonæ ſummam habentes Poteſtatem, omni Tempore Hoſtes inter ſe ſunt, &c. quænam Autem ſit juſta Cauſa metuendi, ne altera Præſtitura ſit, quod promiſit, ea quæ metuit, eruit Judex, De Cive,* Cap. 2. Sect. 11.——" The State or " Condition of different Societies amongſt themſelves, is a natural, that is " to ſay, an hoſtile State; neither ſuppoſing them to hold a Ceſſation of " Arms, is their State, for this Reaſon, to be called a State of Peace, but " rather a Breathing Time, in the which one Enemy, watching the Mo- " tions and Looks of another, calculates and takes an Eſtimate of its own " Security, not from Compacts and Agreements, but, from the armed " Strength and the Stratagems of the adverſe Party, and all this, upon a " Right of Nature," as we have already proved at large in this our Book *De Cive*, Chap. 2. Article 11.

" And, upon this one Principle, that, Compacts in the State of Nature " (as often as any well-grounded Apprehenſion of Danger or juſt Fear " ariſes, intervenes, comes between,) are invalid, inſignificant, and this " Doctrine we have in the *Leviathan*, Chap. 13. Kings, he goes on to " ſay, and Perſons inveſted with the Sovereign Authority are at all " Times publick Enemies to each other, *&c.*"

Now, whatſoever proves the juſt Cauſe of Fear and Apprehenſion (leſt the other Parties engaging ſhould not perform their Promiſes) is the very Fear, the very Apprehenſion itſelf: And, therefore, muſt of Conſequence, become the Arbitrator, the Judge. The Concluſion, therefore, of theſe Poſitions advanced by Mr. *Hobbes*, is, that, every new Cauſe of Suſpicion will prove ſufficient to render null and void any Compact or Agreement of mutual Truſt, Confidence and Fidelity: As is evident, partly, from the Quotations juſt now mentioned, and partly from the 14th Chap. of his *Leviathan*; becauſe, to be ſure and beyond all Exception, there cannot poſſibly be any coercive reſtraining Power ſuperiour to, (and able to carry a Command over) both Societies, which can cauſe an effectual Security, that the one may not be impoſed upon and deceived by the other.

Upon this Foundation, and from theſe Principles, Mr. *Hobbes* has given to Princes, as often as they think fit, a Power of violating and betraying that Faith and Truſt which they have plighted to others. And, notwithſtanding, that, Mr. *Hobbes* ſeems, under the ſpecious Shew of an unbounded Liberty, to flatter and careſs Princes, yet, in reality, he greatly diminiſhes and weakens their Strength and Power; and—what is ſtill worſe, deprives them of almoſt all Manner and Sort of Security. Becauſe, there never yet was any one ſingle civil Society eſtabliſhed ſo compleatly powerful as to de-

fend

fend and ſecure itſelf againſt all the Attacks, Invaſions and Inſults of neighbouring States and Kingdoms without entering into Alliances and Confederacies of other Nations by Leagues and Covenants of Trade and Commerce, of mutual Aſſiſtances and Succours. The Truth of this Aſſertion thoſe Princes ſenſibly feel, and to their Coſt, who too frequently, and yet more precipitately, break Faith. For, it is a ſelf-evident Caſe; that, immediately, whenever ſuch Princes have violated their Leagues and Covenants with any Nation or Monarch, they find it abſolutely neceſſary to ſtrengthen themſelves by ſolemn Leagues and Covenants entered into with other People, leſt they ſhould be laid under the fatal Neceſſity of fighting alone and ſingle againſt all. And, therefore, they enter into mutual Agreements, they do not reject and trample upon all Covenants and Engagements:——Nay ——in Fact, they condemn their own Perfidy by flying for Succour and Refuge to the Fidelity and plighted Engagements of others.——And—— what we may, likewiſe, ſtill farther add: Evident General Experience fully evinces, that, all civil Societies whatſoever, do, by Vertue of Leagues and Covenants, ballance, limit, confine and circumſcribe the Powers, the exorbitant Powers of other Civil States and Kingdoms: And, it is as true alſo, upon the ſame evident Experience, that, the principal moſt eſſential Branch of Political Wiſdom conſiſts in the Knowledge of all thoſe various Ways, whereby, (upon Covenants and Agreements, Leagues and Compacts,) the Strength and Force of public Enemies may be ballanced.

Now, there could not poſſibly be the leaſt Foundation whereupon to lay theſe Political Schemes, if Compacts and Leagues, Covenants and Agreements of mutual Fidelity between different States and Kingdoms were invalid, ineffectual and without Obligation, according to that wild Doctrine of Anarchy and Confuſion contrived by Mr. *Hobbes*.

Suppoſe then, that, theſe deſtructive Principles of Politics, as true, had been taken for granted, and reduced into Practice: Our King, (*i. e.* King *Charles* the Second) when baniſhed from his own juſt and lawful Dominions, during the great Rebellion and tyrannical Uſurpation in *Great Britain*, lawfully might (I tremble at the Relation!) have been murdered by the *French*, the *Spaniards* and the *Dutch*, with whom he reſided:— Nay; ——and have ſuffered Death, notwithſtanding all the moſt ſolemn Leagues and Covenants of Amity, Friendſhip, and Protection which had not long before been entered into with the King for the Preſervation of his Royal Perſon.——But——Almighty God——Glory be to his holy Name! taught thoſe very Nations better Principles *by the Light and Laws of Nature*, ſtamped and impreſſed upon their minds, even againſt Mr. *Hobbes*, who, in thoſe very calamitous times of Rebellion and Anarchy, publiſhed, vended, uttered and diſtributed, thro' all *France* and *Holland*, this his damnable Doctrine; manfully patronizing Perfidy, Treachery, and Rebellion ſo boldly laid down and defended in his Book *De Cive*.——And this very ſame Doctrine, deſtructive of all Society and Government, he farther

vindicates and inculcates in another Book of his, written in *Engliſh*, and publiſhed at that very Time in *London*, under the Title of LEVIATHAN; or, the Matter, Form, and Power of a Common-wealth, Eccleſiaſtical and Civil. By *Thomas Hobbes* of *Malmeſbury*. *London*: Printed for *Andrew Crooke*, at the *Green Dragon* in St. *Paul*'s Church-Yard, 1651.

Laſtly, In a word, if the State of Civil Societies with each other neceſſarily be a State of Arms, of War, of Hoſtility: And, if, in ſuch a State, Violence and Treachery are the prevailing principal Cardinal Virtues, as ſet forth in Mr. *Hobbes*'s *Leviathan*, Chap. 13. Why then the plain and neceſſary Conſequences which follow are theſe, *viz.*

See the Note at Pages 104, 105, 106, &c. Chap. 1. Sect. 32. where this 13th Chapter is quoted at large.

1. There cannot poſſibly be any ſuch Thing as Trade, Commerce, Traffick, or any mutual Dealings at all, between different Nations and Kingdoms.

2. From whence it follows, that, all Nations muſt be deprived of ſeveral Bleſſings and Advantages which they at preſent enjoy.

3. No Taxes, Tributes, Subſidies, Cuſtoms and Duties could ariſe to the Crown from Commerce and Trade.

4. And of Conſequence, a moſt conſiderable Share of Riches and Treaſures, (by Means of which Crown Heads, States and Kingdoms, are now fortified and defended,) muſt ſink and be loſt.

5. No Safety, no Security could be had for Embaſſadors, Envoys, Plenipotentiaries when abroad in foreign Countries.

6. Neither, indeed, could Perſons in ſuch Stations be of the leaſt Uſe or Advantage.

7. Becauſe it could not anſwer any End or Purpoſe to enter into, and ratify, Solemn Leagues and Covenants; if, in one Inſtant, all Leagues and Covenants become invalid, ineffectual, and carry no Obligation; when ever the leaſt Suſpicion, Doubt, or Apprehenſion, ariſes concerning the Performance of the Conditions guarantied and promiſed, which is the Doctrine Mr. *Hobbes* has eſtabliſhed in the 14th Chapter of his *Leviathan*.

Theſe, truly, are the moſt Noble and Royal Privileges which Mr. *Hobbes*, out of his bountiful Generoſity and Munificence, offers to Crown Heads, theſe are the [δῶρα ἄδωρα] Gifts and no Gifts which he beſtows upon Princes. And, notwithſtanding, all his Mighty Pains for the ſake of Princes; yet, he has, in Spight of all his Art, rendered himſelf, and upon juſt Grounds, a very ſuſpicious, diſaffected Perſon: Since he openly declares himſelf, "That, what is Flattery, when applied to leſſer Perſonages, is "only Honour and Reſpect when paid to *Them*;" And his Reaſon is a fine Reaſon truly! "Becauſe, it is the diſtinguiſhing Characteriſtic, the "ſure Sign that we want, and ſtand in need of their Protection, Patro-"nage and Help." See his *Leviathan* in *Latin*, Cap. 10. Pag. 45. 4to. *Amſtel.* 1670. *Bleau.*

We cannot help, therefore, here to remark, that, to utter ſuch Falſities, as even we ourſelves do not believe, and cannot credit concerning any one Perſon whatſoever: (Provided, ſuch Falſities to ſound pompouſly, to appear grand and full of Reſpect:) is one eſſential conſtituent Ingredient of Flattery.

Princes therefore, upon ſo wild an *Hypotheſis*, may with Reaſon ſuſpect, that, Mr. *Hobbes* attributes ſuch High and Mighty Privileges to them, not from any Belief that theſe Privileges are their juſt Right, (for he often contradicts himſelf as to this Point) but from a notional grinning Reſpect; imagining that Princes are highly dignified by a fulſome Adulation, by a groſs Flattery.

SECT. XXIII.

Mr. *Hobbes*'s Notion of High-Treaſon ſpirits up Subjects to Rebellion.

THE Doctrines and Poſitions which Mr. *Hobbes* has advanced, (concerning the Crime of High Treaſon in Subjects againſt their Sovereign, in Connection with the principal and fundamental Opinions ſo peculiar to himſelf,) encourage and ſpirit up Subjects to enter into Rebellion, and, by Conſequence, openly and avowedly tend to overthrow all Civil Government. That, this is not a bold Aſſertion of our own againſt Mr. *Hobbes* and without Foundation, let us examine his Book *De Cive* chap. 14. Sect. 21, 22. Where, he tells us, "that, the Sin of Rebellion, or high Treaſon, does not tranſ-"greſs the Law of Nature, but, the Law only of Civil Society." And conſequently,——Pray, mind his Concluſion,—— "That Perſons guilty "of this Crime, are not to be puniſhed by the Right, by the Authority of "Civil Government, but by the Right the Authority of War; Not as bad "Members of Civil Society, but, as Rebels and publick Enemies to the "State." The Concluſion from hence is very natural, that a Member of Civil Society, by his Rebellion, can withdraw himſelf from, and forfeit, the State and Condition of a Subject, and alter his State into that of a publick Enemy: Or, according to Mr. *Hobbes*, *into a State of Nature.* Here then, truly, in the next Place, immediately will follow (and — let our Readers carefully obſerve, the firſt and laſt Tendency of all Mr. *Hobbes*'s Morality and Politics;) that "ſuch a Rebel as this has recover-"ed his natural Right of puniſhing even with Death that Sovereign from "whom he has revolted and fallen off: And all this, with the ſame "Right, the ſame Equity of Law, that the Sovereign has of putting eve-"ry ſuch Rebel to Death." For, "in a State of War;" or, as Mr. *Hobbes* will have it, "*in a State of Nature*," Rights are on all Sides equal, *i. e.* ſuch a State is a State of mere Equality. From whence it muſt and will follow, that, any Member of Civil Society does not deſerve any other

Puniſhment for High Treaſon, than, that Puniſhment to which he is expoſed, ſuppoſing him in a State of Nature to defend his Right to thoſe Neceſſaries which are abſolutely wanting to the Preſervation of his own Life. Becauſe, in this Caſe, he will be treated as a public Enemy by any other Perſon who will arrogate and aſſume to himſelf a Right over all Things.——Nay—— Mr. *Hobbes* has gone even ſo far as openly and with bare-faced Impudence to tell us, (in the 28th Chapter of his *Leviathan*) that "the Evil inflicted upon public Enemies, (altho' formerly "Members of the Civil Society) does not come under the Notion or De-"finition of a Puniſhment." From whence it follows, "that Traitors "and Rebels are not liable to any Puniſhment: Notwithſtanding, that, "they ſhould be expoſed to all the Miſeries and Calamities of a State of "Nature."

But, if we likewiſe farther add to what is here offered, that, ſince there are numberleſs poſitive Laws in moſt Civil Societies, but more eſpecially in our own Eſtabliſhment of Government, which have provided the ſevereſt Puniſhments for Perſons guilty of High Treaſon: Nothing, moſt certainly, can be a ſtronger, more repugnant Contradiction to all theſe Laws, than to ſay that ſuch guilty Criminals are not liable, are not obnoxious and do not fall under the Penalty of theſe Laws: Or, that, their Crime is not a Tranſgreſſion of that inſtituted Law which threatens them with ſuch a Puniſhment. It is a poor ridiculous evaſive Shift to ſay, that, the Obligation to perform any thing is ſuperfluous, becauſe Perſons lay under a prior Obligation to perform the ſame—Namely, in a State of Nature, and by the Law of Nature. Beyond all Queſtion he is more firmly chained down by many Bonds, who before had been only tied by one.——But—this very ſame Mr. *Hobbes* himſelf has by many ſubtle Arts endeavoured not only to depreciate, but even utterly to aboliſh all the Obligation enjoined by the Law of Nature: And, for this very reaſon therefore, there was an abſolute Neceſſity which takes in and comprehends all the Aids and Aſſiſtances which the Laws of Civil Society could introduce, in order that Perſons, poiſoned with his pernicious Principles, who have thrown off all Reverence and Regard to theſe Laws, may be kept within ſome decent Bounds to their Duty, if not for Conſcience Sake, yet from the Fear the Dread of Civil Power. For, it is an obvious Point, that, all thoſe Means which either leſſen or take from the Obligation of the Laws of Nature, but, more particularly, the Obligation of that Law which enjoins a ſtrict faithful Performance of Compacts and Agreements, do in ſome Reſpect, either more or leſs, both extenuate and take off the Crime of High Treaſon; and conſequently, ſeduce and entice Mankind to perpetrate and commit this very horrible Crime. And therefore, Mr. *Hobbes*, whether he means it or no, in Spight of his own Teeth, ſollicites and invites all Mankind to commit this Crime as often as he affirms, that, theſe Dictates of Right Reaſon are *improperly called Laws*: And, that, they only are *Theorems*, "concern-"ing ſuch *Points*," as contribute to the Preſervation of Mankind:"

As

As he inculcates at large in the 15th chap. of his *Leviathan*, and in his Book *De Cive*, Chap. 3. Sect. 33. Where he declares that theſe Dictates, as enacted by ALMIGHTY GOD in Holy Scripture, are, properly ſpeaking, Laws: But then, if we put the Queſtion to him, and aſk him, from whence we learn, that the Holy Scripture is a Law? He anſwers in the 33d Chapter of his *Leviathan*, "That they, to whom "God has not in a ſupernatural Way revealed himſelf, and declared that "the holy Scriptures took their Origin from him, are not ty'd down by any "Authority to receive theſe Scriptures, unleſs it be by the Authority of "him who holds the ſupreme Power in Civil Society; becauſe, that, this "ſupreme Civil Perſon, or chief Magiſtrate, is the one only Lawgiver." From which Premiſſes the true Concluſion is, *viz. That the Law of Nature, even ſo far as it is ſet forth and contained in Scripture, is not* properly *a Law, unleſs upon the Authority of the Civil Magiſtrate.* And, this Poſition he ſtrenuouſly maintains, notwithſtanding What he acknowledges a little before that *the Law of Nature is the Law of GOD*, and, that *it carries in it a manifeſt clear Authority.*

Now, altho' he tells us, that this Authority is no other than the Authority which we aſcribe to every Doctrine in moral Philoſophy, (taking every ſuch Doctrine as true:) Yet, he would inſinuate, that, this Authority is not ſufficient, is not powerful enough to conſtitute Laws truly and properly ſo called, unleſs there be ſuperinduced the additional Sanction of Civil Authority. From theſe Premiſſes of his it muſt follow, that, the Crime of High-Treaſon is not prohibited by any one Law properly ſo called; and, therefore, that, what we term High-Treaſon is not, truly and properly ſpeaking, a Crime. For, according to Mr. *Hobbes*'s Morality and Politics, that Law of Nature which forbids High-Treaſon is not, truly and properly ſpeaking, a Law: Neither is this Crime, according to him, the Tranſgreſſion of any Law eſtabliſhed upon a Civil Authority.——We are here alſo farther to obſerve, that, all thoſe Paſſages favour this Crime of High-Treaſon, "which tell us, that, the Laws of Nature (as for Inſtance, that "Law which forbids High-Treaſon againſt the Prince) do not lay any "Obligation upon external outward Acts, *i. e.* do not forbid the external "Act of Regicide, except each ſingle Perſon is well ſecured from the Injuries of all other Perſons whatſoever, (as in Chap. 5. Section 1, 2, &c. "of his Book *De Cive*): And, that, this Security is confirmed by ſuch a "Civil Authority as is powerful enough to compel both Parties to pay an "Obedience to the Laws of Nature." Whereas, here he tells us, laying it down as a political Maxim, "That, no ſuch Civil Government as this "can either be eſtabliſhed or preſerved ſafe and ſecure from the Crime of "High-Treaſon againſt the Prince's Perſon, unleſs it be upon the Sanction "of that Obligation enjoined by the Law of Nature: Which (Law of "Nature) in Caſe it does not extend and reach to outward Acts, Kings

"will

" will not be ſecure from Rebellion, and from being murthered by their " Subjects."——Upon this Foundation, Mr. *Hobbes*, according to true Principles of Reaſon, is under the indiſpenſable Neceſſity of acknowledging, that, Civil Government, (and the Obligation of Obedience to the Civil State, from the total Violation of which, ariſe the Crimes of High-Treaſon,) is eſtabliſhed upon ſuch a Foundation as Mr. *Hobbes*'s Political Philoſophy will not allow to be ſound, unleſs, at the ſame Time, every ſuch Government be ſupported by the Energy, Power, Helps and Aſſiſtances of its own *Effect*. It is impoſſible, indeed, that, any *Effect*, at the Time of its Non-exiſtence, can contribute any Powers to its *Cauſe*, by the Energy of which *Cauſe* ſuch an *Effect* is not only at firſt to be produced, but alſo, afterwards to be preſerved; now, whatſoever ſaps the Foundation of Obedience to Civil Authority ſoftens the Crime of High-Treaſon, and, by Conſequence, the whole Malignity of this Crime being taken off, the whole Obedience to all Civil Authority is at once diſſolved: Or, in other Words, to expreſs the Truth more fully, the Crime of High-Treaſon becomes abſolutely no Crime at all. In a Word, Mr. *Hobbes*'s Principles ſpirit up Mankind to Rebellion and High-Treaſon, in as much as theſe his Principles allow all the Privileges and Authorities of Empire equally to thoſe, who both by Sedition and Regicide have arrived at Empire and Royalty, as to Kings and Governors, who aſſume this their Title upon the cleareſt Foundations of Juſtice, Law, and Right. And, that, this Charge againſt Mr. *Hobbes* is well grounded appears evident in his Book *De Cive*, chap. 15. Sect. 5. Where he avowedly and openly maintains, that, from the natural Right of *all* over *all Perſons and Things*, each Perſon has a Right, coæval with his firſt Exiſtence, of ruling over and governing all other Perſons whatſoever. And, conſequently, whoſoever can, by any Means poſſible, ſhake off all ſuperior Force, all ſuperior Authority, all ſuperior Power, in Fact, removes all that Impediment, all that Obſtacle, all that Hindrance, whereby he himſelf is reſtrained and hindred from exerting his own Right: And, therefore, upon theſe *Hobbian* Principles, as ſoon as ever any ſuch Perſon has graſped the Throne he may be truly ſaid to govern lawfully and by Right. And conſequently, that, no ſuch Perſon can be deemed either a Tyrant or an Uſurper. Upon theſe Principles, Mr. *Hobbes* maintains, (and conſiſtent enough with his own Opinions,) that during the Time of Seditions, Commotions, and Civil War, two Supreme governing Powers, may ariſe out of one, as he does not ſcruple to ſay in his Book *De Cive*, chap. 6. Sect. 13. His Words are, " That the Author of a Civil War, who by his Rebellion has aſ-" ſumed a Dominion over his Fellow Conſpirators engaged in the ſame " Rebellion, has a Right alſo to defend himſelf and his Party againſt his " lawful King and Governor. And this damnable Doctrine and Poſition, " we have already proved fully upon him, from his own elegant Phraſes, " expreſſed in the *Leviathan*."

Upon

Upon theſe ſame *Hobbian* Principles alſo, Mr. *Hobbes*, with all the Truth and Juſtice imaginable, in the Dedication before his *Leviathan*, addreſſed to Mr. *Francis Godolphin*, acknowledges, that, his Defence and Vindication of the ſupreme Civil Power " is like that of the Geeſe, in Defence " of the Capitol recorded in Hiſtory, which ſimple and impartial Crea- " tures defended the *Romans*, who refuſed to ſurrender the *Roman* Capi- " tol to the *Gauls* their Enemies, they defended them by their Cackling. " For, theſe ſilly Creatures were not more favourable to the *Romans* than " they would have been to the *Gauls* their Enemies, becauſe they " were as ready to defend the *Gauls* in the ſame Manner, had the *Gauls* " ſeized and made themſelves Maſters of the Capitol." The Reader may, if he pleaſes, conſult this Dedication prefixed to his *Engliſh Leviathan*, publiſhed in 1651. Times of Rebellion in *England*, when Uſurpation rode triumphant, and when our Lawful Sovereign King *Charles the Second* was baniſhed his Hereditary Dominions.

In this his *Engliſh Leviathan* Mr. *Hobbes*, with the moſt bare-fac'd Impudence, maintains theſe Principles of Anarchy and Rebellion: And then, let the Reader, (if he be ſo inclined,) compare the *Engliſh* with the *Latin Leviathan*, which underwent ſome little Alteration, and, in which, Mr. *Hobbes* thought proper to rectify, and ſoften a little, ſome of his Notions— But, pray, when did he publiſh this his *Latin* Edition with theſe Emendations? Why it was ſome Time after the Reſtoration of our moſt Gracious Sovereign King *Charles the Second* to his Royal Rights and Privileges, Kingdoms, Dominions.

Upon the whole then, to conclude this *Philoſophical Enquiry* into the Laws of Nature, I have, in my impartial Judgment, fully proved, that, whilſt Mr. *Hobbes* with one Hand ſpeciouſly offers up to Kings and Monarchs Royal Gifts and Privileges, he with the other, treacherouſly plunges a Dagger into their very Hearts.

F I N I S.

Henry-ſtreet, Dublin. The Feaſt of St. *John Baptiſt*, *Monday* 24th of *June*, 1751.

D U B L I N:

Printed for the TRANSLATOR, by SAMUEL POWELL in *Crane-Lane*, 1751.

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PART IV.

APPENDIX:

OR, THE

BIOGRAPHY

AND

OTHER MATTERS

Relating to the

IMPROVEMENTS

IN

Natural *and* Moral Philoſophy.

DUBLIN:

Printed by S. POWELL.

MDCCL.

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PART

PART THE FOURTH.

THE

APPENDIX.

Number I. Containing EXTRACTS from Biſhop SPRAT's HISTORY of the *Royal Society* of *England*, And from Monſ. JOHN BAPTIST DU HAMEL's HISTORY of the *Royal Academy of Sciences* at *Paris*.

An EPITOME *of the* KING's LETTERS PATENTS, *to eſtabliſh the* ROYAL SOCIETY *of* ENGLAND.

CHARLES THE SECOND, by the Grace of God, of *England*, *Scotland*, *France* and *Ireland* King, Defender of the Faith, *&c.* To all unto whom theſe Preſents ſhall come, Greeting. Having long reſolv'd within our ſelf, to promote the Welfare of Arts and Sciences, as well as that of our Territories and Dominions, out of our princely Affection to all kind of Learning, and more particular Favour to Philoſophical Studies. Eſpecially thoſe which endeavour by ſolid Experiments, either to reform or improve Philoſopy. To the Intent therefore, that theſe Kinds of Study, which are no where yet ſufficiently cultivated, may flouriſh in our Dominions; and that the Learned World may acknowledge us to be, not only the Defender of the Faith, but the Patron and Encourager of all Sorts of uſeful Knowledge.

Know ye, that we out of our ſpecial Grace, certain Knowledge, and mere Motion, have given and granted, and do by theſe Preſents, give and grant, for us, our Heirs and Succeſſors, that there ſhall be for ever a Society, conſiſting of a Preſident, Council and Fellows, which ſhall be called by the Name of *the Preſident, Council, and Fellows of the* Royal Society *of* London, *for, and Improving of natural Knowledge*; of which Society, we do by theſe Preſents, declare our ſelf to be the Founder and Patron. And we do hereby make and conſtitute the ſaid Society by the Name, *&c.* to be a Body Corporate, to be continued under the ſame Name, in a perpetual Succeſſion; and that they and their Succeſſors (whoſe Studies are to be employed, for the promoting of the Knowledge of natural Things, and uſeful Arts, by Experiments. To the Glory of God, and the Good of Mankind) ſhall by the aforeſaid Name of Preſident, Council, *&c.* be enabled and made capable in Law, to levy, hold, poſſeſs, and enjoy, Lands, Tenements, *&c.* Liberties, Franchiſes, Juriſdictions, for Perpetuity, or Terms

of Lives, or Years, or any other Way: As alſo Goods, Chattels, and all other Things of what Nature or Kind ſoever. And alſo by the Name aforeſaid, to give, grant, demiſe, or aſſign the ſaid Lands, Goods, &c. and to do all Things neceſſary thereabout. And the ſaid Perſons, by the Name aforeſaid, are enabled to implead, be impleaded, ſue, defend, &c. in any Courts, and before any Judges, Officers, &c. whatſoever of the King, his Heirs, and Succeſſors, in all and ſingular Actions, real and perſonal: Pleas, Cauſes, &c. of what Kind ſoever, as any of his Subjects within this Kingdom of *England*, or Corporations, are by Law capable and inabled to do. And the ſaid Preſident, Council, and Fellows, are impowered to have a common Seal for their Uſe in their Affairs; and, from Time to Time, to break, change, and make anew the ſame, as ſhall ſeem expedient unto them.

And his Majeſty, in Teſtimony of his Royal Favour towards the ſaid Preſident, Council, and Fellows, and of his ſpecial Eſteem of them, doth grant a Coat of Arms to them and their Succeſſors, *viz.* On a Field Argent, a Canton of the three Lions of *England*: For a Creſt, an Eagle proper on a Ducal Coronet ſupporting a Shield charged with the Lions aforeſaid; and for Supporters, two Talbots with Coronets on their Necks. The ſaid Arms to be born, &c. by the ſaid Society upon all Occaſions.

And that his Majeſty's Royal Intention, may take the better Effect for the good Government of the ſaid Society from time to time: It is eſtabliſhed, that the Council aforeſaid, ſhall conſiſt of twenty-one Perſons; (whereof the Preſident for the Time being always to be one.) And that all Perſons, which, within two Months next enſuing the Date of the ſaid Charter, ſhall be choſen by the ſaid Preſident and Council; and in all times after the ſaid two Months, by the Preſident, Council, and Fellows, [and noted in a Regiſter to be kept for that Purpoſe] ſhall be Fellows of the ſaid Society, and ſo accounted, and called during Life, except by the Statutes of the ſaid Society to be made, any of them ſhall happen to be amoved. And by how much any Perſons are more excelling in all Kinds of Learning, by how much the more ardently they deſire to promote the Honour, Buſineſs, and Emolument of the ſaid Society, by how much the more eminent they are for Integrity, Honeſty, Piety, Loyalty, and good Affection toward his Majeſty, his Crown and Dignity; by ſo much the more fit and worthy, ſuch Perſons are to be judged, for Reception into the Society.

And for the better Execution of his Royal Grant, his Majeſty hath nominated, &c. his truſty and well beloved *William* Viſcount *Brouncker*, Chancellor to his deareſt Conſort, Queen *Catharine*, to be the firſt and modern Preſident, to continue in the ſaid Office from the Date of the Patent to the Feaſt of St. *Andrew* next enſuing, and until another Perſon of the ſaid Council be duly choſen into the ſaid Office. The ſaid Lord *Brouncker* being ſworn in all Things belonging thereto well and faithfully to execute the ſaid Office, before his right well beloved and right truſty Couſin and Counſellor, *Edward* Earl of *Clarendon*, Lord High Chancellor of *England*, in the Words following.

I William *Viſcount* Brouncker *do promiſe to deal faithfully and honeſtly in all Things belonging to that Truſt committed to me, as Preſident of the* Royal Society *of* London, *for improving natural Knowledge.* So help me God.

And his Majeſty hath nominated, &c. the Perſons following; his truſty and well beloved Sir *Robert Moray*, Knight, one of his Privy Council in his Kingdom of *Scotland*,

Scotland, *Robert Boyle* Eſq; *William Brereton* Eſq; eldeſt Son to the Lord *Brereton*, Sir *Kenelme Digby* Knight, Chancellor to his deareſt Mother Queen *Mary*, Sir *Gilbert Talbot* Knight, Maſter of his Jewel Houſe, Sir *Paul Neile* Knight, one of the Uſhers of his Privy Chamber, *Henry Slingsby* Eſq; one of the Gentlemen of his ſaid Privy Chamber, Sir *William Petty* Knight, *Timothy Clark*, Doctor of Phyſic, and one of his Phyſicians, *John Wilkins*, Doctor of Divinity, *George Ent*, Doctor of Phyſic, *William Erſkine* Eſq; one of his Cupbearers, *Jonathan Goddard* Doctor of Phyſic, *William Ball* Eſq; *Matthew Wren* Eſq; *John Evelyn* Eſq; *Thomas Henſhaw* Eſq; *Dudley Palmer*, of *Gray's-Inn* Eſq; *Abraham Hill*, of *London* Eſq; and *Henry Oldenburg* Eſq; together with the Preſident aforeſaid, to be the firſt and modern twenty-one of the Council and Fellows of the *Royal Society* aforeſaid, to be continued in the Offices of the Council aforeſaid, from the Date of the Patent to the Feaſt of St. *Andrew* next following, and from thence till other fit Perſons be choſen into the ſaid Offices. The ſaid Perſons to be ſworn before the Preſident of the Society, for the Time being, well and truly to execute the ſaid Offices, according to the Form and Effect of the aforeſaid Oath to be adminiſtred to the Preſident by the Lord Chancellor as aforeſaid.

For the adminiſtring which Oath to the ſaid Perſons, and all others hereafter from Time to Time to be choſen into the ſaid Council, full Power and Authority is granted to the Preſident for the Time being: And the ſaid Perſons duly ſworn, and all other from Time to Time duly choſen into the ſaid Council and ſworn, are to aid, adviſe and aſſiſt in all Affairs, Buſineſſes and Things, concerning the better Regulation, Government and Direction of the *Royal Society*, and every Member thereof.

Furthermore, Liberty is granted to the ſaid Society, lawfully to make and hold Meetings of themſelves, for the ſearching out and Diſcovery of natural Things, and Tranſaction of other Buſineſſes relating to the ſaid Society, when and as often as ſhall be requiſite, in any College, Hall, or other convenient Place in *London*, or within ten Miles thereof.

And Power is granted to the ſaid Society, from Time to Time, to nominate and chuſe yearly, on St. *Andrew*'s Day, one of the Council aforeſaid, for the Time being, to be Preſident of the Society, until St. *Andrew*'s Day next enſuing (if he ſhall ſo long live, or not be removed for ſome juſt and reaſonable Cauſe) and from thence until another be choſen and put into the ſaid Office, the ſaid Preſident ſo elected, before Admiſſion to that Office, to be ſworn before the Council, according to the Form before expreſſed, who are impowered to adminiſter the ſaid Oath from Time to Time, as often as there ſhall be Cauſe to chuſe a Preſident.

And in Caſe that the ſaid Preſident, during his Office, ſhall die, recede, or be removed, then, and ſo often, it ſhall be lawful for the Council of the *Royal Society*, to meet together to chuſe one of their Number for Preſident of the ſaid Society; and the Perſon ſo choſen and duly ſworn, ſhall have and exerciſe the Office of Preſident for the Remainder of the Year, and until another be duly choſen into the ſaid Office.

And in Caſe that any one or more of the Council aforeſaid ſhall die, recede, or be removed (which Perſons, or any of them, for Miſdemeanor, or other reaſonable Cauſe, are declared to be amoveable by the Preſident and the reſt of the Council) then, and ſo often, it ſhall be lawful for the Preſident, Council, and Fellows, to chuſe one or more of the Fellows of the *Royal Society* in the room of him or them ſo deceaſing, receding, or amoved, to compleat the aforeſaid

Number of twenty-one of the Council, which Perſon or Perſons, ſo choſen, are to continue in Office until St. *Andrew*'s Day then next enſuing, and until others be duly choſen, the ſaid Perſons being ſworn, faithfully to execute their Offices, according to the true Intention of the Patent.

And his Majeſty doth will and grant unto the ſaid Preſident, Council, and Fellows, full Power and Authority on St. *Andrew*'s Day, yearly, to elect, nominate and change ten of the Fellows of the *Royal Society*, to ſupply the Places and Offices of ten of the aforeſaid Number of twenty-one of the Council, declaring it to be his royal Will and Pleaſure that ten and no more of the Council aforeſaid be annually changed and removed by the Preſident, Council and Fellows aforeſaid.

And it is granted, on the Behalf of the ſaid Society, that if it ſhall happen that the Preſident to be ſick, infirm, detain'd in his Majeſty's Service, or otherwiſe occupied, ſo as he cannot attend the neceſſary Affairs of the Society, then, and ſo often, it ſhall be lawful for him to appoint one of the Council for his Deputy, who ſhall ſupply his Place from Time to Time, as often as he ſhall happen to be abſent during the whole Time of the ſaid Preſident's Continuance in his Office, unleſs he ſhall, in the mean Time, conſtitute ſome other of the Council for his Deputy: And the Deputy ſo conſtituted is impower'd to do all and ſingular Things which belong to the Office of the Preſident of the *Royal Society*, and in as ample Manner and Form as the ſaid Preſident may do by Vertue of his Majeſty's Letters Patents, he the ſaid Deputy being duly ſworn before the Council in Form before ſpecified, who are impower'd to adminiſter the Oath as often as the Caſe ſhall require.

It is farther granted to the Society, to have one Treaſurer, two Secretaries, two or more Curators of Experiments, one or more Clerk or Clerks, and alſo two Serjeants at Mace, who may from Time to Time attend on the Preſident; all the ſaid Officers to be choſen by the Preſident, Council and Fellows, and to be ſworn in Form and Effect before ſpecified, well and faithfully to execute their Offices, which Oath the Council are impowered to adminiſter: And his Majeſty nominates and appoints his well beloved Subjects, the aforeſaid *William Ball* Eſq; to be firſt and modern Treaſurer; and the aforeſaid *John Wilkins* and *Henry Oldenburgh*, to be the firſt and modern Secretaries of the *Royal Society*, to be continued in the ſaid Offices to the Feaſt of St. *Andrew* next following the Date of the Patent. And that from Time to Time, and ever hereafter, on the ſaid Feaſt of St. *Andrew* (if it be not *Lord's Day*, and if it be *Lord's Day*, on the next Day after) the Preſident, Council and Fellows aforeſaid, are impowered to nominate and chuſe honeſt and diſcreet Men for Treaſurer and Secretaries, which are to be of the Number of the Council of the *Royal Society*, which Perſons elected and ſworn, in Form before ſpecified, are to exerciſe and enjoy the ſaid Offices until the Feaſt of St. *Andrew* next then following.

And if it ſhall happen, that the aforeſaid Election of the Preſident, Council, Treaſurer and Secretaries, or any of them, cannot be made or perfected on the Feaſt of St. *Andrew* aforeſaid: It is granted to the aforeſaid Preſident, Council, and Fellows, that they may lawfully nominate and aſſign another Day, as near to the ſaid Feaſt of St. *Andrew* as conveniently may be, for making or perfecting the ſaid Elections, and ſo from Day to Day till the ſaid Elections be perfected.

And in caſe that any of the aforeſaid Officers of the *Royal Society* ſhall die, recede, or be removed from their reſpective Offices, then and ſo often it ſhall be lawful

lawful for the ſaid Preſident, Council and Fellows, to chuſe one or more into the Office or Offices vacant, to hold the ſame during the Reſidue of that Year, and until others be duly choſen and ſworn in their Places.

Moreover, on the Behalf of the Society, it is granted unto the Preſident and Council, that they may aſſemble and meet together in any College, Hall, or other convenient Place in *London*, or within ten Miles thereof (due and lawful Summons of all the Members of the Council to extraordinary Meetings being always premiſed) and that they being ſo met together, have full Power and Authority, from Time to Time, to make, conſtitute and eſtabliſh ſuch Laws, Statutes, Orders and Conſtitutions, which ſhall appear to them to be good, uſeful, honeſt and neceſſary, according to their Judgments and Diſcretions, for the Government, Regulation and Directions of the *Royal Society*, and every Member thereof; and to do all Things concerning the Government, Eſtate, Goods, Lands, Revenues, as alſo the Buſineſſes and Affairs of the ſaid Society: All which Laws, Statutes, Orders, *&c.* ſo made, his Majeſty Wills and Commands, that they be, from Time to Time, inviolably obſerved, according to the Tenor and Effect of them; provided that they be reaſonable, and not repugnant or contrary to the Laws, Cuſtoms, *&c.* of this Kingdom of *England*.

And furthermore, full Power and Authority is given and granted unto the ſaid Society, from Time to Time, to chuſe one or more Printers and Gravers, and by Writing ſealed with the common Seal of the Society, and ſigned by the Preſident for the Time being, to grant them Power to print ſuch Things, Matters and Buſineſſes concerning the ſaid Society, as ſhall be committed to them by the Council from Time to Time, the ſaid Printers and Gravers being ſworn before the Preſident and Council in Form before ſpecified, which Preſident and Council are impowered to give the ſaid Oath.

And for the greater Advantage and Succeſs of the Society in their philoſophical Studies and Endeavours, full Power and Authority is granted unto them, to require, take and receive, from Time to Time, dead Bodies of Perſons executed, and the ſame to anatomize, to all Intents and Purpoſes, and in as ample Manner and Form as the College of Phyſicians and Company of Chirurgeons of *London* (by what Names ſoever the ſaid two Corporations are or may be called) have had and made Uſe of, or may have and uſe the ſaid Bodies.

And for the Improvement of ſuch Experiments, Arts and Sciences, as the Society may be employed in, full Power and Authority is granted unto them, from Time to Time by Letters under the Hand of the Preſident in the preſence of the Council, to hold Correſpondence and Intelligence with any Strangers, whether private Perſons or Collegiate Societies, or Corporations, without any Interruption or Moleſtation whatſoever: Provided that this Indulgence or Grant be extended to no further Uſe, than the particular Benefit and Intereſt of the Society, in Matters philoſophical, mathematical, and mechanical.

Full Power and Authority is alſo granted on the Behalf of the Society, to the Council, to erect and build one or more Colleges within *London*, or ten Miles thereof, of what Form or Quality ſoever, for Habitation, aſſembling or meeting of the Preſident, Council and Fellows, about any Affairs and Buſineſſes of the Society.

And if any Abuſes or Differences ſhall ever hereafter ariſe and happen about the Government or Affairs of the Society, whence the Conſtitution, Progreſs, and Improvement, or Buſineſſes thereof, may ſuffer or be hindered: In ſuch Caſes his Majeſty aſſigns, and authoriſes, his right Truſty and right well beloved Couſin

and

and Counſellor, *Edward* Earl of *Clarendon* Lord High Chancellor of *England*, by himſelf during his Life, and after his Deceaſe, the Lord Arch-Biſhop of *Canterbury*, the Lord Chancellor, or Lord Keeper of the Great Seal of *England*, the Lord High Treaſurer of *England*, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, the Lord Biſhop of *London*, and the two principal Secretaries of State for the Time being, or any four or more of them, to compoſe and redreſs any ſuch Differences or Abuſes.

And Laſtly, his Majeſty ſtrictly Charges and Commands all Juſtices, Mayors, Aldermen, Sheriffs, Bailiffs, Conſtables, and all other Officers, Miniſters and Subjects whatſoever, from Time to Time, to be aiding and aſſiſting unto the ſaid Preſident, Council, and Fellows of the *Royal Society*, in and about all Things, according to the true Intention of his Letters Patents.

This is the legal Ratification which the *Royal Society* has received. And in this Place I am to render their publick Thanks to the Right Honourable the Earl of *Clarendon*, Lord Chancellor of *England*, to Sir *Jeffery Palmer* Attorney-General, and to Sir *Heneage Finch*, Solicitor-General; who by their chearful Concurrence, and free Promotion of this Confirmation, have wiped away the Aſperſion, that has been ſcandalouſly caſt on the Profeſſion of the Law, that it is an Enemy to Learning and the Civil Arts. To ſhew the Falſhood of this Reproach, I might inſtance in many Judges and Counſellors of all Ages, who have been the Ornaments of the Sciences, as well as of the Bar, and Courts of Juſtice. But it is enough to declare, that my Lord *Bacon* was a Lawyer, and that theſe eminent Officers of the Law, have compleated this Foundation of the *Royal Society*: Which was a Work well becoming the largeneſs of his Wit to deviſe, and the Greatneſs of their Prudence to eſtabliſh.

According to the Intention of theſe Letters Patents, their Council has ever ſince been annually renewed; their Preſident, their Treaſurer, their Secretaries choſen: The Chief Employments of the Council, have been to manage their political Affairs, to regulate Diſorders, to make Addreſſes and Applications in their Behalf; to regard their Privileges, to diſperſe Correſpondents, but principally to form the Body of their Statutes, which I will here inſert.

An ABSTRACT *of the Statutes of the* Royal Society.

WHATEVER Statute ſhall be made, or repealed, the making or repealing of it, ſhall be voted twice, and at two ſeveral Meetings of the Council. This Obligation ſhall be ſubſcribed by every Fellow, or his Election ſhall be void.

We who have hereto ſubſcribed, do promiſe each for himſelf, that we will endeavour to promote the Good of the *Royal Society* of *London*, for the Improvement of natural Knowledge, and to purſue the Ends, for which the ſame was founded: That we will be preſent at the Meetings of the Society, as often as conveniently we can: Eſpecially at the Anniverſary Elections, and upon extraordinary Occaſions: And that we will obſerve the Statutes and Orders of the ſaid Society: Provided, that whenever any of us ſhall ſignify to the Preſident under his Hand, that he deſires to withdraw from the Society, he ſhall be free from this Obligation for the Future. Every Fellow ſhall pay his Admiſſion Money, and afterwards Contribution towards the defraying of the Charges of Obſervations and Experiments, *&c.*

The

The Ordinary Meetings of the *Royal Society*, ſhall be held once a Week, where none ſhall be preſent, beſides the Fellows, without the Leave of the Society, under the Degree of a Baron, in one of his Majeſty's three Kingdoms, or of his Majeſty's Privy Council; or unleſs he be an eminent Foreigner, and theſe only without the Leave of the Preſident.

The Buſineſs of their weekly Meetings ſhall be, to Order, take account, conſider, and diſcourſe of, philoſophical Experiments and Obſervations; to read, hear, and diſcourſe upon Letters, Reports, and other Papers, containing philoſophical Matters; as alſo to view, and diſcourſe upon the Productions and Rarities of Nature and Art; and to conſider what to reduce from them, or how they may be improved for Uſe or Diſcovery.

That the Experiments be made at the Charge of the Society; two Curators at leaſt, ſhall be appointed for the Inſpection of thoſe which cannot be performed before the Society; by them the bare Report of Matter of Fact ſhall be ſtated and returned.

The Election of Fellows ſhall be made by way of Ballot; and their Admiſſion by a ſolemn Declaration, made by the Preſident of their Election.

The Election of the Council and Officers ſhall be made once a Year: Eleven of the preſent Council ſhall be continued by Lot, for the next Year, and ten new ones choſen in like Manner. Out of this new Council, ſhall be elected a Preſident, Treaſurer, and two Secretaries in the ſame way.

The Preſident ſhall preſide in all Meetings, regulate all Debates of the Society and Council; ſtate, and put Queſtions; call for Reports and Accounts from Committees, Curators and others; ſummon all extraordinary Meetings upon urgent Occaſions, and ſee to the Execution of the Statutes. The Vice-Preſident ſhall have the ſame Power in the Abſence of the Preſident.

The Treaſurer or his Deputy, ſhall receive and keep Accounts of all Money payable by the Society. He ſhall pay ſmall Sums by Order of the Preſident, under his Hand, but thoſe that exceed five Pounds by Order of the Council. All Bills of Charges for Experiments, ſhall firſt be ſigned by the Curators. The Accounts of the Treaſurer, ſhall be audited four times a Year, by a Committee of the Council, and once a Year by a Committee of the Society.

The Secretaries are to take Notes of the Orders, and material Paſſages of the Meetings; to take care of the Books, Papers, and Writings of the Society; to order, and direct the Clerks in making Entries of all Matters in the Regiſter, and Journal Books of the Society or Council; to draw up ſuch Letters as ſhall be written in their Name, which ſhall be approved at one of their Meetings; to give Notice of the Candidates propounded in order to Election.

The Curators by Office, ſhall have a ſufficient Allowance for their Encouragement, which ſhall encreaſe proportionally with the Revenue of the Society, provided that it exceeds not two hundred Pounds a Year. They ſhall be well ſkilled in philoſophical and mathematical Learning, well verſed in Obſervations, Inquiries, and Experiments of Nature and Art. They ſhall take Care of the managing of all Experiments and Obſervations appointed by the Society or Council, and report the ſame, and perform ſuch other Taſks, as the Society or Council ſhall appoint; ſuch as examining of Sciences, Arts, and Inventions now in Uſe, and the bringing in Hiſtories of natural and artificial Things, *&c.* They ſhall be propounded at leaſt a Month before they are choſen. They ſhall be examined by the Council before the Election: To their Election, every Member of the Society ſhall be ſummoned: They ſhall at firſt be only elected for a Year of Probation,

Probation, except they be of known Merits; at the End of the Year, they ſhall be either elected for Perpetuity, or for a longer Time of Probation, or wholly rejected. The Cauſes of ejecting a Curator, ſhall be the ſame with ejecting a Fellow, or for fraudulent Dealing and Negligence in the Affairs of the Society, provided, that he ſhall firſt receive three reſpective Admonitions. If any Curator ſhall be diſabled by Age, Infirmity, or any Caſualty, in the Service of the Society, ſome Proviſion ſhall be made for him during Life, if his Condition requires, according as the Council ſhall think fit.

The Clerk ſhall conſtantly attend at all Meetings; he ſhall follow the Directions of the Secretaries, in regiſtering and entring all Matters that ſhall be appointed: He ſhall not communicate any Thing contained in their Books, to any that is not a Fellow. He ſhall have a certain Rate, for what he copies, and a yearly Stipend for his Attendance.

The Printer ſhall take Care for the printing of ſuch Books, as ſhall be committed to him by Order of the Society; and therein he ſhall obſerve their Directions, as to the Correction of the Edition, the Number of the Copies, the Form or Volume, *&c.*

The Operators of the Society, when they have any of their Work under their Hands, ſhall not undertake the Work of any other Perſons, which may hinder the Buſineſs of the Society. They ſhall have Sallaries for their Attendance.

The common Seal of the Society, ſhall be kept in a Cheſt, with three Locks, and three different Keys, by the Preſident, Treaſurer, and one of the Secretaries. The Deeds of the Society ſhall be paſſed in Council, and ſealed by them and the Preſident.

The Books that concern the Affairs of the Society, ſhall be the Charter Book, Statute Book, Journal Books, and Regiſter Books, for the entering of Philoſophical Obſervations, Hiſtories, Diſcourſes, Experiments, Inventions.

The Names of Benefactors ſhall be honourably mentioned, in a Book provided for that Purpoſe.

In Caſe of Death, or Receſs of any Fellow, the Secretaries are to note it in the Margent of the Regiſter, over-againſt their Names.

The Cauſes of Ejection ſhall be contemptuous Diſobedience to the Statutes and Orders of the Society, defaming, or maliciouſly damnifying the ſame. This ſhall be declared by the Preſident, at one of the Meetings; and the Ejection recorded.

The Extent and Method of ENQUIRY *purſued by the* Royal Society

OF the Extent of the Matter, about which they have been already converſant, and intend to be hereafter; there can be no better Meaſure taken, than by giving a general Proſpect of all the Objects of Men's Thoughts; which can be nothing elſe, but either God, or Men, or Nature. As for the firſt, they meddle no otherwiſe with divine Things, than only as the Power, and Wiſdom, and Goodneſs of the Creator is diſplayed in the admirable Order and Workmanſhip of the Creatures.

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It cannot be denied, but it lies in the natural Philoſopher's Hands, beſt to advance that Part of Divinity; which, though it fills not the Mind with ſuch tender and powerful Contemplations, as that which ſhews us Man's Redemption by a Mediator; yet, it is by no Means to be paſſed by unregarded, but is an excellent Ground to eſtabliſh the other.

This is a Religion, which is confirmed by the unanimous Agreement of all Sorts of Worſhips, and may ſerve, in reſpect to Chriſtianity, as *Solomon*'s Porch to the Temple; into the one the Heathens themſelves did alſo enter; but into the other, only God's peculiar People.

In Men, may be conſidered the Faculties and Operations of their Souls, the Conſtitutions of their Bodies, and the Works of their Hands. Of theſe, the firſt they omit; both becauſe the Knowledge and Direction of them have been before undertaken, by ſome Arts, on which they have no mind to intrench, as the Politics, Morality and Oratory; and alſo becauſe the Reaſon, the Underſtanding, the Tempers, the Will, the Paſſions of Men, are ſo hard to be reduced to any certain Obſervation of the Senſes, and afford ſo much room to the Obſervers to falſify or counterfeit; that if ſuch Diſcourſes ſhould be once entertained, they would be in Danger of falling into talking, inſtead of working, which they carefully avoid. Such Subjects therefore as theſe they have hitherto kept out. But yet, when they ſhall have made more progreſs in material Things, they will be in a Condition of pronouncing more boldly on them too. For, though Man's Soul and Body are not only one natural Engine (as ſome have thought) of whoſe Motions of all Sorts, there may be as certain an Account given as of thoſe of a Watch or Clock; yet by long ſtudying of the Spirits, of the Blood, of the Nouriſhment, of the Parts, of the Diſeaſes, of the Advantages, of the Accidents which belong to human Bodies (all which will come within their Province) there may, without Queſtion, be very near Gueſſes made, even at the more exalted and immediate Actions of the Soul; and too, without deſtroying its ſpiritual and immortal Being.

Theſe two Subjects, God, and the Soul, being only forborn: In all the reſt they wander at their Pleaſure: In the Frame of Mens Bodies, the Ways for ſtrong, healthful and long Life: In the Arts of Men's Hands, thoſe that either Neceſſity, Convenience or Delight have produced: In the Works of Nature, their Helps, their Varieties, Redundancies and Defects; and in bringing all theſe to the Uſes of human Society.

In their Method of enquiring, I will obſerve how they have behaved themſelves in Things that might be brought within their own Touch and Sight; and how in thoſe, which are ſo remote and hard to be come by, that about them they were forced to truſt the Reports of others.

In the firſt Kind, I ſhall lay it down as their fundamental Law, that whenever they could poſſibly get to handle the Subject, the Experiment was ſtill performed by ſome of the Members themſelves. The want of this Exactneſs has very much diminiſhed the Credit of former Naturaliſts; it might elſe have ſeemed ſtrange, that ſo many Men of Wit, ſetting ſo many Hands on Work, being ſo watchful to catch up all Relations, from Woods, Fields, Mountains, Rivers, Seas and Lands, and ſcattering their Penſions ſo liberally; ſhould yet be able to collect ſo few Obſervations, that have been judicious or uſeful. But the Reaſon is plain; for while they thought it enough to be only Receivers of other's Intelligence, they have either employ'd ignorant Searchers, who knew not how to digeſt or diſtinguiſh what they found; or frivolous, who always lov'd to come home laden, tho' it were but with Trifles; or (which is worſt of all) crafty, who having per-

ceived the Humours of thoſe that paid them ſo well, would always take Care to bring in ſuch Collections as might ſeem to agree with the Opinions and Principles of their Maſters, however they did with Nature itſelf.

This Inconvenience the *Royal Society* has eſcaped, by making the whole Proceſs paſs under its own Eyes. And the Taſk was divided amongſt them by one of theſe two Ways.

Firſt, It was ſometimes referred to ſome particular Men, to make Choice of what Subject they pleaſed, and to follow their own Humour in the Trial; the Expence being ſtill allowed from the general Stock. By which Liberty, that they afforded, they had a very neceſſary Regard to the Power of particular Inclinations; which in all Sorts of Knowledge is ſo ſtrong, that there may be numberleſs Inſtances given of Men, who in ſome Things have been altogether uſeleſs, and yet in others have had ſuch a vigorous and ſucceſsful Faculty, as if they had been born and form'd for them alone.

Or elſe, *Secondly*, the Society itſelf made the Diſtribution, and deputed whom it thought fit for the Proſecution of ſuch or ſuch Experiments. And this they did either by allotting the ſame Work to ſeveral Men, ſeparated one from another; or elſe by joining them into Committees (if we may uſe that Word in a philoſophical Senſe, and ſo in ſome meaſure purge it from the ill Sound which it formerly had.) By this Union of Eyes and Hands there do theſe Advantages ariſe: Thereby there will be a full Comprehenſion of the Object in all its Appearances; and ſo there will be a mutual Communication of the Light of one Science to another. Whereas ſingle Labours can be but as a Proſpect taken upon one Side. And alſo by this fixing of ſeveral Mens Thoughts upon one Thing, there will be an excellent Cure for that Defect, which is almoſt unavoidable in great Inventors. It is the Cuſtom of ſuch earneſt and powerful Minds, to do wonderful Things in the Beginning; but ſhortly after, to be overborn by the Multitude and Weight of their own Thoughts; then to yield, and cool by little and little; and at laſt grow weary, and even to loath that, upon which they were at firſt the moſt eager. This is the wonted Conſtitution of great Wits; ſuch tender Things are thoſe exalted Actions of the Mind; and ſo hard it is for thoſe Imaginations, that can run ſwift and mighty Races, to be able to travel a long and a conſtant Journey. The Effects of this Infirmity have been ſo remarkable, that we have certainly loſt very many Inventions, after they have been in part faſhioned, by the mere Languiſhing and Negligence of their Authors. For this the beſt Proviſion muſt be, to join many Men together; for it cannot be imagined, that they ſhould all be ſo violent and fiery; and ſo by this mingling of Tempers, the impetuous Men not having the whole Burthen on them, may have Leiſure for Intervals to recruit their firſt Heat; and the more judicious, who are not ſo ſoon poſſeſſed with ſuch Raptures, may carry on the others ſtrong Conceptions, by ſoberer Degrees, to a full Accompliſhment.

This they have practiſed in ſuch Things whereof the Matter is common, and wherein they may repeat their Labours as they pleaſe. But in foreign and remote Affairs, their Intentions and their Advantages do far exceed all others.

For theſe, they have begun to ſettle a Correſpondence through all Countries, and have taken ſuch Order, that in ſhort Time there will ſcarce a Ship come up the *Thames*, that does not make ſome Return of Experiments, as well as of Merchandize.

This

This their Care of an Universal Intelligence, is befriended by Nature itself, in the Situation of *England*: For, lying so as it does, in the Passage between the Northern Parts of the World and the Southern; its Ports being open to all Coasts, and its Ships spreading their Sails in all Seas; it is thereby necessarily made, not only Mistress of the Ocean, but the most proper Seat for the Advancement of Knowledge.

From the Positions of Countries arise not only their several Shapes, Manners, Customs, Colours, but also their different Arts and Studies. The Inland and Continent we see, do give Laws to Discourse, to Habits, to Behaviour; but those that border upon the Seas, are most properly seated, to bring home Matter for new Sciences, and to make the same Proportion of Discoveries above others in the intellectual Globe, as they have done in the Material.

Upon this Advantage of our Island, there is so much Stress to be laid towards the Prosperity of this Design, that if we should search through all the World for a perpetual Habitation, wherein the Universal Philosophy might settle itself, there can none be found, which is comparable to *London*, of all the former, or present Seats of Empire. *Babylon*, that was the Capital City of the first Monarchy, was situated in a Champion Country, had a clear and uncloudy Air; and was therefore fit enough to promote one Part of Natural Knowledge, the Observations of the Heavens: But it was a Midland Town, and regarded not the Traffick of Foreigners, abounding with its own Luxury and Riches. *Memphis* was improper upon the same Account; for, *Egypt* was a Land content with its own Plenty, admitting Strangers, rather to instruct them, than to learn any thing from them. *Carthage* stood not so well for a resort for Philosophers, as for Pirates; as all the *African* Shore continues at this Day. As for *Rome*, its Fortune was read by *Virgil*; when he said that it only ought to excel in the Arts of Ruling. *Constantinople*, though its present Masters were not barbarous, yet is too much shut up by the Straits of *Hellespont*. *Vienna* is a Frontier Town, and has no Communication with the Ocean, but by a long compass about. *Amsterdam* is a Place of Trade, without the Mixture of Men of freer Thoughts. And, even *Paris* itself, though it is far to be preferred before all the others for the Resort of learned and inquisitive Men to it, yet is less capable, for the same Reasons for which *Athens* was, by being the Seat of Gallantry, the Arts of Speech, and Education.

But it is *London* alone, that enjoys most of the other's Advantages, without their Inconveniencies. It is the Head of a mighty Empire, the greatest that ever commanded the Ocean: It is composed of Gentlemen, as well as Traders: It has a large Intercourse with all the Earth: It is, as the Poets describe their House of Fame, a City, where all the Noises and Business in the World do meet: And therefore this Honour is justly due to it, to be the constant Place of Residence for that Knowledge, which is to be made up of the Reports and Intelligence of all Countries.

To this I will add; that we have another help in our Hands, which almost forces this Crown on the Head of the *English* Nation: And that is, the noble and inquisitive Genius of our Merchants. This cannot be better shewn, than by comparing them with those of that one Country, which only stands in Competition with us for Trade. The Merchants of *England* live honourably in foreign Parts; those of *Holland* meanly, minding their Gain alone: Ours converse freely, and learn from all; having in their Behaviour very much of the Gentility of the Families, from which so many of them are descended: The

others when they are abroad, ſhew, that they are only a Race of plain Citizens, keeping themſelves moſt within their own Cells, and Ware-houſes; ſcarce regarding the Acquaintance of any, but thoſe with whom they Traffick. This Largeneſs of ours, and Narrowneſs of their Living, does, no doubt, conduce very much to enrich them; and is, perhaps, one of the Reaſons that they can ſo eaſily under-ſell us: But withal it makes ours the moſt capable, as theirs unfit, to promote ſuch an Enterprize, as this of which I am now ſpeaking. For indeed, the Effects of their ſeveral Ways of Life are as different: Of the *Hollanders*, I need ſay no more, but of the *Engliſh* Merchants I will affirm, that in all Sorts of Politeneſs, and Skill in the World and human Affairs, they do not only excel them, but are equal to any other Sort of Men amongſt us.

This I have ſpoken not to leſſen the Reputation of that induſtrious People: But, that I might (if it were poſſible) inflame their Minds to an Emulation of this Deſign. They have all Things imaginable to ſtir them up; they have the Examples of the greateſt Wits of other Countries, who have left their own Homes, to retire thither, for the Freedom of their philoſophical Studies: They have one Place (I mean the *Hague*) which may be ſoon made the very Copy of a Town in the new *Atlantis*; which for its Pleaſantneſs, and for the Concourſe of Men of all Conditions to it, may be counted, above all others, (except *London*) the moſt advantageouſly ſeated for this Service.

Theſe have been the Privileges and Practices of the Royal Society, in Things Foreign and Native. It would now be needleſs to ſet down all the Steps of their Progreſs about them; how they obſerved all the Varieties of Generations and Corruptions, natural and artificial; all the Increaſings and Leſſenings, Agreements and Oppoſitions of Things; how, having found out a Cauſe, they have applied it to many other Effects, and the Effects to different Cauſes; how they are wont to change the Inſtruments, and Places, and Quantities of Matter, according to Occaſions; and all the other Subtilties and Windings of Tryal, which are almoſt infinite to expreſs. I ſhall only, in paſſing, touch on theſe two Things which they have moſt carefully conſulted.

The one is, not to preſcribe to themſelves any certain Art of experimenting, within which to circumſcribe their Thoughts; but rather to keep themſelves free, and change their Courſe, according to the different Circumſtances that occur to them in their Operations, and the ſeveral Alterations of the Bodies on which they Work. The true experimenting, has this one thing inſeparable from it, never to be a fixed and ſettled Art, and never to be limited by conſtant Rules. This, perhaps, may be ſhewn too, in other Arts; as in that of Invention, of which, though in Logick and Rhetorick, ſo many Bounds and Helps are given; yet I believe very few have argued or diſcourſed by thoſe Topicks. But whether that be unconfin'd, or no, it is certain that experimenting is; like that which is called *Decence* in human Life: Which, though it be that, by which all our Actions are to be faſhioned, and though many things may be plauſibly ſaid upon it; yet it is never wholly to be reduced to ſtanding Precepts; and may almoſt as eaſily be obtained, as defined.

Their other Care has been, to regard the leaſt, and the plaineſt Things, and thoſe that may appear at firſt, the moſt inconſiderable, as well as the greateſt Curioſities. This was viſibly neglected by the Antients. The Hiſtories of *Pliny*, *Ariſtotle*, *Solinus*, *Ælian*, abounding more with pretty Tales, and fine monſtrous Stories, than ſober and fruitful Relations. If they could gather together ſome extraordinary Qualities of Stones or Minerals, ſome Rarities of the Age, the Food,

Food, the Colour, the Shapes of Beaſts, or ſome Vertues of Fountains, or Rivers, they thought they had performed the chiefeſt Part of Natural Hiſtorians. But this Courſe is ſubject to much Corruption: It is not the true following of Nature; for, that ſtill goes on in a ſteady Road, nor is it ſo extravagant, and ſo artificial in its Contrivances, as our Admiration, proceeding from our Ignorance, makes it. It is alſo a Way that, of all others, is moſt ſubject to be deceiv'd; for it will make Men inclinable to bend the Truth much awry, to raiſe a ſpecious Obſervation out of it: It ſtops the ſevere Progreſs of Enquiry, infecting the Mind, and making it averſe from the true Natural Philoſophy: It is like Romances, in reſpect of true Hiſtory; which, by multiplying Varieties of extraordinary Events and ſurpriſing Circumſtances, makes that ſeem dull and taſteleſs. And, to ſay no more, the very Delight which it raiſes, is nothing ſo ſolid; but, as the Satisfaction of Fancy, it affects us a little in the Beginning, but ſoon wearies and ſurfeits: Whereas a juſt Hiſtory of Nature, like the Pleaſure of Reaſon, would not be, perhaps, ſo quick and violent, but of far longer Continuance in its Contentment.

Excerpta ex Regiæ Scientiarum Academiæ *Hiſtoriâ.*

Autore Johanne Baptiſtâ Du Hamel.

Præscriptæ *LUDOVICO Magno* Regiæ Scientiarum Academiæ Sanctiones.

Quo teſtatior ſit omnibus ſolita Ludovici *magni erga Regiam Scientiarum Academiam benevolentia, hæc ſtatuit Rex munificentiſſimus, quæ ritè deincepts obſervantur.*

1. PERPETUUS Regiæ Scientiarum Academiæ patronus Rex eſto. Academia regis mandata ab eorum uno, qui ſunt à ſecretioribus, quem huic muneri Rex ipſe præfecerit, accipiat.

2. Prædicta Academia ex quatuor Academicorum ordinibus conſtabit, honorariorum, penſionariorum, aggregatorum, & alumnorum; prima claſſis denos, tres aliæ vicenos habebunt. Neque quiſquam, niſi qui à rege vel aſſumptus, vel probatus fuerit, ulli claſſi adſcribetur.

3. Honorarii omnes regnicolæ ſint, eruditione vel in mathematicis, vel in phyſicis ſpectabiles; ex quibus unus præſes erit; neque ullus unquam in penſionariorum ordinem tranſcribetur.

4. Penſionarii omnes Lutetiæ domicilium habeant. Ex iis tres geometræ ſint, tres aſtronomiæ, tres mechanicis, tres anatomicis, chymicis tres, tres itidem Botanicis operam dent, quibus unus Secretarius, & Quæſtor unus addantur.

5. Aggregatorum idem numerus eſto: Ex quibus placet duodecim eſſe regnicolas; duoſque geometriæ, aſtronomiæ duos, duos item mechanicis, totidem anatomiæ, chymiæ & botanicæ operam Navare: Octo verò reliqui Galli ſint an externi, nullo diſcrimine cenſeantur; harum diſciplinarum & artium quam libuerit amplectantur.

6. Quiſquis in alumnorum ordinem adſcribetur, is Lutetiæ Pariſiorum degito, & quod doctrinæ genus profitebitur academicus penſionarius, cui datus fuerit, in id incumbito. Quod ſi quis quum penſionariorum, tum etiam alumnorum

rum ad ea vocetur munera, quæ alibi quam in urbe præſentiam aſſiduam exigunt, in ejus locum alius, perinde ac ſi mortis causâ vacaret, ſufficiatur.

7. Cum locus vacabit honorarii, academicorum ſuffragio legatur, qui à rege comprobetur.

8. Cum locus vacabit penſionarii, tres academicorum ſuffragio legantur, ex quibus duo ſaltem aggregati, aut alumni ſint, iique regi, ut quem videbitur aſſumat offerantur.

9. Cum locus vacabit aggregati, duo ſimiliter academicorum ſuffragio legantur, quorum unus ſaltem è numero ſit alumnorum; iique regi, ut quem videbitur aſſumat, ſiſtantur.

10. Qui vacuum alumni locum obtineat, penſionarius ipſe legito; qui, ſi probatus fuerit academicorum ſuffragio, regi poſtea proponatur.

11. Nemo ad obtinendum in academia locum, niſi qui ſit integris moribus, & ſpectatâ probitate, regi offeratur.

12. Nemo regulari inſtituto adſtrictus in academiam niſi fortè in honorarii locum aſſumatur.

13. Nemo quoque in penſionariorum aut aggregatorum ordinem, niſi is aut ex aliquo opere, eóque inſigni edito, aut ex alicujus diſciplinæ curriculo cum laude confecto; aut alicujus machinæ, aliuſve cujuſpiam rei non ignobilis inventione claruerit, regi proponatur.

14. Nemo in penſionariorum, aut aggregatorum ordinem, niſi qui ſaltem vigeſimum quintum ætatis annum attigerit, nominetur.

15. Nemo pariter infra viginti annorum ætatem in alumnorum ordinem adſciſcatur.

16. Conventus academici diebus Mercurii & Sabbati, in regiis ædibus celebrentur. Quibus diebus ſi feſtum intervenerit, pridie habeantur.

17. Unaquæque conventuum academicorum ſeſſio duarum ſaltem horarum, à tertiâ ad quintam eſto.

18. Feriæ Academicæ ab octavo Septembris die, ad undecimum uſque Novembris producantur. Præterea quindenis Paſchatis diebus, necnon hebdomadâ Pentecoſtes, & a nativitate Chriſti, ad Epiphaniam uſque Vacationis ſunto.

19. Academicorum unuſquiſque conventus omnes frequentet: Neque Penſionariorum quiſquam negotiorum ſuorum cauſâ, extra induciarum tempus, ultra duos menſes, niſi impetratâ a Rege veniâ, abſit.

20. Cum multa ex operibus ab academiâ univerſim elaboratis incurrere incommoda uſus ipſe docuerit; Academicorum unuſquiſque peculiarem ſibi ſtudiorum ſuorum materiam ſumito, de quâ ad Academiam referat, ut mutuis obſervationibus veritas illuſtretur.

21. Primo quoque ſingulorum annorum conventu, Penſionarii academici quod ſibi propoſitum opus habeant, in quo elaborent, ſcripto denuncient; cæteri quoque, ut idem faciant, invitentur.

22. Quanquam ſinguli Academici ad ea præcipuè quæ ſunt ejus artis, cui ſe potiſſimum addixerunt, animum appellere debent; univerſi tamen cogitationes ſuas & labores eo conferant, unde utilitas aut lux aliqua ad diverſas matheſeos partes, vel ad artium incrementa, vel ad Hiſtoriæ naturalis notitiam poſſit accedere.

23. In unoquoque congreſſu, duo ſaltem ex penſionariis quaſdam obſervationes in eam, cui incumbunt, ſcientiam recitent. Aggregatis item quicquid cogitaverint aut obſervaverint, promendi poteſtas eſto. Cùm Honorariis, tùm Penſionariis,

riis, tùm etiam aggregatis, juxta artes ſuas de propoſito argumento cogitata promendi poteſtas ſit, non item alumnis, niſi cum a Præſide rogati fuerint.

24. Quæcunque ab Academicis in conventum afferentur obſervationes, eo ipſo die Secretario deſcriptæ tradantur; ut, ubi uſus fuerit, conſulantur.

25. Quæcunque ab Academicis Experimenta proferentur, ab iiſdem in conventu, ſi commodum erit: Sin minus nonnullis coram iterentur.

26. Si qui fortè inter ſe diſſentiant Academici, in id intenta Academia ſit; ne quis aſperioribus verbis, vel ſcripto, vel voce, alterum inſectetur, eadem, in oppugnandâ quorumvis doctorum ſententiâ, moderatio ſit.

27. Ut quam primum edoceatur Academia, ſi quid novi cum in Mathematicis, tum in phyſicis repertum fuerit, id ei curæ ſit, ut cum Eruditis ſeu Lutetiæ, ſeu in provinciis degant, imo etiam cum exteris literarum commercia tueatur. Quod qui fecerit diligentiſſimé, is in quavis electione competitoribus anteponatur.

28. Id muneris uni alicui ex Academicis injungatur, ut, ſi qua vel in Gallia, vel alibi prodierint in lucem ſcripta de Mathematicis aut Phyſicis, diligenter legat, & de iis ad Academiam ſic referat, ut a cenſura abſtineat, quæque uſui eſſe poterunt, ea tantummodo decerpat.

29. Quæ aliis in locis facta fuerint Experimenta, ſi res tanti viſa fuerit, hæc in Academiâ iterentur: Quod conſonum, quod abſonum fuerit, in Tabulas referatur.

30. Quæcunque opera ſtatuerit vir academicus publici juris facere, hæc vel ab Academiâ univerſâ, vel ab iis quibus datum id negotii fuerit expendantur: Alioqui non approbentur: Neque quis Academici nomen ſcriptis iis præfigat, quæ in lucem prodibunt, niſi prius ab Academiâ comprobata fuerint.

31. Academia, ſi Rex ita juſſerit, machinas omnes, quarum privilegia a Rege poſtulantur expendat: quæ ſi novæ ſint, aut utiles, id ſcripto teſtetur: Machinarum autem inventores ex typa Academiæ tradant.

32. Honorarii, Penſionarii, Aggregati in iis rebus quæ ad Diſciplinas & artes, tantummodo pertinent, ſuffragii jus habento.

33. Ubi de electionibus aut de rebus, ad Academiam ſpectantibus agetur, ſolis Honorariis aut Penſionariis ſuffragii jus eſto. Suffragia per Tabulas ſunto.

34. Nemo alienus ad ſolitos Academiæ conventus admittatur, niſi, ſi quis novæ alicujus machinæ, aut inventi cujuſpiam gratiâ, a Secretario introducatur.

35. Ad publicos autem cætus qui bis unoquoque anno futuri ſunt, nimirum poſtridie Sancti Martini & Feſtorum Paſchalium quivis admittatur.

36. Præſes una cum Honorariis in ſuprema menſæ parte ſedeat; ex utroque exedræ latere Penſionarii; Aggregati in extremâ parte; Alumnorum vero unuſquiſque pone eum Academicum ſedeat cui Alumnus datus fuerit.

37. Præſes in quolibet conceſſu, atque in iis omnibus, quæ ad Academiam ſpectabunt, id ſeduló curet, ut compoſité & ordine cuncta fiant, ipſe vel Regi, vel ei Regni Secretario, quem Rex ipſe præpoſuerit, rationem reddat.

38. In unoquoque conventu, quæcunque res in deliberationem venerit, de eâ ſententias Academici ex ordine rogantor: Quod pluribus placuerit, pronunciatur.

39. Die primo Januarii cujuſque anni, Rex Præſidem Academiæ creabit; quæ Creatio tametſi ſingulis annis erit renovanda, tamen prorogabitur hæc eidem Præſidi provincia, quamdiu Regiæ Majeſtati viſum fuerit; cumque fieri poſſit, ut vel valetudine, vel negotiis impeditus conſeſſui non interſit, Rex ſimul alterum deſignabit Academicum qui abſentis vices obeat.

40. Quæcunque

40. Quæcunque in unoquoque Academicæ conſeſſu propoſita, agitata, diſcuſſa, & conſtituta fuerint, Secretarius ſummatim colligat: Quidquid è ſcripto recitatum fuerit, in Tabulas referat. Si quid ex Academiæ Tabulis exſcriptum cuipiam ſive Academico, ſive alieno, cujus id interſit, tradatur, id Chirographo Secretarii muniatur. Vertente anno præcipuarum rerum, quæ Tabulariis continentur, breviarium per argumenta digeſtum publicetur.

41. Tabulæ cujuſcunque ſint generis, ad Academiam, quovis modo pertinentes, penes Secretarium maneant, ei ſingulæ à Præſide cum indice confeſtim tradantur: Tum menſe Decembri quot annis index recenſeatur; & iis, quæ totius anni decurſu adjecta fuerint, augeatur.

42. Secretarius ſit perpetuus: qui ſi per valetudinem aut probabilem aliquam cauſam intereſſe conventibus non poterit quem volet ex Academicis, qui vicem ſuam impleat, ſeligat.

43. Libri omnes, inſtrumenta, Machinæ, cætera denique Academiæ ſupellex quæſtoris cuſtodiæ tradatur. Cum officium hoc aggredietur, huic Præſes cuncta ex perſcripto indice tradito, index vertente anno a Præſide recenſeatur: Si qua facta fuerit acceſſio per totum anni decurſum, ea in indicem referatur.

44. Quæſtor, quæ res ſuæ fidei concreditæ ſunt, earum viris doctis & viſere cupientibus copiam faciat. Eas extra repoſitorium exportari injuſſu Academiæ ne ſinat. Si quid ſuper hac re juſſerit Academia, id ſcriptum habeat.

45. Quæſtor autem perpetuus eſto, ſi quando legitimâ de cauſâ quæ ſunt ſui muneris obire non poterit, unum ex Academicis, qui vicem ſuam gerat, deſignet.

46. Quo facilior ſit diverſorum quæ ab Academicis elaborari poterunt operum Editio, Rex Academiæ poteſtatem facit eligendi ſibi typographum cui hujus electionis ergo, quæ neceſſaria ſunt, tum excudendis, tum dividendis Academicorum operibus, ab ipſamet Academiâ probatis, privilegia Rex jubebit expediri.

47. Quo magis ad labores ſuos continuandos excitentur Academici, Rex ſolitas penſiones impertietur, inſuper beneficia extra ordinem, pro dignitate operum largietur.

48. Quo etiam Academici ſuis in ſtudiis adjuventur & quam quiſque profitetur artem magis ac magis promoveat; qui ad varia experimenta, aut diſquiſitiones neceſſarii ſunt, ſumptus Rex pro munificentia, & benignitate ſuâ ſuppeditare perget.

49. Ut ſua ſit aſſiduitati in Academiæ congreſſibus merces, Academicis Penſionariis qui unicuique conſeſſui aderunt, Rex quadraginta numiſmata largietur.

50. Placet Demum uti hæ conſtitutiones proximo conſeſſu recitentur, in Tabulas referantur, & diligentiſſime, prout jacent, obſerventur. Quod ſi quis Academicus contra fecerit, is pro delicti gravitate pœnas Regi perſolvat. Datum in Regia Verſaliarum, die Januarii vigeſimo ſeptimo. Anno milleſimo ſexcenteſimo nonageſimo nono.

Regiæ

Regiæ Scientiarum Academiæ Hiſtoria.

SECTIO I.

Quæ rationes moverint Regem Chriſtianiſſimum *ut* Scientiarum Academiam *inſtitueret.*

I. PAX Galliam inter & Hiſpaniam, Anno 1659, conſtituta præter alios benè multos hunc attulit fructum, ut bonarum artium ſtudia acriora quàm uſquam antea excitaret. Jam eruditorum cœtus frequentiores celebrari cœperunt, qui cogitata ſua & inventa inter ſe conferrent: quo quidem nihil utilius perficiendis artibus & promovendis diſciplinis fieri poteſt.

Noſtra quidem hac ætate in Gallia, Italia, Anglia, & Germania, complures prodierunt Academiæ, non ex omnibus promiſcué, ſed ex eruditis & delectis viris conflatæ, quæ humanioribus litteris, & exquiſitis diſciplinis perpoliendis magno fuerunt adjumento. Sed hoc unum pleriſque defuit, ut ſuprema auctoritate & principum liberalitate munirentur.

Utrumque Scientiarum Academiæ Regis invictiſſimi munificentia eſt conſecuta. Nam ſancito cum Hiſpania pacis fœdere ſibi glorioſo, & ſubditis perutili, Rex Chriſtianiſſimus curas omnes & cogitationes ſuas ad regni adminiſtrationem, & populis ſuis felicitatem procurandam, convertit; ac primum morbis omnibus quos grave diuturnumque bellum invexerat, mederi voluit, tum imperio ſuo tot victoriis aucto litterarum & ſcientiarum ſplendorem adjicere cogitavit. Eam porro tutiſſimam præclaris artibus promovendis rationem fore judicavit, ſi Societatem ex doctis & ſelectis viris congregaret, qui collatis inter ſe ſtudiis et inventis, multo majores progreſſus facerent, quam ſi in ſua quiſque arte aut ſcientia ſeorſim elaboraret.

Hanc Academiam, non tantum eo nomine utilem fore exiſtimavit, quod fructuoſa & novis inventis ferax futura eſſet, ſed vel ex eo maximè, quod ab aliis excogitata, quæque ex publico uſu eſſe poſſunt, diligentiùs expendens, illud imprimis caveret, ne ſumptus inutiles in probandis ſingulorum inventis inſumerentur. Nam ſæpe evenit ut ingenioſos homines inventionis calor decipiat. Quæque incurrunt difficultates non intento ſatis animo proſpiciant. Quin etiam cogitationes ſuas interdum ea veri ſpecie ſic obducunt ut difficillimum ſit verum a falſo ſecernere, niſi acre & ſeverum peritiorum judicium acceſſerit. Sed ubi quæ propoſita ſunt, accurato ſubjecta fuerint examini, tum de executione ipſa, & de eorum uſu faciliùs poterit judicari; ac demum neceſſarii ſumptus iis perficiendis tutiùs ſuppeditantur, qui non raro majores ſunt quam privatorum vires ferre poſſint. Atque hoc accuratum & diligens examen hoc utilius futurum eſt, quod auctores ipſi privilegiis ſibi conceſſis plerumque abutantur, dum alios ſubinde in Societatem non ſine magno utrorumque damno inducunt. Id quoque probé noverat Rex ſapientiſſimus non aliam excogitari poſſe artibus & diſciplinis promovendis rationem magis Idoneam, quam ſi veterum cogitata experimentis, et velut oculis ipſis ſubjicerentur, ac ſubinde novis & utilibus inventis, quæ ſunt acriorum meditationum fructus, augerentur, quæ ratio nunquam hactenus tentata eſt, ne ab iis quidem

principibus, qui bonas artes majori ſtudio coluerunt, hoc ſcilicet Ludovico magno fuit propoſitum, cum de inſtituenda Scientiarum Academiâ cogitavit.

II. Placuit Chriſtianiſſimo Regi ejus rei, quam mente conceperat, atque è publica utilitate futuram judicaverat, executionem ipſam illuſtriſſimo viro D. Colbert demandare. Hunc, ante aliquot annos, inter præcipuos regni ſui ad miniſtros ſelegerat, illiuſque acerrimum judicium, fidem, & diligentiam incredibilem in adminiſtratione ærarii, & in præclaris quibuſque publicæ rei muneribus perſpecta habebat & cognita. Magno is quoque artium & ſcientiarum promovendarum ſtudio ardebat, omnino perſuaſus eas inter præcipua regni ornamenta & publicæ felicitatis inſtrumenta cenſeri; neque aliud eſſe majus & illuſtrius florentis Imperii indicium, quam ſi litteris ut armis honos habeatur.

III. Huic igitur perilluſtri viro Rex maximus id muneris dedit, ut rem ipſam executioni mandaret. Is adeo cum doctis & perſpicacis ingenii viris inito conſilio ſtatuit eam ſocietatem ex viris qui in Phyſicis & in Mathematicis diſciplinis eſſent verſatiſſimi, cogi oportere: Sic tamen ut ſinguli unam ex iis præter cæteras colerent, reliquas non omitterent. Id enim perſuaſum habebat vir eximius eas diſciplinas ita inter ſe eſſe connexas & conſertas, ut difficillimum ſit quemquam vel in una ex iis excellere, niſi alias quoque non leviter attigerit. Huic etiam nonnulli auctores fuerunt, ut Academia non ex Geometris modo & Phyſicis, ſed etiam ex iis conſtaret viris, qui à politioribus litteris, & ab Hiſtoria imprimis eſſent inſtructi. Quod utique vehementer approbavit; ſimul id conſtituit, ut Geometræ & Phyſicæ Mercurii & Sabbati diebus, die quidem Mercurii ſeparatim, die Sabbati unâ convenirent eum in locum Regiæ Bibliothecæ ubi exſtant libri de his diſciplinis conſcripti. Conſimili ratione qui Hiſtoriæ dabant operam, Lunæ & Jovis diebus eó ſe reciperent, ubi Hiſtorici Libri continentur. Qui denique in politioribus litteris, Grammaticis nimirum, Poëtica, & Eloquentia ſtudium ſuum poſuerant, hi diebus Martis & Veneris ſimul aggregarentur: Ac demum ut die Jovis cujuſque Menſis primo omnes illæ Societates unâ coïrent, ubi ab iis qui in unaquaque Academia deſignati fuerant, (Secretarios vocant,) ut res diſcuſſas & dijudicatas ſcriptis mandarent, relatione facta in generali illo congreſſu unicuique liceret, quæ ſibi difficiliora viderentur proponere ex tempore ſolvenda. Quod ſi majores eſſent difficultates quàm ut ſtatim diſſolvi poſſent, ac ſubinde metuendum foret, ne una vel altera objectio, tempus omne congreſſus abſumeret, tum quæ contra dicerentur Scriptis proponenda & eorum rationes diluendæ: quod hæc ſit ratio & brevior & tutior veri dijudicandi. Ubi iis eſſet abunde ſatisfactum, aut nihil occurreret, quod merito opponi poſſet, tum quod propoſitum fuerat, ut totius conventûs judicium haberetur.

IV. Hæc prima fuit Academiæ inſtituendæ forma deſignata, quæ in eo ſtatu diù permanere non potuit. Nam in ortu ſuo ſtatim ob certas rationes ea fuit extincta quæ hiſtoriæ illuſtrandæ gratia fuerat conſtituta. Cum enim hiſtoria & eccleſiaſtica maximè cum theologicis quæſtionibus, iiſque imprimis quæ ad publicum eccleſiæ regimen ſpectant, arctiſſime conjuncta videatur, atque ex iis quæ ſunt facti, perſæpe quæ juris ſunt deducantur, periculum erat, ne ille doctorum hominum congreſſus quos minime opus erat, offenderet.

Nec diutius ſtetit eorum conventus qui politioribus litteris dabant operam, ſed feliciorem tamen habuit exitum. Cum enim majori ex parte ii eſſent Franciæ Academiæ Socii, Gallicæ linguæ peritiſſimi; cumque primus hujus Academiæ ardor temporum lapſu plurimùm deſerbuiſſet, adeo ut jam pene deſerta & interitui proxima videretur, nonnulli ex iis, quos D. Colbert ſelegerat, ſuæ ſocietatis amore ducti, quam penè neglectum cernebant, auctores illi fuere, ut eandem benignitatem

tatem & curam in veterem Academiam conferret, quam huic novæ Societati tribuebat, neque id opus esse, ut diversi cætus iisdem de rebus cogerentur, præsertim, cum iidem utramque Academiam componerent: Nec dubitabant, quin illa Academia pristinum suum splendorem recuperaret, si Rex maximus eam, suâ benevolentiâ, suoque Præsidio complecti dignaretur. Consilium illud homini prudentissimo non probari, non potuit, qui ad restituendam, & sustentandam illam Academiam animum adjunxit, ac paucis post annis cum illustrissimus Seguierius Franciæ Cancellarius diem suum obiisset, Ludovicus magnus hanc Societatem in suam clientelam accepit, quod illi quasi novum ortum dedit. Quin et D. Colbert, in hujus Corporis Societatem ascisci, non recusavit, & interdum cætibus adesse, ita ut nunquam majore, in honore, aut splendore, fuerit illustris, hæc Societas.

VI. Atque hunc habuit exitum humaniorum litterarum schola, ut vocant Græci, eaque cum Academia Francica confusa est: adeò ut Geometrarum & Physicorum Academia sola perstiterit, quæ primævam sui ortus vim & robur semper retinuit, nec de pristino suo studio quicquam remisit.

Ac Mathematici quidem primi sex aut septem ad summum convenere mense Junio, anni 1666. Hi porrò erant D. D. Carcavy, Huygens, de Roberval, Frenicle, Auzolt, Picard & Buot. Atque ea fuit prima hujus Academiæ institutio, quæ ex Geometris penè solis adhuc constabat.

SECTIO II.

De primis hujus Academiæ exordiis.

I. HOC omnibus Academiis, quæ nostra hac ætate in tota penè Europa sunt institutæ, Propositum fuit, ut Physicam & Disciplinas, quæ ex ea fluxerunt, observationibus & experimentis, non temerè & casu, sed certa ratione & consilio factis subnixam illustrarent. Nullos enim progressus faciet nobilis illa Scientia, quamdiù ratio ab experientia divelletur, aut vagis quibusdam & confusis notionibus contenti, circa verborum pugnas hærebunt; cum, denique, systemata ad libidinem efficta, velut fundamenta huic Scientiæ substernentur. Nam genuina philosophiæ naturalis principia sunt observationes & experimenta. His utique, ut alio loco monuimus, si destituatur, vaga erit & incerta. Ratio quippe sine experientia et sibi uni relicta, velut navis, sine gubernatore, fluctuat, ac vicissim experientia, cui ratio non prælucet, cæca est, & inconsulta, nec quicquam ferè utile procreat.

II. Ea quidem mente, eo consilio Ludovicus Magnus Academiam formare statuit ex viris nimirum fama & nomine jam cognitis, iisque non eruditis modo, sed quod majus est, expertis conflatum, qui multa legissent, & vidissent, quique nulli secti velut jurati essent addicti, quos omne disciplinarum genus oblectaret quidem, sed unam tamen ex iis præ cæteris colerent. Hos diligendi Domino Colbert cura, ut diximus, a Rege fuit demandata. In quo quidem idem judicium, & eandem diligentiam, qua in maximis rebus uti solebat, adhibuit. Ac præter eos qui a nobis sunt nominati, quique ad Mathesim, imprimis, animum adjunxerant, hos elegit qui physicis in rebus excellere magis videbantur, D. de la Chambre, Medicum Regis ordinarium, D. Perault, omni genere Scientiarum naturalium præstantem, D. D. du Clos, & Bourdelin, in Chymiæ laboribus valde exercitatos, D. D. Pecquet, & Gayen Anatomiæ peritos, D. Marchant in Botanicis imprimis versatum. Pauçis ante mensibus eodem me honore affecerat, atque,

ut loquuntur, Secretarium Academiæ deſignaverat, ut quæ proponerentur, ſcriptis exciperem, & in Commentarios referrem: Utriſque & Geometris, & Phyſicis, adjunxerat juvenes ingenio & ſcientia præſtantes, D. D. Niquet, Couplet, Richer, Pivert, d'Avois, & alios quoſdam pereruditos, qui poſtea publicis operibus magna cum laude præfuerunt.

III. Die 22° Decembris anni 1666, duæ illæ Societates in unam coaluere, ac Geometræ ſimul & Phyſici in aulam Regiæ Bibliothecæ convenerunt, ubi D. de Carcavi quæ eſſet Regis voluntas expoſuit, quo conſilio eos convocaſſet, nempe, ut omnes ſummo ſtudio & cura, in promovendis his diſciplinis, elaborarent, ob id maximè à D. Colbert delectos fuiſſe, ut aliquid ad publicam utilitatem, & ad Regis gloriam, ſpectabile efficerent.

In eo Congreſſu deliberatum fuit, utrum ex Phyſicis & Mathematicis una & eadem, an duplex Societas coaleſceret, an utique unâ, aut ſeparatim convenirent. Omnium penè ea fuit ſententia, ambas ſocietates, quæ ſibi mutuas præſtant operas, ſeparari non oportere. Qui enim in mathematicis diſciplinis præcellunt iidem ferè a Philoſophiâ naturali ſunt inſtructi, ac Geometrarum accurata & ſolida concludendi ratio nuſquam utilior videtur, quàm eruditorum ſocietati, ubi facile a propoſito abduci, & conjecturis tanquam demonſtrationibus vis & pondus addi ſolet. Ex prioribus Geometria probat inſequentia, ex certis incerta. Apud eos illud eſt capitale in Paralogiſmum incurrere; ſimplicior demum hæc eſt, & ſeverior docendæ veritatis ratio: Nam ad veritatem nititur, non ad oſtentationem. Ea eſt inter Phyſicam & Matheſim cognatio, ut unam ab alia ſejungi, non oporteat: Nam motuum leges & gravium deſcenſus, aeris & aliorum corporum vis elaſtica, luminis reflexio & refractio, quiquid demum ad viſum pertinet, vel auditum, mundi ſyſtema, corporum cœleſtium motus, atque id omne quod ad Staticam ſpectat, Animalium Organa ad leges mechanicas aptata, ne vix quidem poſſunt ſine aliqua matheſeos cognitione percipi. Nec ferè alia ratio afferri poteſt, cur Phyſica tot retro ſæculis velut effæta & ſterilis permanſerit, ac nullos penè fecerit progreſſus, quàm quod mathematicæ diſciplinæ ab iis qui Phyſicam coluerunt, penè neglectæ fuerint; ac noſtra quidem ætate qui Phyſicæ majora attulerunt incrementa, iidem Matheſi imprimis exculti fuerunt, ut, Galilæus, Gaſſendus, Cabeus, Carteſius, Honoratus Fabry, ut alios penè innumerabiles, omittam, tùm eos qui vivere deſierunt, tùm etiam complures, qui adhuc vivunt, & Philoſophiam naturalem plurimùm auxerunt.

IV. Quamobrem id omnium conſenſu fuit conſtitutum, ut omnes, cùm Geometræ, tùm Phyſici bis in unaquaque hebdomadâ unâ convenirent: Sic tamen, ut die Mercurii, quæ ad Matheſim, die Sabbati, quæ ad Phyſicam ſpectant, tractarentur. Illud eodem quoque die ſtatutum, ut quæ in Academia gererentur, non vulgarentur, niſi hoc ipſum faciendum ea judicaſſet. Quod utique cùm per ſe æquum eſt, tùm in omni ſodalitio & Societate, obſervandum. Cum autem vix illud conſequi liceat, ut nemo unus ex multis qui una congregantur, nova & cognitione digna in cætu ipſo propoſita amicis & familiaribus impartiri non amet, ſæpè evenit, ut quædam feliciter inventa & longiori ſilentio tecta ab aliis evulgata fuerint; ſive eadem excogitarint, quod non raro accidit hac potiſſimùm ætate, cum omnes eruditi in perficiendis artibus & diſciplinis, tanto ſtudio elaborent; ſive in eodem argumento feliciter verſati ea ſit mentis celeritate & ingenii ſolertia, ut leviter admoniti artificium omne alicujus machinæ, aut quodvis aliud ſtatim percipiant, & melius interdum exequantur, quem ii ipſi qui eamdem primi excogitarunt. Quod Galilæo eveniſſe in præclara Teleſcopii inventione fugit neminem. Cum enim in familiari colloquio a viro nobili accepiſſet Batavum quemdam in Mathematicis rudem, ſic duo aptare vitra, ut res objectas & majores & diſtinctiores

distinctiores cerneret, ut erat perspicaci ingenio, & in Dioptrica apprimè versatus, quo id fieret modo, statim animo complexus, quod casu & temere ab alio inventum fuerat, ratione duce penè ad summam perduxit. Nam vitra sic expoliri jussit, Idonea figura donari, ac tubo aptari, ut Jovis satellites, phases Veneris, & innumerabiles in via lactea, stellulas primus deprehenderit.

V. Non illud quidem permagni refert ad publicam utilitatem id nosse, quis primus præclari alicujus inventi auctor fuerit, dummodo magna hinc in publicum manent commoda: Æquum tamen videtur ut quantum fieri potest, iis ipsis honos habeatur, qui res novas & utiles primi excogitarunt. Nobile illud, novis inventis & operibus scientias ornandi studium, quo nostri hujus sæculi fervent ingenia, & laudabilis inter eruditos, imo & inter diversas nationes, Æmulatio, mirum quantum ad promovendas disciplinas confert, dummodo intra eum consistat modum, quem ratio & honestas præscribunt: Ac nescio an quicquam aliud eruditorum cætus magis commendet, & utiliores efficiat: Hac enim sublata æmulatione Academiæ magna ex parte langueſcunt, ac nihil ferè utile proferunt.

Sed ea quam diximus adhibenda est moderatio, quæ si absit, cætus illi in vanas & molestas contentiones degenerant. Idque in publicis cætibus, ad quos omnibus, sine discrimine, patet aditus, sæpe contingit: Tùm enim difficillimum est omnem vitare confusionem. Nam disputationis æstu abrepti, non tam veritatis, quam victoriæ studio tenemur: Ita persæpe, pudor, deformis pertinacia nos transversos agunt, ac tenebras offendunt animis, non eos veritatis luce complent.

VI. Postremo hi conventus consumendi otii causa cum voluptate quadam magis instituti videntur, quam ut aliquid genere humano utile reperiatur; non enim iidem eruditi eo conveniunt, sed alii atque alii, ut libitum est. Unde difficile est ullum ibi argumentum accuratè & diligentèr pertractare. Hoc tamen commodi afferunt, ut multis subinde qui id sibi facile persuadent nihil utile, nihil homine dignum in rerum naturalium investigatione inesse, gustum quemdam, ut ita dicam, bonarum artium ingenerent. Quin & eam abstergunt rubiginem quæ in scholis interdum contrahitur, ubi vehemens animorum contentio parit molestam, contradicendi libidinem, cumque circa quæstionem vagas, aut voces barbaras occupantur, nunquam ad res ipsas & experimenta descendunt. Quanquam exercitationes illæ scholasticæ aut ad forum parant adolescentum ingenia, aut ad alias vitæ functiones, in quibus vita civilis versatur, quæ profundas Geometrarum speculationes, aut nimis retrusam mysteriorum naturæ cognitionem non postulant.

VII. Quocirca illud fateri, bona fide cogimur, publicos congressus sua quidem utilitate non carere, sed eos nihil aut parum conferre posse ad ea quæ Rex invictissimus sibi proposuit, ut par est, exequenda, nempe ut promoveantur artes & scientiæ naturales: Adeo ut non mediocres inde fructus in publicum deriventur. Non enim hoc loco agitur de ingenii sui aut eruditionis ostentatione, sed de iis inveniendis quæ publicæ utilitati serviunt. Quæ ab aliis fuerunt inventa, justo & severo examini sunt subjicienda, ut nova authoritate muniantur crebræ & accuratæ observationes, experimenta demum facienda quæ certa ratione fieri debent, non temere aut inconsulto. Hoc enim non experiri, sed palpare est in tenebris atque in rebus parvi momenti tempus & operam consumere.

VIII. Ne illud quidem inficiamur publicos illos eruditorum congressus qui primùm apud illustrissimum non mortium libellorum supplicum magistrum, tum apud D. Thevenot sunt celebrati, plurimùm momenti attulisse naturalibus disciplinis promovendis; eò conveniebant doctissimi quique, & si quid recens inventum fuisset, diligenter & accuratè expendi solebat. Complures viri qui postea & scriptis & præclaris inventis illustres fuere, & Galli & exteri eo frequenter veniebant. Atque ut alios omittam, Steno cum adhuc juvenis, postea Episcopus ibi

industriam

induſtriam & eruditionem ſuam, in rebus anatomicis primùm exhibuit; ac neſcio an illorum cætuum occaſione celeberrimæ Academiæ brevi poſt tempore in variis Europæ regionibus non fuerint proſeminatæ.

IX. Nam ut rem ipſam ab altiori repetamus exordio, jam ante Quinquaginta annos, ingenio, & doctrina præſtantes viri, quique matheſim & phyſicam imprimis coluerunt, non una & certis diebus, ſed cùm libitum erat, apud P. Merſennum conveniebant, & inter alios conſpicui erant Gaſſendus, Carteſius, Hobbeſius, Robervallius, Paſchalis uterq; parens & filius, Blondellus & alii. Hos utique ſeparatim rogabat Merſennus ut propoſitum aliquod problema expenderent, aut experimenta quædam certo fine aut conſilio facerent. Et quidem eæ diſciplinæ quæ ex geometria & phyſica permiſtæ, quæq; ad vitæ humanæ cultum ſunt utiliores, & majori voluptate animum complent, nunquam magis excultæ videntur.

X. Ac merito dubitari poteſt an ulla alia ætas plures ingenio & eruditione præſtantes extulerit viros, qui phyſicam, anatomen, matheſim vel puriorem, vel phyſicæ admiſtam majore ſtudio & animi contentione coluerint, quam ætas illa magnis ingeniis ferax. Tum enim in Italia adhuc in vivis erat inſignis ille mathematicus & philoſophus Galilæus Galilæi, qui brevi poſt tempore diem ſuum obiit; tum ejus ſucceſſor florebat, Torricellus, ut taceam de Cavallerio, Cabeo, Scheinero, & aliis bene multis. In Gallia præter eos quos appellavi florebant Carteſius, Gaſſendus, Fermat Senator Tholoſanus, Bachet, Deſargues, & in Anglia præter inſignes Geometras, ut Baronem Neper qui logarithmos primus invenit, eodem fere tempore Guillelmus Harveus regis Angliæ archiater, qui ſanguinis circuitum primus omnium, vel excogitavit, vel firmis & inconcuſſis rationibus ſic demonſtravit, ut qui conſecuti ſunt vix quicquam addiderint, tum eximium de animalium generatione libellum edidit in lucem. Tam præclara inventa peritiores ubique fere excitarunt medicos ut anatomen novis obſervationibus illuſtrarent. Brevi poſt tempore in Gallia, D. Pecquet commune chyli receptaculum & canalem thoracicum feliciter detexit. In Dania, Thomas Bartholinus vaſa lymphatica, Vvarthonius Anglus quoſdam ductus ſalivales quos Steno adhuc juvenis innumeris aliis poſtea deprehenſis accuratius expoſuit. Omitto alia complurima, quæ clariſſimus Marcellus Malpighius qui nuper e vivis exceſſit, cum eſſet ſummi Pontificis Innoc. XII. archiater, in omento, corde, Liene, cerebro obſervavit, quæque univerſam Medendi artem non mediocriter auxerunt.

XI. Ex Anglis maximè qui præ cæteris in rebus anatomicis elaborarunt, quod primi omnium ſanguinis circulationem reperiſſent, quidam certas corporis partes accuratius examinandas ſuſceperunt, ut Vvarthonius corporis glandulas, Gliſſonius jecur, Vvillis cerebrum & nervos, Lower cor ipſum, & illus motum, ac novis ſubinde inventis, hanc ſcientiam ſic locupletarunt, ut anatomia ex qua Medendi ſcientia pene univerſa pendet, majora tamen ceperit incrementa, quam unquam antea: Adeo inter eruditos valet æmulatio, ut in provehendis artibus & diſciplinis nulla res plus poſſit.

XII. Sub finem dominationis Olivarii Cromvelii complures viri nobiles quibus & hæ diſciplinæ cordis erant, quique magna ex parte Galliam & Italiam peragrarant, atque eruditorum cætui apud D. D. Monmort & Thevenot interfuerant, Oxonii unâ convenerunt, qui de rebus phyſicis inter ſe conferrent, & varia facerent experimenta. Præterquam enim earum diſciplinarum quas in dies perpoliri cernebant, ſtudio tenebantur, illud quoque vel maximum accedebat, quod legitimo ſuo regi addicti minus tutum iis videretur domi ſuæ quietos agere, quaſi

præſenti

præſenti rerum ſtatu minus contenti opportunum tempus tyranni jugum excutiendi expectarent. Ea ratione minui poſſe periculoſam Cromvelis de ſe ſuſpicionem, ſi his ſtudiis ſe dederunt, quæ tranquillitatem animi ac ſecuritatem poſtulant, id accepi a D. Boyle, anno 1669. cum Londini agerem.

XIII. Hoc genere exercitationis delectati in eo permanſerunt, ac ſocietas eorum paulatim aucta eſt, dum ſub Carolo II. Magnæ Britanniæ Rege, quem earum diſciplinarum ſtudium imprimis oblectabat, in unum corpus Londini coierunt. Tunc enim regia ſocietas Anglicana regis ipſius autoritate fuit conſtituta, & ſuis privilegiis inſtructa.

Jam, ut diximus, in Italia plures erant Academiæ quæ ad politiores litteras, & ad ea quæ ſunt vitæ civilis officia, magis ſpectabant, quam ad diſciplinarum augmentum. Excipienda tamen illuſtris Academia Florentina quæ ſereniſſimi magni Hetruriæ ducis authoritate fundata, magnos extulit viros, ut Galilæum, Torricellum, Borellum, Redi, Bellinum, &c. neque alibi fere, quam in ſcholis publicis philoſophicæ & mathematicæ diſciplinæ docebantur. Qui in obſervationibus & experimentis faciendis ſtudium ſuum & operam ponebant, ſeſe invicem inviſere contente, aut per epiſtolas, quoddam inter ſe commercium inire, quæ occurrebant difficultates, aut ſolvenda problemata ſibi mutuo proponere, aut ſi quid obſervatione dignum foret, alios ſubinde admonere, quid ſibi iis de rebus videretur, quid animo cogitaſſent, ultro aperiebant. Quod liquet ex epiſtolis Gaſſendi, Carteſii, Robervallii, Merſenni, ex vita Piereſchii. Hi utriq; inter præcipuos noſtri hujus ſæculi viros numerantur, qui in Gallia experimentalem philoſophiam promoverunt, uti & iiſdem pene temporibus Franciſcus Baco Angliæ Cancellarius, qui formam inſtaurandæ ſcientiæ naturalis & certis obſervationibus confirmandæ primus delineavit, cumque, ut ipſe ait, pene ſolus eſſet totius regni negotiis diſtrictus, is tamen omnes philoſophiæ partes non mediocriter illuſtravit.

XIV. Quod ſi Ludovicus magnus Regiam Scientiarum Academiam eo tantum inſtituiſſet modo, quo Cardinalis Richelius Academiam Francicam, aut Carolus ſecundus Anglicam ſocietatem, ac privilegiis quibuſdam eam ornare, impendiis faciendis certum deſtinare fundum contentus, magna ſanè illi haberetur gratia. Sed is non modo hanc conſtituere voluit, aut neceſſarios experimentis & obſervationibus faciendis ſuppeditare ſumptus, verum etiam placuit illi ſuæ liberalitatis ac benevolentiæ teſtimoniis eos cumulare, quos huic ſocietati certo judicio & delectu adjunxit, ut in eam cogitationes ſuas & curas omnes conferrent. Quodque mirandum magis eſt, bella quantumvis acerba nihil de regia munificentia detraxerunt, ne his quidem poſtremis annis cum tota pene Europa adverſus Galliam conjuraſſet.

SECTIO III.

Phyſicarum exercitationum primæ delineationes proponuntur.

I. NUNC ad ea veniamus in quibus Academia potiſſimum ſe exercuit, & etiamnum ſe exercet: Hoc enim præcipuum eſt hujus hiſtoriæ argumentum, idq; maxime a nobis expectari crediderim. Ac primum quidem vitandæ confuſionis cauſa de phyſicis & mathematicis laboribus, ſeparatim ſic dicendum eſt, ut rerum potius quam temporum ſeriem perſequamur. Illud quoque admonendum, hoc nobis eſſe propoſitum, non ut integros de anatomia, arte chymica, aut

aut de aliis diſciplinis libros conſcribamus, ſed tantum ut ea mandemus litteris quæ ad Academiæ hiſtoriam pertinent, quos illa progreſſus fecerit, quæ demum unoquoq; anno fuerint deſignata, quæ perfecta, exponamus. Neque in eo laborandum nobis eſt ut omnes commentarios aut tabularia exhauriamus, quod longum eſſet, nec publici ſaporis: Non enim his de rebus magna volumina ferre ætas noſtra poteſt. Sed priuſquam omnes Academiæ labores, ſigillatim & exercitationes explicentur, quid illi propoſitum maxime fuerit, quamque tenuerit viam in unaquaque diſciplina pertractanda, ante intuendum nobis eſt.

Atque ut a phyſicis rebus ordiamur, vir cum viveret ingenio & omni genere eruditionis præſtans D. Perrault, qua ratione duæ illæ Philoſophiæ naturalis partes, quæ eruditorum ſtudia imprimis ad ſe convertunt, anatomia & botanica tractandæ ſint, breviter expoſuit, atque anatomes promovendæ eam, velut formam delineavit. Anatomicas obſervationes duplicis eſſe generis, primum admonuit: Aliæ enim ad organorum ſtructuram & confirmationem referunt, aliæ in uſu organorum & eorum functionibus exquirendis verſantur: Ex organorum fabrica uſus perſæpe & actiones, ac viciſſim ex uſu & functionibus organa ipſa deteguntur.

II. Quocirca eò omnis anatomica indagatio ſpectat, ut ex organis jam notis uſus incogniti, & ex perſpectis functionibus inſtrumenta his aptata innoteſcant. Multis in hanc rem prolatis exemplis tum organorum quorum uſus adhuc ſunt in occulto, ut lienis, pancreatis, glandularum, quæ atræbiliares, aut renes ſuccenturiati dici ſolent, tum actionum, quæ cum ſint manifeſtæ, ex organis nondum ſatis bene perſpectis oriuntur: Cujus generis fortè eſt lactis generatio, & ſanguinis ipſius confectio: Tandem id concludit, hinc amplam exercitationibus Academicis materiem ſubſterni, atque ea inſiſtendum methodo, qua in rerum pene omnium inveſtigatione utimur, ſenſu nimirum, vel ratione, ac ſæpius utrumque eſſe adhibendum. Quamvis enim corporis humani notitia ex accurata omnium partium ſeparatione, & ex aſpectu ipſo pendeat, non ſoli tamen oculi judices ſunt ea in re ſatis idonei, niſi rationis accedat judicium: Secus vix de uſu partium quæ detectæ fuerunt, quicquam certi decerni poteſt, ac fruſtra ſæpe nova indagantur organa, quæ ratio ipſa minime neceſſario judicat. Itaque rationem ſimul & ſenſum una conjungere optimum fuerit. Interdum conjecturis utendum, cum demonſtrationes ſenſibiles deſunt: Conjecturas probabiles ſuppeditare ſolent ligaturæ; liquorum injectiones quibus vaſa fiunt apertiora, aut humores coagulantur, & alia ejuſmodi de quibus Idoneis locis dicemus.

III. Quæ de botanica diſſeruit, ad hæc duo capita revocantur, eas exercitationes duplicis eſſe generis: Nam vel ſunt meræ botanicæ, vel philoſophicæ: Priores quidem ad plantarum hiſtoriam pertinent, quæ multiplici ratione illuſtrari, & locupletari poteſt, ut ſuo loco dicendum erit; ſed ſtirpium ortus, cauſas & naturas exquirere diligentius, hoc philoſophi munus videtur, qui plantarum ortus & vegetationes poteſt expendere; ſi exempli gratia earum ſemina antequam terræ mandentur, intentiori animo microſcopii ope intueatur, tum iis ſæpius e terra erutis, quæ iis accidant mutationes, in magnitudine, in figura partium, in ſuccis, in coloribus animadvertat, quæ in Germine magnorum præcipue ſeminum, paulatim fiant incrementa, quæ caudicis, aut trunci, aut ramorum diſtinctio appareat. Atque ejus generis experimenta variari, iterari, expendi, tranſferri, applicari poſſunt, ut judicium fiat quoddam univerſale, aut propoſitio generalis & conſtans, ex qua rurſus nova prodeant experimenta, quibus hæc naturalis philoſophiæ pars non mediocriter augeri & illuſtrari poteſt.

Quæ

Quæ enim auctores magni nominis cùm veteres, tùm recentiores de plantis ſcripſere, ex iis confirmari poſſunt, aut rejici. An ſucci v. gr. quarundam plantarum, aut ſales ipſi e cineribus extracti eaſdem proferre poſſint, an terræ é regionibus diſſitis allatæ iiſdem plantis procreandis ſint Idoneæ, an quædam ſponte naſcantur è terra altius defoſſa?

IV. Circa plantarum nutritionem illud ut obſervatione & accuratiore indagatione dignum propoſuit, utrum id commune habeant cum animalium nutritione & augmento, ut pars quædam ſit præcipua, quæ alias regat & moderetur, qualis fortè eſt radix ipſa, quæ prima ſuccum é terra exſugens eam parat & coquit, atque in plantam univerſam diſtribuit, cum autem radix tam parvo temporis ſpatio ſuccum, ut par eſt, digerere & excoquere non valeat: (Nam is continenter attrahitur & fluit, quæ eſt viventium omnino conditio) hinc fit, ut repetitis vicibus illum præparatum & ſubactum oporteat, quod alendis partibus nondum ſatis Idoneus, ad radicem ipſam circuitu quodam redeat, quo perfectionem ſuam conſequatur. Qui quidem circuitus fibrarum ope efficitur: Nam fortè ita ſunt aptatæ, ut quædam ſucci alimentitii aſcenſum, aliæ deſcenſum juvent, atque eo fere munere funguntur, quo valvulæ in venis animalium ſanguinis circulationi ſerviunt. Hoc quippe viventium omnium natura poſtulat, quæ ut continuum ſubſtantiæ diſpendium reſarciat, continuâ quoque præparatione & coctione indiget: Illa enim deperditæ ſubſtantiæ reparatio ſuccum exigit ritè præparatum: Hic vero ſtatim perfici nequit, iſque in perenni motu verſatur, nam videmus plantas avulſas brevi exſiccari & tabeſcere. Quare id videtur neceſſarium ut ad eas partes quæ huic muneri deſtinantur, identidem redeat quaſi recoquendus. Utrum vero res ita ſe habeat, ut ex fibris plantarum aliæ ita ſint aptatæ, ut ſuccus per eas aſcendat, aliæ facilem huic ſucco deſcenſum præbeant, hoc utique ex iis plantis quæ craſſiore ſucco, ut lacte donantur, conjici poterit. Verum de his poſtea redibit ſermo: Nam interjecto aliquo tempore D. Mariotte qui paucis poſt menſibus in Academiam aſcitus eſt, ſuas in eandem rem conjecturas & obſervationes propoſuit.

V. Sub idem fere tempus D. Duclos qui multum operæ & temporis in chymia excolenda impenderat, quid in eo genere laborum faciendum judicaret, paulo fuſius expoſuit, illud ante omnia accuratiori examini ſubjiciendum exiſtimabat, quæ ſint genuina mixtorum corporum principia. Duplici id via tentari poſſe, aut partium ex quibus mixtum quodvis componitur, ſeparatione, aut ex ipſis obſervationibus, quæ circa ejus generationem & præcipuas affectiones fieri poſſint. Negabat ille chymicis adeo jactata principia, ſalem, ſulphur, & mercurium eo nomine donari poſſe, cum in alia ſimpliciora reſolvantur. Multa in eadem, ſententiam adjecit, quæ non ſunt hujus loci & temporis. Horum enim principiorum numerum, quiſque ut libitum eſt, augere poteſt, aut minuere.

NUMBER II.

The LIFE *of the Right Honourable* FRANCIS BACON, *Baron of* Verulam, *Viſcount* St. Alban. *By Dr.* Rawley. *With Inſertions from Sir* William Dugdale's BARONAGE, *and Dr.* Teniſon's BACONIANA.

FRANCIS BACON, the Glory of his Age and Nation, the Adorner and Ornament of Learning, was born in *York-houſe*, or *York-place*, in the *Strand*, on the two and twentieth Day of *January*, in the Year of our Lord 1560. His Father was that famous Counſellor to Queen *Elizabeth*, the ſecond Prop of the Kingdom in his Time, Sir *Nicholas Bacon* Knight, Lord-keeper of the Great Seal of *England*; a Lord of known Prudence, Sufficiency, Moderation and Integrity. His Mother was *Anne*, one of the Daughters of Sir *Anthony Cook*, unto whom the Erudition of King *Edward* the Sixth had been committed, a choice Lady, and eminent for Piety, Virtue and Learning, being exquiſitely ſkilled for a Woman, in the *Greek* and *Latin* Tongues. Theſe being the Parents, you may eaſily imagine what the Iſſue was like to be, having had whatſoever Nature or Breeding could put into him.

Sir *William Dugdale* is ſomething more particular on this Subject; obſerving, as to his Parentage, that he was the youngeſt of thoſe two male Children which Sir *Nicholas Bacon* of *Redgrave*, in *Com. Suff.* Knight, had by *Anne* his Wife, one of the ſix Daughters of Sir *Anthony Cook*, of *Giddy-hall*, in *Com. Eſſex*, Knight, (a Perſon much honoured for his Learning, and being Tutor to King *Edward* the Sixth) all thoſe Daughters being exquiſitely ſkilled in the *Greek* and *Latin* Tongues.

Which *Nicholas*, having been a diligent Student of the Laws in *Gray's-inn*, was made the King's Attorney in the Court of *Wards*, in 38 *Hen.* 8. and upon the Death of that King (which ſoon after happened) had his Patent, for the ſame Truſt, renewed by his Son and Succeſſor, King *Edward* the Sixth, in the ſixth Year of whoſe Reign he was conſtituted Treaſurer for that noble Society of *Grays-inn*, whereof he had been ſo long a Member. And being grown famous for his Knowledge, was ſhortly after, *viz.* in 1 *Elizabeth*, made Lord-keeper of the Great Seal of *England*, and knighted; which Office, in his Time, was by Act of Parliament made equal in Authority with the Chancellor's.

What I have otherwiſe obſerved of this Sir *Nicholas Bacon*, is, that being no Friend to the Queen of *Scots*, (then Priſoner in *England*) he was privy and aſſenting to what *Hales* had publiſhed, in Derogation to her Title, as next and lawful Succeſſor to Queen *Elizabeth*, aſſerting that of the Houſe of *Suffolk* before it; for which *Hales* ſuffered Impriſonment, and had not *Cecil* ſtood his faithful Friend, ſo might he; nothing being more diſtaſteful to Queen *Elizabeth*, than a Diſpute upon that Point. Next, that in 14 *Elizabeth*, upon thoſe Propoſals made by the Nobility of *Scotland* for her Enlargement, he oppoſed it; alledging, that no Security could ballance the Danger thereof. Laſtly, that upon his Death, which happened in *April*, *anno* 1579 (21 *Elizabeth*) this Character is given of him by the learned *Camden*, *viz.* That he was *Vir præpinguis*, *ingenio acerrime*,

rimo, ſingulari Prudentia, ſumma Eloquentia, tenaci memoria, & ſacris conſiliis alterum columen: Of Perſon very corpulent, moſt quick Wit, ſingular Prudence, admirable Eloquence, ſpecial Memory, and another Pillar to the Privy-council.

Of his Death, Dr. *Teniſon* gives this Account from a Paper of the Lord *Bacon:* He had his Barber rubbing and combing his Head; and becauſe it was very hot, the Window was open, to let in a freſh Wind, he fell aſleep, and awaked all diſtempered, and in a great Sweat: Said he to the Barber, *Why did you let me ſleep? Why, my Lord,* ſaid he, *I durſt not wake your Lordſhip. Why then,* ſaith my Lord-keeper, *you have killed me with Kindneſs.* So he removed into his Bed-chamber, and within a few Days died. Whereupon being interred on the South Side of the Choir in St. *Paul*'s Cathedral, within the City of *London*, he had a noble Monument, there erected to his Memory, with this Epitaph.

Hic Nicolaumne Baconum, *Conditum; exiſtima ILLUM, tam diu* Britannici *regni ſecundum columen; exitium malis, bonis aſylum; cæca quem non extulit ad hunc honorem ſors; ſed Æquitas, Fides, Doctrina, Pietas, Unica & Prudentia. Neu forte raptum crede, qui Unica brevi vita perenni emerit duas: Agit vitam ſecundam cælites inter animas: Fama implet orbem, vita quæ illi tertia eſt. Hac poſitum in ará eſt Corpus, olim animi Domus, ara dicata ſempiternæ Memoriæ.*

His firſt and childiſh Years were not without ſome Mark of Eminency; at which Time he was endued with that Pregnancy, and Towardlineſs of Wit, as they were Preſages of that deep and univerſal Apprehenſion which was manifeſt in him afterward, and cauſed him to be taken Notice of, by ſeveral Perſons of Worth and Place, and eſpecially by the Queen; who (as I have been informed) delighted much then to confer with him, and to prove him with Queſtions; unto whom he delivered himſelf with that Gravity, and Maturity above his Years, that her Majeſty would often term him *the young Lord-keeper.* Being aſked by the Queen how old he was, he anſwered with much Diſcretion, being then but a Boy, That he was two Years younger than her Majeſty's Reign; with which Anſwer the Queen was much taken.

At the ordinary Years of Ripeneſs for the Univerſity, or rather ſomething earlier, he was ſent by his Father to *Trinity* College in *Cambridge*, to be educated, and bred under the Tuition of Dr. *John Whitgift*, then Maſter of the College, afterwards the renowned Archbiſhop of *Canterbury*; a Prelate of the firſt Magnitude for Sanctity, Learning, Patience, and Humility: Under whom he was obſerved to be more than an ordinary Proficient in the ſeveral Arts and Sciences: Whilſt he was Commorant in the Univerſity, about ſixteen Years of Age, as his Lordſhip hath been pleaſed to impart unto myſelf, he firſt fell into the Diſlike of the Philoſophy of *Ariſtotle*; not for the Worthleſſneſs of the Author, to whom he would ever aſcribe all high Attributes, but for the Unfruitfulneſs of the Way, being a Philoſophy (as his Lordſhip uſed to ſay) only ſtrong for Diſputations and Contentions, but barren of the Production of Works, for the Benefit of the Life of Man; in which Mind he continued to his dying Day.

After he had paſſed the Circle of the Liberal Arts, his Father thought fit to frame and mould him for the Arts of State; and for that End ſent him over into *France* with Sir *Amyas Paulet*, then employed Ambaſſador Lieger into *France*; by whom he was, after a While, held fit to be intruſted with ſome Meſſage or Advertiſement to the Queen; which having performed with great Approbation, he returned back into *France* again, with Intention to continue for ſome Years there. In his Abſence in *France* his Father, the Lord-keeper, died, having col-

lected (as I have heard from knowing Perſons) a conſiderable Sum of Money, which he had ſeparated with Intention to have made a competent Purchaſe of Land, for the Livelihood of this his youngeſt Son, who was only unprovided for; and tho' he was the youngeſt in Years, yet he was not the loweſt in his Father's Affection: But the ſaid Purchaſe being unaccompliſhed at his Father's Death, there came no greater Share to him than his ſingle Part, and Proportion of the Money, dividable amongſt five Brethren; by which Means he lived in ſome Straits and Neceſſities in his younger Years; for as for that pleaſant Site and Manor of *Gorhambury*, he came not to it till many Years after, by the Death of his deareſt Brother, Mr. *Anthony Bacon*; a Gentleman equal to him in Height of Wit, tho' inferior to him in the Endowments of Learning and Knowledge; unto whom he was moſt nearly conjoined in Affection, they being the ſole Male Iſſue of a ſecond Venter.

Being returned from Travel, he applied himſelf to the Study of the Common Law, which he took upon him to be his Profeſſion, in which he attained to great Excellency; tho' he made that (as himſelf ſaid) but as an Acceſſory, and not his principal Study. He wrote ſeveral Tractates upon that Subject, wherein ſome great Maſters of the Law did outgo him in Bulk, and Particularities of Caſes; yet in the Science of the Grounds and Myſteries of the Law, he was exceeded by none. In this Way he was, after a While, ſworn of the Queen's Council learned extraordinary, a Grace (if I err not) ſcarce known before. He ſeated himſelf, for the Commodity of his Studies and Practice, amongſt the honourable Society of *Gray's-inn*, of which Houſe he was a Member; where he erected that elegant Pile, or Structure, commonly known by the Name of the *Lord Bacon's Lodgings*, which he inhabited by Turns the moſt Part of his Life (ſome few Years only excepted) unto his dying Day; in which Houſe he carried himſelf with ſuch Sweetneſs, Comity and Generoſity, that he was much revered, and beloved by the Readers and Gentlemen of the Houſe.

Notwithſtanding that he profeſſed the Law for his Livelihood and Subſiſtence, yet his Heart and Affection was more carried after the Affairs and Places of State; for which, if the Majeſty Royal then had been pleaſed, he was moſt fit. In his younger Years he ſtudied the Service, and Fortune (as they call them) of that noble but unfortunate Earl, the Earl of *Eſſex*: unto whom he was, in a Sort, a private and free Counſellor, and gave him ſafe and honourable Advice, till in the End the Earl inclined too much to the violent and precipitate Counſel of others, his Adherents and Followers, which was his Fate and Ruin.

His Birth, and other Capacities, qualified him above others of his Profeſſion, to have ordinary Acceſſes at Court, and to come frequently into the Queen's Eye; who would often grace him with private and free Communication, not only about Matters of his Profeſſion, or Buſineſs in Law, but alſo about the arduous Affairs of State; from whom ſhe received, from Time to Time, great Satisfaction. Nevertheleſs, tho' ſhe cheared him much with the Bounty of her Countenance, yet ſhe never cheared him with the Bounty of her Hand, having never conferred upon him any ordinary Place, or Means of Honour and Profit, ſave only one dry Reverſion of the Regiſter's Office in the Star-chamber, worth about 1600 *l. per Annum*, for which he waited in Expectation, either fully, or near twenty Years; of which his Lordſhip would ſay in Queen *Elizabeth*'s Time, that it was like another Man's Ground buttalling upon his Houſe, which might mend his Proſpect, but it did not fill his Barn; nevertheleſs, in the Time of King *James* it fell unto him; which might be imputed not ſo much to her Majeſty's

Averſeneſs

Averſeneſs and Diſaffection towards him, as the Arts and Policy of a great Stateſman then, who laboured, by all induſtrious and ſecret Means, to ſuppreſs and keep him down, leſt if he had riſen, he might have obſcured his Glory.

But tho' he ſtood long at a Stay in the Days of his Miſtreſs Queen *Elizabeth*; yet after the Change, and coming in of his new Maſter King *James*, he made a great Progreſs; by whom he was much comforted, in Places of Truſt, Honour and Revenue. I have ſeen a Letter of his Lordſhip to King *James*, wherein he makes Acknowledgment, that he was that Maſter to him that had raiſed and advanced him nine times, thrice in Dignity, and ſix times in Office. His Offices (as I conceive) were Council learned extraordinary to his Majeſty, as he had been to Queen *Elizabeth*; King's Solicitor General; his Majeſty's Attorney General; Counſellor of State, being yet but Attorney; Lord-keeper of the Great Seal of *England*; laſtly, Lord Chancellor; which two laſt Places, tho' they be the ſame in Authority and Power, yet they differ in Patent, Height, and Favour of the Prince. Since whoſe Time none of his Succeſſors, until this preſent honourable Lord, did ever bear the Title of Lord Chancellor.

His Dignities were, firſt, Knight; then, Baron of *Verulam*; laſtly, Viſcount *St. Alban*. Beſides other good Gifts, and Bounties of the Hand which his Majeſty gave him, both out of the Broad Seal, and out of the Alienation Office, to the Value in both of 1800 *l. per Annum*; which with his Manor of *Gorhambury*, and other Lands and Poſſeſſions near thereunto adjoining, amounting to a third Part more, he retained to his dying Day.

Towards his riſing Years, not before, he entered into a married Eſtate, and took to Wife *Alice*, one of the Daughters and Co-heirs of *Benedict Barnham* Eſq; and Alderman of *London*, with whom he received a ſufficiently ample and liberal Portion in Marriage: Children he had none; which tho' they be the Means to perpetuate our Names after our Deaths, yet he had other Iſſues to perpetuate his Name, the Iſſues of his Brain; in which he was ever happy and admired, as *Jupiter* was in the Production of *Pallas*. Neither did the Want of Children detract from the good Uſage of his Conſort during the Inter-marriage, whom he proſecuted with much conjugal Love and Reſpect, with many rich Gifts and Endowments: Beſides a Robe of Honour which he inveſted her withal, which ſhe wore unto her dying Day, being twenty Years and more after his Death.

After this, coming from Travel, and applying himſelf to the Study of the Common Law, he was ſeated in *Gray's-inn*, where in ſhort Time he became ſo highly eſteemed for his Abilities, as that in the 30th of *Elizabeth* (being then but twenty-eight Years of Age) that honourable Society choſe him for their Lent Reader; and in the 32d of *Elizabeth* was made one of the Clerks of the Council.

In the 42d of *Elizabeth*, being Double Reader in that Houſe, and affecting much the Ornament thereof, he cauſed that beautiful Grove of Elms to be planted in the Walks, which yet remain. And upon the 23d of *July*, 1 *Jac.* was knighted at *Whitehall*; ſhortly after which, *viz.* in the 2d of *Jac.* he was made one of the King's Council learned, having therewith a Grant of 40 *l. per Annum*, Fee; and in the 5th of *Jac.* conſtituted his Majeſty's Solicitor General. In the 9th of *Jac.* he was made joint Judge with Sir *Thomas Vavaſor*, then Knight-marſhal of the Knight-marſhals Court, then newly erected within the Verge of the King's Houſe; and in the 11th of *Jac.* (27 *Octob.*) being made Attorney General, was ſworn of the Privy Council. In the 14th of *Jac.* he was conſtitu-

ted

ted Lord-Keeper of the Great Seal (7 *Martii*) being then fifty-four Years of Age.

It is ſaid in a Libel (in which are many other notorious Slanders) that the Duke of *Buckingham*, to vex the very Soul of the Lord Chancellor *Egerton*, in his laſt Agony, did ſend Sir *Francis Bacon* to him for the Seals; and likewiſe, that the dying Chancellor did hate that *Bacon* ſhould be his Succeſſor, and that his Spirit not brooking this Uſage, he ſent the Seals by his Servant to the King, and ſhortly after yielded his Soul to his Maker. In which few Words there are two palpable Untruths; for firſt, the King himſelf ſent for the Seal, not the Duke of *Buckingham*; and he ſent for it, not by Sir *Francis Bacon*, but by Secretary *Winwood*, with this Meſſage, *That himſelf would be his Under-keeper, and not diſpoſe of the Place of Chancellor while he lived:* Nor did any receive the Seal out of the King's Sight till the Lord *Egerton* died, which ſoon fell out.

Next, the Lord Chancellor *Egerton* was willing that Maſter Attorney-General ſhould be his Succeſſor, and ready to forward his Succeſſion: So far was he from conceiving Hatred againſt him, either upon that, or any other Account.

The Lord *Egerton* was his Friend, in the Queen's Time, and I find Mr. *Bacon* making his Acknowledgments, in a Letter to him, in theſe Words, which I once tranſcribed from the unpubliſhed Original. "For my placing; your "Lordſhip beſt knoweth, that when I was moſt dejected with her Majeſty's "ſtrange Dealing towards me, it pleaſed you, of your ſingular Favour, ſo far "to comfort and encourage me, as to hold me worthy to be excited, to think of "ſucceeding your Lordſhip in your ſecond Place, ſignifying, in your Plainneſs, "that no Man ſhould, better content yourſelf, which your exceeding Favour, "you have not ſince varied from; both in pleading the like Signification into "the Hands of ſome of my beſt Friends; and alſo in an honourable and anſwe-"rable Commendation of me to her Majeſty. Wherein, I hope, your Lord-"ſhip (if it pleaſe you to call to Mind) did find me, neither over-weening, in "preſuming too much upon it, nor much deceived, in my Opinion of the "Event, for the continuing of it is ſtill in yourſelf; nor ſleepy, in doing ſome "good Offices to the ſame Purpoſe."

This Favour of the Lord *Egerton*'s, which began ſo early, continued to the laſt, and thus much Sir *Francis Bacon* teſtified, in his Letter to Sir *George Villiers*, "My Lord Chancellor told me Yeſterday, in plain Terms, that if the King "would aſk his Opinion, touching the Perſon that he would commend to ſucceed "him, upon Death, or Diſability, he would name me, for the fitteſt Man; you "may adviſe, whether Uſe may not be made of this Offer." And the like appears by what Maſter Attorney wrote to King *James*, during the Sickneſs of my Lord Chancellor. Amongſt other Things, he wrote this to the King, "It "pleaſed my Lord Chancellor, out of his ancient and great Love to me, which "many times in Sickneſs appeareth moſt, to admit me to a great deal of Speech "with him this Afternoon; which, during theſe three Days, he hath ſcarcely "done to any."

In the ſame Libel, my Lord *Bacon* is reproached as a very neceſſitous Man, and one, for that Reaſon, made Keeper, by the Duke, to ſerve ſuch Turns, as Men, of better Fortunes, would never condeſcend to. And this alſo is a groundleſs and uncharitable Inſinuation. He had now enjoyed, a good while, many profitable Places, which preſerved him from Indigence, though his great Mind did not permit him to ſwell his Purſe by them to any extraordinary Bigneſs. And in the Queen's Time, when he was in meaner Circumſtances, he did not look

look upon himſelf as in that Eſtate of Neceſſity, which tempteth genetous Minds to vile Things. Hear himſelf repreſenting his Condition; no Man knew it better, or could better expreſs it. Thus he ſtates his Caſe, in the aforeſaid unpubliſhed Letter to the Lord Chancellor *Egerton*, of the Whole of which, I ſometimes had the Peruſal, though now much of it is loſt, and, as I believe, beyond all Recovery. "My Eſtate (ſaid he) I confeſs a Truth to your Lord-"ſhip, is weak and indebted, and needeth Comfort; for both my Father, "(though I think I had greateſt Part in his Love, of all his Children) in his Wiſ-"dom, ſerved me in as a Laſt-comer: And myſelf, in mine own Induſtry, have ra-"ther referred, and aſpired to Virtue, than to Gain; whereof I am not yet wiſe enough "to repent me. But the while, whereas *Solomon* ſpeaketh, that *Want cometh firſt as* "*a Way-faring Man, and after as an armed Man*; I muſt acknowledge myſelf to "be in *primo gradu*; for it ſtealeth upon me: But for the ſecond, that it ſhould "not be reſiſted; I hope in God, I am not in that Caſe, for the preventing "whereof, as I do depend upon God's Providence all in all; ſo in the ſame, his "Providence, I ſee opened unto me, three not unlikely Expectations of Help: "The one, my Practice; the other, ſome Proceeding in the Queen's Service; "the third, the Place I have in Reverſion, which, as it ſtandeth now unto me, "is but like another Man's Ground buttalling upon my Houſe, which may mend "my Proſpect, but it doth not fill my Barn."

This Place he meaneth was the Regiſter's Office in the Star-chamber, which fell to him in the Time of King *James*, and was worth about 1600*l.* by the Year.

But to return from this Digreſſion. When Sir *Francis Bacon* was conſtituted Lord Keeper, the King admoniſhed him, that he ſhould ſeal nothing raſhly; as alſo, that he ſhould judge uprightly, and not extend the royal Prerogative too high. After which, *viz.* upon the ſeventh Day of *May* (which was the firſt Day of *Eaſter* Term next enſuing) he made his ſolemn Proceeding to *Weſtminſter-Hall*, in this Order: Firſt, the Writing-Clerks, and inferior Officers belonging to the Court of *Chancery*; next, the Students of the Law; then the Gentlemen of his own Family; after them, the Serjeant at Arms, and Bearer of the Great-Seal, on Foot; then himſelf, on Horſeback, in a Gown of purple Sattin, riding betwixt the Lord Treaſurer, and Lord Privy Seal; next, divers Earls, Barons, and Privy-Counſellors; then the Judges of the Courts at *Weſtminſter-Hall*, whoſe Place in that Proceeding was aſſigned after the Privy-Counſellors. And when he came into the Court, the Lord Treaſurer, and Lord Privy-Seal gave him his Oath, the Clerk of the Crown reading it.

Upon the fourth of *January*, 16 *Jac.* he was made Lord Chancellor of *England*; on the eleventh of *July* next enſuing, created Lord *Verulam*; and on the twenty-ſeventh of *January*, 18 *Jac.* advanced to the Dignity of Viſcount *St. Alban*, his ſolemn Inveſtiture being then performed at *Theobald*'s; his Robe carried before him by the Lord *Carew*, and his Coronet by the Lord *Wentworth*. Whereupon he gave the King ſeven-fold Thanks; firſt, for making him his Sollicitor; ſecondly, his Attorney; thirdly, one of his Privy-Council; fourthly, Lord-Keeper of the Great-Seal; fifthly, Lord Chancellor; ſixthly Baron *Verulam*; and, laſtly, Viſcount *St. Alban*.

But long he enjoyed not that great Office of Lord Chancellor; for in *Lent*, 18 *Jac.* Corruption in the Exerciſe thereof being objected againſt him, (of which, it is believed his Servants were moſt guilty, and he himſelf not much acceſſary) the Great Seal was taken from him.

This

This Fall he foreſaw, yet he made no Shew of that baſe and mean Spirit, with which the Libel before remembered, does unworthily charge him. King *Charles* the Firſt, of bleſſed Memory, (then Prince) made a very different Obſervation upon him.

Returning from hunting, he eſpied a Coach, attended with a goodly Troop of Horſemen, who, it ſeems, were gathered together to wait upon the Chancellor, to his Houſe, at *Gorhambury*, at the Time of his Declenſion. The Prince, ſmiling, ſaid, "Well! do we what we can, this Man ſcorns to go out like a "Snuff." And he commended his undaunted Spirit, and excellent Parts, not without ſome Regret, that ſuch a Man ſhould be falling off.

It is true, that after the Seal was taken from him, he became a great Example of Penitence and Submiſſion; but it was a Submiſſion, which both manifeſted his juſt Senſe of his Fault, and the more venial Nature of it, as ariſing from Negligence, rather than Avarice and Malice.

He ſhewed by it, that there was not in his Heart that Stiffneſs of Pride, which openly denies or juſtifies thoſe Crimes, of which itſelf is ſecretly convinced: But it appeared not by any thing, during all the Time of his Eclipſe of Fortune, that there was any Abjectneſs of Spirit in him. The many great Works which he wrote, ſhew a Mind in him not diſtracted with Anxiety, nor depreſſed with Shame, nor ſlow, for Want of Encouragement, nor broken with Diſcontent. Such a Temper is inconſiſtent with ſuch noble Thoughts and Deſigns, ſuch ſtrict Attention, ſuch Vigour of Conceit, ſuch a maſculine Style, ſuch Quickneſs in Compoſition, as appeared in his learned Labours.

When the Great Seal was taken from him, it was committed to the Cuſtody of *Henry* Viſcount *Mandevil*, (at that Time, Preſident of the Council) and certain other Lords Commiſſioners: And upon the tenth of *July* after, to Doctor *John Williams*, Dean of *Weſtminſter*, afterwards Biſhop of *Lincoln*.

The laſt five Years of his Life being withdrawn from Civil Affairs, and from an active Life, he employed wholly in Contemplation and Studies: A Thing whereof his Lordſhip would often ſpeak during his active Life, as if he affected to die in the Shadow, and not in the Light; which alſo may be found in ſeveral Paſſages of his Works. In which Time, he compoſed the greateſt Part of his Books and Writings, both in *Engliſh* and *Latin*, which I will enumerate, as near as I can, in the juſt Order wherein they were written: *The Hiſtory of the Reign of King* Henry *the Seventh*; *Abecedarium Naturæ*; *A metaphyſical Piece*, a Fragment of which is printed, Vol. II. p. 14. *Hiſtoria Ventorum*; *Hiſtoria Vitæ & Mortis*; *Hiſtoria Denſi & Rari*, Printed, Vol. II. p. 67. *Hiſtoria Gravis & Levis*, which is loſt; *A Diſcourſe of a War with* Spain; *A Dialogue, touching an holy War*; *The Fable of the new* Atlantis; *A Preface to a Digeſt of the Laws of* England; *The Beginning of the Hiſtory of the Reign of King* Henry *the Eighth*; *De Augmentis Scientiarum*; *or, the Advancement of Learning*, put into *Latin*, with ſeveral Enrichments and Enlargements; *Counſels, civil and moral*, or his *Book of Eſſays*, likewiſe enriched and enlarged; *The Converſion of certain Pſalms into* Engliſh *Verſe*; *The Tranſlation into* Latin *of the Hiſtory of King* Henry *the Seventh*; *Of the Counſels, civil and moral*; *of the Dialogue of the Holy War*; *Of the Fable of the new* Atlantis, *for the Benefit of other Nations*; His reviſing of his Book, *De Sapientia Veterum*; *Inquiſitio de Magnete*; *Topica Inquiſitionis*, *De Luce & Lumine*, printed, Vol. II. pag. 208. Laſtly, *Sylva Sylvarum, or the Natural Hiſtory*. Theſe were the Fruits and Productions of his laſt five Years. His Lordſhip alſo deſigned, upon the Motion and Invitation of his late Majeſty, to have written

written *The Reign of King* Henry *the Eighth*; but that Work periſhed in the Deſignation merely, God not lending him Life to proceed farther upon it, than only in one Morning's Work; whereof there is extant *Ex Ungue Leonem*, now printed, Vol. III. p. 507.

There is a Commemoration due, as well to his Abilities and Virtues, as to the Courſe of his Life. Thoſe Abilities, which commonly go ſingle in other Men, though of prime and obſervable Parts, were all conjoined and met in him; theſe are, Sharpneſs of Wit, Memory, Judgment, and Elocution: For the former three, his Books do abundantly ſpeak them, which, with what Sufficiency he wrote, let the World judge; but with what Celerity he wrote them, I can beſt teſtify: But for the fourth, his Elocution, I will only ſet down what I heard Sir *Walter Raleigh* once ſpeak of him, by way of Compariſon, (whoſe Judgment may well be truſted) that the Earl of *Saliſbury* was an excellent Speaker, but no good Penman; that the Earl of *Northampton* (the Lord *Henry Howard)* was an excellent Penman, but no good Speaker; but that, Sir *Francis Bacon* was eminent in both.

I have been induced to think, that if there were a Beam of Knowledge derived from God upon any Man, in theſe modern Times, it was upon him: For, though he was a great Reader of Books, yet he had not his Knowledge from Books, but from ſome Grounds and Notions from within himſelf; which, notwithſtanding, he vented with great Caution and Circumſpection. His Book *De Inſtauratione magna* (which, in his own Account, was the chiefeſt of his Works) was no ſlight Imagination, or Fancy of his Brain; but a ſettled and concocted Notion, the Production of many Years Labour and Travail. I myſelf have ſeen, at the leaſt, twelve Copies of the Inſtauration, reviſed Year by Year, one after another, and every Year altered and amended in the Frame thereof; till, at laſt, it came to that Model in which it was committed to the Preſs: As many living Creatures do lick their young ones, till they bring them to their Strength of Limbs.

In the compoſing of his Books, he did rather drive at a maſculine and clear Expreſſion, than at Fineneſs, or Affectation of Phraſes, and would often aſk, if the Meaning were expreſſed plainly enough, as being one that accounted Words, to be but ſubſervient or miniſterial to Matter, and not the Principal; and if his Style were polite, it was, becauſe he could do no otherwiſe. Neither was he given to any light Conceits, or deſcanting upon Words; but did ever purpoſely and induſtriouſly avoid them: For he held ſuch Things to be but Digreſſions, or Diverſions from the Scope intended, and to derogate from the Weight and Dignity of the Style.

He was no Plodder upon Books, though he read much, and that with great Judgment, and Rejection of Impertinencies, incident to many Authors: For he would ever interlace a moderate Relaxation of his Mind with his Studies, as walking, or taking the Air abroad in his Coach, or ſome other befitting Recreation; and yet he would loſe no Time; inaſmuch as upon his firſt and immediate Return, he would fall to reading again, and ſo ſuffer no Moment of Time to ſlip from him, without ſome preſent Improvement.

His Meals were Refections of the Ear, as well as of the Stomach, like the *Noctes Atticæ*, or *Convivia Deipno-Sophiſtarum*; wherein a Man might be refreſhed in his Mind and Underſtanding no leſs than in his Body. And I have known ſome of no mean Parts, that have profeſſed to make Uſe of their Note-books, when they have riſen from his Table. In which Converſations, and otherwiſe,

he was no daſhing Man, as ſome Men are, but ever a Countenancer and Foſterer of another Man's Parts. Neither was he one that would appropriate the Speech wholly to himſelf, or delight to outvie others, but leave a Liberty to the Coaſſeſſors to take their Turns, wherein he would draw a Man on, and allure him to ſpeak upon ſuch a Subject, as wherein he was peculiarly ſkilful, and would delight to ſpeak: And for himſelf, he contemned no Man's Obſervations; but would light his Torch at every Man's Candle.

His Opinions and Aſſertions were, for the moſt Part, binding, and not contradicted by any, rather like Oracles than Diſcourſes, which may be imputed, either to the well-weighing of his Sentence, by the Scales of Truth and Reaſon; or elſe, to the Reverence and Eſtimation, wherein he was commonly had, that no Man would conteſt with him; ſo that there was no Argumentation, or *pro* and *con*, (as they term it) at his Table; or, if there chanced to be any, it was carried with much Submiſſion and Moderation.

I have often obſerved, and ſo have other Men of great Account, that if he had Occaſion to repeat another Man's Words after him, he had an Uſe and Faculty to dreſs them in better Veſtments and Apparel than they had before; ſo that the Author ſhould find his own Speech much amended, and yet the Subſtance of it ſtill retained, as if it had been natural to him to uſe good Forms; as *Ovid* ſpake of his Faculty of verſifying:

Et quod tentabam ſcribere, verſus erat.

When his Office called him, he was of the King's Council learned, to charge any Offenders, either in Criminals or Capitals; he was never of an inſulting and domineering Nature over them, but always tender hearted, and carrying himſelf decently towards the Parties, (though it was his Duty to charge them home) but yet, as one that looked upon the Example with the Eye of Severity, but upon the Perſon with the Eye of Pity and Compaſſion. And in civil Buſineſs, he was Counſellor of State; he had the beſt Way of adviſing, not engaging his Maſter in any precipitate or grievous Courſes, but in moderate and fair Proceeding: The King, whom he ſerved, giving him this Teſtimony, That he ever dealt in Buſineſs *ſuavibus modis*; which was the Way that was moſt according to his own Heart.

Neither was he, in his Time, leſs gracious with the Subject than with his Sovereign. He was ever acceptable to the Houſe of Commons, when he was a Member thereof, being the King's Attorney; and choſen to a Place in Parliament, he was allowed and diſpenſed with to ſit in the Houſe, which was not permitted to other Attorneys. And as he was a good Servant to his Maſter, being never, in nineteen Years Service, (as he himſelf averred) rebuked by the King, for any thing relating to his Majeſty; ſo he was a good Maſter to his Servants, and rewarded their long Attendance with good Places freely, when they fell into his Power; which was the Cauſe that ſo many young Gentlemen of Blood and Quality ſought to liſt themſelves in his Retinue. And if he were abuſed by any of them in their Places, it was only the Error of the Goodneſs of his Nature, but the Badges of their Indiſcretions and Intemperances.

This Lord was religious; for though the World be apt to ſuſpect and prejudice great Wits and Politicians to have ſomewhat of the *Atheiſt*; yet he was converſant with God, as appeareth by ſeveral Paſſages throughout the whole Current of his Writings; otherwiſe he ſhould have croſſed his own Principles, which were, that a little Philoſophy maketh Men apt to forget God, as attributing too much

to

to ſecond Cauſes; but Depth of Philoſophy bringeth Men back to God again. Now I am ſure there is no Man that will deny him, or account otherwiſe of him, but to have been a deep Philoſopher. And not only ſo, but he was able to render a *Reaſon of the Hope which was in him*, which that Writing of his, *Of the Confeſſion of the Faith*, doth abundantly teſtify. He repaired frequently (when his Health would permit him) to the Service of the Church, to hear Sermons, to the Adminiſtration of the Sacrament of the bleſſed Body and Blood of *Chriſt*; and he died in the true Faith eſtabliſhed in the Church of *England*.

This is moſt true, he was free from Malice, which (as he ſaid himſelf) he never bred nor fed. He was no Revenger of Injuries, which, if he had minded, he had both Opportunity and Place high enough to have done it. He was no Heaver of Men out of their Places, as delighting in their Ruin and Undoing. He was no Defamer of any Man to his Prince: One Day, when a great Stateſman was newly dead, that had not been his Friend, the King aſked him, What he thought of that Lord which was gone? He anſwered, That he would never have made his Majeſty's Eſtate better; but he was ſure, he would have kept it from being worſe; which was the worſt he would ſay of him: Which I reckon, not among his moral, but his *Chriſtian* Virtues.

His Fame is greater, and ſounds louder, in foreign Parts abroad, than at home in his own Nation, thereby verifying that divine Sentence, *A Prophet is not without Honour, ſave in his own Country, and in his own Houſe:* Concerning which, I will give you a Taſte only, out of a Letter, written from *Italy* (the Storehouſe of refined Wits) to the late Earl of *Devonſhire*, then Lord *Cavendiſh:* "I will expect the new Eſſays of my Lord Chancellor *Bacon*; as alſo his Hiſtory, with a "great deal of Deſire, and whatſoever elſe he ſhall compoſe; but in particular "of his Hiſtory, I promiſe myſelf a thing, perfect and ſingular, eſpecially in "*Henry* the Seventh, where he may exerciſe the Talent of his divine Underſtanding."

This Lord is more and more known, and his Books here more and more delighted in; and thoſe Men, that have more than ordinary Knowledge in human Affairs, eſteem him one of the moſt capable Spirits of this Age; and he is truly ſuch. Now his Fame doth not decreaſe with Days ſince, but rather encreaſe. Divers of his Works have been antiently, and yet lately tranſlated into other Tongues, both learned, and modern, by foreign Pens; ſeveral Perſons of Quality, during his Lordſhip's Life, croſſed the Seas, on Purpoſe to gain an Opportunity of ſeeing him, and diſcourſing with him; whereof one carried his Lordſhip's Picture, from Head to Foot, over with him into *France*, as a thing which he foreſaw would be much deſired there, that ſo they might enjoy the Image of his Perſon, as well as the Images of his Brain, his Books. Among the reſt, Marquis *Fiat*, a *French* Nobleman, who came Ambaſſador into *England*, in the Beginning of Queen *Mary*, Wife to King *Charles*, was taken with an extraordinary Deſire of ſeeing him; for which he made Way by a Friend: And when he came to him, being then, through Weakneſs, confined to his Bed; the Marquis ſaluted him with this high Expreſſion, That his Lordſhip had been ever to him like the Angels, of whom he had often heard, and read much of them in Books, but he never ſaw them. After which, they contracted an intimate Acquaintance; and the Marquis did ſo much revere him, that beſides his frequent Viſits, they wrote Letters one to the other, under the Titles and Appellations of a Father and Son: As for his many Salutations, by Letters, from foreign Worthies devoted to

Learning, I forbear to mention them, becauſe that is a thing common to other Men of Learning or Note, together with him.

But yet in this Matter of his Fame, I ſpeak in the comparative only, and not in the excluſive; for his Reputation is great in his own Nation alſo, eſpecially among thoſe, who are of a more acute and ſharper Judgment; which I will exemplify, but with two Teſtimonies, and no more. The former, when his Hiſtory of *Henry* the Seventh was to come forth, it was delivered to the old Lord *Brook*, to be peruſed by him; who, when he had diſpatched it, returned it to the Author, with this Eulogy, "Commend me to my Lord, and bid him take care "to get good Paper and Ink, for the Work is incomparable." The other ſhall be that of Dr. *Samuel Collins*, late Provoſt of *King's-College*, in *Cambridge*, a Man of no vulgar Wit, who affirmed unto me, that when he had read the Book, *Of the Advancement of Learning*, he found himſelf in a Caſe to begin his Studies anew, and that he had loſt all the Time of his ſtudying before.

It hath been deſired, that ſomething ſhould be ſignified touching his Diet, and the Regimen of his Health; of which, in regard of his univerſal Inſight into Nature, he may perhaps be to ſome an Example. For his Diet, it was rather a plentiful and liberal Diet, as his Stomach would bear it, than a reſtrained; which he alſo commended in his Book of the *Hiſtory of Life and Death*. In his younger Years he was much given to the finer and lighter Sorts of Meats, as of Fowls, and ſuch like; but afterward, when he grew more judicious, he preferred the ſtronger Meats, ſuch as the Shambles afforded, as thoſe Meats which bred the more firm and ſubſtantial Juices of the Body, and leſs diſſipable; upon which he would often make his Meal, tho' he had other Meats upon the Table. You may be ſure he would not neglect that himſelf, which he ſo much extolled in his Writings, and that was the Uſe of Nitre, whereof he took in the Quantity of about three Grains in thin warm Broth every Morning, for thirty Years together next before his Death. And for Phyſic, he did indeed live phyſically, but not miſerably; for he took only a Maceration of Rhubarb, infuſed into a Draught of White Wine and Beer mingled together for the Space of half an Hour, once in ſix or ſeven Days, immediately before his Meal, whether Dinner or Supper, that it might dry the Body leſs; which (as he ſaid) did carry away frequently the groſſer Humours of the Body, and not diminiſh or carry away any of the Spirits, as ſweating doth; and this was no grievous Thing to take. As for other Phyſic in an ordinary Way (whatſoever hath been vulgarly ſpoken) he took not. His Receipt for the Gout, which did conſtantly eaſe him of his Pain within two Hours, is ſet down in the End of the *Natural Hiſtory*, Vol. III. p. 233.

It may ſeem the Moon had ſome principal Place in the Figure of his Nativity; for the Moon was never in her Paſſion, or eclipſed, but he was ſurpriſed with a ſudden Fit of fainting, and that, tho' he obſerved not, nor took any previous Knowledge of the Eclipſe thereof; and as ſoon as the Eclipſe ceaſed, he was reſtored to his former Strength again.

He died on the 9th Day of *April* in the Year 1626 early in the Morning of the Day, then celebrated for our Saviour's Reſurrection, in the ſixty-ſixth Year of his Age, at the Earl of *Arundel*'s Houſe in *Highgate* near *London*, to which Place he actually repaired about a Week before; God ſo ordaining that he ſhould dye there of a gentle Fever, accidentally accompanied with a great Cold, whereby the Defluxion of Rheum fell ſo plentifully upon his Breaſt that he died by Suffocation, and was buried in St. *Michael*'s Church at St. *Alban*'s, being the Place

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deſigned for his Burial by his laſt Will and Teſtament; both becauſe the Body of his Mother was interred there, and becauſe it was the only Church then remaining within the Precincts of old *Verulam*; where he had a Monument erected for him of white Marble, by the Care and Gratitude of Sir *Thomas Meautys*, Knight, formerly his Lordſhip's Secretary, afterwards Clerk of the King's moſt honourable Privy Council under two Kings; repreſenting his full Portraiture in the Poſture of ſtudying, with an Inſcription compoſed by that accompliſhed Gentleman and rare Wit, Sir *Henry Wotton*.

But however his Body was mortal, yet no doubt his Memory and Works will live, and will, in all Probability, laſt as long as the World laſteth. In order to which I have endeavoured (after my poor Ability) to do this Honour to his Lordſhip, by way of conducing to the ſame.

BACONIANA:

OR,

Collections relating to the Life of the Right Honourable Sir FRANCIS BACON, *Baron of* Verulam, *Viſcount* St. Alban: *Together with an Account of his Lordſhip's Works in four Volumes*, Folio, *printed at* London, 1730.

AT my firſt Entrance on this Work I reſolved to act the Panegyriſt, not to attempt a Character of our noble Author in full Length, nor yet to deſcend to diſabling Apologies for undertaking the Publication of his Writings: For ſince our Author's Works have ſurmounted all Envy, and by their bright Influence have ſcattered all thoſe Miſts which were raiſed againſt him by Prejudice and Dulneſs, it would amount to a Wantonneſs of Imagination to prove That every body aſſerts; and beſides, Poſterity has been ſo juſt to his Memory, that we can, without Difficulty, collect ſuch Teſtimonies of his real, ſuperior Excellency, from the beſt Writers, as will abundantly ſatisfy even a prejudiced Reader, that he had few, if any, Equals among the Antients or Moderns.

It may nevertheleſs, on this Occaſion, be expected, that I ſhould draw a Parallel between our noble Author and ſome of the great Names who have bleſſed Mankind with their moſt beneficial and important Diſcoveries; and to ſhew how he outſtripped all the great Sages of old, as *Ariſtotle*, *Plato*, &c. and that the moſt celebrated Moderns have been proud to fight under his Standard, as *Grotius*, *Boyle*, *Locke*, &c. Yet, as this would be a Taſk rather pompous than uſeful, and as I affect not to aſſume to myſelf an imaginary Applauſe of Diligence or Penetration, by retailing of Indexes and Contents, I wave ſuch an Undertaking, as impertinent and uſeleſs.

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The Province therefore which is left me, for the Diſcharge whereof I think myſelf ſtrictly accountable to the Reader, will contain thoſe Particulars.

I. To make ſome Collections, conſiſting of private Papers and public Inſtruments, illuſtrating the Life and Writings of our noble Author.

II. To give ſome Account of the Order or Method of digeſting our Author's Works, with the Addition of new Treatiſes, and the Improvements of thoſe publiſhed before to the World; which will occaſionally repreſent the Whole that is performed in this Edition.

Firſt, It has indeed been ſuggeſted by ſeveral Perſons, during the Progreſs of this Work, that the Subject required an entire new Life: But every one will be perſuaded, that a great deal of Leiſure and Application, together with a maſterly Hand, are abſolutely neceſſary for ſuch an Undertaking.

Beſides, the Life wrote by Dr. *Rawley* is ſo authentic and conſiderable, that it would have been both an Injury to the Public and to his Memory to have thrown it aſide; he having uſed ſo much Diligence, Accuracy and Judgment in publiſhing the Lord *Bacon*'s Works, as well as in writing his Life; and even had the Poſt of Honour aſſigned him while our noble Author was alive, to be the Editor of his learned Labours. On theſe Accounts nothing ſhould take place which can obſcure or detract from his Merit in this Way, ſince it would be in ſome meaſure a declaring againſt the Author himſelf, to controul the Appointment which he at firſt ſo juſtly made, and which was afterwards applauded in the Performance. And again, every Reader at firſt Glance will be able to obſerve, that many of thoſe Collections could not poſſibly be inſerted into the Text of Dr. *Rawley*'s Life without mangling it; nor yet could they conveniently be added as Notes, by reaſon of their running out into ſo great a Length.

I ſhall begin theſe Collections with ſome Paragraphs taken from the Introduction of Dr. *Teniſon*, publiſhed before the *Lord Bacon's Remains*, 1679. And as the World is much indebted to that Editor of the *Lord Bacon's genuine Remains*, for the elaborate Critique upon his Works, as well as for retrieving ſeveral valuable Fragments of our noble Author, which had otherwiſe periſhed or been diſperſed, I ſhall need no Apology for producing his Sentiments, and for delivering them in his own Words. He obſerves, Page 4. 'For any Praiſe upon 'the Account of this ſmall Performance, it is not worth the while to be ſoli- 'citous about it; yet ſometimes mean Men get a Stock of Reputation, by ga- 'thering up the Fragments of the Learned; as Beggars (they ſay) have gotten 'Eſtates by ſaving together the Alms of the Rich. If that falls not out here, 'where it is not expected, it will be abundantly enough to me if the infe- 'rior Reader may have Benefit, and any Honour may be done to the Memo- 'ry of his Lordſhip, whoſe more general Encomium I ſhall firſt ſet down, 'and then annex a particular Narrative of thoſe Deſigns and Labours of his, 'which may be ſaid not only to merit, but even to exceed all my Commenda- 'tions.

'I begin (as I ſaid) with his Lordſhip's Praiſe in a more general Way: And 'here I affirm with good Aſſurance (for Truth is bold) that amongſt thoſe few, 'who by the Strength of their private Reaſon, have reſiſted popular Errors, and 'advanced real and uſeful Learning, there has not riſen a more eminent Perſon 'than the Lord High Chancellor *Bacon*. Such great Wits are not the common 'Births of Time; and they ſurely intended to ſignify ſo much, who ſaid of the 'Phœnix (tho' in Hyperbole as well as Metaphor) that Nature gives the World

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'that individual Species but once in five hundred Years. It is true, there lived 'in Part of the laſt, and this [ſeventeenth] Century, many memorable Advan-'cers of philoſophical Knowledge, I mean not here ſuch as *Patricius* or *Teleſius*, '*Brunus*, *Severinus* the *Dane*, or *Campanella*; theſe, indeed, departed from ſome 'Errors of the Ancients, but they did not frame any ſolid Hypotheſis of their 'own; they only ſpun new Cobwebs, where they had bruſhed down the old: 'Nay, I intend not, in this Place, either *De Chart* or *Gaſſendi*; they were cer-'tainly great Men, but they appeared ſomewhat later, and deſcended into the 'Depths of Philoſophy after the Ice had been broken by others; and thoſe I take 'to have been chiefly *Copernicus*, Father *Paul* the *Venetian*, *Galileo*, *Harvey*, *Gil-'bert*, and the Philoſopher before remembered Sir *Francis Bacon*, who, if all his 'Circumſtances be duly weighed, may ſeem to excel them all. He was by Pro-'feſſion a Common Lawyer; by Office, in the Queen's Time, one of the Clerks 'of the Council; in the Reign of King *James* one of the King's Council lear-'ned; then Solicitor General, and one of the Judges in the Knight-marſhal's 'Court; then Attorney General, and one of the King's Privy Council; then 'Lord-keeper of the Great Seal, and, during the King's Abſence in *Scotland*, 'Lord Protector; and laſt of all, Lord High Chancellor of *England*: So that 'in ſuch a Life as his, ſo thickly ſet with Buſineſs of ſuch Height, it is a Mi-'racle that all Seeds of Philoſophy were not daily over-dropped, and in a ſhort 'Time quite choaked, and that any one of them ſprung up to Maturity; and 'yet his proſpered beyond thoſe of the Philoſophers before mentioned, tho' 'they were not preſſed on with ſuch a Crowd of ſecular Buſineſs.

'For *Copernicus*, he concerned himſelf eſpecially in the Revolutions of the 'heavenly Bodies; in reviving and perfecting the obſolete Doctrine of *Philolaus*, 'touching the Motion of the Earth, and in ſetting free the Planets from thoſe 'many Epicycles, Eccentrics and Concentrics, in which *Ptolemy* and others had 'entangled them: And he well underſtood the Courſe of the Stars, though he 'did not much ſtudy that natural, Motive-power which carries them about in 'their ſeveral Ellipſes. The like Remark may be made concerning Mr. *Gil-'bert*, who applied himſelf particularly to the Conſideration of Magnetic Pow-'ers; as alſo concerning Dr. *Harvey*, who enquired principally into the Genera-'tion of Animals, and the Motion of the Heart; Subjects in which he made 'great Progreſs, though into the former, the Help of Microſcopes would have 'given him farther Inſight; and in both, he rather purſued the Proofs of his 'Hypotheſes, than the Nature of the Mechanic Force which produced thoſe 'great Effects.

'Father *Paul* was a more general Philoſopher, and the Head of a Meeting of 'Vertuoſi in *Venice*: He excelled in Mechanics, in Mathematics of all Kinds, 'in Philological Learning, in Anatomy. In his anatomical Studies, he exer-'ciſed ſuch Sagacity, that he made farther Diſcoveries in the Fabric of the Eye, 'and taught *Aqua-pendente*, thoſe new Speculations which he publiſhed on that 'Subject: He found out (ſaith *Fulgentio*) the *Valvulæ* in the Veins, and began 'the Doctrine of the Circulation of the Blood, though there is Reaſon to believe 'that he received the Hints of it from Sir *Henry Wotton*, who himſelf had taken 'them from Dr. *Harvey*; but the preſent State of the Affairs of *Venice* ſo re-'quiring, Father *Paul* bent his Studies to Eccleſiaſtical Polity, and chiefly em-'ployed his Pen in detecting the Uſurpations and Corruptions of the Papacy; 'endeavouring (ſo far as Books could do it) to preſerve the Neck of that Re-

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'public from the Bondage of *Paul* the Fifth, who attempted to ſet his Foot 'upon it.

'*Galileo* farther improved the Doctrine of *Copernicus*; diſcovered, by Teleſ-'copes, new Stars in the Heavens; wrote Dialogues concerning the Syſtem of 'the World, and touching local Motion; which latter is the Key that openeth 'Nature: But he deſcended not to the ſeveral Claſſes of Bodies in Nature, and 'the Particulars contained in them, and their reſpective Motions and Uſes. 'Neither did he publiſh any Thing till many Years had paſſed, ſince Mr. '*Bacon* had formed and modelled in his Thoughts his larger Idea of Experi-'mental Knowledge.

'His *Sydereus Nuncius* came not forth till towards the midſt of the Reign of 'King *James*; and King *Charles* had ſat ſome Years on his Throne ere he pub-'liſhed his *Dialogue of the Syſtem of the World.* Whereas Mr. *Bacon* had not 'only publiſhed two Books of his Advancement, in the Beginning of King '*James*'s Reign, but early in the Queen's Time (as from his *Letter to Fulgentio* 'plainly appeareth) he had written his *Temporis partus Maximus.* That Book '(pompous in its Title but ſolid in its Matter, like a great Feather put ſome-'times in a good Head-piece) contained in it, tho' in imperfect Manner, and ſo 'far as the greenneſs of his Years permitted, the principal Rudiments of his 'Inſtauration. The Work therefore of the Inſtauration was an Original, and a 'a Work ſo vaſt and comprehenſive in its Deſign, that tho' others in that Age 'might hew out this, or the other Pillar, yet of him alone it ſeemeth true, that 'he framed the whole Model of the Houſe of Wiſdom.

'In thoſe Days in which he began his Studies, *Ariſtotle* was in Effect the Pope 'in Philoſophy. The Lectures, both in his private College and in the public 'Schools, were generally Expoſitions upon *Ariſtotle*'s Text; and every Opinion 'wrote by him as his own, was eſteemed as authentic as if it had been given un-'der the Seal of the *Fiſher*. It was therefore a very ſingular Felicity in a young 'Gentleman, to ſee farther into Nature than that celebrated Philoſopher, at whoſe 'Feet he was placed; and it was as happy as it was extraordinary, that he took 'Diſtaſte betimes at the vulgar Phyſics: Uſe and Cuſtom, in that Way, might 'have reconciled it to him, as it had done to others of great Learning. For a 'Philoſopher is like a Vine, of which, they ſay, it muſt be ſet of a Plant, and 'not of a Tree.

'But tho' there was bred in Mr. *Bacon* ſo early a Diſlike of the Phyſiology of '*Ariſtotle*, yet he did not deſpiſe him with that Pride and Haughtineſs with 'which Youth is wonted to be puffed up: He had a juſt Eſteem of that great 'Maſter in Learning, and greater than that which *Ariſtotle* himſelf expreſſed to-'wards the Philoſopher that went before him; for he endeavoured (ſome ſay) to 'ſtifle all their Labours, deſigning to himſelf an univerſal Monarchy over Opi-'nions, as his Patron *Alexander* did over Men. Our Hero owned what was ex-'cellent in him; but in his Enquiries into Nature, he proceeded not upon his 'Principles. He began the Work anew, and laid the Foundation of Philoſophic 'Theory in numerous Experiments

'By this Theory is not (as I conceive) ſo much to be underſtood, that moſt ab-'ſtracted and more narrow one, of the mere Nature and Definition of Matter, 'Motion, Place, Figure, Site, Quantity, and the like, which a Man's Reaſon 'may find out by a few common and daily Appearances in Nature, or Opera-'tions of Art; but we are to underſtand by it, a truer and fuller Knowledge of

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'the Syſtem of the World, of the ſeveral Actions and Paſſions of Bodies in 'it, and of the divers Ways whereby, in themſelves, or by the Application of 'Art to them, they may be made ſerviceable to human Life.

'Now this was a Work for a Man of a thouſand Hands, and as many Eyes, 'and depended upon a diſtinct and comprehenſive Hiſtory of Nature; it was a 'Way laborious and tedious, yet uſeful and honourable, and in this, like the 'Way of the Snail, which ſhineth tho' it is ſlow.

'Such an uſeful and noble Philoſophy did our Author deſign, inſtead of the 'Art of Diſputation, which then generally prevailed, and which he compared 'to the Condition of Children, who are apt for Talk, but not for Generation; 'and certainly that Character was moſt due unto himſelf which he gave to *Zeno-* '*phanes*, of whom he ſaid, *that he was a Man of a vaſt Conceit, and that minded* '*nothing but* Infinitum.

'Eaſy it is to add to Things already invented; but to invent, and to do it 'under Diſcouragement, when the World is prejudiced againſt the Invention, 'and with loud Clamour hooteth at the Projector: This is not an Undertaking 'for Dulneſs or Cowardice; to do this argues an inquiſitive and ſagacious Wit, 'a Mind free from ſlaviſh Prepoſſeſſion; a piercing Judgment, able to ſee thro' 'the Miſts of Authority; a great Power in the Underſtanding, giving to a Man 'ſufficient Courage to bear up the Head againſt the common Current of philo- 'ſophical Doctrines, and Force to beat out its own Way in untravelled Places.

'With ſuch intellectual Ability was the Lord *Verulam* endowed: And he 'ſtood on the old Paths, and perceived the Unſoundneſs of their Bottom; their 'intricate Windings; their Tendency to an uſeleſs End, or rather to endleſs 'Diſputation, and the daily Juſtlings and Rencounters of thoſe who travelled in 'them: He looked attentively round about him, he eſpied a new, and better, 'and larger, and ſafer Way, and he journeyed far in it himſelf, and he left a 'Map of it for Poſterity, who might farther purſue it: And he has been hap- 'py in being followed by Men of the ableſt Underſtandings, with ſingular Suc- 'ceſs; and the Societies for improving natural Knowledge do not at this Day 'depart from his Directions, tho' they travel farther than Death would ſuffer him 'to adventure.

'I can, at preſent, call to Remembrance but one Man who hath undervalued 'his Lordſhip's Method, and it is the ſame Man who hath libelled the Holy 'Scriptures themſelves, the Infidel *Spinoza*; this Man objecteth againſt his Way, 'that it faileth in the very Entrance of it, thro' a Miſtake about the Original of 'Error.

'His Lordſhip's Opinion is the ſame with that which *Des Cartes* inſiſted on in 'his later Philoſophy; both ſhew, that therefore Man deceives himſelf, becauſe 'his Will (being larger in its Deſires than the Underſtanding is in its Compre- 'henſions, and haſtening its Opinion of ſuch Objects as it covets to know, be- 'fore it hath ſufficiently attended to them, and obtained a clear and diſtinct 'Perception of them) does cauſe it to yield a blind and raſh, and therefore 'groundleſs Aſſent to inſufficient Evidence.

'His Lordſhip hath expreſſed it thus, after his better Way of ſaying Things. "The Underſtanding is not only made up of dry Light, but it receives an In- "fuſion from the Will and Affections, and that begets ſuch Sciences as the "Heart deſireth; for a Man ſooneſt believes that which he would have to be "true: Wherefore he rejects difficult Truths, thro' Impatience in enquiring; "and ſober Truths, becauſe they reſtrain his Hope (or Deſire;) and the deeper

" natural Truths, by Reaſon of Superſtition; and the Light of Experiments, " by Reaſon of Arrogance and Pride, leſt the Mind ſhould ſeem to be conver- " ſant in mean and tranſitory Things; and Paradoxes, out of Reſpect to the " Opinion of the Vulgar. In Sum, the Will ſeaſons and infects the Mind by " innumerable Ways, and by ſuch as are ſometimes not at all perceived."

'Now, how think you doth *Spinoza* ſhew this Opinion to be a groſs and fun- 'mental Miſtake? Why, by denying that there is any ſuch Thing in Man as a 'Will (as if that general Name was ever uſed to ſignify a particular Act, and 'not rather to expreſs the general Notion of that Power) by telling us, that all 'Volitions are particular Acts, and as fatally determined by a Chain of phyſical 'Cauſes, as any Effects whatſoever of natural Bodies. So that we are like to learn 'well from his Philoſophy, how to amend our erroneous Aſſent; whilſt it teach- 'eth us that it is neceſſary, and not to be mended, unleſs Men could have other 'Bodies, and there were another Scheme of Nature.

'It muſt be confeſſed, that the Lord I write of was not without Infirmities, 'intellectual or moral; and the latter of theſe have made the greateſt Noiſe 'from the greatneſs of his Fall. I do not here pretend to ſpeak of an Angel, 'but of a Man; and no Man, great in Wit and high in Office, can live free 'from Suſpicion of both Kinds of Errors; for that Heat which is inſtrumental 'in making a great Wit, is apt to diſorder the Attention of the Mind, and the 'Stability of the Temper; and high Place, becauſe it giveth Power and Oppor- 'tunity, tho' no Authority to offend, is ever looked on with a jealous Eye; 'and corrupt Men, who mete by their own Meaſures, think no Man can be 'great and innocent too.

'His Lordſhip owned it, under his Hand, that he was frail, and did partake 'of the Abuſes of the Times; and ſurely he was a Partaker of their Severities 'alſo, tho' they proved by Accident happy Croſſes and Misfortunes: Methinks 'they are reſembled by thoſe of Sir *George Sommers*, who being bound by his 'Employment for another Coaſt, was by Tempeſt caſt upon the *Bermudas*; and 'there a ſhipwreck'd Man made full Diſcovery of a new, temperate, fruitful 'Region, which none had before inhabited, and which Mariners, who had only 'ſeen its Rocks, had eſteemed an inacceſſable and enchanted Place. The great 'Cauſe of his Suffering is to ſome a Secret; I leave them to find it out, by his 'Words to King *James*: *I wiſh*, (ſaid he) *that as I am the firſt, ſo I may be the 'laſt of Sacrifices in your Times.* And when from private Appetite it is reſol- 'ved, that a Creature ſhall be ſacrificed, it is eaſy to pick up Sticks enough, 'from any Thicket whither it hath ſtrayed, to make a Fire to offer it 'with.

'But whatſoever his Errors were, or the Cauſes of his Misfortunes, they are 'over-balanced by his Virtues, and will die with him: His Errors were but as 'ſome Excreſcences, which grow on theſe Trees that are fit to build the Pala- 'ces of Kings; for tho' they are not proper and natural Parts, yet they do not 'very much deprive the Body of its Uſe and Value. And farther (to expreſs 'myſelf by a more decent Image, a Compariſon of his own) his Fall will be to 'Poſterity but as a little Picture of Night-work, remaining amongſt the fair and 'excellent Tables of his Acts and Works.

'Theſe I diſtinguiſh into two Kinds, his mechanical Inventions, and his Wri- 'tings: I doubt not but his mechanical Inventions were many; tho' I can call 'to Mind but three at this Time, and of them I can give but a very broken 'Account: And for his Inſtruments, and Ways in recovering deſerted Minds,

'I can

'I can give no Account at all; tho' certainly, without new Tools, and peculiar Inventions, he would never have undertaken that new and hazardous Work of the three Inventions which come now to my Memory: The

'First was an Engine repreſenting the Motion of the Planets; of this I can ſay no more than what I find in his own Words, in one of his Miſcellany Papers in Manuſcript: The Words are theſe. *I did once, to be repreſented to me by Wires, the Motion of ſome Planets, in Fact as it is, without Theories of Orbs*, &c. *and it ſeemed a ſtrange and extravagant Motion; one while they moved in Spires forwards; another while they did unwind themſelves in Spires backwards; one while they made larger Circles, and higher; another while ſmaller Circles, and lower; one while they moved to the North in their Spires; another while to the South*, &c.

'His ſecond Invention was a ſecret Curioſity of Nature, whereby to know the Seaſon of every Hour in the Year by a Philoſophical Glaſs, placed (with a ſmall Proportion of Water) in a Chamber: This Invention I deſcribe in the Words of him from whom I had the Notice of it, Mr. *Thomas Buſhell*, one of his Lordſhip's menial Servants, a Man ſkilful in diſcovering and opening of Mines, and famous for his curious Water-works in *Oxfordſhire*, by which he imitated Rain, Hail, the Rainbow, Thunder and Lightning.

"This Secret cannot be that Inſtrument which we call *Vitrum Calendare*, or "the Weather-glaſs: The Lord *Bacon*, in his Writings, ſpeaking of that as a "Thing in ordinary Uſe, and commending not Water but rectified Spirit of "Wine, in the Uſe of it: Nor (being an Inſtrument made with Water) is it "likely to have ſhewed Changes of the Air with ſo much Exactneſs, as the later "Baroſcope made with Mercury: And yet it ſhould ſeem to be a Secret of "high Value, by the Reward it is ſaid to have procured, for the Earl of *Eſſex* "(as Mr. *Buſhell* in his *Extract*, p. 17. reporteth) when Mr. *Bacon* had made a "Preſent of it to him, was pleaſed to be very bountiful in his Thanks, and be-"ſtow upon him *Twickenham-park*, and its Garden of *Paradiſe*, as a Place for "his Studies."

'I confeſs, I have not Faith enough to believe the Whole of this Relation; and yet I believe the Earl of *Eſſex* was extremely liberal, and free even to Profuſeneſs; that he was a great Lover of learned Men, being in ſome Sort one of them himſelf; and that with ſingle Patronage he cheriſhed the hopeful Parts of Mr. *Bacon*, who alſo ſtudied his Fortune and Service: Yet Mr. *Bacon* himſelf, where he profeſſeth his Unwillingneſs to be ſhort in the Commemoration of the Favours of that Earl, is in this great one perfectly ſilent. But there is in his *Apology* another Story, which may ſeem to have given to Mr. *Buſhell* the Occaſion of his Miſtake. After the Queen had denied to Mr. *Bacon* the Solicitor's Place, for the which the Earl of *Eſſex* had been a long and earneſt Suitor on his Behalf, it pleaſed that Earl to come to him from *Richmond* to *Twickenham* Park, and thus to break with him, *Mr.* Bacon, *the Queen hath denied me the Place for you,——you fare ill, becauſe you have choſen me for your Mean and Dependance: You have ſpent your Thoughts and Time in my Matters; I die——if I do not do ſomewhat towards your Fortune. You ſhall not deny to accept a Piece of Land which I will beſtow upon you.* And it was, it ſeems, ſo large a Piece, that he underſold it for no leſs than eighteen hundred Pounds.

'His third Invention was a Kind of mechanical Index of the Mind; and of this Mr. *Buſhell* hath given us the following Narrative and Deſcription. "His

" ſhip preſented to Prince *Henry* two triangular Stones (as the Firſt-fruits of his " Philoſophy) to imitate the ſympathetical Motion of the Load-ſtone and Iron, " although made up of the Compounds of Meteors (as Star-ſhot Jelly) and other " magical Ingredients, with the reflected Beams of the Sun: on Purpoſe that " the Warmth, diſtilled into them thro' the moiſt Heat of the Hand, might diſ- " cover the Affection of the Heart, by a viſible Sign of their Attraction and Ap- " petite to each other, like the Hand of a Watch, within ten Minutes after they " are laid on a Marble Table, or the Theatre of a great Looking-glaſs. I write " not this as a feigned Story, but as a real Truth; for I was never quiet in my " Mind till I had procured thoſe Jewels of my Lord's Philoſophy from Mr. *Ar-* " *chy Primroſe*, the Prince's Page. Of this I find nothing, either in his Lord- " ſhip's Experiments touching Emiſſion or immateriate Virtues, from the Mind " and Spirits of Men, or in thoſe concerning the ſecret Virtue of Sympathy and " Antipathy; wherefore I forbear to ſpeak farther in an Argument about which " I am ſo much in the Dark."

' Having tranſcribed this general Account, I could not forbear to reflect a ' little on that Paſſage in Dr. *Rawley*'s Life of our noble Author, [After he ' had paſſed the Circle of the Liberal Arts, his Father thought fit to frame ' and mould him for the Arts of State; and for that End ſent him over into ' *France* with Sir *Amyas Paulet*, then employed Ambaſſador-lieger into *France*, ' &c.] and I was very ſolicitous to caſt ſome Light upon ſo remarkable an Event; ' in the ſixth Book *De Augmentis Scientiarum*, Vol. I. p. 162. ſpeaking of the ' Invention of his Cypher, he ſays, Quod certe, cum adoleſcentuli eſſemus Pari- ' ſiis, excogitavimus; which makes an Approximation to the Time of our Au- ' thor's Travels, and yet appears defective. I preſently recollected, that his at- ' tending upon Sir *Amyas Paulet* was a Key to open this Difficulty, and to aſcer- ' tain the Time: But conſulting *Camden*, and all the *Engliſh* Hiſtories my ſlender ' Stock afforded, to my great Mortification I could not trace the ſlighteſt Print ' or Footſtep of any ſuch Embaſſy. The Reaſon of all this Diligence, in a Mat- ' ter which may be reckoned inconſiderable, muſt be reſolved into a ſingle Point ' of Curioſity: The Lord-keeper, Sir *Nicholas Bacon* our Author's Father, was ' at that Time as high in Fame as Station; and as he was one of thoſe great ' Luminaries which then ruled this our Orb, I indulged the Thought, to learn ' what Age was moſt ſuitable to form the Mind by Travel; or at leaſt what were ' the Sentiments of thoſe who then ſat at the Helm: In this Perplexity, *Richard* ' *Rawlinſon* L. L. D. put into my Hands a Collection of Letters in MS. which ' at firſt Sight related to thoſe Times; and if any Thing occurs in Conſequence ' which will be acceptable, it is entirely owing to his Friendſhip. I had not ad- ' vanced many Pages in this Treaſure, before I found it contained a Number of ' the original Letters of Sir *Amyas Paulet*, during his Embaſſy in *France*, and ' particularly ſeveral to the Lord-keeper *Bacon*, mentioning our Author, with ' Dates and all other Marks of being genuine. I ſhould be unpardonable in paſ- ' ſing by thoſe which relate to our Author; and I hope to be excuſed for ſelec- ' ting one or two more, which caſt a ſtronger Light upon ſome Tranſactions in ' thoſe Days than any Thing I have been ſo fortunate to meet with: I ſhall give ' the Letters according to their Dates, and add a very few Remarks about their ' Importance.'

Mr.

Mr. John Blackbourn's *Account of Lord* Bacon's *compleat Works, in four Volumes, Folio, collected by him and publiſhed at* London *in the Year* 1730.

I NOW come to give ſome Account of the Order or Method of digeſting our noble Author's Works, wherein I ſhall occaſionally repreſent both the Acceſſion of new Treatiſes, and the Improvements and Collations of thoſe formerly publiſhed to the World.

I need not make an Apology for ranging the *Latin* and *Engliſh* Works ſeparately by themſelves; the Reader will preſently obſerve that the Direction of the Author, and their natural Order have in a great meaſure aſſigned them the Place they ſtand in; and the Propriety of printing *Latin* Works entire ſpeaks for itſelf.

The Method in which theſe Works are printed, is in general the ſame which our noble Author himſelf has laid down in his Diſtribution of the Work. Vol. I. p. 12. he gives us this Order, 1. *Partitiones Scientiarum.* 2. *Novum Organum, ſive Indicia de Interpretatione Naturæ.* 3. *Phænomena univerſi, ſive Hiſtoria naturalis & Experimentalis, ad condendam Philoſophiam.* 4. *Scala Intellectus.* 5. *Prodromi, ſive Anticipationes Philoſophiæ ſecundæ.* 6. *Philoſophia ſecunda, ſive Scientia activa.* So that the Partition of the Sciences, the *Novum Organum*, or Interpretation of Nature and Natural Hiſtory, are obvious to follow in their Order.

Again, the Order of the Natural Hiſtory is thus, by the Author's own Appointment. Vol. II. p. 21. *Tituli Hiſtoriarum & Inquiſitionum, in primos ſex Menſes Deſtinatarum.* 1. *Hiſtoria Ventorum.* 2. *Hiſtoria Denſi & rari necnon Coitionis & Expanſionis Materiæ per Spatia.* 3. *Hiſtoria Gravis & Levis.* 4. *Hiſtoria Sympathiæ & Antipathiæ rerum.* 5. *Hiſtoria Sulphuris, Mercurii & Salis.* 6. *Hiſtoria Vitæ & Mortis*; and this is a Guide and Direction for placing Treatiſes of a like Subject. And to theſe Directions may be added, *Epiſtola ad* Fulgentium, printed Vol. II. p. 403. and his Letter to Biſhop *Andrews*, printed before his Advertiſement touching an holy War, Vol. III. p. 534.

Having given this firſt Deſign, I ſhall deſcend more particularly.

My Care at the Entrance upon this Work, was to remove the firſt Preface and Diſtribution upon the *Novum Organum*, where they were originally printed in the Year 1620, and to place them before the Beginning of the Inſtauration. This was plainly pointed out by the Direction of Archbiſhop *Sancroft*, who ſeldom diſmiſſed any Author but what was the better for his Peruſal, either in Emendations or Explications, or both. I remember a *Latin* Inſtrument drawn up by this venerable Archbiſhop and illuſtrious Confeſſor, conſtituting Dr. *Floyd*, the then Biſhop of *Norwich*, his Vicar General, *&c.* which, in my humble Opinion, comes up to the Purity and Politeneſs of the *Auguſtan* Age; and many of thoſe who are acquainted with *Emanuel* College Library, *Cambridge*, where the greateſt Part of his Books were depoſited by the Directions of his laſt Will, ſay, That his Judgment and Elegance, both as a Critic and fine Writer, ſhine ſo bright throughout that Collection, in Marginal Notes and Illuſtrations under his own Hand, that he appears to have excelled in Senſe and Diction, as much as he did in Station. I have been contented to ſpeak thus much, becauſe this great Prelate had formed a Deſign in which he had made ſome Progreſs, of publiſhing an Edition of our Author's Works, and had in great meaſure ſettled the Text and Diſpoſition

poſition of them: And this preſent Edition will appear to be purged of many hundreds of Errors by Means of his great Diligence and Judgment; to which I muſt add, That as the Rights of Mankind are the common Care of all benevolent Tempers, and as the Rights of Princes are the common Intereſt of all thoſe Princes that are not degenerated and abandoned, ſo there is a Kind of Sympathy and Solicitude in all great Minds to ſupport the Memory and Reputation of thoſe of the like Rank and Elevation.

But the Reader himſelf, at firſt View, will ſee the Propriety of this Order: For the Preface now printed, Vol. I. p. 7. is concerning the State of the Sciences, which therefore belongs to the Partition of the Sciences; and the Diſtribution now printed, Vol. I. p. 12. is the Diſtribution of the whole Inſtauration, and conſequently ought to be ranged before the firſt Part of the *Inſtauration*, which is *De Augmentis Scientiarum*, and not before the *Novum Organum*.

Beſides, our noble Author himſelf has not obſcurely intimated this Method and Diſpoſition, if the Edition of the *Novum Organum* in 1620 be at all obſerved: For there the Reader will find, by a repeated Title, that the ſecond Part of the Inſtauration, or *Novum Organum*, begins at p. 35. of that Edition; and all that precedes does properly belong to the firſt Part of the *Inſtauration*, and is called the *Inſtauration:* And more plainly ſtill, at the End of the Diſtribution, *Deeſt pars prima Inſtaurationis quæ complectitur partitiones Scientiarum: Illæ tamen ex ſecundo libro de Progreſſibus faciendis in Doctrina divina & humana, nulla ex parte Peti poſſunt.* So that indeed the placing this Preface and Diſtribution immediately before the *Novum Organum*, appears to be merely caſual and accidental; for theſe being finiſhed in 1620, when the *Novum Organum* was publiſhed, were printed along with it; and when the *De Augmentis Scientiarum* was enlarged and printed in 1623, they having ſo lately appeared in a Part of the ſame Work, and being printed in the ſame Form, were not thought fit to be reprinted and conſigned to their proper Station. I have nothing farther to add concerning the firſt and ſecond Part of the Inſtauration, having both had their Author's laſt Hand, but that they are printed from the beſt Editions at *London*, 1623 and 1620, and that they are more correct even than thoſe hitherto beſt Editions: And the few Eſcapes of the Printer will be taken Notice of at the Concluſion of this Account.

As to the Order of the ſecond Volume, the *Paraſceve*, the *Abecedarium* and *Præfatio*, as juſt hinted, p. 155, do naturally claim the firſt Place.

Dr. *Teniſon*'s Account of the *Abecedarium* ſeems to be very juſt, p. 94. "A "Fragment of his Lordſhip's *Abecedarium Naturæ*, this is commonly ſaid to be "loſt; and it is well nigh ſo, the latter Part of it only remaining. But where the "Whole is good, each Part is of Value; and Antiquaries who travel in the "Dominions of the Grand Seignior, do not deſpiſe the ancient Statues which "they find there, tho' *Mahometan* Superſtition hath broken off their Heads."

This Work is ſaid to be a metaphyſical Piece, but it is not ſo in the ſtricteſt Senſe; its principal Deſign is the Partition of Things into their ſeveral Claſſes; a Deſign which his Lordſhip brought to more Perfection in his *Organon*, and Book *De Augmentis Scientiarum:* And tho' in it were handled Conditions of Being, yet not abſtractly from all Body, but with Reference to it; and therefore his Lordſhip did not call it *Abecedarium Hyperphyſicum*, but the *Alphabet of Nature.* And his Lordſhip giveth expreſs Caution in his Book of Advancement, That where he ſpeaks of Conditions of Entities which are called tranſcendental, (ſuch as, *much*, *little*, *the ſame*, *divers*, *poſſible*, *impoſſible*) he be not interpreted

ted in a logical but phyſical Senſe. His Lordſhip was much averſe to high and uſeleſs Speculations, and he was wont to expreſs that Averſeneſs in the following Compariſon, *The Lark* (ſaid he) *is an high Flyer, and in its Flight does nothing but ſing; but the Hawk flies high, and thence deſcends and catches its Prey.*—And again, he truly obſerves, p. 36.

The firſt Section [of *Natural Hiſtory*] is the Hiſtory of Winds, written in *Latin* by the Author, and by *R. G.* Gent. turned into *Engliſh:* It was dedicated to King *Charles*, then Prince, as the Firſt-fruits of his Lordſhip's Natural Hiſtory, and as a Grain of Muſtard-ſeed which, by Degrees, was to grow into a Tree of Experimental Science. This was the Birth of the firſt of theſe ſix Months, in which he determined (God aſſiſting him) to write ſix ſeveral Hiſtories of Natural Things, to wit, of *denſe and rare Bodies*; of *heavy and light Bodies*; of *Sympathy and Antipathy*; of *Salt, Sulphur and Mercury*; of *Life and Death*; and (which he firſt perfected) that of *Winds*, which he calls *the Wings by which Men fly on the Sea*, and *the Beſoms of the Air and Earth*. And he rightly obſerveth concerning thoſe *Poſtnati* (for, as he ſaith, They are not a Part of the ſix Days Work, or primary Creatures) "That the Generation of them has not been well underſtood, "becauſe Men have been ignorant of the Nature and Power of the Air, on "which the Winds attend, as *Æolus* on *Juno*."

An *Engliſh* Tranſlation of this Book of *Winds* was printed in the ſecond Part of the *Reſuſcitation*, as it is called, tho' improperly enough; for it is rather a Collection of Books already printed, than a Reſuſcitation of any conſiderable ones, which before ſlept in private Manuſcript. The ſecond Section is, *the Hiſtory of Denſity and Rarity*, and of *the Expanſion and Coition of Matter in Space:* This Diſcourſe was written by his Lordſhip in *Latin*, and was publiſhed very imperfectly by *Gruter*, amongſt other Treatiſes, to which he gave the Title of *Impetus Philoſophici*; and very perfectly and correctly by Dr. *Rawley*, *London* 1658, out of whoſe Hands none of his Lordſhip's Works came lame and ill-ſhapen into the World.

In this Argument, his Lordſhip allowing that nothing is ſubſtracted or added to the Total Sum of Matter, does yet grant, That in the ſame Space there may be much more or leſs of Matter; and that (for Inſtance ſake) there is ten times more of Matter in one Tun of Water, than in one of Air. By which his Lordſhip ſhould ſeem to grant, what yet I do not find he does in any other Place, either that there is a *Vacuum* in Nature, or Penetration of Parts in Bodies.

The third Section is *the Hiſtory of Gravity and Levity*, which (as before was ſaid) was but deſigned, and remaineth not (that I can hear of) ſo much as in the rude Draught of its Deſignation; only there are publiſhed his Lordſhip's Topics, or Articles of Inquiſition, touching Gravity and Levity, in his Book of *Advancement*; and a brief *Aditus* to this Hiſtory annexed to the *Hiſtoria Denſi & Rari*, Vol. II. p. 106. In that *Aditus*, or Entrance, he rejecteth the Appetite of heavy Bodies to the Center of the Earth, as a ſcholaſtic Fancy: He taketh it for a certain Truth, That Body does not ſuffer but from Body; or that there is any local Motion which is not ſolicited either from the Parts of the Body itſelf which is moved, or from Bodies adjacent, either contiguouſly, or in the next Vicinity, or at leaſt within the Orb of their Activity: And, laſtly, he commendeth the Magnetic Virtues introduced by *Gilbert*, whom yet in this he diſalloweth, that he made himſelf as it were, a Magnet, and drew every Thing to his Hypotheſis.

The

The fourth Section is *the Hiſtory of Sympathy and Antipathy:* Of this we have only the *Aditus* annexed to that of *Hiſtoria Gravis & Levis*, and a few Inſtances in his *Sylva Sylvarum*. In this Hiſtory he deſigned to avoid magical Fancies, which raiſe the Mind in theſe Things to an undue Height; and Pretence of Occultneſs of Quality, which layeth the Mind aſleep, and preventeth farther Enquiry into theſe uſeful Secrets of Nature.

The fifth Section is *the Hiſtory of Salt, Sulphur and Mercury*, the three Principles of the common Chymiſts; of which three, he thought the firſt to be no primordial Body, but a Compound of the two others, knit together by an acid Spirit. The *Aditus* to this is annexed to that of *Hiſtoria Sympathiæ & Antipathiæ rerum*; but the Treatiſe itſelf was (I think) never written.

The ſixth Section is *the Hiſtory of Life and Death*, written by his Lordſhip in *Latin*, and firſt turned into *Engliſh* by an injudicious Tranſlator; and rendered much better a ſecond Time by an abler Pen, made abler ſtill by the Advice and Aſſiſtance of Dr. *Rawley*.

This Work, tho' ranked laſt amongſt the ſix monthly Deſignations, yet was ſet forth in the ſecond Place; his Lordſhip, as he ſaith, inverting the Order, in reſpect of the prime Uſe of this Argument, in which the leaſt Loſs of Time was by him eſteemed very conſiderable. The Subject of this Book, which Sir *Henry Wotton* calleth none of the leaſt of his Lordſhip's Works, and the Argument (of which ſome had before undertaken, but to much leſs Purpoſe) is the firſt of thoſe which he put in his Catalogue of the *Magnalia Naturæ*. And doubtleſs his Lordſhip undertook both a great and a moſt deſirable Work, of making Art ſhort, and Life eaſy and long; and it was his Lordſhip's Wiſh, That the nobler Sort of Phyſicians might not employ their Times wholly in the Sordidneſs of Cures, neither be honoured for Neceſſity only, but become Coadjutors and Inſtruments of the divine Omnipotence and Clemency, in prolonging and renewing the Life of Man; and in helping Chriſtians, who pant after the Land of Promiſe, ſo to journey thro' this World's Wilderneſs, as to have their Shoes and Garments (theſe of their frail Bodies) little worn and impaired.

Hitherto the Method of this ſecond Volume, both in Reaſon and Authority, is unalterable: And as theſe Treatiſes have had our Author's laſt Hand as he proceeded, I have had no other Solicitude about them, ſave the printing them correctly from the *London* Editions. The immediate following Pieces, *viz. Hiſtoria ſoni & Auditus*, p. 189. *Articuli Quæſtionum circa Mineralia*, p. 203. *Inquiſitio de Magnete*, p. 208. *Inquiſitio de Verſionibus, Tranſmutationibus, Multiplicationibus, & Effectionibus Corporum*, p. 210. and his *Topica Inquiſitionis de Luce & Lumine*, do naturally here follow from their Similitude of Titles and Subjects; and Dr. *Rawley* having placed them in this Order at the End of the *Hiſtoria Denſi & rari*, printed at *London*, by *R. Daniel* 1658, gives a Kind of Sanction to this Method.

Thus far, being under neceſſary Directions, the Clew now leads us to give the reſt of the *Latin* Philoſophical Pieces, which have a Relation to ſome or other of the three Parts of the *Inſtauration* preceding; ſo that the Chain and Connexion carries us to the *Scripta Philoſophica*, communicated to *Gruter* by Sir *William Boſwell* or *Boſvile*, one of our noble Author's Executors, Vol. II. p. 559.

But of theſe the Reader will find the Preface removed, and placed at the Head of this Volume, p. 16. under its proper Title, *viz. Hiſtoriæ Naturalis ad Condendam Philoſophiam Præfatio*; and the Treatiſe following in *Gruter*, viz. *Tabula coitionis & Expanſionis Materiæ*, &c. entirely diſmiſſed, being only a Skeleton, or

firſt

firſt Draught, and either entirely contained, or improved and amended in the *Hiſtoria Denſi & Rari*; and the *Topica Inquiſitionis de Luce & Lumine*, which is the laſt Piece amongſt theſe Scripta, is conſigned to the Station which I lately ſaid Dr. *Rawley* gave it.

And now I owe that Juſtice to the Reader as to declare, That partly upon Advice, and partly on the Evidence of the Matter, I have entirely changed the Method, and moſtly the running Titles of thoſe Pieces publiſhed by *Gruter*, being certain that he has offended in Method, as glaringly and frequently as he has done in Grammar and Orthography. This abundantly appears from his placing the *Scala Intellectus* &c. and the *Pandromus*, or *Pandromi ſive Anticipationes Philoſophiæ ſecundæ*, almoſt in the Middle of thoſe *Scripta*; whereas, in Truth, they ought viſibly to come laſt of all, being the only Fragments in theſe *Scripta* which belong to the fourth and fifth Parts of the *Inſtauration*.

I could here bring in a long Reckoning, but I have ſaid more already than is to my own Liking; only ſo remarkable a Departure from a firſt Publiſher, ought to be ſupported by very evident Reaſons; and my ſole and ſimple View is, if I can be ſo fortunate, To recommend my own Method to the Approbation of the Judicious, and not to deſcend to the Office of a Scavinger.

Recollecting, therefore, that this Volume, in its neceſſary Order, had hitherto wholly conſiſted of Natural Hiſtory, it occurred to me that the Chain and Connexion would be the longer, and conſequently the Chaſms and Interruptions the fewer, by continuing the Natural Hiſtory: Accordingly Method ſeemed to direct me to print *Inquiſitio legitima de motu*, p. 218. *De Sectione Corporum, continuo & vacuo*, p. 222. and *De fluxu & refluxu maris*, p. 234.

Having continued the Natural Hiſtory, I obſerved a great Number of Treatiſes ſcattered amongſt theſe Scripta, concerning the Interpretation of Nature; and I thought they would ſupport and illuſtrate each other, by being brought together. I have placed them in this Order, *Judicia vera de Interpretatione Naturæ*, p. 243. *Partis Inſtaurationis ſecundæ Delineatio & Argumentum*, p. 246. *Aphoriſmi & Conſilia de Auxiliis mentis, & Accenſone luminis naturalis*, p. 255. *De Interpretatione Naturæ ſententiæ duodecim*, p. 256. *De Interpretatione Naturæ præmium*, p. 264. *Cogitata & Viſa, de Interpretatione Naturæ*, p. 266. *Bodlei Epiſtola, in qua candide expendit cogitata & Viſa*, p. 284. Then follows the *Deſcriptio Globi Intellectualis*, *Thema Cæli*, *Parmenidis*, Teleſii & Democriti *Philoſophia tractata in fabula*, of which ſome Account has been rendered already: And as I have met with no Manuſcript Copies of theſe Works, all I have been able to perform was to correct the grammatical and typographical Errors, which I have done in great Abundance. And as to the placing the *Scala Intellectus* towards the Cloſe of theſe *Scripta*, p. 342. and the *Prodromus* or *Prodromi*, p. 344. be pleaſed to take the following Account from Dr. *Teniſon*, p. 48. near the Bottom.

" The fourth Part of the *Inſtauration*, deſigned, was *Scala Intellectus:* To this " there is ſome Sort of Entrance in his Lordſhip's *Diſtribution*, Vol. I. p. 12. and " in a Page or two under the Title of *Scala*, publiſhed by *Gruter* (and reprinted " Vol. II. p. 342.) but the Work itſelf paſſed not beyond the Model of it in the " Head of the noble Author.

" That which he intended, was a particular Explication and Application of the " ſecond Part of the *Inſtauration* (which giveth general Rules for the Interpretation " of Nature) by gradual Inſtances and Examples.

" He thought that his Rules, without ſome more ſenſible Explication, were " like Diſcourſes in Geometry or Mechanics, without Figures and Types of En-

" gines. He therefore deſigned to ſelect certain Subjects in Nature or Art, and, " as it were, to draw to the Senſe a certain Scheme of the Beginning and Progreſs " of philoſophical Diſquiſition in them: Shewing, by Degrees, where our Conſi- " deration takes Root, and how it ſpreadeth and advanceth. And ſome ſuch " Thing is done by thoſe who from the *Cicatricula*, or from the *Punctum ſaliens*, " obſerve and regiſter all the Phænomena of the Animal unto its Death; and af- " ter it alſo in the medical, or culinary, or other Uſe of its Body; together with " all the Train of the Thoughts occaſioned by thoſe Phænomena, or by others in " Compare with them.

" And becauſe he intended to exhibit ſuch Obſervations as they gradually ariſe, " therefore he gave to that deſigned Work the Title of the *Scale* or *Ladder of Un-* " *derſtanding*. He alſo expreſſed the ſame Conceit by another Metaphor, advi- " ſing Students to imitate Men, who by going by Degrees from ſeveral Emi- " nences of ſome very high Mountain, do at length arrive at the Top or Pike " of it."

The fifth Part of the *Inſtauration*, deſigned, was what he called *Prodromi, ſive Anticipationes Philoſophiæ ſecundæ*. To this we find a very brief Entrance in the *Diſtribution*, and the *Scripta* publiſhed by *Gruter*; and tho' his Lordſhip is not known to have compoſed any Part of this Work by itſelf, yet ſomething of it is to be collected from the Axioms and greater Obſervations, interſperſed in his *Natural Hiſtories*, which are not pure but mixed Writings. The *Anticipations* he intended to pay down as Uſe, till he might furniſh the World with the Principal.

In the ſixth and laſt Part of his *Inſtauration*, deſigned, which was, *Philoſophia ſecunda, ſive Scientia activa:* This general Philoſophy, founded upon ſenſible Nature, or artificial Experiments, and built up by Degrees in Obſervations and Axioms, he at length deſpaired of, and commended to Poſterity. Time only can thoroughly finiſh what his Lordſhip began; and ſufficiently commend his Diligence and Sagacity, who collected ſo many Materials, and diſpoſed them into ſuch Order; and made in ſo ſhort a Time, and (for the moſt Part) in the midſt of Civil Buſineſs, ſuch mighty Preparations towards the building of the Houſe of Wiſdom.

Having given ſuch Evidence for the placing thoſe Fragments in the Concluſion of our noble Author's Philoſophical Writings, I had leſs Scruple what ſhould follow; for the Treatiſe *De Sapientia veterum*, being of a mixt Nature, *viz.* Philoſophical, Poetical and Political, I was under no Heſitation whether it ſhould immediately follow the purely Philoſophical Works; accordingly it is printed p. 346, *&c.* What Dr. *Teniſon* ſays of it, p. 55. take as follows:

" In the Place I may reckon his Book *De Sapientia veterum*, written by him in " *Latin*, and ſet forth a ſecond Time with Enlargement, and tranſlated into *En-* " *gliſh* by Sir *Arthur Gorges*; a Book in which the Sages of former Times are ren- " dered more wiſe than it may be they were, by ſo dextrous an Interpreter of their " Fables. It is this Book which Mr. *Sandys* means, in theſe Words which he hath " put before his Notes on the Metamorphoſes of *Ovid*, p. 18. Of modern Wri- " ters, I have received the greateſt Light from *Giraldus*, *Pontanus*, *Ficinus*, *Vives*, " *Comes*, *Scaliger*, *Sabinus*, *Pierius*, and the Crown of the latter, the Viſcount of " *St. Albans*"

It is true, the Deſign of this Book was Inſtruction in Natural and Civil Matters, either couched by the Ancients under thoſe Fictions, or rather made to ſeem ſo, by his Lordſhip's Wit, in the opening and applying of them: But becauſe the

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firſt Ground of it is poetical Story, therefore let it have this Place, till a fitter be found for it.

Laſtly, p. 403. Our noble Author's Epiſtles in *Latin* conclude his Works in that Language, with additional ones by Dr. *Rawley*, *Deodate* and *Iſaac Gruter*: And upon a careful Review I do humbly hope, that our Method, hitherto, is tolerably exact, if not irreproveable; for the *Deſcriptio Globi*, &c. *Thema Cæli*, and *Parmenidis*, &c. *Philoſophia*, tho' they moſt properly belong to the firſt Part of the *Inſtauration*, yet are purpoſely thrown towards the latter End of the *Scripta*; partly that they might not interrupt the Thread of the Natural Hiſtory, and partly that they might not have the Precedency of the more correct Pieces concerning the Interpretation of Nature.

Our Failing thus far has either been conſtantly near known Shores, within Sight of Land, or elſe our Courſe has been ſteered by able and experienced Pilots. We are now to launch out into the vaſter Ocean of our Author's *Engliſh* Works, where more Difficulties ariſe both from the Danger of the Sea, and the Darkneſs of the Sky: However, it is ſelf-evident and undeniable, that the *Advancement of Learning* ſhould have the Precedence. This is the Performance printed 1605, to which many of the Letters in the fourth Volume do refer, beginning p. 561. And tho' this Work is entirely contained in the *De Augmentis*, yet I had the Approbation of very good Judges for the reprinting of it; and I conceive the Reaſons dictating this Conduct are of Weight.

No Writing can challenge the Credit and Authority of an Original better than this: No Performance ever reflected more honour and Reputation upon our Mother Tongue, conſidering it in its beautiful, maſterly Expreſſion, in its juſt and inimitable Method, and in its ſurpriſing and important Diſcoveries.

Again, the *Advancement of Learning* is the beſt Preparatory for the reading of the *De Augmentis*; and as the *De Augmentis* has almoſt in every Line a Beauty of Expreſſion, or Order, or Penetration, and frequently all of them united; on this Account I preſume to think, that a Perſon of very good Literature and nice Taſte will not fully comprehend the Deſign, Method and Subſtance of the Partitions of the Sciences, without ſome ſuch Aſſiſtance, unleſs upon repeated Readings: But when the Optics are thus ſtrengthened, I conceive they may ſuſtain and collect the more briſk and copious Rays: I might ſay more, but our noble Author was always more delighted with Weight than Number; and if what I have offered has no Weight, what might be added may be more ſuperficial ſtill.

Thirdly, Having mentioned the *Advancement of Learning*, and *Helps for the intellectual Powers*, our neceſſary Order begins the third Volume with the *Natural Hiſtory*. Dr. *Teniſon* obſerves, p. 41.

" The greateſt Branch of the third Part of the *Inſtauration* is his *Sylva Sylvarum*, or *Natural Hiſtory*, which containeth many Materials for the building of " Philoſophy, as the *Organum* doth Directions for the Work; it is an Hiſtory not " only of Nature freely moving in her Courſe (as in the Production of Meteors, " Plants, Minerals) but alſo of Nature in Conſtraint, and vexed and tortured by " human Art and Experiment: And it is not an Hiſtory of ſuch Things orderly ranged, but thrown into an Heap; for his Lordſhip, that he might not " diſcourage other Collectors, did not caſt this Book into exact Method; for " which Reaſon he hath the leſs Ornament, but not much the leſs Uſe.

" In this Book are contained Experiments of Light and Experiments of Uſe, " (as his Lordſhip was wont to diſtinguiſh) and among them ſome extraordinary, " and others common: He underſtood, that what was common in one Country,

" might be a Rarity in another; for which Reaſon Dr. *Caius*, when in *Italy*,
" thought it worthy his Pains to make a large and elegant Deſcription of our
" way of Brewing. His Lordſhip alſo knew well, that an Experiment manifeſt
" to the Vulgar, was a good Ground for the Wiſe to build farther upon; and
" himſelf rendered common ones extraordinary by Admonitions, for farther Tri-
" als and Improvements. Hence his Lordſhip took Occaſion to ſay, That his
" writing of *Sylva Sylvarum* was (to ſpeak properly) not a Natural Hiſtory, but
" a high Kind of natural Magic, becauſe it was not only a Deſcription of Nature,
" but a breaking of Nature into great and ſtrange Works.

" This Book was written by his Lordſhip in the *Engliſh* Tongue, and tranſla-
" ted by an obſcure Interpreter into *French*; and out of that Tranſlation into
" *Latin*, by *James Gruter*, in ſuch ill Manner, that they darkened his Lord-
" ſhip's Senſe, and debaſed his Expreſſion. *James Gruter* was ſenſible of his Miſ-
" carriage, being kindly advertiſed of it by Dr. *Rawley*; and he left behind him
" divers Amendments, publiſhed by his Brother *Iſaac Gruter*, in a ſecond Edi-
" tion; yet ſtill ſo many Errors have eſcaped, that the Work required a third
" Hand. Monſieur *Ælius Deodatus* had once engaged an able Perſon in the
" Tranſlation of this Book, one who could have done his Lordſhip Right, and
" obliged ſuch Readers, as underſtood not the *Engliſh* Original. He began, and
" went thro' the three firſt Centuries, and then deſiſted; being deſired by him
" who ſet him on Work, to take his Hand quite off from that Pen with which he
" moved ſo ſlowly. His Tranſlation of the third Century is now in my Hands;
" but that of the two firſt I believe is loſt.

" His Lordſhip thus began that third Century in *Engliſh*.—All Sounds (what-
" ſoever) move round, that it to ſay, on all Sides, upwards, downwards, for-
" wards and backwards. This appeareth in all Inſtances.

" Sounds do not require to be conveyed to the Senſe in a right Line as Viſibles
" do, but may be arched, tho' it be true they move ſtrongeſt in a right Line; which
" nevertheleſs is not cauſed by the Rightneſs of the Line, but by the Shortneſs
" of the Diſtance, *Linea recta breviſſima:* And therefore we ſee, if a Wall be
" between, and you ſpeak on the one Side, you hear it on the other; which is
" not becauſe the Sound paſſeth through the Wall, but archeth over the Wall.

" Theſe Words are thus turned by *James Gruter*, in his laſt Edition, and tole-
" rably well, eſpecially if we compare them with ſome other Places in his Tran-
" ſlation.

" Omnes ſoni, qualeſcunque ſint in circulum moventur; hoc eſt in omnes par-
" tes, ſurſum, deorſum, antrorſum, retrorſum, quod omnes docent inſtantiæ.

" Soni non requirunt ut recta linea ad ſenſum devehantur, quemadmodum
" viſibilia, ſed poteſt eſſe arcuata; quamvis verum ſit, quod fortiſſime per rec-
" tam lineam moveant: Neque tamen id lineæ debetur rectitudini, ſed minori in-
" tervallo; linea enim recta eſt breviſſima. Hinc, ſi quis ab altera interjecti pa-
" rietis parte vocem proferat, ab altera queat exaudiri; non quod vox parietem
" tranſeundo penetret, ſed quod arcuata ultra parietem aſcendat.

" But the Tranſlator, employed by Monſieur *Deodate*, turned them after this
" better Manner:

" Omnes in univerſum ſoni orbem feruntur: In omnem videlicet partem;
" ſurſum, deorſum, antrorſum, & retrorſum, hoc in omnibus exemplis cerni-
" tur.

" Soni non in recta tantum linea ad ſenſum deferri neceſſe habent, quemad-
" modum inviſibilia; ſed & inflexa & arcuata devehi poſſunt: quanquam in recta

" linea

" linea fortiſſime moveantur, ubi tamen non hoc imputandum rectitudini lineæ, " ſed brevitati intervalli. Recta enim linea eadem breviſſima eſt. Itaque ex- " perimur, muro interjecto, vocem ex univerſa parte muri exaudiri, quæ ex al- " tera ejus parte prolata fuerit; auditur autem, non quod per murum penetret, " ſed quod eum tranſcendat motu flexuoſa.

" The judicious Reader may diſcern by this little, how much this latter Tran- " ſlator excelled the former, in comprehending and expreſſing his Lordſhip's " Senſe. And yet I cannot ſay, that throughout thoſe three Centuries, in which " he hath laboured, he hath every where truly hit his Conceit. His Lordſhip had " a very peculiar Vein with him; and I may reſemble it to the Singularity in " the Face of *Cardan*, who tells us, in his own Life, that he ſat to Painters of " divers Countries, yet could never have the Air of it taken by them.

" Whilſt I am ſpeaking of this Work of his Lordſhip's, *Of Natural Hiſtory*, " there comes to my Mind a very memorable Relation, reported by him who " bare a Part in it, the Reverend Dr. *Rawley:* One Day his Lordſhip was dic- " tating to that Doctor, ſome of the Experiments in his *Sylva:* The ſame Day, " he had ſent a Friend to Court, to receive for him a final Anſwer, touching " the Effect of a Grant, which had been made him by King *James:* He had " hitherto only Hope of it, and Hope deferred; and, as he was deſirous to " know the Event of the Matter, and to be freed, one Way or other, from the " Suſpence of his Thoughts, his Friend returning, told him plainly, That he " muſt thenceforth deſpair of that Grant, how much ſoever his Fortunes needed " it. Be it ſo, ſaid his Lordſhip; and then he diſmiſſed his Friend very chear- " fully, with thankful Acknowledgments of his Service. His Friend being gone, " he came ſtraight way to Dr. *Rawley*, and ſaid thus to him: Well, Sir, your " Buſineſs won't go on; let us go on with this, for this is in our Power. And " then he dictated to him afreſh, for ſome Hours, without the leaſt Heſitancy " of Speech, or diſcernible Interruption of Thought. To this Work, *Of Na-* " *tural Hiſtory*, may be reduced his Lordſhip's Treatiſe *De Sono & Auditu*; *De* " *Metallis & Mineralibus*; *De Magnete*; *De Verſionibus, Tranſmutationibus, Mul-* " *tiplicationibus & Effectionibus Corporum*; *De Luce, & Lumine:* All publiſhed " by Dr. *Rawley*, in the Collection called, *Opuſcula varia poſthuma* Franciſci " Baconi, *Lond.* 1658."

We may likewiſe reduce to the ſame Place, the Paper *De Fluxu & Refluxu Maris*, publiſhed by *Iſaac Gruter*, amongſt the *Scripta*; and the other, *De ratione inveniendi cauſas Fluxus & Refluxus Maris*; as alſo the *Baconiana Phyſiologica, & Medica*, in the *Remains*, now re-printed, Vol. III. p. 210.

There may be farther added, his *Cogitationes de naturâ rerum, De Sectione Corporum, continuo & vacuo*; and the *Fragment*, called, *Filum Labyrinthi, ſive, Legitima Inquiſitio de Motu:* All publiſhed by the ſame Mr. *Gruter*, (and reprinted, Vol. II. p. 218, *&c.*) Likewiſe the Treatiſes, *De Motûs, ſive, Virtutis activæ variis Speciebus. Nov. Organ*, p. 318, 373, in Vol. I.

For it was his Lordſhip's Deſign, not merely to exhibit a Hiſtory of Bodies, but moreover to procure a diſtinct and comparative one of their Vertues; ſuch as thoſe of Denſity and Rarity; Conſiſtency and Fluidity; Gravity and Lævity; Heat and Cold. *Diſtrib. Operis*, Vol. I. p. 12, *&c.*

Such a Collection of Natural Hiſtory, was, of Neceſſity, to be undertaken anew. For the Collections which were before in Men's Hands, were but a ſmall and inconſiderable Heap, when the Chaff and Fable were ſifted from them, though the more conſiderable for that Separation and farther, as his Lordſhip noteth, too

many

many of thoſe Hiſtories were at firſt framed, rather for Delight, and Table-talk, than for Philoſophy. Stories were feigned, for the Sake of their Morals; and they were frequently taken upon groundleſs Truſt; and the later Writers borrowed out of the more ancient, and were not Experimenters, but Tranſcribers; and ſuch a one was *Pliny* himſelf, both in his larger and leſſer Work, I mean that of *Solinus*, who is but *Pliny* contracted.

There are, who have accuſed the Lord *Bacon* himſelf, for taking Experiments too readily upon Truſt, and without Deliberation, and diſcreet Choice. To ſuch I will return Anſwer in his own Words: "The Rejection which I conti-"nually uſe of Experiments, tho' it appeareth not, is infinite; but yet if an "Experiment be probable in the Work, and of great Uſe, I receive it, but de-"liver it as doubtful."

The Fragments following have a manifeſt Relation to the *Natural Hiſtory*; and as they are printed by Dr. *Teniſon* in the *Remains*, his Account of them is the more authentic. *Introd.* p. 95.

The——Paper about Natural Things, is his Lordſhip's Inquiſition touching the compounding of Metals.

Then follow, in the next Place, his Articles of Queſtions touching Minerals: Of theſe, the firſt enquireth about the ſame Subject with the foregoing Paper; but finding them diſtinguiſhed by his Lordſhip, I have not joined them together.

Theſe Queſtions were turned into *Latin*, and in that Tongue publiſhed by Dr. *Rawley*, amongſt his Lordſhip's *Opuſcula:* But the *Engliſh* Originals are now the firſt Time ſet forth; and having by me three Copies, I publiſhed them by that one on which his Lordſhip had endorſed, with his own Hand, *This is the clean Copy.*

Now theſe Enquiries being in themſelves imperfect, and without much Solution of his Lordſhip's adjoined, I have here added to them the ſeveral Anſwers of Dr. *Meverel*, to whom they were propoſed by his Lordſhip. It has not been in my Power, as yet, to inform myſelf duly about this Doctor; but doubtleſs he was a Chymiſt, as thoſe Times went, of the firſt Order. It was his Lordſhip's Manner, on divers Mornings, to ſet down Enquiries for the following Days in ſome looſe Papers, and in one of them I find this, among other Memoranda, to ſend to Dr. *Meverel*, "Take Iron and diſſolve it in Aqua-fortis, and put a "Load-ſtone near it, and ſee whether it will extract Iron; put alſo a Load-ſtone "into the Water, and ſee whether it gather a Cruſt about it."

After the Queſtions of his Lordſhip about Minerals, and the Anſwers of Dr. *Meverel*, there follows, in the fourth Place, an Inquiſition concerning the Verſions, Tranſmutations, Multiplications and Effections of Bodies, not hitherto publiſhed in the *Engliſh* Tongue, in which his Lordſhip wrote it.

Fifthly, There is annexed a certain Speech, touching the Recovery of drowned Mineral Works, prepared, as Mr. *Buſhell* ſaith, for that Parliament under which he fell. His Lordſhip, no Doubt, had ſuch a Project, and he might prepare a Speech alſo for the facilitating of it; but that this is a true Copy of that Speech I dare not avouch: His Lordſhip's Speeches were wont to be digeſted into more Method, his Periods were more round, his Words more choice, his Alluſions more frequent and managed with more Decorum: And as no Man had greater Command of Words, for the Illuſtration of Matter, than his Lordſhip, ſo here he had Matter which refuſed not to be cloathed in the beſt Words.

The

The ſixth Paper about Natural Things, containeth certain Experiments, about Weight in Air and Water.

The ſeventh containeth a few Propoſals to the Countryman, called, *Experiments for Profit*. The eighth, Experiments about the Commixture of Liquors. The ninth, a Catalogue of Bodies attractive, and not attractive, with experimental Obſervations about them.

Under the third Head of *Medical Remains*, is contained, in the firſt Place, a Paper which he called *Grains of Youth:* In it he preſcribeth divers Things, as Means to keep up the Body in its Vigour; amongſt theſe is the Receipt of the *Methuſalem* Water, againſt the Dryneſs of Age, which his Lordſhip valued and uſed.

Next follows a Catalogue of Aſtringents, Openers and Cordials, inſtrumental to Health: Then comes, in the third Place, an Extract, by his Lordſhip, for his own Uſe, out of the *Hiſtory of Life and Death*, together with ſome new Advices in order to Health.

Laſt of all, there are added four medical Receipts; the firſt is, his Lordſhip's Broth and Fomentation againſt the Stone, which I judged acceptable to the Public, ſeeing his Receipt againſt the Gout had been ſo, tho' it worketh not an infallible Cure: And here it may ſeem ſtrange, that his Lordſhip does not mention Spirit of Nitre, which he ſo often uſed, and which a very ingenious Experimenter hath noted to be the beſt of Acids againſt the Stone. The ſecond is the Receipt of an Ointment, called by his Lordſhip *Unguentum Fragrans ſive Romanum*; by this he meaneth an Unguent which conſiſted of Aſtringents, preventing Exceſs of Tranſpiration, and Cordials comforting the Parts, and he called it (I ſuppoſe) the *Roman Unguent*, becauſe That People did eminently make Uſe of Baths and Anointings. He himſelf held, That the anointing with Oil was one of the moſt potent Operations to long Life, and that it conduced to Health, both in Winter, by the Excluſion of the cold Air, and in Summer, by detaining of the Spirits within, and prohibiting the Reſolution of them, and keeping off the Force of the Air which is then moſt prædatory: Yet it was his Lordſhip's Opinion, That it was beſt to anoint without bathing, tho' he thought bathing without anointing bad. The third and fourth are Receipts to comfort the Stomach; one of them he calleth a *Secret*, and I ſuppoſe it might be communicated to him by Sir *Henry Wotton*; for Sir *Henry* ſpeaks of his Preparation of a certain Wood, as of a rare Receipt to corroborate the *Viſcera*, and to keep the Stomach in Tone.

In his Preface to the *New Atlantis*, Dr. *Rawley* has determined that Piece to attend the *Natural Hiſtory*, by our Noble Author's own Deſignation.

We are left now to a more arbitrary and conjectural Method; and I could not form to myſelf a better than this, which I have taken upon Deliberation and Advice, *viz.* To begin with the ſhort Sentences and Apophthegms, and then gradually to riſe up to the Eſſays, or ſhort Diſcourſes: Having gained this Ground, to proceed to the Hiſtory, which is of a more mixed Nature; after that, to advance to the Treatiſe concerning the Law; and having finiſhed the Law Pieces, ſtrictly ſpeaking, I judged it proper to annex thoſe that have a near Relation or Affinity to the Law, ſuch as the Caſe of the *Poſtnati*, of *a General Naturalization*, of the *Scotch Nation*, the *Charges*, the *Speeches in Parliament*, and on other Occaſions; and then to print ſuch Pieces of a miſcellaneous Nature as can't properly be ranked under any of the foregoing Heads: For our noble Author himſelf has given us a Kind of Authority in the ninth Book of the firſt Part of the *Inſtauration*, to reſerve his Theological Pieces, as he has done the Partition of Theology,

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towards the Concluſion of his acknowledged Writings, ſo that they amount to the Bulk of a juſt Treatiſe; then I have reprinted ſome Pieces of a more doubtful and apocryphal Nature; and laſt of all, the *Letters*. This is the general Scheme to which I have reduced the remaining Works.

NUMBER III.

Of Juriſprudence, *or the* Imperial Civil Law.

By Mr. ROLLIN.

I ANNEX the Knowledge of Laws to Moral Philoſophy, of which it is a Part; or, at leaſt to which it has a great Relation: It is a Subject of great Extent, but I ſhall treat it very ſuccinctly.

The Memoirs with which an able Profeſſor at Law, Mr. *Lorry*, one of my very good Friends, has ſupplied me, have been of very great Uſe to me.

By the Knowledge of the Law, I mean, *the Knowledge of Right of Laws in general.* Every People have had their particular Laws and Legiſlators: *Moſes* is the moſt ancient of them all; God himſelf dictated the Laws it was his Will that his People ſhould obſerve. *Mercurius Triſmegiſtus* amongſt the *Egyptians*, *Minos* amongſt the Inhabitants of the Iſland of *Crete*, *Pythagoras* amongſt the Cities of *Great Greece*, *Charondas* and *Zeleucas* in the ſame Country, *Lycurgus* at *Sparta*, and *Draco* and *Solon* at *Athens*, are the moſt celebrated Legiſlators of Pagan Antiquity. I proceed directly to the *Romans*.

The Beginnings of the *Roman* Civil Law, were little extenſive: Under the Kings, *Rome* had only a ſmall Number of Laws, which were propoſed at firſt by the Senate, and afterwards confirmed in the Aſſembly of the People. *Papirius*, who lived in the Time of *Tarquinius Priſcus*, was the firſt that collected the Laws, made by the Kings, into one Body. That Collection was called, from the Name of its Author, *Jus Papirianum*, *The Papirian Law*. The Common Wealth, after having aboliſhed the Power of Kings, retained their Laws for ſome Time, but they were afterwards expreſly aboliſhed by the *Tribunitian Law*, in Hatred to the Name of Kings. From that Time it uſed an uncertain Kind of Right, till the twelve Tables, which were prepared by the *Decemviri*, and compoſed out of the Laws of *Athens* and the principal Cities of *Greece*, into which Deputies had been ſent, to collect ſuch as they ſhould judge the wiſeſt, and beſt adapted to a Republican Government.

Theſe Laws were the Foundation and Source of the whole *Roman* Civil Law; and *Cicero* is not afraid to prefer them infinitely to all the Writings of the Philoſophers, as well in reſpect to the Weight of their Authority, as the Extent of the Utility deducible from them.

The Brevity, and at the ſame Time the Severity, of the Law of the twelve Tables, made Way for the Interpretation of the Learned, and the Prætors Edicts.

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The firſt employed themſelves in explaining their Spirit and Intention, the ſecond in ſoftening their Rigour, and ſupplying what might have been omitted.

The Laws, in Proceſs of Time, having multiplied to Infinity in a Manner, the Study of them became abſolutely neceſſary, and at the ſame Time very difficult: Perſons of Birth, Capacity, Learning, and Love for the Public Good, diſtinguiſhed by the Name of *Civilians*, applied themſelves wholly to this Study. The young *Romans*, who deſigned to open themſelves a Way to the great Offices of the Common-wealth, by the Talent of Eloquence, which was the firſt Step to them, went to the Houſes of theſe Civilians, in order to acquire their firſt Knowledge of the Law; without which, it was not poſſible for them to ſucceed at the Bar. Private Perſons, in all their Affairs, had Recourſe to them; and their Houſes were regarded as the Oracles of the whole City, from whence Anſwers were brought, which determined Doubts, calmed Diſquiets, and directed the Methods it was neceſſary to take, in the Proſecution of all Suits. Theſe Anſwers were no more than Opinions, which might inform the Judges, but impoſed no Neceſſity upon them of following them.

Auguſtus was the firſt who gave them more Authority, in appointing Civilians himſelf, that were no longer limited to ſerve as Council to Particulars, but were held the Emperor's Officers: From thenceforth, their Opinions, reduced to Writing, and ſealed with the public Authority, had the Force of Laws; to which the Emperors obliged the Judges to conform.

Theſe Civilians publiſhed various Works, under different Titles, which have contributed exceedingly to reducing the Knowledge of the Civil Law into Art and Method.

Theſe Laws, in Proceſs of Time, multiplied extremely, and made Way for Doubts and Difficulties, by Contradictions *ſuppoſed* or *real*. In ſuch Caſes, Recourſe was had to the Prince, who gave the Solution of them. He adjudged alſo, by Degrees, the Cauſes referred to him by Appeal; and anſwered, by Reſcripts, all the Conſultations addreſſed to him by Petition or Memorial. And from thence partly, came the Conſtitutions of the Emperors, ſo full of Wiſdom and Equity, from which the Body of the *Roman* or Civil Law has been formed.

To form theſe Deciſions with the greater Maturity, they called in the Aſſiſtance of the moſt learned Civilians, and did not give their Anſwers, till after having concerted them well with all Perſons in the Empire, who were beſt verſed in the Laws and Rights of the Public.

I ſhall ſay a few Words, in this Place, upon the moſt celebrated Civil Lawyers of the later Times.

PAPINIAN (*Æmilius*) was in great Conſideration with the Emperor *Severus*, whom he had ſucceeded in the Office of Fiſcal Advocate. He was looked upon as the Aſylum of the Laws, and the Repoſitory of the whole Knowledge of them. The Emperor *Valentinian* the third raiſed him above all the Civilians, in ordaining by his Law of the 7th of *November* 426, That when they were divided upon any Point they ſhould follow the Opinion eſpouſed by that eminent Genius, as he calls him. And indeed *Cujas* judges him the moſt profound Civilian that ever was, or ever will be.

The Emperor *Severus* being willing to raiſe his great Merit to equal Dignity, made him *Præfectus Prætorii*, of which one of the principal Functions was to judge Cauſes jointly with the Emperor, or in his Name. *Papinian*, to acquit himſelf the better in that Office, took *Paulus* and *Ulpian* for his Counſellors and Judges aſſiſtant, whoſe Names are alſo very famous amongſt the Civilians.

Severus, at his Death, left two Sons, *Caracalla* and *Geta*; tho' they had both the Name, *Dion* aſſures us, that only *Caracalla* had the Power of Emperor, who ſoon ridded himſelf of his Collegue in the moſt cruel and barbarous Manner conceivable, for he cauſed him to be aſſaſſinated in the Arms of their common Mother, and, according to ſome, killed him with his own Hands.

Caracalla murdered all whom his Brother had loved, and who had either ſerved or retained to him, without Diſtinction of Age, Sex or Quality; and *Dion* ſays, That he began with 20,000 of his Domeſtics and Soldiers. To mention or write the Name of *Geta*, ſufficed for being immediately butchered; ſo that the Poets dared not uſe it even in Comedies, where it was commonly given to Slaves. *Papinian* could not eſcape his Cruelty; it is ſaid, that *Caracalla* would have obliged him to compoſe a Diſcourſe to excuſe the Death of *Geta*, either to the Senate or People, and that he generouſly replied, "It is not ſo eaſy to excuſe as to commit Parricide; "and to accuſe an innocent Perſon, after having deprived him of his Life, is a "ſecond Parricide."

He remembered, without Doubt, that *Seneca* had been very much blamed for having compoſed a Letter for *Nero* to the Senate, to juſtify the Aſſaſſination of his Mother. The Son of *Papinian*, who was then Quæſtor, and had three Days before exhibited magnificent Games, was alſo killed.

Fabius Sabinus. The Emperor *Heliogabalus* having ordered a Centurion, to go and kill *Sabinus*, that Officer, who was a little deaf, believed that he had bade him make *Sabinus* quit the City: The Centurion's Error ſaved the Life of *Sabinus*, who paſſed for the *Cato* of his Times. The Emperor *Alexander*, who ſucceeded *Heliogabalus*, placed him in the Number of thoſe next his Perſon, and whoſe Counſel he took for governing wiſely.

Ulpian (*Domitius Ulpianus*) deſcended originally from the City of *Tyre*. He had been Counſellor and Judge aſſiſtant to *Papinian*, in the Time of *Severus*. When *Alexander* came to the Empire, he placed him near his Perſon, in quality of Counſellor of State, and to take care of all Things referred to his Judgment; which Employment is evidently that ſince called *Great Referendary*. He afterwards made him *Præfectus prætorio*.

Lampridius places him at the Head of thoſe wiſe, learned and faithful Perſons, who compoſed *Alexander*'s Council; and aſſures us, that Prince paid him greater Deference than any body elſe, upon account of his extraordinary Love of Juſtice; that he converſed only with him in private; that he looked upon him as his Tutor; and that he proved an excellent Emperor, from making great Uſe of *Ulpian*'s Counſels in the Government of the Empire.

As *Ulpian* endeavoured to re-eſtabliſh Diſcipline amongſt the Prætorian Soldiers, they roſe againſt him, and demanded his Death of *Alexander*. Inſtead of granting their Requeſt, he often covered him with his Purple Robe, to defend him againſt the Effects of their Fury. At length, having attacked him in the Night, he was obliged to fly to the Palace, to implore the Aid of *Alexander* and *Mammæa*. But all the Awe of the Imperial Authority could not ſave him, and he was killed by the Soldiers, even in the Sight of *Alexander*. Several of *Ulpian*'s Works are ſtill extant.

Paulus (*Julius Paulus.*) He was of *Padua*, where his Statue is ſtill to be ſeen. He was nominated Conſul under *Alexander*, and then *Præfectus prætorio*. He, as well as *Sabinus* and *Ulpian*, was of the Council, formed by *Mammæa* the Mother, and *Maſa* the Grandmother of *Alexander*, to adminiſter the public Affairs, during the Minority of that Prince. Every body knows the great Services they did, and

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the Reputation they acquired him. The *Roman* Empire had, at that Time, every Thing that could render a State happy, a very good Prince, and excellent Miniſters: For the one is of ſmall Utility without the other; and perhaps it is even more dangerous to the People, to have a Prince good of himſelf, but who ſuffers himſelf to be deceived by bad Men, than to have one more wicked, who however, inſpects into the Conduct of his Officers, and obliges them to do their Duty. *Alexander* always ſet great Value upon the Merit of *Paulus*, who is ſaid to have wrote more than any other Civilian.

POMPONIUS was alſo of *Alexander*'s Court and Council. How happy was this Reign! As he lived to the Age of ſeventy-eight, he compoſed a great Number of Works. Amongſt the reſt, he made a Collection of all thoſe famous Civilians, down to the Emperor *Julian*.

MODESTINUS *(Herennius)* lived alſo in the Reign of *Alexander*, who raiſed him to the Conſulſhip. He, as well as the four preceding Lawyers, was *Papinian*'s Diſciple, whoſe Care formed them all in the Knowledge of the Civil Law. What Services does a ſingle Man ſometimes render a State by his Learning and Pupils!

TRIBONIAN was of *Pamphilia*. He was honoured with the firſt Employments, at *Conſtantinople*, by the Emperor *Juſtinian*. It was under that Prince, and by his Care, that the Civil Law took a new Form, and was reduced into an Order, that ſtill ſubſiſts, and will for ever do him Honour.

Before him, there were many *Codes*, which were either compiled from, or Abridgments of, the *Roman* Laws. *Gregorius* and *Hermogenes*, two Civilians, made a Collection of Laws, which, from their Names, was called *The Gregorian and Hermogenian Code*. It was a Collection of the Conſtitutions of the Emperors, from *Adrian* down to *Diocleſian* and *Maximin* in 306. This Work was of no Uſe, for want of Authority to cauſe it to be obſerved. The Emperor *Theodoſius* the younger was the firſt who compoſed a *Code* in ſixteen Books, conſiſting of the Conſtitutions of the Emperors, from *Conſtantine the Great* down to him; and he abrogated all Laws not compriſed in this Syſtem, which is called *The Theodoſian Code*, and was publiſhed in 438.

And laſtly, the Emperor *Juſtinian*, ſeeing the Authority of the *Roman* Law much weakened in the Weſt, from the Decline of the Empire, reſolved to cauſe the whole Body of the *Roman* Law to be compiled anew. He charged *Tribonian* with this Commiſſion, who called in the Aid of the moſt learned Civilians then in being. He choſe the fineſt of the Imperial Conſtitutions, from *Adrian* down to his own Time, and publiſhed this new *Code* in 529.

He afterwards undertook a new Work by Order of the Emperor: This was to extract the fineſt Deciſions from the two thouſand Volumes of the ancient Civilians, and to reduce them into one Body, which was publiſhed in 533, under the Name of the *Digeſt*. The Emperor gave this Collection the Force of Law, by the Letter which he wrote in Front of the Work, and which ſerves it for a Preface. It is called alſo *The Pandect*. *The Digeſt* conſiſts of fifty Books.

The ſame Year appeared the *Inſtitutes of Juſtinian*, a Book which contains the Elements and Principles of the *Roman* or Civil Law.

The Year following, that is to ſay, in 534, the Emperor made ſome Alterations in his firſt *Code*, which he aboliſhed, and ſubſtituted a new one in its ſtead, to which alone he gave the Authority of Law.

And laſtly, after this Reviſal, *Juſtinian* publiſhed an hundred and ſixty-five Conſtitutions, and thirteen Edicts, which are called *Novellæ*, *The Novels*, either becauſe they make a conſiderable Change in the ancient Law; or, according to

Cujas, becauſe they were made upon new Caſes, and compiled after the Reviſal of the *Code*, by the Order of that Emperor. Moſt of the *Novels* were wrote in *Greek*, and were tranſlated into *Latin*.

The Body of the Civil Law therefore conſiſts of four Parts, *The Code*, *The Digeſt*, *The Inſtitutes* and *The Novels*. By the *Civil Law*, the *Inſtitutes* underſtand the Laws peculiar to each City or People. But at preſent it is properly the *Roman* Law, contained in the *Inſtitutes*, the *Digeſt* and the *Code*. It is otherwiſe called *the Written Law*.

From all that I have now ſaid may be ſeen, what Services a Prince may render his People, who applies himſelf ſeriouſly to the Cares of Government, and who is well convinced of the Extent and Importance of his Duties. *Juſtinian* had been very ſucceſsful in the Wars he had undertaken, and had the Wiſdom to aſcribe that Succeſs neither to the Number of his Troops, the Courage of his Soldiers, the Experience of his Generals, nor his own Talents and Abilities; but ſolely to the Protection with which God had vouchſafed to favour his Arms. But, had he contented himſelf with this Military Glory, he would have thought, that he had only half diſcharged the Functions of Sovereignty, which was principally eſtabliſhed for rendering Juſtice to the People, in the Name and Place of God himſelf. Accordingly he declares expreſly, in a public Edict, That the Imperial Majeſty ought not to be adorned with Arms only, but armed alſo with Laws, for the good Government of the People as well in Peace as War.

Accordingly, after having reſtored Peace to the Provinces of the Empire, as a Warrior, he turned his Thoughts to the Regulation of its Polity, as a Legiſlator, by inſtituting an univerſal Body of Law, to ſerve as the Rule of all Tribunals: A Work which had been much the Object of the Wiſhes of his Predeceſſors, as himſelf obſerves in more than one Place, but which ſeemed attended with ſo many Difficulties, that they had always believed it impracticable. He ſurmounted them all with a Conſtancy, that nothing was capable of diſcouraging.

For ſucceeding in this important Enterprize, he employed all the moſt learned Civilians in the whole Extent of the Empire, preſiding himſelf in the Work, and reviſing exactly all they compoſed. Far from aſcribing the Honour of it to himſelf, as is uſual enough, he does them all Juſtice; he mentions them with Praiſes, he extols their Erudition, he treats them almoſt as his Collegues, and recommends it as a Duty, to thank the Divine Providence for having ſupplied him with ſuch Aids, and for having honoured his Reign by the Compoſition of a Work ſo long deſired, and ſo uſeful and neceſſary for the due Adminiſtration of Juſtice. An Emperor, of leſs Zeal for the Public Good, and leſs Liberality, than *Juſtinian*, would have left all thoſe Civilians in Obſcurity and Inaction. How many excellent Talents of all Kinds remain buried, for want of Patrons to produce them! The Learned are not wanting to Princes, but Princes to the Learned.

The great Qualities and Actions of *Juſtinian*, would have recommended him for ever to the Veneration of Mankind, if his Conduct, in reſpect to Eccleſiaſtical Affairs, had not ſullied his Glory.

I ſhall conclude this Article upon the Knowledge of Civil Law, with ſome Extracts from Laws, that may give the Reader an Idea of the Beauty and Solidity of the different Inſtitutions of which I have been ſpeaking.

" Digna vox eſt Majeſtate regnantis, legibus alligatum ſe Principum profiteri: " Adeo de Auctoritate juris noſtra pendet auctoritas. Et, re vera, majus imperio " eſt ſummittere legibus Principatum; & oraculo præſentis Edicti, quod nobis " licere non patimur, aliis indicamus." " It is worthy of the Majeſty of a " Prince

" Prince to declare himſelf bound and limited by the Laws: So much does our " Authority depend on Right and Juſtice. And, indeed, to ſubmit the ſovereign " Power to the Laws, is greater than to exerciſe it; wherefore we are well ſatiſ- " fied to make known to others, by the preſent Edict, what we do not think law- " ful for us to do." It is an Emperor, Maſter of almoſt the Univerſe, who ſpeaks thus, and who is not afraid of hurting his Authority, by declaring the juſt Bounds by which it is limited.

" Reſcripta contra jus elicita, ab omnibus Judicibus refutari Præcipimus; niſi " fortè ſit aliquid, quod non lædat alium, & proſit petenti, vel crimen ſuppli- " cantibus indulgeat." " We ordain, That no Judge ſhall have any Regard to " Reſcripts obtained from us, contrary to Juſtice, unleſs they tend to granting " ſome Grace to Petitioners, not to the Hurt of others, or to remitting ſome Pu- " niſhment to Suppliants." It is very uncommon for Princes, either to own that they have deceived themſelves, or been deceived by others, and to retract, in Conſequence, what they have once decreed. Nothing, however, does them more Honour than ſuch an Acknowledgment, as we ſee in the Example of *Artaxerxes*, who publicly revoked the unjuſt Decree he had been miſled into paſſing againſt the *Jews*.

" Scire Leges, non hoc eſt verba earum tenere, ſed vim ac poteſtatem." " To " know the Laws, is not only to underſtand the Words of which they are com- " poſed, but their Force and Efficacy."

" Non dubium eſt in Legem committere eum, qui verba Legis amplexus, " contra Legis nititur voluntatem; nec pœnas inſertas legibus evitabit, qui ſe " contra juris ſententiam ſæva prærogativa verborum fraudulenter excuſat." " It " is not to be doubted, but that he acts contrary to the Law, who confining " himſelf to the Letter, acts contrary to the Spirit and Intent of it; and who- " ever, to excuſe himſelf, endeavours fraudulently to elude the true Senſe of a " Law, by a rigorous Attachment to the Words of it, ſhall not eſcape its Penal- " ties by ſuch Prevarication."

" Nulla juris ratio, aut Æquitatis Benignitas patitur, ut, quæ ſalubriter pro " utilitate hominum introducuntur, ea nos duriore Interpretatione contra ipſo- " rum commodum producamus ad ſeveritatem." " It is contrary to all Juſtice " and Equity, that thoſe Things which have been wiſely inſtituted for the Good " of Mankind, ſhould be wreſted to their Prejudice by a miſtaken Severity, and " a too rigid Interpretation."

" Obſervandum eſt jus reddenti, ut in adeundo quidem facilem ſe præbeat, " ſed contemni non patiatur. Unde mandatis adjicitur, ne in ulteriorem fami- " liaritatem provinciales admittant: Nam ex converſatione æquali contemtio " dignitatis naſcitur. Sed & in cognoſcendo, neque excandeſcere adverſus eos " quos malos putat, neque precibus calamitoſorum illachrymari oportet. Id enim " non eſt conſtantis & recti Judicis, cujus animi motum vultus detegit; & ſum- " matim ita jus reddi debet, ut auctoritatem dignitatis ingenio ſuo augeat." " The Perſon who adminiſters Juſtice ought, indeed, to be eaſy of Acceſs, but " ſhould not ſuffer himſelf to be deſpiſed, by making himſelf too cheap. Hence " it is, that in the Inſtructions given to Provincial Governors and Magiſtrates, it " is recommended to them, not to admit the People of their Provinces into too " great a Degree of Familiarity, becauſe converſing as Equals, induces Contempt " of Dignity. In rendering Juſtice, he ought alſo neither to expreſs great In- " dignation againſt ſuch as he believes criminal, nor ſuffer himſelf to be ſoftened " too much by the Prayers of the Unfortunate. For it does not become the Con-

" ſtancy

" ſtancy and Gravity of an upright Judge, to diſcover the Sentiments of his Heart " in his Countenance: In a Word, he ought to diſpenſe Juſtice in ſuch a Man- " ner, as to exalt the Authority of his Office by the Wiſdom and Moderation of " his Conduct."

" Quæ ſub conditione jurisjurandi relinquuntur, à Prætore reprobantur. Pro- " vidit enim is qui ſub jurisjurandi conditione quid accepit, aut omittendo con- " ditionem perderet hæreditatem legatumve, aut cogeretur turpiter, accipiendo " conditionem, jurare. Voluit ergo eum, cui ſub jurisjurandi conditione quid " relictum eſt, ita capere, ut capiunt hi, quibus nulla talis jurisjurandi conditio " inſeritur: Et rectè. Cum enim faciles ſint nonnulli hominum ad jurandum " contemptu religionis, alii perquam timidi metu divini Numinis uſque ad ſuper- " ſtitionem: Ne vel hi, vel illi, aut conſequerentur, aut perderent quod relictum " eſt, Prætor conſultiſſimè intervenit. The Tendency of this Law is admirable. It diſpenſes with a Perſon's taking an Oath, to whom an Eſtate or Legacy has been left upon Condition of taking ſuch Oath; and ordains, that he ſhall enjoy ſuch Eſtate or Legacy, as if ſuch Condition had not been inſerted, leſt it ſhould occaſion him either to ſwear contrary to his Conſcience, or to renounce his Right, thro' an over-ſcrupulous or ſuperſtitious Delicacy of Conſcience. It were to be wiſhed, that the Spirit of this Law ſhould occaſion the Abundance of uſeleſs Oaths to be aboliſhed, which bad Cuſtom has introduced into all the trading Societies and Companies of *France*.

" Advocati, qui dirimunt ambigua fata cauſarum, ſuæque defenſionis viribus " in rebus ſæpe publicis ac privatis lapſa erigunt, fatigata reparant, non minùs " provident humano generi, quàm ſi præliis atque vulneribus patriam parentes- " que ſalvarent. Nec enim ſolos noſtro imperio militare credimus illos, qui gla- " diis, clypeis, & thoracibus nituntur, ſed etiam advocatos. Militant namque " patroni cauſarum, qui glorioſæ vocis confiſi munimine, laborantium ſpem, vi- " tam, ac poſteros defendunt." " Advocates, who terminate Cauſes, of which " the Events are always uncertain, and who, by the Force of their Eloquence, " whether in reſpect to the Public, which often happens, or private Perſons, re- " inſtate ruinous Affairs, render no leſs Service to Mankind, than if they defen- " ded their Country and Parents in Battle, at the Expence of their Blood and " Wounds. For we rank in the Number of thoſe who fight for our Empire, not " only ſuch as act for it with Sword, Harneſs and Shield, but thoſe alſo who lend " our Subjects the noble Aid of Eloquence, in Defence of their Lives, Intereſts " and Poſterity."

It is with Reaſon that the Prince beſtows ſuch fine Praiſes on a Profeſſion, which makes ſo ſalutary an Uſe of the Talents of the Mind, and that he equals it with whatever is greateſt in the State. But, at the ſame Time, he recommends to Advocates the Exerciſe of ſo illuſtrious a Profeſſion with a noble Diſintereſtedneſs, and not to diſgrace it by a baſe Devotion to ſordid Intereſt. " Ut non ad turpe " compendium ſtipemque deformem hæc arripiatur occaſio, ſed laudis per eam " augmento quærantur. Nam ſi lucro pecuniaque capiantur, veluti abjecti at- " que degeneres inter viliſſimos numerabuntur." He alſo exhorts them not to abandon themſelves to the inhuman Itch and Pleaſure of bitter Raillery and groſs Invective, which only leſſen the Weight of the Advocate's Diſcourſe in the Eſteem of his Hearers, but to confine themſelves ſtrictly to what the Neceſſity and Succeſs of Cauſes requires. " Ante omnia autem univerſi advocati ita præbeant pa- " trocinia jurgantibus, ut non ultra quàm litium poſcit utilitas, in licentiam con- " vitiandi & maledicendi temeritate prorumpant. Agant quod cauſa deſiderat,

" temperent

" temperent ab injuria. Nam ſi quis adeo procax fuerit, ut non ratione ſed pro-
" bris putet eſſe certandum, opinionis ſuæ imminutionem patietur."

Dr. Thomas Wood's Introduction *to a new Inſtitute of the* Imperial *or* Civil Law.

THE Law is *an Art directing to the Knowledge of Juſtice.*

I. *Juſtice is univerſal or particular.*

Univerſal Juſtice is a *conſtant and perpetual Deſire of giving to every one his Due*; and hath for its Rule all Laws divine and human.

Particular Juſtice is a conſtant and perpetual Will of giving to every one his Due according to particular Agreement, or the Laws of Civil Society. The *Subject* then of the *Law* is Civil Society, and the *End* of it particular Juſtice. *Particular Juſtice*, as it is exerciſed in Commerce, is called *Commutative* or Expletory Juſtice, directed without any Regard to the different Conditions of Men, and obſerves a ſimple Proportion. As it is exerciſed in *Governing* and *Beneficence*, it is called *Diſtributive* or Attributive Juſtice, which does appoint Rewards and Puniſhments, according to the ſeveral Conditions, Stations and Qualities of Men; and if there are many Claims, it obſerves a *comparative* Proportion. Juſtice is to be learned by conſidering the Law of Nations and the Civil Law, *i. e.* the Law of each Common-wealth. The Law of Nations muſt be diſtinguiſhed into the original or primary Law of Nations, and the conſequential or ſecondary Law of Nations. For, Law is to be applied only to Man who is capable of it, not to Brutes who are governed by Inſtincts and Inclinations; as, Self-preſervation, a Propenſity to Generation, to eat, ſleep, *&c.* which cannot be any Foundation for Juſtice.

II. The original or primary Law of Nations, or the Law of Natural Man, is that which unimproved Reaſon has planted amongſt all Men, and is the true *Law of Nature*; a diſcerning Principle in Men of Good and Ill; or the Dictate of right Reaſon, declaring from its Conformity or Diſagreeableneſs every Action to be good or evil. It's Object is natural Good or Evil; but, the Will or Choice being determined, then it is *Moral Good* or Evil. It always forbids or commands as other Laws. The Author of Reaſon is the Legiſlator. Rewards and Puniſhments, ariſing from a quiet or unquiet Conſcience, are the Sanction, and do conſtantly attend it.

From this Deſcription obſerve, That what is *præternatural*, or a *Permiſſion* and *Right* of Reaſon and Nature, or natural *Inclination* or Inſtinct, and all other Things vulgarly called *Natural*, or ſaid to proceed from Nature, are different from the true Law of Nature.

The *original* or primary Law of Nations, or *Law of Nature*, has one eternal Mark upon it, *viz.* Immutability. I mean by that, That the *Law of Nature* is eſſential to the well-being of Society. As Man is in a Society, the Law of Reaſon and Nature cannot continually take place, but upon a Suppoſition. For it does not enjoin me to buy or ſell, but upon the Suppoſition that I will buy or ſell; it does require of me, that I ſhould not deceive or defraud. But, as there is ſcarce a general Rule without Exceptions, ſo this Propoſition, *The Law of Na-*

ture

ture is immutable, or, The Law of Nature is eſſential to Society, lies under ſome Reſtrictions.

It is immutable or eſſential in its general Principles and Injunctions; not but that it may be otherwiſe in ſome Circumſtances and remote Concluſions from it. As it is a general Injunction, *That we muſt not enrich ourſelves by another's Loſs and Damage*; *that we ought to obſerve our Promiſes*, &c. But this being found inconvenient in the general Obſervance, it is allowed, that one may enrich himſelf in the particular Caſe of Preſcription upon another Man's Right, and that Minors may chuſe whether they will ſtand to their Promiſes, it is mutable then in Part only, and cannot wholly be changed without deſtroying the Order of Society; as no State can ſubſiſt under a general Licence to kill and ſteal, this is the common State of the Queſtion. But the Law of Nature ought to be obſerved in every Part of it, tho' by reaſon of Inconveniencies, Civil Polity takes the Liberty to make Allowances.

The conſequential or ſecondary Law of Nations, or the Law of Nations properly ſo called, is that which does proceed from natural Reaſon, but not ſo ſimply and immediately as the original and primary Laws. They are deduced by long Experience and Practice, from a Conſideration of the Nature of Society, and from an Enquiry into the Diſpoſitions of Mankind. Neceſſity or Convenience was the Cauſe of them. They are divided into two general Branches: The firſt was the Appointment of diſtinct Properties; from whence aroſe Kingdoms, Cities, Commerce, Contracts. The ſecond Branch carried Rewards and Puniſhments; and from thence Magiſtracy, Dignities, Courts of Judicature, War, Bondage, *&c.*

The Civil Law, is that Law which every Common-wealth or City has eſtabliſhed and appointed peculiarly for itſelf: This may be called the Arbitrary or Municipal Law; for it is not of that Neceſſity or Extent with the Law of Nations, which is obſerved almoſt by all Mankind. From theſe two Laws, *viz.* the *Law of Nature*, and the *Law of Nations*, the *Roman* Law was compiled, and is emphatically called, *The Civil Law*. Upon which Account, ſeveral Things, which were originally and by Invention the Law of Nations, are become Parts of the Civil Law by a new Eſtabliſhment and Approbation. The twelve Tables were the Foundation of the *Roman* Law, which after the Expulſion of *Tarquin* were brought from *Athens* and other *Grecian* Cities.

The whole Civil Law is comprized in four Books, the *Code*, the *Pandects* or *Digeſts*, the *Inſtitutes*, the *Novels* or *Authentics*. The *Code* is divided into twelve Books, and was the firſt Book which the Emperor *Juſtinian* ordered to be collected (for the moſt Part) out of the Conſtitutions of the former Emperors, diſperſed in the *Gregorian*, *Hermogenian* and *Theodoſian Codes*. There are only ſome Fragments left of the two firſt, but the *Theodoſian* is entire.

The *Code* of *Juſtinian* came forth in the Year of our Lord 534. The *Digeſt* or *Pandects* came forth in the Year 533, and is divided into fifty Books: It was collected from the *Commentaries* of the antient Lawyers, their *Reſponſes*, and other Writings.

The *Inſtitutes* came out alſo in the Year 533, and is divided into four Books: It is a Syſtem from the whole Body of the Law, but not ſo diſtinct and comprehenſive as it might be, neither ſo uſeful at this Day as at firſt.

The *Inſtitutes* ſometimes correct, or are contrary to, the *Digeſt*; but the ſecond Publication of the *Code* came after them, in which ſome Things are omitted, which the *Inſtitutes* refer to from the firſt Publication.

Laſt

Laſt of all, the *Novels* or *Authentics* were publiſhed at ſeveral Times without any Method: They are called *Novels*, becauſe they are new Laws; and *Authentics*, becauſe they are exactly and authentically tranſlated from the *Greek* into the *Latin* Tongue.

A Law is the Precept of the ſupreme Power, (or Power derived from it,) *obliging the Subject to act, or not to act, under a Penalty.* Its Force and Efficacy does not appear in commanding, forbidding, permitting, puniſhing. It does always command or forbid: For tho' it may be a Precept of Permiſſion, it commands the Judges to admit thoſe Things permitted; and tho' it may be a Privilege, exempting him whoſe Privilege it is from the Obligation of the Law, yet it forbids others to act contrary or derogatory to it.

A Law obliges all but the Prince, and Kings, or their Embaſſadors, who abide amongſt us, becauſe they have a Parity of Power. This is the Definition of the Law largely taken; but in its ſtrict Senſe (as it is a written Law of the *Romans*) it is defined to be,

1. That which the People of *Rome* hath eſtabliſhed upon the Recommendation or Requeſt of a Senatorian Magiſtrate; ſo that the other Parts of the written Law are,

2. A *Plebiſcite*, which the common People enacted at the Requeſt of the Tribune, or other Plebeian Magiſtrate.

3. A Decree of the Senate.

4. The Conſtitution of the Emperor, either by a Reſcript (which is the Letter of the Emperor in anſwer to particular Perſons who enquire the Law of him, but if it is ſent to a Corporation or Body of Men, that have conſulted him, his Letter then is called a *Pragmatic Sanction*) or by Edict, which the Emperor eſtabliſhes of his own Accord, that it may be generally obſerved by every Subject; or by Decree, which the Emperor pronounces upon hearing a particular Cauſe between Plaintiff and Defendant.

But if at any Time a Conſtitution is ſpecial, it is called a *Privilege (Privata Lex)* which is particularly eſtabliſhed for the Sake of a certain Perſon or Thing upon a particular Account. If it is granted to a Perſon, it dies with him; if to a Thing (ſuppoſe to an Eſtate, that it ſhall never pay Taxes, *&c.*) it paſſes down to the Succeſſors, and continues while that Thing is in Being. If a Privilege is granted to Scholars, it is granted to their Wives and Children.

By the Way, note, That a Privilege may be made, not only for a Man's Advantage, but to his Diſadvantage, and againſt him: As when a Puniſhment more ſevere than ordinary is inflicted upon an Offender for Example ſake, and *in Terrorem.* But here I do not underſtand Privilege in the vulgar Senſe, but in its proper Meaning, as it is a particular Conſtitution, contrary to a general Law.

All this Power of iſſuing forth his Pleaſure by Reſcripts, Edicts and Decrees, was given to the Prince by the *Lex Regia*, wherein the People of *Rome* ſubmitted themſelves wholly to the Government of one Perſon, *viz. Julius Cæſar*, after the Defeat of *Pompey*, or to *Auguſtus* after the Death of *Julius*. By this it came to paſs, that the Prince alone could not only make Laws, but was eſteemed above the coercive Power of them.

5. The Edict of the Prætors, or the *Jus Honorarium*, was alſo Part of the written Laws, which the Prætors, or ſuch kind of Magiſtrates, did propoſe by the Conſent of the People. Their Buſineſs was to interpret the Law by Equity, and to mitigate the Rigour of it. As their Office was annual, ſo at firſt were their Interpretations, till the *Cornelian* Law made their Edicts perpetual.

6. *Laſtly*, There were the Anſwers or Opinions of the Lawyers who had an Authority to interpret, and from whoſe Declarations the Judges at that Time could not recede.

The Civil Law is either written or unwritten; the written Law is either public or private.

Public, which immediately regards the State of the Common-wealth, as the Eſtabliſhment of Things relating to religious Perſons; the enacting and Execution of Laws; the Conſultations about War and Peace, *&c.*

Private, that more immediately has Reſpect to the Concerns of every particular Perſon.

Book 2. Chap. 2. p. 90.

Servitus, a Service, is a Right, by which one Thing is ſubject for Uſe and Conveniency to another Thing or Perſon, contrary to common Right; and not where one Perſon is ſubject to another Perſon: Theſe Rights are called *Services*.

Of Services, ſome are *predial*, ſome *perſonal*.

I. *Predial* or *real* Services, *are Rights which one Eſtate owes to another Eſtate*; as, becauſe I am Owner of ſuch a Ground, I have the Right of a Way thro' the Ground of another; or, becauſe I am poſſeſſed of this Houſe, my Neighbour cannot beat out a Window out of his own Houſe towards me, or build his Houſe higher without my Leave.

Here one is the ruling Eſtate, the other ſubject to the Ruſe; either to ſuffer ſomething from the other, or not to do a Thing without the Leave of the Owner of the ruling Eſtate. Both theſe Eſtates muſt be in diſtinct Proprietors; for a Man's Eſtate cannot owe a Service to himſelf. And as Eſtates are either rural, as Lands, Barns, Stables, *&c.* or City Inheritances, as Houſes for Habitation; ſo predial Services are ſubdivided into *Ruſticas* and *Urbanas*, Rural or City Services.

Ruſticæ, or Rural Services, are,

1. *Iter*, a Right for a Man to go on Foot or Horſeback, or in a Sedan, over another Man's Land to his own.

2. *Actus*, a Right of walking, riding, driving Cattle or a Cart over another's Land. There may be *Actus* alſo without the Right of driving a Cart, and that we vulgarly call *a pack* or *prime Way*.

3. *Via* or *Aditus*, a Right of walking, riding, driving Cattle or Carts, and alſo of drawing Stones, Timber, and even of leading an Army, ſo it be done without Damage to the Corn or Graſs, within a Space conſiſting of eight Foot, at leaſt ſtraitways, and of ſixteen Foot upon Turnings; this with us is either the King's Highway or the common Streets. The Space of other Services of this Nature are not ſo determined by Law.

4. *Aquæductus*, or a Right of bringing Water by a Pipe or Rivulet thro' another Man's Land to my own, without Prejudice to navigable Rivers, or any other Man's Eſtate.

5. A Right of drawing Water, and of watering Cattle; a Right of Common and of Paſturing; of Hunting, Hawking, Fiſhing; of making Lime, digging Gravel, Chalk, Stone and Sand, for the Uſe of my Eſtate, but not for other Uſes, as to make Earthen Veſſels, *&c.* for the Service muſt be made Uſe of only for the Profit of the ruling Eſtate.

Urbanæ, or City Services, belong to Buildings, and Houſes erected for Habitation of Men, and not for Corn or Cattle, unleſs they are as Out-houſes to the principal Manſion: Of this Nature are Gardens made for Pleaſure, and the Ground appurtenant to it. They are called City Services, tho' the Buildings are in Villages and in the Country; for it is the Uſe which the Buildings are put to, that makes them either Rural or City Inheritances, and not the Place where they ſtand.

Theſe

Theſe Services of City Inheritances are either *affirmative* or *negative*; whereas Rural Services are affirmative only.

The AFFIRMATIVE Services are,

1. That the Wall of my Neighbour's Houſe ſhall bear the Burthen of my Building, and which he ſhall be bound to repair.

2. That he ſhall be bound to build his Houſe higher to defend mine from Wind and Weather, where perhaps he was before reſtrained of his natural Liberty to build as high as he pleaſed by the Governors of the City, who often enjoin Uniformity in Buildings. Theſe Services are contrary to the Nature of other Services, which conſiſt only in ſuffering, or in an Obligation not to do; whereas theſe oblige to act.

3. That a Neighbour ſhall ſuffer me to fix a Beam or Piece of Timber or Stone in his Wall.

4. That my Buildings may project, ſo as Carts and Carriages ſhall be forced upon his Ground.

5. That the Eves of my Houſe (called *Suggrundæ* or *Suggrundia*) may hang over, to protect my own Walls from the Rain.

6. That I may turn the Droppings of the Eves of my Houſe on my Neighbour's Houſe or Ground, or that I may receive the Droppings of the Eves of his Houſe into my Ciſtern; which may be beneficial where there is want of Water.

7. That my Sink or Gutter ſhall run thro' his Houſe.

8. That I may beat out what Lights and Windows I pleaſe againſt him.

9. That I may have a clear and pleaſant Proſpect from my Houſe.

10. That I may have a Way or Paſſage thro' the Houſe or Backſide of another. Theſe are Rural and Country Services, yet when *applied* to City Inheritances, they are City Services; for as to the laſt Inſtance, it often happens that one Neighbour may go up the Stairs of another to his own Chamber, *&c.*

The NEGATIVE Services are,

1. That he ſhall not turn the Droppings of the Eves of his Houſe upon my Houſe or Ground.

2. That he ſhall not darken my Windows by building, or otherwiſe.

3. That he ſhall not hinder my Proſpect by building, or planting of Trees.

4. That he ſhall not make any Windows to overlook me, and by that Means take away the Privacy which every Man deſires in his Dwelling. If I have no Service upon him in this Inſtance, he may make as many Windows as he pleaſes; but then I may erect Sheds againſt them, and ſo make them uſeleſs, except the Windows have been Time out of Mind.

5. And laſtly, that he ſhall not build his Houſe higher without my Leave; otherwiſe he may, of common Right, build as high as he thinks fit, tho' my Windows are darkened by it. Yet he ought not, generally ſpeaking, to build contrary to the Form of the ancient Building, or exceed the uſual Height; neither ought he, by any new Erection, to hinder the Wind from coming into my Barn, which is neceſſary for the winnowing my Corn. But if it is a Controverſy to what Height the Building may be erected, it muſt be decided by the local Laws; and if there are none, the whole Matter ought to be left to the Direction of the Judge, who muſt enquire how the Buildings have been formerly, and have an Eye upon the Form of the neighbouring Houſes; if any Thing is done contrary to it, he may reduce the Building to its proper Form, and pull down that which was irregularly built, at the Charges of the Perſon that erected it.

II. *Perſonal Services, are thoſe Services which are due from a Thing to a Perſon*; by ſome theſe are called *Mix'd Services*, and they are many and various, but without any certain Name, except three, which are called *Uſufruct*, *Uſe*, *Habitation*.

1. *Uſufructus, is a Right of uſing and taking all Manner of Profits of a corporeal Thing belonging to another Perſon, without Diminution or Prejudice to the Propriety of it.* It cannot continue for a longer Time than the Life of the Perſon that claims this Right; it certainly cannot be for ever. But if the Heir of the *Uſufructuary* is nominated alſo by the Teſtator, two *Uſufructs* are appointed; for it cannot come to the Heir by Deſcent, and if it is given jointly, the Survivor ſhall have the Whole. It may be conſtituted for a leſs Time than the Life of the *Uſufructuary*, upon Condition and in a certain Manner only: But whoſoever has this Right, may take to himſelf all Manner of Profits ariſing out of the Thing, and diſpoſe of thoſe Profits as he pleaſes, by ſelling or letting to Hire, *&c.* as much as the Proprietor himſelf might have done, if the Profit of it had not been given from him. Yet the *Uſufructuary* ſhall ſtand to ſmall Repairs to preſerve the Buildings; he ſhall pay the Taxes and other Duties laid upon it, unleſs there is an Order by the Teſtator, or ſome Agreement to the contrary. He ought not to cut down Timber Trees, unleſs for Repairs, nor Trees bearing Fruit; for hereby the Proprietor would be injured; if he builds upon the Eſtate he cannot afterwards take it down.. He muſt take care of the Cattle that are ſick, recruit their Number if any die, plant young Trees in the place of thoſe that are fallen, unleſs they fall by an inevitable Accident; and in general, muſt act as a wiſe and prudent Man would act upon ſuch an Eſtate. And becauſe the *Uſufructuary* cannot claim the Profits of the Eſtate or Thing, unleſs he has actually received and ſeparated them; as Corn and Hay from the Ground, Grapes from the Vine, Wool from the Sheep, Milk from the Cow, *&c.* therefore if he dies before they are ſeparated from the Soil or Thing, they ſhall not paſs to his Heirs, but ſhall belong to the Proprietor (or to him in Reverſion;) for by the Death of the *Uſufructuary* the Title does vaniſh; ſo that he cannot have a proportionable Rate according to the Time that he was in Poſſeſſion: Neither does this ſeem unjuſt, that the Proprietor ſhould take the Product of the Pains and Labour of the *Uſufructuary*; for, on the contrary, the *Uſufructuary* receives all thoſe Profits that are not ſeparated from the Soil or Thing (perhaps of the whole Year) tho' his Right commenced at the latter End of that Year; yet the Heir ſhall claim the Expences and Charge which were laid out upon the Tillage of the Land; for Equity ſuggeſts, that the Proprietor ſhould not be enriched at the Loſs of the *Uſufructuary*. Farther, if a Tenant has received the whole Profits of the Land for that Year, the Heir of the *Uſufructuary* ſhall have the Rent, tho' the *Uſufructuary* died before the Day of Payment agreed on; for the *Uſufructuary* has no more or leſs than if he had held it in his own Hands.

An *Uſufruct* is twofold; *Verus* (a proper *Uſufruct*) and *Quaſi Uſufructus* (an *Uſufruct* improperly ſo called.)

1. A *true* and *proper Uſufruct* conſiſts in a Right of taking the Profits of thoſe Things which do not periſh in the uſing; as the Right of taking the Profits of Land, Houſes, Cattle and Bondmen.

2. An *improper Uſufruct* is of thoſe Things which periſh in the uſing, as of Wine, Oyl, *&c.* alſo Money; for that too, by continual Exchange, ſeems to vaniſh from us; as if the Uſe of ſo much Money for Life were given in Legacy upon Security and Caution, that ſo much ſhould be repaid to the Heir by the Legatee

gatee when he died: Or ſo much Wine and Oyl, upon Caution and Security, that at the Time of the Death of the Legatee the Value of it ſhould be paid to the Heir in Money.

Caution, or perſonal Security, is to be given of Neceſſity in an improper *Uſufruct*, either to return the ſame Thing in Kind, ſafe and ſound, or the Value of it when the *Uſufruct* is at an End; for Caution belongs to the very Subſtance of it, and muſt be given of Courſe unleſs remitted. This Caution makes an improper *Uſufruct* to differ from, borrowing, letting to Hire, *&c.* for there Caution is not of Neceſſity. Now it ſhall not be eſteemed to be returned ſafe and ſound, if the Subſtance and Form of it is changed, which may be done, tho' the Eſtate is improved, and the better for it.

2. *Uſus*, the Uſe of a Thing, being a perſonal Service (becauſe due to a Perſon) is a Right of uſing only a corporeal Thing, belonging to another, without Prejudice to the Propriety of it.

This uſing does not conſiſt in the taking the Profits; for tho' an *Uſufruct* comprehends an Uſe, an Uſe does not comprehend an *Uſufruct*, or a Right to take the Profits: For he that has this Right cannot take the Profits generally, but only for his daily Uſe and neceſſary Subſiſtence, according to his Quality and Character. He will be reſtrained if he uſe more: But the *Uſufructuary* may take Things for Pleaſure, may claim all manner of Profit, and make all manner of Advantage.

He that has the Uſe of Land given to him, may take for his daily Uſe, and the Uſe of his Family, all manner of Herbs, Apples, Hay, Straw and Wood, and alſo Corn for Bread, with other Fruits of the Land; if he that has the Uſe will bear a proportionable Share of the extraordinary Charges in Sowing, Plowing, and of the Huſbandry about it; and if the Profits of the Land are only ſufficient for the Uſe of his Family, it is equitable that the Perſon that has this Uſe, ſhould alone be at the Charges of manuring it. When, I ſay, he ſhall take only for his daily Uſe, I do not intend that he is reſtrained from laying up a Store for a longer Time, perhaps for a Year; but if any Thing remains at his Death, the Proprietor ſhall have it, not the Heir. But when he is taking theſe Profits for his neceſſary Subſiſtence, and when he is reſident upon the Land, he ought not to be an Hindrance to the Proprietor or his Workmen; neither muſt he pretend to ſell his Right, or let it out to Hire, or aſſign it over to others: For this Right is allowed only to his own Perſon, and another might be of an higher Character and have a larger Family, which would be a greater Burthen to the Eſtate of the Proprietor. Yet this cannot be a general Concluſion; for ſometimes it may appear by Circumſtances, that the Teſtator deſigned that the Uſe might be ſold, or let to Hire; as if the Uſe of a Wood lying afar off (where Carriage would be chargeable, and more worth than the Wood itſelf) were given by Legacy, unleſs it were lawful to cut down ſome Wood and ſell it, the Legacy might be to no Purpoſe or Advantage. And if the Teſtator ſhould give by Legacy the Uſe of Horſes, to one that got his Living by letting Horſes out to Hire; the Trade of the Legatee is ſuch a Circumſtance, that it may eaſily be believed that the Teſtator deſigned they might be let out.

He that has the Uſe of an Houſe muſt inhabit there himſelf, and not transfer it over to others, which is required alſo in other Uſes: And excepting the Reſtraint of this Liberty, the Perſon that had the Uſe of an Houſe given him, has it as large as if he had the *Uſufruct* thereof. And tho' it is ſaid that he cannot transfer his Right, it is not to be underſtood that he muſt live alone there; for if he inhabits there himſelf, he may let out Part of the Houſe upon a Rent, which Part would

would be otherwiſe uſeleſs to him, as being too large for his Family: But this is not a transferring his Right, unleſs he too forſakes it. He may receive a Gueſt either for Money or Friendſhip (tho' this was doubted of heretofore) as well as his Wife's Children, Freemen and Bondmen. He cannot make a public Inn or a Tavern of it, for the Reception of all Sorts of Strangers and Travellers; it muſt be confined to his own Family, which, tho' it ſhall daily encreaſe afterwards, may ſtill be received, unleſs the Perſon appointing the Uſe has directed the contrary.

If a married Woman has ſuch an Uſe given to her, upon Condition that ſhe ſhall live apart from her Huſband, the Condition ſhall be void, and the Huſband and his Family may live with her. If a Virgin or Widow has ſuch a Gift or Legacy, the Huſband which ſhe ſhall afterwards marry ſhall alſo be received.

He that has the Uſe of Cattle for Carriage, may employ them not only for himſelf but for his Wife and Children. He ſhall have the Profit of what they earn, if they are employed about the Affairs of him that has the Uſe of them given to him.

Thus the Cattle, as Horſes, Mules, Aſſes, Oxen, may be employed to plow, draw and carry Burthens according to the Cuſtom of the Country; but cannot be let out to Hire, for the Advantage of him that has the Uſe, unleſs the Teſtator would have it ſo, or unleſs otherwiſe the Legacy would be ineffectual, and to no Purpoſe, as above mentioned. In the Uſe of other Cattle, as Cows, Sheep or Goats, he that has the Uſe cannot take the Milk, Wool, Lambs or Kids; for thoſe belong to the *Uſufructuary*; but he may make Uſe of them to dung his Land; and if he takes a ſmall Quantity of Milk, it will be allowed of; for laſt Wills and Teſtaments are not to be interpreted ſtrictly.

3. *Habitation is a perſonal Service, and a Right of a Perſon to live in the Houſe of another, without Prejudice to the Proprietor.* He that has only the Uſe of an Houſe, has not ſo much as he that has Habitation; for he that has Habitation may ſell his Right, or let it to Hire, tho' he does not live there himſelf; which he cannot do that has only an Uſe.

It differs from *Uſufruct*, becauſe the *Uſufructuary* may employ the Houſe to other Purpoſes than to live in it; but he that has Habitation can uſe it no otherwiſe than for a Dwelling.

NUMBER IV.

Archdeacon Payne's *Life of Biſhop* Cumberland.

RICHARD CUMBERLAND D. D. Lord Biſhop of *Peterborough*, was born in the Pariſh of St. *Bridget*, otherwiſe St. *Bride*'s, in *London*, *July* 15th, 1631, being St. *Swithin*'s Day. He was the Son of a Citizen in *Fleet-ſtreet*, much reſpected by all that knew him.

His Lordſhip's Education was firſt in St. *Paul*'s School under Mr. *Langley*, a very eminent Grammarian, where he continued till he was ſeventeen Years of Age; and in 1648 was admitted into St. *Mary Magdalen* College in the Univerſity of *Cambridge*, where he applied himſelf cloſely to his Study; and in 1653 took his Batchelor of Arts Degree; in 1656 he commenced Maſter of Arts, and

was

was made Fellow of that Houſe, where he ſtudied Phyſic a Year or two, and then took Orders.

The Foundation of this College, in Proportion to its Bigneſs, has ſent its full Compliment of learned Men into the World. Two of its Maſters in our Author's Time were, Dr. *Rainbow*, Biſhop of *Carliſle*, Dr. *Duport*, Dean of *Peterborough*, each of them of great Eminence. Such Men were ſhining Ornaments to the Society, but neither that, or any other College, bred together Men of more Learning and Virtue, than three whom that ſmall Society elected near the ſame Time into its Body, Dr. *Cumberland*, Dr. *Hezekiah Burton*, and Dr. *Hollings*.

The laſt was a Phyſician, who ſettled at *Shrewſbury*, and liv'd there with univerſal Eſteem to a good old Age; receiv'd in the Families that were happy in his Acquaintance, not only as a Friend and a Phyſician, but almoſt as a good *Genius*. The Diſtance of their Reſidence did not obliterate the diſintereſted Affection that was between him and his Friend Dr. *Cumberland*, which was of equal Duration with their Lives.

His other worthy Friend, Dr. *Burton*, a moſt excellent Perſon, was early loſt to his Family, his Acquaintance, and the World. I call his Death a Loſs to the World, becauſe I believe there hardly was in it, a Man who had in a greater Degree the Chriſtian Spirit of Love and Good-will, and Zeal to do Good to others. (I have by me Evidence of what I affirm, ſome of his familiar Letters to my own Father who had been his Pupil, which tho' writ with great Haſte and Negligence, breathe ſuch a Spirit as cannot but leave good Impreſſions on thoſe that read them.) God who had filled his Heart with theſe Deſires, did not permit him to live to bring them to Effect. Great Modeſty prevented his publiſhing any Thing in his Life-time, but the ſhort *Alloquium ad Lectorem* before his Friend's Book, *De Legibus Naturæ*.

Theſe were our Author's intimate Friends; but he maintained a particular Acquaintance with all others of the ſame Society, who were eminent for Parts and Learning. His own Love to Merit made him ſhew Reſpect to all who deſerv'd it, as the natural Sweetneſs of his Temper, and his other Accompliſhments, made him again beloved by them. Among theſe were Sir *Samuel Moreland*, eminent for his Skill in the Mathematics; Mr. *Pepys*, many Years Secretary to the Admiralty; a Gentleman who was Maſter of all polite Learning, and who by his Laſt Will, in grateful Memory of his Education, there bequeath'd his own, a moſt elegant Library, to *Magdalen* College, tho' he referr'd the full ſettling of ſo noble a Legacy to his Executors.

Another Contemporary to him in that Society, and afterwards a great and uſeful Friend, was Sir *Orlando Bridgman*, to whom he dedicated his Book of *the Laws of Nature*, as he did that of *Jewiſh Weights and Meaſures* to Mr. Secretary *Pepys*.

His chief Introduction into the World, to be known, otherwiſe than by his Writings, was thro' the Friendſhip of Sir *Orlando Bridgman*. Our Author, and his Friend Dr. *Burton*, were both his Chaplains when he was Lord Keeper, and preferr'd by him. Had his Lordſhip been inclin'd to have ſought any where elſe, where there was a larger Choice, he could not have pitch'd on Clergymen of greater Merit than theſe, who had been his Acquaintance and Contemporaries in the ſame College.

He diſtinguiſh'd himſelf whilſt he was a Fellow of the College by the Performance of his Academical Exerciſes. He went out Batchelor of Divinity at a pub-

a public Commencement; and tho' it was hardly known that the ſame Perſon perform'd thoſe great Exerciſes twice, yet ſuch was the Expectation he had rais'd, that he was afterwards ſolicited to keep the Act at another public Commencement for his Doctor's Degree.

His firſt Preferment, for which he quitted an Univerſity Life, was the Rectory of *Brampton* in *Northamptonſhire*, given him by Sir *John Norwich*. The Patron was not diſappointed, in having a Clerk who in all Reſpects anſwered his higheſt Expectations; and they lived together in the greateſt Unanimity.

His Nomination afterwards to the Biſhoprick of that Dioceſe was the more proper in this Reſpect, that he had liv'd long in it. Had the Clergy retain'd the primitive Privilege of electing their Biſhop, that of the Dioceſe of *Peterborough*, would have choſen no other Perſon.

No Man was then more univerſally belov'd, and applauded, excepting by here and there one inflamed with party Heat. Few were prejudic'd againſt the individual Man, againſt Dr. *Cumberland*, tho' more were againſt his Promotion. Ill-will and Envy will be directed againſt Men that are rais'd to be eminently conſpicuous; and he muſt be very inconſiderable, whom no Body thinks worth oppoſing, or opening his Mouth againſt.

In this Rural Retirement he minded little elſe than the Duties of his Function and his Studies. His Relaxations from theſe were very few beſides his Journies to *Cambridge*, which he made frequently to preſerve a Correſpondence with his learned Acquaintance in that Place.

In human Probability his Talents were to be confined to a ſmall Country Pariſh: His own Thoughts being never turn'd to the raiſing himſelf. That which is the *Opprobrium Theologorum*, the *Snare*, (I could almoſt call it the *Scandal*) of our Profeſſion, *Preferment-ſeeking*, he was perfectly free from.

But it pleaſed God to call him to act in a larger Sphere: The Inſtrument of his Providence in it was, Sir *Orlando Bridgman*, who being rais'd to that high Station of Lord Keeper of the Great Seal, invited his Friend and Fellow-Collegiate, Mr. *Cumberland*, up to Town, and ſoon after beſtow'd on him the Living of *Allhallows* in *Stamford*, the Preſentation for that Turn being in the Gift of the Crown.

This occaſioned his Remove to *Stamford*, a Town whoſe Inhabitants, if I am not prejudic'd in it's Favour, are People of better Senſe, and more Civility, than others uſually are of the ſame Degree and Condition.

They knew how to value Mr. *Cumberland*, and all Ranks of People thought it their common Advantage that ſuch a Man was plac'd among 'em.

He engag'd in an extraordinary Trouble in this Place; for beſides the Duty that was incumbent on him as Miniſter, he accepted of the weekly Lecture, and by this Means was obliged to preach three Times every Week in the ſame Church.

This difficult Province he went through conſtantly and aſſiduouſly. This, which alone would have been a Burthen too heavy for an ordinary Man, he diſcharg'd with ſo much Eaſe, that he carried on at the ſame Time great Deſigns in his Philoſophical, Mathematical, and Philological Studies.

In this Station of a private Clergyman ſo great was his Reputation, that he was importun'd by the Univerſity, and by other Acquaintance, to take upon him the weighty Exerciſe of Reſponding at the publick Commencement. Nothing but the earneſt Solicitation of his Friends could have prevail'd with a Man, void not only of Ambition, but even the Deſire of Applauſe, to appear ſo publickly.

liekly. This he did in the Year 1680. The Theſes maintain'd by him, directed againſt the oppoſite Enemies of our Church, were,

Sancto Petro nulla data eſt Juriſdictio in cæteros Apoſtolos.
Separatio ab Eccleſiâ Anglicanâ eſt Schiſmatica.

In my own Time, many Years after, the Fame of Dr. *Cumberland*'s Performance was freſh among the Members of the Univerſity.

He had been for ſome Time ſenſible of the Meaſures that were too notoriouſly and too publicly taken in Favour of *Popery*. As he was a moſt hearty Lover of the *Proteſtant* Religion, the great Subject of his Sermons was to fortify his Hearers againſt the Errors, and to preſerve them from the Corruptions of that idolatrous Church. He deteſted nothing ſo much as *Popery*, and was jealous, almoſt to an Exceſs, of every Thing that he ſuſpected to favour it.

The Bigotry of that Religion, and the Ignorance and Slavery it introduces wherever it has Power, cannot but raiſe Ideas dreadful to the laſt Degree, in a Man that has Freedom and Largeneſs of Thought. I have been told by elderly Men in theſe Parts, how he, who was in other Things of the cooleſt Temper in the World, us'd to be fired with Zeal, when in his preaching he was expoſing that Superſtition. This Depravation of Chriſtianity ran much in his Thoughts, and the Enquiry how Religion came at firſt to degenerate into Idolatry, put him upon the Searches that produced the following Work.

The melancholy Proſpect of Affairs in the Reign of King *James*, as it made deep Impreſſions on every one who wiſhed well to our Conſtitution in Church and State, ſo it made a deeper than ordinary, on this excellent Perſon, and contributed to the bringing on him a dangerous Fit of Sickneſs, one of the ſevereſt Fevers from which ever Man recovered.

But, after a Night of Gloomineſs and Darkneſs, Day broke out at the *Revolution*. Providential Eſcapes from Wrecks at Sea, and great Perils at Land, when they are afterwards related to other Perſons are heard coldly, and make not much Impreſſion; but they who were Eye-witneſſes of them, much more they who eſcaped from them, have their Hearts raiſed upon every Recollection of their Preſervation. So tho' thoſe who knew not, or were unconcerned at the Dangers that threatened us from *Popery* and *arbitrary Power*, can hear of that Conjuncture with Indifference: Others, who ſaw then our Hazard, and were likely to fall Sacrifices to it, know beſt how to eſtimate the Greatneſs and the Bleſſing of that Deliverance.

In ſuch Convulſions as this Change occaſioned, the utmoſt Prudence was required to make Things ſettle firmly again.

The Prince happily thought, that Lenity ſuited beſt with the *Engliſh* Tempers and Conſtitution. As Deſert was above all Things regarded in the Diſpoſal of Preferments, ſo it was eſpecially in Eccleſiaſtical ones. Whatever Motives might in other Times have recommended Clergymen to Biſhopricks, at this Seaſon nothing could do it but Merit.

It was not ſo much conſidered, who had made their court beſt, as who had deſerved beſt. And the Men who were then raiſed to that high Station were ſuch, and ſuch only, as had been moſt eminent for their Learning, moſt exemplary in their Lives, and firmeſt to the *Proteſtant* Intereſt.

Whilſt theſe Qualifications were only conſidered, ſuch a Man could not eaſily be overlooked, tho' he himſelf did leaſt of any Man look for ſuch a Promotion. The King was told, that Dr. *Cumberland* was the fitteſt Man he could nominate to the Biſhoprick of *Peterborough*. Thus a private Country Clergyman, with-

out poſting in Court, a Place he had rarely ſeen; without ſuing to great Men; without taking the leaſt Step towards ſoliciting for it, was pitched upon to fill ſo great a Truſt, only becauſe he was fitteſt for it. He walked, after his uſual Manner, on a Poſt-day to the Coffee-houſe, and read in the News-paper, *That one Dr.* Cumberland, *of* Stamford, *was named to the Biſhoprick of* Peterborough. A greater Surprize to himſelf than to any body elſe.

A Promotion like this, and done in ſuch a Manner, was a Reputation to thoſe that conferred it. The Approbation of it was general; tho' in the Struggles the Nation was then in, it cannot be ſuppoſed to be univerſal. There was a Party, to whom the Principles he had always profeſſed, and the Maxims on which he had acted, could not but be diſagreeable.

Such could not be ſuppoſed to be pleaſed with it. But even theſe Men were obliged to own, That a Divine was exalted to the Prelacy of the greateſt perſonal Merit, and whoſe Life was without the leaſt Blemiſh.

He now applied himſelf to the Work of a Biſhop. Studious Men acquire Habits that make them not over-forward to put themſelves out into Action. The Speculations of their Mind employ the whole Man. The natural Calmneſs of his Lordſhip's Temper added ſtill to this Diſpoſition: Yet no Man took more Care not to be defective in his proper Duty. He made no Omiſſions to conſult his own Eaſe, or to ſpare his Pains; and the Deſires of his Mind, That all under him ſhould do their Duty, were very earneſt and ſincere.

His Speeches to the Clergy at his Viſitations, and his Exhortations to the Catechumens before his Confirmations, tho' they have not the Embelliſhments of Oratory, nor would make a pompous Figure, were they publiſhed; yet they are fervent Expreſſions of the inward Deſires of his Soul, to do what Good he was able, and to excite others to be influenced by it: They are the pious Breathings of a plain and good Mind.

On all Occaſions he treated his Clergy with ſingular Regard and Indulgence. An Expreſſion that often came from him, was, *I love always to make my Clergy eaſy.* This was his Rule, on all Applications made to him by them; and if he err'd, it was always on this Side. When the Duties of his Office required it, he never ſpared himſelf. To the laſt Month of his Life, it was impoſſible to diſſuade him from undertaking Fatigues, that every Body about him feared were ſuperior to his Strength: He was inflexible to their Intreaties, and his Anſwer and Reſolution was, *I will do my Duty as long as I can.* He had acted by a Maxim like this in his Vigour: When his Friends repreſented to him, that by his Studies and Labours he would injure his Health, his uſual Reply was, *A Man had better wear out than ruſt out.*

The laſt Time he viſited his Dioceſs he was in the eightieth Year of his Age. As it was my Duty to attend him, I had Apprehenſions, that he could not but ſuffer thro' the Fatigues of it, tho' it pleaſed God he had no Inconvenience from it. A good Providence, without Doubt, attends Men diſcharging their Duty.

At his next Triennial, when he was in the eighty-third Year of his Age, it was with the laſt Difficulty that he could be diſſuaded from undertaking again the Viſitation of his Dioceſs: That an Omiſſion then happened, was not with his good Liking and Approbation, but was almoſt a Force put upon him. To draw the Clergy nearer than the uſual Decanal Meetings, to make his Viſitations eaſier to himſelf, was a Thing he would not hear of. He would never take a Burden from his own Shoulders, to lay it on other People's.

When

When I read the Character given in Scripture of *Moſes*, *that he was very meek above all Men that were upon the Face of the Earth*; and that given to *Nathanael* by our Saviour, *that he was an* Iſraelite *indeed*, *in whom was no Guile*; I cannot but apply them to this extraordinary Perſon: For I think there never could be a Man after them, whom theſe Characters do more truly fit. He was of the moſt eaſy, chearful, humble, undeſigning Temper: His Candour towards all People was unparalleled; he took every Thing by the beſt Handle. It is no Hyperbole to ſay, That in Humility of Mind, in Sweetneſs and Benevolence of Temper, and in Innocence of Life, he was not exceeded by mortal Man.

He was without Gall or Guile; ſo perfectly free from any Tincture of Artifice, Ambition, or Ill-will, as if he had in theſe Reſpects been born exempt from the Corruptions of human Nature.

He lived to the eighty-ſeventh Year of his Age, with, I believe, the feweſt Sins of Commiſſion that ever Man did, who arrived to that Period of Life:—— Bleſſed with a Mind free from every evil Paſſion.

His Compoſition had no Alloy of Vain-glory. He never did any Thing to court Applauſe, or gain the Praiſe of Men. He never acted a Part, never put on a Maſk; his Tongue and Heart always went together. If he ran into any Extreme, it was the Exceſs of Humility, the ſafeſt Side for every Chriſtian to err on.

He lived with the Simplicity and Plainneſs of a primitive Biſhop; converſed and looked like a private Man, hardly maintaining, as the World calls it, the Dignity of his Character.

He was not one that loved *to have the Pre-eminence*; and he contended with no body for Prerogative and Precedence.

He uſed Hoſpitality without Grudging. No Man's Houſe was more open to his Friends; and the Eaſe and Freedom with which they always found themſelves entertained, was peculiar to it.

The Poor had ſubſtantial Relief at his Door; and his Neighbours and Acquaintance, a hearty Welcome to his Table, after the plentiful and plain Manner in which he lived. Every Thing in his Houſe ſerved for friendly Entertainment, nothing for Luxury or Pomp.

His Deſire was to make every Body eaſy, and to do them Good. He diſpenſed with a liberal Hand to the Neceſſities of others, tho' his contented Mind made him require little for his own.

His Kindneſs to his Relations and Acquaintance that wanted it, the Sums he parted with to ſuch as were indigent, are Deeds not proper to be proclaimed. Half ſuch Sums diſtributed with Oſtentation, by thoſe who deſire to have Glory of Men, would have gained the Fame of great Liberality and Generoſity. In theſe Caſes he truly obſerved our Saviour's Precepts, *to do his Alms in ſecret, and even not to let his Left Hand know what his Right Hand did.*

Every Body concerned with him, or that held under him, felt the Advantage of the Benevolence and Goodneſs of his Temper. He had a paternal Eſtate, the Leſſees of which found him a Landlord kind indeed.

He never raiſed his Rents, or hardly changed a Tenant: They grew old in his Farms, and were afterward ſucceeded by their Children.

Such was he alſo to them that held under him as he was Biſhop; good-natur'd, I am almoſt tempted to ſay, to a Fault; they were ſure to find no Preſſure from him: The Point in Queſtion always was, his preſerving the juſt Rights of his See. If he could be prevailed on to raiſe a Fine, where the Reaſon and Equity

of it was moſt apparent, it was always with great Difficulty, and never his own voluntary Act. In renewing ſome of his Leaſes, he ſhewed great Inſtances of Kindneſs and Compaſſion: I wiſh they who received the Obligation were ſenſible enough of it; for indeed Tenants under Biſhops are generally a thankleſs Sort of Men; they conſider not the Eſtate they hold as another Man's, but look upon it as their own, and part grudgingly with what goes out of it, as a Hardſhip on themſelves.

As the great Chriſtian Graces in which he excelled were Humility and Meekneſs, and theſe concurring with a ſedentary and ſtudious Habit, it is not to be expected that there ſhould be in the ſame Man any great Degree of Warmth and Activeneſs. God Almighty gives not Perfection to any Man in this mortal State. They that are moſt uſeful to the World by their active Spirits, are alſo often turbulent; they frequently are in Miſtakes; they are too apt to call their own Deſigns and Paſſions by the Name of the *Public Good*, and to be tranſported too far by their Zeal.

Men who have Excellencies in one Kind, are not without Defects in another. This may be interpreted as a Signification of the Will of God, that Men ſhould be ſomewhat equal, and to keep thoſe who have great Talents humble; that *they ſhould not think of themſelves more highly than they ought to think, but to think ſoberly.*

His Lordſhip was of a Temper ſo calm and cool, that it could not be raiſed to the Height of Anger. He would expreſs his Diſlike of a Thing, and that was the utmoſt of his Indignation. He therefore never fell into any Indecencies of Paſſion, any unguarded Expreſſion, or Diſcompoſure of Mind, as he had not on the other Hand a vigorous Spirit of Diſcipline. I thought it the more my Duty, in the Station in which I had the Honour many Years to ſerve him, to endeavour to ſupply that; and have thereby experienced, to what Inconveniencies a reforming Spirit expoſes a Man, and how hazardous it is to follow Truth too cloſe at its Heels.

Thro' Exceſs of Charity, he was not willing to think the World ſo degenerate as it really is. He would believe no Ill of any Man, unleſs he had full Proof of it: He abhorred entertaining Suſpicions, but loved rather to think, that there was as much Rectitude and Integrity in other Men as in himſelf. And indeed had other Men been any thing like him, there would have been no need for Severity. The Maxim then would be commendable,

——*Si vis amari,*
Languidâ regnes Manu.——

Had his Life been as active as it was innocent, he would have riſen above the Pitch of human Nature.

His natural Parts were not quick, but ſtrong and retentive. He was a perfect Maſter of every Subject he ſtudied. Every Thing he read ſtay'd with him. The Ideas in many Mens Minds are too like the Impreſſions made in ſoft Wax; they never are diſtinct and clear, and are ſoon effaced: In his Mind they were like Impreſſions cut in Steel, they took ſome Time in forming, but they were clear, diſtinct and durable.

The Things he had chiefly ſtudied, were theſe Searches into the moſt antient Times, Mathematics in all its Parts, and the Scripture in its original Languages. Theſe were the great Works of his Life; but he had, by the Bye, diverted into almoſt all other Studies: He was thoroughly acquainted with all the Branches of Philoſophy;

Philoſophy; he had good Judgment in Phyſic, knew every Thing that was curious in Anatomy, had an Intimacy with the Claſſics: Indeed he was a Stranger to no Part of Learning, but every Subject he had Occaſion to talk of, he was as much a Maſter of it, as if the Direction of his Studies had chiefly lain that Way.

He was thoroughly converſant in Scripture, and had laid up that Treaſure in his Mind. No hard Paſſage ever occured, either occaſionally or in reading, but he could readily give the Meaning of it, and the ſeveral Interpretations, without needing to conſult his Books. He ſometimes had Thoughts of writing an Expoſition of the Epiſtles to the *Romans* and *Galatians*.

It was a Misfortune to the World that he wanted that Spur ſo neceſſary to excite Men to Action, the Deſire of Praiſe. Had he done it, I believe he would have cleared the Controverſy about *Juſtification*, with all its Appendages, above any Thing that ever was publiſhed. He often, in Converſation, explained to me what he thought the Key to the difficulteſt Places of thoſe Epiſtles; it opens them ſo eaſily, that I cannot but believe that it is the true one. If his Lordſhip was right, Polemical Divines have quite miſtaken the Senſe of St. *Paul*, and written much to little Purpoſe on the Subject of *Juſtification*.

Learned Men often love and affect to be ſilent. His Lordſhip was ſo humble, that he thought no Body too low to be converſed with, and ſo benevolent, that he was willing every Body that came near him ſhould partake of his Knowledge. As he was the moſt learned, ſo he was the moſt communicative Man I ever knew. No Converſation pleaſed him ſo well as what turned upon ſome Part of Learning.

The firſt Experience I had of this was while I was Under-graduate in the Univerſity, ſoon after his Lordſhip's Promotion. I was then ſtudying ſome Parts of the Mathematical Sciences: He did me the Honour to talk with me on thoſe Subjects. It ſtruck me with Surprize to ſee ſo much Condeſcenſion, Familiarity of Converſation, and Love to inform a young Man, in a Perſon of his Learning, Age and Station. The Years I ſince have ſpent in greater Freedom with him, have been the moſt happy Part of my Life: A Bleſſing that by me can never be ſufficiently valued.

His Soul was, thro' his whole Life, in a conſtant Calm and Serenity, hardly ever ruffled with any Paſſion. Having thus a Mind friendly to his Body, and being exactly regular and temperate in his way of Living, he attained to a good old Age, with perfect Soundneſs of Mind and Body. He was not afflicted with, or ſubject to, any Ailing or Diſtemper; never complained that he was ill, or out of Order; came almoſt conſtantly from his Chamber in a Morning with a Smile in his Countenance.

The Poet gives a Deſcription of old Age very unlovely,

Quærit, & inventis Miſer abſtinet———
Difficilis, querulus.———
———Cenſor, caſtigatorque minorum.

His Lordſhip lived beyond what *Horace* called Old Age, but never were Characters more unſuitable to any Man than theſe were to him; 'tis literally true that he was in every reſpect the very Reverſe of them. Would you have retired from every Thing that was cenſorious, querulous, uneaſy, diſquieting, you muſt have gone into his Company, and the Room where he ſat. The Eaſineſs and Sweetneſs of his Temper was ſuch, as is not to be deſcribed by Words; nothing but

Converſation

Converſation with him, and the Experience of it, could give a Man a juſt Idea of it. This happy Diſpoſition was become a Habit to him, and continued to the laſt Day of his Life.

His Senſes and bodily Strength laſted better than could well be expected in a Man whoſe Courſe of Life had been ſtudious and ſedentary. Yet I, who converſed with him every Day, thought that the Faculties of his Mind were leſs impaired than thoſe of his Body.

He remained a Maſter of all the Parts of Learning he had ſtudied when he was young. He ever loved the Claſſics, and to the laſt Week of his Life would quote them readily and appoſitely.

When Dr. *Wilkins* had publiſhed his *Coptic* Teſtament, he made a Preſent of one of them to his Lordſhip, who ſat to ſtudy this when he was paſt eighty-three. At this Age he maſtered the Language, and went thro' great Part of this Verſion, and would often give me excellent Hints and Remarks, as he proceeded in reading of it.

The laſt Converſation I had the Happineſs to have with him, was as he was reading in a News-paper, *that the Emperor had made Sir* George Bing *a Knight of the Golden Fleece.* He was pleaſed, and ſaid, *That Order of Knighthood was the propereſt that could be for an Admiral. The Expedition of the* Argonauts, ſaid he, *was the firſt conſiderable Enterprize the* Greeks *undertook by Sea; I think it was about eighty Years before the* Trojan *War. Yes,* ſaid I, *my Lord, it is placed thereabouts. Then,* ſaid he, *you find I can remember. Fetch me down* Uſher's Annals *and* Marſhal's Tables; *I have a Mind to look over theſe Things.*

That Afternoon I left him for a Day; at my Return I found him ſtruck with the *Ictus Paralyticus*, which immediately took from him his Limbs and Speech. We had not the leaſt previous Notice of this. He roſe that Morning rather better and more vigorous than uſual; but was ſtruck in a Moment by a Blow from which he could not be recovered.

This was the Period of a happy old Age, and he was *gathered to his People* in his full Maturity.

In his Life-time he publiſhed no more than two Books. His *Diſquiſitio Philoſophica de Legibus Naturæ*, is one of the firſt writ in the demonſtrative Way on a moral Subject, I may add too the perfecteſt; for I believe all good Judges allow it to be a Demonſtration. He was not near the Preſs while it was working off, by this Means it came into the World incorrectly printed. This may have been ſome Diſcouragement to the reading of it, tho' the Difficulty of the Subject, and the Cloſeneſs of the Reaſoning has been a greater. Hardly any Men hitherto have made themſelves acquainted with the Argument of it, but ſuch as are in the uppermoſt Form of Learning.

I have ſometimes wiſhed that his Lordſhip would have been pleaſed to have reviſed it, and try'd to make it more eaſy and intelligible; but it had lain ſo long out of his Hands, that he did not care to take it up again. He gave me Leave to attempt any Thing of that Kind, if I would, and as a Help he gave me his own interleaved Book, which has here and there a little Addition. I read his Book over and over diligently with this View, but never found where I could well alter any Thing, where I could leave out, or where I could add. All I can think on to give a little Advantage to common Readers, is to print the Book correctly, to give an Analyſis of the Argumentation, to add Contents to each Paragraph, and to divide them oftener: This I may perhaps find Leiſure to do.

His

His *Eſſay towards the Recovery of* Jewiſh *Weights and Meaſures* is much eſteemed. Dr. *Bernard* in his Book *De Ponderibus*, &c. publiſhed after it, thought fit to contradict ſome of his Aſſertions without quoting him. His Lordſhip writ ſome Sheets to juſtify his Calculations; but his Averſeneſs to any Thing like wrangling made him lay them by, and leave his Book to ſhift for itſelf.

Theſe Studies went on the more heavily, from a great Burthen our Author had then on his Mind. He had a quicker Senſe than many other Men of the Advances *Popery* was making upon us; he was affected with the Apprehenſions of it to the laſt Degree. This made him turn his Thoughts to the Enquiry, By what Steps and Methods Idolatry got Ground in the World. The oldeſt Account of this he believed he found in *Sanchoniatho*'s Fragment. This he ſaw was a profeſſed Apology for Idolatry, and owned openly what other Heathens would have made a Secret of, *That the Gods of the Gentile World had been all mortal Men.* He ſtudied this Fragment with no other View than as it led to the Diſcovery of the Original of Idolatry. He ſpent ſome Time upon it, before ever he had a Thought of extracting from it Footſteps of the Hiſtory of the World preceding the Flood. The firſt Hint given him was from this Paſſage,

Ισιρις ἀδελφὸς Χνᾶ τῦ πρώτυ Φοίνικος.

Iſiris *the Brother of* Chnaa *the firſt* Phœnician.

The firſt *Phœnician* was indiſputably *Canaan*, whoſe Poſterity peopled that Country. His Name in the *Hebrew* is often writ *Chnaan*; that the *Egyptian* King, called by the *Greeks*, *Iſiris*, was Brother to him, was ſomething new. The next Step was to find, that *Miſor* in *Sanchoniatho* was *Mizraim* in *Moſes*. *Mizraim* was the Name of a People, like *Ludim*, *Philiſtim*, *Caphtorim*, &c. The ſingular Number, and the proper Name of the Man was *Miſor*; in this there is not much Difficulty, nor that *Miſor* (from whence comes *Mizraim*) was the Brother of *Canaan*. It is a greater to make *Miſor* the ſame Man with *Iſiris*, tho' it is done without much Force. M in *Hebrew* is a ſervile Letter often omitted; leave it out, the Name is *Iſor*; add to this a *Greek* Termination, which *Greek* Authors always do to Eaſtern Names, it is *Iſoris*, and by the ſmall Change of the Vowel, *Iſiris*.

The next Obſervation was, that *Miſor* or *Iſiris* is placed by *Sanchoniatho* about the Diſtance of twelve Generations from *Protogonus*, the firſt produced Man, and *Mizraim* is undoubtedly in the twelfth Generation from *Adam*.

Our Author then proceeded to collect, that *Protogonus* was *Adam*; what Name *Sanchoniatho* called him by we know not, it was probably by ſome Eaſtern Name ſignifying the firſt created Man, which *Philo-Biblius* tranſlates *Protogonus*, by a *Greek* Word of the ſame Import. *Æon* and *Protogonus* are the two firſt Mortals: *Æon* our Author conjectures to have ſome Affinity to the Name *Eve*. *Ænon*, adds *Sanchoniatho*, firſt gathered Food from Trees; what can this be but an Alluſion to *Eve*'s eating the forbidden Fruit?

From *Protogonus* and *Æon*, ſays *Sanchoniatho*, deſcended *Genus*. You cannot well make any other *Greek* Name of the *Hebrew Cain* than γένος.

Hence our Author concludes, that *Sanchoniatho* preſerved the Hiſtory of the idolatrous Line of *Cain*, as *Moſes* did that of *Seth*, who were the Worſhippers of the true God.

Who the Men were whoſe Names are preſerved by *Sanchoniatho* in the ſucceeding Generations, we know not; their Memory periſhed with the Flood. But in the twelfth Generation from *Æon* and *Protogonus* we find *Miſor*; and *Mizraim* is

in

in the ſame Diſtance from *Adam* and *Eve*. Here again we are got within our Knowledge.

But we have not in *Sanchoniatho* one Word about the Deluge. What Wonder is it we ſhould not? *Sanchoniatho* was an Idolater; he writes avowedly a Defence or Apology for Idolatry. The Deluge was a Judgment on the idolatrous World, and ſwept it away. The Worſhippers of the true God gloried in this, and reproached the Heathens with it; no Wonder then they were deſirous to conceal ſuch a Matter of Shame to themſelves.

Cronus, who makes the great Figure in this Hiſtory, our Author ſuppoſes to be *Ham*, and brings good Vouchers for his Opinion from Antiquity. Conſequently therefore *Ouranus*, the Father of *Cronus*, muſt be *Noah*. *Ham*, among the Sons of *Noah*, was the Man of Ambition, and the Reſtorer of Idolatry after the Flood. How long he lived we know not: We are aſſured by *Moſes*, that his Brother *Shem* lived five hundred and two Years after the Flood. *Ham*, in all Probability, lived long, tho' perhaps not ſo long as this religious and peaceable Man *Shem*. He deſired to make his Sons great; therefore beſides *Canaan*, who peopled *Syria*, two other of his Sons, *Cuſh* and *Mizraim*, were the Founders of two great Empires, the *Aſſyrian* and the *Egyptian*. *Sanchoniatho* repreſents him as a Sort of univerſal Monarch, travelling over the World to plant Colonies. He intimates, that he outlived *Miſor* [*Miſraim*] and ſettled the Son of *Miſor*, *Thoth*, the great *Hermes* of the *Egyptians*, in the Kingdom of *Egypt*. From the Records left by this *Thoth*, *Sanchoniatho* collected his Hiſtory, and with him this Fragment ends.

Where *Sanchoniatho* ends, *Eratoſthenes* begins: The two firſt Kings in his Catalogue are *Menes* and *Athothes*. That *Menes* was the firſt King in *Egypt*, and the ſame Man with *Mizraim*, is, I think, allowed on all Hands. *Athothes* is plainly the ſame Name with *Thoth*. A is arbitrarily prefixed, or omitted. He is called indifferently *Thoth* or *Athoth*. *Es* is only the *Greek* Termination.

Eratoſthenes was the learnedeſt Man of his Time, a Native of *Cyrene* bordering on *Egypt*, Librarian to *Ptolemæus Euergetes*, had greater Opportunities and Helps for ſearching the *Egyptian* Records than any other Man.

The Prieſts of *Egypt* had ever been in a Combination to relate extravagant and incredible Accounts of their Kings, thinking thereby to aggrandize their Monarchy. *Eratoſthenes* went with a Deſire to find out the Truth. The Names of the firſt thirty-eight of his Catalogue of the Kings of *Thebes* in *Egypt* are preſerved; they are a Succeſſion for the Space of one thouſand and fifty-five Years. *Nilus*, the laſt King but one in this Liſt, is ſuppoſed to have lived about the Time of the Siege of *Troy*.

Dicæarchus, a learned Hiſtorian, Contemporary with *Ariſtotle*, ſays, That from this *Nilus* to the Beginning of the Olympiads were four hundred and thirty-ſix Years.

This Account has an Air of Probability; it places *Menes* about fourteen hundred Years before the Olympiads, near two hundred Years after the Flood, and it agrees well with the *Moſaic* Hiſtory.

We have, by this Means, a Series of Profane Hiſtory, from the firſt Man to the firſt Olympiad, agreeing with the Scripture. *Sanchoniatho* begins his Hiſtory with *Protogonus* [*Adam*] and brings it down to *Thoth*, the ſecond King of *Egypt*. *Eratoſthenes* begins his Catalogue with *Menes* [*Miſor*] and *Athothes* [*Thoth*] which is connected with the Olympiads.

This is what I take to be an Improvement on the Subject; a Diſcovery that has hitherto eſcaped the Inquiſitiveneſs of all other learned Men.

While

While other Divines of the Church of *England* were engaged in the Controverſy with the *Papiſts*, in which they gained over them ſo compleat a Victory; our Author was endeavouring to ſtrike at the Root of their idolatrous Religion. His firſt Deſign he finiſhed about the Time of the *Revolution*, and would then have printed it, but his Bookſeller was ſo cautious, that he did not care to undertake it. Upon this Diſcouragement, he laid aſide the Thoughts of making it public; but he was entered on a Subject he did not know how to leave. Having made what he thought a great Diſcovery, theſe Searches into the oldeſt Times became more engaging to him; and he went on with them, rather for his own Entertainment, than with any Deſign to make the World acquainted with them.

He made a Progreſs on a ſecond Part, which he entitled, *Origines Antiquiſſimæ*, and has on this writ ſeveral Diſſertations, which I propoſe ſhall make a ſecond Volume. He gave not over the Studies till 1702. To that Year I find Papers written by him, but none later.

After I had the Happineſs of coming into his Family, I had a great Curioſity to ſee theſe Papers, which I found he had not reduced into Order, nor laid up with Care. What is writ on ſuch Subjects is always encreaſing under a Man's Hand. After his Lordſhip had penned his firſt Thoughts, he added to them ſo many Interlineations, References and Additions, that without his Aſſiſtance no Man could have made any thing of them. I ſat down to the tranſcribing of them, which, with his Help, I got through, having the Opportunity of conſulting him on every Difficulty, and have been thereby the Means of preſerving a great deal of Learning, which muſt have been otherwiſe irretrievably loſt.

I often expreſſed to him my Wiſhes, that they might be publiſhed. He told me I might do what I would with them, but it was too late for him to meddle any more with them.

He allowed himſelf Time to turn theſe Things often over in his Mind, and very ſedately. He had a cool Head, and was the fartheſt of any Man from being carried away with a warm Imagination: It was not his Temper to invent an Hypotheſis, and then ſtrain for Arguments to ſupport it. He has made in theſe Papers many new Diſcoveries in the Hiſtory of the earlieſt Ages, and conſequently great Improvements in Chronology. Such Matters at their firſt Appearance are uſually queſtioned and ſuſpected; but his Lordſhip had long dwelt on them: Farther reading and ſearching ſtill confirmed him in the Juſtneſs of his Notions, and he would ſay to me when I talked with him on theſe Subjects, *The more I think of them, the more I am perſuaded of the Truth of them.*

He ſaid he had been in the wrong in writing ſuch Reſearches, which only a few of the Curious and Inquiſitive, even among learned Men, would trouble themſelves with examining, in the *Engliſh* Tongue.

He had therefore ſome Thoughts of writing them anew in *Latin*. He made ſome Progreſs in that Deſign, and the lateſt of his Diſſertations are written in that Tongue, but he never found Leiſure to finiſh it.

I once intended to have undertaken this Work myſelf, to have turned the whole into *Latin*, and to have altered the Method according to a Scheme his Lordſhip gave me. But I am ſenſible it would be too much for my Abilities to perform it as it ought to be; the Work would only ſuffer by paſſing under ſuch unſkilful Hands. The rough Draught of ſo great a Maſter ſhould be preſented to the World as he left it: I ought not, I think, to be ſo vain as to attempt to touch it at all after him; it is Honour enough for me to be thought fit to tranſcribe his Copy, or to carry his Books.

As he left his Papers, so they shall come into the World. The first Volume is just as he writ it about thirty Years ago.

His *Origines Antiquissimæ*, which I propose shall make another Volume, are all Tracts writ later, and two of them, *viz.* *De Cabiris* and *De Legibus Patriarchalibus*, in *Latin*.

I have Papers enough to make a large Volume, but I would publish only those that are best finished.

Had he been pleased to have undertaken such a Thing himself, it would have come into the World with much greater Advantage: I shall offer them only as Materials, which other learned Men may work up into a more regular and beautiful Fabrick.

The Reader must not expect in them great Exactness. One Inconvenience not now to be remedied, is, that to what he composed first he would afterwards, as fresh Proofs and Illustrations arose, add long Paragraphs in the Nature of References which must be brought in, but too often break the Thread and Connexion of the Discourse, and make it abrupt: These will occur too frequently, and call for the Reader's Candour.

These and other Accidents will make room for Objections, to Men that love to have a Handle for carping and caviling. I myself have been under a Temptation to be arrogant enough to criticise sometimes on the Argumentation, and sometimes on the Style, *viz.* That the Author has taken Pains to prove many Things that most Readers would easily allow, that the Reasonings might be sometimes shorter, and the Expression more accurate; tho' the last may be excused in a Man who always minded Things, and neglected Words. But I think the great Qualification in a Transcriber should be Faithfulness, and I have religiously adhered to the Letter of my Copy, not daring to alter any Thing. The Humour which prevailed with several learned Men to reject *Sanchoniatho* as counterfeit, because they knew not what to make of him, his Lordship always blamed. *Philo-Byblius*, *Porphyry* and *Eusebius*, who were better able to judge than any Moderns, never call in Question his being genuine.

What Mr. *Dodwell* has writ on this Subject, is rather the Expression of his own Inclination to disbelieve him, than an Argument to prove that he is spurious.

What Acceptance my Part in this Work will meet with among the Judicious, who shall give it a Perusal, I know not. I have been prompted to the Pains I have taken from a Desire to benefit and entertain them, as well as to preserve the Remains of a great Man, for whose Memory I ought to have, and ever shall have, the highest Veneration.

POSTSCRIPT.

Archdeacon *S. Payne* published this Life of Bishop *Cumberland* by Way of Preface to *Sanchoniatho's Phœnician History*, translated from the first Book of *Eusebius de Præparatione Evangelicâ*. With a Continuation of *Sanchoniatho*'s History by *Eratosthenes Cyrenæus*'s Canon, which *Dicæarchus* connects with the first Olympiad.

These Authors are illustrated with many Historical and Chronological Remarks, proving them to contain a Series of *Phœnician* and *Egyptian* Chronology, from the first Man to the first Olympiad, agreeable to the Scripture Accounts.

counts. By the Right Reverend *R. Cumberland* D. D. late Biſhop of *Peterborough*. *London* printed 1720.

NUMBER V.

The AUTHOR'S DEDICATION.

To the Right Honourable Sir Orlando Bridgman *Knight and Knight Baronet, Lord High Chancellor of* England, *Keeper of the Great Seal, and of his Majeſty King* Charles *the Second's moſt honourable Privy Council.*

My moſt noble LORD,

THE two Reaſons which chiefly prevail with all Authors, who dedicate Books, are either, *Firſt*, The Importance of the Subject; or, *Secondly*, The particular Situation and Circumſtances of the Author himſelf. Both theſe Reaſons prevail with me to addreſs this Performance to your Lordſhip.

For ſince *the Laws of Nature*, the Subject-matter of this Work, are the ſolid Foundations of that Equity which your Lordſhip, from your own innate Diſpoſition, ſo fondly admire; and ſince in the *High Court of Chancery*, where, by the Royal Favour of our moſt gracious Sovereign, you preſide as ſupreme Judge, it muſt appear a Piece of unpardonable Injuſtice in me, to have ſought after any other Patron.

In this controverſial Treatiſe, however, we do not only diſcourſe upon the Maxims of Equity in particular, but upon Religion, upon Juſtice, and upon Civil Government in general.

Theſe Principles, which your Lordſhip holds in the higheſt and deareſt Eſteem, are, as we complain, attacked by Mr. *Hobbes*.

For, altho' this Gentleman, at ſome Times, allows the Dictates of Reaſon, which concern theſe Points, to be impreſſed upon every human Mind by Almighty God, as Rules of Action; yet he, notwithſtanding this Conceſſion, obſtinately denies any ſuch Dictates to lay an Obligation upon outward Acts, conformable to theſe Dictates: Or, that they are, in any Propriety of ſpeaking, *Laws*, unleſs they firſt be eſtabliſhed upon Civil Authority: And, unleſs they firſt are guarded by the Sanctions of the Civil Magiſtrate. In ſhort, he utterly denies that any ſuch Laws are the Concern of thoſe who are not Members of the ſame Civil Community. De Cive, Ch. 4. Sect. 1. De Cive, Ch. 3. Sect. 27. De Cive, Ch. 5. Sect. 2, 5. De Cive, Ch. 6. Sect. 3.

Theſe are the prevailing Opinions, the ruling Principles, the Κυρία Δόξα of Mr. *Hobbes*; and, for the Eſtabliſhment of which, all the reſt of his Opinions either ſerve, or from which his moſt fundamental Maxims are deduced. Hence he concludes, that in all the ſeveral Conſtitutions of Civil Government, from the higheſt Leviathan in Engliſh, Chap. 26. pag. 143.

higheſt to the loweſt, one with another, the Members of one Community may act as they pleaſe by the Members of any other; all being, as he ſays, in a perpetual State of War, notwithſtanding that the Compacts of mutual Faith and Fidelity be as binding and obligatory as poſſibly can be deviſed.

From hence, he peremptorily inſiſts upon it, That all Men lawfully may take away Life, with the Neceſſaries and Comforts thereunto belonging, from all Men, provided they be in a State which he imagines and calls *natural*; or, provided they be not Members of the ſame Civil Community.

Whereas we, on the contrary, maintain, That theſe Principles are not only repugnant to the Divine Authority over the external Acts and Behaviour of Mankind, and which Natural Religion dictates; but we alſo affirm this Concluſion to follow as a direct Conſequence from his Principles, That Almighty God has not laid an Obligation upon any Man to the external Acts of Juſtice and Fidelity, without which it is, in the Nature of Things, impoſſible for any peaceable Society or Intercourſe amongſt Mankind to ſubſiſt.

For, taking away the Sanction of that Obligation, which theſe Dictates of Reaſon derive from the Authority of Almighty God, it is no Matter of Wonder if Mr. *Hobbes* cannot produce any other Tye of Obligation binding enough to reſtrain the unbounded Liberty of Mankind.

For all Civil Authority, as being inferior to the Divine Authority of the Laws of Nature, becomes weak and helpleſs, unleſs aided by Nature's Laws, which lay the Obligation upon outward Acts, as the wiſe Foundation, and the well-connected Security of ſuch Authority.

But, beſides this: He is not ſatisfied totally to demoliſh the ſure Foundations of Civil Society and Laws, unleſs he can overſet and change Laws, even after they are written and eſtabliſhed, to favour every Vice according to the Humour of his *Leviathan*.

In order, therefore, that Lawyers may have no Buſineſs at all upon their Hands, he introduces armed Force, as the Interpreter of Law, which is, with Sword in Hand, to cut ſhort all knotty Points. And, he openly declares, in the very ſame Chapter of his Book called the *Leviathan*, That our Judges of the *Engliſh* Common Law are not Judges but Lawyers.

Leviathan in Engliſh, Pages 143 and 147.

Since therefore it is ſo well known, my Lord, to all the World, how zealous you always have appeared in the Cauſe of Piety, Religion and Juſtice, you juſtly claim the firſt Right to this Treatiſe: Becauſe, you conſtantly and propitiouſly promote that univerſal Good of the whole Community, under which [*univerſal Good*] are contained Religion and univerſal Good-will, and in theſe we ſhall find comprehended all the Laws of Nature.

Your Lordſhip's Piety towards God, is fully demonſtrated from your Bounty to his Church, by endowing the Epiſcopal See of *Cheſter* with Land, as alſo many Pariſhes with Glebes, for the Accommodation of reſident Curates.

You, my Lord, in one Capacity, exerciſe and practice Benevolence to Mankind in general, as a Member of the Privy Council, (where the grand Concernments of univerſal Trade and public Treaties are tranſacted) and where your Lordſhip moſt religiouſly reveres the Laws of Nations, of Public Contracts, of Public Peace; and where, in all Conſultations, you utterly abhor and abominate even every the leaſt Appearance of, Invaſion upon Property.

In your Lordſhip's other Capacity, you likewiſe ſhew yourſelf a ſteady, faithful Subject to that Conſtitution of Government under which you are born, and for

for the Support of which (in *Lucan*'s Character of *Cato*) you delighted to ſtand, when it was even overcome and oppreſſed.

Victrix cauſa Diis placuit, ſed victa Catoni.

Neither would your Lordſhip ſubmit to an uſurping Tyrant, altho' in actual Poſſeſſion, and at a Time when Mr. *Hobbes* avowedly maintained and openly ſupported, as Doctrines, that this uſurped Power, and a quiet Submiſſion to it, were lawful. Leviathan in Engliſh, at the Concluſion, pag. 300.

In ſhort, the Subject Matter of this Treatiſe apologizes beſt for me; and, to ſpeak ingenuouſly, is the original Source of this Dedication.

As to the AUTHOR; it is ſufficient to ſay, That he lies under Obligations to your Lordſhip as his Patron, which he with Pleaſure and Gratitude acknowledges: And, that the Production of his Studies and Labours belong of Right to you, he being, in a Manner, born under your Lordſhip's Roof.

I have, indeed, theſe further Views in dedicating this Book to your Lordſhip, that it may prove more acceptable to Men of Letters, who riſe and flouriſh under your Lordſhip's Protection; and becauſe I am, in my Conſcience convinced, that this Treatiſe will be moſt highly acceptable to your Lordſhip's Sons, who inherit their Father's Virtues.

What now only remains is, humbly to aſk Pardon, that I have preſumed to declare publicly, thoſe Acts of Goodneſs which you liberally performed for the Good of the Church with all poſſible Secrecy.

I have not addreſſed myſelf to your Lordſhip with the leaſt View towards Flattery, but from an inward Perſuaſion, that your great Liberality will redound to the Glory of the *Reformation*, and ſhine as an Example illuſtrious enough for Men of the higheſt Figure and Fortune to behold, admire, and as truly worthy of their own Imitation.

Above all,—I beſeech your Lordſhip's Pardon for having detained you too—too long from Affairs of the firſt Importance. I therefore now retire to my daily Supplication, which is, That God may, as long as poſſible, preſerve your Lordſhip a Bleſſing to his Church, to our gracious Sovereign, to theſe Realms, and to us all:———*All Mankind.*

I am, MY LORD,

Upon many Accounts,

Your Lordſhip's moſt obedient,

And moſt devoted humble Servant,

R. C.

The Reverend Doctor HEZEKIAH BURTON's

ALLOQUIUM AD LECTOREM:

OR,

A ſhort Admonition to the Readers of this Philoſophical Enquiry, *&c. Tranſlated into* Engliſh *by* J. T.

I BEG the Favour of the learned Readers to take Notice, that our Author, in this his *Philoſophical Diſſertation*, did not ſtudy to captivate the Fancy with enticing Words, nor with the laboured Refinements of Rhetoric.

He did not waſte his Time and Pains in collecting far and near, elegant Turns of Expreſſion, nor in modelling the Harmony of his Periods.

As his Readers, however, are not, on the one Hand, to walk in the Flower-gardens of Oratory; ſo, neither are they, on the other, to tread the thorny Ways of dry Schoolmen, nor travel a dreary Journey thro' the wild Thickets of Briers and Brambles only. They will not find in our Author Monkiſh Barbariſms; and but few, if any, Terms of Art, as they are commonly called,———neither, in ſhort, will he enſnare them with the Fallacies of Sophiſtical Reaſoning.

Our Philoſopher does not cheriſh ſuch rigid, auſtere, Stoical Principles; neither does he abominate all kind of Elegance with ſuch an Abhorrence, as to place the whole Value of his Performance upon a careleſs, wild Neglect: And yet, he cannot be ranked in the Claſs of what are termed *your finiſhed Men, your nice, polite, courtly Authors. He does not ſet up for ſo abſolute an Admirer of* Cicero, neither did he exert all his Talents in pleaſing thoſe, who place the whole Value of Writing in Language and Expreſſion: He values Expreſſion, indeed, ſo far, as to underſtand his own Meaning himſelf, and convey the full Senſe of it to others.——And,——ſince he could not be exact in every minute Article, he would not neglect the moſt material.

Objection. "But, his Attention being cloſely engaged upon his Subject, like all thoſe who "chiefly ſtudy the main Point, he appears in a Negligence of Style, and in a Sort "of an Undreſs."

Anſwer. In order to clear him from this kind of Imputation, he entruſted me with his Manuſcript. Whether thro' Inability or Idleneſs, or (which is pretty much the ſame Thing) thro' many Avocations and trifling Kinds of other Buſineſs, I certainly have not fully executed the Taſk by ſome expected from me.

I muſt therefore intreat the Readers, to take off every Imputation of this Kind from our Author, and to lay it at my Door.

Gaſpar Scioppius was a German, and one of the famous Writers of the ſeventeenth Century. He was a remarkable Critic.

Now as to that moſt heinous Offence which I have committed againſt the grammatical Folks (which to be ſure is an Offence no leſs than capital) I acknowledge myſelf deſervedly worthy of their ſevereſt Indignation and Puniſhment.

If none of theſe Excuſes, in ſhort, can plead my Pardon, I muſt appeal to *Scioppius*, and the other critical, ſtrict Judges of the *Latin* Tongue; I will call them to my Aſſiſtance, who never refuſed Patronage to ſuch Votaries as invoke their Aid. Theſe Gentlemen are, to be ſure, the high and mighty Judges, who

have

have a Right to aſcertain and vindicate the juſt Forms, and proper Modes of Expreſſion.

It is the uſual Practice of theſe Critics, and with the whole Weight of their Authority, to tranſplant and naturalize foreign Phraſes. Now they will, beyond all Doubt, ſtrenuouſly maintain, That a plain Stile is agreeable to a Philoſophical Subject; becauſe it is the eaſieſt, and the moſt naturally adapted to handle every ſuch Subject well.

Take heed therefore, my good Readers, and be adviſed by me, not to find Fault with our Author's Stile, leſt ye proclaim and wage War publicly with the whole Herd of Critical Grammarians.

There is alſo another Caution neceſſary, and that is, not to expect in this Treatiſe any witty Points, ſatyrical Turns, or facetious Jokes, either in the Thought or in the Expreſſion. Becauſe, our Author was, to be ſure, an utter Enemy to all that Kind of Confutation; and from which Sort of Reaſoning, in ſuch numberleſs Inſtances, he ſo heavily reproaches his Adverſary, and would never have ſpared him, but that he did not care always to give a Looſe to his juſt Indignation.

It is the moſt difficult Thing in the World to refrain from Satyr, in treating that rude, barbarous Philoſophy, which lays the Foundations of all Irreligion, Injuſtice, Villainy, and even Rebellion itſelf.

However, our Author, who is of a moſt beneficent Nature, choſe to uſe a gentle, mild Expreſſion, and that upon many Accounts:

Firſt, He was fully reſolved to treat Mr. *Hobbes* with Humanity and Gentleneſs, not only upon Account of his great Learning; but, more eſpecially, becauſe Mr. *Hobbes*,—poor Gentleman! is now emaciated, and almoſt quite ſunk beneath the Weight and Infirmities of Age.

Mr. Hobbes was at this Time, viz. A. D. 1671. in the eighty-third Year of his Age, or thereabouts.

Secondly, Becauſe, our Author imagined it equally barbarous, to declaim with bitter Invectives againſt a dying old Man, continually under the dreadful Apprehenſions of Death, as to inſult over the laſt Remains of a departing Soul, or to torture the Manes of the Dead.

Thirdly, Becauſe, our Author employed a great deal of his Time and Pains in mathematical Studies, from which Kind of Studies he learned a Simplicity and Purity of Expreſſion, quite diſengaged from rhetorical Ornaments, and free from all Points of Wit.

Fourthly, No poſſible Reaſon can be aſſigned, why our Author ſhould not uſe this plain Manner of Writing, altho' upon a Subject different from Mathematics.

For the Caſe is pretty much the ſame, in writing upon other Subjects, as upon thoſe of Mathematics. You ſeldom find Authors, well principled in the mathematical Science, miſtaken in Point of Reaſoning; unleſs, perhaps, it happens, now and then, that a mathematical Scholar may grow ſomewhat mad: A melancholy Inſtance of which we have in Mr. *Hobbes!*

That our Author, therefore, might inveſtigate and trace out Truths of the moſt Importance and Difficulty, and fairly lay theſe Truths before his Readers in a clear, regular Stile, he judged, that reaſoning upon a moral Subject with mathematical Demonſtration, could the better baniſh from his Thoughts and Writings the uneven and turbulent Irregularities of an unſettled Genius.

In a Word, to avoid Prolixity, whoſoever will cavil at this Book (as a jejune, barren Performance, without any Spirit, Wit or Beauty) ought to conſider, that our Author's ſole Intent was, to diſcover and lay the moſt weighty Truths open

in

in the cleareſt Manner, and confirm them by the moſt concluſive Demonſtrations; which, if he has not effectually performed, we may deſpair of ever ſeeing ſuch a Work well executed, even unto the End of Time.

This Caution, however, I give you, by the Bye, That whatſoever Commendation I moſt deſervedly beſtow either upon our Author or upon his Performance, not to underſtand it as if I would pre-engage your Favour by too early, haſty an Encomium.

Every one is at all the Liberty in the World (notwithſtanding any Thing that I have ſaid to the contrary) to judge for himſelf: But with this Proviſo, that he firſt reads over, with Patience and Attention, the Book itſelf; and that he thoroughly underſtands it; and then, when this is done, he may (but yet with Candour and Impartiality) paſs Sentence upon it.

Whatever ignorant, malevolent, invidious Scoffers object againſt our Author, or his Performance; whatever muttering Noiſes, by way of Contradiction, lazy Sophiſts may ſnarl out againſt it; whatſoever little Cavils Atheiſts, and the Enemies to God and Man, we ſhall eſteem, rather praiſe than reproach.

The beſt of Men will, to be ſure, behave themſelves with Candour; and they all, even to a Man, will take upon themſelves the Defence of that Cauſe [*the common Good*] which our Author defends. Nay,—I have no Doubt upon me, but that this Book will be acceptable to all, except the very worſt of Men, eſpecially ſince the main Deſign of this Undertaking is to prove, That every Individual, to the beſt of his Abilities, muſt promote the common Happineſs of All.——And, unleſs I am miſtaken in my Conjecture, the preſent Generation will highly commend, and Poſterity, with Wonder and Surprize, eſteem our Author. For, if I have the leaſt Judgment at all, this Book is written, not only for the preſent Age, but for endleſs Ages to come.

Go on, therefore, O thou moſt excellent Author, according to that boundleſs, diffuſive Benevolence with which thou art bleſſed! Go on, I ſay, to deſerve the beſt Gratitude from the whole human Race! That is, go on and communicate to ALL, thoſe moſt excellent Precepts which you yourſelf have traced out:——— [ΑΥΤΟΔΙΔΑΚΤΑ——] Precepts which truly may be called your own,——— Precepts inceſſantly flowing from your own Mind, as from a Fountain of the cleareſt, pureſt, beſt Ideas: And,—may the whole Univerſe reap the bleſſed, moſt delicious Fruits of your Learning, your Wiſdom, your Integrity.—Fruits which very few,—too few, indeed, as yet, either feel, taſte or underſtand.

And—now—by way of Concluſion—I addreſs myſelf to all, the whole rational Syſtem of created Agents, and who, upon the Principles of *Univerſal Benevolence*, are my Parents and Brethren. I addreſs myſelf to you all, as many as ye be, altho' in Number paſſing Numeration, diffuſed and ſpread over the whole Expanſe of boundleſs Space, whether ye be *Indians*, or *Scythians*, or *Africans*, or the Inhabitants of Regions and Countries as yet unknown; whether ye be more widely different in your Sentiments of Religion, in your Notions and Affections, than in Situation and Place. I addreſs and beſeech you all, with Care and Obſervance, to peruſe *The Holy Bible*, and this admirable Book of our Author, if happily, by any Means, theſe two moſt excellent Books of divine Inſtruction happen to fall into your Hands—Hearken to your own Reaſon,—Hearken to your own Experience,—Hearken to your own Senſes,—All ſilently admoniſhing and pronouncing Inſtructions—Hearken, in a Word, to Univerſal Nature, with one Voice declaring, That nothing is more humane, more lovely, more amiable,

more

more perfective of human Nature: That nothing more nearly reſembles the Nature of God, than *Benevolence* univerſally extended and exerted towards *All*.

All theſe Monitors with a clear, with an audible Voice, (—A Voice by the deep Ear of Meditation heard) and with one Conſent declare, That a *Good-will*, the moſt diffuſive and boundleſs, is the firſt Principle, the juſt Meaſure, and the only ſure Rule of all our Duty: That it is the ultimate End of all our Actions; the ampleſt Reward the Fulneſs of Hope can reach: And—in ſhort,—that it is Man's chief Good.

To what exorbitant Degrees of Exceſs, or to what Ends and Purpoſes, therefore, ſhall we, a wretched Race of ſtupid, abſurd Mortals, indulge our Hatred and Malice, our Envy and Jealouſy, our Simulation and Diſſimulation?

Let us rather, having laid aſide Malevolence, Anger, Wrath, and an Overviolence of Self-love [*Nimiâ φιλαυτίᾳ,*] provoke one another to Love, to a Love unfeigned, to a Love without End and without Bounds towards *All*.

By theſe Means we ſhall arrive at the higheſt, moſt exalted State of human Happineſs, where we ſhall conſult and act, not only the Good of ourſelves, and of our own Fleſh and Blood: Not only the Good of thoſe who agree with us in Opinions and Sentiments: Not only the Good of our Friends and Countrymen, but *the Good of All*, let *that All* be as many, as numberleſs, as Imagination can conceive. *Rare is the Happineſs of ſuch an Age!* A Golden Age ſcarce to be found! When ALL, with their higheſt their pureſt Affections, and with their beſt-united Endeavours will promote the Happineſs of ALL.—O bleſſed Time! —O moſt amiable Age!——Let us, my Brethren, as much as in us lies, preſs forward towards ſo bleſſed a State.——And——that——our moſt bountiful God, the one eternal Fountain, Prototype and original Parent of Love, would aſſiſt our own Endeavours, and (having purged all Rancour and Malignity of Envy and Malice from our Souls) plentifully pour into our Hearts and Minds his holy Spirit, his Mankind-loving Spirit. [*Φιλανθρωπον illud* Πνῦμα·] That we *All*,—all who inhabit the univerſal Frame of Nature, may firmly unite and be linked together by indiſſoluble Bonds of beneficent Affection. And this, from the inmoſt Receſſes of a ſincere Soul, is my fervent Prayer, who am, with ardent Zeal,

Your truly Benevolent,

HEZEKIAH BURTON.

Hezekiah Burton D. D. and *Richard Cumberland* D. D. were Chaplains to Sir *Orlando Bridgman* when he was Lord-keeper, and they were both preferred by him. *John Hollins* M. D. practiſed Phyſic at *Shrewſbury*, and lived there with univerſal Eſteem to a good old Age.

NUMBER VI.

The Life, Inventions *and* Improvements *of Dr.* Robert Hooke.

By RICHARD WALLER, *S. R. Secr.*

UNDERSTANDING that it would be acceptable to ſeveral learned and ingenious Perſons to have ſome public Account given of the Life, Studies and Employments of ſo knowing and diligent an Enquirer into Nature, as Dr. *Robert Hooke* is generally allowed to have been, and who was one of the greateſt Promoters of Experimental Natural Knowledge, as well as Ornaments of the laſt Century (ſo fruitful of great Genii) I could not well refuſe that Taſk, which (knowing my own Inſufficiency for ſuch an Attempt) I could hardly undertake, being conſcious it required a Perſon much better qualified with natural and acquired Abilities to perform it with Satisfaction; eſpecially in ſo judicious and nice an Age, more ready to find Faults than pardon Miſtakes: Beſides, my Deſire has always been, not to expoſe myſelf to Cenſure, when I might live quietly, *Studiis ignobilis otii*. But the following Papers of *Dr. Hooke*, having been put into my Hands to be publiſhed, I was, in ſome Manner, obliged to appear in Print. What Miſtakes the candid Reader may obſerve, in the following Relation of his Life, I hope he will obligingly pardon. In which I profeſs the utmoſt Sincerity, the greateſt Part of my Vouchers being either taken out of his own Memorials, or from the Journals of the *Royal Society*.

Had Dr. *Hooke* proſecuted a Deſign, which I find he once propoſed to himſelf, my preſent Undertaking had been as vain as needleſs; for in a ſmall Pocket-diary of his I found theſe Words written:

" *Saturday*, *April* 10th, 1697. I began this Day to write the Hiſtory of my " own Life, wherein I will comprize as many remarkable Paſſages as I can now " remember or collect, out of ſuch Memorials as I have kept in Writing, or " are in the Regiſters of the *Royal Society*; together with all my Inventions, Ex- " periments, Diſcoveries, Diſcourſes, *&c.* which I have made, the Time when, " the Manner how, and Means by which, with the Succeſs and Effect of them; " together with the State of my Health, my Employments and Studies, my " good or bad Fortune, my Friends and Enemies, *&c.* All which ſhall be the " Truth of Matter of Fact, ſo far as I can be informed by my Memorials, or my " own Memory, which Rule I reſolve not to tranſgreſs."

Accordingly I found a Beginning of his Life, which tho' it affords but little Satisfaction, being only concerning his Childhood, yet I have here given an Abſtract of what is contained in it.

Dr. *Robert Hooke* was born at *Freſh-water*, a Peninſula on the Weſt Side of the Iſle of *Wight*, on the 18th of *July*, being *Saturday*, 1635, at twelve o'Clock at Noon, and chriſtened the 26th following by his own Father, Miniſter of that Pariſh.

He was very infirm and weakly, and therefore nurſed at home, tho' his Brothers and Siſters were nurſed abroad; and for at leaſt ſeven Years his Parents had very

very little Hopes of his Life, being often ſick; all which Time his chief Food was Milk, or Things made thereof, and Fruits, no Fleſh in the leaſt agreeing with his weak Conſtitution. For his Age he was very ſprightly, and active in running, leaping, *&c.* tho' very weak as to any robuſt Exerciſe; was very apt to learn any Thing, and, after his *Engliſh*, ſoon learned his Grammar by Heart: But, as he ſays, with but little Underſtanding, till his Father deſigning him for the Miniſtry, took ſome Pains to inſtruct him. But he ſtill being often ſubject to the Head-ach, which hindered his Learning, his Father laid aſide all Thoughts of breeding him a Scholar; and finding himſelf alſo grow very infirm thro' Age and Sickneſs, wholly neglected his farther Education; who being thus left to himſelf, ſpent his Time in making little mechanical "Toys (as he ſays) in which "he was very intent, and, for the Tools he had, ſucceſsful; ſo that there was no-"thing he ſaw done by any Mechanic, but he endeavoured to imitate, and in "ſome Particulars could exceed (which are his own Words)." His Father obſerving, by theſe Indications, his great Inclination to Mechanics, thought to put him Apprentice to ſome eaſy Trade, (as a Watchmaker's or Limner's) he ſhewing moſt Inclination to thoſe or the like mechanical Performances; for making Uſe of ſuch Tools as he could procure, ſeeing an old Braſs Clock taken to Pieces, he attempted to imitate it, and made a Wooden one that would go: "Much about "the ſame Time he made a ſmall Ship, about a Yard long, fitly ſhaping it, adding "its Rigging of Ropes, Pulleys, Maſts, *&c.* with a Contrivance to make it fire off "ſome ſmall Guns, as it was ſailing croſs a Haven of a pretty Breadth. He had "alſo a great Fancy for Drawing, having, much about the ſame Age, copied ſe-"veral Prints with a Pen, that Mr. *Hoſkins* (Son to the famous *Hoſkins*, *Cowper*'s "Maſter) much admired one not inſtructed could ſo well imitate them."

Theſe Indications of a mechanic Genius appeared in him when very young; for, by the ſame Paper, I find, that his Father died in *October* 1648, having for three or four Years before his Death been much afflicted with a Cough, a Palſy, Jaundice and Dropſy.

This is the Sum of what he has left of his own Writing; by which we find him, at the Time of his Father's Death, to be thirteen Years and about three Months old.

This early Propenſity of his to Mechanics was a Sign of his future Excellency in ſuch Contrivances, and admirable Facility, he afterwards manifeſted in applying mechanical Principles to the Explication of the moſt difficult Phænomena of Nature; and I remember, it has been often obſerved by ſeveral Perſons, that whatever Apparatus he contrived for the exhibiting any Experiment before the *Royal Society*, it was performed with the leaſt Embarraſſment, clearly and evidently to explain the preſent Subject; which was a ſufficient Proof of his true Knowledge of the mechanical Powers, and of a Method of applying them to the Explication of Nature.

How he ſpent the next ſix or ſeven Years of his Life, I have not been particularly informed; but, I underſtand, he was for ſome Time with Sir *Peter Lely*, how long I am not certain, I ſuppoſe but a ſhort Time; for I have heard, that the Smell of the Oyl-Colours did not agree with his Conſtitution, increaſing his Head-ach, to which he was ever too much ſubject.

It was after this that he lived with Dr. *Buſby*, the late famous Maſter of *Weſtminſter* School, as a Scholar in his own Houſe, where with more Diligence he applied himſelf to *Latin* and *Greek*, in which he made a ſufficient Proficiency for the Time, and had a competent Knowledge; and at the ſame Time got ſome Inſight

into the *Hebrew*, and ſome other Oriental Languages. While he lived with Dr. *Buſby*, he fell ſeriouſly upon the Study of the Mathematics, the Dr. encouraging him therein, and allowing him particular Times for that Purpoſe. In this he took the moſt regular Method, and firſt made himſelf Maſter of *Euclid*'s Elements, and thence proceeded orderly from that ſure Baſis to the other Parts of the Mathematics, and after to the Application thereof to Mechanics, his firſt and laſt Miſtreſs.

From *Weſtminſter* School he went to the Univerſity of *Oxford*, in 1653. But as it is often the Fate of Perſons great in Learning to be ſmall in other Circumſtances, his were but mean.

I find that he was a Student of *Chriſt-church*, tho' not of the Foundation, but was, as I have heard, a Servitor to one Mr. *Goodman*, and took his Degree of Maſter of Arts ſeveral Years after, about 1662 or 1663.

About the Year 1655 he began to ſhew himſelf to the World, and that he had not ſpent his juvenile Years in vain; for there being a Concourſe at that Time of extraordinary Perſons at *Oxford*, each of which afterwards were particularly diſtinguiſhed for the great Light they gave the learned World by their juſtly admired Labours, he was ſoon taken Notice of, and for his Facility in mechanic Inventions much prized by them.

For the Proof of his being at this Time brought into the Acquaintance of theſe great Men, I ſhall tranſcribe ſome Paſſages which I met with among his Manuſcripts; and firſt, ſpeaking of their philoſophical Meetings at *Oxford*, he ſays,

" At theſe Meetings, which were about the Year 1655 (before which Time I " knew little of them) divers Experiments were ſuggeſted, diſcourſed and tried " with various Succeſſes, tho' no other Account was taken of them but what par- " ticular Perſons perhaps did for the Help of their own Memories; ſo that many " excellent Things have been loſt, ſome few only by the Kindneſs of the Authors " have been ſince made public: Among theſe may be reckoned the honourable " Mr. *Boyle*'s Pneumatic Engine and Experiments, firſt printed in the Year 1660. " For in 1658 or 1659, I contrived and perfected the Air-pump for Mr. *Boyle*, " having firſt ſeen a Contrivance for that Purpoſe made for the ſame honoura- " ble Perſon by Mr. *Gratorix*, which was too groſs to perform any great Mat- " ter."

The Draught of this Air-pump and all its Parts, as it was after publiſhed by Mr. *Boyle*, I have now by me deſigned by Mr. *Hooke*, and I have heard him ſay, he was then ſent to *London* by Mr. *Boyle*, to get the Barrel and other Parts for that Engine, which could not be made at *Oxford*. But to return to ſome other Notes.

" The ſame Year I contrived and made many Trials about the Art of flying " in the Air, and moving very ſwift on the Land and Water, of which I ſhew'd " ſeveral Deſigns to Dr. *Wilkins*, then Warden of *Wadham* College, and at the " ſame Time made a Module, which, by the Help of Springs and Wings, raiſed " and ſuſtained itſelf in the Air; but finding by my own Trials, and afterwards " by Calculation, that the Muſcles of a Man's Body were not ſufficient to do any " Thing conſiderable of that Kind, I applied my Mind to contrive a Way to " make artificial Muſcles; divers Deſigns whereof I ſhewed alſo, at the ſame " Time, to Dr. *Wilkins*, but was in many of my Trials fruſtrated of my Ex- " pectations."

What is mentioned here of his Attempts about Flying is confirmed by ſeveral Draughts and Schemes upon Paper, of the Methods that might be attempted for that Purpoſe, and of ſome Contrivances for faſtening ſuccedaneous Wings, not unlike

unlike thoſe of Bats, to the Arms and Legs of a Man; as likewiſe of a Contrivance to raiſe him up by Means of horizontal Vanes placed a little aſlope to the Wind, which being blown round, turned an endleſs Screw in the Center, which helped to move the Wings, to be managed by the Perſon by this Means raiſed aloft: Theſe Schemes I have now by me, with ſome few Fragments relating thereto, but ſo imperfect, that I do not judge them fit for the Public. But to return to his own Notes.

" About this Time, having an Opportunity of acquainting myſelf with Aſtro-
" nomy, by the Kindneſs of Dr. *Ward*, I applied myſelf to the improving of the
" Pendulum for ſuch Obſervations; and in the Year 1656 or 1657 I contrived
" a Way to continue the Motion of the Pendulum, ſo much commended by
" *Ricciolus* in his *Almageſtum*, which Dr. *Ward* had recommended to me to pe-
" ruſe: I made ſome Trials for this End, which I found to ſucceed to my Wiſh.
" The Succeſs of theſe made me farther think of improving it for finding the
" Longitude; and the Method I had made for myſelf for mechanic Inventions,
" quickly led me to the Uſe of Springs, inſtead of Gravity, for the making a
" Body vibrate in any Poſture; whereupon I did firſt in great, and afterwards in
" ſmaller Modules, ſatisfy myſelf of the Practicableneſs of ſuch an Invention;
" and hoping to have made great Advantage thereby, I acquainted divers of my
" Friends, and particularly Mr. *Boyle*, that I was poſſeſſed of ſuch an Invention,
" and craved their Aſſiſtance for improving the Uſe of it to my Advantage.

" Immediately after his Majeſty's Reſtoration, Mr. *Boyle* was pleaſed to acquaint
" the Lord *Brouncker* and Sir *Robert Moray* with it, who adviſed me to get a
" Patent for the Invention, and propounded very probable Ways of making con-
" ſiderable Advantage by it. To induce them to a Belief of my Performance,
" I ſhewed a Pocket Watch, accommodated with a Spring, applied to the Arbor
" of the Ballance to regulate the Motion thereof, concealing the Way I had for
" finding the Longitude: This was ſo well approved of, that Sir *Robert Moray*
" drew me up the Form of a Patent, the principal Part whereof, *viz.* the De-
" ſcription of the Watch, ſo regulated, is his own Hand-writing, which I have
" yet by me; the Diſcouragement I met with in the Management of this Affair,
" made me deſiſt for that Time."

So far this Paper: In Confirmation of what is above ſaid, I met with a Draught of an Agreement between the Lord *Brouncker*, Mr. *Boyle*, and Sir *Robert Moray*, with *Robert Hooke* Maſter of Arts, to this Purpoſe, That *Robert Hooke* ſhould diſcover to them the Whole of his Invention, to meaſure the Parts of Time at Sea, as exactly and truly as they are at Land by the Pendulum Clocks, invented by Monſieur *Huygens*; that of the Profits to be made thereby not exceeding 6000 *l.* *Robert Hooke* was to have Three-fourths of whatever was made more of it, not exceeding 4000 *l.* *Robert Hooke* was to have Two-thirds of the reſt; if more could be made of it, he was to have the Half, and *Robert Hooke* to be publicly owned the Author and Inventor thereof. This is the Sum of one Draught; there are indeed ſome others which differ only in the Diviſion of the Profits, which it is needleſs here to trouble the Reader with. In purſuance of this Deſign, there were ſeveral Papers drawn up, *viz.* The Draught of an Act of Parliament to oblige all Maſters of Ships to pay ſo much *per* Tun for the Uſe of this Invention, as alſo of a Warrant to be granted by the King to *Robert Hooke* M. A. *&c.* for a Patent for the ſole Uſe of the ſaid Invention for fourteen Years, and ſigned, by his Majeſty's Command, *William Morrice*. I have ſome other Papers which are unneceſſary to be here mentioned.

Thus

Thus far the Matter then proceeded; and how it came to ſtop here, may be juſtly wondered; but to give the Reader the beſt Satisfaction I can in this Matter, I ſhall tranſcribe a Paragraph out of the Poſtſcript to *Hooke*'s Treatiſe of Helioſcopes, printed 1676.

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" This Treaty with me had been finally concluded for ſeveral thouſand Pounds, " had not the inſerting of one Clauſe broke it off, which was, *That if after I had* " *diſcovered my Invention about the finding the Longitude by Watches (tho' in them-* " *ſelves ſufficient) they, or any other Perſon ſhould find a Way of improving my Prin-* " *ciples, he or they ſhould have the Benefit thereof during the Term of the Patent,* " *and not I.* To which Clauſe I could no ways agree, knowing it was eaſy to " vary my Principles an hundred Ways; and it was not improbable but there " might be ſome Addition of Conveniency to what I ſhould at firſt diſcover, it " being *facile inventis addere*; and judging it unreaſonable to be deprived of the " Benefit of my Inventions, in themſelves ſufficient, becauſe others might vary " them, or any other Ways improve them, of which it was very probable they " would have no Thought if they had not the Advantage of being inſtructed by " my Diſcovery, it having been hid ſome thouſands of Years already; as indeed " the Effect hath made evident and certain, there having been nothing done by " any body elſe upon that Matter ever ſince."

There is more in the ſame Place worth the peruſal, which, for Brevity, I omit.

Dr. *Hooke* ſuffering this Invention to lie undiſcovered to the laſt, gave ſome Perſons cauſe to queſtion whether he was ever Poſſeſſor of it, and to doubt whether what in Theory ſeemed very promiſing, would anſwer when put to the Teſt of Practice: Others indeed more ſeverely judged, that it was only a Kind of boaſting in him, to aſſert he knew that which had not yet been performed, though attempted by many. However the Matter is, it is certain he perſiſted in the Affirmation to the laſt; and not many Weeks before his Death told me and other Perſons, that he knew a certain and infallible Method to diſcover the true Place of a Veſſel at Sea, as to its Eaſt and Weſt Diſtance from the Port departed from; whether by Watches, or other Time-keepers, or by any other Ways, I know not, tho' indeed, by what is before mentioned, it ſhould ſeem to be by Watches, for the Improvement of which he made many Trials, and read ſeveral Diſcourſes.

However, this Matter produced the Diſcovery of that moſt uſeful and practicable Method of regulating Pocket-watches by a ſpiral Spring, applied to the Arbor of the Ballance, as they are now made, without any conſiderable Addition ſince; the Hiſtory of which, as I have heard it from himſelf, and find publiſhed, is thus.

In Diſcourſe once he told me, that about the Year 1660, he having ſhewn a Movement ſo regulated to the Lord *Brouncker*, &c. as is above related, Monſieur *Huygens* having for ſome Time applied himſelf to invent ſeveral Ways to regulate Time-keepers by the Correſpondence he held with Mr. *Oldenburgh*, among other Matters had Notice of this, for which there was afterwards an Application made to procure a Patent. This indeed is poſſible; but whether it were ſo or not, I cannot determine. That Mr. *Hooke* had (many Years before *Huygens* mentioned it) diſcovered the Invention is certain, by what is related in the Hiſtory of

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the *Royal Society*, among ſeveral new Inventions, in theſe Words, *There have been invented ſeveral Kinds of Pendulum-watches for the Pocket, wherein the Motion is regulated by Springs*, &c.

Now

Now tho' this does not mention the Springs being ſpiral or faſtened to the Arbor of the Ballance, yet it appears it was ſo by what is related above, and a Paſſage I have ſeen in a Letter from Sir *Robert Moray* to Mr. *Oldenburgh*, dated *Oxon, Sept.* 30, 1665. clears it, in which are theſe Words, " You (meaning *Oldenburgh*) will be the firſt that knows when his (that is *Huygens*'s) Watches will " be ready, and I will therefore expect from you an Account of them; and if he " imparts to you what he does, let me know it: To that Purpoſe you may aſk " him, if he doth not *apply a Spring to the Arbor of the Ballance*, and that will " give him Occaſion to ſay ſomewhat to you; if it be that, you may tell him " what *Hooke has done in that Matter, and what he intends more.*" Altho' I cannot be aſſured what *Oldenburgh* wrote to Monſieur *Huygens*, yet it is probable their Intimacy procured what he knew; and it is evident that *Huygens*'s Diſcovery of this was firſt publiſhed in the *Journal des Scavans*, and from thence in the *Philoſophical Tranſactions* for *March* 25th, 1675, about ten Years after that Letter of Sir *Robert Moray*'s, and near fifteen after *Hooke*'s firſt Diſcovery of it.

To this I ſhall add what Mr. *Oldenburgh* has printed, *Philoſ. Tranſact.* No. 118. " 'Tis certain the Deſcriber of Helioſcopes (meaning *Hooke*) ſome Years ago cauſed to be actually made ſome Watches of this Kind, which (indeed he there " ſays) were unſucceſsful." Which whether ſo or not, I cannot learn, ſo many Years after; tho' I am inclined to think that Expreſſion proceeded from Paſſion, the Invention and Principle of *Hooke*'s and *Huygens*'s being both the very ſame as are now uſed.

To this of Mr. *Oldenburgh*, Mr. *Hooke* made his Reply in a Poſtſcript to his *Lampas*: In Rejoinder to which *Oldenburgh* printed a Declaration of the Council of the *Royal Society*, to teſtify his Faithfulneſs in managing the Correſpondence of the Society; but it is obſervable, that in this Place there is no Contradiction to *Hooke*'s being the firſt in that Invention. Philoſ. Tranſ. No. 129. p. 749.

It cannot be denied but that Mr. *Hooke* was frequently deſired to perfect his Inventions about Watches and Time-keepers, which, when urged, he as often promiſed; and when any new Contrivance was by any Perſon produced, he then ſhewed ſomething of his own, either the ſame, or excelling it, a Proof he had tried the ſame before. Particularly when on the 9th of *Auguſt* 1666, Mr. *Mercator* ſhewed to the Society a Watch of his Invention, repreſenting the Æquation of Time, to the Approbation of the Company, Mr. *Hooke* at the ſame Time produced a new Piece of Watch-work of his own Contrivance, to meaſure Time exactly both at Sea and Land, of which he was deſired to bring in the Deſcription, which, tho' promiſed, was, as I think, never done. Journal R. Soc.

It muſt be confeſſed, that very many of his Inventions were never brought to the Perfection they were capable of, nor put in Practice till ſome other Perſon, either Foreigner or of our own Nation, cultivated the Invention, which, when *Hooke* found, it put him upon the finiſhing that which otherwiſe poſſibly might have lain till this Time in its firſt Defects. Whether this Miſtake aroſe from the Multiplicity of his Buſineſs, which did not allow him a ſufficient Time, or from the Fertility of his Invention, which hurried him on in the queſt of new Entertainments, neglecting the former Diſcoveries when he was once ſatisfied of the Feazableneſs and Certainty of them, tho' there wanted ſome ſmall Matter to render their Uſe more practicable and general, I know not, and whether this was the Caſe in the preſent Subject: But this I ſuppoſe may be an undoubted Truth, the

ſpiral

ſpiral Springs were not applied generally to regulate Watches, till after this Diſpute with *Huygens*.

I have been the more particular in this Matter, that I might, as far as I was able, aſſert the Invention to the true Author, and ſuppoſe I have wronged no Perſon. They that require more of this Subject may conſult the *Philoſophical Tranſactions*, and *Hooke*'s Tracts in the Places before quoted. I have in this brought all that relates to this Queſtion together, that the Reader may the better underſtand the whole Matter, tho' thereby I have diſordered the Series of his Life, and Order of Time.

But to return (from this Digreſſion, which, to make it more plain, I have enlarged upon) to *Oxford*, I find that 1655 or 6 there were many curious Experiments, Obſervations and Enquiries made, and Inſtruments for thoſe Purpoſes contrived, as particularly the *Barometer*, of which he ſays, the firſt Occaſion of the Invention was a Suggeſtion of Sir *Ch. Wren*, in order to find whether the Hypotheſis of *Des Cartes*, for giving the Reaſon of the Tides from the Preſſure of the Moon upon the Air in its Paſſage by the Meridian, were true or not. At this Time I have heard Mr. *Hooke* ſay, it was firſt obſerved, that the Height of the Mercury in the *Barometer* did not conform itſelf to the Moon's Motion, but to that of the different Gravitation of the Air, as has been ſince ſufficiently verified. Yet in a *French* Treatiſe printed at *Paris*, ſeveral Years after this Obſervation at *Oxford*, the Diſcovery of the Gravitation of the Air is attributed to Monſieur *Paſcal*, deduced from ſeveral Experiments, made about the Year 1650 at *Clermont* in *Auvergne* by Monſieur *Perier*, at *Paris* by others, and at *Stockholm* by Meſſieurs *Des Cartes* and *Chanute*; which if it be, as is there related, and the Inferences from that Experiment ſuch as are in the ſame Tract mentioned, 'tis ſtrange they ſhould not have been applied to the Uſe of ſo beneficial an Inſtrument ſooner, which I do not find it was till after this Obſervation at *Oxford*.

Traitez de l'Equilibre de liqueurs, &c. 1664.

By the Perſuaſion of Dr. *Seth Ward*, afterwards Biſhop of *Saliſbury*, about 1656, he applied himſelf more particularly to the Study of Aſtronomy, and about 58 or 59, he ſays thus, "I contrived ſeveral Aſtronomical Inſtruments for making "Obſervations both at Sea and Land, which I afterwards produced before the "*Royal Society*."

Some of theſe, I ſuppoſe, are the Inſtruments hereafter mentioned in his *Aſtronomical Lectures*, where I have endeavoured to retrieve as many as I could, partly from ſome rough Draughts, partly from old Modules, and ſome from the verbal Deſcriptions where both thoſe Helps were wanting; in which how I have ſucceeded, is left to the candid Reader's Judgment.

Much about this Time (as he ſays) he contrived the *Circular Pendulum*, and the Uſe of it, for continuing the Motion of another *Pendulum*, which he afterwards ſhewed to the *Royal Society* in 1663; about which Time, and afterwards, there are ſeveral Particulars relating to the *Circular Pendulum*, entered in the Journals as his: A Movement to this Purpoſe is deſcribed in his *Animadverſions* on *Machina Cæleſtis*, pag. 68. printed 1674.

In the Year 1660. the moſt illuſtrious *Royal Society* was founded; for a full Account of which, and its Inſtitution, the Reader is referred to the Right Reverend and learned Dr. *Sprat*'s Hiſtory thereof, publiſhed 1667. I ſhall only obſerve the Occaſion and Time when Mr. *Hooke* was introduced into their Service as *Curator*. Soon after the Beginning of the *Royal Society*, *viz.* about *April* 1661, a Debate aroſe in the Society, occaſioned by a ſmall Tract printed in 1660, about the

the Cauſe of the riſing of Water in ſlender Glaſs Pipes, higher than in larger, and that in a certain Proportion to their Bores: This Diſcourſe was wrote and publiſhed by *Hooke*; the Explication of which difficult Phænomenon made him the more regard it. The Sum of his Reaſonings upon this Subject he publiſhed afterward, *Micrograph.* Obſerv. the 6th. in which there are ſeveral very curious and then new Remarks and Hints, as to the Nature of Fluidity and Gravity; which laſt is farther proſecuted in his *Treatiſe of Springs*, with other excellent Subjects, to which the Inquiſitive are referred for a more ample Satisfaction.

This, together with his former Performances, made him much reſpected by the *Royal Society*; and on the 5th of *November* 1662 "Sir *Robert Moray* propoſed a Per-"ſon that was willing to be entertained as a Curator by the Society, offering to fur-"niſh them every Day when they met, with three or four conſiderable Experiments; "which Propoſition was unanimouſly received, Mr. *Hooke* being named to be the "Perſon: And accordingly the next Day of their Meeting, on the 12th of *No-*"*vember*, he was unanimouſly accepted, and taken as Curator, with the Thanks of "the Society ordered to Mr. *Boyle* for diſpenſing with him for their Uſe; and or-"dered that Mr. *Hooke* ſhould come and ſit among them, and both bring in every "Day three or four of his own Experiments, and take Care of ſuch others as ſhould "be recommended to him by the Society."

From this Time the Society's Journals gave ſufficient Teſtimonials of his Performances, all which would be too many to particularize here, therefore I ſhall only touch upon ſome of the chief, as the Experiment of breaking Glaſs Bubbles inward, the Air contained in them being rarified by Heat in their Blowing, and ſo hermetically ſealing them whilſt hot; which Bubbles were obſerved at a certain Degree of Tenſion, both in the diſtending them whilſt blowing, and in their contracting as they cooled, to yield a ſmart Sound, ſeveral of theſe in cooling would break inwards with a briſk Noiſe, tho' others broke without any Noiſe; upon which the Experimenter made ſeveral Remarks.

Many Experiments were made to explicate the Nature and Quality of the Air, *viz.* as to its Gravitation, its different Effects when rarified, condenſed and natural, with its Uſe as to the Life of Animals, and maintaining a lucid Flame, or Cauſe the Diſſolution of Bodies by Fire: A live Animal and Lamp being incloſed together in a Receiver, ſhewed the *Pabulum Vitæ* and *Flammæ* to be much the ſame; at which Time alſo he tried how long the ſame Air would ſerve for breathing. This leads me to remember that noble Experiment made by him of keeping a Dog alive, his *Thorax* being laid open, by blowing freſh Air into his Lungs, of which a particular Account is given in the *Hiſtory of the Royal Society*, Page 232. which plainly ſhews the Uſe of the Air, and Difference between Venal and Arterial Blood.

He ſhewed what Addition of Weight is given to Fluids, by aſcending and deſcending Bodies in them. The different ſpecific Weight of hot and cold Water, with the Uſes to be made thereof in heating large Quantities of Water: Of the Difference of Ice and Water, with the Refraction of other Fluids, by an Inſtrument deſcribed in the Preface to his *Micrography*.

Experiments and a Contrivance to ſhew the Force and Velocity of Bodies falling from ſeveral Heights, weighing Bodies at ſeveral Heights. Pendulums of two hundred Feet long. The Difference of the Barometer at ſeveral Heights. Experiments to improve Land Carriage. Methods of conveying ſecret and quick Intelligence.

Inſtruments to meaſure Time exactly. To obſerve a ſecond Minute by the Sun or Stars. To try the Strength of Gunpowder, and ſeveral others, particularly an Engine to cut down the Teeth of Watch Wheels, more exactly than can be done by the moſt expert Hand; an Invention now of conſtant Uſe. About this Time he fixed the Standard for the Thermometer from the Point of freezing; and contrived a Way to make the Motions of the Barometer more ſenſible; which is ſince, with farther Improvements, publiſhed in the *Philoſophical Tranſactions*, No. 185. p. 241.

In *February* 1663-4. he contrived a Way to ſupply freſh Air to the Urinator under the Diving Bell, by a Chain of Buckets and a Leaden Box for his Head, when he went out of the Bell, to be ſupplied with freſh Air from the Bell, *&c.* At this Time he ſhewed Experiments of the dilating of Glaſs and other Bodies by Heat.

In *July* 1664. he produced an Experiment to ſhew the Number of Vibrations of an extended String, made in a determinate Time, requiſite to give a certain Tone or Note; by which it was found, that a Wire making two hundred ſeventy-two Vibrations in one Second of Time, ſounded *G*, *Sol*, *Re*, *Ut*, in the Scale of all Muſic. Other Experiments were made of the Diviſion of a *Monochord*, which I omit.

About this Time many Experiments were made of the Velocity of Bodies ſinking and riſing in Water, in order to aſcertain that Contrivance which was after made public, of ſounding the Seas Depth with a Sounding Ball, which is too well known to inſiſt on it.

At ſeveral Meetings of the Society in 1663 and 4, he produced his *Microſcopical Obſervations*, and read the Explications and Diſcourſes made upon them, which were after publiſhed in his *Micrographia*, at the Beginning of the Year 1665. In which Book, I ſuppoſe, it will hardly be denied, that there are more excellent Philoſophical Diſcoveries and Hints, than in moſt extant of its Bulk: The Book itſelf being well known, I ſhall only obſerve, that there are deſcribed in it ſeveral Sorts of Microſcopes, with the Ways of uſing them. The Baroſcope, Hygroſcope, an Inſtrument to graduate Thermometers, an Engine to grind Optic-glaſſes, an Inſtrument to meaſure the Refraction of Liquors, *&c* I remember Mr. *Marſhall*, when he deſired the Society's Approbation of his new Method of grinding Spectacles, and other Optic-glaſſes, owned, he had the firſt Intimation of it from a Hint of Mr. *Hooke*'s, in this Book, about the poliſhing many very ſmall Microſcope Object-glaſſes at once.

A more particular Account of this Book is extant in the *Philoſophical Tranſactions*, No. 2. p. 29. And to ſhew the Eſteem Foreigners had of it, I ſhall refer the Reader to the Account given of it in the *Journal Des Sçavans* for the Month of *December* 1666. In this the Journaliſt ſpeaks with great Reſpect of the Author, and Eſteem for the Work itſelf, obſerving the vaſt Number of curious Remarks made therein concerning the Improvement of the other Senſes, as well as that of Seeing: Obſervations of Colours and Light, the Moon, Stars, Reflection, Inflection, *&c.* Concluding after (having mentioned ſeveral) that the Book contains more than can be taken Notice of in an Extract.

In the Beginning of *June* 1664, Sir *John Cutler* having intimated his Deſign to ſome Members of the Society, of founding a Mechanic Lecture, with a yearly Gratuity of fifty Pounds, on the 22d of the ſame Month ſeveral Members met to confer about the Manner of ſettling that Lecture; and on the 9th of *November* following it is entered in the Journals to this Purpoſe, " Sir *John Cutler* ha-
" ving founded a Lecture, and ſettled an annual Stipend upon *Robert Hooke*
M. A.

" M. A. of fifty Pounds during Life (entruſting the Preſident, Council and Fel-
" lows of the ſaid Society, to direct and appoint the ſaid Mr. *Hooke* as to the
" Subject and Number of his Lectures) the Society ordered ſeveral of their
" Members to wait upon Sir *John Cutler*, with their Thanks for his particular
" Favour to a worthy Member, and for that Reſpect and Confidence he hath
" hereby expreſſed towards their whole Body, *&c.*"

On the 27th of *June* 1664, it was voted, " That at the firſt Opportunity Mr.
" *Hooke* ſhould be put to the Scrutiny for the Curator's Place by Office. On the
" 23d of *November* following he was propoſed as a ſettled Curator of Experiments;
" and on the 11th of *January* 1664, elected and made Curator by Office for Life,
" with an additional Salary to Sir *John Cutler*'s Annuity."

At this Time he read ſeveral Aſtronomical Lectures, ſome of which are publiſhed in this Volume, and invented many Inſtruments, particularly his Quadrant with a Roller on the Limb; an Inſtrument to meaſure the Velocity of the Wind; and repeated the Experiment of the Vibrations of a Pendule two hundred Feet long. The firſt Propoſal for the Weather Clock was then offered upon the Deſcription of one made by Sir *Chriſtopher Wren*. The Experiment was made and Account given of the Suſpenſion of the Mercury to ſeventy-five Inches in the Tube, which, with ſome Additions, is printed in this Volume. From this Time he brought in, almoſt at every Meeting, Experiments, Obſervations, Schemes of new Inſtruments and Inventions, or ſomething conſiderable to the Advancement of Knowledge; and very frequently read his *Cutlerian Lectures*, of many whereof he publiſhed, the moſt material Parts in his Tracts printed at different Times, in *Quarto*, called *Lectures and Collections*, &c. comprizing compendiouſly, in one continued Diſcourſe, the chief Matters and Subjects handled in ſeveral Lectures.

Thus the generous Ardor with which the *Royal Society* was inſpired, continued till the Year 1665, when, by Reaſon of the great Mortality then reigning, they were obliged to deſiſt, and break up their weekly Meetings, till the 14th of *March* 1665-6, when, upon Summons, they met again. In this Interim the Members retired to ſeveral Places in the Country, and Mr. *Hooke* attended Dr. *Wilkins* and ſome other ingenious Gentlemen into *Surry*, near *Banſtead-downs*, where ſeveral Experiments were made during this Receſs, an Account of which was after brought into the Society.

At ſome of the firſt Meetings, after they came together again, " Mr. *Hooke* pro-
" duced a very ſmall Quadrant for obſerving accurately to Minutes and Seconds, it
" had an Arm moving on it by Means of a Screw lying on the Limb of the
" Quadrant;" this is all the Account I find of it. Poſſibly this was the firſt ever made after that Manner, tho' it is now ſufficiently known and practiſed: A large one of this Sort, and of all its Parts, with the reſt of the Apparatus and Manner of uſing it, is at large publiſhed by the Inventor, *Anno* 1674, in his *Animadverſions on Hevelius's Machina Cæleſtis*, pag. 54. in which Book alſo ſeveral other ingenious Contrivances, Inſtruments and Inventions are mentioned.

" *May* 23, 1666, there was read a Paper of Mr. *Hooke*'s explicating the In- Journal R. S.
" flection of a direct Motion into a Curve, by a ſupervening, attractive Principle,
" which was ordered to be regiſtered. The Diſcourſe contained therein is an In-
" troduction to an Experiment, to ſhew that Circular Motion is compounded of
" an Endeavour by a direct Motion by the Tangent, and of another Endeavour
" tending to the Center: To which Purpoſe there was a Pendulum faſtened to the
" Roof of the Room, with a large Wooden Ball of *Lignum Vitæ* on the End of

" it; and it was found, that if the Impetus of the Endeavour by the Tangent, at " the firſt ſetting out, was ſtronger than the Endeavour to the Center, there was " generated ſuch an Elliptical Motion, whoſe longeſt Diameter was parallel to the " direct Endeavour of the Body at the firſt Impulſe; but if that Impetus were " weaker than that Endeavour to the Center, there was generated ſuch an Elliptical Motion, whoſe ſhorter Diameter was parallel to the direct Endeavour of the " Body in the firſt Point of the Impulſe; if both were equal, there was made a " perfect circular Motion. There was alſo made another Experiment, by faſtening another pendulous Body by a ſhort String on the lower Part of the Wire, by " which the greater Weight was ſuſpended, that it might freely make a circular or " eliptical Motion round the bigger, whilſt the bigger moved circularly or elliptically about the firſt Center. The Intention whereof was to explicate the manner of the " Moon's Motion about the Earth, it appearing evidently thereby, that neither " the bigger Ball, which repreſented the Earth, nor the leſs, which repreſented the " Moon, were moved in ſo perfect a Circle or Ellipſis, as otherwiſe they would " have been, if either of them had been ſuſpended and moved ſingly: But that a " certain Point, which ſeemed to be the Center of Gravity of the two Bodies, " (howſoever poſited and conſidered as one) ſeemed to be regularly moved, in " ſuch a Circle or Ellipſis, the two Balls having other peculiar Motions in ſmall " Epicycles about the ſaid Point."

" *Auguſt* 1ſt, 1666, he read his Obſervations of the Comet in 1664, after printed among his Tracts, and called *Cometa*. The ſame produced a certain Contrivance, to ſhew that the Circular Pendulum was made of two ſtrait Lines " croſſing each other, *&c.*" And about the ſame Time his Inſtrument to take the Diſtance of the Stars from the Moon, the one Object ſeen direct, the other by Reflexion. This is publiſhed in his Book, pag. 503.

The dreadful Conflagration of a great Part of the City of *London*, happening in the Beginning of *September* 1666, brought another great Hindrance to the Society's Proceedings; ſo that they were obliged to remove their uſual Place of Meeting from *Greſham College* to *Arundel-houſe* in the *Strand*, where, by the Favour of the then Duke of *Norfolk*, they proſecuted their former Enquiries; their firſt Meeting at *Arundel-houſe* being on the 9th of *January* 1666-7.

" On the 19th of *September* 1666, he produced a Module he had deſigned for " the rebuilding of the City, with which the Society were very well pleaſed; and " Sir *John Lawrence*, the then late Lord Mayor, addreſſed himſelf to the Society, " expreſſing the preſent Lord Mayor's and Aldermen's liking thereof, as alſo their " Deſire that it might be ſhewn to his Majeſty, they preferring it far before the " Model drawn up by the City Surveyor."

What this Model was I cannot ſo well determine; but I have heard, that it was deſigned in it to have all the chief Streets, as from *Leadenhall* Corner to *Newgate*, and the like, to lie in an exact ſtrait Line, and all the other croſs Streets turning out of them at right Angles, all the Churches, public Buildings, Market-places, and the like, in proper and convenient Places; which, no doubt, would have added much to the Beauty and Symmetry of the Whole. How this came not to be accepted of, I know not; but 'tis probable this might contribute not a little to his being taken Notice of by the Magiſtrates of the City, and ſoon after made Surveyor.

The rebuilding of the City, according to the Act of Parliament requiring an able Perſon to ſet out the Ground to the ſeveral Proprietors, Mr. *Hooke* was pitched upon, and appointed City Surveyor for that difficult Work, which being very

very great, took up a large Proportion of his Time, to the no ſmall Hindrance of his Philoſophical Diſquiſitions.

In this Employment he got the moſt Part of that Eſtate he died poſſeſſed of, as was evident by a large Iron Cheſt of Money found after his Death, which had been locked down with a Key in it, with a Date of the Time, by which it appeared to have been ſo ſhut up for above thirty Years: In this was contained the greateſt Part of what he left behind him, which was to the Value of many Thouſands in Gold in Silver. That he might by this Place juſtly acquire a conſiderable Eſtate, I think cannot be denied, every particular Perſon after the Fire being in Haſte to have his Concerns expedited; ſo that, as I have been informed, he had no Reſt early and late from Perſons ſoliciting to have their Grounds ſet out, which, without any Fraud or Injuſtice, deſerved a due Recompence in ſo fatiguing an Employ.

October 31, 1666, he ſhewed his inclining Pendulum, with the Uſes thereof, to regulate the Motions of a Clock as exactly as a long one.

On the 9th of *January* 1666-7, he was ordered to proſecute his Obſervations of the Earth's *Paralax*, formerly by him propoſed: A large Account of the Reſult of his Obſervations therein were after printed, in his *Attempt to prove the Motion of the Earth* 1674, being the firſt of his *Cutlerian Lectures* publiſhed.

On the 6th of *February* following, he produced his new *Lamp*; contrived ſo as to ſupply the Oyl in equal Quantity as it waſtes, that it may never riſe too much or too little; the farther Deſcription and Explication of which, with many curious Remarks, were publiſhed 1677, and intitled *Lampas*, or *Deſcriptions of ſome Improvements of Lamps and Water-poiſes*, &c.

February the 28th, he firſt produced his *Reflecting Teleſcope*, which is deſcribed with the Reaſon of the Principle, with ſome other Inſtruments, in his *Treatiſe of Helioſcopes*, printed 1676.

On the 17th of *June* 1667, and afterwards, he read large Diſcourſes of the Cauſes, Powers and Effects of *Earthquakes*, affirming the great Hills and Mountains in the World to have been raiſed by them: of which Subject he at ſeveral Times afterwards made very many Diſcourſes and Lectures, the moſt Part of which are collected together in this Volume, beginning at Page 279.

In *July* 1667, he tried ſeveral Experiments upon himſelf in an *exhauſted Receiver*, big enough to contain a Man; I think the only Experiment of that Kind ever tried.

At this Time he contrived a *Micrometer*, of leſs Charge and Difficulty than that invented by Mr. *Gaſcoin* with Screws.

December 26th, 1667, he brought in a farther Deſcription of a *Sea Barometer*.

January the 16th, 1667-8, he produced "his new Contrivance of promoting "the Vibrations of Pendules, ſo as to prevent all Checks; which he affirmed had "not been provided againſt by any Contrivance to that Time.

April 9th, 1668, he produced two Inſtruments to promote the Senſe of Hearing.

May the 14th, he ſhewed an Experiment of the Penetration of Liquors in Oyl of Vitriol and fair Water.

About this Time he produced many other Experiments and Inventions, which I omit; and ſhall only obſerve, that there being ſeveral Diſcourſes about the meaſuring

meaſuring of a Degree of the Earth, he propoſed divers Methods of performing it, and invented ſeveral Inſtruments; and, as is entered in the Journal, *October* 28, 1669. Mr. *Hooke* was of Opinion, *That one of the exacteſt Ways of meaſuring, was by making accurate Obſervations of the Heavens to a Second, by a perpendicular Tube, and then to take exact Diſtances by Angles to a Second alſo*; which I take to be the Method obſerved by the *French* not long after, as may be ſeen by a particular Treatiſe of it publiſhed by Monſieur *Picart*, as likewiſe by what *Duhamel* ſays in his Hiſtory of that Society, *p.* 98. to which the Curious are referred. I find alſo, by ſome Notices and looſe Papers of our Curator, that he invented a Sort of travelling Caleſh for this Purpoſe, which ſhould deſcribe upon a Paper, not only the menſuration of the Way gone over, but the ſeveral Aſcents and Deſcents, together with the Turnings and Windings of the Caleſh, or the Points of the Compaſs upon which the Perſon travelled, with other Contrivances, which, I know not by what Misfortune, were never put in Practice. There were alſo other Methods for meaſuring a Degree, propoſed to be made in St. *James*'s Park on the Canal, which alſo had the like Fate of not being proſecuted.

In *January* 1669-70, he firſt propoſed a Drop of Mercury for an univerſal Standard; and in *April* ſhewed an Experiment with a Solution of Copper, to repreſent the Appearance of Clouds and other aerial Meteors, by dropping into it ſeveral Salts, *&c.* And at the ſame Time ſhewed the Uſe of introducing the Species into a dark Room for Painting, and contrived a Box for that Purpoſe, which is here printed.

In *March* 1671, "he ſhewed ſeveral Experiments to explain the Nature and "Cauſe of *Gravity*: Particularly on the 9th. an Experiment was made, in which "ſome Flour put into a void, ſhallow Glaſs, with a large ſloping Brim and a "pretty tall Foot, was made to riſe and run over like a Fluid, by the knocking "on the Edge of the Glaſs, and alſo by the forceably moving of one's Finger "round the Edge of the ſame. Leaden Bullets alſo being put into this Glaſs, "did, by knocking, move it like a Fluid.—This was propoſed to conſider what "might be the Cauſe of Gravity, and ſuggeſt an Hypotheſis to explicate the Mo-"tion of Gravity by, *&c.*"

Theſe, and ſeveral other Experiments, he ſhewed to explain Natural Bodies and Actions; in ſome of which I have been the more particular, out of a Hope theſe Hints may excite ſome inquiſitive Perſon to proceed farther in ſuch Enquiries.

This ſame Year ſeveral Diſcourſes and Papers paſſed between the learned Mr. *Newton* and Mr. *Hooke*, concerning a new Theory of Light and Colours, which being now ſo generally known, I ſhall not farther inſiſt on it.

About this Time he made a Propoſition for perfecting all Sorts of Optic-glaſſes, the Secret of which was delivered in an Anagram to the Preſident, my Lord *Brouncker*.

The Diſpute with Hevelius.

Not long after this Time began that unhappy Diſpute between Monſieur *Hevelius* and *Hooke*, concerning the Preference of Plain and Teleſcopical Sights for Aſtronomical Inſtruments, which, as I can collect, was thus occaſioned. Mr. *Hooke*, by means of Mr. *Oldenburgh*, had recommended to Monſieur *Hevelius* the Application of Teleſcopic Sights, to his exquiſitively contrived and elaborated Inſtruments, affirming, that by them an Angle might be taken to a much greater Niceneſs than with plain Sights; and gave them a ſhort, but, as he thought, a ſufficient Information of the manner of applying them to the Inſtrument, and intimated,

timated, that if any Thing required a farther Explication, he was ready to give it. Nevertheleſs *Hevelius* could not be prevailed with to make Uſe of them; whether he thought himſelf too experienced to be informed by a young Aſtronomer, as he reckoned *Hooke*; or whether having made ſo many Obſervations with plain Sights, he was unwilling to alter his Method, leſt he might bring their Exactneſs into Queſtion; or whether being, by long Practice, accuſtomed to the Uſe of them, and not thoroughly apprehending the Uſe of the other, nor well underſtanding the Difference, as Mr. *Molineux* has obſerved in his *Optics*, is indeed uncertain.

Not long after came out his curious and pompous Book of the firſt Part of his *Machina Cæleſtis*; and *Hooke* took Occaſion, in his *Cutlerian Lectures*, to read ſeveral Diſcourſes upon that Book, and the Inſtruments therein deſcribed, which were printed *Anno* 1674. under the Title of *Animadverſions upon Hevelius's Machina Cæleſtis.*

In which Treatiſe, vindicating ſomewhat warmly the Benefit of Teleſcopic Sights and their Preference, he chanced to let ſlip ſome Expreſſions, which, tho' poſſibly ſtrictly true, could yet never be digeſted by *Hevelius.*

Several Years after, *Hevelius* publiſhed his *Annus Climactericus*, which again revived the Diſpute, and cauſed ſeveral learned Men to intereſt themſelves in the Controverſy. This, I think, is the true Hiſtory of the Matter. I ſhall here ſubjoin what *Hooke* wrote himſelf, in Anſwer to what ſome Perſons thought fit to write upon this Subject, as I found them drawn up by himſelf, in a Paper or two among his Manuſcripts: For the better underſtanding of which, I ſhall obſerve, *Firſt*, That *Hevelius* having ſent his *Annus Climactericus* to the *Royal Society*, Dr. *Wallis* was deſired to give an Account of it, which is printed in the *Philoſophical Tranſactions*, No. 175. p. 1162. in which the Doctor having uſed ſome Expreſſions which *Hooke* thought reflected too ſeverely upon him, and Mr. *Molineux* not long after ſending a Letter to the ſame Purpoſe, he wrote his own Vindication almoſt *verbatim*, as I have here printed it, at leaſt nothing material is omitted or added.

" There having been lately read, in a Meeting of this honourable Society, a " Letter from Mr. *Molineux*, containing ſeveral Reflections that concerned me, " which, without ſome ſatisfactory Anſwer, muſt needs make me ſuffer in the " Opinion of thoſe who have not truly underſtood the Matter in Controverſy; " and the high Eſteem I have of the Juſtice and Judgment of this illuſtrious " Company, perſuades me the rather to make my Defence here.

" The Objections in the Letter were theſe.

" That if it be true which has been aſſerted, not only by ſome celebrated Aſ- " tronomers, but chiefly by Mr. *Hooke* in his *Animadverſions*, &c. the Endeavours " of *Hevelius* will be fruſtrated, and his vaſt Charges to no more Purpoſe than " *Tycho*'s, and all his ſplendid *Apparatus* but meer Lumber; for upon this Queſ- " tion as to Plain Sights, the Price of his Aſtronomical Labours of his whole " Life depends; but ſurely this were an Event highly deplorable, not only " to the Party himſelf immediately concerned, but the whole *Reſpublica Lite-* " *raria.*

" *Secondly*, Mention is made of the Slightneſs and Smallneſs of what I had pub- " liſhed, which was only a Pamphlet that aſſerted, that notwithſtanding all this, " yet merely for want of Teleſcopic Sights, and ſome new kind of invented Di- " viſions on Mr. *Hevelius*'s Inſtruments, I went ſo far as to doubt whether his " Obſervations could be true, and always the ſame to two or three Minutes; and

" that

" that the whole Import of it, beſides this, was nothing but the Deſcription of " an Inſtrument which he never heard was put in Practice.

" The *third* Objection againſt me is, That tho' Monſieur *Hevelius* had earneſt- " ly requeſted from me, or any one elſe that had Teleſcopic Inſtruments, to " ſend him ſome Diſtances of fixed Stars obſerved by them, yet he could never " be ſo happy as to obtain any from me, tho' afterwards he did from ſome " others, *&c.*

" Theſe, and ſome other Diſcourſes, ſpread abroad tacitly, inſinuate, that the " publiſhing thoſe *Animadverſions* was a very ill Action, and that the Learned in " general have received a great Prejudice thereby; it concerns me therefore to " clear myſelf of this Imputation: For Anſwer then I ſay,

" *Firſt*, If what I have publiſhed in thoſe *Animadverſions* be true and certain, then " I deſire to know whether it were better for the *Reſpublica Literaria* to be ac- " quainted with it, or to remain poſſeſſed with the Belief of ſome Aſſertions of " Monſieur *Hevelius*, which are really Miſtakes (not to ſay worſe) tho' poſſibly " till that Time, wherein I publiſhed them, they were generally believed to be " Truths, as he has taken a great deal of Pains to induce a Belief of, in the " firſt Part of his *Machina Cæleſtis*, from Page 293 to Page 300; which I the " rather mention, becauſe ſome Perſons have thought and aſſerted, that I " was the firſt Aggreſſor in Print, the contrary of which thoſe ſix Pages " evince.

" *Secondly*, Whether thoſe deplorable Events of leſſening the Price of Mon- " ſieur *Hevelius*'s Works, if that were true, when put into the Ballance, will " out-weigh the detecting a Miſtake, or Diſcovery of a Truth, in a Matter of " ſo great moment in Natural Philoſophy, as concerns the moſt conſiderable " Parts of Knowledge in the Theory of the Univerſe, eſpecially of Celeſtial Bo- " dies; for if Truth be that which is moſt prevalent with all Philoſophical Spi- " rits, againſt any particular Intereſt, then I hope I ſhall prove I have not of- " fended in that Particular, in my Publication of thoſe *Animadverſions*. And " *Hevelius* himſelf was of the ſame Mind, when, at the ſixty-firſt Page of his " Preface, he writes (ſpeaking of his diſparaging ſome Things of *Tycho Brahe*) " *In hoc negotio ſemper in cujuſvis animo hærere debet. Amicus Plato, Amicus Arif-* " *toteles, ſed magis tamen amica veritas.* Nor do I find him ſo ſhy in proclaiming " the Miſtakes of *Tycho*'s Obſervations, when it made for his own Reputation; " for in the thirty-fourth Page of his Preface he ſays, *That the greateſt Part of* " Tycho's *Obſervations differed from his own four, five, ſix, and even ten Minutes.* " At the thirty-ninth Page he ſays, *That of* 780 *in* Tycho's *Catalogue, there are* " *but* 260 *which differ, not leſs than two Minutes; but all the reſt differ* 3′, 5′, 10′, " 20′, 30′, 40′, 45′, 50′, *nay a whole Degree from the Truth, and that fifteen dif-* " *fer above a Degree, and ſome many more, even to eight Degrees in Longitude, and* " *in Latitude to thirteen whole Degrees, ſometimes in Defect, ſometimes in Exceſs*; " yet, for all this, *Hevelius* would be thought highly to value *Tycho Brahe*, and " not to have made any Reflections upon him.

" Nor has the detecting Miſtakes, even in Perſons of as great Fame, been " looked upon ſo ill a Thing, but rather a meritorious Action, as might be " inſtanced in Dr. *Pell*'s ſhort Anſwer, in a Quarter of a Sheet of Paper, to *Lon-* " *gomontanus*'s Work, which had been the Buſineſs of thirty Years. Another " Inſtance may be of *Phocilides* upon *Lanſbergius*, the learned *Savilian* Aſtrono- " mic Profeſſor, againſt *Bulialdus*, &c. all which Authors were well eſteemed " for their detecting Miſtakes, and diſcovering Truth. And as for any diſre-

" ſpectful

" ſpectful or undervaluing Sentiments I had of *Hevelius* or his Performances, I " hope what I have printed in my *Animadverſions* will prevail with the Unpreju- " diced to believe the contrary; where I ſay, *That I would not be underſtood by* " *theſe Animadverſions to undervalue the Works and Performances of a Perſon ſo high-* " *ly meriting the Thanks of the Learned World, for his great Expence and vaſt Pains,* " *in performing a Work ſo highly uſeful to Aſtronomy and Navigation, that I did not* " *in the leaſt doubt but that it would be a Work of perpetual Eſteem, and much pre-* " *ferrable to any Thing of the like Kind yet done in the World; and that he had gone* " *as far as was poſſible for human Induſtry to go with Inſtruments of that Kind,* " *which were as compleat and exact as Inſtruments with plain Sights could be made;* " *and that he had calculated with all imaginable Care and Skill, and delivered them* " *with the like Candor and Integrity: But yet that it was my Opinion, that this ought* " *not to diſcourage others from making Uſe of Teleſcope Sights, and to make better* " *Obſervations with Inſtruments by that Means more exact.*

" This I hope may apologize for my writing thoſe *Animadverſions.*

" But, in the next Place, I muſt make ſome Defence for what is ſaid in them. " This Gentleman ſays, *I went ſo far as to doubt whether* Hevelius's *Obſervations* " *could be made true, and always the ſame to two or three Minutes.* I wiſh the " Place had been quoted where I ſaid ſo, ſince I only ſaid, *that I believed it im-* " *poſſible for any one to diſtinguiſh with common Sights, any Diſtance in the Heavens to* " *leſs than half a Minute, and very few to a Minute; and I am apt to believe there* " *may be ſome Inſtances, even in* Hevelius's *Catalogue, that will verify this Aſ-* " *ſertion.*

" And for any other Aſſertion, which is *really mine* in that Treatiſe, I do not " doubt of ſatisfying any unprejudiced Perſon by Experiment, if deſired, which " I ſay is *really my Aſſertion*; for, by Miſtake or otherwiſe, ſome Things have been " fathered upon me I never ſaid, *viz. That* I ſhould aſſert, *an Inſtrument of a Span* " *Radius might be made, that ſhould perform Obſervations ſixty times more accurate* " *than could be done with his beſt Inſtruments:* Which Aſſertion is none of mine; " and whoever have ſpread theſe Falſities, might have found better Employ- " ment. I ſay, indeed, that a very ſmall Inſtrument, curiouſly made, exactly " divided and inſtructed with Teleſcope-ſights, will perform much better in all " Obſervations (except of the Sun) than the largeſt Inſtrument without ſuch " Sights, for the Reaſon before alledged from the Defect in our Eyes, which " cannot diſtinguiſh an Angle leſs than half a Minute; nor is this a Defect in my " own Eyes only (as *Hevelius* ſomewhere ſeems to hint) for the Experiment may " eaſily be tried with the beſt Eyes.

" Nor is it any Diſparagement to *Hevelius*'s Obſervations to compare them " with *Tycho Brahe*'s, tho' I ſhould have ſuppoſed them but of equal Value, ſince " the mere repeating of his Obſervations would be of great Uſe in Aſtronomy, " theſe being almoſt one hundred Years after his; for we muſt, by ſuch Compa- " riſons, judge of many conſiderable Enquiries concerning Celeſtial Bodies, " which cannot by other Means be ſo well detected; for which I refer to " the ſeventy-ſixth Page of my *Animadverſions*, *viz.* to know whether thoſe Ce- " leſtial Bodies, which are ſuppoſed ſo fixed, do not vary their Poſitions to " each other, and alſo their Magnitudes, which I had good Grounds to be- " lieve.

" As to the Objection, that my Pamphlet contained *little beſides the Deſcrip-* " *tion of an Inſtrument never put in Practice*, I conceive there may be ſeveral " Miſtakes; for I am of Opinion, upon Peruſal, there will be ſomewhat elſe in

" that Treatiſe worth Conſideration. Next, that there have been Inſtruments " made, perfected and uſed after that Way, by Sir *Jonas More*, by Mr. *Gregory* " in *Scotland*, by Mr. *Halley*, and many others; and I believe very few Aſtrono- " mical Inſtruments ſince have been made with plain Sights; and if the multi- " tude of Authorities were neceſſary, I could produce *Auzout*, *Picart*, *Mariot*, " *Romer*, *De la Hire*, *Montanari*, *Gotignies*, and others; not to name thoſe of " our own Nation.

" As to my not returning the Obſervations of certain Diſtances of Stars, which " *Hevelius* deſired, it is ſufficiently known what Inconveniencies we lay under in " this Place after the Fire of *London*; and had I found Conveniencies, yet the " unkind Reception thoſe Things found which I ſent him, was enough to deter " me from ſuch a Compliance; tho' he was ſenſible how I had often been ready " to gratify his Curioſity in many other Particulars. But when his *Machina Cæ-* " *leſtis* was publiſhed, I was obliged to write thoſe *Animadverſions*, in which, I " hope, all unprejudiced Readers will juſtify my Procedure; at leaſt, I am ready " to prove any Thing I have therein aſſerted."

I have been the larger in the Account of this Controverſy, that the intelligent Reader may make the better Judgment thereof, it being the moſt conſiderable he ever had with any Perſon, and ſhall wave the giving my Opinion of it.

In 1674. he ſhewed an Engine or Inſtrument to perform any arithmetical Operation: But the more particular Account of this and other Inſtruments, not deſcribed in this Volume, I ſhall reſerve for another Opportunity.

About the latter End of the ſame Year the *Royal Society* kept their weekly Meeting at *Greſham* College again; and on the 15th of *January* following he ſhewed a Way to determine how ſmall an Angle an unaſſiſted Eye is able to diſcern, by which it was found, that none of the Perſons Eyes preſent could obſerve a much leſs Angle than of a Minute; for a more ample Account of which the Reader is referred to the eighth Page of his *Animadverſions*.

From this Time many magnetical Experiments were made by him; and on the 19th of *March* he propoſed a Theory of the Variation, the Subſtance of which was this; " That the Magnet hath its peculiar Poles, diſtant ten Degrees from " the Poles of the Earth about which they move, ſo as to make a Revolution in " three hundred and ſeventy Years, whence the Variation hath altered of late a- " bout ten or eleven Minutes every Year, and will probably continue ſo to do for " ſome Time, till it begins to grow ſlower and ſlower, and will at length be ſta- " tionary and retrograde, and in Probability may return; but whether it will be " ſo or not Time muſt ſhew. At the ſame Time he propoſed the making of a " very eaſy and nice Inſtrument, to obſerve the Variation of the Variations of " the Needle in different Parts of the World."

What this Inſtrument was is not eaſy now to be determined; but the Reader will find the Figure of an Inſtrument ſomething to this Purpoſe at Page 486.

On the 4th of *February* 1674-5, ſeveral Obſervations and Diſcourſes having been made about the Structure of the Muſcles of Animals, Mr. *Hooke* ſaid, " That his Obſervation was, that the fleſhy Part of a Muſcle conſiſted of an in- " finite Number of exceeding ſmall, round Pipes, extended between the two " Tendons of the Muſcles, and ſeemed to end in them. Which Tendons, in " the Muſcles of Beef boiled, would be eaſily ſtript off from thoſe Pipes, and ſo " leave the round Ends of thoſe Pipes very diſtinct and viſible. He ſaid, that " the Reaſon of the moving of a Muſcle might be from the filling or emptying

of

" of thoſe Pipes, whoſe Sides ſeemed to be flexible like thoſe of a Gut. He inti-
" mated alſo, that he knew a Way of making ſuccedaneous Muſcles for a Man,
" to ſupply the Defect of his Muſcles for flying, and give one Man the Strength
" of ten or twenty, if required.

" *March* the 18th 1674-5. he made an Experiment of a new Property of Light,
" having before read ſome Diſcourſes upon that Subject." This Experiment is to be ſeen Page 186 of this Book, to which the Reader is referred for a more full Account.

Mr. *Oldenburgh*, the then Secretary, dying in the Time of the Society's Receſs, 1677. Mr. *Hooke* was deſired to take his Place, and take the Minutes of what conſiderable Matters paſſed, which he did on the 25th of *October* 1677. and the ſame Day produced his Water-poiſe, and ſhewed the Nicety thereof. The Deſcription of this is in the *Philoſoph. Tranſact.* No. 197. p. 623. There were afterwards ſome other Hydroſtatical Inſtruments produced, as likewiſe many Improvements of the double and ſingle Microſcopes, with the Uſe of ſmall Glaſs Canes and other Contrivances, by which he verified Monſieur *Leuenhook*'s Obſervations: Theſe, with ſeveral others, I omit, they not being ſo intelligible without Schemes.

From that Time he officiated in that Place, as well as his Curatorſhip, ſhewing ſeveral Experiments and Inſtruments, in order to explain the Gravitation and Alterations in the Air by Vapours, *&c.* Contriving an Air-poiſe, to ſhew the different ſpecific Gravity of the Air, by a large, thin Ball of Glaſs counterpoiſed.

In *February* 1677-8. upon an Account of Monſieur *Gallet*'s Obſervation of the oval Figure of *Mercury* in the Sun, he gave ſeveral Reaſons for the prolated oval Figure of the Planets, ſome of which are printed in this Volume, Page 355. with a Demonſtration thereof, and ſaid, " That all Fluids on the Surface would
" run into that Shape; and that it was not improbable but that the Water here
" about the Earth might do ſo by the Influence of the diurnal Motion of the
" Earth, which compounded with that of the Moon, he conceived, was the
" Cauſe of the Tides."

From this Time he made microſcopal Obſervations on *Animalcules* in Pepper-water, and other Seeds ſteeped in Water, confirming Monſieur *Leuenhook*'s Aſſertions, and propoſed ſome Improvements of Microſcopes.

Some Propoſals were made by him of Inſtruments more accurate than thoſe formerly invented for ſounding the Seas Depth, bringing up Water, or other Subſtances from the Bottom, or any aſſigned Depth, which were ſome Years after more perfected.

April 25, 1678. he ſhewed an Experiment farther to explain the Action of a Muſcle, " which was by a Chain of ſmall Bladders faſtened together, ſo as by
" blowing into one Pipe, the Whole might be ſucceſſively filled, and by that
" means contracted, ſuppoſing the Fibres of the Muſcles, which ſeemed like a
" Necklace of Pearl in the Microſcope, might be filled with a very agil Matter,
" which he thought moſt likely to be Air, which being included in ſo thin Skins,
" was eaſily wrought upon by Heat, Cold, or the acting Properties of the Li-
" quors that paſs between them, and ſo perform the lengthening and contracting
" of the Muſcles."

Auguſt 1678. he read ſeveral Diſcourſes, and ſhewed Experiments in order to confirm his Theory of Springs and ſpringy Bodies, which are publiſhed in his Treatiſe *De Potentia reſtitutiva* the ſame Year; the Sum of which Hypotheſis is

comprized in a Cypher at the End of his Deſcription of Helioſcopes, being the third of a Decimate of Inventions which he there mentions he was Maſter of, ſome of which he diſcovered himſelf, affirming he had a Century of the like uſeful Inventions: Others of them I have had the Luck to find out, which I ſhall take this Opportunity of mentioning. I ſhall firſt tranſcribe what he ſays of them, and then add the decyphering of them.

The ſecond Invention, which is the firſt Cypher, is thus worded.

" The true mathematical and mechanical Form of all manner of Arches for " building, with the true Butment neceſſary to each of them; a Problem which " no Architectonic Writer hath ever yet attempted, much leſs performed. " ab, cec, dd, eeeee, f, gg, iiiiiiii, ll, mmmm, nnnnn, oo, p, rr, sss, ttttt, " uuuuuuuu, x, which decyphered is theſe Words, *Ut pendet continuum, flexile, ſic ſtabit contiguum rigidum inverſum*, which is the *Linea Catenaria*."

The third is his Theory of Springineſs, in theſe Letters, ce, iii, no, sss, tt, uu, which is, *Ut tenſio ſic vis*. This is the Principle of his Theory of Springs.

" The ninth, which is the next Cypher, is concerning a new Sort of Philoſo- " phical Scales, of great Uſe in Experimental Philoſophy, cde, ii, nn, oo, p, sss, " tt, uu, *Ut Pondus ſic Tenſio*."

The laſt is mentioned as a very extraordinary Invention in Mechanics, above the Chimeras of perpetual Motions for ſeveral Uſes, aa, æ, b, cc, dd, eeeeee, g, iii, l, mmm, nn, oo, pp, q, rrrr, s, ttt, uuuuu, *Pondere præmit aer vacuum quod ab igne relictum eſt*. This is one of the Principles upon which Mr. *Savery*'s late invented Engine for raiſing Water is founded. *See* Lexicon Technicum, *under* Engine.

On the 29th of *Auguſt* 1678. his Grace the Duke of *Norfolk* having given the *Arundelian* Library to the *Royal Society*, Mr. *Hooke* was ordered to be aſſiſtant in making a Catalogue thereof, and removing it to *Greſham* College.

In the Beginning of the Year 1679. and afterwards, ſeveral Experiments were repeated, to examine the Uſe of the Air in Reſpiration, by including Animals in common rarified and condenſed Air, as likewiſe concerning the Neceſſity of the Air to maintain Fire, to illuſtrate his Theory of Fire farther, *viz.* " That Air is " a *Menſtruum* that diſſolves all ſulphureous Bodies by burning; and that without " Air no ſuch Diſſolution will follow, tho' the Heat applied be never ſo great; " which was tried particularly by a Charcoal encloſed in an Iron Caſe with a " Screw-ſtopper, which, tho' violently heated, yet the Coal was not burnt nor " waſted when taken out."

Some Experiments were made to explain the different Gravitation of the Air, and to ſhew that Vapours preſs only according to their own Gravity, and not according to the Space they take up in the Atmoſphere.

Some Contrivances were ſhewn by him to be added to the Weather-clock, as a Hygroſcope, a Contrivance to meaſure the Quantity of Rain, Snow or Hail fallen in a certain Time; which Engine was ſoon after perfected in all its Parts, and ſet up in the Repoſitory.

In *July* 1679. he read a Diſcourſe concerning a Way to help ſhort-ſighted Perſons, which he called *Myopibus Juvamen*; this is printed in his third Collection, p. 59. " At the ſame Time he gave his Thoughts of the Reaſon of the different " apparent Magnitude of the Sun and Moon in the Meridian and near the Hori- " zon; which he ſuppoſed to be a Deception of the Eye, as judging them when " near the Horizon, to be farther off than when nearer the Zenith, for that he " ſaid the Diameters meaſured were really the ſame in both Places, or rather

" ſomething

" ſomething leſs in the Horizon than in the Zenith, being removed a Semidia-
" meter of the Earth farther off."

Experiments were made by him of the Mixtures of Metals, particularly of Copper and Tin, in which there was obſerved a real Penetration, the *Compoſitum* being ſpecifically heavier than either of the Metals before Mixture; for whereas Copper is to Water as $8\frac{1}{2}$ to 1, and Tin to Water as $7\frac{17}{30}$ to 1, the *Compoſitum* was to Water as $8\frac{3}{4}$ to 1.

" In *December*, the ſame Year, an Experiment being ſuggeſted, to try whether
" the Earth moved with a diurnal Motion or not, by the fall of a Body from a
" conſiderable Height, alledging, it would fall to the Eaſt of true Perpendicu-
" lar: Mr. *Hooke* read a Diſcourſe upon that Subject, wherein he explained what
" the Line deſcribed by a falling Body muſt be, ſuppoſed to be moved circular-
" ly by the diurnal Motion of the Earth, and perpendicularly by the Power of
" Gravity; and ſhewed it would not be a Spiral Line, but an Eccentrical-el-
" liptoeid, ſuppoſing no Reſiſtance in the *Medium*; but ſuppoſing a Reſiſtance,
" it would be an Eccentric-ellipti-ſpiral, which, after many Revolutions, would
" reſt in the Center at laſt; that the fall of the Body would not be directly Eaſt,
" but to the South-eaſt, and more to the South than the Eaſt. This was tried,
" in which the Ball was ſtill found to fall to the South-eaſt."

The Remainder of this Year was ſpent in making Experiments of the mixture of ſeveral Metals; among the reſt, Mr. *Hooke* took Notice, in the mixture of Copper and Tin, of ſeveral Particulars, as, *Firſt*, " That the Colour of the
" Copper was quite deſtroyed, it appearing much of the Colour of Iron poliſh'd.
" *Secondly*, That the Compoſition, tho' made of two very malleable Metals, was
" yet very brittle and friable. *Thirdly*, That it bore a pretty good Poliſh and
" Reflexion. *Fourthly*, That tho' Copper is exceeding hard to be melted, yet
" the Mixture melted very eaſily. *Fifthly*, That viewing the poliſhed Surface
" with a Microſcope, he found it very full of ſmall Holes, or Blobs, in the
" Metal."

In *April* 1680. he produced a new invented Level.

In *May* he read a Paper of Obſervations upon an unuſual Sort of Hail-ſtones that fell on the 18th, the Sum of which was to this Purpoſe. About ten o'Clock in the Morning it grew very dark and thundered much, and near to the S. E. when ſoon after the Hail fell from the Size of Piſtol-bullets to the Bigneſs of Pullets Eggs; the ſmaller were white like Chalk, and pretty round, the larger conical or oval; upon breaking them they were found to be made of ſeveral Orbs, encompaſſing one another: Several had a white Center, or *Nucleus*, in the middle, which in others was more towards one Side; they that exceeded in Bigneſs were made by an additional Accretion of tranſparent Icecles, radiating from the white Ball in the middle; ſome of theſe ſtood in diſtinct tranſparent Rays, in others the Interſtices were filled up between the Rays with a white, opaque Concretion: The lower Part of theſe Stones were more flat, and like a Turnip, the Radiations appearing more towards the upper Side; the Sides and Top were more rough, and the Ends of the Stiriæ were prominent. Before they fell, a great Noiſe was heard in the Sky: From the manner of their Figure, Mr. *Hooke* conceived their Accretion was made by a Congelation of Water as they fell, that the Globe in the middle, about the Bigneſs of a Pea, was the firſt Drop that concreted into Hail, the Coats being added to it as it paſt through the watry Clouds, of which ſome were white, ſome pellucid, according to the different coldneſs of the Regions they paſt through.

July

July 8th, 1680. upon a Debate concerning the Experiment of my Lord *Bacon*'s of the internal motion of Bodies, Mr. *Hooke* related, "That he had obſerved that the motion of the Glaſs, filled with Water, was obſerved to be vibrative, perpendicular to the Surface of the Glaſs, and that the Circular Figure changed into an Oval, one way, and that the Reciprocation preſently changed it into an Oval the other way, which he diſcovered by the Motion of the Undulation or riſing of the Water in the Glaſs, which was obſerved to be in four Places of the Surface in a ſquare Poſture, the ſame Glaſs being ſtruck on the Edge with a Viol-bow, this ſquare Undulation was very plain, and there was alſo diſcovered another Undulation, by which the Water was obſerved to riſe in ſix Places like an Hexagon, and upon farther Trials alſo in eight Places like an Octagon; each of theſe gave their particular and diſtinct Sounds or Notes, the Four and Eight were Octaves, and the Six and Four were Fifths, *&c.*"

In *November* 1680. he read ſome Obſervations he had made of a *Comet* then appearing, which, with other Obſervations and Diſcourſes of other Comets, are publiſhed in this Volume under that Title, beginning at Page 194.

And about this Time Mr. *Hooke* ſhewed a Contrivance by a *Statera*, to examine the attractive Power of the Magnet at ſeveral Diſtances, and made many Experiments therewith.

In *April* 1681. and afterwards, he read his Lectures of *Light* and *Luminous Bodies*, which are here collected together, and begin at Page 71.

In *July*, the ſame Year, he ſhewed a Way of making *Muſical and other Sounds*, by the ſtriking of the Teeth of ſeveral Braſs Wheels, proportionally cut as to their Numbers, and turned very faſt round: in which it was obſervable, that the equal or proportional Strokes of the Teeth, that is, 2 to 1, 4 to 3, *&c.* made the muſical Notes, but the unequal Strokes of the Teeth more anſwered the Sound of the Voice in ſpeaking.

November following he mentioned a new Sea-quadrant for making Obſervations more accurate than could be done by any Inſtrument yet known; this is what the Reader will find towards the End of this Volume. At the ſame Time he firſt mentioned his new Compaſſes for deſcribing all Sorts of Spirals, as likewiſe of the Rhumb Lines, which Inſtrument I alſo have endeavoured to retrieve from being loſt.

Soon after this he ſhewed and demonſtrated a very expeditious Way of drawing the Rhumb Lines exactly true upon a Globe, by an Inſtrument grounded upon the ſame Principle with the other. He ſhewed alſo a very eaſy Way of finding all the poſſible *Foci* of Rays refracted by a *Plano-ſpherical Lens*, whereof the Convex Side was turned toward the *Focus*, as alſo the Quantity of Rays that would paſs thro' ſuch a Glaſs, whoſe Convexity was of the full Bigneſs of a Hemiſphere.

"In *January* 1681-2. he ſhewed an Inſtrument to deſcribe all Sorts of *Helixes* upon a Cone, by which he affirmed to be able to divide any given Length, tho' very ſhort, into almoſt any aſſignable Number of given Parts, as ſuppoſe an Inch, into 100000 equal Parts: This he conceived very uſeful for perfecting aſtronomical and geographical Inſtruments. And at the next Meeting he produced another Inſtrument, by which he deſcribed a certain Curve Line, which may be called an *Inverted Parabola*, or *Parabolical Hyperbola*, having theſe Properties, that it is infinite both Ways, and hath two *Aſymptotes* as an *Hyperbola*, &c. A third Inſtrument was alſo ſhewed, for exactly deſcribing the *Spiral*

"of

" of *Archimedes* by a new Propriety thereof, and that as eaſily and truly as a " Circle; whereby not only any given Arch might be divided into any Num- " ber of equal Parts, but a ſtrait Line given equal to the Circumference of a " Circle.

" *March* the 1ſt. he ſhewed a Way, by the ſame Inſtrument, of deſcribing all " Varieties of Ellipſes."

In the ſame Year he read the Remainder of his Diſcourſes of *Light*, which are in the following Volume printed, and particularly that Lecture explicating the Memory, and how we come by the Notion of Time.

From this Time, or rather ſomething before, he began to be more reſerved than he had been formerly, ſo that altho' he often made Experiments, and ſhewed new Inſtruments and Inventions, and read his *Cutlerian Lectures*, yet he ſeldom left any full Account of them to be entered, deſigning, as he ſaid, to fit them himſelf for the Preſs, and then make them public, which he never performed. This is the Reaſon that I am obliged to be the ſhorter in the remaining Part of his Life; and ſhall only touch upon ſome few of his Performances, ſince the bare naming of them, or mentioning their Titles, will but create an uneaſy Curioſity in the Reader, without any Satisfaction.

Several of theſe Lectures and Diſcourſes I have endeavoured to preſerve from being loſt, by publiſhing them in this Book, and ſome Inſtruments are there deſcribed.

In the Beginning of the Year 1687. his Brother's Daughter, Mrs. *Grace Hooke* died, who had lived with him ſeveral Years, the Concern for whoſe Death he hardly ever wore off, being obſerved from that Time to grow leſs active, more melancholy and cynical.

On the 5th of *May* he read a Lecture of the unequal *diurnal* Motion of the Earth, which the Reader may find in this Book.

In *July* he ſhewed an Experiment of the Communication of Motion, by a Packthread extended a very conſiderable Length, and, after running over a Pulley, brought back to the Place near to which the other End was faſtened; and it was found, that any Addition of Weight or Motion given to the one End, would be immediately ſenſible at the other End of the String, tho' it muſt paſs in going and returning ſo great a Length: There were other Ways ſhewn of communicating Motion, as by a long Cane ſuſpended by Strings, or by Wires diſtended a great Length; in which it was obſervable, that the Sound was propagated inſtantaneouſly, even as quick as the Motion of Light, the Sound conveyed by the Air coming a conſiderable Time after that by the Wire.

A great Part of the next Year he was very weak and ill, being often troubled with Head-achs, Giddineſs and Fainting, and with a general Decay all over, which hindered his Philoſophical Studies, yet ſtill he read ſome Lectures whenever he was able. At the ſame Time a Chancery-ſuit, which he was forced to have with Sir *John Cutler* for his yearly Salary, made him very uneaſy, the Trouble of which increaſed his Illneſs.

But on the 20th of *June* he read a farther Deſcription concerning ſeveral Ways of making a portable *Sea Barometer*, with the great Uſes thereof in foretelling Changes of the Weather and Storms.

From this Time, for ſome Years, I find but little done by him, except his reading the Lectures founded by Sir *John Cutler*, ſeveral of which are here printed, to which the Curious are referred: Of theſe he read in *December* 1691. ſeveral relating to Improvements of ſounding Inſtruments, which he called *Nuntii inanimati*

inanimati ad fundum Abyſſi emiſſarii. Having received a Warrant from Dr. *Tillotſon* the Archbiſhop of *Canterbury*, for a *Degree of Doctor of Phyſic*, he went on the 7th of *December*, the ſame Year, and took the Oaths before Sir *Charles Hedges* in *Doctors Commons*.

About this Time he was employed about the contriving and ſurveying the Hoſpital ſtanding near *Hoxton*, given by the Will of Alderman *Aſk*, a Building that few will judge any Diſreputation to the Contriver, for the due Proportion of its Parts, and Beauty of the Whole. I have heard indeed that Dr. *Hooke* has been blamed for exceeding the Sum at firſt propoſed to be expended thereon; and once diſcourſing with him upon that Subject, he owned to me, that it had far exceeded the firſt Eſtimate he had given in of the Charges, but not by his Fault or Miſtake, but partly by new Additions and Alterations of the firſt Deſign, and chiefly by his not procuring and agreeing with the Workmen himſelf, which if he had done, as he ſaid, he would have engaged it ſhould have come to little or no more than his firſt propoſed Sum. He alſo propoſed that there might be inſtituted in that Place a *Mathematical School* for Boys, to be inſtructed in the Principles of *Aſtronomy* and *Navigation*, which at firſt was well approved of by the Perſons concerned in the Management of that Affair.

On *Thurſday* the 8th of *September* 1692. he ſet down an Earthquake to be obſerved by himſelf exactly 55 Min. paſt one o'Clock *p. m.* he notes, that there was no Wind but Rain all Day. It was remarkable, that this Earthquake was felt at the ſame Time not only in moſt Parts of *England*, but alſo in ſeveral Parts of *Germany*.

This Year he read a curious Diſcourſe deſcribing the Tower of *Babel* or *Belus*. The Year following he read ſeveral Lectures about Earthquakes, and an Explication of *Ovid's Metamorphoſis*, of which it is needleſs to mention the Contents, or the Times, the Dates of moſt of them being affixed to them in the following Book.

On the 18th of *July* 1696. being his Birth-day, his Chancery Suit for Sir *John Cutler's* Salary was determined for him, to his great Satisfaction, which had made him very uneaſy for ſeveral Years. In his Diary he ſhews his Senſe of it in theſe Terms, DOMSHLGISS: A. which I read thus, *Deo Opt. Max. ſummus Honor, Gloria, in ſecula ſeculorum, Amen. I was born on this Day of* July 1635. *and* GOD *has given me a new Birth, may I never forget his Mercies to me; whilſt he gives me Breath may I praiſe him.*

March the 5th 1697-8. he read a Lecture about the prolated, ſpheroedical Figure of the Sun, and other *Phænomena* thereof, of the *Maculæ* and *Faculæ*, &c. of making a Helioſcope by four reflex Planes in a twenty-four Foot Tube, or a Teleſcope for Planets and fixed Stars, by two Reflexions, in a Tube of forty Foot, with Monſieur *Huygens's* one hundred and twenty Foot Glaſs, which was well liked of.

June 27, 1698. he read a Lecture upon *Huygens's Coſmotheoros*, and ſhewed a Module of *Saturn* and his Ring.

Thus I have mentioned ſome of his Performances, in the latter of which I have been the more ſuccinct, having exceeded the Bounds I at firſt intended in the Accounts of the former. It muſt be confeſſed, that the latter Part of his Life was nothing near ſo fruitful of Inventions as the former; tho' it is certain he had a Deſign to repeat the moſt Part of his Experiments, and finiſh the Accounts, Obſervations and Deductions from them, and had an Order for the Society's bearing the Charge thereof, in *June* 1696. when he propoſed likewiſe to perfect the

Deſcription

Deſcription of all the Inſtruments he had at any Time contrived; but by reaſon of his increaſing Weakneſs, and a general Decay, he was abſolutely unable to perform it, had he deſired it never ſo much.

He had for ſeveral Years been often taken with a Giddineſs in his Head, and ſometimes great Pain, little Appetite, and great Faintneſs, that he was ſoon very much tired with Walking, or any Exerciſe.

About *July* 1697. he began to complain of the Swelling and Soreneſs of his Legs, and was much over-run with the Scurvy; and about the ſame Time being taken with a Giddineſs, he fell down Stairs and cut his Head, bruiſed his Shoulder, and hurt his Ribs, of which he complained often to the laſt.

About *September* he thought himſelf (as indeed all others did that ſaw him) that he could not laſt out a Month. About which Time his Legs ſwelled more and more, and not long after broke, and for want of due Care mortified a little before his Death. From this Time he grew blinder and blinder, that at laſt he could neither ſee to read nor write. Some of the laſt he wrote, I believe, was on the 17th of *December* 1702. when he ſets down a Memorandum about an Inſtrument to take the horizontal Diameter of the Sun to the Tenth of a ſecond Minute, but diſcovers not the Way.

Thus he lived a dying Life for a conſiderable Time, being more than a Year very infirm, and ſuch as might be called Bed-rid for the greateſt Part, tho' indeed he ſeldom, all the Time, went to Bed, but kept in his Cloaths, and when over-tir'd lay down upon his Bed in them, which doubtleſs brought ſeveral Inconveniencies upon him; ſo that at laſt his Diſtempers of ſhortneſs of Breath, Swelling, partly of his Body but moſtly of his Legs, increaſing, and at laſt mortifying, as was obſerved after his Death, by their looking very black, being emaciated to the utmoſt, his Strength wholly worn out, he died on the 3d of *March* 1702-3, being ſixty-ſeven Years, ſeven Months, and thirteen Days old.

His Corps was decently and handſomely interred in the Church of St. *Helen* in *London*, all the Members of the *Royal Society* then in Town attending his Body to the Grave, paying the Reſpect due to his extraordinary Merit.

His Character.

As to his Perſon, he was but deſpicable, being very crooked; though I have heard from himſelf, and others, that he was ſtrait till about ſixteen Years of Age, when he firſt grew awry, by frequent practiſing Turning with a Turn-lath, and the like incurvating Exerciſes, being but of a thin, weak Habit of Body, which increaſed as he grew older, ſo as to be very remarkable at laſt: This made him but low of Stature, tho' by his Limbs he ſhould have been moderately tall. He was always very pale and lean, and laterly nothing but Skin and Bone, with a meagre Aſpect, his Eyes grey and full, with a ſharp, ingenious Look whilſt younger; his Noſe but thin, of a moderate Height and Length; his Mouth mainly wide, and upper Lip thin; his Chin ſharp, and Forehead large; his Head of a middle-ſize. He wore his own Hair of a dark brown Colour, very long and hanging neglected over his Face uncut and lank, which about three Years before his Death he cut off, and wore a Perriwig. He went ſtooping and very faſt (till his Weakneſs, a few Years before his Death, hindered him) having but a light Body to carry, and a great deal of Spirits and Activity, eſpecially in his Youth.

He was of an active, reſtleſs, indefatigable Genius, even almoſt to the laſt, and always ſlept little to his Death, ſeldom going to ſleep till two, three or four o'Clock in the Morning, and ſeldomer to Bed, often continuing his Studies all Night, and taking a ſhort Nap in the Day. His Temper was melancholy, miſ-

truſtful and jealous, which more increaſed upon him with his Years. He was in the Beginning of his being made known to the Learned, very communicative of his philoſophical Diſcoveries and Inventions, till ſome Accidents made him, to a Crime, cloſe and reſerved. He laid the Cauſe upon ſome Perſons, challenging his Diſcoveries for their own, taking Occaſion from his Hints to perfect what he had not; which made him ſay, he would ſuggeſt nothing till he had Time to perfect it himſelf, which has been the Reaſon that many Things are loſt, which he affirmed he knew. He had a piercing Judgment into the Diſpoſitions of others, and would ſometimes give ſhrewd Gueſſes and ſmart Characters.

From his Youth he had been uſed to a Collegiate or rather Monaſtic Life, which might be ſome Reaſon of his continuing to live ſo like an Hermit or Cynic, too penuriouſly, when his Circumſtances, as to Eſtate, were very conſiderable, ſcarcely affording himſelf Neceſſaries.

I indeed, as well as others, have heard him declare ſometimes, that he had a great Project in his Head as to the Diſpoſal of the moſt part of his Eſtate, for the Advancement of Natural Knowledge, and to promote the Ends and Deſigns for which the *Royal Society* was inſtituted: To build an handſome Fabric for the Society's Uſe, with a Library, Repoſitory, Laboratory, and other Conveniencies for making Experiments, and to found and endow a perpetual *Phyſico-mechanic Lecture*, of the Nature of what himſelf read. But tho' he was often ſollicited by his Friends to put his Deſigns down in Writing, and make his Will as to the Diſpoſal of his Eſtate to his own Liking, in the Time of his Health; and after, when himſelf and all thought his End drew near, yet he could never be prevailed with to perfect it, ſtill procraſtinating it, till at laſt this great Deſign proved an airy Phantom, and vaniſhed into nothing. Thus he died at laſt, without any Will and Teſtament that could be found. It is indeed but a melancholy Reflection, that while ſo many rich and great Men leave conſiderable Sums for founding Hoſpitals, and the like pious Uſes, few ſince Sir *Thomas Greſham* ſhould do any Thing of this Kind for the promoting of Learning, which no doubt would be as much for the Good of the Nation, and Glory of God, as the other of relieving the Poor.

He always expreſſed a great Veneration for the eternal and immenſe Cauſe of all Beings, as may be ſeen in very many Paſſages in his Writings, and ſeldom received any remarkable Benefit from God without thankfully acknowledging the Mercy; never made any conſiderable Diſcovery in Nature, invented any uſeful Contrivance, or found out any difficult Problem, without ſetting down his Acknowledgment to the Omnipotent Providence, as many Places in his Diary teſtify, frequently in theſe or the like Words, abbreviated thus, D O M G M, and was a frequent Studier of the Holy Scripture in the Originals: If he was particular in ſome Matters, let us leave him to the Searcher of Hearts.

To conclude, all his Errors and Blemiſhes were more than made Amends for, by the Greatneſs and Extent of his natural and acquired Parts, and more than common, if not wonderful Sagacity, in diving into the moſt hidden Secrets of Nature, and in contriving proper Methods of forcing her to confeſs the Truth, by driving and purſuing the *Proteus* thro' all her Changes, to her laſt and utmoſt Receſſes; ſo that what *Ovid* ſaid of *Pythagoras* may not unfitly be applied to him.

Menie

Mente Deos adiit, & quæ Natura negavit
Viſibus humanis, oculis ea Pectoris hauſit.

Metamorph. Lib. 15.

There needs no other Proof for this, than the great Number of Experiments he made, with the Contrivances for them, amounting to ſome hundreds; his new and uſeful Inſtruments and Inventions, which were numerous, his admirable Facility and Clearneſs, in explaining the Phænomena of Nature, and demonſtrating his Aſſertions; his happy Talent in adapting Theories to the Phænomena obſerved, and contriving eaſy and plain, not pompous and amuſing Experiments to back and prove thoſe Theories; proceeding from Obſervations to Theories, and from Theories to farther Trials, which he often aſſerted, to be the moſt proper Method to ſucceed in the interpretation of Nature. For theſe, his happy Qualifications, he was much reſpected by the moſt learned Philoſophers, both at home and abroad: And as with all his Failures, he may be reckoned among the great Men of the laſt Age, ſo had he been free from them, poſſibly, he might have ſtood in the Front. But *humanum eſt errare.*

N. B. This Life of Doctor *Robert Hooke*, is prefixed to the Doctor's Poſthumous Works, publiſhed by *Richard Waller*, S. R. Secr. at *London*, in Folio, 1705.

NUMBER VII.

The LIFE *of* WILLIAM HARVEY, *M. D.*

DOCTOR WILLIAM HARVEY, an eminent Phyſician, and particularly diſtinguiſhed by his Diſcovery of the Circulation of the Blood, was eldeſt Son of *Thomas Harvey*, Gentleman[a]; by *Joan Halke*, his Wife; and was born at *Folkſtone* in *Kent*, on the ſecond of *April*, 1578. At Ten Years of Age, he was ſent to a Grammar School at *Canterbury*, from whence at Fourteen, he was removed to *Gonvil* and *Caius* College in *Cambridge*. At Nineteen, he travelled into *France* and *Italy*; and at Twenty-Three, ſtudied Phyſic at *Padua*, under *Euſtachius Radius*, *John Thomas Minidous*, and *Hieronymus Fabricius ab Aquapendente*. At Twenty-Four, he became Doctor of Phyſic and Chirurgery in that Univerſity; and ſoon after returning into *England*, [b] was incorporated Doctor of Phyſic in *Cambridge*, practiſed Phyſic in *London*, and married[c]. In 1604, he was admitted Candidate of the College of Phyſicians in *London*, and three Years after elected Fellow[d]. Upon the Death of Doctor *Davis*, he was appointed Lecturer of Anatomy and Chirurgery in that College[e]; and on the 16th, 17th, and 18th of *April* 1616, read a Courſe of Lectures in Anatomy, ſtill extant in Manuſcript[f]; under the Title of *Prælectiones Anatom. Univerſal. per me Gulielmum Harveium, Medicum Londinenſem, Anatom. & Chirurg. profeſſorem, Ann. Dom.* 1616. *Anno Ætatis* 37. *prælect. Apr.* 16, 17, 18. In which Lectures he opened his Diſcovery relating to the Circulation of the Blood; which, after a Varie-

[a] Dr. Charles Goodall's Epiſtle dedicatory to his Hiſtorical Account of the College of Phyſicians Proceedings againſt Empiricks, &c. London 1684. in Quarto.
[b] Wood Faſti Oxon. Vol. II. col. 6. 2d. Edit. London, 1721.
[c] Ibid.
[d] Goodall, ubi ſupra.
[e] Id. ibid.
[f] In the Library of Sir Hans Sloan, Bart.

ty of Experiments, publicly exhibited, he communicated to the World in his *Exercitatio Anatomica de Motu Cordis & Sanguinis*, printed at *Francfort* in 1628, in Quarto. There are prefixed to this Book, a Dedication to King *Charles* Iſt. and another to Doctor *Argent* Preſident, and to the reſt of the College of Phyſicians of *London*; in which Doctor *Harvey* obſerves, that it had been finiſhed ſeveral Years before. But notwithſtanding the Force of the cleareſt Evidence, which ſhines through that whole Treatiſe, his noble Diſcovery met with vaſt Oppoſition; and he was obliged to bear the Attack of numberleſs Adverſaries, who generally in their Anſwers ſhewed more a Spirit of Contradiction, than any Strength of Reaſoning. The moſt conſiderable Attack upon it was by Doctor *James Primeroſe*, in his *Exercitationes & Animadverſiones in Librum de Motu Cordis & Circulatione Sanguinis, contra Harveium*, printed at *London* 1639; and by *Æmilius Pariſanus* in his *Refutatio Harveii de motu cordis & Sanguinis in Animali*; printed at *Leyden* the ſame Year. In Anſwer to which laſt Book, Doctor *George Ent*, publiſhed at *London*, in 1641, *Apologia pro Circulatione Sanguinis contra Æmilium Pariſanum*. But as ſoon as the Public was perfectly ſatisfied, that the Doctrine of the Circulation was not to be conteſted, a great many Perſons challenged the Prize, unwilling, that our Author ſhould have the Reputation of it: And *Vander Linden*, of *Leyden*, particularly diſtinguiſhed himſelf by his zealous Efforts to prove, that *Hippocrates* knew it, and that Doctor *Harvey* only revived it.

It was aſſerted likewiſe by others, that Father *Paul*, the *Venetian*, was the firſt Diſcoverer of it; while *Honoratus Faber* preſumed to claim to himſelf the Honour of the Invention. But the Pretences in Favour of the firſt, have been refuted by Doctor *Walter Charlton*, in his anatomical Lectures read in the College of Phyſicians in 1683, and publiſhed the ſame Year; and *Honoratus Faber* has been unanſwerably confuted by *John Alph. Borelli*, in his *Hiſtoria & meteorologia incendii Ætnei*. And it is very remarkable, that as this Diſcovery was intirely owing to Dr *Harvey*, ſo he has explained it with all the Clearneſs imaginable. For though much has been ſince written upon that Subject, yet his own Book is the ſhorteſt, the plaineſt, and the moſt convincing of any, as every Perſon may be ſatisfied, who ſhall look into the many Apologies written in Defence of the Circulation, or have the Patience to read the tedious and uninſtructive Treatiſe of *Raymond Vieuſſens De ſanguine & Corde*.

Hiſtory of Phyſic part i. p. 235. Edit. Lond. 1725.

On the third of *December*, 1627, Doctor *Harvey* was choſen one of the Elects of the College of Phyſicians; and *December* 30th, 1629, he reſigned the Place of Treaſurer of that College[h]. In 1632[i], he was appointed Phyſician to King *Charles* the Iſt. as he had been before to King *James* the Iſt.[k] and adhering to the Royal Cauſe, upon the breaking out of the Civil Wars, attended his Majeſty at the Battle of *Edgehill*, and thence to *Oxford*, where he was incorporated Doctor of Phyſic *December* 7th, 1642[l]. In 1645, he was elected Warden of *Merton* College in that Univerſity[m], by Virtue of the King's Letters ſent to the Society of that Houſe for that Purpoſe; but the Year following, when the Garriſon of *Oxford* ſurrendered to the Parliament, he left that Office, and retired to *London*[n].

[h] From the Regiſter of the College.
[i] Wood, ubi ſupra.
[k] Goodall, ubi ſupra.
[l] Wood, ubi ſupra.
[m] Id. Hiſt & Antiquit. Univerſ. Oxonienſ. lib. ii. p. 86.
[n] Id. Faſti Ox. ubi ſupra.

In 1651, his admirable Book, intitled, *Exercitationes de Generatione animalium, quibus accedunt quædam de partu, de membranis ac humoribus uteri & de Conceptione*, was printed at *London*, in Quarto, and Dedicated, by Doctor *George Ent*, to the Preſident and College of Phyſicians in *London*. In 1654, he, though abſent was choſen Preſident, of that College; but refuſed that Poſt on the

the 30th of *September* the ſame Year. *July* the 28th, the Year following, he ſettled his Eſtate in *Kent*, on that College: And died *June* 30th, 1657, in the Eightieth Year of his Age. He was interred in the Church of *Hempſted* in *Eſſex*, where a Monument is erected to his Memory.

From the Regiſter of the College. So the Inſcription on his Monument. But Wood. Faſti, Oxon. ubi ſupra ſays, June 30th, and Peck's Deſiderata Curioſa, Vol. ii. lib. xiv. p. 29. June 22.

He deſigned to have publiſhed ſeveral Treatiſes, particularly.

Firſt, A *Practice of Phyſic* conformable to his Theſis of the Circulation of Blood.

II. *Tractatus de pulmonum uſu & motu, de eventilatione omni, aeriſque neceſſitate & uſu; de variis & differentibus organis hujus Cauſâ in animalibus, factis.*

III. *Tractatus de quantitate Sanguinis in unoquoque aut ſingulis pulſationibus protruſâ, & quando plus, & quando minus, & quâ de cauſâ; itidem de Circuitûs Cauſis, utilitatibus, & Sanguinis arcanis.*

IV *Obſervationes de uſu lienis.*

V. *Exercitationes de reſpirationis cauſis, organis, & uſu.*

VI. *Obſervationes de motivis organis animalium, & de muſculorum fabricâ.*

VII. *Tractatus de Animalium amore, libidine, & coitu.*

VIII. *Obſervationes medicinales de Herniæ carnoſæ curatione, aliiſque curationibus præter Vulgi Sententiam, & Methodum feliciter peractis.*

IX. *De Nutritionis modo.*

X. *Hiſtoria Multorum Animalium, præſertim inſectorum, ab inconſpicuis præ exiguitate principiis & ſeminibus (quaſi Atomis in Aere volitantibus) a ventis huc & illuc Sparſis & diſſeminatis, ortum.*

XI. *Anatomia medica ad medicinæ uſum maximè accommodata, ubi ex multis diſſectionibus corporum ægrotorum graviſſimis, & miris Affectionibus confectorum, quomodo & qualiter partes interiores in ſitu, magnitudine, conſtitutione, figurâ, & ſubſtantiâ, & reliquis accidentibus ſenſilibus à Naturali formâ & apparentiâ permutentur, & quam variis modis & miris afficiantur, enarrare ſuſciperit.*

Beſides his peculiar Skill in his own Profeſſion, he was a very univerſal Scholar, and extremely converſant in the Hiſtory and Politics of the ancient and modern Times; on which Account he is introduced by Mr. *Henry Neville*, as one of the principal Perſonages in his Dialogue, intitled; *Plato Redivivus.*

See a Letter to Walter Moyle, Eſq; printed in the Account of Mr. Moyle and his Writings, p. 26. 27. prefixed to the whole Works of Walter Moyle, Eſq; that were publiſhed by himſelf, Edit. Lond. 1727, in Octavo.

NUMBER VIII.

The LIFE *of* THOMAS WILLIS, M. D.

DOCTOR THOMAS WILLIS, an eminent *Engliſh* Phyſician in the Seventeenth Century, was eldeſt Son of Mr. *Thomas Willis*, by *Rachel* his Wife, Daughter of Mr. *Howell*, and was born *January* the 27th, 1621, at *Great Bedwin* in *Wiltſhire*. Having had a good Foundation of Grammar Learning under Mr. *Edward Sylveſter*, a noted School-maſter in *All-Saints* Pariſh in *Oxford*, he became, in 1636, through the Patronage of Mr. *Thomas Iles*, Canon of *Chriſt Church*, a Member of that College; and applying himſelf vigorouſly to his Studies,

Studies, took the Degree of Batchelor of Arts, *June* 19th 1639, and that of Maſter, *June* 18th 1642; about which Time, *Oxford* being garriſoned for the King, he, among other Scholars who continued there, bore Arms for his Majeſty's Defence, and devoted his leiſure Hours to the Study of Phyſic, in which Faculty he took the Degree of Batchelor, *December* the 8th 1646. The Garriſon of *Oxford* being then ſurrendered to the Parliament, he applied himſelf to the Practice of his Profeſſion, in which he ſoon became very eminent, and ſettled in St. *John Baptiſt*'s Pariſh in *Oxford*, in an Houſe oppoſite to *Merton* College, where he appropriated a Room to be an Oratory for divine Service according to the Church of *England*, to which he ſincerely adhered, even in Times of the greateſt Danger. In this Room Mr. *John Fell*, afterwards Dean of *Chriſt Church*, and Biſhop of *Oxford*, whoſe Siſter *Mary* our Author had married, Mr. *John Dolben*, afterwards Archbiſhop of *York*, and Mr. *Richard Alliſtree*, afterwards Provoſt of *Eaton* College, conſtantly exerciſed the Liturgy and Sacraments, according to the Church of *England*. To which moſt of the Royaliſts in *Oxford*, eſpecially Scholars, who had been ejected, daily reſorted. *Auguſt* 25th, 1660, he became *Sedleian* Profeſſor of natural Philoſophy, in the Room of Doctor *Joſhua Croſts*, then ejected; and *October* the 30th following, took the Degree of Doctor of Phyſic; and being ſent for to moſt of the People of Quality about *Oxford*, in one of his Journies, in *April*, 1664, he diſcovered the famous medicinal Spring, at *Aſtrop* near *Brackley*, having, upon obſerving his Horſe drink plentifully of it, made ſeveral Experiments upon the Water.

Which they had before conſtantly done in his Room, at Chriſt Church.

He was one of the firſt Members of the *Royal Society*, and ſoon made his Name illuſtrious by his Excellent Writings, particularly his *Diatribæ duæ medico Philoſophicæ de fermentatione, altera de febribus*, and his *Diſſertatio Epiſtolica de Urinis*, printed at the *Hague*, in 1659; his *Cerebri Anatome*, and his Piece, *De Ratione motus Muſculorum*, publiſhed in 1664; his *Pathologiæ Cerebri & nervoſi generis Specimina, in quo agitatur de morbis convulſivis & de Scorbuto*, in 1667; his *Affectionum, quæ dicuntur Hyſtericæ & Hypocondriacæ, Pathologia Spaſmodica, vindicata contra Reſponſionem Epiſtolarem*, Nath. Highmore, M. D. His *Exercitationes medico Phyſicæ duæ*, 1. *De Sanguinis accenſione*: 2. *De motu muſculari*, in 1670. His *De animâ Brutorum, quæ hominis vitalis & ſenſitiva eſt, Exercitationes duæ*, in 1672: And his *Pharmaceutice rationalis, ſive diatriba de medicamentorum operationibus in humano corpore*, in 1674.

In 1666, after the Fire of *London*, he removed to *Weſtminſter*, upon the Invitation of Archbiſhop *Sheldon*, and ſettled in St. *Martin's-Lane*. And as he roſe early in the Morning, that he might be preſent at Divine Service, (which he ſeldom, or never failed) before he viſited his Patients, he agreed with a School-maſter, who taught in the Veſtry-Room adjoining to the Church of St. *Martin's*, to read Prayers in that Church, at Six in the Morning in Summer, and Seven in the Winter half Year, as well as at five in the Evening; and ſeeing the Service at theſe Times greatly frequented, he ſettled Twenty Pounds *per Annum*, at his Death, which Sum he had for ſome Years limited, and paid in his Life Time, to the School-maſter, for the Augmentation of his Stipend, that his Scholars might attend the ſaid Prayers, at the Beginning and Ending of their School Hours. He was likewiſe a liberal Benefactor to the Poor wherever he came, having, from his firſt Practice, allotted Part of his Profits to charitable Uſes; his Cuſtom being always in the latter Years of his Life to beſtow to thoſe Purpoſes all his *Sunday* Fees, which amounted to more than thoſe of any other Day of the Week, his Practice being more conſiderable, than that of any of the Phyſicians his Contemporaries.

He

He was Fellow of the College of Phyſicians in *London*, and refuſed the Honour of Knighthood. He was exact and regular in all his Hours, and his Table was the Reſort of moſt of the great Men in *London*. He died at his Houſe in *St. Martin's Lane*, on the 11th of *November* 1675, and was interred in the ſame Grave with his Wife in *Weſtminſter Abby*.

His Character is drawn to great Advantage, by Doctor *John Fell*, Dean of *Chriſt Church*, and Biſhop of *Oxford*, in a Poſtſcript added to Doctor *Willis*'s Preface to his *Pharmaceutice Rationalis*; and Mr. *Wood* tells us, "that he was a plain "Man, of no Carriage, little Diſcourſe, Complaiſance, or Society; yet for his "deep Inſight, and happy Reſearches into Natural and Experimental Philoſophy, "Anatomy and Chemiſtry, for his wonderful Succeſs and Repute in his Practice, "and the natural Smoothneſs, pure Elegancy, and delightful unaffected Neatneſs "of his *Latin* Stile, none ſcarce hath equalled, much leſs ſurpaſſed him; that "when at any Time he is mentioned by Authors (as he is very often) it is done "in Words expreſſing their higheſt Eſteem of his great Worth and Excellency; "that he is placed ſtill as firſt in Rank among Phyſicians; and that he hath "laid a laſting Foundation of a Body of Phyſic, chiefly on Hypotheſes of his "own framing." His Merit gained him the higheſt Eſteem among thoſe of the firſt Diſtinction and Fortune, as well as Genius and Learning: And his Readineſs upon all Occaſions to ſerve Mankind, juſtly rendered him amiable to every one who knew him. However, notwithſtanding the great Reputation which his Works raiſed him, both at home and abroad, yet ſeveral of them, like thoſe of the immortal *Harvey*, did not eſcape the Cenſure even of ſome Perſons of real Merit. Of this Claſs was Dr. *Schelhammer*, who in his Treatiſe *De Auditu*, printed at *Leyden* in 1684. repreſents Dr. *Willis* as ſometimes defective in Point both of Judgment and Fidelity, when he treats of Philoſophical and Chemical Subjects. But Dr. *Derham* has defended our Author againſt this Attack, and obſerves, That this general Cenſure is a very unjuſt one, ſince he was a Writer of known Probity; and tho' his Antagoniſt, in his Treatiſe above mentioned, has ſurpaſſed all who wrote before him on that Subject, yet his particular Exception to Dr. *Willis*, is founded upon a Miſtake or Miſrepreſentation of the Meaning of that Author, whoſe Veracity was equally remarkable with his great Abilities as an Anatomiſt, a Philoſopher and a Phyſician.

Athen. Oxon. Vol. ii. Col. 249.

Phyſico-Theology, Book IV. c. 3. p. 125. 5th Edit.

Dr. *Willis* left one Son, *Thomas*, Father of *Brown Willis*, of *Wadden-hall*, Eſq; eminent for his Knowledge in Antiquities; and two Daughters, *Jane*, married to *Robert Symonds*, High-ſheriff for *Herefordſhire* in the laſt Year of King *William*, and *Rachel*, married to *Roger Lingen*, of *Radbook* in *Glouceſterſhire*.

NUMBER

NUMBER IX.

The LIFE *of* ROBERT BOYLE, *Esq*;

ROBERT BOYLE, Esq; the seventh and youngest Son of *Richard*, the first Earl of *Cork*, by *Catharine* Daughter of Sir *Geoffry Fenton*, some Time Secretary of State to Queen *Elizabeth* for the Kingdom of *Ireland*, was born at *Lismore* in that Kingdom on the 25th of *January* 1626-7. At nine Years of Age he was sent to *Eaton* School, where he continued four Years; and at fourteen went to travel with his Brother, the Lord Viscount *Shannon*, and resided above a Year at *Geneva*; whence he proceeded to *Italy*, and returned to *England* in 1645. From his earliest Years he was very remarkable for his uncommon Modesty and irreproachable Behaviour in all Respects; and his Piety received a vast Increase, as he often acknowledged, from his Acquaintance with Archbishop *Usher*, who, as he was particularly the Friend of the whole Family, so seeing such Seed and Beginnings in him, studied to cultivate them with due Care. He set himself chiefly to the Study of the Scriptures in their original Languages, which he followed in a Course of many Years with so great Exactness, that he could have cited all remarkable Passages very readily, in the *Hebrew* as well as the *Greek*. At the Age of twenty-two he began to apply himself to all the Branches of Natural Philosophy, which he prosecuted with great Vigour at *Oxford*, where he settled in the latter End of the Year 1653. and frequented that Society of ingenious Men, who met in that University for the Improvement of Philosophical Learning, and laid the Foundation of the *Royal Society*, of which Mr. *Boyle* was one of the first Members. Upon his leaving *Oxford*, he removed to the House of his Sister the Countess of *Ranelagh*, where he spent the last forty Years of his Life.

From the Memoirs and Papers relating to Mr. Boyle, printed in London 1692. in Quarto.

Id. p. 25—33.

In this Situation, being Master of a plentiful Fortune, and eased of the Trouble of a Family of his own, he devoted himself with such Success to the Cultivation of his favourite Studies, as has rendered his Name famous throughout the World, a considerable Part of his philosophical Works having been translated into *Latin*. His moral Character was likewise in all Points great and noble. He had a profound Veneration of the Deity, so that the very Name of God was never mentioned by him without a visible Pause in his Discourse. He had the strongest Sentiments of Religion, the Interests of which he promoted to the utmost of his Power. He was constant and serious in his secret Addresses to God; and in all his Enquiries into Nature, his chief Design was to raise higher Thoughts in himself and others of the divine Greatness, Glory, Wisdom and Goodness; and in that Article of his Will relating to the *Royal Society*, he recommends it to them, and to other Searchers into Physical Truths, to refer their Attainments to the Glory of the great Author of Nature, and the Comfort of Mankind. He founded a Lecture for the Proof of the Christian Religion against *Atheists*, *Pagans*, *Theists*, *Jews* and *Mahometans*, without descending lower to any Controversies among Christians themselves. He was at the Charge of the Translation and Impression of the New Testament into the *Malayan* Language, which

which he ſent over all the *Eaſt-Indies*. He gave a noble Reward to the Perſon who tranſlated *Grotius*'s incomparable Book *Of the Truth of the Chriſtian Religion* into *Arabic*; and was at the Expence of a whole Impreſſion, which he took Care to have diſperſed in all the Countries where that Language is underſtood. He reſolved alſo to have an Impreſſion of the New Teſtament in the *Turkiſh* Language; but the Company thinking it became them to do it, ſuffered him only to contribute a large Share towards it. He gave ſeven hundred Pounds for an Edition of the *Iriſh* Bible, which he ordered to be diſtributed in *Ireland*; and contributed liberally towards the *Welch* Bible, and that in *Iriſh* for the Highlands in *Scotland*. He gave in his Life-time three hundred Pounds towards propagating the Chriſtian Religion in *America*; and as ſoon as he heard that the *Eaſt-India* Company were entertaining Propoſitions for the like Deſign in the Eaſt, he preſently ſent one hundred Pounds for a Beginning and Example; but intended a greater Sum when the Work ſhould be ſet on foot to the Purpoſe. He had the higheſt Regard for the Clergy, of which he gave many eminent Inſtances; particularly, when he underſtood what Share he had in Impropriations, he ordered very large Gifts to be made to the Incumbents of thoſe Pariſhes, and to the Widows of ſuch as died, before he had reſolved upon this Charity. He was conſtant to the Eſtabliſhed Church, though an Enemy to Perſecution in Matters of Religion, and averſe to all contracted Notions of Religion. He was extremely candid and courteous in his Converſation; and tho' he found that his eaſineſs of Acceſs, and the Deſires of many Perſons, eſpecially Foreigners, to viſit him, made a great waſte of Time; yet as he was ſtrict in not ſuffering himſelf to be denied, when he was at home, ſo he ſaid, that he knew the Heart of a Stranger, and how much eaſed his own had been, while he was travelling, if admitted to the Converſation of thoſe whom he deſired to ſee; and therefore he thought, that his Obligation to Strangers was more than mere Civility, and that it was a Point of religious Charity in him. His Laboratory was conſtantly open to the Curious, whom he permitted to ſee moſt of his Proceſſes. He was very plain, unaffected, and temperate in the Manner of his Life; and bore all his Infirmities and Pains, which were very ſevere, with the Decency and Submiſſion which became a Philoſopher and a Chriſtian. And whatever he was in the ſight of Men, he was in Reality the ſame in his moſt ſecret Receſſes. He affected nothing which was ſolemn or ſupercilious, nor uſed any Methods to make Multitudes run after him, or depend upon him. It never appeared that there was any Thing hid under all this Appearance of Goodneſs, which was not only ſo; for he concealed both his Piety and Charity all he could, and lived in the due Methods of Civility, and would never aſſume the Authority which all the World was ready to give him. He allowed himſelf a great deal of innocent Chearfulneſs; ſo that he had nothing of the Moroſeneſs to which Philoſophers think they have ſome Right, or of the Affectations which Men of an extraordinary pitch of Devotion ſometimes run into, without being well aware of them. His Charity to thoſe in Want, and his Bounty to learned Men, were the moſt exemplary imaginable, but without Oſtentation. He was particularly liberal to Perſons in Diſtreſs, without letting them know from whence it came; and for ſeveral Years his Charity exceeded a thouſand Pounds *per Annum*. He ſpoke of the Government, even in Times which he diſliked, and upon Occaſions which he ſpared not to condemn, with an Exactneſs of Reſpect. King *Charles* II. King *James* and King *William* were ſo highly pleaſed with his Converſation, that they often uſed to converſe with him with great Familiarity. His four elder Brothers

Id. p. 27.

Id. p. 27—30.

Id. p. 30—35.

thers being all Noblemen, he was ſeveral times offered a Peerage, which he conſtantly refuſed to accept. He had too unblemiſhed a Candour to be capable of thoſe Arts and Practices which the World generally terms Wiſdom. He could neither lie nor equivocate, but conld well be ſilent; and by practiſing that much, he covered himſelf upon many Occaſions. He made true Judgments of Men and Things, and his Advices were ſolid and ſound; and if Caution and Modeſty laid too great Reſtraints upon him, his Invention was fruitful to ſuggeſt Expedients. He had great Notions of what human Nature might be brought to; but ſince he ſaw Mankind not capable of them, he withdrew himſelf early from Affairs and Courts. He had a very particular Sagacity in obſerving what Men were fit for; and had ſo vaſt a Scheme of different Performances, that he could eaſily furniſh thoſe with Work who had Leiſure and Capacity for it; and when he ſaw them engaged, would enable them by a handſome Preſent to carry it on. His Knowledge was various and extenſive; but his peculiar and beloved Study was Chemiſtry, which he purſued with no avaricious Deſign, but only to find out Nature, to ſee of what Principles Things were compounded, and into what they might be reſolved, and to prepare good Medicaments, without ſpending his Eſtate and Time upon high Pretenſions; and he made that Art an Entertainment to himſelf, and a Charity to others.

Id. p. 35—37.

His Health was extremely tender, and his Eyes weak; yet, by living under an exact Regimen, he attained the ſixty-fourth Year of his Age, and preſerved his Sight to the laſt.

He died *December* 30th, 1691, and was interred on the 7th of *January* following, in the Chancel of the Church of St. *Martin's in the Fields.*

NUMBER X.

THO. HOBBES Malmeſburienſis *Vita.*

THOMAS HOBBES, natus *Apr.* 5°, 1588. Malmeſburiæ, agri Wiltonienſis. Literis Latinis & Græcis initiatus, annum agens decimum quartum, miſſus eſt Oxonium; ubi per quinquennium manſit, operam impendens ſtudio logicæ & phyſicæ Ariſtotelicæ. Cùm annum ageret viceſimum, commendatus ab amicis, Oxonio relicto, recepit ſe in domum domini Gulielmi Cavendiſh Baronis de Hardwick, & (paulo pòſt) Comitis Devoniæ, ubi filio ejus primogenito adoleſcenti ſibi ferè coætaneo ſervivit; placuitque tum filio tum patri, temperans, ſedulus, hilaris. Anno ſequente, cum domino ſuo in urbe perpetuò fere degens, quod didicerat linguæ Græcæ & Latinæ magna ex parte amiſerat. Deinde per Galliam & Italiam peregrinantem dominum ſequutus, gentium illarum linguas eouſque didicit, ut intelligere eas mediocriter potuerit. Interea Græcam & Latinam linguam paulatìm perire ſibi ſentiens, philoſophiam autem logicamq; (in quibus præclarè profeciſſe ſe arbitratur) viris prudentibus deriſui eſſe videns, abjectâ logicâ & philoſophiâ illâ vanâ quantum temporis habebat vacui, impendere decrevit linguis Græcæ & Latinæ. Itaque cùm in Angliam reverſus eſſet hiſtoricos

ricos & poetas (adhibitis grammaticorum celbrium commentariis) verſavit diligenter; non ut floridè, ſed ut Latinè poſſet ſcribere, & vim verborum cogitatis congruentem invenire; itaq; verba diſponere, ut lectio perſpicua & facilis eſſet. Inter hiſtoricos Græcos Thucydidem præ cæteris dilexit, & vacuis horis in ſermonem Anglicum paulatim converſum cum nonnulla laude circa annum Chriſti 1628. in publicum edidit; eo fine, ut ineptiæ Democraticorum Athenienſium concivibus ſuis patefierint. Eo anno comes Devoniæ, cui jam ſervierat viginti annos, diem obiit, patre ejus biennio antè defuncto. Anno ſequente, qui erat Chriſti 1629. cum attigiſſet annum quadrageſimum, rogatus à nobiliſſimo viro domino Gervaſio Clifton, ut vellet filium ſuum adoleſcentem comitari in Galliam, accepit conditionem. In peregrinatione illa inſpicere cæpit in elementa Euclidis; & delectatus methodo illius, non tam ob theoremata illa, quàm ob artem ratiocinandi diligentiſſimè perlegit. Anno Chriſti 1631. revocatus eſt in familiam Comitiſſæ Devoniæ, ut filium ſuum Comitem Devoniæ, natum annos 13, in literis inſtrueret, quem etiam circiter triennium pòſt comitatus eſt in Galliam & Italiam, ſtudiorum ejus & itinerum rector. Dum moraretur Pariſiis, principia ſcientiæ naturalis inveſtigare cæpit. Quæ cùm in natura & varietate motuum contineri ſciret, quæſivit imprimis, qualis motus is eſſe poſſet, qui efficit ſenſionem, intellectum, phantaſmata, aliaſque proprietates animalium; cogitatis ſuis cum reverendo patre Marino Merſenno ordinis minimorum, in omni genere philoſophiæ verſatiſſimo, viroque optimo, quotidie communicatis. Anno Chriſti 1637. cum patrono ſuo in Angliam rediit, & apud illum manſit; unde de rebus naturalibus commercia cum Merſenno per literas continuavit. Interea Scoti, depulſis epiſcopis, ſumpſerunt arma contra regem, faventibus etiam miniſtris Anglis, illis qui vocari ſolent Preſbiteriani. Itaque convocatum eſt in Anglia parliamentum illud notiſſimum, quod inceptum eſt, Nov. 3. 1640. Ex iis, quæ in illo Parliamento tribus quatúorve diebus primis conſulta viderat, bellum civile ingruere, & tantùm non adeſſe ſentiens, retulit ſe rurſus in Galliam, ſcientiarum ſtudio Pariſiis tutius vacaturus cum Marſenno, Gaſſendo, aliiſque viris, propter eruditionem, & vim in ratiocinando, celeberrimis (non enim dico philoſophis, quia nomen illud à plurimis nebulonibus jamdiu geſtatum, tritum, inquinatum, nunc infame eſt). Cum jam Pariſiis ageret, libellum ſcripſit De Cive, quem edidit anno 1646; quo tempore prævalentibus parliamentariis, multi eorum, qui partes regias ſequuti erant, & in illis princeps Walliæ (qui nunc eſt Rex Angliæ) Pariſiis confluxerunt. Statuerat circa idem tempus, hortatu amici cujuſdam nobilis Languedociani migrare in Languedociam, & præmiſerat jam quæ ſibi neceſſaria erant; ſed commendatus principi, ut elementa mathematicæ illi prælegeret, ſubſtitit Pariſiis. Quod ab hoc munere temporis habuit vacui, conſumpſit in ſcribendo librum, qui nunc non ſolùm in Anglia, ſed in vicinis gentibus, notiſſimus eſt nomine Leviathan; quem etiam in Anglia edendum curavit ipſe manens adhuc Pariſiis, anno 1651, annum agens 63. In eo opere jus regium, tum ſpirituale, tum temporale, ita demonſtravit, tum rationibus, tum authoritate, ſcripturæ ſacræ, ut perſpicuum fecerit, pacem in orbe chriſtiano nuſquam diuturnam eſſe poſſe, niſi vel doctrina illa ſua recepta fuerit, vel ſatis magnus exercitus cives ad concordiam compulerit; opus, ut ille ſperabat, concivibus ſuis, præſertim verò illis, qui ab epiſcopis ſteterant, non ingratum. Quanquam enim unicuique illo tempore, ſcribere & edere theologica, quæ vellet, liberum erat; quia regimen eccleſiæ (poteſtate declarandi quæ doctrinæ eſſent hæreſes, ipſius regis authoritate ſublatâ, epiſcopis exutis, rege ipſo trucidato) tunc nullum erat; diligenter tamen cavit, ne quid ſcriberet, non modò contra ſenſum ſcripturæ ſacræ, ſed etiam contra doc-

trinam ecclesiæ Anglicanæ, qualis ante bellum ortum authoritate regiâ constituta fuerat. Nam & ipse regimen ecclesiæ per episcopos præ cæteris formis omnibus semper approbaverat. Atq; hoc duobus signis manifestum fecit. Primò cum in oppido Sti. Germani prope Parisios morbo gravissimo, lecto affixus esset venit ad eum Mersennus, rogatus à quodam amico communi, ne amicum suum extra ecclesiam Romanam mori pateretur. Is lecto assidens (post exordium consolatorium) de potestate ecclesiæ Romanæ peccata remittendi aliquantisper disseruit; cui ille, mi pater (inquit) hæc omnia jamjudum mecum disputavi. Eadem disputare nunc molestum erit. Habes, qui dicas, amæniora. Quando vidisti Gassendum? Quibus auditis, Mercennus Sermonem ad alia transtulit. Paucis post diebus accessit ad illum, doctor Johannes Cosinus episcopus (post) Dunelmensis, obtulitque se illi comprecatorem ad deum. Cui ille cùm gratias reddidisset, Ita (inquit) si precibus præiveris, juxta ritum ecclesiæ nostræ. Magnum hoc erga disciplinam episcopalem signum erat reverentiæ. Anno 1651. exemplaria aliquot illius libri, Londini recens editi, in Galliam transmissa sunt; ubi theologi quidam Angli Doctrinas quasdam in illo Libro contentas, tum ut hæreticas tum ut partibus regiis adversas criminati sunt; & valuere quidèm aliquandiù calumniæ illæ, in tantum, ut domo regiâ prohibitus fuerit; quo factum est ut protectione regiâ destitutus, metuensque ne à Clericis Romanis, quos præcipuè læserat, malè tractaretur, in Angliam coactus sit refugere. Rediens in Angliam, concionantes quidem invenit in Ecclesiis, sed seditiosos; etiam preces extemporarias, & illas audaces, & nonnunquam blasphemas, symbolum autem fidei nullum, decalogum nullum; adeò, ut per tres primos menses non invenerit, quibuscum in sacris communicare potuerit. Tandem ab amico ductus ad ecclesiam, à suo hospitio plusquam mille passus distantem, ubi pastor erat vir bonus & doctus, qui & Cænam Domini ritu Ecclesiastico administravit, cum illo in sacris communicavit. Alterum hoc signum erat non modo hominis partium Episcopalium, sed etiam christiani sinceri; nam illo tempore ad Ecclesiam quamcunque legibus aut metu cogebatur nemo. Quæ igitur episcopo cuiquam in illum causa iræ esse potuit, nisi ei, qui neminem à se dissentire, pati per superbiam, posset? Interea doctrinam ejus academici & ecclesiastici condemnabunt ferè omnes; laudabunt nobiles, & viri docti ex laicis. Refellebat nemo; conati refellere, confirmabunt. Scripsit enim non ex auditione & lectione ut scholaris; sed ex judicio proprio cognita & pensitata omnia, sermone puro & perspicuo, nec rhetorico. Stantem inter amicos & inimicos quasi in Æquilibrio, fecerunt illi, ne ob doctrinam opprimeretur; hi, ne augeretur. Itaque fortunâ tenui, fama doctrinæ ingenti, in patroni sui comitis Devoniæ hospitio per cæterum vitæ tempus perpetuò delituit, studio vacans geometriæ & philosophiæ naturalis; ediditq; jam senex librum quendam, quem inscripsit de corpore; continentem logicæ, geometriæ, physicæ (tum sublunaris, tum cœlestis) fundamenta; deducens logicam quidem à significatione nominum; geometriam autem, & physicam, ex Figurarum, & effectuum naturalium generationibus.

Hominis ergo neque genere, neque opibus, neque nogotiis belli aut pacis assueti vitam scribo, & in publicam emitto; sed in omni genere scientiæ excellentis, & ferè singularis. Cujus ingenium ut cognoscerent (partim etiam ut sua ostentarent) convenerunt eum viri innumeri, tum nostrates tum exteri; & inter illos, nonnulli legati principum, aliique viri nobilissimi. Adeò, ut conjecturâ inde factâ de voluntate hominum eruditorum, qui posthac erunt, non ingratum fore posteritati existimavi, si quem vidisse voluerunt, illius vitam literis posteritati traderem;

traderem; præcipuè quidem, ut quæ ſcientiis ille primus addidit, deinde etiam cætera vitæ ejus, quæ à lectoribus deſiderari poſſe videbuntur cognoſcerent.

Quæ ſcripſit de Jure naturali, de conſtitutione civitatum, de Jure eorum, qui ſummam habent Poteſtatem; de officiis civium, in libris Leviathan & De Cive (quia domi foriſque nota, & maximè celebrata ſunt) prætereunda cenſeo.

In phyſicis cauſam ſenſuum, precipuè viſûs, unà cum doctrina omni optica, & naturâ lucis; refractionis reflectioniſque cauſas naturales, ignotas ante, primus demonſtravit, in libro de homine. Item cauſas qualitatum ſenſibilium, nimirum colorum, ſoni, caloris & frigoris. Somnia autem & phantaſmata, quæ anteà pro ſpiritibus & mortuorum animis habebantur, & rudi vulgo terriculamenta erant, omnia profligavit. Cauſam autem æſtuum marinorum, & deſcenſionis gravium, à motu quodam Telluris perſpicuè derivavit. Nam Phænomena ille omnia ad motum refert, non ad rerum ipſarum potentias intrinſicas, neque ad qualitates occultas; ut ante illum omnes phyſici. De motu autem in libro de corpore, ſatis fusè ſcripſit & profundiſſimè.

In Ethicis ante illum nihil ſcriptum eſt, præter ſententias vulgares. At ille mores hominum ab humana Natura, virtutes & vitia à lege naturali; & bonitatem malitiamque actionum à legibus civitatum derivavit. In mathematicis principia geometriæ, nonnulla correxit. Problemata aliquod difficillima, à ſummis geometris (ab ipſis geometriæ cunabulis) ſummo ſtudio fruſtra quæſita invenit; nimirum hæc, arcui circuli lineam rectam, areæ circuli quadratum æquale exhibere, idque variis methodis. In diverſis libris.

2. Datum Angulum dividere in data ratione.

3. Cubi ad Sphæram rationem invenire. In problematibus geometricis.

4. Inter duas rectas datas, medias continuè proportionales invenire quotcunque. In problematibus geometricis,

5. Polygonum regulare deſcribere quotcunque laterum. In roſeto.

6. Centrum gravitatis invenire quadrantis circuli & bilinei, quod continetur arcu quadrantis & ſubtenſa ejus. In roſeto.

7. Centra Gravitatis invenire paraboliformium omnium. In libro de corpore. Hæc omnia primus conſtruxit & demonſtravit, & præterea alia multa; quæ (quia legentibus occurrent, & minoris ſunt) prætereo.

Facient (opinor) hæc, ut vita ejus non indigna videatur, quæ tum ad exteros tum ad poſteros ſcientiarum ſtudioſos tranſmittatur; præſertim hoc tempore, cùm ſcribuntur vulgo vitæ obſcurorum hominum nulla virtute inſignium, deſiderante nemine.

Scripſit præterea, circa annum ætatis ſuæ octogeſimum, hiſtoriam belli civilis Anglicani inter regem Carolum primum & parliamentum ejus, Anglicæ; item ortum & incrementa poteſtatis pontificiæ, carmine latino, verſuum circiter duûm millium. Sed non ſinebant tempora ut publicarentur.

Silentibus tandem adverſariis, annum agens octogeſimum ſeptimum, Homeri Odyſſeam edidit à ſe converſam in verſus Anglicanos, anno deinde proximo etiam Iliada. Denique Cyclometriam, annum agens nonageſimum primum, integram nondum editam.

Quod ad formam attinet, vultu erat non ſpecioſo, ſed, cum loqueretur, non ingrato. Effigies ejus ad vivum à pictore excellente deſcripta, qualis erat ætatis ſuæ ſeptuageſimo, in conclavi regis Caroli ſecundi conſervatur. Extant etiam ejuſdem

dem imagines ab aliis pictoribus, diverſis temporibus factæ rogatu amicorum, in Anglia non paucæ, & in Gallia aliquot.

Naturâ ſuâ, & primis annis, ferebatur ad lectionem hiſtoriarum, & poetarum; & ipſe quoque carmen tentavit, nec (ut plurimi judicabunt) infœliciter. Poſtea autem cum in congreſſu quodam virorum doctorum, mentione facta de cauſa ſenſionis, quærentem unum quaſi per contemptum, quid eſſet ſenſus, nec quemquam audiſſet reſpondentem, mirabatur, qui fieri potuerit, ut qui Sapientiæ Titulo homines cæteros tanto faſtu deſpicerent, ſuos ipſorum ſenſus, quid eſſent, ignorarent. Ex eo tempore de cauſa ſentiendi ſæpe cogitanti, forte fortunâ mentem ſubiit, quòd ſi res corporeæ & earum partes omnes conquieſcerent, aut motu ſimili ſemper moverentur, ſublatum iri rerum omnium diſcrimen, & (per conſequens) omnem ſenſionem; & propterea cauſam omnium rerum quærendam eſſe in diverſitate motuum. Atque hoc principio uſus eſt primo. Deinde ut cognoſceret varietates & rationes motuum, ad Geometriam cogebatur; & à principiis ſuis, ingenio ſuo, Theoremata illa, quæ ſupra commemoravi, fœliciter demonſtravit, Tantum intereſt inter illos, qui proprio genio; & illos, qui in Archivis veterum, aut ad quæſtum docentium, ſcientiarum veritatem quærunt.

In Colloquiis familiaribus jucundus erat, præterquam illorum, qui ad illum venerunt diſputandi cauſa contra ea, quæ jam ediderat (nec revocari poterant) de Jure ſummarum Poteſtatum civili aut Eccleſiaſtico. Nam cum his vehementiùs aliquando diſputabat, quàm erat neceſſarium.

Naturaliter apertus erat, & inter adverſarios (qui multi potenteſque erant) innocentia magis, quàm conſilio tutus.

Juſtitiæ erat cum ſcientiſſimus, tum tenaciſſimus. Nec mirum cum eſſet pecuniæ negligentiſſimus, & pro tenuitate fortunarum ſuarum, ultra modum beneficus; ſed beneficio Patronorum ſuorum & regis optimi dulciſſimique Caroli ſecundi, ſatis copioſè ſenex vixit.

NUMBER XI.

The LIFE *of Sir* ISAAC NEWTON.

SIR ISAAC NEWTON was deſcended from the elder Branch of the Family of Sir *John Newton*, Baronet, and was born at *Woolſtrope* in *Lincolnſhire*, on *Chriſtmas-Day*, in the Year 1642. At twelve Years of Age, he was ſent to the Free-ſchool at *Grantham*, in that County, and in 1660 removed to *Trinity-College* in the Univerſity of *Cambridge* [a], where in 1663, he began to apply himſelf to the Mathematics [b], in learning of which he had no Occaſion to ſtudy *Euclid*; for, he underſtood that Author almoſt before he read him; and a Caſt of his Eye upon the Contents of the Theorems, was ſufficient to make him Maſter of them. He advanced at once to the Geometry of *Des Cartes*, *Kepler's Optics*, &c. and it is certain, that he had made his great Diſcoveries in Geometry

[a] See his Eloge by Monſieur de Fontenelle.

[b] General Dictionary Hiſtorical and Critical, Vol. vii. p. 776.

try, and laid the Foundation of his two famous Works, the *Principia* and the *Optics*, by the Time that he was four and twenty Years of Age.

In 1664, he took the Degree of Batchelor of Arts, and in 1668, that of Maſter, being elected the Year before, Fellow of his College. In 1668, *Nicholas Mercator*, a Native of *Holſtein*, but who had ſpent moſt of his Time in *England*, publiſhed his *Logarithmotechnia*, in which he gave the Quadrature of the *Hyperbola*, by an infinite Series. This was the firſt Appearance in the learned World, of a Series of this Sort, drawn from the particular Nature of the Curve; and that in a Manner very new and abſtracted. Doctor *Barrow*, then at *Cambridge*, where Mr. *Newton*, who was about twenty-ſix Years of Age, reſided, recollected, that he had met with the ſame Thing in the Writings of that young Gentleman, and there not confined to the *Hyperbola* only, but extended by general Forms to all Sorts of Curves, even ſuch as are mechanical to their Quadratures, their Rectifications and their Centres of Gravity, to the Solids formed by their Rotation, and to the Superficies of thoſe Solids; ſo that ſuppoſing their Determinations to be poſſible, the Series ſtop at a certain Point, or at leaſt their Sums were given by ſtated Rules: But if the abſolute Determinations were impoſſible, they could yet be infinitely approximated; which is the happieſt and moſt refined Method of ſupplying the Defects of human Knowledge, that the human Imagination could poſſibly invent. To be Maſter of ſo fruitful and general a Theory, was a Mine of Gold to the Geometrician; but it was a greater Glory to have been the Diſcoverer of ſo ſurpriſing and ingenious a Syſtem. So that Mr. *Newton*, finding by *Mercator*'s Book, that he was in the Way to it, and that others might follow in his Track, ſhould naturally have been forward to open his own Treaſures, and ſecure the Property which conſiſted in making the Diſcovery. But he contented himſelf with the Treaſure, which he had found, without regarding the Glory. His Manuſcript upon infinite Series was communicated only to Mr. *John Collins*, and the Lord *Brouncker*, and even this had not been done, but for Doctor *Barrow*, who would not ſuffer him to indulge his Modeſty ſo far as he had deſired. This Manuſcript was taken out of Mr. *Newton*'s Study in 1669, being intitled, "A Method which I formerly found out, "*&c.*" and ſuppoſing the Word, *formerly*, to mean no more than three Years, he muſt then have diſcovered this admirable Theory of his Series, when he was not Twenty-four Years of Age. But what is ſtill more aſtoniſhing, this Manuſcript contains both the Diſcovery and Method of Fluxions, or thoſe infinitely ſmall Quantities, which occaſioned ſo great a Conteſt between Mr. *Leibnitz* and him, or rather between *Germany* and *England*. In 1669, he was choſen Profeſſor of Mathematics in the Univerſity of *Cambridge*; and the ſame Year, and the two following, read in the public Schools, a Courſe of Optical Lectures in *Latin*, which contain the Diſcoveries which he had made with Regard to Light and Colours in 1666, and of which he communicated an Account to the *Royal Society*, in 1671. In 1672, he publiſhed an Edition of *Varentius*'s *Geographia Generalis*, with Additions and Illuſtrations; and in the Winter, between the Years 1676, and 1677, he found the Propoſition, that by a centripetal Force reciprocally as the Square of the Diſtance, a Planet muſt revolve in an Ellipſis about the Center of Force, placed in the lower Focus of the Ellipſis, and with a Radius drawn to that Centre, deſcribe Area's proportional to the Times. In 1683, he reſumed the Conſideration thereof, and added ſome other Propoſitions concerning the Motions of the Celeſtial Bodies; and in 1687, publiſhed his grand Work intitled, *Philoſophiæ naturalis principia Mathematica*. The ſame Year,

Ibid. p. 776, 777, 778, 779.

Year, the Privileges of the Univerſity of *Cambridge* being attacked by King *James* the IId. he appeared one of the moſt zealous Defenders of them, and was accordingly nominated one of the Delegates of the Univerſity, to the *High Commiſſion Court*. He was likewiſe choſen one of their Members, for the *Convention Parliament* in 1688, in which he ſat till it was diſſolved. In 1696, he was appointed Warden of the Mint, in which Employment, he did very ſignal Service at the Time, when the Money was called in to be re-coined; and three Years after, was made Maſter of the Mint, a Place of very conſiderable Profit, which he held till his Death. In 1697, he was elected one of the Members of *The Royal Academy of Sciences* at *Paris*; and in 1701, was a ſecond Time, choſen Member of Parliament for the Univerſity of *Cambridge*. In 1705, he was choſen Preſident of the *Royal Society*, and continued in the Chair without Interruption, till the Day of his Death.

The Year following, he publiſhed his *Optics*; and in 1705, had the Honour of Knighthood from Queen *Anne*.

Ibid. p. 779.—794.

In the Reign of King *George* Iſt. he was better known at Court than before. The Princeſs of *Wales*, afterwards Queen Conſort of *England*, uſed to propoſe ſuch Difficulties to him, as none but himſelf could Anſwer to her Satisfaction; and ſhe was often heard to declare in Public, that ſhe thought herſelf happy in living at the ſame Time, and converſing with ſo great a Man.

He enjoyed a ſettled and equal State of Health, to the Age of Eighty, but about that Time began to be afflicted with an Incontinence of Urine; though even for the five Years which preceded his Death, he had great Intervals of Health and Eaſe. It was then evident that his Diſtemper was the Stone, though when the Paroxyſms were ſo violent, that large Drops of Sweat run down his Face, he never uttered the leaſt Complaint, nor expreſſed the leaſt Impatience; and as ſoon as he had a Moment's Eaſe, he would ſmile, and talk with his uſual Chearfulneſs. Till then, he always read and wrote ſeveral Hours in a Day. But at laſt, his Diſtemper put an End to his Life, on the 20th of *March*, 1726-7, in the Eighty-fifth Year of his Age. He was interred with great ſolemnity in *Weſtminſter-Abby*.

He was of a middling Stature, and ſomewhat inclined to be fat in the latter Part of his Life. His Countenance was pleaſing, and venerable at the ſame Time. He was of a mild Diſpoſition, and a great Lover of Peace. He would rather have choſen to remain in Obſcurity, than to have the Calm of a Life ruffled by the Conteſts which Genius and Learning always draw upon ſuch as are too eminent for theſe Qualities. His Modeſty was very great, and always continued ſo, without the leaſt Alteration, tho' the World conſpired againſt it. He was candid and affable, and always put himſelf upon a Level with his Company. He never thought either his Merit or his Reputation ſufficient to excuſe him from any of the common Offices of Life. No Singularities, either natural or affected, diſtinguiſhed him from other Men. Tho' he was firmly attached to the Church of *England*, he was averſe to the Perſecution of the Nonconformiſts. He judged of Men by their Manners, and the true Schiſmatics, in his Opinion, were the Vicious. Not that he confined his Principles to mere natural Religion, for he was thoroughly perſuaded of the Truth of Revelation; and amidſt the great Variety of Books, which he had conſtantly before him, that which he ſtudied with the greateſt Application was the Bible. He did not neglect the Opportunities of doing Good, with the plentiful Income of his Patrimony, and a profitable Employment improved by a good Œconomy, put into his Power. He thought

thought a Legacy was no Gift, and therefore left no Will; for he was unbounded in his Generosity towards his Relations or others, who stood in need of his Assistance. When Decency, upon any Occasion, required Expence and Shew, he was magnificent without grudging it, and with a very good Grace. At all other Times that Pomp, which seems great to low Minds only, was wholly retrenched, and the Expence reserved for better Uses.

NUMBER XII.

The Life *of Sir* WILLIAM TEMPLE, *Bart.*

SIR *WILLIAM TEMPLE*, Bart. was descended from a younger Branch of the Family of the *Temples* of *Temple-hall* in *Leicestershire*. He was Grandson of Sir *William Temple*, Secretary to the unfortunate *Robert* Earl of *Essex*, and afterwards Provost of *Dublin* College, and Son of Sir *John Temple*, Master of the Rolls in *Ireland*, by *Mary*, Sister of the learned Dr. *Henry Hammond*. He was born at *London* in 1628, and first sent to School at *Penhurst* in *Kent*, under the Care of his Uncle Dr. *Hammond*, then Minister of the Parish, and from thence at ten Years of Age, to Mr. *Leigh* Schoolmaster of *Bishop Scotford*, and at seventeen was placed in *Emanuel* College in *Cambridge*, under Dr. *Ralph Cudworth*, Author of the *Intellectual System*. At nineteen he began his Travels into *France*; and passing thro' the *Isle of Wight*, where King *Charles* I. was then Prisoner in *Carisbrook* Castle, he met there with Mrs. *Dorothy Osborn*, Daughter of Sir *Peter Osborn*, then Governor of *Guernsey* for the King, who was going with her Brother to their Father at *St. Maloes*. He made that Journey with them, and there began an Amour with that young Lady, which lasted seven Years, and then ended in a happy Marriage. He passed two Years in *France*, learned *French* perfectly, and soon after made a Tour into *Holland*, *Flanders* and *Germany*, in which he grew a complete Master of *Spanish*. After his Return in 1654. he married Mrs. *Osborn*; and during the Usurpation passed his Time privately with his Father, two Brothers and a Sister in *Ireland*. The five Years he lived there were spent chiefly in his Closet, in improving himself in History and Philosophy; and he refused all Solicitations of entering into any public Employment, till the Restauration, when he was chosen Member of the Convention in *Ireland*, as he was likewise of the subsequent Parliament for the County of *Carlow*; and in 1662 was appointed one of the Commissioners to be sent from the Parliament to the King, into whose Favour he was introduced by the Lord Chancellor *Clarendon* and the Earl of *Arlington*. In 1665. he was sent by his Majesty to the Bishop of *Munster*, in order to conclude a Treaty, by which that Bishop obliged himself, upon receiving a certain Sum of Money, to enter immediately with the King into the War with *Holland*; and soon after he received a Commission to be Resident at *Brussels*, with a Patent for the Dignity of a Baronet. In *December* 1667. he had Orders to come over to *England* privately, by the Way of *Holland*, where he made Monsieur *De Wit* a Visit, which laid the Foundation of a triple Alliance.

Life of Sir William Temple, prefixed to the first Volume of his Works, Edit. London 1740.

ance. Upon which, in five Days after his Arrival at Court, he was diſpatched back to the *Hague*, and in as many concluded that famous Treaty between *England*, *Sweden* and *Holland*; after the Ratification of which he returned to *Bruſſels*, with a View to prevail with the *Spaniards* to conſent to a Peace with *France*, which was treated the next Summer in 1668. at *Aix la Chapelle*, whither he was ſent Embaſſador Extraordinary and Mediator, and with his Collegue, Sir *Leoline Jenkins*, after many Difficulties and Delays, at laſt brought it to a happy Concluſion. Soon after he was ſent Embaſſador Extraordinary to the States General, with Inſtructions to confirm the Triple Alliance, and ſolicit the Emperor and *German* Princes, by their Miniſters, to enter into it. But the Meaſures of the *Engliſh* Court being changed in *September* 1669. he received Orders to haſten over to *England*, where he met at firſt with a very cool Reception, and was preſſed to return to the *Hague*, and make way for a War with *Holland*, with which leſs than two Years before he had been ſo applauded for having made ſo ſtrict an Alliance; but he excuſed himſelf from having any Share in it, and retired to his Houſe at *Schene*, near *Richmond* in *Surry*; and in this Interval of his Leiſure and Retreat, wrote his *Obſervations on the United Provinces*, and one Part of his *Miſcellanies*. About the End of the Summer 1673. the King growing weary of the ſecond *Dutch* War, reſolved to ſend Sir *William Temple* to *Holland* to conclude a Peace; but Powers having been ſent at this Time from thence to the Marquis *De Frezno*, the *Spaniſh* Embaſſador at *London*, Sir *William* was ordered to treat with him, and in three Days concluded the whole Affair. As a Reward for his Service, he was offered the Embaſſy into *Spain*, which, for want of his Father's Conſent, who was old and infirm, he refuſed; as he did ſoon after the Place of Secretary of State, for want of ſix thouſand Pounds which he was to lay down for it, and could not ſpare. In *June* 1674. he was again ſent Embaſſador to the *Hague*, and afterwards one of the Embaſſadors and Mediators in the Treaty of *Nimeguen*. In 1679 he was ſent for to *England*, to enter upon the Office of Secretary of State, which he declined on account of the uncertain Situation of public Affairs; but adviſed the King to form a new Council, of which he was appointed one, tho' afterwards, upon the Change of Meaſures at Court, and the Freedom with which he delivered his Opinion, his Name was ſtruck out of the Council Book. This gave him Occaſion to ſend the King Word, That he would live the reſt of his Life as good a Subject as any in his Kingdoms, but never meddle again with public Affairs; a Reſolution which he inviolably maintained, ſpending the Remainder of his Days at *Moorpark* near *Farnham* in *Surry*, without having the leaſt previous Knowledge of the Prince of *Orange*'s Expedition into *England* in 1688. and refuſing the earneſt Solicitations of that Prince, when he was advanced to the Throne, to engage in his Service, and to be Secretary of State, tho' he was often conſulted by him in his moſt ſecret and important Affairs. In 1694. he had the Misfortune to loſe his Lady, who was eminent for the higheſt Accompliſhments, and particularly eſteemed by Queen *Mary*, with whom ſhe had the Honour to keep a conſtant Correſpondence by Letters, in which ſhe had an admirable Turn of Wit, and a peculiar Elegance and Beauty of Expreſſion. Sir *William* ſurvived her four Years, and died in *January* 1698. in his ſeventieth Year, being interred in *Weſtminſter Abbey*.

He had an extraordinary Vivacity, with ſo agreeable a Vein of Wit and Fancy in his Converſation, that no body was welcomer in all Sorts of Company; but his Humour was greatly affected by the Spleen in ſudden Changes of Weather, and eſpecially from the Croſſes and Diſappointments which he ſo often met

wit

with in his Endeavours to contribute to the Honour and Service of his Country. He was an exact Obſerver of Truth, thinking none, who had failed once, ought ever to be truſted again; of great Humanity and Good-nature; his Paſſions naturally warm and quick, but tempered by Reaſon. He never ſeemed buſy in his greateſt Employments; was devoted to his Liberty, and therefore averſe to the Servitude of Courts. He had been a paſſionate Lover, was a kind Huſband, an indulgent Father, a good Maſter, and excellent Friend; and knowing himſelf to be ſo, was impatient of the leaſt Suſpicion or Jealouſy from thoſe he loved. He was not without ſtrong Averſions, ſo as to be uneaſy at the firſt Sight of ſome whom he diſliked, and impatient of their Converſation; apt to be warm in Diſputes and Expoſtulations, which made him hate the one and avoid the other, being uſed to ſay, that *they might ſometimes do well between Lovers, but never between Friends.* He had a very familiar Way of converſing with all Sorts of People, from the greateſt Princes to the meaneſt Servants, and even Children, whoſe imperfect Language and natural innocent Talk he was fond of, and made Entertainment out of every Thing that could afford it. He was born to a moderate Eſtate, and did not much increaſe it during his Employments. His Religion was that of the Church of *England*, in which he was born and educated; and how looſe ſoever Biſhop *Burnet*, who was not acquainted with him, in the *Hiſtory of his own Time*, repreſents his Principles to have been, yet there is no Ground for ſuch a Reflection given in his Writings, among which his excellent *Letter to the Counteſs of Eſſex* is a convincing Proof, both of his Piety and Eloquence. He was rather tall in Stature; his Shape, when young, very exact; his Hair dark brown, and curled naturally; and whilſt that was eſteemed a Beauty, no body had it in greater Perfection; his Eyes grey, but lively, and his Body lean, but extremely active, ſo that none acquitted themſelves better at all Exerciſes. Ibid.

NUMBER XIII.

The LIFE *of* JOHN LOCKE, *Esq*;

JOHN LOCKE, Eſq; one of the moſt eminent *Engliſh* Writers in the ſeventeenth Century, was Son of Mr. *John Locke*, of *Penſford* in *Somerſetſhire*, and born at *Wrington*, ſeven or eight Miles from *Briſtol*, and baptized there *Auguſt* 29th, 1632. From *Weſtminſter* School he was ſent, 1651, to *Chriſt-Church* in *Oxford*, of which he became a Student, and took the Degree of Batchelor of Arts *February* 14th 1655-6; and that of Maſter *June* 29th 1658. He was highly diſſatisfied with the common Courſe of Studies then purſued in the Univerſity, becauſe nothing was taught there but the *Ariſtotelian* Philoſophy, embaraſſed with obſcure Terms and uſeleſs Queſtions; and he had a great Averſion to the Diſputes of the Schools, at that Time much in Uſe. The firſt Books which gave him a Reliſh for the Study of Philoſophy, were the Writings of *Des Cartes*; for though

though he did not always approve of that Philoſopher's Sentiments, he found, that he wrote with Perſpicuity. He applied himſelf now with Vigour to his Studies, and particularly to that of Phyſic, in which he acquired a conſiderable Knowledge. In 1664 he went to *Germany* as Secretary to Sir *William Swan*, Envoy from the *Engliſh* Court to the Elector of *Brandenburgh*, and ſome other *German* Princes; and in leſs than a Year returned to *England*, where, among other Studies, he cultivated that of Natural Philoſophy.

While he was at *Oxford* in 1666, he became acquainted with the Lord *Aſhley*, afterwards Earl of *Shafteſbury*, who introduced him into the Converſation of ſome of the moſt eminent Perſons of that Time. In 1668, he attended the Earl and Counteſs of *Northumberland* into *France*; but did not continue there long, becauſe the Earl dying in his Journey to *Rome*, the Counteſs, whom he had left in *France*, with Mr. *Locke*, was obliged to return to *England*. Mr. *Locke*, upon his Return thither, lived as before, at the Lord *Aſhley*'s, then Chancellor of the *Exchequer*, though he retained his Place of Student of *Chriſt-Church*, whither he went from Time to Time to reſide. In 1670, and the Year following, he began to form the Plan of his *Eſſay on human Underſtanding*; but his Employments and Avocations prevented him from finiſhing it then. It was perhaps about this Time, that he became a Fellow of the *Royal Society*. In 1672 his Patron, now Earl of *Shafteſbury*, and Lord High Chancellor of *England*, appointed him Secretary of the Preſentations; which Place he held till the End of the Year 1673. when that Earl reſigned the Great Seal. In *June* the ſame Year, he was made Secretary to the Commiſſion of Trade; which Place was worth to him five hundred Pounds *per Annum*. But that Commiſſion was diſſolved in *December*, 1674; and on the 6th of *February* following, he took the Degree of Batchelor of Phyſic.

In Summer, 1675, he travelled into *France* for his Health, being then inclinable to a Conſumption. The Earl of *Shafteſbury* being reſtored to Favour at Court, and made Preſident of the Council in 1679, thought proper to ſend for Mr. *Locke*, to *London*; but that Nobleman did not long continue in his Poſt, being ſent Priſoner to the Tower; and after his Diſcharge, retiring to *Holland* in *December* 1682, Mr. *Locke* followed him thither. He had not been a Year abſent from *England*, when he was accuſed at Court, of having written certain Tracts againſt the Government, which were afterwards diſcovered to be Performances of another Perſon; and in *November*, 1684, he was deprived of his Place of Student of *Chriſt Church*. After the Death of King *Charles* II. Mr. *William Penn*, who had known Mr. *Locke* at *Chriſt Church*, uſed his Intereſt with King *James* II. to procure a Pardon for him, and would have obtained it, if Mr. *Locke* had not anſwered, that he had no Occaſion for a Pardon, ſince he had not been guilty of any Crime. In *May*, 1685, The *Engliſh* Envoy at the *Hague* demanded him, and Eighty-three other Perſons, to be delivered up by the States General; upon which he lay concealed till the Year following; and in 1687, formed a weekly Aſſembly at *Amſterdam*, conſiſting of Mr. *Limborch*, Mr. *Le Clerc*, and others, for the Sake of Converſation upon important Subjects. In *February* 1688-9, he returned to *England* in the Fleet, which convoyed the Princeſs of *Orange*. He endeavoured to procure his Reſtoration to his Place of Student of *Chriſt Church*; not that he deſigned to return thither, but only that it might appear from thence, that he had been unjuſtly deprived of it. But when he found that the College could not be prevailed on, to diſpoſſeſs the Perſon,

ſon, who had been elected in his Room, and that they would not admit him as a Supernumerary Student, he deſiſted from his Claim.

It would have been eaſy for him now to have obtained a very conſiderable Poſt; but he contented himſelf with that of Commiſſioner of Appeals, worth two hundred Pounds a Year. About the ſame Time, he was offered to be ſent abroad in a public Character, and it was left to his Choice, whether he would be Envoy at the Court of the Emperor, the Elector of *Brandenburgh*, or any other, where he thought the Air moſt ſuitable to him; but he waved it on Account of his ill State of Health. In 1695, he was appointed one of the Commiſſioners of Trade and Plantations, a Place worth a thouſand Pounds a Year; which he diſcharged with great Succeſs, till 1700, when he reſigned it, becauſe he could not bear the Air of *London*, on Account of his Aſthmatic Diſorder. He ſpent a great Part of the laſt fourteen or fifteen Years of his Life at *Oates* in *Eſſex*, a Seat of Sir *Francis Maſham*, Baronet, and during this agreeable Retirement, applied himſelf to the Study of the Scriptures, and employed his laſt Years intirely in it. His Strength began to fail him more remarkably than ever, at the Entrance of the Summer before his Death; a Seaſon, which in former Years, had always reſtored him ſome Degrees of Vigour. Then he foreſaw his End was very near. He often ſpoke of it himſelf, but always with great Compoſure; and died with a full Reſignation to the Will of the Deity, and the firmeſt Hopes of a Future Life, on the 28th of *October*, 1704, in the ſeventy-third Year of his Age.

He had great Knowledge of the World, and the Buſineſs of it. Prudent without being cunning, he gained the Eſteem of every Perſon by his Probity; and was always ſafe from the Attacks of a falſe Friend, or a ſordid Flatterer. Averſe from all Manner of vain Complaiſance, his Wiſdom, his Experience, his gentle and obliging Manners, ſecured him the Reſpect of his Inferiors, the Eſteem of his Equals, and the Friendſhip and Confidence of thoſe of the higheſt Quality. Without ſetting up for a Teacher, he inſtructed others by his own Conduct. He remembered a great many agreeable Stories, which he always introduced properly, and generally made them yet more delightful by his Manner of telling them. He was no Enemy to Raillery, provided it were delicate and perfectly innocent. He accommodated himſelf to the Reach of all Capacities. He had a peculiar Art in Converſation, to lead People to talk of what they underſtood beſt; and by this Means acquired a very good Inſight into moſt Arts. He was ſo far from aſſuming thoſe Airs of Gravity, by which ſome Perſons, as well learned as unlearned, love to diſtinguiſh themſelves from the reſt of the World, that on the contrary he looked upon them as an infallible Mark of Impertinence. Nay, ſometimes he would divert himſelf with imitating that ſtudied Solemnity, in order to turn it the better into Ridicule; and upon this Occaſion he always remembered the Maxim of the Duke of *Rochefoucault*, which he admired above all others, *That Gravity is a Myſtery of the Body, invented to cover the Defects of the Mind.* He was naturally choleric, but his Anger never laſted long. If he retained any Reſentment, it was againſt himſelf for having given way to ſo ridiculous a Paſſion; which, as he uſed to ſay, may do a great deal of Harm, but never yet did the leaſt Good. He diſliked thoſe Authors who labour only to deſtroy, without eſtabliſhing any Thing themſelves. He adviſed, that whenever we have meditated any Thing new, we ſhould throw it as ſoon as poſſible on Paper, in order to be the better able to judge of it, by ſeeing it all together

gether; becauſe the Mind of Man is not capable of retaining clearly a long Chain of Conſequences, and of ſeeing, without Confuſion, the Relation of a great Number of different Ideas. His Writings upon various Subjects will render his Name immortal; and his *Eſſay on Human Underſtanding*, is a Maſter-piece in its Kind, formed to qualify Men for Buſineſs and the World, as well as for the Sciences and Speculation.

F I N I S.

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